ML20197E084
| ML20197E084 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/31/1976 |
| From: | Durst J NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES) |
| To: | Ehrenfried M NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20197D284 | List:
|
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9712290189 | |
| Download: ML20197E084 (98) | |
Text
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March 31, 1976
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Manfred von Ehrenfried. Chief Test and Evaluation Branch TROM:
Jay B. Durst
SUBJECT:
CLASSIFIED REPORT ON THE LAND TRANSPORTATION VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS - ERWIN TO LYNCHBURG 3/2/76 The attached Secret document constitutes the subject report. The report is unclassified if all (C) or (S) pages are removed. This report will be background material for the interim report scheduled for April 15th and a final report by May 15th.
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Jay B. Durs Test and Evaluation Branch
..,p NATIONAL SEC INFORMATIM
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9712290189 971222 PDR ORG NEACAM PDR g ; c'O l $ '5
SUBJECT:
LAND TRANSPORTATION YULNERABILITY ANALYSIS REPORT, SHIPMENT OF 5NM FROM ERWIN, TENNE 55EE TO LYNCHBURG, VIRGINIA, 2 MARCH 1976
===1.
Background===
The information and evaluations of this report were gathered during a three day field evaluation by a joint NRC Army Special Forces team during the period 1-3 March 1976.
A brief resume of the background and experience of the evaluators is attached.
(Enclosure 1)
The evaluation examined a truck movement of SNM from Erwin Tennessee to Lynchburg, Va, This ship.nent, performed by Tri-State Motor Transit Corporation of Joplin, Missouri, transported 264 kilograms of U02 from the Nuclear fuel Services Processing Plant at Erwin to the Babcock and Wilecx Naval Nuclear Fuel Division at Lynchburg. The SNM was inaded in a total of 24 6M containers, which closely resemble a 55 gallon drum.
Each container held 11 kilograms of U02, 97% enriched in the isotope U235.
A sequence of seven transport routes are to be evaluated and reported on during the field collection stage of the Land Transportation Vulnerability Analysis.
Each report will n.ake an interim assessment of the vulnerability of the current system, as prescribed by 10 CFR, Part 73, against a theft assault by a three man team possessing Special Forces motivation and training or against a single insider (one of the guard-driver transport crew).
Specific short-comings will be identified along with possible remedies or correctives.
A final report, after field collection is complet<:d, will make a detailed analysis of failure threshholds, trade offs, cost, and generic requirements.
All routes are in the Eastern United States and are part of the Naval Reactor Program, which is the portion of the present nuclear fuel cycle most i
heavily engaged in shipment of highly enriched uranium. The six locations which are the terminals of shipments in the Naval fuel cycle are located (A-F) on the sketch map (Figure 1). The routes to be analyzed are depicted as (1) through (7). During 1975 eighty-four percent of the total weignt of HEU shippad moved on these seven routes.
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A-Lynchburg -
3 B-Apollo E
c-Erwin -
D-Uncaeville b
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.E-Piketon F-Wood River V
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UNCLASSIFIED
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- Key, Plant Licensee Activity A.
Babcock & Wilcox NNFC Naval Fuel Fabrication Lyichburg, Va.
B.
Babcock & Wilcox NMD Production of Naval fuel Apollo, Pa.
C.
Nuclear idel Services Production of Naval fuel Erwin, Tenn.
D.
U'iited Nuclear Corp.
Naval Fuel Fabrication Uncasville, Conn.
E.
Goodyear Atomic Corp.
Production of high enriched Piketon, Ohio UF6 F.
United Kuclear Corp.
High eririched uranium Wood River Junction, R. I.
scrap recovery The objective of this program is, "To evaluate the effectiveness of the pIesent system to prevent theft of greater than five kilograms of special nuclear material by a three man assault force possessing Special Forces skills and training, or by one insider."
To assist the collection of field data and subsequent analysis three assumptions were made, o That the transport system will be in compliance with current regulations of the NRC and the carrier.
The observations, con-clusions and recommendations which are made are not directed to-ward the isses of compliance.
Rather, they are pointed toward the identification of vulnerabilities and short-comings of the present system when measured against the defined thetat level, o That the attack force will be a single irsider or a three man team.
He specific limitations were placed on equipment or weapons.
However, a requirement for undetected escape in less than thirty minutes put some limits on the violence of attack and places a premium on stealth, speed and suprise.
o That the operations analysis of road transportation mode can be subdivided into four elements. These are:
o The route and terminal element and its identifying characteristic of travel time and length, topography, route conditions, terminals,stop and rest locations, light and weather conditions, traffic density, police density and deployment, entry to and exit from other road systems and areas of isolation or defile which provide sites for attack or ambush.
II-4 UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED o The transport safeguards system, which includes the currently approved plan of the carrier, and the prccedures by which this plaa is implemented and controlled. During operation its components are the transporter, the armed driver-guards, comunications for location reports and emergency requests and moving operating procedures for security.
o The attack threat element. To define this system the Special Forces soldiers have been given the mission to seize five kilograms or more of special nuclear material and to remove this material to a safe haven (a lor.etion free from hot pursuit by response forces) within tnirty minutes from the time attact is initiated. The elements of the attack threat are defined by detailed scenarios which specify intelligence gathering, preparation, ams and equipment requirements, force corposition, the plan for attack and escape, an estimate of probable casualties, and the probability of success.
o The response forces element includes all forces whose timely arrival at the attack site would defeat the adversary, cordon his forces, or pursue his escape.
To measure this response capability data was collected on State and County police strength, usual deployment, comunication capability, f
armament, planning and training procedures, liaison and cooperation with other police agencies and current inhibitions prescribed by higher authority or jurisdiction.
The remainder of this report sumarizes.the results of the Erwin-Lynchburg assessment.
Each of the four elements of the transportation mode is discussed in some detail, followed by an assessment of the adequacy of the current safe-guards system to defeat the two levels of threat.
I Route and Terminals It's a long-long road from Lynchburg to Erwin - 287 miles and seven hours elapsed time. The NRC evaluators rode in the cab of the transporter and in a trail car. The Special Forces team trailed the transporter, semi covertly, in a private car. Their observations of the crew are attached.
(Enclosure 2).
Both teams were instructed to make reconnaisance of route characteristics.
II-5 UNCLASSIFIED 4
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State Police Dhision Headquarters are located at the symbol P.
Vulner-able attack areas are at symbol A.
The hachured area is the area where radio-telephone coninunication b undependable.
Ali highways, with the exception of Interstate 81, are a combination of two and four lane, in excellent condition, with moderate to heavy population density, moderate to heavy traffic density, and run through terrain that con-sists of rolling hills with open countrysidt.
These routes do not provide good ambush sites but are ioaal for a hijack attempt using a fake law enforce-ment scenario.
The intersection of 460 E and Mt. Athos Road, near the final destination, pacvide an idtal static ambush site.
Highwa., 23/19 from Johnson City. T."in. to Erwin, Tenn, can be easily monitored for the arrival of the Tri State Tractor thus ale ting attackers of'an impending shipment, since highway 23/19 is the only route leading from Erwin, Tenn. to the north.
Local end county law enforcement patrols on these roads are moderate and consist of one to two personnel in et:h patrol.
About two thirds of the route follows Interstate 81, a four lane super-highway, in excelle.it condition, with moderatetraffic, and very light oopulation density which traverses terrain ranging from rolling hills with open countryside to mountainous country with thick forested mountainsides.
In many areas the north and sou+.h bound lanes are separated and obstructed from view of each other.
Law enforcement patrols are light. Access roads are few and are limited.
II-6
p.
These access reads give reso'y access to remote and isolated areas, idice forces can use the access roads to seal off ground mobile escape. The threat group could also block 'hese access points to isolate the attack site and prevent response forces from reacting to alsnn.
Interstate 81 provides several locations where a hijacking attempt could be successfully accomplished by forcing a truck into a high embankment or gully or by using the fake law enforcement scenario.
There are many overland foot routes into remote areas suitable for cache of stolen SNM.
Patrols of this road are accomplished only by the state highway patrol and during this assess-ment no patrols were observed.
A rest and refueling stop was made at Campbell Truck Center on highway llN.
This stop is an ideal location for a duress scenario, and is the most vulnerable site oh the route.
Weather and light conditions were ideal. The trip was completed during daylight hours.
During hours of darkness, fog, rain or snow the attacker would have a significant advantage. While his vision and mebility would aise be restricted he could compensate for this by thorough planning, rehearsal and equipment. His security would be increased greatly by the reduction in police and random traffic density, part'cularly during the hours 3-8 a.m.,
when alnost no police patrols operate.
In sumary, the route selection for this move generally favors the defender because of the high traffic and random vehicle density, ideal road conditions, good communication and short trip duration.
Despite these ad-vantages to the defender, there are at least four points or areas where the transporter is susceptible to defeat by scenarios involving duress, ruse or direct assault. These detailed scenarios are discussed below, and are. attached as enclosure 3.
3.
The Transportation Safeguards System '
Tri State's system employs an armored cab over tractor specially constructed by Morris Armored Car Company.
The trailer is a standard 40 foot stainless tandem axle trailer. This trailer can bc imobilized by a control in the cab which permits the driver to drop the trailer and drive away, even while in motion.
The trailer hitch is non-standard, and will not couple to a standard cab hitch.
Further imob111 ration and penetration resistance is provided by thepacket(dromedary)loadingsystem. SNM containers are loaded into steel containers which are then loaded into the trailer with access doors forward.
These containers weigh more than three thousand pounds, and would be difficult to remove from the imobilized truck trailer without special ".quipment. The dromedary containers have short time resistance to explosive or burn bar entry (2-5 minutes).
The non-standard configuration of the cab, its obvious gun II-7 6*
ports, and the NRC and DOT radi;-active placard requirements facilitate the identification of the vehicle.
(These factors might also increate the security of the vehicle.against attack by a poorly trained or casual adversary force by their impression of strength). The loading doors of tBe trailer are alarmed, but cannot be observed by the driver during movement.
Because of these, penetration and imobilization characteristics no escort vehicle is required. Two driver guards and a safety supervisor ride in the armored cab. All are anned with 38 caliber police revolvers.
A twelve gauge shot gun is carried in the cab.
Driver training, conducted by the University of Southern Missouri, is generally excellent, but does not include pr:ctical instruction in use of the armored cab as a dafense position or firing weapons from the cab.
Tri-State management, as well as the drivers, 're aware that the present system has little defense against one insider.
Driver guards are carefully selected, have good initial training, and ate L-cleared as a minimum. Tri-State would like to increase clearance to the Q level, but cannot do so under current procedures.
Upgrading of clearance requirements for employment would decrease vulnerability to inside theft. A requirement for an additional two man escort vehicle is an immediate precaution which could be taken against the single insider.
Comunication equipment is marginal. Conditions for radio-telephone were ideal, and all required reports were made within one to two minutes.
While this is satisfactory for administrative reporting, it would probably be inadequate during the confusion of an armed attack, and it is doubtful that an alert of attack would be transmitted.
The motivation, efficiency, and procedures training of the crew was rated as superior.
They have been properly instructed on the use of deadly force. Nevertheless, certain procedural changes would increase security.
A simple duress code for use in reporting location should be implemented.
Such a code would guard against using a captured driver to make a forced deceptive transmission.
The tractor crew left the tractor unattended and unguarded during the evenim of 1 March 1976'at the Buffalo Valley Motel end Elms Restaurant respectively.
During these unattended periods the tractor was vulnerable to sabotage to fuel tanks, comunication, and cooling system or to emplacement of disabling explosives which could have imobilized the truck along the route.
Defensive procedures at rest stops are dis-organized and the side and rear of the cargo trailer are left vulnerable.
In sumary, the following major vulnerabilities were detected.
Pene-tration resistance is limited. The trailer can be penetrated by the attackers in less than five minutes and the SNf1 could be transferred to an-other vehicle, including a passenger car. While company policy of driver screening and the addition of a safety supervisor to the crew have some effect to prevent theft by one insider, requirement for a separate escort vehicle would greatly increase this protection and would also increase the probability that a request for response forces would be initiated.
Dupli-catory radio equipment of the escort would give comunication redundancy, though it would not obviate the defects of the primary radio telephone, comunications system, cinally, relatively simple procedural changes 'to II-8
include a duress code, checks for sabotage or tampering after unguarded vehicle exposures, and proced;res for defense during rest stops would improve security.
None of these procedural changes would be expensive, and they could be imple-mented almost immediately, probably by direct coordination with Tri State.
4 The Attack / Threat System 7
The forriulation of the attack scenario and plan was the responsibility of Captain Gordon Spies' three man team, using covert observation as the primary means of' gaining intelligence.
Because the prepared scenarios are detailed they cannot easily be synopsised and they are attached as Enclosure 3.
All members of this team have hed uccessful experience in actual ambush of moving vehicles in Vietnam. ** a environment more hostile than the current safeguards environment.
The team developed attack scenarios in the following manner.
Semi-covert surveillance was made of the actual move. Specific attention was devoted to the vehicle, driver guards, route, response forces, random traffic and comuni-cations.
During the move tentative ambush sites were. identified. On the following day the route was retraced and point assessments were made of each of these sites and photos and sketches were made.
This intelligence wa's then used to develop plans which would accomplish the assigned mission of theft and escape.
Low level aerial photos were subsequently made to confirm the ground reconnaisance.
Five basic threat scenarios were produced.
These are discussed in the probable order of successful accomplishment o One insider.
Any member of the three man team could hijack the shipment by killing or otherwise 1 mobilizing his two companions.
His escape time could be extended many hours by the simple expedient of making bogus location calls during the scheduled duration of the movenent. There are many variatior.s that could be followed by which the SNM could be transferred to another vehicle by outside conspirators while he carried out his subterfuge. The mechanics of this scenario are identical with those of theft by duress, discussed below.
This scenario would be greatly inhibited by us of an armed escort vehicle with redundant comunications.
o Under threat by duress the three attackers take control of the shipment by stealth attack during the stop at Campbell Truck Center.
i The attackers then transfer the shipment to another vehicle and escape.
At least one hour would be available before alert of possible incident would be given.
Under current procedures this escape time could be as great as five hours.
If one of the crew were forced to continue nonnal location reporting an even longer escape time would be provided. An escort car would greatly increase protection against this threat.
II-9
o Theft by ruse.
In this plan the truck is stopped by a bogus police officer, who subsequently dismounts the crew and imobilizes them in a variety of ways. The unifonns and equipment needed for such a ruse are easily obtainable. An escort vehicle would inhibit this scenario. High probability of successful escape, o Rolling interdiction along three selected spots on route I-81 and 460 E.
This scenario creates an accident of the transport vehicle.
It is dangerous to the attackers and should optimally require six attackers, though three attackers could accomplish it.
It risks Use chance that an attack alert will be given if not perfectly executed and leavegevioence at the scene of the accident which would be detected, probably less tnan an hour after execution.
Its probability of complete success is much lower than the previous scenarios.
Success chances im-prove greatly during darkness or bad weather. Would be greatly compli-cated by an escort car.
o Static ambush at the intersection of 460 E and Mt. Athos Road (the ternoff to B&W Lynchburg). This plan requires six attackers, and is subject to detection by random traffic or police. No attack alert would be given but a rapid follow up discovery of the attack is highly likely.
The degree of violence required would energize a sizable:pur-suit and recovery response. The plan is risky. but might succeed.
In discussions of threat to transportation movement frequent reference is made to attackers who have the motivation and skills of Special Forces soldiers.
The scenarios which have been constructed are a measure of what those skills are. Weather, light conditions, route selection and communication conditions on this run all favored the defender.
Despite these advantages the Special Forces team have formulated five simple scenarios of attack, three of which have a high probab*lity of success.
In the attacker's appraisal the following changes would increase the defenders capability:
armed escort, more rapid and dependable communications, and greater security awareness by crew members, particularly when stopped.
5.
Response Forces Element The commanders of the state police di.1sions transited by the shipment were interviewed on the day following the shipment.
Both Part 73 and current studies by Sandia consider the state p0 lice as the primary source of outside response to attack.
We examined strength, armament, response times, communication capability, and coordination with other response forces.
Three divisions were covered in Virginia, and one in Tennessee.
Similar interviews were made, by telephone with the sheriffs of each of the 14 councies which were transited.
11-10
The III, IV and VI Divisions of Virginia cover the western two thirds of the state and border on North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky and West Virginia. There are a total of six divisions in the state. Though there is some variation each western division covers about 7000 square miles of area, and approximately 15 counties. MajorcitiesareRoanoke(92,000),Lynchbur (55,000), Charlottesville (40,000) Danville (50,000), and Bristol (15,000)g The major interstate routes traversing the area are 64, 77, 79 and 81.
(SeeEnclosure4).
Each of the four divisions has approximately 125 patrol officers. Each is assigned a radio vehicle for unaccompanied patrol. Armament is a 4" barrel S&W T caliber revolver and a 12 gauge Winchester pump shotgun, which is stowed in the police car.
Each car has a one channel duplexed radio which comunicates with a base station, but is not car to car netted. Comunication with adjacent divisions is made by switching to the alternate duplexed channel.
Patrol troopers are assigned on a regional basis. Average coverage ranges from one unit for rural counties, to 3-4 units in the most popul' us o
counties which have nWor interstate interdhanges. Heaviest coverage is made during the period 8AM-3AM. All areas are virtually uncovered during the 3AM-8AM period.
Because of limited comunications Virginia does not use a routine location check on patrol units. Units normally report when making an apprehension, or when in trouble.
Consequently, the base station dis-patcher's knowledge of a patrol unit location at any time is poor.
Each division comander was questioned about response capability at the time the Tri State van translted his division the preceeding day.
In each case they their response would have been one unit within twenty minutes, with a build up of converging units to perhaps 3-4 within an hour.
This converging interdiction would have been ordered by the duty dispatcher and its efficiency and method would have been detemined by the infomation available about the attacking force.
The Virginia State Police do not desire to be informed of shipments througl their area.
Their reasoning is that they could do nothing even if they had such information.
Resources are so thin that they have no interest in move-ments until an actual call for help is relayed.
Virginia State Police do not monitor CB and are very disparaging of it.
They do have CD capability in some patrol units, and at base station.
The Virginia State Police response would also depend on the amount of
~
detail contained in the driver-guard alert-request. While one unit should arrive at the attack scene within 20 minutes, the speed of add on responses would depend on the seriousness of the incident and other non-predictable factors.
Other jurisdictions (County and municipal) would be alerteds :and i
would be coordinated as the overall convergement and isolation of attack site developed. The State Police have well developed comunication procedures with these other LLEA control centers.
In many cases, these county and municipal police have more assets on patrol than the State Police.
I!-11
Procedures cf the Tennessee State Police district headquarters are generally similar. Density of coverage is 125 units for a 13 county area covering about 6000 square miles.
(See enclosure 5).
Communicatiens are better than in Virginia, and include car to car capability.
We talked with Major Montgomery, Comander of the eastern division.
Unlike Virginia supervisors, he wants to be informed of shipments through his area. Without directly comitting resources he indicated that he would provide an informal escort to such shipments. He further indicated that his ability to provide such escort, and even islicopter over-flight, would be greatly strengthened if operations and maintenance funds were made available by the federal government.
Tennessee Police are less disdainful of the CB than Virginia, and give it some credence as a comunications and intelligence adjunct.
enforcement agencies located on the route have no <nowledge, Police local Except for E. win Police and Campbell Coun'y, Virginig of when shipments are made. These local law enforcement agencies have not been contacted for coordination and assistance in the event of an incident.
All have fears about radioactive dangers at the attack site. County and City police, even though they have 'nore parsonnel, better comunications, and better response times than State Police are not presently an effective response.
In summary, police response assets e e thinly spread, and provide little deterrent to a well trained attack team with a target time of less than thirty minutes.
State Police have good capability to coordinate other LLEA assets in response, but the lack of car to car comunication would limit coordination at the attack siten in cordon, or in pursuit. State Police are very undermanned, and are reluctant to accept an escort comnittment unless some means of reim-bursement can be found.
Both they and the sheriffs are anxious to get more information about the current system including routes, equipment photographs, consnication capabilities, and radioactive hazard.
An information packet covering these subjects should be prepared for their use.
At present no one, including NRC, has made a realistic effort to coordinate police assets into reasonable response pcsture, or to inform them of the dimensions of the current problem. Until these anu other actions are taken the present response system is not a deterrent to an intelligent and well trained attacker.
6.
Where do we staed?
o This shipment was not adequately protected to provide a high degree of assurance against theft by one insider or a three man assault.
High assurance currently rests with the attacker.
!!-12 6
o Primary deficiencies noted were these:
One insider could hijack the shipment and have an escape o
time ranging from one to to five or more hours.
Factors which would reduce this vulnerability include separate escort (s),
position location devices, instantaneous digital comunications which could be used in a fail-safe mcnner, and much more stringent liaison with LEA.
o The ability of the radio-telepi,one to give alert of attack is doubtful.
Transmissions require too much time even when the transporter is in range of an operator, o Police response is clearly inadequate.
Effective responsa under the present system would be a lucky happenstance.
The combination of total police assets into a coordinated response will be intricate and time consuming, and is fraupht with legal and jurisdictional sensitivities. Nevertheless, it should be pursued.
o A well trained adversary ha: multiple opportunit4s to steal material, eye.) over a well selectt:1 route traversed during daylight and favorable weather, o The single change which would do most to enhance security would be the additien of one or more accort vehicles.
o This project will be continued, at an accelerated pace. An interim final report, based on. Isessment of at least five routes.will be sub-mitted by 15 April 105.
. Durst Test Director
Enclosures:
1.
Biographical data 2.
Special forces observation
& surveillance report.
Scenarios 3.
Map of Virgin (not included in this report) 4 ia Police Divisions not included in this report)
Map of Tennessee Police Divisions ((not included in this report) 5.
11-13
C 2
C h
2 THE BLACK HAT THREAT O
E:
- 5 special forces personnel - INRC - 4 U.S.A.
"Tl
- 11 years in Vietnam - 100 years of service i
M
- All airborne combat infantrymen M
g
- All trained.en communications, explos.ives, ITI' firearms, operatior:s, intelligence and medical g
specialties
- All have been ambushed and have executed destructive vehicle ambushes in actual combat
- The group possesses a total of 9 major combat awards
UNCLASSIFIED 4
OBSERVATIONS OF TRUCK ACTIVITIES ON 2 MARCH 1976 0705 - Truck departed Buffalo Valloy Country club and headed south on 11wy 23 /19 towards Erwin, Tonn.
0730-0752 - Truck was parked at the Elms Restaurant, Erwin, Tenn. Drivers ate breakfast (no one remained with vehicle) 0752 - Truck departed restaurant enroute to NFS.
0756 - Truck arrived at NFS. 1Yuck was parkec' la par ting lot - Icf t unattended while drivers went to security building.
Otbrers returned to truck wearing protective clothing, drovo vehicle into plcet, around to reer of building.
Loading area could not be observed.
(Loading area could he observed from outside of plant by proper placement of observar personnel).
0958 - Truck with trailer (TS107) passed tbuntatn View Restaurant heading north on !!wy 23/19. Truck easy to identify due to configuration of tractor and radioactive signs on trailer.
1028 - Truck entered llwy 137 (Tenn)N ct Johnson City. Headed north towards Kingsport, Tenn.
1041 - Truck tearns off Ilwy 137 on to Interstate 81 north.
1107 - Truck departs I-81 at exit #3 on to liwy 11 north.
1112 - Truck enters Campbell Truck Center on Ilwy 11N. Truck takes on fuel:
$37.57 for diesel, $3.00 for oil, $.12 tax for a total expenditure of $40.69.
1137 - Truck moves to rear of truck stop.
1140 - Truck departs on liwy 11N.
1142 - Truck cnters 1-81 north at Exit #4.
1244 - Truck enters rest arca betwoon exits 20 and 21 mile marker 61.
After truck entered and departed the rest area no detailed log was maintained of its activi tics.
It was only a matter of timo dntil the driver became aware of us following them.
Ideally, two vehicles (or more) are necessary to provide constant and secure surveillance.
1 II-15 UNCLASSIFIED l
1
II. - 1.3 The Transportation Safeguards System The present road transportation safeguards system is mar. dated by Title 10, Chapter 1, Cooe of Federal Regulations - Energy Part 73 Sections 1, 2, 6, 30, 31, 35 and 36. Guidelines for compliance with these regula-tions are found in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cornisden Regulatory Guides Indus >/ mplementation of i
5.10, 5.12, 5.15, 5.17, 5.20 and 5.31.
these regulations and guidelines has resulted in three major transporta-tion safeguards systems:
the Tri-State Motor Transit Company dromedary system, the Edlow International armored car system, and the Babcock and Wilcox escorted transport system.
This section of the report provides a brief description of the communications capabilities, transport equip-ment, guard and driver capabilities and training, and procedural week-nesses of each transport system observea in the course of our study of the individual routes.
All three carriers use the same basic comunications equipment, the radiotelephone.
Radiotelephone check calis were made with varying degrees of success on the various routes.
On the Erwin to Lynchburg route all check calls were connected with Joplin dispatch within one to two minutes.
While on the Piketon to Apollo route the radiotelephone was useless throughout the entirc Ohio part of the route.
Even under the best cir-cumstances observed the radiotelephone would probably be inadequate to directly summon LLEA aid during the confusion of an armed attack.
Tri-State supplements the radiotelephone with Citizens Band radio capability.
This capability, however, was not used during the shipment observed.
Both B&W and Tri-State have VHF business band transceivers in the SNM transport vehicles.
B&W uses a Motorola Mocom 35 for escort to transport comunications. The Tri-State General Electric transceiver serves two purposes.
First it serves as the escort to transport comunication for an escorted transport system which is capable of imeciate implementation.
Second, it is part of a new comunications system which 7.llows the guards to communicate with the transport vehicle when out of sight at most stops.
From what we have observed, the present comunications system, with the possible exception of the Citizens Band Radio (see Appendix B), is inadequate to summon aid in the event of attack.
The main feature differentiating the three carrier transport sys ums is the configuration nf the transport vehicle.
The Tri-State transport vehicle consists of a tractor with an armored cab and non-standard trailer hitch, coupled to a 40 foot self loading trailer.
The trailer uses a packet loading system utilizing several packets (dromedaries), 3/16ths inch thick steel containers weighing approximately 3,000 lbs. empty.
The Edlow II-16 i
l
e International Corporation subcontracts to Dunbar Armored Car Corporation on the east coast and so uses a large standard armored car.
Both the Edlow vehicle and the Tri-State vehicle are sufficiently amored and penetration resistant that present regulations do not require them to be escorted.
Babcock ind Wilcox transport SNM in an unarmored non-penetration resistant vehicle, either a light one ton comercial van or a standard tractor trailer rig. The escort vehicle is an unmodified comerical four door plymouth sedan.
None of these transport modes provide a great deal of penetration resistance or amor.
Neither Babcock and Wilcox vehicle is penetration resistant or armored. The Edlow and Tri-State vehicles are somewhat better; however either allows access to the SNM by burn bar or shaped explosive charges in two to five minutes, and neither is sufficiently armored to resist fire, from a 357 magnum or an M16.
Further, the Tri-State vehicle could be immobilized by :,ne well placed shot which ruptured the exposed brake lines.
It is apparent that considerable vehicle and con-tainer hardening would be required to create a transport vehicle well armored against the sort of weaponry easily obtained by modern terrorists and having penetration delay time capability of greater than 20 minutes.
The Tri-State vehicle was crewed by two armed driver / guards and an amed safety supervisor. The Edlow armored car crew consisted of an amed driver and an amed guard. The two drivers of the B&W shipment were unarmed but the two escorts driver / guards were amed. All of the armed drivers and guards were armed with 38 caliber pistols and the Tri-State cc. Edlow armored car, and B&W escort vehicle carried 12 gauge shot guns loaded with 00 Buckshot. The Tri-State guards were alert and efficient and had completed the training course discussed in Appendix C.
These guards were either Q or L cleared.
Administrative and legal problems make it currently impossible to have all Tri-State guards Q cleared. The Edlow ar.d B&W guards seemed somewhat less alert to security, as on one occasion each left shipments completely unguarded outside of the security area at their destinations for more than 10 minutes.
The Edlow driver was also observed oassing through school zones at excessive speed. All B&W guards and drivers were Q cleared as a condition of employment. The Edlow guards had no clearances at the time this analysis was made.
Edlow has since requested clearances. None of the guards of the three companies had any real training in the protection of SNM in transport or defensive tactics during ambush.
(Current regulatory guides do not suggest such specific training.) This lack of training led to extremely poor use of the escort by B&W.
The procedures in use by all three transporters when this evaluation was conducted have serious but relatively simply rectifiable security short-comings.
At the time the analysis was made none of the transporters had 11-17 4
duress codes for checkpoint calls, sabotage check procedures, or good defensive procedures at rest and fuel stops.
None of the carriers had communicated with the local police authorities more frequently than a yearly letter or made any real attempt to coordinate actions with the police.
Tri-State had no procedures to handle the possibility af being stopped by a bogus police officer.
Both Tri-State and Edlow left vehicles parked in non-secure areas for long periods of time (overnight) inviting sabotage by would-be thieves.
The Edlow driver violated several traffic ordinances. When making land time check calls, the Edlow driver parked 50 that he could not keep the guard making the calls under visual sur-veillance.
Both the Edlow and B&W guards on one occasion each left the vehicle and cargo unguarded outside the security area of the shipment destination for a period exceeding ten minutes.
The B&W shipments have no prescribed route of travel and drivers can make route changes without reporting the fact to dispatch. On the B&W run the escort followed the van.
so closely that they were really part of the same target group.
The B&W drivers and guards are not provided with phone numbers of locations of local police assistance, or route maps.
On the B&W shipments no one was in charge to the extent that he could have coordinated a defense if the shipment were attacked.
The B&W shipments were also observed to make an excessive number of stops due to failure to top off fuel tanks and coordinate driver changes with fuel and rest stops.
These procedural weaknesses can be corrected at little cost and such corrections should be required as a part of new regulations and guides, i
11-18
II.-l.4 Route Analysis Results On the succeeding pages the six routes which were analyzed are depicted in sketch maps.
These sketch maps each depict the locations of the scenarios which were selected for that route, and which are discussed and illustrated in section 11-1.5.
The locations of non-route specific scenarios (rolling ambushes and police ruses) are also displayed as " site of similar type of scenario."
In each case the number given to the scenario correlates to the number assigned in the scenario discussion.
The sketch also includes the location of major State Police Headquarters, indicated by a P, areas of radio mask of the radiotelephone, and sections of the route which are most susceptible to ambush. These sections of road are invariably sections where comunications are poor, population is low, and police patrol density is less than nonnal.
Finally, a capsulized description of the route is typed upon the map face.
This description includes the detailed route, traffic and population density, police patrol density, terrain analysis, specific vulnerable areas, and an overall route assessment.
It should be noted that two of the routes (Apollo-Lynchburg, B&W)
(Lynchburg-Piketon, Edlow) are particularly vulnerable, and that four of the six high pay off scenarios are sited on these two routes.
II-19
~
LAND TRANSPORTATION VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS ERWIN TO LYNCHBURG PENNSYLVANIA s
I \\
O l
l I
OHIO WEST VIRGINIA VIRGINI A I
I I
l i
b
, APPOMATTOX tvNcnouno ENTUCKY WYTHVILLE CAgOUNb NOBN anisTot KINGSPORT '
JOHNSON CITv P0tiCE HE ADQUARTERs famN 6 RADIOTELEPH0mE UNRELIABLE O slTI 0F sCINARIO Q
O slTE OF SIMIL AR TYPE OF sCEN ARIO7 m suscErfista TO Aususu TENNESSEE f/
Erwin, Tenn, to Lynchburg, Va.
Tri State Shipment in daytime.
Routes: US 23/1-81/US 460/Mt. Athos Road.
ITiTTIc Density: Moderate to heavy, all routes.
Population Density: US 23 and US 460 - moderate to heavy; I light.
Terrain; il5 23 - open countryside ard rolling hills; I open countryside with hills /
and mouatainous areas with dense vegetation; US 460 - open country-side and rolling hills.
Observed Police Patrols: US 23 and US 460 - heavily patrolled by local, county, and state pT ice; I lightly patrolled by state police, none observed.
Route Assessment: A well planned route and a very good selection for shipment of SNM.
No deviations recormiended.
11-20 SECRET e
SECRET +
LAND TRANSPORTATION VULNERABluTY ANALYSIS PIKET N TO APOLLO PENNSYLVANIA
~~ ~5POLLo i
emseva e e
O l
OHIO I
WEST l\\
VIRGINIA VIRGINIA I
meton l
q Poa m oum.,
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(ENTUCKY NORTN LEGEND P POLICE HE ADQUARTERS 6 RADIOTELEPHONE UNRELIAOLE O site OF SCENARIO g
O slTE OF slGNLAR TYPE OF SCENARIO TENNESSEE e susetmeLE 70 msusu
/
Piketon, Ohio to Apollo, Pa. B&W shipment Ilay and nighttime.
Routes: US 23/0hio 159/US 22/1-70/US 119/Pa. 66.
Ti'aTTTc Density: Moderate to heavy, all routes with exception of Ohio 159 which was very light.
Population Density: US 23 - light to moderate; Ohio 159 - light; US 22 - light to moderate; l light; US 119 and Pa. 66 - moderate to heavy.
Terrain: All routes were through open countryside with rolling hills, to steep large hills.
Observed Police Patrols: With the exception of US 119 and Pa. 66 all other routes were very lightly patrolled and only an occassional state trooper or local patrol was observed.
Route Assessment: This is a good route with the exception of 159 and US 22 that travel througn open farmland. The recomended deviation for this route would be to eliminate 159 and US 22 and take US 23 to I-270 and I-70.
II-21
~
6___ - ~
m LAND TRANSPORTATION VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS NCHBURG TO MKETON PENNSYLVANIA s
1 \\
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OHIO WEST l
VIRGINlA VIRGINIA 1
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ENTUCKY ROANOKE p,
CAgOUNb av7wevue NOBT LICEND T
POLICE Hi ADOUART[Rs em RADIOTELEPHONE UNRILIABLE O slit OF SCENAnto O slit of slMILAR TYPE OF SC
/WW sustfriitLE TO AMeusH TENNESSEE
//
Lynchburg, Va. to Piketon, Ohio. Federal Express Shipment (Edlow) in daytime.
Routes: US 460/1-81/05 460/ West Va. Turnpikt.'i-64/US 52/US 23.
TrHTfc Density: Moderate to heavy, al? routes.
Population Density: US 460 - moderate to heavy; I light; US 460 - light to heavy; Turnpike - negative to light; l light to heavy; US 52 - moderate to heavy; US 23 -
moderate.
Terrain: US 460 (first leg) - open countryside and rolling hills; I open countryside and rolling hills; US 460 (second leg) - open countryside ard rolling hills to mountainous areas with dense trees and brush; W. Va. Turnpike - heavy rnountainous area with dense trees and brush, abandoned mines, abandoned roads leading into highway with rope and cable barriers; l mountainous areas combined with open countryside and rolling hills; US 52 - open countryside with rolling hills; US 23 - open countryside and rolling hills.
Observed Police Patrols: All US highways are well patrolled by local, county and state police; West Virginia Turnpike was well patrolled by state police; l-81 lightly patrolled and no state police observed.
Route Assessment: A good route with the exception of the second leg of US 460 which should be changed to continuing I-81 south to I-77 and then north to the turnpike.
II-22 4
I t
i LAND TRANSPORTATION VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS PINET N - ERWIN
(
)
q l
l OHlO WEST VIRGINIA VIRGINIA i
PlutTON f
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f To.,
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' CHARLESTON P
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PmissegTom KENTUCKY Q '
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j J
P PollCE HE ADOUARTERs S
6 RADIOTELEPHONE UNRILIABLE g
s D SITE OF Sc!NARIO 8
0 $1TE Of stulLAR TYPE OF SCENARIO p
'""'^ususu TENNESSEE
/
Piketon, Ohio to Erwin. Tenn. Federal Express (Edlow) in daytime.
l Routes: US 23/US 52/I-64/W.Va. Turnpike /I-77/I-81/US 23.
TraTfTc Density: Moderate to heavy all routes.
Population Density: As described in items 1 and 2 with exception of I-77 which is the same as 1-81.
Terrain: As described in items I and 2 with exception of I-77 which is the same as I-81.
Observed Police Patrols: As described in items 1 and 2 with exception of I-77 which is the same as I-81.
Vulnerable Areas: See attached sketch.
Route Assessment: A good route with no deviations reconsnended.
II-23 4
5
\\
O l
LAND TRANSPORTATION VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS PIKET N - ERWIN
(
I q
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I OHIO WEST VIRGINIA VIRGINIA 1
PIK E TON
- I[' PontsA40uTH f
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swww sustEPfl8t! TO AU5UsH whoxvstts g
11-24 Piketon. Ohio to Erwin. Tenn. Tri State shipment in daytime.
Rnutes: US 23/115 52/US 68/l-75/I-81/US 23.
Traffic Density: Moderate to heEvy all routes.
Population Density: US 23 - as described in item 2; US 52 - light to moderate; ifs 68 -
light to moderate; l negative to light; I negative to light; US 23 - as described in item 1.
Terrain: US 23 - as described it item 2; US 52 - rolling countryside to hioh steep hills and bordered by the Ohio River; US 68 - open countryside and rolling hills; I rolling countryside to heavy mountainous areas with dense trees and brush; I rolling open countryside to mountainous areas; US 23 - as described in item 1.
Observed Police Patrols: All US highways were well patrolled by local, county and state Fo11ce; I-75 anTT-Mere very lightly patrolled by state police and only occasionally 6
observed.
Route Assessment: A very good route and no deviations recomended.
II-24 4
l LAND TRANSPORTATION VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS APOLLO - LYNCHBURG PENNSYLVANIA spoLLo j
eittsaunaw e Ib
- ' 8 3 8 **
oc5
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Apollo. Pa. to Lynchburg Va. B&W i shipment at nicht.
\\
Routes:
Pa. 66/U5 119/Pa. Turnpike /
I I
NUS 522/1-81/1-64/Va.151/6/US 29/
\\
US 46.
g I
l Traffic Density: Pa. 66 and US 119 -
WEST RGINIA VI GINIA I
moderate to heavy; US 522 - negative to 1
very light; l moderate; l light to moderate; Va. 151/6 - negative to very light; US 29 - light to
{
j) moderate; US 460 - heavy.
Terrain: Pa 66 - open countryside and rolT F hills; US 119 - open countryside
(
I andro $linghills;Pa. Turnpike-large steep hills *.o mountainous areas with a combination of open countryside and
- *C" A"0" dense forest and brush covered areas; US 522 - open countryside and rolling hills to mountainous areas; I open countryside and rolling hills; l open countryside and rolling hills; Va. 151/6 - open countryside and rolling hills; US 29 - open countryside anci SOUN^
ing hills; US 460 - as described in NORW PopulaEionDensity: Pa. 66 and US 119 -
moderate to heavy population; Pa.
Potect HE ApouARi[Rs Turnpike negative to light; I light;
.,,,,,. R Aoioti ttrHoNE uNRE LiA8tt US 522 - light to moderate; l light; o s:TE or setnAnno Q
I light; Va. 151 and 6 - light; o sitt or simitan tyrt at scinAnio US 29 - light to moderate; US 460 -
evvw suscirusta to AususH
/
as described in item 1.
Observed Police Patrols: All US highways with the exception of US 522 are well patrolled by local, county, and state police. US 522 had no police observation at all. Pa. Turnpike.
I-70, and I-81 were lightly patrolled by the state police. Pa. route 66 is very heavily patrolled.
Rnute Assessment: This route is a poorly planned route and a very bad selection. Suggested Teviations are eliminat;ng US 522 and take I-70 all the way to 1-81 and eliminating Va. 151 and 6 by taking I-81 ell the way to 1-64, 1-64 to US 29. and US 29 to Lynchburg, Va.
II-25
enum 11-1.5 scenario Analysis Lacking a design threat, we elected to prescribe a threat of one insider, or three outsiders upon our analysis.
Since explosives, automatic weapons, and hand held armor piercing weapons are easily obtained we placed no limitation upon weapons.
Further, since a three man conspiratorial cell is hard to detect, we placed no limits on adversary time for planning, pre-mission training, or post attack seclusion.
The one inhibition which we did place upon the adversary was a time limit of 20-30 minutes, from attack to escape to safe haven.
This time was derived from previous estimates, including those made by Sandia in the Transportation Mode Analysis, of probable time required for initial response to overt attack in which no alare was given.
We were prepared to modify the threat level if the collection of field data suggested modification.
Luckily, the field collection of data gave serendipitous support to our threat definition.
The adversary team very rapidly discerned a number of salient vulnerabilities of the present system which, along with the imposed limitation on target time, drove them to low levels of strength and violence.
Specifically, in some order of pricrity of importance:
Some routes are inherently dangerous, either because of isolation, or time of day.
Comunications are inadequate to cound alert.
Driver / guard procedures are not focused upon defense, and euffer from lack of organization, chain of comand and competent briefing and planning.
The current eyetem, even with escort, presenta a single target to the ambusher.
Pcnctration resistance is limited and would take minutes to overcome.
Responec foreca have not been coordinated, and are unauare that they have a role in the cafeguards ayatem.
The fixed location of a relatively feu terminals and routee effectively limite carrier attempts at accrecy to minor variations of time and route.
All of the above vulnerabilities were detected by simple observation, and without use of inside assistance.
These observations were further cor-roborated by open literature and visits to the Public Document Room by the adversary team.
As the selected scenarios which follow demonstrate, the current part 73 system is highly vulnerable to a three man attack using only simple weapons and low levels of attack violence.
None of the three methods of trans-portation has resistanca to a single insider.
11-26
In a more optimistic vein, the reduction of present vulnerability does not seem either technically difficult, nor particularly costly.
If the scenarios chosen had been pitted against a two escort convoy, capable of communicating an alert, and with increased penetration resistance,it is the adversary prediction that even a large attack force (12 men) would find it difficult to escape to a safe haven.
The scenarios include the following plans of attack:
Hijack at eccluded rest stop, at night, on a poorly eclected route.
Hijack at a telephone stop, at day, on a poorly eclecced route.
Static ambuch, at day, on a very rugged and poorly selected route.
A police ruce which io not route specific.
A police ruce which is route specific.
A rolling ambush. along a poorly selected route.
Similar ecenarios could however be executed on each of the routes surveyed.
It should be noted that the ambushes, with the exception of the police ruce and rolling ambuch, are routc epecific.This factor highlights the vital importance of route and time ecletion.
II-27 4
S
SCENARIO #1: APOLLO-LYNCHBURG Concept of Operations: Hyjack(2 Men) 1.
Information a.
Attack Group: 2 men anned with silenced handguns and blackjacks.
b.
Transporter: Unannored tractor and trailer operated by two unarmed men and an unarmored sedan operated by two anned men that provide
- escort, c.
Police:
None in local proximity, d.
Route Characteristics and location: Midway Truck Stop just inside Virginia State line on US 522. Highway is twa lanes running through rolling hills, and contains light to negative traffic and very light population density at attack site.
2.
Plan of Attack: Two men assault the one guard and one driver outside truck stop, seize truck, and drive away.
3.
Specific individual missions:
a.
- 1 man of attack group is placed to rear of building and close to telephone line entrance to building.
b.
- 2 man of attack group is sitting in a car or out of sight in back of building, c.
When truck and escort enter Midway Truck Stop the convoy stops, and one driver and one guard leave the convoy and enter the building.
(The guard makes a call from the phone booth prior to entering the building).
d.
After the phone call is made and the two individuals enter the building the #1 man cuts the phone lines behind the building and approacnes the escort vehicle from behind, knocks out the guard or kills him with the silence weapon,. cuts the mike from the radio-telephone, and puts an icepick to the front tire. He then joins the #2 man at the truck.
e.
The #2 man waits until the driver and guard enter the building, approaches the truck cab from the blind side or rear, knocks out the driver or kills him by silenced weapon, enters the cab, and drives the truck down US 522 to a preselected side road where a van is prepositioned. The rear container is opened and the desired amount II-28
)
of SNM is removed and placed in the van for the first portion of the evacuation system. The remaining material and truck are blown up by explosive with delayed time fuze to prevent intnediate knowledge of stolen amount and cause chaos.
4.
Administration and Logistics:
a.
Pre-training: Rehearsals on prepositioning, get-a-way, vehicles, timing, reconnaissance, etc.
b.
Equipment: Wire cutters, handguns with silencers, blackjacks, ice pick, bolt cutters, van, and other required vehicles, i
11-29 e
l~ W HI-JACK APOLLO-LYNCHBURG HIGHWAY 522 W
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..f:, P/ '
Telephone Lines Severed D
. : ~ T'i ~ Y?Q.{, '.
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'h [* .*h,o9,.'k One (1) Man each Vehicle l fy ;,,'. P.
gc Inside Restaurant O
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Two Hi-jackers Dispatch Sleeping 4
.[ t, * *,.k*. k Drivers / Guards immobilize Escort o,
Vehicle - Drive Truck Away.
1 g
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SCENARIO #2: GLEN LYN, VA.
Concept of Operations: Hyjack(2 men) 1.
Information:
a.
Attack Group: two men armed with TASAR (high voltage dart gun) and silenced handgun.
b.
Transporter: Armored vehicle with two driver / guards armed with har ~ juns and equipped with rsdio-telephone.
c.
Police:
None in local proximity.
d.
Route Characteristics and Location: Glen Lyn Post Office located on highway 460 east on the Virginia / West Virginia border. Highway is a four lane highway crossing the New River at comunity of Glen Lyn.
Population density is light and traffic density is light.
2.
Plan of Attack: Two individuals posing as hitchhikers await the truck to make a routine telephone call at the Post Office. When truck stops for telephone check individuals shoot driver as he reenters the truck and captures the other guard, hyjack truck and drive to a remote spot for cargo removal.
3.
Specific individual missions:
a.
- 1 man armed with electric dart gun positions himself so he can hit the driver or guard (who makes the telephone call) when he starts to reenter the truck. Af ter he shoots the guard / driver he will maintain electrical current on the person until the #2 man accom-plishes his mission, and then drives chase car to follow the shipment.
b.
- 2 man armed with a handgun is positioned imediately to the rear of the truck and will approach the remaining driver / guard after the first driver / guard is immobilized, instruct the driver to pull the immobilized man into the truck, and drive as instructed.
(The man hit by the electrical dart will go into convulsions or silently collapse and present an attitude of heart attack).
c.
The truck will be driven back across the bridge and onto a secondary road leading to a remote area. The cargo will be removed into a van and placed into an evacuation system. The truck could be left alone or destroyed by explosive causing a local chaotic situation.
The guards would be killed.
NOTE:
The driver / guard remaining in the truck will in all probability think his partner is having a heart attack or reaction and will try to help him and not notice the second man approach.
II-31
4.
Administratien and Logistics:
a.
Pre-training: Rehearsals with TASAR gun, drive all routes, etc.
b.
Equipment: TASAR, silenced hand guns, and van.
i e
i l
1 4
4 4
11-32
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Hi-JACK / DURESS LYNCHBURG-PIKETON f
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SCENARIO #3: LYNCHBURG TO PIKETON O ncept of Operations: Static Anbush on US 460 (3 men) 1.
Infont. tion:
a.
Att acker: Three men armed with automatic weapons.
b.
Transporter: Federal Annored Express with two drivers / guards and equipped with handguns and radio-telephone, c.
Police:
None in local proximity - road lightly patrolled.
d.
Route Characteristics and location: Highway 460 East between Narrows and Rich Creek, Virginia. Highway is a four lane unlimited access with separated east and west bound lanes bordered by New River and near vertical cliffs.
Highway contains light traffic density and negative population density.
2.
Plan of Atta..;: Truck is halted on 460E between Narrows and Rich Creek.
Lanes are separated by near vertical rock cliffs covered with tre6s.
Road is winding and hilly.
East bound lane is blocked and truck engaged by automatic weapons fire.
Drivers / guards are killed and SNM it transferred to a waiting van.
Evacuation affected over previously reconnoitered route.
3.
Spec:fic Missions For Each Subordinate Element.
a.
Concept of Operations: See attached sketch, b.
Individual Missions: One man positioned around curve from proposed ambush site alerts assult element when truck passes his location, drops tree across west-bound lane to halt traffic, and moves to join assult element.
Tow men armed with automatic weapons dislodge rocks or drop tree and block road at ambush site. When truck stops it is engaged with automatic weapons fire through windshield and side windows killing drivers / guards.
Keys are removed from guards ind cargo doors opened, SNM is removed and placed in van, and armored n icle is driven over cliff and down onto east bound lane. Van is driven to a remote area for further evacuation, c.
Time on target - 10 minutes.
d.
Escape routes: 460 west to preselected secondary road - SNM cached -
van abandoned.
e.
Time to Safehaven:
20 minutes.
11-34 1
l l
f.
Diversions or deceptions:
Road blocked by trees or rock slides east and west of am5ush site.
Truck rolls down onto east bound lane.
4.
Administration and logistics.
a.
Pre-training:
Rehearsals conducted until time / coordination problems solved.
b.
Post Theft Actions: Three men separately go completely out of area, remain out of trea until, time is right for rcmoval of SN1 from cache site for further disposition.
c.
Equipment:
2 automatic weapons 1 pistol 2 walkie talkie type radios 1 chain saw 30' nylon rope 1 van 1 automobile 1 6 lb sledge 3 tree cutting charges.
20 # TNT detonctor assembled.
9 I
II-35
j
~
fter Ambush, Vehicle
' RICH CREEK, VIRGINIA
^
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o Hau f
Driven Over Embankment
(
f to Block East-Bound Lane g
and Confuse Police I
/
4
(
Downed Tree / Rock Slide
\\,k.
Halts Armored Truck
[ O's -
Two-Man Assault Elemeni
~'
Engages Truck with t
cf Automatic Weapons Fire i
5 AE; g
30 Ft. Cliff with Protruding s
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Boulders, Covered with Trees M
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N Lanes Separated by 60 Ft.
Near Vertical Cliff, Covered with Tregs & Bushes NAR ROWS, VIRGINI A.
Tree Dropped on Road
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/
gump SCENARIO #4:
INTERSTATE 81 Concept of Operation: Police Ruse 1.
Information:
a.
Attacker: One man with State Trooper unifom and authentic looking patrol car. One or two additional men hidden in rear of patrol Car.
b.
Transporter: Armored tractor with trailer and three armed guards / drivers.
c.
Police: Occasional patrol.
i d.
Route characteristics:
Four lane highway where north and south lanes are divided.and obscured from each other.
2.
Plan of Attack: Trooper stops shipment and disarms driver / guards and drives truck away.
3.
Specific individual missions.
a.
One man in a state trooper ur.iform, and in a car appearing to be authentic, stops the truck for speeding, missing license, or other
- reason, As the driver opens the door of the truck to speak to the trooper, the phony trooper forces the drivers /goards to disarm (possibly using mace) or shoots one or more of the guards and threatens the others.
b.
When the first man starts the disarming operation, the other two personnel in the car go forward to. assist him and to drive the truck to an isolated and secluded spot. The trailer doors are opened using keys or bolt cutters. Another truck is then bac.ked up to the trailer and by use of one or two winches mounted to the floor of the truck, a dromedary is pulled from the trailer into the truck.
Prepared linear shaped charges will be available in the event the winches fail, c.
After the dromedary or the contents of at least two drums have been loaded, the men depart the area.
d.
Time on target at point of pull-over would be 3-6 minutes, and time on target at point of SNM transfer would be 7-12 minutep, e.
Escape routes would be predetermined local secondary roads.
11-37 Q
4.
Administration and Logistics Requirements.
a.
Training:
Rehearsals (timing, routes, driving, etc.)
b.
Post Theft Actions: Travel to rented warehouse, barn, etc., break-down of load for further dispersion.
l 6
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I 11-38 w-*-
SCENARIO #5: OHIO STATE ROUTE 159 Concept of Operations:
Police Ruse 1.
Information:
a.
Attacker:
3 men. Two men in police uniforms with handguns, and one rented straight truck.
b.
Transporter: one unarmed tractor-trailer rig win two unamed
, drivers and an escort sedan with two armed guards.
c.
rolica:
None observed on route.
d.
Route Characteristics and location: Two lane highway through open rolling countryside, very light traffic density, lighc populption density, and extremely light police coverage.
Location is approxi-mately 2 milcs south of Kingston, Ohio. Highway passes under a rail road.
2.
Plan of Attack: At railroad crossing overpass or 159 south of Kingston, Ohio the truck stops beyond overpass to stop transport unit and two men in police uniforms hyjack both vehicles.
3.
Specific Missions:
a.
Rented straight truck moves along 159 at good distance ahead of
- shipment, b.
As the rented truck pas:es under the overpass it will stop and two men in police uniforms jump out and prepare to flag down the shipmeat.
When the shipment stops, the phony officers walk back to the truck to explain the delay (an accident, etc.). They continue on back to the escort car and begin to explain the delay to the guards and get the " drop" on them. The guards are disarmed.
One phony officer will get into the rear of the escort car and keep them covered while the second phony officer goes back to the truck and forces the two unarmed men to follow the strai go when he hears a horn signal)ght truck (the straight truck will The shipment will be driven to a secluded spot on a secondary road for transfer and further evacuation.
The drivers and guards will be lef t locked in container.
l c.
Time en target: 2-5 minutes at overpass and 4-9 minutes at transfer point.
d.
Escape routes:
North to Kingston then south on secondary road to preselected point.
.-.-~ -. -- - -
l 4.
Administration and Logistics:
a.
Pre-training: Rehearsals for time and route reconnaissance, b.
Equipment: Rented Truck, r.ade or stolen uniforms, handguns, boltcutters.
F 0
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II-40
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SCENARIO #6: HIGHWAY, VA. 151-6 Route: Apollo to Lynchburg. Highway 151/6 between junction at 1-64 and Greenfield.
Concept of Operations:
RollingAmbush/ Hijack.
1.
Information:
a.
Attackers: 2 men anned with shotg9ns.
b.
Transporter: One tractor-trailor with two drivers and one escort sedan with two armed guards.
c.
Police: Lightly patrolled area and none in local proximity.
d.
Route Characteristics and Location:
Two lane road traversing steep hilly terrain, lightly patrolled, very light traffic density, light population density. Conditions of heavy fog allowing visibility of 50 to 100 feet and requiring tt'uck to travel at approximately 10-15 MPH.
Location of ambush anywhere along 151/6 between I-64 and Greenfield.
2.
Plan of Attack:
Rolling hijack to take place just after truck turns off I-64 on to 151/6.
Driver / guard in escort car will be eliminated by shotgun blast.
Truck will be forced to stop and shipment taken.
3.
Specific Missions:
a.
Concept of Operations: See sketch, b.
Individual Mis.sions: #1 man drives automobile and positions car at exit of Ny 151 off of I-64, follows escort car until it arrives at preselected location, and pulls along side of escort car.
- 2 man discFarges automatic shotgun (loaded with 00 buck) out window of car directly into side window of escort car, killing driver.
- 1 mm simultaneously rams front of escort vehicle causing it to leave road over embankment.
- 1 n>.9 accelerates auto and overtakes truck, cuts it off, and forces it to stop.
- 2 man forces drivers to evacuate truck and go down enbankment on foot, and then drives truck to preselected site where van is cached.
SNM is transferred to "an, truck is driven over embankment, and hijackers depart area on previously selected routes, c.
Time on target: 5 minutes, d.
Escape routes:
Proselected secondary roads leading to other major routes.
II-42 assume.
e
(
e
e.
Time to safe haven: 30 minutes.
f.
Diversions or deceptions: Truck could be blown up after SNM removed or set on fire to delay police response.
j 4.
Administration and Logistics:
a.
Pre-training:
Practice shooting shotgun from moving car and rehearsals, b.
Equipment:
I automobile, one van, two shotguns.
11-43 t
I i
ROLLING HI-JACK APOLLO-LYNCHBURG HIGHWAY 151 Scenario No. 6 Twc Men in Van Pull Opposite Escwt Car - Discharge Auto Shotgun (W/00 Buck) Killing Driver / Guard i
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to Pre-Selected Location Forces Driver Out of Truck.
Drives Truck (Following Van)
Transfers SNM to Van..
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UNCLASSIFIED III.
Discussion of Fixes Ill. - 1.1 ImmeU ate Actions Taken The analysis, from the very start, was organized in close cooperation with the three primary approved plan carriers of Part 73 shipments:
Tri State Motor Transit, of Joplin, Missouri; Edlow International, of Washington, D.C.,
and Babcock and Wilcox, of Apollo, Pennsylvania.
Contact was also made with The Wackenhut Company, an approved plan carrier of occasional shipments, and Transnuclear, White Plains New York, which serves as the licensee for most import and export shipments to Western Europe.
Each of these cor-porations gave their unrestricted cooperation throughout the test, even though aware that the results of the assessment would probably be critical of some of their procedures.
This straight forward program of cooperation gave ih diate impact to most of the assessment findings. At the conclusion of eat.. assessment the test team and the guard drivers made a critique of the movement.
These give and take sessions usually stretched for several hours.
They solicited comment and suggestions from the guard-drivers, most of who-have many years of experience.
These suggestions have been incorporated in the results of this report.
Each assessment was also debriefed to the management of Tri-State Edlow and Babcock and Wilcox, both individually, and in a final debrief con-ference held in Richmond, Virginia on April 21, 1976.
This conference was also attended by executives of two of the armored car companies which act as contractors for Edlow, and by Mr. Charles Allen, President of the National ArmortJ Car Association.
Here, again, we solicited the appraisal of this mpert group, and modified our tentative conclusions in response.
It is fair to state that the following conclesions were agreed to.
An cacort vehic!c, armed, and vith ocevranicatione to sound aiert chould be added imcc"ately, to tha1rt incide theft, and to decrease vulnerability to ambush.
T' radictelephonc should be imediately eupplemented by a CB radio in each vehicle.
Aaoistance should ba given to carricre in getting expedited eicarance of guards,nd drivers.
Required standards for guard-driver training should be reviced.
Pending that revision, the NRC should provide a high inpact retraining courac to guard-drivers to remedy current training defecte.
!!I-l UNCLASSIFIED
.g
UNCLASSlFIED Longer range actione should examine the questione of container resistance, tegal authority to use deadly force, the provision of a accond ared ecoort vehiate, the use of amored cecort vehictee and personal body amor, and direct carrier to police radio comunication.
Action has already been taken by the Director, PNSS, and the Licensing Branch, to implement license conditions which require the addition of an armed escort vehicle, equipped with OB radio, to all licensee shipments, and to supplement current guard training with training in defense and escort procedures.
The Test and Evaluation Branch has been assigned the responsibility to design this four hour course of supplementary instruction.
Other imediate or short term actions to improve the present system are discussed in detail in the four succeeding subsectionr.
(III-1.2-1.5).
After early fall of 1976 the NRC will surrender responsibility for shipments within the Naval Fuel Cycle to ERDA. At that time the preponderant number of SNM shipments regulated by NRC will be import and export shipments.
Test and evaluation will make an assessment of the routes used for these shipmentr, and the terminal handling procedures.
The initial trip report on this project, an examination of terminal procedures at O' Hare Inter-nationa, is attached as Appendix F.
III-2 UNCLASSIFIED 4
UNCLASSIFIED
!!!-2.0 Training Programs in the courst! of the analysis of the present transportation safeguards system. a nunber of security procedure short comings on the part of the guards and drivers were observed.
Interviews the the guards and drivers conducted after these observations were made indicated that most of these defic,encies could be remedied by improving guard and driver training.
As another part of the analysis, the transport guard training suggested in NRC Regulatory Guide 5.20 was evaluated by actually training a staff member as a transport guard.
In this part of the analysis deficiencies in the quard training curriculum were also noted.
(SeeAppendixD).
Therefcre one of our 'najor proposals to improve transportation safeguards is to require supplementary guard and driver training beyond that suggested in Regulatory Guide 5.20. Since the sort of training that we wish to require is not currently offered by any training academy. NRC will have to develop the curriculum and conduct the training. The task of of developing the curriculum and conducting the training can be broken down into three main it! M-The first major subtask 1..Gw in making supplementary training available to guards and drivers is thet of curriculum development. The analysis has shown that the curriculum should contain detailed instruction in at least the following: escort placement strategy and tactics, escort-transport coordinated defensive tactics, ee. cort-transport comunications requirements and procedures, escort-transport coordination under accident conditions, supplementary weapons training associated with SNM transport and escort vehicles, and escort-transport countersurveillance techniques.
We propose to contract out both the detailed curriculum development and the teachning of the course. Both the U.S. Army and Missouri Southern State College Police Academy have shown an interest in assisting us in this phase.
Af ter the curriculum has been developed, the next major subtask is conducting the course.
It may prove desirable to conduct one course for the guards and drivers of all the major transporters together or to conduct separate courses for each transporter.
This decision will depend upon available facilities and scheduling.
Final subtask will be to use the experience gained in conducting the the training course and further evaluations of the trained drivers to modify the curriculum for the supplementary training course and in con-junction with the Office of Standards Development rewrite the transportation section of Regulatory Gudie 5.20.
Simultaneously, we hope to offer the course for transporters of SNM in the future.
III-3 UNCLASSIFIED 4
UNCLASSIFIED
~
If this program for establishing and requiring supplementary transport guard and driver training is implemented with the other safeguard fixes detailed in this report, the likelihood of successful theft of SNH and its transport to a safe haven will be markedly reduced.
J 4
111-4 UNCLASSIFIED G
UNCLASSIFIED
!!!-3.0 LLEA Awareness As a part of our esaluation of the present land transportation safe-guards system, we interviewed the State police along each route analyzed and the county and municipal police along the Erwin to Lynchburg route.
From these interviews two conclusions could be readily drawn.
- First, the police have the capability to provide a level of response adequate to prevent attackers of an SNM shipment from reaching a safe haven with the material.
Second, the police were generally unaware of the SNM ship-ments passing through their jurisdiction. Accordingly, one of our major proposals to improve transporation safeguards is to brief the police on SNM shipments and to help them coordinate their response ;n the event of an attack on such a shipment.
The task of improving police awareness of SNM shipments may be divided into three main parts.
The first major subtask involved in improving police awareness of SNM shipments along a given route is a survey of police response capabilities along that route.
In the course of this analysis, we discovered that the distribution of police resources varies considerably from State to State and through the local jurisdications.
For example, in Tennessee, the bulk of the response capability was concentri.ted in the State Police; whereas, in Virginia the County Sheriffs had more men and better equipment than did the State Police.
This survey can and should be coordinated with the Contingency Planning Branch's program of writing transportation contingency plans.
The second subtask involved in improving police awareness is the pre-paration of a briefing packet and briefing to be given to the local law enforcement authorities along the route.
In this circumstance a personal briefing seems clearly superior to simply mailing out an awareness packet. A personal briefing makes a better impression on the LLEA and provides an opportunity for dialogue to resolve potential operational problems.
The briefing packet should be understandable without the briefing and should contain the following infonnation:
a description of SNM routes in their jurisdiction, photographs of the trucks and description of typical cargoes, police-transport comunications procedures, the phone number of NRC Regional Office, and the phone number of the nearest radiological assistance team.
The police-transport comunication pro-cedures part of this packet can be useful in reducing or eliminating comunications hoaxes if the C.B. radio is used by providing a verification code.
This subtask should be coordinated with the F.B.I.
It may also
!!I-5 UNCLASSIFIED 6
UNCLASSIFIED be desirable to implement it in conjunction with some of the safety programs currently carried out by the Office of International and State Programs.
The final subtask involved in improving police awareness is a yearly updating of the 'sstablished police response system.
This updating is necessary for several reasons.
First, as the nuclear economy progresses the routes will change.
Likewise as time passes the distribution of police capabilities will change.
Finally, unless we continue to remind the police of their safeguards role, they will lapse into the same lack of awareness we discovered in this evaluation.
In fact, during this evaluation, we discovered that, in Tennessee at least, there was close coordination between police and transporters about 8 years ago which had by the time of the evaluation regressed into a complete lack of coordination. This indicates that a periodic renewal of NRC-police communication is extremely desirable.
If this program for increasing police awareness and coordinating police response is implemented, in combination with the other safeguards fixes detailed in this report, the police should be able to provide a timely response sufficient to prevent the theft and transport of SNM to a safe haven.
III-6 l
UNCLASSIFIED l
+
UNCLASSIFIED I!!-4.0 Communications Much has been written about comun1 cations as related to the transport of SNM. However, the Land Transportation Vulnerability Analysis group actually vent into the SNM tmnsport environment to come up with their recorr:endations which are summarized in this section.
No attempt is mada to repeat the analysis of various alternatives which were included in the Transportation Mode Analysis or in the Special Safeguards Study daterial for GESMO.
In some cases, these analyses are not addressing the right issues or at least, have a weak operational requirements basis. The point is, that these studies " studied" whereas we operationally analyzed comunications in the actual environment. Our conclusions are different for many reasons.
First, ve prioritize the " operational need" for conrtunications before selecting an alternative.
This was done with Safeguards perfortnance criteria in mind. Our communications priorities are as follows:
Alert of an attack or iminently grave situation a.
b.
Check and balance on the tone mievotent insider c.
Vehicle and orcu aafety against road hacardo uhich might also jeopardize security d.
Opemtional statue of the chipment Due to these priorities, the Special Forces and NRC Test and Evaluation Branch recommend the following steps be taken:
First, take all necessary steps to allow SNM transporters to have "polic; type" VHF/UHF tranaceivera capable of a vide range of "selectable" police and commercial VHF/UHF frequencies.
Through widescale LLEA involvement in Nuclear Safeguards and increased guard / escort training, this " coupling of measures" will increase the probability for a rapid and timely response by the LLEA more than any other steps taken.
This alternative was not discussed in previously published " studies" but was discussed by our analysis team with many carriers and police officers and uas ucil received.
There are, of course, some difficulties in implementing this option but they are considered minor and very cost effective when compared to other options of ten heard. Until the VHF/UHF capability is implemented, the use of Citizens Band Radios (preferably a Single Side Band set) can offer considerable merit from the first three standpoints previously mentioned; i.e., alert of an attack, check and balance, and crew / vehicle safety.
III-7 UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED Second, detrmine the need, degree and type of opemtional control required of JNN ahipments as this will determine further comunications needs.
For instance, does NRC Headquarters need to know when each shipment starts and ends in real time? Does NRC need to know where a shipment is at any given minute? Is every hour or day good enough? The "information needs" should drive the system design. We should not jump to do what ERDA does - they have different needs and priorities. Why should we have a " Transportation Control Center" and all the associated costs for comunications, computers etc., if NRC doca not need to knou the accond by accond pwgrees of shipmente in the Comercial fuct cycle.
perhaps a single person in an office in Silver Spring with FTS and Bell Telephone can give us hour by hour status of the 2-10 shipments per day during the all-up mixed oxide era.
Third, thoroughty understand the purpoace and priorities of the cocort.
This understanding has communications implications as well as the more obvious reasons. Here is how we see them:
a.
Check and balance on the lone malevolent insider (Look at recenthistory!)
b.
Increase the probability that an alarm will get out to the LLEA should an attack occur.
c.
Add another set of parameters for the adversary to consider (where is the escort, what can it do to me? etc.)
d.
Crew and Vehicle Safety - road hazards, maintenance, etc.
With these priorities, one can see that the escort also needs " police type" VHF/UHF comunications but other types of intra-vehicle comunica-tions could suffice until VHF can be implemented. This could be C.B. or comercial VHF/UHF.
A word of caution to those interested in SECOM! We have thoroughly evaluated this system and have several memos on file on the subject.
First, one must look at the system in-toto, not just an HF network vf th a mini-computer. SECOM'o "Achittee heel" is in Albuquerque 's ability to actuaZZy get LLEA to the scene. To our knowledge, this has not been demonstrated. The Test and Evaluation Branch would enjoy setting up a demonstration of a simulated vehicle under attack and have three identical messages to be transmitted on SECOM II, VHF Police and C.B. and see which alert was received by the police first. This could be done under controlled conditions with the cooperation of the police on an actual SNM route.
III-8 UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED There is no doubt in our mind that SECOM would come in last but then, to be fair, we have not actually tested it. SECON is not a practical neans 1
of contrunicationa unless the NRC pute a major emphasis on operational knoutedge and, therefore, control of SNM shipmente.
We have explored the sharing of SECOM with ERDA and, whereas, it is feasible to do so, our preference would be VHF/UHF police-type comuni-cations first, SECOM a long second, with C.B. filling the gap until we can get one or the other implemented.
As for satellite comtnications, we see no need for such a ayatem for SNM transport even with an all up mixed oxide nuclear economy.
In summary, the role of coni unications must be examined from the standpoint of " operational need under both adversary and normi conditions. "
Previous studies have not addressed these needs in the proper perspective nor have they prioritized the basic requirements. When so done, the overwhelming evidence points to the ability to directly comunicate uith the police on their frequencies when an amergency occure but use other comercial frequencica for normt modes.
The NRC has not previous 1y evaluated this and seems to jump to the conclusion that it is too much trouble to coordinate these requirements with various police jurisdictions.
On the other hand, those on the evaluation team who have actually contacted many police jurisdictions find an overwhelming and positive resporise to the suggestions.
In addition, we find that, while the NRC is trying to detennine which way it will go, ordinary Citizens Band radio has a very high probability for getting out an alert as well as to assist the crew with road hazards and maintenance. The use of Citizens Band is further explored in the appendix.
The optimum comunications set, as we now see it, is a progrernable or selectable VHF/UHF system which has the ability (and organizational approval) to use various police frequencies along Jan SNM route and which can use standard comercial frequencies for intra-vehicle comunications between the primar/ vehicle (the ShM shipment) and the escort (s) vehicle.
The current radio telephone could be retained in a means of comunicating back to the licensee or to NRC concerning operational status.
Until this optimum system is implemented, the carriers should retain the radio telephone but add Citizens Band.
Even the optimum system could use Citizens Band due to its use as a tool to maintain knov'. edge of what is happening on the road.
The current communications ayatema as presently required by the NRC Regulations are totally inadequate from the Safeguarde perepective.
III-9 UNCLASSIFIED 9
.... ~.
UNCLASSIFIED 111-5.0 Legal problems and Required Support The following broad areas require positive action by the NRC legal staff.
The action required is to casiat us in implementation as well as to advise us of existing laws which may make the road difficult. Although some areas may be old issues, they are repeated as still being problems which inhibit to some degree our progress in effecting adequate safeguards.
The items are listed in order of priority.
1.
Commercial guards and drivers carrying hand guns, shot guns and possibly other weapons across State lines. Also the need for special, recognized gun-pennits.
(How many shipments in the past have violated State laws with our head turned the other way?)
2.
The use of deadly force by commercial guards for protection of SNM.
(We are ready to consider this issue as hing academic for the scenarios studied.)
3.
Use of police VHF/VHF frequencies by comercial licensee guards and drivers for declaring an emergency. Comercial VHF/UHF would be used for normal comunications.
4.
Security clearances for comercial guards. We feel that all guards should have a security clearance and background investigation.
We understand that PL 93-377 gives the authorii.y.
The help required here is for those companies that don't h6ve an ERDT, program to obtain their clearances. Most of the guards we have observed have had a clearance; obtained through some indirect route.
We only need to simplify and otarify the process of obtaining alcarances.
5.
Use of automatic weapons. The threat will always be better armed than the guards and escorts.
Furthermore, the element of surprise will probably take out both the man and the gun. We would rather see other Safeguards implemented before attempting to resolve this difficult legal question. The automatic weapon may have a positive deterrant value as well as make the guards more comfortable but would probably tend to escalate the level of force required by the adversaries who are in the last word position for one-ups-manship.
Should automatic weapons be approved, more guard training would be required.
111-10 UNCLASSIFIED 9
1 4
APPENDIX A Biographies of Test Personnel i
A-1 UNCLASSIFIED 9
-c.
ONCLASSlFIED Manfred von Ehrenfried 9436 Holbrook Lane Potomac, Maryland 20854 (301) 299-2306 POSITION:
Chief. Test and Evaluation Branch Division of Safeguards Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission EDUCATION:
B.S. Physics - Minor Mathematics University of Richmond, Virginia 1960 Post Graduate Work in Computer Techniques University of Houston, Texas 1962 Specialized Training by NASA at M.I.T. in Apollo Guidance, Navigation and Computers 1966 Spacecraft Systems Training - NASA /MSC Flight Controller Training - NASA /MSC EXPERIENCE:
8/1975 - Present Chief. Test and Evaluation Branch - NRC 1972 - 8/75 TRW Systems, Inc.
Program Manager, Assistant Program Manager, Department Manager - Systems Engineering, Manager Hawaii Field Office (Navy and FAA Projects) 1971 - 1972 EG&G/ Wolf Research Manager, Earth Resources Applications Department.
(Recomended an approach for monitoring the environmental effects of nuclear power stations to the State of Maryland.)
A-2 UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSlFlED 1961 - 1971 NASA Manned Spacecraft Center Chief, Science Requirements and Operations Branch Mission Staff Engineer - Apollo 7 Apollo Pressure Suit Test Subject Apollo Guidance Officer - Apollo 1 Assistant F;ight Director - Gemini Control Center Operations Officer - Mercury Control Center 1960 - 1961 Physics and Math Teacher - Colonial Heights, Virginia 1957 - 1959 Chemical Engineering Assistant - Allied Chemical Corp.
H0NORS AWARDS AND SPECIAL ACHIEVEMENTS NASA Group Achievement Award for the Apollo Program NASA Gm-Achievement Award to the Science and Applications Directoratq NASA Group Achievement Award to the Apollo 7 Flight Operations Team NASA Group Achievement Award to the Gemini Support Team Manned Spacecraft Center - Outstanding Performance Rating Manned Spacecraft Center - Sustained Superior Performance Award NASA Group Achievement Award for Project Mercury General Dynamics Certificate of Achievement for the Team which launched the first American astronaut into orbit.
PUBLICATIONS:
Have authored or co-authored hundreds of documents in the field of flight operations, science and engineering requirements, hchnical proposals, concept papers, etc. A few selected puolications of interest to the Safeguards Test and Evaluation Branch are:
The Integrated Connand System (ICS) Security Plan The ICS Operational Evaluation - Threat The ICS Alert and Notification Capability Crisis Management in the Fleet Connand Center Electric Power Plant Environmental Monitoring and Data Processing System Fleet Conrnand Support Center - Systems Integration Propocal Logic and Rational for Prioritizing Detailed !?st' Objectives Mercury, Gemini and Apollo Mission Rules A-3 UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED Jay B. Durst 2120 Bucknell Terrace Silver Spring, Maryland Telephone: 949-8345 POSITION:
Plant Protection Analyst Division of Safeguards Nuclear Regulatory Comission EDUCATION:
B.S., U. S. Military Academy, 1950 MPA, Harvard University, 1955 Graduate Study. Harvard University 1955 Fellow, Case Institute, 1957 Army War College 1969 EXPERIENCE:
1973 - 1975 Business and Government Consultant (D00) 1972 - 1973 Chief of Staff, USA J. F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance Ft. Bragg, N.C.
1971 - 1972 Comander, Fif th Spec.a1 Forces Group, f t. Bragg, N.C.
1969 - 1970 Director of Doctrine and Analysis, (Surveillance Target Acquisition and Night Operations) Office of the Chief of Staff Arntv.
1968 - 1969 Student, Ariqv War College 1966 - 1968 Military Secretary and Executive Officer, Office of the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
1965 - 1966 Commander, Special Forces, Third Corps Vietnam, 1963 - 1965 Associate Professor of Economics and Executive Officer.
Department of Social Sciences, West Point, N.Y.
1962 - 1963 Student, Air Comand and Sta.i College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.
A-4 UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED 1960 - 1962 Troop Duty, 4th Infantry Division Ft. Lewis, Washington, 1950 - 1960 Various troop and staff duty as an Infantry Officer.
HONORS, AWARDS, AND SPECIAL ACHIEVEMENTS:
Ai rborne Combat Infant,yman Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters Meritorious Service Medal Bronze Star for Valor Guest Lecturer, Air War College, Defense Information School, Kent State University Harvard University.
PUBLICATIONS:
Doctrine for Employment, Unattended Ground Sensors, U.S. Army, 1969.
Essay, " War and Mobilization" in An Economic History of the United States, Seymour Harris, ed., McGraw Hill, N.Y., 1961
" Limited War - An Evaluation," in Military Review.
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, January, 1970.
Various other professional articles.
A-5 UNCLASSIFIED 4
UNCLASSIFIED Dr. Martin Messinger Reston, Virginia 22090 Telephone:
POSITION:
Operations Research Analyst Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Division of Safeguards EDUCATION:
B.E.E. City College of New York 1962 M.S. (E.E.) Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn 1967 Ph.D.(SystemScience)
Polytechnic Institute of E ooklyn 1967 M.S. (Mathematics) Polytechnic a>+,1tute of flew York 1974 EXPERIENCE:
1975 - Present Operations Research Analyst Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Division of Safeguards 1971 - 1975 Physical Scientist and System Engineer Amunition Development and Engineering Directorate Concepts and Effectiveness Division Picatinny Arsenal, Dover, New Jersey 1974 Lecturer Department of Electrical Engineering Polytechnic Institute of New York 1970 Consultant: Application of Bayesian Statistics to Stockpile Reliability Assurance 1969 Operations Research Associate Mobil Oil Corporation 1968 Lecturer, Department of Electrical Engineering Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn 1965 - 1967 Instructor, Departments of Electrical and Mechanical Engineering, Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn A - 6' UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED HONORS, AWARDS AND SPECIAL ACHIEVEMENTS:
Dean's List - 2nd year at C.C.N.Y.
Graduated C.C.N.Y. Magna-Cum-Laude Awarded 3 year National Defense Education Act Fellowship for Graduate Study Won 1967 IEEE National Reliability Award Quality Increase for Outstanding Performance - 1973 Letter of Commendation, Col. W. R. Highlander, Jr., U. S. Army Engineer School, Fort Belvoir, for providing support to the Army FASCAM study.
Maa-on-the-job promotion - 1974 Won Army Material Command Systems Analysis Award for outstanding achievement in System Analysis - 1974 and 1975.
e.
PUBLICATIONS:
" Reliability Approximations for Complex Structures,"
Proceedings 196/ IEEE Annual Reliab111ty Symposium, 1967.
Exponential and Weibull Approximations for Chain Structures. Proceedings 1968 IEEE Annual Reliability Symposium, 1968.
Techniques for Optimum Spaces Allocation - A Tuitorial Review, IEEE Reliability Transactions June 1971.
A Proof th-t the Exposure Function Method for Calculating the Expected Danage Probability is Better than the Vulnerable Area Approximation, Transactions 18th Conference of Army Mathematicians, May 1972.
Mixed Anti-Material, Anti-Personnel Minefields. Trans-actions of the 19th Conference of Army Mathematicians, May 1973.
Mixed Minefield Modeling, Proceedings 12th Annual U.S.
Army Opei ations Research Symposium, October 1973.
A-7
\\
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED Illuminating Round Effectiveness Modeling, Transactions 20th Conference of Army Mathematicians, May 1975.
An Illumination Effectiveness Model with an Application to Mortar Fuzing, Proceedings 14th U.S. Anny Operations Research Symposium, November 1975.
A-8 UN01.ASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED Mr. Harry M. Mitchell 9307 Shari Drive Fairfax, Virginia 22030 Telephone:
978-4008 POSITION:
Systems Analyst, Contingency Planning Branch Division of Safeguards Nuclear Regulatory Commission EDUCATION:
B.S., Electrical Eng/ Marine Eng., USNA, 1952 M.S., Nuclear Engineering, N.C. State, 1960 28 Semester Hrs., Nuclear Physics, Advanced Mathematics, (above M.S. Requirement)
EXPERIENCE:
1973 - 1975 Chief, Operations Division, Air Force Special Weapons Center, KAFB, Albuquerque, New Mexico 1969 - 1973 Assistant Air Attache Paris, France Foreign Technology Technical Officer 1968 - 1969 Chief C123K, Standardization / Evaluation, Saigon, Vietnam 1964 - 1967 Program Element Manager - Low Altitude Supersonic Vehicle (NuclearRamjet),Hg.USAF DCS/AF R & D - Directorate Science & Technology 1962 - 1964 Assistant Division Chief, Ramjet Engine Division, Aero Propulsion Lab, WPAFB, Dayton, Ohio 1960 - 1962 Chief, Advanced Propulsion Section, Aero Propulsion Laboratory, WPAFB, Dayton, Ohio 1958 - 1960 Graduate Student - North Carolina State University MS Candidate - Nuclear Engineering 1955 - 1958 Flying Instructor - B-26 Wing, Long Beach, California l
A-9 UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED 1954 - 1955 Air Rescue Service, Goose Bay, Lab.
1952 - 1954 Flying School, Lt. Bomber Pilot, Langley AFB, Virginia HONORS, AWARDS AND SPECIAL ACHIEVEMENTS:
Pi Sigman Pi - Physics Honors Society, North Carolina State Graduated upper 10% of class - U.S. Naval Academy, 1952 M.S. Degree with Honors - North Carolina State,1960 Bronze Star Distinguished Flying Cross, Vietnam, 1968 Camnendation Medal, CSAF,1967 Meritorious Service Medal,1973 PUBLICATIONS:
Five Technical Notes - Gaseous Reactors, Radiation Effects on the B-7D~ Electrostatic Propulsion, WPAFB, Dayton, Ohio.
Thesis - Concentric Voids in Spherical Reactors and Cells, M.S. Thesis - North Carolina State,1960.
A-10 UNCLASSIFIED 9
UNCLASSIFIED I
Dr. John '4. Hockert 13920 Castle Blvd.
Apt. # 403 Silver Spring, Md. 20904 Telephone:
890-6983 POSITION:
Systems Data Analyst, Test and Evaluation Branch Division of Safeguards Nuclear Regulatory Commission EDUCATION:
B.S. Physics, California Institute of Technology,1969 M.A. Physics, State University of New York at Stony Brook, 1970 Ph.D. Nuclear Physics, State University of New York at Stony Brook, 1975 SNM Guard Training, Missouri Southern State College,1976 EXPERIENCE:
1976 - Present Systems Data Analyst, NRC 8/75 - 12/76 Post-doctoral Research Associate in Nuclear Physics at S.U.N.Y. Stony Brook 1965 - 1965 Summer employment as a Data Analyst for Aircraft Wheel and Brake Test Laboratory at B.F. Goodrich, Troy, Ohio HONORS, AWARDS AND SPECIAL ACHIEVEMENTS:
Tau Beta Pi - Engineering Honor Society, California Institute of Technology B.S. with Honors, California Institute of Technology NASA Traineeship 1969-71 A-11 UNCLASSIFIED O
UNCLASSIFIED PUBLICATIONS:
" Meson Exchange Currents in Deuteron Electrodisintegration,"
NuclearPhysicsA217(1973)
"A New Method for Determining the Energy Independent Effective Interaction," Physics Letters 53B(1974)
"The Charge Fonn Factor of the Deuteron and Optimized Polynomials," Physics Letters, November 1975 Thesis - Some Electromagnetic Properties of the Deuteron _,
August 1975.
e A-12 UNCLASSIFIED 4
~
UNCLASSIFIED G. N. Spies Company C, 1st Battalion 5th Special Forces Group Fort Bragg, N.C.
28308 RANK:
Captain Infantry (Direct Field Commission from SFC)
DUTY:
Executive Officer Company C and Special Duty to JFKCENMA as Special Projects Officer SPECIAL MILITARY TRAINING:
Italian Language School Airbone School Airborne Jump Masters School SCUBA School Air Trcnsportability School Aerial Delivery School CBR School Ranger School PSYOPS School Mountain and Cold Weather School Infantry Basic Course Demolition Courses Navy Amphibious krfere School Special Forces Schoui Operations and Intelligence Course (Infantry)
Personnel Management School Desert Warfare and Survival Course Airmobile Operations Course EXPERIENCE:
Speaks Italian 22 years military service 14 years Special forces A-13 UNCLASSIFIED 4
UNCLASSIFIED AWARDS:
Master Parachutist Badge Combat Infantry Badge Air Crewmans Badge 2 awards of Comendation Medal 5 Awards of Bronze Star 7 Awards of Air Medal 1 Award Purple Heart Presidential Unit Citation Cross of Gallantry (Vietnam se) 6 Campaigns in Vietnam A-14 UNCLASSIFIED G
UNCLASSIFIED Lowell Stevens Company A, 1st Battalion 5th Special Forces Group Fort Bragg, N.C.
28308 RANK:
Master Sergeant E-8 DUTY:
Team Sergeant Special Forces A Team SPECIAL MILITARY TRAINING:
Airborne School Airborne Jump Masters Schcol Air Transportability School Aerial Delivery School CBR School Military Assistance School Recondo School NCO Academy Special Forces Operations and Intelligence Special Forces Recon School Marine Debarkation School (it is an Officer's Course)
The High Altitude Low Opening School Tracking School Special Projects School (which involves Nuclear Weapons)
United States Winter Warfare School Air Force Survival School in Phillipines Demolition Courses Davey Crockett School Rough Terrain Parachuting Speaks Vietnamese and Montagnard EXPERIENCE:
17 years military service 13 years Special Forces 10 years duty in Asia AWARDS:
Master Parachutist Combat Infantry Badge A-15 UNCLASSIFIED
~
UNCLASSIFIED AWARDS (Cont'd)
Expert Infantry Badge 3 awards of the silver star 6 awards of the bronze star medal 2 awards of the Army Commendation Medal 4 awards of the air medal 2 awards of the purple heart 2 awards of the cross of gallantry l
A-16 UNCLASSIFIED 4
UNCLASSIFIED B. G. Knight Headquarters Detachment,1st Battalion 5th Special Forces Group Fort Bragg, N.C.
28308 RANK:
Sergeant First Class E-7 DUTY:
Comunication Chief,1st Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group SPECIAL MILITARY TRAINING:
Airborne Airborne Jumpmaster School Air Transportability and Aerial Delivery School Light Aircraft Jumpmaster CBR School Special Forces School Infantry Comunications School Radio Repair School Radio Teletype School Operations and Intelligence School (Infantry)
Intelligence Analyst School Demolitions and Mine Warfare School Navy Amphibious Warfare School Jungle Operations School Mountain and Cold Weather School Speaks Vietnamese EXPERIENCE:
21 years military service 12 years Special Forces AWARDS:
6 campaigns in Vietnam Combat Infantryman Badge Master Parachutist Badge Presidential Unit Citation Vietramese Cross of Gallantry A-17 UNCLASSIFIED i
k
UNCLASSIFIED t
Donald C. Neale Company C, 1st Battalion
-Sth Special Forces Group Fort Bragg, N.C.
28308 RANK:
Seargeant Fist Class E-7 DUTY:
Team Sergeant Special Forces A Team SPECIAL MILITARY TRAINING:
Military Assistance School
-Vietnamese Language School Operations and Intelligence School Airborr.e School Jump Masters School Davey Crockett School Greek Language School NCO Academy NCO Advanced Course for Infantry Greek Winter Warfare School Scuba School Speaks Vietnamese and Greek EXPERIENCE:
12 years military service 6 years Special Forces 2 years duty in Vietnam excluding Special Forces duty under TOY Status AWARDS:
6 Campaigns in Vietnam Parachutist Badge Combat Infantry Badge 3 Valor Awards of the Bronze Star Medal 1 Valor Award of the Army Commendation Medal A-18 UNCLASSIFIED 4
- - ~UNCLASSIFIE6
~
i e
i f
q APPENDIX B Comunications 4
l B-1 UNCLASSIFIED
{
o e
- ' - - - - - - - ~ _ _ _ _,
'T y
~~+'sse-u,
UNCLASSIFIED L
a APPENDIX 3 Comnunications (CB) 1.
During the entire assessment period the area of radio comunications war observed and assessed, and specifically, the citizens band radio.
Comunications is necessary for any successful operation (this includes both the movement of critical material and a successful theft opera-tion of critical material). The following remarks will address specific findings in the area of CB consnunications.
2.
All law enforcement agencies contacted throughout the assessment period utilize the citizens band radio (with exception of the Va. State Police)withintheirareaofresponsibility.
3.
The CB radio was not utilized by any carrier observed, though it was determined that they have used it in the past on occasion, but do not consider it a necessary mode of consuunications.
4.
Other modes of comunication observed consisted of FM communications between the carrier and escort vehicle which are considered a very efficfent method of internal coordination and control during the shipnent, and a radio-telephone that in most instances was non-funct'.onal due to the high amount of dead zones contained along the routes.
5.
The citizens band radio was found to be the most impressive mode of comunications during-this assessment period, though, none of the carriers utilized the CB during shipments. The following remarks,are submitted in support of the recommendation that CB radios be contained and used aboard all vehicles involved in the shipment of SNM.
In this respect, it must not be forgotten, that the CB radio can also be used by a threat group or individual for his benefit as well.
a.
During one shipment period a carrier had left his truck parked at a motel where it was unattended and unobserved in an unlighted a rea. Alongside the vehicle were two commercial tractors. During the night two individuals made an assessment of the armored vehicle, but while they were assessing the vehicle, a driver of B-2 UNCLASSIFIED
i l
one of the comercial tractors came cut of the motel and observed them.
He imediately got into his cab, drove a very short distance, and made a call on his CB notifying the local police of the situation. The police were on the spot within 10 minutes.
b.
On the open highway most truckers utilize the CB radio for traffic conditions and police locations and their activities. At all times the truckers know exactly where patrols are located and what their activities are. Police patrols are tracked up and down the highway continuously.
In addition, all unusual conditions that exist along the highway are broadcasted and relayed up and down the highway. A carrier equipped with the CB would know exactly the location of a patrol in the event he determined he was being followed or a possible attonpt of theft was going to be
- made, c.
The truckers have formed a very close fraternal organization through the CB radio and each driver does not hesitate to help his fellow driver along the highway to include advising on observed truck malfunctions, traffic conditions, road conditions, weather conditions, highway accidents, reckless and speeding drivers, road improvement work areas, detours, unusual incidents, etc..
Each driver looks out for the welfare of other drivers.
d.
During an escorted shipment, the truck drivers were broadcasting the intention of possibly forcing the escort vehicle off the road because he wes steadily following the carrier vehicle and it was assumed that he was harrassing it. The escort vehicle was identified as being an unmarked patrol car or a vehicle containing two private security personnel who were trying to scare the truckers by playing the role of law enforcernent officers. This situation could have been alleviated, had the escort vehicle contained a CB radio. The individual writing this paper advised the truckers by CB radio that it was not an unmarked patrol car, but in fact a safety patrol for the shipment it was following thereby convincing the truckers it was a shipment that could use constant surveillance and assistance along its route. The tisckers take specific interest in shipments such as explosives, inflammables, military hardware, etc.
NOTE: The carrier and escort were not displaying RADI0 ACTIVE signs.
B-3 UNCLASSIFIED
,4
UNCLASSIFIED l
I e.
On the Pennsylvania Turnpike the undersigned's car was identified as being umarked patrol car on one occasion and on another occasion identified as being a car doing unusual things due to the fact that I followed the truck (carrier) for periods, then passed the carrier, and would pull over on the side of the road and wait for it to pass and then again follow it. Unusual incidents on the road are quickly picked up by truck drivers and broadcasted, and everyone on the road is waiting and watching for you.
f.
On interstate 81 an armored Wells Fargo vehicle was observed pulled over on an exit. Alongside the truck a car containing two women was observed. This situation was im3diately observed by the truckers and broadcasted up and down the highway and within a couple of minutes it was detemined that the truck was only out of gas and the women were providing assistance in obtaining gas.
This assistance was obtained through the use of CB between the Wells Fargo vehicle and the car containing the women.
g.
Along the West Virginia Turnpike a truck had run into a ditch and lain over on his side. The CB radio immediately broadcasted this situation up and down the road. Truckers were calling to see if the truck needed assistance and a wrecker was dispatched and the load removed from the truck before the State Police arrived to provide traffic assistance.
h.
D., route 66 south of.bollo, Pennsylvania a pickup truck ran off the road, through a side guard rail, and down a 40 foot embankroent.
People immediately stopped to provide assistance. The CB was utilized to call in the accident and request police and fire department assistance. The police came within 5 minutes and the fire department arrived within 8 minutes of the CB call.
6.
Though it must be remembered that a threat group can utilize the CB radio in support of their own operations-through monitoring traffic, law enforcement locations, and broadcastM 'ake situations, etc.,
the CB radio is considered to be a very important mode of communica-tions.
Emergency situations on the CB are heard by the world and the observed close coordination ot the trucking industry while rolling on the highway indicate there exists a very informal, but very efficient security system on the nation's highways. This system exists at any location and at any time along the major well traveled routes, and is a system that carriers of critical material should consider.
B-4 UNCLASSIFIED
.~
l i
1
L UNCLASSIFIED l
7.
The Citizens Band radio has become a national comon comunications system that has proven itself to provide a multitude of benefits to its users.
Public service groups such as REACT monitor the emergency channel and relay distress calls to local police. -In addition the-Department of Transportation is developing a nationwide motorist emergency assistance comunications network which is scheduled to be on the air in 31 states within the next year.
Both the public service groups and the Department of Transportation emergency assistance comunications network can be included in NRC trans-portation contingency plans. The use of Citizens Band radio not only provides additional security, but plays a very important role in highway safety as well. Therefore, it is highly recomended that this system be included with shipments of critical material.
8.
In addition to the above, it is recomended that all shipments of critical material include a radio that has the capability to comuni-cate directly with local law enforcement agencies along any route.
This upability could be developed by the use of a crystal controlled transceiver capable of operating on both the high and low bands of VHF and the UHF band.
Radio frequencies of all local law enforcement agencies are unclassified and easily obtained. Crystal controlled transceivers can easily be programed to operate on all major police frequencies on a given route by the number of channels available on the transceiver. An ideal number of channels would be ten. This type radio would be used only in the event of an emergency.
B-5 UNCLASCIFIED 4
UNCLASSIFIED E
APPENDIX C SNM Transport Guard Training i
C-1 UNCLASSIFIED
~
~
UKCIISSIFfED
/*
umino stats:
p'
'g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMA 41sslON g
j WAAM8800 ton. D. C. 30006 e
k.....*
MEMORANDUM FOR: Thomas C. Thayer, Assistant Director for Operation and Evaluation THRU:
Manfred von Ehrenfried, Chief Test and Evaluation Branch John Hockert [ b k.
FROM:
SUBJECT:
SNM TRANSPORT GUARD TRAINING From March 25 through April 2, I attended the Tri-State Motor Transport special nuclear materials guard course conducted at the Missouri Southern State College Regional Police Academy. A course schedule is attached. The only depart:;res from the schedule as written were some changes in the Practical Defensive Tactics due to Mr. Scorse's schedule conflicts. Due to illness, I missed the classes of March 22-24. How'ever, I was able to pick up the legal material in class on March 27. I feel that, as a whole, the course more than satisfies the intent of Regulatory Guide 5.20. The main strengths of the course are the high quality of instruction by Messrs. Seneker and Spu~lin, the combat movie shoot-don't shoot situational training and the general situational training. If all proceeds according to schedule, video tapes of the situational training will be available here by April 16. The situational training is extremely useful both because it requires the student's active involvement and because it emphasizes the practical reasons for security pg'rcedures, in this session of the course, the NRC Land Transportation Vulnerability Analysis had a direct impact on the course, since one of the scenarios developed by the Special Forces group during the Erwin to Lynchburg route analysis was used as a situation during the situational train-ing. This gave the individual driver / guards an opportunity to discover what they might do in such a situation and the critique over the videotape after-wards was an aid in evaluating both the guards' compliance with procedures in a crisis and the applicability of the present procedures to crisis situations.
It is to Tri-State's credit that Walt Durch paid close attention to this aspect,.
of the situational training critique and reported the procedural problems back to top nanagement.
The training program has several weaknesses. Probably the inain weakness is a lack of training in specific tractor trailer defensive tactics in an attack situation. This coursc presented an excellent film on anti-hijacking tactics and Mr. Seneker gave a very good lecture on counter surveillance tactics.
However this was all the course offered. Addition of a theoretical discussion of driving tactics useful under attack and actual practice of such tactics would add a great deal to the course. In spite of large amount of tine devoted to weapons training (23 hours2.662037e-4 days <br />0.00639 hours <br />3.80291e-5 weeks <br />8.7515e-6 months <br />), I feel that the training was not sufficient.
There was very little training in the use of the shotgun (probably the most useful weapon in an isolated an6ush situation) and no practice in firing the C-2 UNCLASSIFIED l
v UNCI.ASSIFIED lhows C. Thayer '
weapons out of the gun ports in the tractor.
Within the tine constraints of the present course, such training is not really possible. The time allotted to firearms training in regulatory guide 5.20 seems to me to be quite unreal-istic.
Fortunately, the pistol qualification requirement in the regulations probably increases the amount of firearms training that most guards receive.
However, this is at the expense of training with the shotgun since there is no qualification requirenent with it. Addition of a shotgun qualification requirenent (possibly something like skeet shooting) and firing range practice from inside the tractor would be a significant improvement in the course.
With this sort of training and sone training in tractor escort coordination tactics under fire, this course would turn out guards who could probably hold their own in a fire fight better than the average policeman.
The six drivers who wrrt through the course with me Messrs. Nicolas Barra, Guy Carrol, Floyd Ford, Bryan Meyer, James Stong, Winfred White, and the safety supervisor Mr. Dewey Cowen were intelligent level headed fellows.
They took the course quite seriously and were quite concerned about possible threats and security. Our route analysis so far indicates that on Tri-State shipnents the safety supervisor pretty.nuch sets the tone for shipment security.
I think Mr. Cowen will do a good job at thiL Several changes were noticeabia in the nen as the men as the course progressed.
They took the position of guard more seriously and in particular had more respect for the weapons. One of them told me that he used to take a gun along with him when he went out drinking but that he would not do that any more.
It is my feeling that in order for a group of guards to be effective they must be an elite disciplined unit.
I was very pleased by Tri-State's efforts in this respect.
The pro-cedural requirements for the guard uniform help maintain spit 'n, alish and the presence of the safety supervisor, if he is a good leader, mtintains the required discipline.
I was quite impressed by Tri-State's committment to maintaining the guards as an elite disciplined unit.
Nowhere was this better exemplified than at the graduation ceremony / party.
Tri-State reserved a private dining room at the best restaurant in Joplin and had a dinner for the graduating guards and their wives. After dinner the certificates of completion were pre-sented by Dean James Maupin of Missouri Southern State College.
In attendance from Tri-State were: Mr. Boyd, President; Mr. Chuck Mayer, Vice President, Nuclear Division; Mr. perkins, Vice President; and Mr. Southwick, Director of Sa fe ty.
This interest in the guard program by top managenent impressed both the graduating guards and ne with the seriousness with which the program is taken by Tri-State.
Continuing managenent interest of this nature is bound to keep the guards alert and safeguards conscious.
C-3 UNCLASSIFIED 4
I
l UNCLASSIFIED Thomas C. Thayer.
There have been three main changes in Tri-State security procedures since I last discussed Safeguards procedures' with them.
First, because of present legal problems they are no longer allowing the guards to enter truck stop facilities armed.
The guards will remain armed outside the tractor cab only during loading, unloading, and specific guard duty of the truck. Needless to say, this severely increases vulnerability to various scenarios at rest stops.
This change is partially compensated for by the implementation of a walkie-talkie to truck communications system for use at rest stops.
I feel, however, that the net effect of the two changes is to increase vulnerabilities at the stops. A third procedure change is the implementation of a duress code for radiotelephone. This system has two parts one of which is under the driver's control.
The other part allows dispatch to detect any check calls made from points significantly different from stated check points independent of any action by the driver. These procedures decrease the vulnerability to both the scenarios based on duress and those based on one insider.
Reconnendations for future action.
The issue of gun laws and deadly force must be resolved soon.
If drastic Oction must be taken to bring this issue to the attention of the Commission, Congress, and the public, it seems to me that it should be taken as soon as is politically feasible.
We should coordinate possible upN ming guard / driver training sessions with Missouri Southern State College.
Both Mr. Seneker and Mr. Spurlin are ex-cellent instructors and Mr. Spurlin has field experience in ambush and escort situationswith prisoner and witness transport as a part of Kansas City Police Organized Crime Division.
We should work toward modifications of Regulatory Guide 5.20 to improve weapons training and suggest situational training as has been discussed in this memo.
~Y John Hockert Test and Evaluation Branch 1
j C-4 UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
(
e U
APPENDIX D Event Tree Transportation Vulnerability Methodology 1
6 0-1 UNCLASSIFIED g.
UNCLASSIFIED APPENDIX 0 Event Tree Transportation Vulnerability Methodology In order to quantitatively evaluate the benefits gained from the incorpora-tion of safeguard improvements, i.e., escort vehicles and tactics, armor, armament, vehicle penetration resistance, and communications, into the regulations governi'g the transportation of special nuclear material, it is necessary to develop an analytical methodology that can be used to compute the probability of a successful attack.
The model should incorporate a complete description of the attack scenario as well as the configuration of the transporter and escort at the time of attack, the road network in the area of the attack, terrain features, and environmental. conditions at the time of the attack. Using this methodology, the attack success probability can then be studied parametrically as a function of the attack scenario and safeguard fixes employed.
At one extreme in constructing this methodology, one can develop an extensive Monte Carlo computer simulation program that would in essence be a compre--
hensive microscopically detailed war game simulation. This computer program would generate, for a given scenario, a complete time history of all the actions and interactions of all the participants, i.e. the attacking force, the transporter, escorts, external response force, etc.
For each simulation the outcome of the attack would be ascertained, and by replaying the scenario a sufficient number of times, the corresponding attack success probability could be estimated.
Variations on the computer simulation approach include the use of Lanchester type equations to simplify the determination of the outcome of any fire fight that results during the course of the attack.
Unfortunately, developing Monte Carlo computer simulation methodology of this nature requires a very extensive effort in manpower and resources and it is not certain whether parameters that need to be inputs to the model can ever be obtained with sufficient accuracy to warrant such a large develop-mental effort.
An alternate methodology approach which has been pursued during the course of the transportation vulnerability evaluation is the development of a simple event tree logic model to depict the macrosopic sequence of events that could transpire during the course of an attack on a transporter carring SNM, and the logical interrelationships that exist connecting these events. The conditional probability corresponding to the occurrence or non-occurrence of each macrosopic event that is input to the model was obtained by using a sort of Delphi polling technique:
experts were polled and asked to estimate, using their best judgement, the required input probabilities to the model.
D-2 UNCLASSIFIED
4 A generic event sequence applicable to virtually all transportation mode attack scenarios of interest is shown in Figure 1.
Each node on the event tree represents a logical event which may occur during the course of the attack scenario analyzed. The event tree consists of ten of these logically connected probabilistic event nodes which are explicitly described by the questionnaire shown in Figures 2 and 3.
The function of the questionnaire is to specify the event nodes sufficiently so that the Delphi poll may be performed and estimates of the required probabilities may be obtained for a particular scenario from " experts" and other persons familiar with the SNM transport routes and security system. For example the variable X5 would represent, in a given scenario, an estimate of the conditional probability that the police response forces can arrive at the scene of the attack before the attackers gain free access to the trailer if.the police have been alerted. The structure of the model gives a number of consistency checks among the various condition probabilities by implying specific numerical orderings. For example, in a self-consistent set of probability estimates X3 will always be greater than or equal to X -
6 In terms of the event conditional probabilities X<
through X10, defined on the questionnaire in Figures 2 and 3, the probability of a successful attack is given by:
Pa = (1-X ) X X X4 + X) 0-X ) X X #7+#1 5 8 g 10 X X X X j
2 3 5
2 6 The first term represents the contribution to the overall attack success probability from the case where the police are not alerted. The second term represents the probability contribution where the police are alerted but do not arrive at the scene of the attack in time. The last term represents the probability of attack success in the case where the police are alerted and arrive on the scene before the attackers gain free access to the trailer.
It should be noted that these three probabilities are additive since they represent mutually exclusive events.
The event tree methodology and Delphi polling technique were used to evaluate the effect of the interim and long term safeguard fixes proposed as a result of the study.
Probability estimates were obtained by polling the study participants. The resulting probabilities of attack success for scenarios I and 3 are illustrated in Figure 4.
The general trend of the results for all scenarios considered is illustrated in Figure 5.
Against the scenarios considered the interim fixes lower the probabilities of attacker success from about 75% to about 25% and the long term fixes lower the success probability _ to about 1%. Two things should be noted in considering these D-3 UNCLASSIFIED 9
UNCl.ASSIFIED results.
First scenarios specifically designed against the interm and long term fixes were not considered and would have success probabilities-greater than or equal to those illustrated. Second all probabilities illustrated are conditional probabilities given that an attack is attempted. Relating those conditional probabilities to the risk of theft of current shipments is extremely problematical.
e f
1 i
D-4 UNCI.ASSIFIED
~
UNCLASSIFIED TRANSPORTATION ATTACK EVENT SEQUENCE START ATTACK POLICE NO (1-X,)
A107 X, 3 r YES 1r ASSISTANCE YES X,
ARRIVES BEFORE
?
ACTION IS OVER?
/
CONVOY YES (1-X l COMBINED YES g
THWARTS ATTACK l'
F O RCES THWART S
NO
?
ATTACK?
h0 irX 2 S ATT ACK7 8
N/
N
- O
^
ATTACKERS NO ATTACKERS C SS S
2 3r NO ACCESS & BTAIN X
/
x NO ATTACKERS YES1rX ACCESS AN0 08TAIN Xs1r YES 3
$NM1
/
IH(F S
X,1r YES INTER
& OVERCOME S
REC 0V INS ATTACKERS $
'I
- 10 1r 0 NO' 4
PURSU IN RCEPT
& DVERCOME ATTACKERS?
X,1r N0 figure 1 D-5 UNCLASSIFIED
r l
l l
1 l
i QUESTIONNAIRE USED TO OBTAIN EVENT PROBABILITY ESTIMATES i
Probability that statement is true:
l Police will dispatch aid either because of call from the convoy or random patrol.
(X1)
C c~i 2
Attackers can overpower un-reinforced convoy defense force and access 2;
O 2
trailer at will.
(X2)
C4!
b
? ?
i P
S Given the attackers can access trailer at will, they can obtain SNM before (A!
i d
stopped by random factors.
(X3)
E 2
3[
m After theft is randomly discovered attackers can still reach a safe haven.
m-(X4)
C:
(Before the attackers have access at will to the trailer.)
(X5)
Given that police assistance is called,it can respond during the attack.
Given that police assistance is called at the beginning of the attack and the unreinforced convoy defenders are overpowered and attackers have access at will to trailer, the attackers can obtain SNM before police arrive or hold off police j
until SNM is obtained.
(X6) i
~
ww.
QUESTl0NNAIRE USED TO OBTAIN EVENT PROBABILITY ESTIMATES (Con't)
Civen that police have knowledge of the general area in which the theft occurred C
but have no description of attackers, means and direction of escape, and no units c:
[
in direct pursuit, attackers can reach safe haven.
2-r--
s (X7)
O; a
38' Given that police assistance is called and police arrive before attackers have b:
L E
m 1
Mi access at will to trailer, attackers can overwhelm both convoy defense and police response forces to gain access to trailer at will.
--l (X8)
Ti Given that police have responded to the scene but police and convoy defenders o
rys U!
have been overwhelmed and attackers have access at will to the trailer, the attackers can obtain SNM before further police reinforceinents arrive or hold off police reinforcements until SNM is obtained.
(X9)
Given that police have knowledge of the specific area of the theft, have a description of the attackers and direction of escape and may have a unit in pursuit, the attackers can reach a safe haven with SNM.
(X10)
O 9
03ldlSS03 Nil 8-0 y aan6u PROBABILITY OF SUCCESSFUL ATTACK k
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UNCLASSIFIED EFFECT OF TRANSPORTATION SAFEGUARDS FIXES 80%
i 70%
2 0
60%
E 22
@ SO%
s m
'o 40%
y SE 30%
.E 5
C E 20%
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APPENDIX E
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o Land Transportation Evaluation Team Front Row: M von Ehrenfried, Jay Durst, H. M. Mitchell Back Row:
Dr. John Hockert, Capt. G. Spies, Sgt. Don Neale, Sgt. Bobby Knight, Master Sgt. Lowell Stevens, Dr. M. Messinger Land Transportation Evaluation Team I
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Front Row: Capt. Gordon Spies, Jay Durst (Col. U.S.A./NRC) blaster Sgt. LoweU Stevens I
Back Row: Sgt. Don Neale, Sgt. Bobby Knight 1
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Appendix F import Shipment (Chicago, 4 May 76)
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