ML20154A765
| ML20154A765 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 09/05/1985 |
| From: | NRC |
| To: | NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20154A702 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-85-728 HGN-057, HGN-57, NUDOCS 8603040148 | |
| Download: ML20154A765 (28) | |
Text
5 Proposed Agenda For the September 5 Meeting Between the 11ydrogen Control Owners Croup and the Nuclear Regulatory Comission
] Discussion of Issues Af fecting Testing 9:00 - 10:30 Identified in the NRC letter dated August 16, 1985 10:30 - 11:30 Discussion of Adequacy of 4 Scale Test Facility IIcat Losees 11:30 - 1:00 Lunch 1:00 - 2:00 Coments on the NRC Staff Evaluation of Program Plan Tasks 2 - 6 2:00 - 3:00 Coments on the NRC Staff Evaluar. ion of Program Plan Tasks 8,10 and 11 3:00 - 3:30 Coments on the NRC Staff Evaluation of Tasks 13 and 14
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P 3:30 - 4:00 NRC Staff Caucun i
4:00 - 4:30 Closing Coc:ments.
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i OBJECTIVES FOR THE SEPTEMBER 5 HEETING BETWEEN THE HYDROGEN CONTROL OWNERS GROUP AND THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION STAFF o
Resolve remaining open items on the BCOG Program Plan as identified in the NRC staff's July 8,1985 letter o
Resolve open items affecting production testing as identified in the NRC staff's August 16, 1985 letter Agree on basis for initiating production testing in 1/4 scale ~
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Discuss additional work in progress on the heat loss report l
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SCOPING TESTING DATA REDUCTION AND ASSESSMENT o
NRC letter on August 16 no'ced a need for ECOG to provide additional data supporting conclusions and observations HCOG submitted a scoping test report on August 1, 1985 HCOG plans to submit an augmented report o
NRC letter commented on consistency /securacy of numbers in BCOG meeting handouts HCOG August 1, 1985 table contained modified data table which corrected errors o
NRC letter identified questions on methodology used to assess temperature repeatability and velocity / radiant heat flux repettability Augumented scoping test report will include alternate methods of establishing peak temperatures Repeatability of velocity data is still under evaluation Repeatability of heat flux data ic not significant and need not be assessed to assure repeatability of thermal environment definition
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NECESSITY TO COMPLETE ADDITIONAL TEST TO ASSESS THE EFFECT OF LOW CONSTANT-STEAM ADDITION o
BCOG completed a scoping test to assess the effect of substantially increasing the steam flow supplied with the hydrogen o
Results from this test showed no effect in the diffusion flame thermal environment o
ECOG elected to evaluate the potential effects from higher than expected steam flows because this condition was perceived to have the greatest chance of effecting the thermal environment Steam can only affect the transient if it is not condensed near the sparger exit High steam flows through the sparger would have the' greatest potential to not be fully condensed o
The results from the scoping test demonstrated that even at high steam flows, all steam is condensed in the pool, i.e. no observable increase in facility pressure o
The results from the scoping test demonstrate that there is no change in temperatue distribution at the HCU floor as a result of injecting large quantities of steam o ^ Since no effects are observable for condition in which large amounts of steam are injected, it is r_easonable_ to assume there will not be anL significant effects from using a very low steam A ow Jg
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l INCLUSION OF GRATING JUST ABOVE POOL SURFACE Initial scoping tests (S.07 and S.07.1) with grating installed o
near the pool surface in the 3150 chimney indicated very localized increases in gas temperature in both the 315o and 45o chimney In addition a localized decrease in gas temperature was observed in another region of the 450 chimney o
HCOG concluded that although such grating did not appear to have a h tantial general effect, gratingwould3 @ ded in each plant's geometric simulation to assure that any effects from grating are included in the test results Additional scoping tests (_S.lb S-lL1 and S-12.2) were then o
performed with a full complem9nt of grat1Jn at t;ne_ pool-surface (simulating Perry) as well as blockagesTo flow in the chimneys These tests indicated a significan u ener.alized_ reduc _ tion in HSU_
floor tempera <tures The effect of the a g tiona ow blockages is expected to increase such t emparnt-ntes due to stagnating _the~ upward _ flow _of i
hot cases The reduction in gas temperatures is attributed to heat removed from the flames by the grating above the pool i
A detailed assessment of the heat removal capability of the 1/4 scale grating above the pool indicates that this grating removes slightly more heat from the flames than grating which is perfectly scaled to 1/4 scale facility Based on this result, HCOG plans to gro_ceed with production __ tests o
for Perry without _ including anV-gratiDa above the_pook In parallel, an analytical effort will be completed to fully define the geometryd_" perfectly"_ scaled-grating-and to define the-degree-ofw onservatism-offered by not inc. uding_ grating _in t_he tests ev t
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CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM AVAILABILITY CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM /ECC SYSTEM DESIGN o
Two redundant trains of containment spray system are included o
The containment spray system is a subsystem of the RHR system common pump on Division 1 with LPCI-A common pump on Division 2 with LPCI-B o
Each ESF division includes two fully independent ECC systems each of which is capable of completely quenching a hydrogen generation event Division One includes LPCI-A and LPCS Division Two includes LPCI-B and LPCI -C o
Completely separate Division 3 high pressure ECCS with an independent diesel generator o
Additional high pressure makeup provided by a DC control powered safety grade RCIC system which is operable before vessel depressurization i
o :If offsite power is available, condensate and feedwater pumps would be available o
If necessary, makeup can be provided by safety grade high flow service water pumps o
Therefore many methods of coolant makeup and recovery are available besides RHR pumps
1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM AVAILABILITY (CONTINUED) o If failures were to occur which prevented injection, it would most likely not disable both containment spray systems; reasonable to assume failure mode of ECCS would still allow containment spray operability.
Loss of all power supplies and coolant makeup is' low probability and represents small core melt frequency contribution o Power supply would be available to some pumps for reactor coolant makeup Mechanical failure of remaining pumps is not a reasonable assumption Failure to provide reactor coolant makeup due to valve failure, breaker failure, logic failure, control power failure, or other failures is just as probable Most of these other failures can be remedied by the operator in time to prevent significant hydrogen production RHR A/B injection valves are inside containment and mechanical failure could not be repaired during the event Therefore failure to inject due to injection valve failure is a reasonable assumption and containment spray would be available
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CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM AVAILABILITY (CONTINUED)
Recovery of reactor coolant makeup would assuredly allow operation of containment sprays o
BGE scenario assumes all reactor coolant makeup systems are si'multaneously unavailable o
Some inventory makeup must be recovered prior to significant core melt and vessel failure o
Recovery of ECCS or other high capacity system more probable than low capacity system Recovery of only low capacity would result in significant
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core melt In order for a small capacity system to be recovered, other large capacity systems including systems with containment spray capability would also have to be available Tremendous number of high capacity systems other than those which provide containment spray are available for recovery o
Recovery of offsite power prior to significant core melt is a high probability and would provide condensate and feedwater systems Recovery of Divisions I or II Diesel Generators would always o
provide one other makeup system besides the RHR system used for containment spray
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If high capacity makeup system is recovered, almost assuredly would recover enough ECCS or other makeup sources to allow use of containment spray o
It is fully reasonable to assume availabilty of at least one train of containment spray systems to mitigate degraded core events i
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^ 4 % CA d-M4 SP]c CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM AVAILABILITY SYSTEM ACTUATION The present revision three of the BWROG Emergency Procedure o
Guideline directs the operator to actuate containment sprays before the bulk containment temperature reaches 185 degrees The BWROG EPG includes a caution which prohibits diversion of water o
to the containment sprays if the system is required to provide adequate core cooling.
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o BCOG does not believe that this caution precluMs use of the containment sprays during hydrogen generation events For the vast majority of accidents which produce hydrogen, at least two systems would be recovered allowing the operator to use a contiTnment spray system for its intended function For unlikely situations in which the operator recovers only one system, he can initially use the system to recover tl.e core, then divert water to the containment spray system to control gq ggg g
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TEST TO VALIDATE THE CLASIX-3 CODE o
NRC's August 16, 1985 letter noted that no test was now included to provide for validation of CLASIX-3 o
HCOG has completed a sco ng test with very low hydrogen injection rates Test evaluated phenomena at hydrogen flow rates of 0.07, 0.035 and 0.025 lbm/sec Test evaluated phenomena at high and low oxygen concentrations o
Test showed intermittent diffusion _ (lames on the suppression pool surface down'to flows of 0.035 lbm/sec o
Test completed on 9/3, no detailed evaluatiSn of data yet complete l
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HEAT LDSS REPORT o
NRC staff identified concerns over agreement between 1/4 scale data and heat loss report predictions j w h o
FMRC is completing revised predic a
1 y response Use actual test hydrogen release history Assume combustion initiates and extinguishes at times observed in test o
Evaluating several factors which influence predictions Background gas heat loss correlations
, Condensation on surfaces Heat loss mechanisms not treated in previous analysis Direct heat loss from flames Incompleteness of combustion Beat loss correlations for plumes f t'$
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Open Items on Tasks 2-6 o
Inclusion of__ acceptance critarinn_ in task two on mitigation system O
cost and schedule impact 80 o
Manual versus automatic system actuation f
Development of acceptance criterion on igniter circuit design o
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Issue:
Manual versus automatic syctem actuation HCOG Position: Manual initiation of Hydrogen Igniter System (HIS) is sufficient to preclude potential hydrogen combustion containment failure resulting from a hydrogen generation event (BGE).
History: - February 12, 1985 HCOG indicated during a meeting with the NRC that a significant amount of time would be available to allow the operator to manually actuate the igniters
- July 8,1985 NRC letter suggested that HCOG had not yet made an adequate case for manual actuation of the igniter system Comments:
Most analyses of HGE's show that there is approximately one f from ev_ane initat-iOD to Scaeration of.significant.
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- Qvent indicator and actuatinn nf igniters _is RPV water legel at Top-of-Active Fuel
- R_Py water leve_1 is a_ key safety paramdtes and monitored closely by the operators for accidents and transients
- Manual activation of the igniter system is a straightforward and simple action requiring only posit 19ning_ two handswitches (Div. I and Div, 2) to the "on" position
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- Operators would not_be_ hesitant.in energizing the igniter system during qbestionable scenarios as ti ey_ are passive, h
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.MAAP analysis for LOCA shows approximately X minutes from event initiation to TAF and at least 20 minutes from TAF to a wetwell hydrogen concentration of 4%
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Issue: Manual Versus Automatic Actuation (Continued)
SORV Event Analysis with ECCS codes during RPV blowdown and the BWRCHUC during core heatup show:
o Approximately lJ minutes from event initiation to TAF o
Approximately.30 minutes from event initiatlon to a wetwell hydrogen concentration _o.f 4% by vol_ume
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Th e r ef o r e, Aa f f fc'i en tMn_e__i s_ avail abl e_d u r i n g HG E '_s_
event recognition _and_ operator action.to actuate'th_e_ igniters J
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Issue:
Development of Acceptance Criteria for Igniter System Circuit Design a
tJ1LRQ HCOG_ Position - Development, of an apceptance criterion On the number of igniters allowed on a circuit is not warranted History - February 12, 1985:
In BCOG-NRC meeting HCOG indicated electrical circuit design is generally plant unique problem o
based on plant facility layout o
linked to electrical penetration availability o
linked to availability of power supplies
- July 8,1985:
NRC letter suggested BCOG still needs to develop acceptance criterion
- July 17, 1985 :
In HCOG-NRC meeting 1 ( scale test to evaluate igniter availability issues w[as sug g d
- Completed test in 1/4 scale to assess ffect f igniters out_
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$ No pocketing of hydrogen U;3 IIN b>7 WMNQ
-Testhasdemonstratedthattheoriginaldesignlcriteris are excessively conservative
- Electrical circuit design iraplementing criteria are plant unique t
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Issues Validation of CLASIX-3 Against NTS data.
ECOG Position - Limited Scope Evaluation is Possible History - Feb. 12, 1985:
In HCOG-NRC meeting, HCOG suggested CLASIX-3 NTS comparisons were unnecessary o
NTS was single compartment facility o
Minimal heat sinks in NTS o
Comparisons would not be meaningful in context of Mark III July 8,1985:
NRC letter suggested HCOG should complete comparisons StaiUS - HCOG has completed limited validation of CLASIX-3 against NTS Comparisons show CLASIX-3 provides conservative predictions New task will be added to Program Plan e
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open Items-on Tasks 8 and 1A o
Use of multiple hydrogen and steam release histories in CLASIX-3 analysis o
Combustion parameters to be used in analysis s
o Variation in assumed operator response times k
o Break sizes considered in Task 10 o
Acceptance criteria for hydrogen ~ combustion induced pool swell
Issue:
Use of Multiple Hydrogen and Steam Release Histories in CLASIX-3 Analyses.
I BCOG Position - HCOG will evaluate effect of decreasing hydrogen and steam flow rate History - NRC letter dated 6/4/85 accepted precept of hydrogen production " spike" followed by constant tail for testing and analysis
- NRC letter dated 7/8/E5 suggested HCOG should consider varying the hydrogen and steam release histories used in containment response analysis Comments - 1/4 scale testing has demonstrated diffusion flamen occur at hydrogen flow rates down to.07 lbm/sec (full. scale)
- Use of a long term hydrogen injection of.1 lbm/sec in CLASIX-3 should be very conservative
- Use of high hydrogen flow rates clearly in diffusion flame regime for " spike" portion of the transient is not reasonable
- HCOG's intent is to use 1/4 scale test data for the hydrogen production spike to establish initial.CLASIX-3 conditions
- CLASIX-3 analysis would then be completed for the " tail" portion of the release history
- Using 0.1 lbm/sec hydrogen production " tail" represents a reasonable upper bound for deflagration analysis.
ECOG will also complete an analysis using 0.05 lbm/sec hydrogen flow rate with 1/2 the long term steam production N
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Combustion Parameters Used in Analysis HCOG P_osition - Combustion parameters proposed are appropriate i
History - February 6, 1985:
In HCOG-NRC meeting, HCOG contended that proposed combustion parameters were appropriate
- April 2, 1985:
NRC letter indicated combustion parameters proposed for CLASIX-3 validation using 1/4 scale data were unacceptable
- May 22, 1985:
In HCOG-NRC meeting, HCOG contended that 1/4 scale - CLASIX-3 validation would demonstrate ceneervatism in approach
- June 4,1985:
NRC letter accepted BCOG's position on combustion parameters for use in validating CLASIX-3 against 1/4 scale data
- July 8,1985.NRC letter not clear on acceptability of HCOG assumptions Comments - 1/4 scale tests completed to date show CLASIX-3 calculations are signif MiiiEly more severc
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- CLASIX-3 analyses completed to date have used excessively conservative assumptions
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- Mess.,, conservative assumptions is justi_flable based on extensive evaluation iT t~estlata and BEried on early 1/4 scale results.
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d Issue Variations In Assumed Operator Response Times In CLASIX-3 BCOG PositiOD - HCOG will evaluate the effects of varying the assumed times for operator action on spray actuation, and depressurization of the reactor pressure vessel in small break LOCAS History - February 6, 1985:
HCOG contended in BCOG-NRC meeting that variations in operator response times should not be considered in CLASIX-3 analyses
- J uly 8, 1985 :
NRC letter indicated operator response time should be considered r
Comments - Only operator actions which can affect CLASIX-3 analysis arc 5
o actuation of hydrogen mixing systems o
actuation of containment sprays o
manual depressurization in small break accidents I
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- Actuation of hydrogen mixing systems has an insignificant effect on transient
- HCOG does not agree that delays in operator actuation of containment sprays should be evaluated o
Long time interval available before high temperatures reached o.Significant operator attention would be devoted to containment temperature o
Emergency Procedure Guidelines direct operator to actuate sprays before containment temperature reaches 185'F
- Delay l_n_ operator actuation of spr_ays will be evaluated by completing a CLASIX-3 analysis where containment spray actuation is delayed by 5 minutes in order to (2 solve the staff's concefns p,....,
Issue; Break siJes considered in Tack 10 BCOg Pos.itiDD -
Hydrogen control system design should be bassed on the Scenarios with the highest pIObability of hydrogen combustion containment failure (UCCF)
History - February 12, 1985; HCOG Indicated in meeting with NRC that large breaks were less likely to lead to recoverable degraded core accidents.
- July 8,1985 NRC letter indicated that HCOG should consider break sizes corresponding to mainsteam line, feedvater and recirculation line breaks CommeDim - From RSSMAP, therc are only three dominant sequences which contribute to HCCF o
All three sequences are transient initiated
- Only one dominant accident sequence involving LOC 3 was identified for GGNS o
This sequence (SI) was initiated by a small LOCA and contributed 13% to the total core melt frequency (CMF) o HCCP is not predicted to occur for Drywell Dreak l
Scenarios with the highest core melt frequency:
containment failure tespits from over_ pressurization 41e to igppression pool _M atup Q
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- Large drvwell_ brea_ka were also evaluated by RSSMAP, however their contribution to the GGNS total _ CMP was small (<l%) as compared to the small break sequence l
- ECOG selected tran lent initiated sequences which could potentially-resultln CCFZaGhe appr6priate _HIS_.b_ase g ae scegario for desi'gn of the HIS.
l o.S9101 Falected__ng a-nurroga_te for other dominant sequences which' result in McCf~'-
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To be conservative, UCOG aEaly2eL a drywell-break. accident in order to evaluate the effect of possible hydrogen combustion on drywell equipment and structures o Small break selected since higher CMP contributilon o Size of' break chosen to be same as SEV to allow use of san:e mase/ energy release history and it is conservative No larger break sizes need be conaldered for analysic M i s suba Wp o
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Open Items _on Task 11 l
Assuring equipment survives differential, pressure produced by' o
hydrogen combustion
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Verifying heat transfer.mSdcling technigsss i
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o Definition of thermally limiting component
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Issue:
Assuring Equipment Survives Differential Pressure BCOG PositJRD: Comparison of peak prennure-produced by hydrogen combustion' d h component qualification pr_esnnre provides adequate assessment of equipment ability to survive hydrogen combustion History - July 8,1985:
NRC letter identified questions on adequacy of HCOG's program to assess pressure effects comments - Qualification testing is completed such that component qualification preesteinf-f+otively a differential, pressure
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- Current HCOG program a.dequately addresses differential pressures produced by hydrogen combustion 9
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Temperature reached by Components During Qualification Testing HCOG P_ps1119D - Qualification testing is generally completed such that components reach peak temperature in qualification profiles Bistory - January 31, 1985:
In HCOG-NRC meeting, HCOG explained that qualification testing for'BWRs occurs over long period of time.
Components have ample opportunity to reach _ thermal gquilibrium with test environment
- July 8, 1985:
NRC letter indicated BCOG should complete an analysis to show component temperatures reach qualification temperature comments - Qualification tanting on BWRs takes place over a period in excess of three hours to account for small break accidents.
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- Peak-qualificatinn temperature is applied to components for g)1 n ontire period-1
- R, COG-=cmbers vil E I-w= environmental.gualification temneratura nrnfiles to assure components reach peak temperature.
- An a,nalynin to demonstrate componente aquilibrate to peak qualification temperature is unnecessary g
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Definition of Thermally Limiting Component ECOG Position:
Thermally limiting component is the _ component or subassembly which is most likely to fail due.to temperature transielits.
History:
July 8,1985:
NRC letter appears to identify two conflicting definitions.for thermally limiting component o
Q_olment-5 under task 11 states EMEA required _, critical component may not be_most_ heat _ sensitive _
o Comment on acceptance criteria 4 and 6 states critical component must have lowest failure _temperaturf Comments - HCOG interprets the staff's comments to mean that if the m.pstJ1gadensitive compon3nt_does not_ survive, BCOG can utiliva n FMPA Pn dqmonstrate_that.311S JQmpOngpt is_not requir'ed toJnsure that the _ piece of equipment will function
(' survive combustion-fhe EMEA will antablish-the-critical component _which mu~st ~
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Issue:
Limited Evaluation of High Hydrogen Concentration Data HCOG Position:
Limited evaluation of applicability of high hydrogen concentration pre-mixed combustion thermal environments will be completed History - February 12, 1985:
In HCOG-NRC meeting, HCOG contended that Mark III plants won't experience combustion at high hydrogen concentrations.
Ergo, no reason exists to evaluate high concentration test data from NTS
- J uly 8, 1985 :
NRC indicated in letter that many factors affect thermal environment besides hydrogen cancentration Comments - HCOG wi1L.eaaluate temperatura prnfiles from NTS for high hydrogen concentration J sts againat tempera _ture_histor-i-es predicted by ennsT'l
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l Open Itsrs on Tasks 13 and 14 o
BCOG is planning on submitting the draft EPG by Mid-October
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o Limited evaluation of Pre-mixed NTS data with hydrogen concentration at or above 10%
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UNITED STATES
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August 28, 1985 f
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Docket No. 50-440, 50-416, 50-417
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50-458, 50-459, 50-461 q
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Elinor G. Adensam, Chief ]/g(_.
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Division of Licensing
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FROM:
Carl R. Stahle, Project Manager Licensing Branch No. 4 Division of Licensing
SUBJECT:
FORTHCOMING MEETING WITH HYDR 0 GEN CONTROL OWNERS GROUP 3
(HCOG) FOR MARK III PLANTS DATE & TIME:
September 5, 1985 9:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m.
LOCATION:
Phillips Building, P-110 Bethesda, MD PURPOSE:
To discuss the Hydrogen Control Program Plan and Test Matrix PARTICIPANTS:
NRC C. Stahle, V. Benaroya, C. Tinkler, K. Parczewski, H. Garg W. Houston, B. Sh.eron, W. Johnston, K. Knfel, L. Kintner, J. Stefano, S. Sterri, J. Rosenthal HC0G S. Hobbs, et al f
a Carl R. Stahle, Project Manager Licensing Branch No. 4 Division of Licensing cc: See next page I
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Mr. crant A. Spangenberg Clinton Power Station Illinois Power Company Unit I cc:
Mr. Allen Samelson, Esquire Jean Foy, Esquire Assistant Attorney General 511 W. Nevada Environmental Control Division Urbana, Illinois 61801 Southern Region 500 South Second Street Richard B. Hubbard Springfield, Illinois 62706 Vice President Technical Associates Mr. D. P. Hall 1723 Hamilton Ave. - Suite K Vice President San Jose, CA 95125 Clinton Power Station P. O. Box 678 Clinton, Illinois, 61727 Mr. H. R. Victor Manager-Nuclear Station Engineering Dpt.
Clinton Power Station.
P. O. Box 678 Clinton, Illinois 61727 Sheldon Zabel, Esquire Schiff, Hardir. & Waite 7200 Sears Tower 233 Wacker Drive Chicago, Illinois 60606 Resident Inspector U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission RR 3, Box 229 A Clinton, Illinois 61727
-Mr. R. C. Heider Project Manager Sargent & Lundy Engineers 55 East Monroe Street
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Chicago, Illinois 60603 Mr. L. Larson Project Manager General Electric Company 175 Curtner Avenue, N/C 393 San Jose, California 95125 Regional Administrator, Region III 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 qpyg.
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Mr. Jackson B. Richard Mississippi Power & Light Company Grand Gulf Nuclear Staiton cc:
Robert B. McGehee, Esquire The Honorable William J. Guste, Jr.
Wise, Carter, Child, Steen and Caraway Attorney General P.O. Box 651 Department of Justice Jackson, Mississippi 39205 State of Louisiana Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804 Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esquire Bishop, liberman, Cook, Purcell Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley, Jr.
and Reynolds Vice President, Nuclear Operations 1200 17th Street, N.W.
Mississippi Power & Light Company Washington, D. C.
20036 P.O. Box 23054 Jackson, Mississippi 39205 Mr. Ralph T. Lally Manager of Quality Assurance Office of the Governor Middle South Services, Inc.
State of Mississippi P.O. Box 61000 Jackson, Mississippi 39201 New Orleans, Louisiana 70161 Attorney General Mr. Larry F. Dale, Director Gartin Building Nuclear licensing and Safety Jackson, Mississippi 39205 Mississippi Power & Light Company P.O. Box 23054 Mr. Jack McMillan, Dirc: tor Jackson, Mississippi 39205 Solid Waste Mississippi State Board of Health Mr. R. W. Jackson, Project Engineer 880 lakeland Bechtel Power Corporation Jackson, Mississippi 39206 15740 Shady Grove Road Gaithersburg, Maryland 20760 Alton B. Cobb, M.D.
State Health Officer Mr. Ross C. Butcher State Board of Health
-Senior Resident Inspector P.O. Box 1700 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Jackson, Mississippi 39205 Route 2, Box 399 Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150 President Claiborne County Board of Supervisors Regional Administrator, Region II Port,Gibson, Mississippi 39150 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 101 Marietta Street, N.W., Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Mr. J. E. Cross, General Manager Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Mississippi Power & Light Company P.O. Box 756 Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150 O
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Mr. Murray R. Edelman Perry Nuclear Power Plant The Cleveland Electric Units 1 and 2 Illuminating Company cc:
Jay Silberg, Esq.
Mr. Larry O. Beck Shaw, Pittman, & Trowbridge The Cleveland Electric 1800 M Street, N. W.
Illuminating Company Washington, D. C.
20006 P. O. Box 97 E-210 Perry, Ohi-44081 Donald H. Hauser, Esq.
The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company P. O. Box 5000 Cleveland, Ohio 44101 Resident Inspector's Office U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmmission Parmly at Center Road Perry, Ohio 44081 Regional Administrator, Region III U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 Donald T. Ezzone, Esq.
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 105 Main Street Lake County Administration Center Painesville, Ohio 44077 Ms. Sue Hiatt OCRE Interim Representative 8275 Munson iMentor, Ohio 44060 Terry J. Lodge, Esq.
618 N. Michigan Street Suite 105 Toledo, Ohio 43624 John G. Cardinal, Esq.
Prosecuting Attorney Ashtabula County Courthouse Jefferson, Ohio 44047 O
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Mr. William J. Cahill, Jr.
Gulf States Utilities Company River Bend Nuclear Plant cc:
Troy B. Conner, Jr., Esq.
Ms. Linda B. Watkins/Mr. Steven Irving Conner and Wetterhahn Attorney at Law 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 355 Napoleon Street Washington, D.C.
20006 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70802 Mr. William J. Reed, Jr.
Mr. David Zaloudek Director - Nuclear Licensing Nuclear Energy Division Gulf States Utilities Company Louisiana Department of P. O. Box 2951 Environmental Quality Beaumont, Texas 77704 P. O. Box 14690 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70898 Richard M. Troy, Jr., Esq.
Assistant Attorney General in Charge Mr. J. David McNeill, III State of Louisiana Department of Justice William G. Davis, Esq.
234 Loyola Avenue Department of Justice New Orleans, Louisiana 70112 Attorney General's Office 7434 Perkins Road Resident Inspector Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70808 P. O. Box 1051 St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775 H. Anne Plettinger 3456 Villa Rose Drive Gretchen R. Rothschild Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70806 Louisianians for Safe Energy. Inc.
1659 Glenmore Avenue Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70775 James W. Pierce, Jr., Esq.
P. O. Box 23571 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70893
-Regional Administrator, Region IV U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Executive Director for Operations 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76011 O
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