ML20155F893
| ML20155F893 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 08/20/1986 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151H280 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-88-198 NUDOCS 8810130411 | |
| Download: ML20155F893 (19) | |
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~f SATETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATIVE To APPENDIX R EXEMPTIONS REQUESTED FOR PILCRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION DOCKET No. 50-293
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated November 16, 1983, Boston Edison Company (BECo, the Licensee) requewted four exemptic J from Section III.G of Appendix R.
By letter dated December 27, 1984, the Licensee submitted additional information in support of two of the requests.
The four exemption requests are the subject of this evaluation.
NRR and Region I fire protection engineers visited the site on April 1, 1986 to review the fire protection modifications committed to be made by the Licensee for compliance with Appendix R and the fire areas where the exemptions from Appendix R had been re que sted.
AdditiongJ information furnished by the Licensee and/or gathered during the site visit was used for this evaluation.
_ b lAh Section III.G.1 of Appendix R requires kire protection j
features to be provided for structures, systems, and components important to safe shutdovn and capable of limiting fire damage so that:
One train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain j
a.
hot shutdown conditions from either the control roon or emergency control station (s) is free of fire damage; and b.
Systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown i
from either the control room or emergency control station (s) can be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Section III.G.2 of Appendix R requires that one train of i
cables and equipment necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown be maintained free of fire damage by one of the following means:
4 a.
Separation of cables and equipment and associated nonsafety circuits of redundant trains by a fire barrier having a 3-hour rating.
Structural steel l
forming a part of or supporting such fire barriers shall be protected to provide fire resistance equivalent to that required of the barrier.
4 8810130411 880907 PDR FOIA JOHNSON 88-198 PDR G/Ar
-a-1 b.
Separation of cables and equipment and associated nonsafety circuits of redundant trains by a horizonta' distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustibles or fire hazards.
In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area.
c.
Enclosure of cable and equipment and associated nonsafety circuits of one redundant train in a fire barrier having a 1-hour roting.
In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area.
If the above conditions are not met,Section III.G.3 requires that there be alternative or dedicated shutdown capability independent of the fire area of concern.
It also requires that fire detection and a fixed suppression systen be installed in the fire area of concern.
These alternative requirements are not deemed to be equivalent; however, they provide equivalent protection for those configurations in which they are accepted.
Because it is not po v ible to predict the specific conditions under which fires may occur and propagate, design basis protective features rather than the design basis fire are specified in the rule.
Plant-specific features may require protection dif ferent from the measures specified in Section III.G.
In such a case, the Licensee must demonstrate, by means of a detailed fire hazards analysis, tnat existing protection or existing protection in conjunction with proposed modifications will provide a level of safety equivalent to the technical requirements of Section III.G of Appendix R.
In summary,Section III.G is related to fire protection f eatures for ensuring that systems and associated circuits used to achieve and maintain safe shutdown are free of fire damage.
Fire protection configurations must meet the specific requirements of section III.G or an alternative 3
fire protection configuration must be justified by a fire hazards analysis.
Generally, the staff will accept an alternative fire protection configuration if:
The alternative ensures that one train of equipment o
necessary to achieve hot shutdown from either the control room or emergency control station (s) is free of fire damage, The alternative ensures that fire damage to at least one o
train of equipment necessary to achieve cold shutdown is limited so that it can be repaired within a reasonable time (minor repairs using components stored on the site).
o Fire-2n*,ardant coatings are not used as fire barriers.
o Modifications required to meet Section III.G would not enhance fire protection safety levels above that provided by either existing or proposed alternatives, o
Modifications required to meet Section III.G would be detrimental to overall facility safety.
2.0 REACTOR BUILDING, ELEVATION (-)17 FEET: TORUS COMPARTMENT (FIRE ZONE 1.30A), CONTROL ROD DRIVE QUADRANT (FIRE ZONE 1.6/1.8), AND RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL TRAIN A PUMP ROOM (FIRE ZONE 1.1) 2.1 Exemptions Requested Exeeptions were requested from Section III.G.2.a to the extent that it requires separation of redundant trains of residual heat removal (RHR), automatic depressurization system (ADS), core spray and emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump cables located in Fire Zones 1.1, 1.6/1.8, and 1.30A, respectively, by 3-hour fire rated barriers.
N 2.2 Discussion 2.2.1 Elevation (-)l7 Feet The Licensee has identified the following conditions which do not meet Section III.G.2.a:
redundant trains of the RHR, core spray, ADS, and emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump cables are not separated from each other by 3-hour rated fire barriers at the boundary between Fire Zones 1.6/1. 8 and 1. 3 0A, as well as at the boundary of Fire Zones 1.30A and 1.1.
Each of the subject fire zones is located in the reactor l
building.
The reactor building is divided by concrete l
floor slabs into six elevations (-)l7 feet, 6 inches; 2 feet, 9 inches; 23 feet; 51 feet; 74 feet, 3 inches; 91 feet, 3 inches; and 117 feet It is divided into fire areas and several fire zones).
The fire areas are separated from each other by fire rated barriers with protected openings.
The fire zones are separated from each other by fire rated barriers penetrated by unprotected openings.
This exemption request involves fire zones located on or adjacent to elevation (-)l7 feet.
The reactor building elevation (-)17 feet is divided inte five fire zones.
Fire Zone 1.30A comprises the majority of 1
this elevation.
It is bounded by Fire Zone 1.1 in the southeast, Fire Zone 1.2 in the northwest, Fire Zone 1.6/1.8 in the northeast, and Fire Zone 1.5/1.7 in the southwest quadrants of this elevation.
It is separated
4 from the four zones (quadrants) by 36-inch-thick concrete walls.
Penetrations in each wall consist of an unprotected doorway and a small number of nonrated mechanical and electrical penetrations.
Elevation (-)17 feet is connected to elevation 23 feet by open stairways located in Fire Zones 1.6/1.8, 1.1, 1.2, and 1.5/1.7.
Fire Zones 1.6/1.8 and 1.1 are open to Fire Zone 1.9 on elevation 23 feet.
Fire Zones 1.2 and 1.5/1.7 are open to Fire Zone 1.10 on elevation 23 feet.
The combustible contents of Fire Zone 1.1 consist of cable insulation and lube oil.
The combustible loading is approximately 12,200 Btu per square foot, which produces an equivalent fire severity of 9 minutes on the ASTM E-119 time-temperature curve.
Fire protection in this zone consists of smoke detectors and a manual hose station.
The combustible contents of Fire Zone 1.2 consist of cable insulation and lube oil.
The combustible leading is approxinately 12,200 Btu per square foot, which produces an equivalent fire severity of 9 minutes on the ASTM E-119 time-temperature curyp.
Fire protection in this zone consists of portable fire extinguishers, and a manual hose station.
The combustible contents of Fire Zone 1.5/1.7 consist of cable insulation and lube oil.
The combustible loading is approximately 14,400 Btu per square foot, which produces an equivalent fire severity of 11 minutes on the ASTM E-119 time-temperature curve.
The fire protection in this zone consists of smoke detectors, portable fire extinguishers and a manual hose station.
The combustible 1ontents of Fire Zone 1.6/1.8 consist of cable insulation and lube oil.
The combustible loading is 1
approximately 4,800 Btu per square foot, which produces an equivalent fire severity of approximately 4 minutes on the I
ASTM E-119 time-temperature curve.
Fire protection in this zone consists of a portable fire extinguisher and a manual hose station.
The combustible contents of Fire Zone 1.9 consist of cable insulation.
The combustible loading is approximately 39,200 Btu per square foot, which produces an equivalent fire severity of approximately 30 minutes on the ASTM E-il9 time-temperature curve.
Fire protection in this zone j
consists of portable extinguishers and manual hose
- stations, i
The combustible contents of Fire Zone 1.10 consist prim-i arily of cable insulation.
The combustible loading is approximately 30,400 Btu per square foot, which produces an equivalent fire severity of 23 minutes on the ASTM E-119 i
time-temperature curve.
Fire protection in this zone i
consists of portable fire extinguishers and manual hose
- stations, i
The combustible contents of Fire Zone 1.30A consist of 24 pounds of cable insulation in one cable tray, which is approximately 125 feet long and approximately 8,200 pounds of fire-retardant painted wood staging (scaffolding) en-c!rcling the torus.
The combustible loading is approx-ir ately 5,900 Btu per square foot, which produces an equivalent fire severity of approximately 4 minutes on the ASTM E-119 time-temperature curve.
No fire proteculon systems or equiement are installed in this fire zone.
However, there is one hose reel and one portable ex-tinguisher in each adjacent quadrant that will reach and cover this fire zone.
2.2.2 Fire Zone 1.30A Fire Zone 1.30A contains cables associated with the fol-lowing safe shutdown systems:
4 o
RHR train B Core spray train EI o
o Emergency diesel generator trains A and B fuel oil transfer pumps o
Reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) o High pressure coolant injection (HPCI) t o
Torus water temperature.
The Licensee has committed to reroute power cables out of l
Fire Zone 1.30A that feed MCC B18 components required for i
train B of the RHR and core spray systems.
The cables will i
be routed out of the reactor building through the west wall, around the exterior, and in through the east wall.
The Licensee has also committed to reroute cables associated with torus water temperature and both trains of fuel oil transfer pumps out of this fire zone as described in the Licensee's letters dated June 25, 1982 and May 17, 1
1983.
Upon completion of the modifications, no train A or B safe shutdown components or cables will be physically present in this fire zone.
However, this fire zone is not separated by complete 3-hour fire rated boundaries from Fire Zones 1.2 and 1.10, which contain train B components required for safe shutdown.
This fire zone is also open to Fire Zone 1.6/1.8 via an open stairway.
Fire Zone 1.6/1.8 does not contain any safe shutdown components, but it is open to i
Fire Zone 1.9 by an open stairwell which contains train A components required for safe shutdowr,.
Therefore, Fire Zone 1.30A provides a path between *. rain A components located in Fire Zone 1.9 and train B components located in Fire Zones 1.2 and 1.10.
The Linimum distance between train A and B components along this path is at least 100 feet horizontally (between the openings in the fire barriers separating Fire Zone 1.30A from Fire Zones 1.2 and 1.6/1.8) and 40 feet vertically between elevations (-)17 and 23 feet.
2.2.3 Fire Zenes 1.2, 1.5/1.7 and 1.10 Fire Zone 1.2 contains cables and equipment associated with train B of the RHR and core spray systems.
Fire Zone 1.5/1.7 contains cables and equipment associated with the RCIC system only.
Fire Zone 1.10 contains cables and equipment associated with train B of the RHR, ADS, core spray, and emergency i
diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump, as well as the HPCI and RCIC systems.
Fire Zones 1.2, 1. 5/1'. 7, and 1.10 are separated from each other and from Fire Zone 1.30A as described above.
In addition, Fire Zones 1.10 and 1.9 are separated from each other by a sprinkler water curtain on elevation 23 feet.
The separation distance between the train B components or cables in these zones and the closest train A-designated zone is at least 100 feet horizontally.
2.2.4 Fire Zones 1.1, 1.6/1.8, and 1.9 Fire Zone 1.1 contains cables and equipment associated with i
train A of the RHR and core spray systems.
The closest redundant train B components are located in Fire Zone 1.2, approximately 150 feet from Fire Zone 1.1, which contains i
counterpart train A.
Fire Zone 1.6/1.8 contains no safe shutdown cables or i
equipment.
However, it is open to Fire Zone 1.9 on elevation 23 feet, which contains cables associated with trains A and B of the RHR, ADS, core spray, and emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer pumps.
The Licensee has committed to relocate cables associated with train B of the above-named systems out of Fire Zone 1.9.
The closest train B components are in Fire Zone 1.2, which is located approximately 100 feet horizontally across Fire Zone 1.30A i
f rom Fire Zone 1.6/1.8, which contains train A.
2.3 Evaluation The fire protection in Fire Zones 1.30A, 1.6/1.8, and 1.1 does not co: ply with the technical require:ents of Section 4
4
7 III.G.2.a of Appendix R because redundant trains of RHR, ads, core spray, and emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump cables are not separated by fire barriers having 3-hour ratings.
The concern was that the lack of 3-hour fire rated barriers between the redundant trains may result in a 1 css of redundant safe shutdown capability.
However, the equivalent fire severity in any of these fire zones is less than 30 minutes.
Therefore, a fire of significant magnitude or severity is not expected to occur.
Also, the burning rate of the combustibles is expected to be limited because most combustibles (oil and lubricants in pumps) are enclosed or treated (fire retardant-painted wood and fire retardant-coated cable) to reduce combustibility.
If a fire should occur in Fire Zone 1.30A, it is expected i
that it would not be detected by fire detectors in Tire Zones 1.5/1.7 or 1.1.
The detectore annunciate in the i
control room to alert the control room operators.
They, in t
turn, would alert the fire brigade to respond to the reactor building and extinguish the fire.
t If the fire was not d'etected promptly, it is expected that it would not result in a loss of safe shutdown capability, I
for the following reasons:
The separation distance is 100 r
feet or more between redundant safe shutdown systems in l
Tire Zones 1.2 and 1.1 or 1.6/1.8 and the combustible loading in Tire Zone 1.30A is limited, which would not allow fire cas temperatures to exceed the limit at which damage to cables or equipment is expected to occur.
In addition, the openings between elevations (-)17 feet and 23 feet would further prevent fire gas temperatures i
criticality because of the mixing with cooler air.
If a fire occurred in one of the quadrants at elevation (-)17 feet, similar results are expected.
I With the installed fire protection features in conjunction with the committed modifications, reasonable assurance exists that a fire originating in the above-described sections of Fire Zones 1.30A, 1.2, 1.1, 1.6/1.8, or 1.5/1.7 j
would not prevent the plant from safely shutting down.
2.4 Conclusion 1
Based on the above evaluation, the staff concludes that the I
existing fire protection features combined with the proposed modifications provide an acceptable level of protection for redundant trains of the RNR, ADS, core spray, and emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer i
pumps on elevation (-)17 feet.
Therefore, the exemptions l
should be granted.
I j
i J
3.0 REACTOR BL'ILDING, TORS CCMPJ.RTMENT, ELEVATIoli (-)l7 TEE!
(TIRE 20NE 1.30A) 3.1 Exenption Requested An exemption was requested f rom Section III.G.2.a to the extent that it requires structural steel forming a part of or supporting the fire barrier between redundant trains of safe shutdown components in Fire Zone 1.30A and Tire Zones i
1.9 and 1.10 to be protected to provide fire resistance equivalent to that required of the barrier.
4 3.2 Discussion j
The concrete floor slab which separates rire Zone 1.30A from Tire Zones 1.9 and 1.10 above is supported by un-protected structural steel beams.
l J
i The combustible materials in Tire Zor.e 1.30A are primarily located 18 feet below the structural steel in the form of
)
fire-retardant painted wood staging.
The other si nificant combustible material, including cable insulation, s
j located 2 feet below the steel in a 12-inch-vide cable tray.
4 l
The Licensee has committed to modifications described in i
section 2.2.
Upon completion of these modifications, Fire Zone 1.30A vill contain only RCIC and HPCI compor.ents, which provide alternate shutdown capability for the RHR and ADS components contained in Tire Zones 1.9 and 1.10 located j
above Fire Zone 1.30A.
The Licensee has performed an analysit of the effect of instantaneous complete combustion of the entire combustible load of this fire tone on the structural steel.
The t
analysis assumed that all of the heat from the fire was j
immediately absorbed by only the steel, and tgat the steel j
vould fail if it reached a temperature of 650 T.
The Licentee's analysis indicated that based on the total i
j combustibleloading,thesteelvougdnotexperiencemore than an* average temperature of 326 T, which is well belov the 650 T assumed to fail the structural steel.
I j
3.3 Evaluation I
l The fire protection in Tire Zone 1.30A does not comply with i
the technical requirements of Section III.G.2.a of Appendix I
R because structura' steel forming a part of or supporting the fire barrier b&
' redundant safe shutdown systems in l
Tire Zone 1.30A and.
Zones 1.9 and 1.10 is not protected to provide fire resistance equivalent to that required of the barrier supported.
j E
i I
I 1
-9 l
The Licensee's analysis indicates that the structural stee; would not fail, even if it instantaneously absorbed the
{
entire heat of combustion of the combustible materials in Tire Zone 1.30A.
However, the Licensee's analysis does not take into account the effect on the steel of a fire plume impinging directly on a structural steel member.
Because i
the cable tray is located approximately 2 feet below the structural steel, a fire in the tray might create air o
temperatures as high as 650 F at the lower flange of the steel.
Therefore, there is not reasonable assurance that a i
fire in this zone would not jeopardize the structural stee; creating a situation which will impair the safe shutdown
{
capability.
]
3.4 conclusion Based on the above evaluation, the staff concludes that the I
existing fire protection features do not provide an
)
acceptable level of protection for redundant trains of i
cables and equipment located in Fire Zones 1.9 and 1.10.
]
Therefore, the exemption should not be granted.
j i
4.0 REACTOR BUILDING, STEAM TUNNEL ELEVATION 23 TEET (TIRE ZONE 1.32) 4.1 Exemption Requested l
An exemptic was requested from Section III.G.2.a to the i
l extent that it requires structural steel forming a part of or supporting the fire barrier between Fire Zone 1.32 and Tire Zones 1.11 and 1.12 to be protected to provide fire i
resistance equivalent to that required of the barrier.
a i
4.2 Discussion The Licensee has identified the following condition which does not meet Section III.G.2.at The structural steel bear supporting the floor slab separating Tire Zone 1.32 from Tire Zones 1.11 and 1.12 is not protected to provide fire resistance equivalent to that required of the barrier.
j Tire Zone 1.32 is located on elevation 23 feet.
It adjoins the containment to the north, Fire Zone 1.9 to the east, and Tire Zone 1.10 to the west.
It is located below Tire i
Zones 1.11 and 1.12 on elevation 51 feet of the reactor and 3
turbine buildings.
Fire Zone 1.32 is separated from Fire Zones 1.11 and 1.12 by a concrete floor slab supported by one structural steel i
beam.
Tire Zones 1.11 and 1.12 contain redundant safe i
shutdown systems.
1 I
The combustible contents of Fire Zone 1.32 consist of a few 4
exposed electrical esbles.
The majority of the cables in i
l l
.go.
l this fire zone are routed in conduits.
There are no other combustible naterials in the fire zone.
Fire protection j
consists of a portable fire extinguisher and a manual hose station in an adjacent area.
i The steam tunnel (Fire Zone 1.32) contains the RCIC and HpCI systens. The Licensee has stated that the loss of these systems does not prevent safe shutdown.
Fire Zones 1.11 and 1.12 contain saf ety-related core spray and PHR valves and safety-related cable trays and panels.
I The Licensee performed an analysis to determine the quantity of combustible material which wogld be required to raise the temperature of the steel to 650 F, above which it would fail to support the floor.
The ane,1ysis indicated that a combustible loading of 21,500 Btu per square foot i
would be required.
The Licensee concluda,d that, since the actual combustible loading in this fire zone is negligible, the steel would not experience high tevporature to fail.
4.3 Evaluation I
The fire protection ih Fire Zone 1.32 does not comply with I
the techt.ical requirements of Section III.G.2.a of Appendix R because structural steel forming a part of or supporting l
the fire barrier between Fire Zone 1.32 and Fire Zones 1.11 and 1.12 is not protected to provide fire resistance equivalent to that required of the barrier supported.
4
)
The Licensee's analysis indicates that *.he structural steel would not fail even if it instantaneously absorbed the entire heat of combustion of the combustible materials present in Fire Zone 1.32.
Although the Licensee's 1
analysis does not take into account the effect of a fire plume impinging directly on a structural member, because of i
the negligible combustible loading, it is not expected that such an exposure fire would be significant.
The re. tore,
reasonable assurance exists that a fire originating in this fire zone will not prevent the plant from safely shutting i
i down.
4.4 Conclusion Based on the above evaluation, the staf f concludes that the existing fire protection featuring for the structural steel in Tire Zone 1.32, which support tha floor of Fire Zones 1.11 and 1.12, provide er, acceptable level of protection j
for the redundant trai.ns of cables and equipment located in Fire Zones 1.11 and 1.12.
Therefore, the exemption should be granted, j
l i
g-,
-al-
\\
l l ',
5.0 SUMP.ARY Bar,ed on the evaluation, the staff finds that the level of fire safety in the fire zones listed below is equivalent to that achieved by compliance with the technical requirements of Section III.G of Appendix R and, therefore, the Licensee's requests for exemption in these zones should be granted:
1.
Fire Zones 1.30A, 1.1, and 1.6/1.8 Lack of fire barriers separating redundant trains of cables and equipment.
Refer to Section 2.0 for details.
2.
Fire Zone 1.32 Lack of fireproofing of structural steel support-ing or forming a part of the fire barrier between Fire Zone 1.32 and Fire Zones 1.11 and 1.12.
Refer to Section 4.0 for details.
Basad on the evaluation, the staff finds that the level of the fire safety in th% area listed below has not been shown to be in compliance with the technical requirements of Section III.G of Appendix R and, therefore, the Licensee's request for exemptien should not be granted:
1.
Fire Zone 1.30A i
Lack of fireproofing of structural steel supporting i
or forming a part of the fire barrier between Fire Zone 1.30A and Fire Zones 1.9 and 1.10.
Refer to Section 3.0 for details.
6.0 PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTORS This safety Evaluation Report was prepared by John Stang based on a Technical Evaluation Report prepared by Tranklin Research Center (TRC) under a contract with the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory commission (NRC).
Mr. J.
"1: van
{
cea**4huted-te tim ischnical vs. par ti:n ei sais' report under a subcontract with n^1f Janeen i A:::;i sus, Inc.
Augwei iG, 1986 4
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-f#
gpuc"A /57 WITED STATTS OF AERICA M.CLEM PEK1AATCR( CDMISSICN EDSTEN ELECTRIC (DF#t(
(Pilgrim i Maclear Pwer Station)
Docket No. 50-293 ej
/
(2.206 %est)
CHITIFIED ltuX Tte Docketea Of fice of the Date of Title or Description Seere tary Docurant of Docmunt d
/
11/9/71 Task Force Review, Cypass Ef fects in G Pressure Sgression Contalment 2 12/1/71 Task Force Review, E), pass Ef fects in E Pressure Sgression Contalment
[ d 9/20/72 MiC internal report by Stesten H.
Hanauer, raising seven concerns centering on the viability of the pressure-spression contalment concept 4/9/25/72 Meno f rom Joseph M. Herdrie to JoM F.
/
O'Laary, Re: acceptance of pressure-sg)pression contalment cmcept
[1/15/73 Meno from S. H. Hanauer to E. J. Bloch.
Re: Etyptes Paths on EM Pressure Sgression Contalment y
1975 Marual of Protective Action Guides and
/<'
Protective Acticns for Mxlear Accidents, EPA-520/1-75-001, EPA 1
f2/75 1.atter from >fC to all utilities omirg EM facilities with Mark i design contalments f4/75 Letter frcm PfC to all utilities omirig EMR facilities with Mark i design contairments i
i
Docket No. 50-293 (2.206) s Date Docketed Of fice of the Date Of Title secretary Docunent of Doctinent e
/
1976
- 61 Starcard 18 7-1976, Section 5.2.6,
'q a Equiprunt Control i
l'
- '*cf
- 2. 1977 Study p@lIshed by Massach;setts PLblic b
Interest Research Croop entitled
'ttaclear Evacuation Pf arrirg:
Blueprint for Chaos"
.; s....,
) 6/20/78 hkra f rom Dr. Hannuer to Dr. Hendele, T
t, tpot irg from R. mig 'A74
/, /
7/78 N.FSO474, "f, Technica l Upda te on
/
Pressure Sgpression Type Contalments In Us3 in U.S. Light Water Reactor Macl6ar Ptwer Plants"
[12/78 Union of Concerned Scient ists, "An Analysis of Chalman Henarle's Response to Senator Hart's L.atter of Jme 15,1978" I}l h1980 lE EkJlletin 80-10. "Containation of l
Nonrad i oac t i ve Sys t en and Re su l t i rg Potential for L.hronItored/Wontrolled l
Release to the Erwirortnant" 7/80 N.Mr.r 0661, %rk i Contalrrrant t.org -
Term Progran Safety Evaluation i
Report"
/. M h 8/19/80 45 Fed. Reg. 55402 4L r
<L$lg1 11/80
[
H. REC-0654 /FB.MEP-1, Rev.1, /
\\t-
"Criteria for Preparatim and Evaluation of Radiological Energency 4
Response Plans and Prepare &ess in Sprt of Raclear Poaer Plants"
/p 1981 SALP Report
// 7/20/81 Response of Boston Edison Co. to 7
Crmrerma l t h o f Ma s s achuse t t s ' Fi r s t f.,
Set of Interrogatories on Energency Plamirg i
lY1982 Cover letter fran Richard C. Yomg, Director, Of fice of Inspection ard Enforcement, MC to BEco, with MC i
)
50-293/EA 81-63 Order Modifyiry i
License Ef feetIve Irmodlately e
tbcket No. 50-293 (2.206) Date Docketed Office of the Date of Title Secretary Doci.ent of Doctrrent
/ 1982 SM.P Report J 1982 Civil Penal ty ard order re: Wdifying L
the Pilgrim Licer'se r
)8/82 Coments of At torrey Ceneral Francis X.
f
'f s/
Bellotti Relative tc, Of f-Site
'/
&nergency Plamirg for the Pilgrim tbclear Pwer Stat ion, steni t ted to F9.W f9/29/82 Report issued by Federal frergency Wnagenen t Agency, Reg i on i ent i t l ed :
"Joint State and Local Radiological BTergency Response Capabilities for the Pilgrim Power Station, Plynouth, MassacNse t ts" 10/27/82 Plant thicpe Analysis Report (m) of the Sogpression Chanber - Mark i Contalrment Long Term (TR-5310-1)
,,, 7 g 3 h1983 14 dated sttxty ptbliShed by MassacNsetts PLbile Interest Research Crotp entitied "Olueprint for Chaos ll: Pilgrim Disaster Plans Still a Disaster"
[p 7 1/83 Report on the Pilgrim tbelear Pwcr Station Siren Test, FU R t-
> f 1983 WSSPilO sttxty of two hospital (Jordan J ; ',, ' ' g Hospital, PlyTruth, and Wrton j g' 4 e/ n /f Hospl tal, Tatsiton)
. /,
e' '
- ['
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10/26/83 Plant thicpe Analysis Report (m) of p,..
/
the Torus Attached Piping - Mark I Contalrment L*rg Tenn Program i
(TR-5310-2) y
(( 1984 SN.P Report 50-293/84-34 j/
1985 SALP Report
- j. 7) 1985 P4C Inspection Report 50-293/85-13 H "% f ) 1985 ffC Inspectlon Report 50-293/85-22 J
Docket No. 50-293 (2.206) Date Docketed s
Of fice of the Date of Tltle Secretary Document of Docurent J-Jf1985 Notice of Violation (Inspection Report
/
50-293/85-32, cover letter fr a Thrras Martin, Director, Division of i
Rad i a t i on Se f e ty ard Sa f ogpa rds, ard l
Apperdix A, Not ice o f Viola t ion)
J }.1985 LER No. 85-26
% 1985 Inspection ruber 85-24 (revealed
/
security level lil violation) q 1/25i45 QJality Assurance Surveillance, 85-1,2-1
/ 1/30/85 Yb E staf f Issued Safety Evaluation R* Port h4/85 Report by Stone & Webster (prodleted
~
i' Pilgrim facility's weste would s
contain stout 1024 curies that year) h 8 } 7/85 N 0956, "Reassessment of the Technical Bases for Estirrating Source Terms" 7/12/95 Nuclear Operations Ma r (tCM) t Mercrarxisn, M85-137 trol and Verificaticn of Operating Atlans h8/8/85 50 Fed. Reg. 32138, "Polley Staterunt I
on Severe Reactor kcidents Regardirg Future Designs ard Existirg Plants
h [p 10/85 Let ter fra FB'A to MIA, outlinirg j./,w Rhn cor.: erns
,- s 3fr S
? 1/86 Let ter fra FSA to MIA, outlining
^
- r. ? 't I
'fr'f Rhn concerns l
r) f31/86 5teven Shot 1y ard Dr. Coren Thepson,
's
/ g;'/[8.-
(
"The Source Term Debate," thlon of r
Concerned Sclentist5
/ h 2/18/86
! ALP Report No. 50-293/85-99 2/21/86 l'E Infomation Notice No. 86-13 412/86
,/ y l'pecial MC Inspectico Report Y
50-293/86-06
Docket No. 50-293 (2,206).
Date Docketed Of fice of the Date of Title seeretary Doctifunt of Do:'.rnent
/ /
4/12/86 Ccn f i rma t ory k l i cn L.a t t e r (CAL) 86 -10, Issued ty Region 1 Administrator hs 1 5/21/86 Ar t ic le, Bos ton Clebe, re: PfC Cm missioners ordering the Pilgrim f acility to rarnsin stut dom teTporarily because of safety prcbiems f/ 5/22/86 Statement of 'Jarrus Asselstine before
/
the SdcoTmittet on Enerw Conservation arc Pcu r
/J 5/23/86 Statement of MC Cmmissioners at f7 hearirg before U.S. House SWecrmi t tet cc Energy Conserva t Ion j
ard Pc>e r, Bos ton Globe h
[e 5/28/86 Telephcne Intervlow with JsTes Asselstine, Boston Clobe
/ f 6/C6 NRC/CR-4594, "Es t Irra ted Sa fe ty l
r Significance of Ceneric issue 61"
)
6/6/86 m response to FBWs Octcber,1985 j
- ,g. g letter
/ f 6/9/86 Statement of Harold Denton, Director, tbclear Reactor Regulation, cuoted in i ns ide MC, Vo l. 8, te, 12 y
6/18/86 Ar t icle, Bos ton Clobe, (exarple of i
st EECo's failure to insure proper surveil lance) t (8
jg'6/18/86 Te s t irrory o f Eme rd A. Thmu s, Di v i s i on L
im^
Chief, Natural ard Tectnological i
a-(.
,s*,5, *,
Haz a rds, FBW, to f ore Ma ssachuse t t s
- ,p'.
State legislators
(> /[
6/18/86 Statement of Mr. LAbering, Dep;ty l'
I
/l 4
, before Massactusetts Director of the Massactusetts Civil f)
[ L 6/21/86 Josegh M. Herdrie, utter to the i
T,l editor, New York Titres, concernirg review issues in the E contalments 1
l 1
I J
l
Docket No. 50-293 (2.206) Date Docketed Office of the Cate of Title Secretary Docwent o f DNttmnt
/ 6/24/86 h ticlo, Boston Globe 2 6/26/86 Mnssachuse t t s Depar tment o f FLbl ic Utilities report
[7f
} 6/27/86 E,xcerpts of Massactusetts Departirent of FW i l e Ut i l i t i e s Repor t, Bos t on Gl obe ff t/ 6/28/86 S t a t arun t s try FBW ard ACIA o f f i c i a l s,
[7
/
Pa t r iot Lad]e r
[7/9/46 S t a t aren t o f J are s As s e l s t i ne, Pa t r i o t Ledger
[ 7/15/86 Petition for Show Cause Concernirg j
Pilgrim I tbclear Pcm r Station
/
7
'l2"'5
'* "" ' r = * ' 'v 6 ' oa '
'+c t o 9
J. L @, BECo re: CAL 86-10 t
f 12/86 Report issued try the Of fice of F%lic F
Sa f e ty o f the Camrormal th of Ma s sa ctus e t t s ont I t l ed "Repor t to th6 Coveenor on &rergency Preparoctwss for an Acident at the Pilgrim Pbclear Pcwier St a t lon"
/
12/19/86 Lat ter frcrn Jares M. TayIw. Director.
Of fice of Inspection ard Enforcement to Serator Colden I>
/$
1/87 Report propared try irrpeiI Corporat1on for BEco ent I t lac *Evalua tion o f Of(site Energency Preparecress in koa SurroWing the Pilgrim tbclear Pcwer Sta tion"
/[
2/20/87 Latter frcrn Thoms MJrley. Regional Mninistrator, t4C Region I to i
Senator Colden re: Delay of Meetirg with Petitioners L
[
j p 3/31/87 Mamerartisn fra FBW to FfC re: FBW s I
conciact of a self initiated review of the overall state of emergency preparmtwss at Pilgrim Station l
i
Docket No. 50-293 (2.206) 7-Date Docketed Of fice of the Date of Title Secretary Doctarent of Doctment
/
4/1/87 Le t t e r f rcm Thorn s E. W r l ey, Reg i ona l 1
Administrator, PfC Region I to Senator Colden re: Meeting betmeen P4C and Pe ti t ioners S 4/29/87 Murorantim frcm the PfC to FBW, wi th attached copy of March 1987 report try the Tcm of Plyuth teaclear l
Crrrmi t t te ent i t led "Papor t to the Selectrren on the Plyfouth l
Radiological Emergency Response Plan"
)
V/2 4/30/87 Le t ter f rcm S. Varga, PfC to R. Bi rd, BECo re: Recpest that licensee provloe details oftrodifications ard procockJral changes 5
5/26/87 Article, Boston Cicbe, re: pressure l
st4pression systers at Chernotryl and l
Pilgrim 1
J 6/4/87 Reports prepared tP/ EECo re: Evacuatlon Titre Estirrates ard Deach Population She l ter irug, Wbi l i ty inpa i red, and 1
Special Facilities
[
f6/12/87 Report try DECO re: A Northern Reception Center 6/17/87 Final SALP Report No. 86-99 (Initially Issued 4/8/87) 7/29/87 FBA Malysis of tre issues raised in i
- ,4
- the s@lect petitlon antitled p'
"Ana1ysIs of Fatergency Praparedness
..-s,..
9 ' ) ou
,f Issues at Pilgrim taclear Power sj/
Station Raised in a Petition to the v
a s
{
,, g!' '
/
&#C Deted July 15, 1986" (Attacritent A j
M
-/-
A to Director's Decision) p 7/30/87 Repor t sdml t ted ts/ BECo ent I t ied "Pilgrim taxlear F.wer Station Restart t
Plan" i
~ p [ [ 8/87 FU4iG-125), "Irtplications of the #
Accident at Cherrebyl for Safety Rm;plation of Camarcial H> clear Pmer Plants in the 1.ht ted States" I
I
Docket bb. 50-293 (2.200) Dete Dock]ted Offire of the Date of Title Secretary DoCLFent Of DoCUTWnt
/J gi8/4/87 Report from FBW entl', led r7 "Sei f Ini t ia ted Pavlevi ard interim Finding for the Pilgrim Pbclear Pwer Station" 2 8/5/87 Report stimi tted by MSSPIFC enti tled "Health Surveillance of the Pilgrim hea" as adderdm to the Pe t i t ion
[}8/6/87 Latter fra FBR to the PfC forwardirg 8/4/87 FB W report entitled "SeI f-Inl t!atod Revlow ard interim Firdirg for the Pilgrim Haclear Pwer 1
Station, Plyrouth, E" 8/21/87 Interim Director's Decision 87-14 I
Brief description of the Pilgrim Mark I th$ated Contalrrrent Design
//A
[ Lhsated Enclosure A to N.MG-0474, "Surmory of '
i
'/
PfC Staf f ktions Related to the TecMical Issues identifled in Dr. Hanaver's Marrerarum of Septerrber 20, 1912
)7 thsated PIIgrim Statton Regalatory PerfonTence a
g-History
,6 4
/r* * *g d thsa tad j
,, 7 N.MG 0713 ard 0714 "Ocetpatlonal
/. /s i
RadIatien Emosure at CerrerercIaI i$ '
POclear Power Reactors" ph h ljndated Updated survey %' the Special Lagislative Carmission on Lar Level i
Redloactive Waste bYt/ thdated Deficiency Report (CR) No.1384
[
gg thda ted 51 Fed. Reg. 29728 f/ Iy thdated PfC's Stan$ard Review Plan I
& dated 9
MSH 1400 (Heactor Safety Sttoy) j/
d I.hsated The Reactor Risk Reference Docurent -
// ~
l i
I Draf t (M.MD 1150)
/ [ # [ [ thdated i
itHD-1250, "Raport m the Acident at i
the Owrnobyl Maclear Pwer Station" I
_ - _ - - _ _ _ _