ML20153G928
| ML20153G928 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant |
| Issue date: | 09/25/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20153G909 | List: |
| References | |
| 70-7002-98-13, NUDOCS 9809300267 | |
| Download: ML20153G928 (16) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION ll1 Docket No:
70-7002 Certificate No:
GDP-2 Report No:
70-7002/98013(DNMS) i Facility Operator United States Enrichment Corporation Facility:
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Location:
3930 U.S. Route 23 South P.O. Box 628 Piketon, OH 45661 Datas:
Ju!y 20 through August 30,1998 inspectors:
D. J. Hartland, Senior Resident inspector C. A. Blanchard, Resident inspector Approg ed By:
Timothy D. Reidinger, Acting Chief Fuel Cycle Branch Division of Nuclear Materials Safety l
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i 9809300267 980925 T
(DR ADOCK 07007002 l
EXECUTNE
SUMMARY
United States Enrichment Corporation Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant NRC inspection Report 70-7002/98013(DNMS)
This inspection report includes aspects of plant operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support. The report covers a six week period of routine resident inspections.
Plant Operations e
The certificatee made a non-conservative decision to continue affected operations after identifying that 15 Nuclear Criticality Safety Approvals had not been approved by the Plant Operations Review Committee. One violation was identified. (Section 01.1) e The inspectors observed some weaknesses during an emergency response to the X-705 Building. The inspectors observed that the certificatee implemented lessons leamed during a subsequent response. (Section 01.2)
Maintenance e
The inspectors did not identify any issues with regards to restoration of the Tails Siation following the May 1998 release. (Section M1.1)
Enaineerina e
The inspectors noted that spurious thermocouple failures continued to challenge autoclave safety systems. One inspector followup item (IFI) was identified.
(Section E21)
The inspectors noted that the certificatee had minimum historic engineering data to e
assist system engineers with resolving system and component problems. Additionally, the inspectors identified that the certificatee had not effectively implemented a formal trend analysis program. One IFl was identified. (Section E2.2)
Plant Support l
The inspectors identified a minor violation with two examples regarding infractions to e
the Site Security Plan during the inspection period. In response to these and other events, the certificatee was developing a corrective action plan to address the apparent adverse trend. One unresolved item was identified. (Section P8.1) i 2
Report Details
- 1. ODerations 01 Conduct of Operations 01.1 Continued Operation Without Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) Aporoved Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSAs) a.
Inspection Scope (88100)
The inspectors reviewed plant operations to verify compliance with Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) and other certificate requirements, b.
Observations and Findinas On August 25, the certificatee discovered that 15 plant NCSAs had not been approved by PORC as required by TSR 3.10.5.f. The NCSAs were prepared hack in 1995 and were inadvertently not included in the PORC reviews required by Compliance Plan issue 8. The certificatee convened a " mini-operational assessment team (OAT)" to review the issue and recommend required actions. The mini-OAT reviewed the controls in the affected NCSAs and concluded that they were adequate.
In addition, the mini-OAT identified a discrepancy while verifying that the affected NCSA controls were flowed down into approved plant procedures. The mini-OAT identified that a non-conservative assay limit was flowed down from NCSA 0330-009-001, " Flushing / Cleaning of 1-1/2 Vented Cavity Pipes and Compressor "B" Seal Cavities." A revision to the NCSA that raised the assay limit from 3.5 weight percent to 10 weight percent had not been implemented, but the flowdown procedure allowed for up to 10 weight percent enrichment before the NCSA revision. The certificatee immediately placed a stop work notice on the activity and made a four hour verbal notification to the NRC. The certificatee later retracted the event after it was determined that the 10 weight percent assay limit was analyzed by another NCSA.
The following day, the inspectors noted that the certificatee did not initiate stop work notices to prevent from performing activities associated with the other 14 NCSAs, and did not take immediate action to have those NCSAs PORC approved as required by the TSR. After further discussion and review, the certificatee initiated six additional stop work notices. The affected activities included: B-25 box storage, use of portable High Efficiency Particulate Air ventilation for maintenance activities, compressor seal movement and handling, and general handling of cylinders at the X-342 Building. The other eight NCSAs involved operations no longer performed, and the NCSAs were canceled.
10 CFR 76.93, " Quality Assurance," requires that the Corporation shall establish, maintain, and execute a quality assurance program satisfying each of the applicable requirements of American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) NOA-1-1989,
" Quality Assurance Program Requirements for Nuclear Facilities."
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ASME NQA-1-1989, Basic Requirement 16, " Corrective Action," states that conditions adverse to quality (CAQs) shall be identified promptly and corrected as soon as possible.
Item S2 of Appendix A of XP4-BM-Cl1002," Problem Report Screening Process," lists a TSR violation as a specific example of a significant CAQ.
Contrary to the above, on August 25, the certificatee did not take prompt action to correct a significant CAQ. Specifically, the certificatee identified that 14 NCSAs had not received PORC approval as required by TSR 3.10.5.f., but continued affected operations until NRC involvement the following day. This is a Violation (VIO 70-7002/98013-01).
c.
Conclusion The certificatee made a non-conservative decision to continue affected operations after identifying that some NCSAs had not been PORC approved.
01.2 Weaknesses Observed Durina Emeraency Response a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors observed the certificatee's performance during emergency responses.
b.
Qbservations and Findinas On August 12, during normal rounds, an operator discovered an uranium solution leaking from overhead off-gas piping of the "C-ioop" pre-evaporator for the uranium recovery system in the X-705 Building. The operator took immediate action to shut down the system, evacuate the building, and notify the emergancy response team.
l The certificatee estimated that between 20-50 gallons was released from the system and collected within the floor's diked system be;ow. No injuries or release to the environment resulted. Upon arrival at the scene, the incident commander (IC) activated the OAT to provide technical assistance. The inspectors observed some weaknesses during the certificatee's response to the event:
e There appeared to be some communication problems among the amergency i
re.Sponders and the OAT with regards to the location of air samples taken for chemical hazard. The OAT reported that the samples were taken "immediately above the spill area." During discussions with the inspectors afterwards, the IC believed that the air samples were taken just inside the door leading to the recovery area. The inspectors leamed later from fire department personnel that the samples were taken about midway between the two extremes, a few feet t
inside the recovery area door.
e The inspectors also observed that no airbome samples were taken for radioactivity prior to declaring an "all clear" for the emergency response. The inspectors noted that the off-gas piping carried vapor that could have potentially resulted in high airbome levels. The IC apparently believed that the air sampler located at the spill location was an alarming type that would have alerted the l-l 4
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responders to high levels. However, the certificatee continued to control access to the recovery area after the "all clear," and subsequent air samples taken afterward indicated background radiation levels.
i The inspectors also noted that the building homs were not sounded prior to e
evacuating the building. As a result, an individual inadvertently entered the building office area from the X-700 Complex. The individual immediately
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realized that an emergency response was in progress and exited the building.
The following day, the inspectors observed an emergency response to a reported explosion in the X-705 Building. The certificatee determined that the explosion was due to the failure of an exhaust fan blower. Again, no release to the environment resulted. The inspectors observed that the certificatee addressed the weaknesses from the previous day, including improved communications, performing air samples for radioactivity prior to declaring "all clear," and the use of the building homs to evacuate the building.
c.
Conclusion i
The inspectors observed some weaknesses during an emergency response to the l
X-705 Building. The inspectors observed that the certificatee implemented lessons leamed during a subsequent response.
08 Miscellaneous Operations issues 08.3 Certificatee Event Reports (90712)
The certificatee made the following operations-related event reports during the inspection period. The inspectors reviewed any immediate safety concems indicated at the time of the initial vrctal notification. The inspectors will evaluate the associated written reports for each of the events following submittal, as applicable.
Number Date Status Title 34557 07/21/98 Closed 1-Hour Report - Records management database marked as unclassified contained classified information.
The inspectors identified that the certificatee performed walkdowns of associated facilities to verify that the requirements for opening, maintaining, and securing classified database equipment were conducted in accordance with procedural requirements.
This item is closed.
34677 08/24/98 Closed Ohio Environmental Protection Agency notification of X-600 Steam Plant opacity exceedence.
The inspectors noted a boiler in the X-600 Steam Plant momentarily exceeded opacity operational limits during the manual startup of this boiler after the scheduled yearly preventive maintenance program. This item is closed.
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l 08.2 Bulletin 91-01 Reports (97012)
The certificatee made the following reports pursuant to Bulletin 91-01 during the inspection period. The inspectors reviewed any immediate NCSA concems associated with the report at the time of the initial verbal notification. Any significant issues emerging from these reviews are discussed in separate sections of this report or in future inspection reports.
Number Date Title 34567 07/23/98 24 Hour Report - Deficient volume in NCSA procedure -
1 did not adequately cover the heterogeneous configuration.
l 34609 08/06/98 24 Hour Report - NCSA requirement not maintained in X-343 Vaporization and Sampling Facility.
34635 08/12/98 Leak of 20-50 gallons of uranyl nitrate solution inside X-705 Decontamination Building.
1 34655 08/19/98 4 Hour Report - Unanalyzed condition discovered during uranium oxide reclamation in X-705 Decontamination Building.
34687 08/26/98 4 Hour Report-Groupings of U-tube samples of UF6 while in transport and in cascade buildings not covered by
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NCSA.
34699 08/27/98 24 Hour Report - Container in X-330 Building not bagged correctly per NCSA-PLANT 001 requirement #4.
34700 08/27/98 24 Hour Report - Three polybottles containing PCBs and possible uranium bearing oil were stored in unapproved storage racks.
34712 08/29/98 24 Hour Report - Several containers found in small diameter storage container area were not bagged correctly.
08.2 (Closed) CER 70-7002/97-17: Cascade Automatic Data Processing (CADP) smoke detectors S-68 and S-85 alarmed in X-333 Building Area Control Room No.1. The certificatee determined that the system actuated from an outgassing of UF6 caused by a break in an abandoned and capped-off 1/4 inch instrument line. The certificatee's root cause investigation determined that a crimp caused a stress point break in the instrument line. The inspectors identified that the line was repaired. This item is closed.
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08.3 (Closed) CER 70-7002/97-18: Improperly loaded and shipped cylinders in overpacks from Portsmouth to Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant. Upon discovery of the improper loaded cylinders into overpacks, the certificatee stopped shipments and opened and inspected other overpacks to confirm that the cylinders were properly loaded.
Additionally, the certificatee performed training to emphasize proper cylinder loading into overpacks and changed Procedure XP4-TE-FD2400, " Shipping and Receiving Large UF6 Cylinders," to provide improved guidance. This item is closed.
II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 Review of Tails Restoration Activities a.
Inspection Scope (88102 and 88103)
The inspectors obsented selected safety system surveillance and maintenance activities to verify that activities performed were in accordance with the TSRs and -
4 procedural requirements.
4 b.
Observations and Findinas For the maintenance and surveillance activities listed below, the inspectors verified one or more of the following: testing was performed in accordance with procedures; test instrumentation was calibrated; limiting conditions for operation were met; removal and i
restoration of the affected components were properly accomplished; test results conformed with TSRs, procedural requirements, and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; and, any deficiencies identified during testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
j Maintenance and Surveillance Activity e
Work Order No. 9806048-01, Test Autoclave No. 2 grading installation for soundless and support in X-342 Building.
e Work Order No. 9758902-01, Install roll motor packing gland retainer and functional test Autoclave No. 2 in X-342 Building.
e Work Order No. 9824490-04, Replace Autoclave No. 2 roll motor gearbox in X-342 Building.
e Work Order No. 9830503-02, Perform annual Preventative Maintenance on LAW crane.
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Work Order No. 9828880-02, Modify configuration of solenoid valve and install control solenoid, in addition, the inspectors reviewed selected work packages and performed a system walkdown to verify that the certificatee took appropriate corrective action prior to 7
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retuming the Tails Station to service following the May 8,1998, release. The l
inspectors noted that the actions, as documented in Engineering Evaluation POEF-821-98-059, included the following:
e Replacement of failed transmitter PBM-1678.
e Visual examination of the system piping due to the potential of damage from the pressure transient.
e Removal of system valve bonnets and visually examination of the valve bellows l
for defects.
e Performance of pressure and vacuum leak test of process piping.
Maintenance and testing of piping housing steam distribution system.
The inspectors did not identify any issues and the certificatee successfully retumed the Tails Station back to service on August 3.
c.
Conclusions The inspectors did not identify any issues with regards to restoration of Tails following the May 1998 release.
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues M8.1 (Open) Violation (VIO) 70-7002/97005-02: Failure to provide approved procedures for complex safety-related work activities. As corrective action, the certificatee developed more specific guidance for maintenance managers and planning personnel to identify what activities would be required to be performed by formal procedures. However, the inspectors continued to identify examples of inappropriate use of work instructions which indicated that the guidance was not effectively being implemented.
In response, the certificatee performed a review of archived work instructions and developed a list of activities believed to be complex in content to be considered for incorporation into approved procedures. The certificatee were developing a plan for completion of procedures for those activities. The certificatee also provided training to maintenance supervisors and planners of criteria to evaluate new work activities for complexity and the use of procedures. The inspectors will continue to monitor certificatee performance in this area.
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e 111. Encineerina E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment E2.1 Autoclave Thermocouple Failures a.
Inspection Scope (88101)
The inspectors reviewed the certificatee's action to resolve chronic autoclave thermocouple failures.
b.
Observations and Findinos The inspectors noted that failed thermocouples continued to challenge the autoclave safety system. Inspection Report 70-7002/98002 discussed two common thermocouple failure modes. These common failure modes were either a failed autoclave thermocouple or a feed-through (fitting used to protect and seal the thermocouple wires through the autoclave shell). The thermocouple and feed-through failures resulted in a high autoclave cylinder temperature signal which closed the autoclave steam supply valves. To address thermocouple and feed-through failures, the certificatee changed the type of wire insulation and feed-through material in January 1998. However, spurious thermocouple failures and resultant safety challenges to the autoclave system have continued to be exhibited.
The inspectors noted that 16 thermocouple failures occurred between January 21 and August 21,1998. The inspectors noted that nine of these 16 failures occurred while the autoclaves were either in Mode 11, IV, or VI (Heating, Feeding, Transfer or Sampling, or Controlled Feed) which challenged the autoclave safety system. As a result, the certificatee was evaluating additional recommendations from the vendor to enhance thermocouple reliability. The recommendations addressed material compatibility with the steam environment, electrical connection between the thermocouple and leads, independent component testing during manufacturing, and cylinder magnet mounting enhancements. The certificatee's autoclave thermocouple corrective action plan included the installation of a redesigned autoclave thermocouple by November 18,1998. The inspectors will follow the certificatee's action to correct autoclave thermocouple failures as an inspector Followup Mem (!Fl 70-7002/98013-02).
c.
Conclusion The inspectors noted that spurious autoclave thermocouple failures continued to challenge autoclave safety systems. The inspectors will continue to monitor the certificatee's actions to resolve the problem. One IFl was identified.
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E2.2 Eauioment History Proaram Review a.
Inspection Scope (88100)
The inspectors reviewed the certificatee's method to document and analyze past component design changes in an effort to improve plant safety through improvements l
in system reliability.
b.
Observations and Findinas The inspectors noted persistent component failures in the process buildings and feed / withdraw facilities that challenged safety systems. Specifically, the inspectors identified the following persistent component failures over the inspection period:
e Problem Report (PR) 98-0551 identified an adverse trend in CADP system component failures in X-333 Building.
PR 98-05457 documented an unacceptable number of autoclave steam supply and containment valve failures in X-344 Building.
PR 98-05749 documented an adverse trend in autoclave thermocouples failures The inspectors noted through record review and discussions with certificatee management and system engineers that the above identified component problems have continued to occur over the past several years. Additionally, the inspectors found minimum engineering documentation that addressed the outcome of past system or component changes to assist in resolving current system or component failures. In addition, the inspectors noted that system engineers had limited knowledge conceming historic changes made to components and systems.
The inspectors reviewed the certificatee's process to capture knowledge gained through component design changes. The inspectors reviewed Procedure XP2-GP-GP1040, " Equipment History Program," issued on August 29,1997. In discussion with the inspectors, the Reliability Manager explained that Procedure XP2-GP-GP1040 was developed, in part, as a tool to resolve component and system failures for system engineers. The inspectors identified that Procedure XP2-GP-GP1040 did provide the structure to capture knowledge gained through component design changes but that the certificatee had not effectively implemented the formal trend analysis required by the procedure.
In response to the inspectors' issue, the certificatee committed to implement the formal trend analysis program by September 26,1998. The inspectors will continue to assess the certificatee's performance with regards to trend analysis as an inspector Followup item (IFl 70-7002/98013-03).
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1 c.
Conclusion The inspectors concluded the certificatee had minimum historic engineering data to assist system engineers with resolving system and component problems. Additionally, the inspectors identified that the certificatee had not effectively implemented a formal trend analysis program. One IFl was identified.
E8 Miscellaneous Enoineerina Issues E8.1 (Closed) CER 70-7002/97-16: Actuation of Autoclave No. 2 shell steam high pressure shutdown in X-342 Building. The certificatee determined that the root cause of the actuation was a failure,of the steam pressure regulator. The certificatee reviewed the autoclave system history and the PR database for the past two years that revealed no previous problems were identified with the regulator. The inspectors noted that the autoclave steam regulator valve will be replaced with an improved regulator as part of the autoclave steam supply and condensate removal system upgrades identified in the Compliance Plan issue 3. This item is closed.
E8.2 (Closed) CER 70-7002/97-21: Autoclave No. 7 high pressure steam shutoff actuation in X-343 Building. The certificatee determined the root cause of the actuation was a failed electronic module in the pressure transducer. The engineering analysis determined that a solder connection on the electrical module circuit board had separated. The certificatee's records indicated the same electrical module had been used in 45 other electrical modules for 15 years with no known identical failures. The certificatee determined that the pressure transducers were acceptable to use, replaced the failed unit, and pc. formed the required loop calibration. This item is closed.
08.3 (Closed) CER 70-7002/97-22: Actuation of Autoclave No. 3 shell steam high pressure shutdown in X-343 Building. The certificatee determined that the root cause of the actuation was an inadequate design of the pressure transducer housing mounting which resulted in a faulty electrical connection. The certificatee determined that pressure transducer housing rotated on the mounting pedestal and affected the integrity of the pressure transducer terminal strip. The inspectors noted that the certificatee changed the pressure transducer housing mounting design to ensure that the transducer could not rotate on the mounting pedestal. This item is closed.
IV. Plant Sur> port P8 Miscellaneous Plant Support issues P8.1 Security Plan Infractions a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors observed activities to assess compliance with the certificatee's Site Security Plan.
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b.
Observations and Findinas The inspectors identified two examples of infractions of the certificatee's Site Security Plan:
e On August 24, during a routine a minor violation in the X-326 Building, the inspectors discovered an unattended confidential procedure lying on a sample buggy used for monitoring a cell treatment. The inspectors immediately tumed i
the procedure over to area control room operators. Tne certificatee determined that the procedure was left unattended for approximately 10 minutes and made a one hour notification to the NRC as required by 10 CFR Part 95.
o On August 25, the inspectors identified that an uncleared individual was not being properly escorted in me Nuclear Regulatory Affairs (NRA) office area.
The inspectors observed that audible and visual contact with the uncleared individual was not maintained due apparently to failure to perform a formal tumover of escort responsibilities. The uncleared individual had potential access to classified matter without escort control.
10 CFR 95.27 states, in part, that classified matter must be under the direct control of authorized individual to preclude physical access by unauthorized persons. The failure to control access or potential access to classified matter in two instances had minimum safety significance is being treated as a Violation of Minor Significance not subject to formal enforcement action, consistent with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NUREG-1600, Revision 1). (NCV 70-7002/98013-04).
The certificatee initiated PR-PTS-98-06327, in response to these and other events as discussed below, to document a possible adverse trend with security violations. As a proposed corrective action, the certificatee was evaluating the use of training, security bulletins, and a security walk-around program to elevate staff's awareness of requirements. The certificatee's implementation of corrective actions to reduce the number of security violations is an Unresolved item (URI 70-7002/98013-05).
c.
Conclusion The inspectors identified a minor violation with two examples to the Site Security Plan during the inspection period. In response to these and other events, the certificatee was developing a corrective action plan to address the apparent adverse trend. One unresolved item was identified.
P8.2 (Closed) CER 70-7002/97-14: The certificatee discovered a classified container unsecured while conducting routine security checks in X-344 Building. The certificatee determined that the root cause of the event was failure to follow Procedure XP2-SS-SS1039, " Handling and Control of Classified Documents." As corrective action, organizational managers reviewed the event with respective container custodians and performed walkdowns of cognizant facilities to verify that the requirements for opening and securing of classified containers were conducted in accordance with Procedure XP2-SS-SS1039.
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The failure to secure an unattended security container having classified matter is a violation of 10 CFR 95.25. However, the certificatee determined that no unauthorized access was gained to the container. Therefore, this licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 70-7002/98013-06).
P8.3 (Closed) CER 70-7002/97-15: The certificatee discovered a classified container unsecured while conducting routine security checks in X-343 Building. The certificatee determined that the root cause of the event was failure to follow Procedure XP2-SS-SS1039," Handling and Control of Classified Documents." As corrective action, organizational managers reviewed the event with respective container custodians and performed walkdowns of cognizant facilities to verify that the requirements for opening and securing of classified containers were conducted in accordance with Procedure XP2-SS-SS1039. In addition, the certificatee transferred the classified matter from the identified unsecured classified container to X-300 Building.
The failure to secure an unattended security container having classified matter is a violation of 10 CFR 95.25. However, the certificatee determined that no unauthorized access was gained to the container. Therefore, this licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 70-7002/98013-07).
V, Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meetina Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of the facility management on August 31,1998. The facility staff acknowledged the findings presented.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Lockheed Martin Utility Services
- J. Brown, General Manager i
- S. Casto, Work Control Manager
- S. Fout, Operations Manager
- J. Morgan, Enrichment Plant Manager
- D. Waters, Acting Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Manager i
United States Department of Enerav J. Orrison, Site Safety Representative i
United States Enrichment Corporation
- L. Fink, Safety, Safeguards & Quality Manager
- J. Miller, USEC Vice President, Production
- Denotes those present at the exit meeting on August 31,1998.
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 88100:
Plant Operations IP 88101:
Configuration Control IP 88102:
Surveillance Observations IP 88103:
Maintenance Observations IP 97012:
Inoffice Reviews of Written Reports on Nonroutine Events ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 070-7002/98013-01 VIO Continued Operation Without PORC Approved NCSAs.
070-7002/98013-02 IFl Action to correct autoclave thermocouple failures.
070-7002/98013-03 IFl Implementation of formal trend analysis program.
070-7002/98013-04 NCV A minor violation for failure to control access to classified matter.
070-7002/98013-05 URI implementation of actions to reduce the number of security infractions.
Closed 070-7002/97-17 CER Actuation of Cascade Automatic Data Processing smoke detectors system in X-333 Building.
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070-7002/97-18 CER improperly loaded and shipped cylinders in overpacks.
l 070-7002/97-16 CER Autoclave No. 2 high pressure steam shutoff actuation in X-342 Building.
070-7002/97-14 CER Discovery of a classified container unsecured in X-344 Building.
l 070-7002/97-15 CER Discovery of a classified container unsecured in j
X-343 Building.
i 070-7002/97-21 CER Autoclave No. 7 high pressure steam shutoff actuation in X-343 Building.
070-7002/97-22 CER Actuation of Autoclave No. 3 shell steam high pressure l
shutdown in X-343 Building.
070-7002/98013-04 NCV A minor violation for failure to control access to classified matter.
l 070-7002/98013-06 NCV Failure to secure an unattended security container.
070-7002/98013-07 NCV Failure to secure an unattended security container.
Discussed j
70-7002/97005-02 VIO Failure to provide approved procedures for complex safety-related work activities.
Certification issues - Closed None l
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LIST OF ACP.ONYMS USED ANSI American National Standards Institute ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers CADP Cascade Automatic Data Processing CAQ Condition Adverse To Quality CER
. Certificate Event Report CFR Code of Federal Regulations IC incident Commander
- IFl inspection Followup item IP Inspection Procedure NCSA Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval NCV-Non-cited Violation NOV Notice of Violation NRA Nuclear Regulatory Assurance NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OAT Operational Assessment Team PDR Public Document Room PORC Plant Operations Review Committee PR Problem Report TSR Technical Safety Requirement UF6 Uranium Hexaflouride URI Unresolved item VIO Violation l
f 16 i-