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Jcint Intervenors ' Contentions.
_ Contention 10 "The staff recognizes that pressurizer heaters and associated controls are necessary to maintain natural circulation at hot stand-by conditions.
Therefore, this equipment should be classified as components important to safety' and required to meet all applicable safety-grade ~
design criteria, including but not limited to diversity (GDC 22), seismic and environmental qualification (GDC 2 and 4),
automatic initiation. (GDC.20), separation and independence (GDC 3 and,22), quality assurance (GDC 1), adequate, reliable on-site power supplies (GDC 1.7) and the single failure criterion.
The Applicant's proposal to connect two out of four of the heater groups to the present on-site amargency power supplies does not provide an equivalent or acceptable level of protection.
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contention 12 "Proper operation of power operated relie? valves, associated block valves and the instruments and controls for these valves is essential to mitigate the consequences of accidents.. In addition, their failure can cause or aggravate a LOCA.
Th e re fore, these valves must be classified as compo~nents important to safety and required to meet all safety-grade design criteria."
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o Contention 20 "Tne TMI-2 accident demonstrated that there are systems and components presently classified as non-safety related which can have an adverse effect on the integrity of the core because they can directly or indirectly affect temperature, pressure, flow and/or reactivity.
This issue is discussed at length in Section 3.2, "System Design Requirements," of NUREG-0578, the TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Report (Short Term).
of the report describes the problem:The following quote from page 18 There is another perspective on this question provided by the TMI-2 accident.
At TMI-2, operational problems with the condensate purification system led to a loss of feedwater and initiated the sequence of events that eventually resulted in damage to the core.
Several nonsafety systems were used at various times in the mitigation of the accident in ways not considered in the safety analysis; for example, long-term mainten-ance of core flow and cogling with the steam generators and the reactor coolant pumps.
The present classifi-cation system does not adequately recognize either of these kinds of ef fects that nonsafety systems can have on the safety of the plant.
Th us, requirements for nonsafety may be needed to reduce the frequency of occurrence of events that initiate or adversely affect transients and accidente, and odier requirements may be needed to improve the current capability for use of nonsafety systems during transient or accident situations.
In its work in this area, the Task Force will include a more realistic assessment of the interaction between operators and systems.
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The staff proposes to study the problem further.
This is not a sufficient answer.
All systems and components which can eidner cause or ageravate an accident or can be called upon to mitigate an acrident must be identified and classified as components important to safety and required to meet all safety-grade"design criteria."
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