Text

Forwards Addl Info & Clarifications to Aid in Resolving Majority of Sser 3 Open Confirmatory Items
	ML20137K551
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	11/27/1985
From:	Devincentis J; PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
To:	Knighton G; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	SBN-903, NUDOCS 8512030224
	Download: ML20137K551 (152)
	v • d • e

{{#Wiki_filter:. M SEABROOK STATION Engineering Office Pub 5C W W h M November 27, 1985 SBN-903 Now Hampshire Yonkee Divislen T.F. B7.1.99 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attention: Mr. George W. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing 1

References:

(a) Construction Permits CPPR-135 and CPPR-136, Docket Nos. 50-443 and 50-444 (b) Memorandum, V. Nerses to G. W. Knighton, Announcement of Site Visit, dated September 10, 1985 (c) Memorandum, V. Nerses to G. W. Knighton, Notice of Meeting 1 with Public Service Company of New Hampshire, New Hampshire Yankee Division and NRC, dated October 28, 1985 (d) Meeting Summary by V. Nerses, Pro' ject Manager, Licensing Branch No. 3, Division of Licensing

Subject:

Resolution of Power System Branch Confirmatory Items

Dear Sir:

On September 24 through 26, 1985, representatives of the Power System Branch performed a site visit,and drawing review of the Seabrook Station as j described in Reference (b). One of the site visit agenda items was the discussion of unresolved confirmatory items listed in Supplement No. 3 of the Seabrook Safety Evaluation Report. As a result of these discussions, and subsequent discussions with the staff during the November 6,1985 meeting [ Reference (c)], we have committed to transmit additional information and clarifications so that the majority of the confiruatory items can be resolved to the staff's satisfaction. Conditional upon the satisfactory acceptance of this submittal, it is our understanding that the confirmatory items that still remain open are the following: SER Paragraph 8.3.1.1.4 - Submittal of the results of the recently completed testing to satisfy Position B-4 of BTP PSB-1. The results will be submitted by January 31, 1986. SER Paragraph 8.3.1.4 - Confirmation that the diesel generator can start and run the start-up feed pump whila carrying the maximum Train A load listed in FSAR Table 8.3-1. This item will remain open until the diesel generator preoperational tests are completed. Estimated completion date, end of February 1986. \\ P.O. Box 300 Seobrook. NH 03874. Telephone (603) 474 %21 \\ t 0512030224 851127 PDR ADOCK 05000443 E PDH w 1

T d' United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Mr. George W. Knighton Page 2 SER Paragraph 8.3.1.1.3 - Portion of Icem 2 pertaining to Non-Class lE loads starting simultaneously with Class lE loads. This additional information will be made available by January 31, 1986. Item 10 (Computer IRTU) of the study on Electrical Interconnections Between Redundant Divisions (transmitted to NRC via SBN-671). We are preparing a presentation to address the staff's concerns on this item. The date of the presentation will be determined later. Appendices A and B to this letter contain the information and clarifications as agreed during the site visit and the November 6,1985 meeting. Appendix C to this letter addresses the three items outlined on Page 2 of the Meeting Summary [ Reference (d)]. The Seabrook Project would very much appreciate any effort on your staff's part to include the resolution of those confirmatory items in the next supplement to the Seabrook Station's SER. Very truly

urs, M

ohn DeVincentis, Director Engineering and Licensing Attachments cc: Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Service List ,w r -,-y,e-,, = - - - -- n --

r V.41am S. Jordan, III Donald E. Chick Diane Curran Town Manager Harmon, Weiss & Jordan Town of Exeter 20001 S. Street, N.W. 10 Front Street Suite 430 Exeter, NH 03833 Washington, D.C. 20009 Brentwood Board of Selectmen Robert C. Perlis RED Dalton Road Office of the Executive Legal Director Brentwood, NH 03833 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Richard E. Sullivan, Mayor City Hall Robert A. Backus, Esquire Newbu ryport, MA 01950 116 Lowell Street P.O. Box 516 Calvin A. Canney Manc hester, NH 03105 City Manager City Hall Philip Ahrens, Esquire 126 Daniel Street Assistant Attorney General Portsmouth, NH 03801 Augusta, ME 04333 Dana Bisbee, Esquire Mr. John B. Tanzer Assistant Attorney General Designated Representative of Office of the Attorney General the Town of Hampton 206 State House Annex 5 Morningside Drive Concord, NH 03301 Hampton, NH 03842 Anne Verge, Chairperson Roberta C. Pevear Board of Selec tmen Designated Representative of Town Hall the Town of Hampton Falls South Hampton, NH 03827 Drinkwater Road Hampton Falls, NH 03844 Pa t rick J. McKeon Selectmen's Office Mrs. Sandra Cavutis 10 Central Road Designated Representative of Rye, NH 03870 the Town of Kensington RFD 1 Carole F. Kagan, Esquire East Kingston, NH 03827 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Jo Ann Shotwell, Esquire Wa s hi ng t on, DC 20555 Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protec tion Bureau Mr. Angi Machiros Depa rt me n t of the Attorney General Chairman of the Board of Selectmen One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Town of Newbury Boston, MA 02108 New bu ry, MA 01950 Senator Cordon J. Hamphrey Town Manager's Office U.S. Senate Town Hall - Friend Street Washington, DC 20510 Amesbury, MA 01913 (ATTN: Tom Bu rac k) Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Diana P. Randall 1 Pillsbury Street 70 Collins Street Concord, NH 03301 Seabrook, NH 03874 (ATTN: Herb Boynton) L

5 APPENDIK_A Additional Information and Clarifications for Confirmatory Items Listed Under Section 1.8 of the SER (Supplement 3)

~ Item C Routing ef Off-Sitt Power Circuito i l The reviewer's concerns regarding vehicular traffic on the bridges over the SF6 bus runs and roadways adjacent to the bus runs are addressed and documented in the attached FSAR page (8.2-5) with marked-up revisions. These revisions will be included in a future amendment to the FSAR. In addition, we are enclosing a copy of UE&C Calculation No. SS15 addressing the design of the guardrails utilized on the bridges which pass over the SF6 bus runs.

paar e+ c-2t SB 1 & 2 Amendment 52 FSAR December 1983 station, as shown on Figures 8.2-7 and 8.2-8. Bus connections from the switching station to Units 1 and 2 are physically g separated. Unit I buswork runs above grade and to the east; \\ Unit 2 buswork runs below grade and to the west of the switching station. Protection to the SF6 buswork from vehicles on the controlled access bridges and on the roads adjacent to the bus runs is provided by guardrails along the plant access road and by guardrails on the bridges which pass over bus runs. The guardrails on the bridges are designed in accordance with AASHO requirements (American Association of State Highway Officials). The rail is 2'-8 3/4" total overall height above the road surface and it is made of 5" extra strong pipe. Each horizontal guardrail at the supporting structures will accept a horizontal load of 5,000 pounds, a total of 10,000 pounds at each impact point. The bridges themselves are conservatively designed for the largest loads required during construction or operation of the plant. The possibility of a vehicle causing (4, & bid ge, damage to the SF6 insulated bus runs is further minimized by p h the fact that roadways adjacent to the SF6 bus runs are on J plant property, accesshis controlled, and vehicles are subject m a. J to strict plant regulated speed limits. Y %bb9.h -s ee wM* c6 4 h 57. The totally enclosed switching station provides maximum pro-tection to the electrical equipment from adverse environmental effects; safety for plant personnel; reliability; and resist-ance to vandalism or sabotage. The compactness of the gas-( insulated system minimizes the visual impact of the switching station. 2. Electrical The electrical configuration of the 345 kV switching station is a breaker-and-half arrangement (as shown on Figure 8.2-5) consisting of: (a) Eight circuit breakers and provisions for one future circuit breaker. (b) Five line positions for connection of three incoming lines, the Unit 1 GSU transformers and the Unit 2 GSU t rans formers. (c) Two bus positions to which the reserve auxiliary trans-formers are connected; the Unit 1 RATS to Bus 2 and the Unit 2 RATS to Bus 1. b. Generator The generator for each unit is rated 1350 MVA, 25 kV, 60 Hz, 0.92 power factor, 3 phase, 1,800 rpm, and is hydrogen-cooled with a water cooled stator. Forced air cooled, isolated phase bus ducts e are used to connect each generator to its associated generator ( step up and unit auxiliary transformers. Turbine generator details are given in Section 10.2. 8.2-5

PAM of C"24 ATTACHMENT A Structures, such as lighting poles adjacent to the SF6 bus runs, are so located such that their failure will not jeopardize the availability of the off-site power circuits outlined in CDC 17. In addition, in the area between the North and South bridges where a light polo is in close proximity to the SF6 bus runs located below grade level, a I galvanized steel grating will be installed over the SF6 bus runs for additional protection of the buses from a falling light pole. The grating is designed for dead load of 35 psf and live load of 100 psf and it will withstand the impact of the adjacent light pole falling on it. l l (.

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f. IEEE 387-1977, it is our engineering judgement that the Seabrook design meets s this standard. IEEE 317-1976: All major elletrical containment penetrations were manufactured to meet the 1976 version of the standard. Some minor electrical penetrations, 3/4" to 1" size which are associated with the personnel air lock, the equip-ment hatch and the containment recireciation sump isolation valve encapsulation tank, were manufactured to meet the 1972 version. It is our engineering judgement that these minor penetrations meet all the important design require-ments necessary to perform their safety function. Requirements that may be i lacking are in the areas of QA documentation, Service Classification docu-mentation, and definition of certain production tests. IEEE 384-1974: The Seabrook design meets the requirements of this standard. IEEE 338-1977: The Seabrook design meets the requirements of this standard. IEEE 484-1975: Refer to RAI 430.31 for comments on this standard. 4 IEEE 450-1975: The Seabrook design meets the requirements of this standard, i 4 I RAI 430.4 .( The three off-site power circuits are routed in close proximity between the j transmission line terminating structures and the switchyard as indicated on Figures 8.2-7 and 8.2-8 of the FSAR. In addition, the two off-site circuits from the switchyard to the generator step-up transformers and the reserve auxiliary transformers are also routed in close proximity. Describe, as l required by GDC 17, how the subject routings are designed and located so as { to minimize, to the extent practical, the likelihood of their simultaneous failure under operating and postulated accident and environmental conditions.

RESPONSE

The SF6 insulated circuits connecting the 345 kV transmission lines to the 345 kV switching station, and those connecting the switching station to the generator step-up and reserve auxiliary transformers, have complete electrical isolation from each other. Each phase conductor is located within a cylindrical aluminum enclosure which is at ground potential. The completely sealed, 1/4-inch thick, aluminum bus enclosures provide physical and electrical pro-taction from environmental conditions such as wind, ice, snow, and lightning which are of concern when locating a standard design (air-insulated) trans-mission line. Because no phase-to phase electrical faults are possible, and because the circuits are protected from environmental hazards, close physical 2 proximity between circuits is possible. l Structures in the vicinity of the SF6 insulated bus include a 34.5 kV, wood pole, distribution line which crosses over the bus runs connecting the line g <' ' termination area to the switching station. The conductors of this line are i fully insulated so that the possibility of damage to the SF6 buses due to a j 4s RAI 430-3 1 l l l

1 FmM c.qt, str. ss-g SktE.T Mo pg,cp y) Amendeest 48 SB 1 & 2 3p, g, gg,got FSAR January 1983 ? tV - Mo O fallen conductor is minimal. The distribution line, which is required for construction power, will be removed af ter completion of construction. There are no other structures, such as lighting towers, located such that, if they fell, they could cause failure of more than one 345 kV circuit. i The low profile of the bus runs minimizes wind loadings on the support struc-tures and conservative design of the common support structures and their l foundation footings provides assurance that the probability of a 345 kV bus support structure failing is extremely low. Protection against vehicles on the controlled access bridges and on the roads adjacent to SF6 bus runs is provided by a guard rail along the plant access road and by guard rails on the bridges which pass over SF6 insulated bus The guardrails on the bridges are designed in accordance with AASHO runs. requirements (American Association of State Highway Officials). The rail is 2'-8 3/4" total overall height above the road surface and it is made of 5" extra strong _ pipe._ Each horizontal guardrail :.L_t Q supporting structures ~ will accept a horizontal load of 5,000 pounds, a total of 10,000 pounds at ~ The bridges themselves are conservatively d'esigned for' each impact point. the largest loads required during construction or operation of the plant. l The possibility of a vehicle causing damage to the SF6 insulated bus runs is i further minimized by the fact that roadways adjacent to the SF6 bus runs are on plant property, access is controlled, and vehicles are subject to strict i plant regulated speed limits. i f The above considerations demonstrate that CDC 17 has been met since the like-lihood of simultaneous failure of the off-site power circuits has been minimized l t to the extent practical. Furthermore, we believe that our design, using SF6 ( insulated circuits, is superior to a design using pole-mounted, air-insulated l circuits. RAI 430.5 The voltage levels at the safety-related buses should be optimized for the full load and minimum load conditions that are expected throughout the anticipated range of voltage variations of the offsite power source by appropriate adjustment of the voltage tap settings of the intervening trans-formers. Submit the planned range of normal operating voltages for each safety-related bus.

RESPONSE

Exhibit 430.5-1 is the Voltage Regulation Study for the Seabrook Station. This study provides the voltage analysis required by BTP PSB-1 (See RAI 430.14). 46 RAI 430-4

N M C_ALC.. C.E T $$-\\E .as., Sytu Mc \\3 of \\8 Jon_ m 9'% L. \\0 7_. U

O 4

HIGHWAY BRIDGES 1.1.6 (C) Other The channel openings and clearance shall be cleared with agencies having h

urisdiction over such matters Channel openings and clearances in general I

shall conform in width, height, and location to all Federal. State and local req uirem ents. 1.1.7-CURBS AND SIDEWALKS The face of the curb is defmed as the vertical or slopmg surface on the roadway side of the curb. Horizontal measurements of roadway and curb width j are given frorn the bottom of the face, or, in the case of stepped back curbs, from the bottom of the lower face for roadway width. Maximum width of brush curbs, if used, shall be 9 inches. (.229 m) Where curb and gutter sections are used on the roadway approach, at either or both ends of the bridge, the curb heicht on the bridge may match the curb height on the roadway approach, c,r if preterred, it may be made higher than the approach curb Where no curbs are used on the roadway approaches, the height of the bndge curb above the roadway shall be not less than 6 inches, (.203 m) and preferably not more than 10 mehes (.254 m). Where sidewalks are warranted for pedestrian traffic on urban expressways, j they shall be separated from the bridge roadway by the use of a traffic or combination railing as shown in Figure 1.1.8. In those cases where a New Jersey type parapet or a curb is constructed on a bridge, particularly in urban areas that have curbs and gutters leading to a bridge, g the same widths between curbs on the approach roadways will be mamtained 1 across the bridge structure. A parapet or other raihng mstalled at or near the curb line shall have its ends properly flared and/or sloped or shielded to prevent its being a hazard to an errant motorist and to prevent its causing a motorist to steer away from it. 1.1.8-R AI LINGS Railing shall be provided at the edge of structures for the protection of traffic and for the protection of pedestrians if pedestrian walkways are provided. Where pedestrian walkways are provided adjacent to roadways on other than ~ urban expressways, a traffic railing or barrier may be provided between the two with a pedestrian railing outside. (See Article 1.1.7--CURBS AND SIDEWALKS) (A) Traffic Railing (1) General While the primary purpose of traffic railing is to contain the average vehicle using the structure, consideration should also be given to protec-tion of the occupants of a vehicle in collision with the railing, to protec-tion of other vehicles near the collision, to vehicles or pedestrians on roadways being overcrossed, and to appearance and freedom of view from passmg vehicles. Materials for traffic rainng shall be concrete, metal, timber, or a combi-t i k

F wL c. Alc S ET wo LX ShMT Mo \\k 09 @ a o s u e. h te z._ 1.1.6 1.1.8 DESIGN 9AN - MO O 5 1 nation. Metal materials with less than 10 percent tested elongation shall not be used. red , agencies having Traffic railings should provide a smooth, continuous face of rail on the nd cwarances in general traffic side with the posts set back from the face of rail. Structural conti-i' Federal, State and local nuity in the rail members, including anchorage of ends, is essential. The railing system shall be able to resist the apphed loads at all locations. Protrusions or depressions at rail joints shall be acceptable provided their thickness or depth is no greater than the wall thickness of the rail r sloping surface on the member or 3/8"(.01m), whichever is less. roadway and curb width Careful attention shall be given to the treatment of railing at the bridge e of stepped back curbs, ends. Exposed rait ends, posts, and sharp changes in the geometry of the Meximum width of brush railing shall be avoided. A smooth transition by means of a continuation of the bridge barrier, guard rail anchored to the bridge end, or other ef fective { dway approach, at either means shall be provided to protect the traffic from direct collision with idge msy match the curb the bridge rail ends. be made higher than the ay approaches, the height (2) Load ngs and Geometncs II , than 8 inches, (.203 m) Traffic railing and traffic portions of combination railings shall be no less than 2' 3" (.686 m) in height measured from the top of the roadway, I ic on urban expressways, the top of future overlay if future resurfacing is anticipated, or from the y the use of a traffic or top of curb to the top of the upper rail member when the curb projection rD is greater than 9 inches (.229 m), except that parapets designed with c. j sloping traffic faces intended to allow vehicles to ride up them under low d I a curb is constructed on a 6 utters lading to a bridge, angle contacts shall be at least 2'-8"(.813 m) in height. D.; l dways will be maintained / The lower element of a traffic or combination railing should consist of bJ! g installed at or near the either a parapet projecting at least 18" (.457 m) above the reference aed or shisided to prevent surface or a rail centered between 15 and 20 ir.ches (.381 and.508 m) M. t its causing a motorist to above the reference surface. The roadway surface, or the top of the over-r lay, if future resurfacing is anticipated, is the reference surface unless there [' [ is a curb or sidewalk projecting more than 9 inches (.229 m) from the [' traffic face of the railing, in which case the surface of the curb or sidewalk L. I' - ir tlk.otection of traffic When the height of the top of the top traffic rail exceeds 2' 9" (.839 ' i f [ is the reference surface. I. . ways are provided. m), the total transverse load distributed to the traffic rails and posta shall hi0 .o roadways on other than be increased by the factor "C". However, the maximum load applied to providsd between the two any one element need not exceed "P" p* - JRBS AND SIDEWALKS) For traffic railings, the maximum clear vertical opening between the lowest rail ano reference surface shall not exceed 17 inches (.432 m) and the maximum opening between succeeding rails shall not exceed 15 inches !i (.381 m). For combination and pedestrian railings, the maximum clear l l vertical opening between the lowest rail and reference surface shall not is to contain the average exceed 15 inches (.381 m) and the maximum opening between succeeding { d also be given to protec. rails shall not exceed 15 inches (.381 m). The traffic faces of all traffic rails must be within one inch (.025 m) of ilth the railing, to protec. } ahicl*s or pedestrians on a vertical plane through the traffic face of the rail closest to traffic. Rails a and frsedom of view from greater distance behind this plane or centered less than 15 inches (.381 m) above the reference surface shall not be considered traffic rails for the i l mstal, timber, or a combi-purpose of distributing the transverse highway design loading, "P", or } f blb 4 1

l 3

i l' l C I i

~ N M. C ALC,. MC U. - \\ E 3qET W g 5 op gg ~~ ~ -5 -TOL Mo 9%'L \\ C 'L 6 HIGHW AY BRMGES 1.1.8 g g "CP", but may be consilered in determining the maximum clear vertical, opening, provided they are iesigned for a transverse loading equal to that applied to an adjacent traffic rail or "P/2" whichecer is the lesser. Transverse loads on posts, equal to "P", or "CP, shall be distributed as shown in Figure 1.1.8. A load equ. I to 1/ 2 the trans,erse load on a post shall simultaneously be applied longitudinally, divided smong not more than four posts in a continuous rail length. Each traffic pest shall also be designed to resist an independently apphed inward load equal to 1/4 the outward transverse Icad. The attachment of each rail required in a traf fic or combinati<.,, railing shall be designed to resist a vertical load equal to 1/4 of the trancverse l design load of the rail. The vertical load shall be applied alternately ap-l ward or downward. The attachment shall also be desigt ed to resist an j inward transverse load equal to 1/4 the transverse rail design load. ] Rail members shall be designed for a moment, due to concentrated loads, at the center of the panel and at the posts of P'L/6 where P' is equal to P, P/2, or P/3, or as modified by the factor "C", where requ. red. The handrail members of combination railing shall be designed for a moment at 2 the center of the panel and at the posts of 0.1wL L is the post spacing. The transverse force on concrete parapet and barrier walls shall be spread over a longitudinal length of 5 feet (1.524 m). Refer to Figure 1.1.8 for the loads and points of application. Railings other than those shown in Figure 1.1.8 are permissible pro-vided they meet the requirements of this Article, except that railing con-3 figurations which have been successfully tested by full scale impact testa j are exempt from the provisions of this Article. (The National Cooperative Highway Etenearch Program Report No.153 describes procedures for crash testing bridge railings.) l (3) Design Railings shall be designed by the elastic method to the allowable stresses for the appropriate matenal. For aluminum alloys 6061-T6, 6063-T6, and 6351-T5, the design stresses given in Tables 1. 5. 2A( 1), 1.5.2A(2),1.5.2(3) of the " AASHTO Standard Specifications for Struc-tural Supports for Highway Signs Luminaires, and Traffic Signals" shall apply; for cast aluminum alloys A444.0-T4, A356.0-T61, and A356.0-T6, i the design stresses given in Table 1.5.2A(5) shall apply. Aluminum railing shall be fabricated and built in accordance with the provuions of Section 6 of April 1976 " Specifications for Aluminum Bridge and other Highway Structures" published by the Aluminum Association for riveted and bolted fabrication, and in accordance with Section 5.1.5.5 of the " AASHTO Standard Specifications for Structural Supporta for Highway, Signs, Luminaires, and Traffic signals," for welded fabrication. The allowable unit stresses for steel shall be as given in Article 1.7.1, except as modified below. For steels not generally covered by the " Standard Specifications," but having a guaranteed yield strength, F, the allowable unit stress, shall be y ( 1 i

Ep.a AL C.A\\.C. " A.T % U.- \\ E S RE E. T Mo \\h Cf \\6 Jo(L Mo W P \\ C 2__ I l.1.8 g 1.1 8 DESIGN ?._4 V % O 7 Q ) imum clear vertical, ord. qual to that th. e r. tall be distributed as . p. s.= = . gi es.. .,, r i n... - ' h g" 9 h."i <erse load on a post r *' ',Ml " l w jf C d among not more l' ; C; p l b: Gk l f,,, '-d p !, i. l 'l. N I I ijl l C,5 L,l l ic post shall also be, ] f. .ad equal to 1/4 the jr- -~,,, I f ~,,, _t_r-C fl' l, !' i

j. /

!.,, <- ' i ~.,. 'j h[ jlI } (( [ combination railing j-[f((- !! /* .; y h.l [, ,l /4 of the transverse 2 1 ,.a.ej, Q, j plied alternately up-1 - -e - p,l ea esigned to resist an gg gg (,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, { lesign loed. due to coneentrated n..............,.. .,.... es s a,. i.,..,,,,.......... i L/6 where P' is equa) 'RAFFIC R AILING where required. The f j' i

-f.

anirr wal a shall be -[. _ I'.t~g g ,3 g L is the post spacing. [ [ M#

M F

T-- ".Jo S nsd for a moment at i \\ gI 1 g i,,,, st c ow ti 3% n . plication.

+

r

l ih 1*

ij.g ! -. i, gj,

',;,{
3

are permissible pro-I'. b { II l s g I,8 'y sept that railing con-g D I," 1 flII A s, i l-4 y. '{!.)i .1 ull sczia impact tests 5 e x, Nationti Cooperative COMBINATION R AILING ~ ' " ' " ' ' ' i procedures for crash i i l ru =h r-%T *b r-up W i [.4 w j ad ( y,e allowable l l_ 7., l am s 6061-T6, j n Tabla 1.5.2A(1), t i / t j L eifications for Struc-I Trsific Signals shall PEDE STRI AN RAILING ~5k T61, and A356.0-T6, j ely. Aluminum railing ..,4..,. t. r -ovinons of Section 6 . and other Highway ...o '. i..... i or riveted and bolted

- '"*.*'..'..*.*o','ii.i....'*.'so...

.,.. irno.w.i 6.. ljl, 5 of the " AASHTO for Highway Signs, c' Y - I' + O - @ ' ' 2n.

ivsn in Article 1.7.1,

'l, p. i Specifications," but e unit strssa, shall be FIGURE 1.1.8 l. 9 [i 't. l

7 FN AL CA\\.C.. SE.T No SS 6 SktET Mc) \\] 09 \\ 3 f, JC.36 Mo 9 % i10 L 2 EV ' NO O 1.1.8 8 HIGHWAY BRIDGES h -) g,1, derived by applying the general formulas as given in the " Standard Specifi- { l cations" under " Unit Stresses" except as indicated below. The allowable unit stress for shear shall be F =0.33F. y y Steel round or oval tubes may be proportioned using an allowable provided the R/t ratio (radius / thickness) is bending stress, Fb = 0.66Fy less than or equal to 40. Square and rectangular tubes, and WF and I sections in bemg with tension and compression on extreme fibers of laterally supported compact sections having an axis of symmetry m the plane of loading may be de-( signed for an allowable stress F =0.60F b y The requirements for a compact section are as follows:

a. The width to thickness ratio of projecting elements of the compression 1600

/ 133 flange of WF and I sections shall not exceedE-y

b. The width to thickness ratio of the compression flange of square or rectangular tubes shall not exceed 6000

'499 Ey, y 13300 [1106 f

c. The D/t ratio of webs shall not exceed Y

d. If subject to combined axial force and bending, the D/t ratio of webs g

shall not exceed 5 13,300 3,l 43 r, 3. r \\ Fa' 6 y a, 11061 - 1.43[ Fa/f_a_[ [ g t or l a t but need not be less than 7010 5,,81 e o, y

e. The distance between lateral supports in inches (m) of WF or I sections t

shall not exceed 2400b or 199.2b 20,000,000 A r 137,640 A f nor or dF dF y y

Fmea C.ALC. LU Me SS-15 M C E.T MC \\ b CF \\b Jo o Mo O foi '~ L 1.1.8 DESIGN PE.N Lic O 9 given in the " Standard Specifi-(B) Pedestrian Railing { icar vlow. rF ,3 F. (1) General f u y I portionsd using an allowabte Railing components shall be proportioned commensurate with the type R/t ratio (radius / thickness) is and volume of anticipated pedestrian traffic, takmg account of appear-ance, safety and freedom of view from passmg vehicles. .md I sections in being with Materials for pedestrian railing may be concrete, metal, timber, or a ' of laterally supported compact combination thereof. 3 e p.'ane of loading may be de-(2) Loading and Geometrics I The mmimum height of a pedestrian railing shall be T 6" i 1066 m) re t.s follows: measured from the top of the walkway to the top of the upper ru rn e m-ig elenients of the e mpression ber. ! l md 16(,0 ' 133 The minimum design loading for pedestrian railing shall be w = 50 lbs. or O per lin. ft. (74.5 kg/m) acting simultaneously transversely and vertically on l y y each longitudinal member. Rail members located more than 5'-0" (1 524 l mpre;ssion flange of square or m) above the walkway are excluded from these requirements. 4 Posts shall be designed for a transverse load of wi acting at the center of ' g99 gravity of the upper rail, or for high rails, at 5'-0" (1.524 m) maximum Y above the walkway. 3300 1196 Refer to Figure 1.1.8 for more information concerning the application y of loads. (3) Design bsnding, the Dlt ratio of webs See Article 1.1.8( A)(3). d' ( I 1.1.9-ROADWAY DR AIN AGE k. The transverse drainage of the roadway should be accomplished by providing } a suitable crown in the roadway surface and longitudinal drainage should be I l accomplished by camber or gradient. Water flowing downgrade in a gutter sec-tion should be intercepted and not permitted to run onto the bridge. Short, L.) N contmuous span bridges, particularly overpasses, may be built without inlets and i a/-a the water from the bridge roadway carned downslope by open or closed chutes / near the end of the bridge structure. Longitudinal drainage on long bridges is accomplished by means of scuppers or inlets which should be of sufficient size and number to drain the gutters adequately. Downspouts, where required,should be of rigid corrosion resistant material not less than 4 inches (.102 m) m least 10 5,f t. dimension and should be provided with cleanouts. The details of deck drsins l or l h /F} should be such as to prevent the discharge of drainage water against any portion I of the structure and to prevent erosion at the outlet of the downspout. Over-n inches (m) of WF or i sections hangmg portions of concrete decks should be provided with a drip bead or notch. i 1.1.10-SUP ER E LEVATION The superelevation of the floor surface of a bridge on a horizontal curve shall ,640A be provided.n accordance with the standard practice of the commission for the ly highway cr,nstruction, except that the superelevation shall not exceed 0.10 foot y per foot 4.10 m per m) width of roadway. I [

4 C Comp 11w.ce with BTP PSB-1 This confirmatory item pertains to the verification of compliance of the Seabrook design to the various positions of BTP PSB-1, " Adequacy of Station Electric Distribution System Voltages." The SER describes how the Seabrook design addresses the various positions of the BTP and also outlines a number of items that need further verification or documentation. During the site visit and subsequent discussions during the November 6,1985 meeting, these various items were discussed with the reviewers and we committed to provide additional information, documentation or clarifications as applicable. In order to resolve this confirmatory item to the staff's satisfaction. We will address the open confirmatory items pertaining to BTP PSB-1 as they appear in the SER. SER Paragraph 8.3.1.1.1 1. In our response to RAI 430.15, we have stated that adequate safety l systems and equipment not exposed to or not rendered inoperable by degraded grid voltage are available for safe shutdown. The staff stated L in the SER that the adequacy of these systems and equipment will be pursued with the applicant. We, therefore, are providing herewith for the staff's review the list of equipment which will not be exposed to or rendered inoperative by degraded voltage and, therefore, would be available to place and maintain the plant in a safe shutdown status. The list incorporates the reasons that support the above statements. Furthermore, during the November 6,1985 meeting, the staff requested that we address the effects of degraded voltage on the battery chargers. We have discussed these affects with the manufacturer of the chargers. He indicates (see attached correspondence) that although ac 1 'At below 'the 10% design limit will effect the de output, the charger wtal not get damaged and when voltage is restored to normal, the charger will function properly. It is also pointed out that spare portable Battery Charger BC-1P is availabic. This charger can easily be connected to any of the four 125 V de buses via the special provision incorporated in the design of the 125 V de switchgear. Refer to FSAR Figure 8.3-37 and l Section 8.3.2.1(c) of the FSAR for details of the special provisions. Acceptance of this list will resolve this confirmatory item. ( 2. This item pertains to the verification of the implementation of delayed automatic disconnection of the degraded voltage source when there is an accident signal. During the site visit and subsequent meetings, this item was discussed. Schematic Diagram 9763-M-310102 Sheet A53h showing the implementation of the design and FSAR Page 8.3-5 noting the deolgn are enclosed. We consider this item closed.

SER Paragr"ph 8.3.1.1.3 The open confirmatory items under this paragraph pertain to the voltage analysis (Voltage Regulation Study) submitted in July 1982 to the NRC in response to RAI 430.5 to satisfy Position B-3 of BTP PSB-1. For the reviewer's convenience, we are enclosing an extra copy of the submitted Voltage Regulation Study. It is to be noted that a revised voltage analysis (Voltage Regulation Study) will be submitted to the NRC under separate cover. The revision of the voltage analysis was felt to be necessary in order to incorporate as-built Information on various components and, furthermore, include additional loads added to the Electrical Distribution System since the issuance of the 1982 I version of the voltage analysis. It should also be pointed out that the calculations used for the revised voltage analysis will be utilized in the performan, of the test to satisfy Position B-4 of the BTP. Resolution of Items (3) and (4) of SER Paragraph 8.3.1.1.3 will be addressed in the submittal of the revised voltage analysis. Resolution of Items (1) and (2) of SER Paragraph 8.3.1.1.3 is provided herewith: Item (1) This issue was discussed with the reviewer during the site visit and was resolved as follows: As indicated in FSAR Figure 8.3-12, Motor CAH-FN-1C (Containment Structure Cooling Fan) is powered from 480 Volt Bus E53. As it can be seen in Table 2 of the voltage analysis (Voltage Regulation Study), Bus E53 has acceptable voltage when starting the above-mentioned motor load. Therefore, the voltage drop is loca11 red to this nonsafety-related motor terminal and has no adverse effects on the Class 1E bus. Item (2) This item was discussed with the reviewer during the site visit and subsequently during the November 6, 1985 meeting, and was resolved as follows: As indicated in Paragraph III.B of the Voltage Regulation Study, the total running load includes safety-related (Buses E5 and E6) and nonsafety-related (Bus Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4) loads. This loading was used in the development of Table 3 which represents accident conditions. The SER also requires that we address Non-Class 1E loads that may start during the same time interval that the Class 1E loads are starting. We are investigating this point and we will address it at a later date. SER 8.3.1.1.4 Resolution of this confirmatory item will remain open pending the performance of the actual tests to satisfy Position B-4 of BTP PSB-1. The tests are expected to be performed during the hot functional testing. Upon completion of the tests, a report will be prepared and will be made available for the staff's review. I

OF C - 2.2. ( f Ag.TsERfhw G3 M A) Sy;tems and equipment required fcr ecfo chutdown c3 lictcd in FSAR S:cti!n 7.4 (attached) will be available in the event of a degraded grid voltage. We categorize these equipment as follows: a. Equipment does not operate during normal plant operation, b. Equipment does not rely on electric power for operation. c. Redundant equipment exists in standby and, therefore, is not connected to the degraded source. d. Equipment (fan motor) is running at less than rated load capacity, thereby providing margin to allow operation at less than rated voltage. e. Equipment is either powered by 125 V de source or 120 V ac Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS). f. Battery charger output will be affected by degraded voltage, but equipment will not be damaged. Upon restoration of voltage, charger will function properly. Note: Each 4.16 kV motor is equipped with early warning systems to alert the operator to overheatinL. RTD input into the computer will provide " Motor Thermal Overivad" alarm, if the temperature exceeds predetermined setpoint. These alarms, when received during periods of low grid voltage, should give the operator an indication of a developing concern in the AC System due to degraded grid voltage. l l

I . s' l TABLE 7.4-1 j (Shoet 1 of 7) l l Equipment Required for Safe Shutdown I l

1) Decay Heat Removal:

Description Device Category Reason Emergency Feedwater Pump MS-V-127 o Powered by 125 V de sourco (FW-P-37A) MS-V-128 o Powered by 125 V de sourco Emergency Feedwater Pump FW-P-378 a Not normally running SG A EFW Control Valve FW-FV-4214A a Not operating SG A EFW Control Valvo FW-FV-42148 a Not oporating SG B EFW Control Valvo FW-TV-4224A a Not operating SG B EFW Control Valve FW-FV-42240 a Not operating SG C EFW Control Valve FW-FV-4234A a Not operating SG C EFW Control Valva FW-FV-42348 a Not operating SG D EFW Control Valve FW-FV-4244A a Not operating SG D EFW Control Valvo FW-FV-42448 a Not operating SG A EFW Flow FW-FI-4214-5 e Powered by UPS FW-FI-4214-2 e Powered by UPS SG B EFW Flow FW-FI-4224-5 e Powered by UPS FW-FI-4224-2 o Powered by UPS _ SG C EFW Flow FW-FI-4234-5 e Powered by UPS FW-FI-4234-2 e Powered by UPS o SG D EFW Flow FW-FI-4244-5 e Powered by UPS FW-FI-4244-2 o Powered by UPS RC Loop 1 Hot Leg Temp. RC-TI-9406 e Powered by UPS RC Loop 1 Hot Log Temp. RC-TI-413A o Powered by UPS l RC Loop 4 Hot Log Temp. RC-TI-9407 e Powered by UPS RC Loop 2 Hot Leg Temp. RC-TI-423A o Powered by UPS RC Loop 1 Cold Log Temp. RC-TI-9410 e Powered by UPS RC Loop 1 Cold Leg Temp. RC-TI-4130 o Poworod by UPS RC Loop 4 Cold Leg Temp. RC-TI-9411 e Powered by UPS RC Loop 2 Cold Lug Temp, RC-TI-4230 0 Poworod by UPS SG A Atmos. Rollef Valve MS-PV-3001 e Powered by 125 V de sourco SG B Atmos. Roliof Valvo MS-PV-3002 e Poworod by 125 V de sourco SG C Atmos. Relief Valve MS-PV-3003 o Powered by 125 V de source SG D Atmos. Relief Valvo MS-PV-3004 o Poworod by 125 V de sourco EFW Pump Suction Pressure FW-PI-4208 b Does not rely on olectric power (for CST lovel) FW-PI-4209 b Does not rely on electric power FW-PI-4257 e Powered by 125 V de sourco FW-PI-4252 o Powered by 125 V de sourco

t TABLE 7.4-1 (Sheet 2 of 7) Description Device Category Reason MS Isol. Valves MS-V-86, 88 e Powered by 125 V de source 90, 92 MS Isol. Valvos MS-V-86, 88 e Powered by 125 V de source 90, 92 SG A Wide-Range Level FW-LI-4310 e Powered by UPS FW-LI-501 SG B Wide-Range Level FW-LI-4320 o Powered by UPS FW-LI-502 SG C Wide-Range Level FW-LI-4330 e Powered by UPS FW-LI-503 SG D Wide-Range Level FW-LI-4340 o Powered by UPS FW-LI-504 SG A Pressure MS-PI-3173 e Powered by UPS FW-PI-514A SG B Pressure MS-PI-3174 e Powered by UPS FW-PI-525A SG C Pressure MS-PI-3170 e Powered by UPS FW-PI-534A SG 0 Pressure MS-PI-3179 e Powered by UPS FW-PI-545A SG Blowdown Isol. Valves S8-V-9, 10, e Powered by UPS 11, 12

2) Reactor Coolant (RC) Inventory and Charging Pump CS-P-2A

} c One pump in standby Charging Pump CS-P-20 Charging Flow Isol. Valve CS-V-142 a Not operating Charging Flow Isol. Valve CS-V-143 a Not operating Charging Pump Suction CS-LCV-1120 a Not operating from RWST Charging Pump Suction CS-LCV-112C a Not operating from RWST Pressurizer Relief RC-PCV-456A o Powered by 125 V de source Valves (PORV) Pressurizer Relief RC-PCV-4560 e Powered by 125 V de sourco Valves (PORV) PORV Block Valve RC-V-122 a Not operating PORV Glock Valve RC-V-124 a Not operating i

? TABLE 7.4-1 (Sheet 3 of 7) Description Devico Category Reason Pressurizer Pressure RC-PI-7336 e Powered by UPS RCS Pressure RC-PI-405-1,2 e Powered by UPS Pressurizer Pressure RC-PI-7335 e Powered by UPS RCS Pressure RC-PI-403-1,2 e Powered by UPS Pressurizer Level RC-LI-7334 e Powered by UPS RC-LI-459A Pressurizer Lovel RC-LI-7333 e Powered by UPS RC-LI-460A Boric Acid Tank Level CS-LI-7446 e Powered by UPS (TK-4A) CS-LI-102 Boric Acid Tank Level CS-LI-7464 e Powered by UPS (TK-48) CS-LI-106 High Pressure Injection SI-V-138 a Not operating High Pressure Injection SI-V-139 a Not operating VCT Disch. Isol. Valve CS-LCV-1128 a Not operating VCT Disch. Isol. Valvo CS-LCV-112C a Not operating RC Normal Letdown Isol. RC-LCV-459 e Powered by 125 V de source RC Normal Letdown Isol. RC-LCV-460 e Powered by 125 V de source RC Excess Letdown Isol. CS-V-175 e Powered by 125 V de source ( RC Excess Letdown Isol. CS-V-176 e Powered by 125 V de supply 1. SI Pump SI-P-6A a Not normally running SI Pump SI-P-6B a Not normally running SI Accum. TK-9A Isol. SI-V-3 a N Not energized f-Valve SI Accum TK-90 Isol. SI-V-17 a (pewered from NCC E522 and Valve SI Accum. TK-9C Isol. SI-V-32 a E622 which are normally Valve SI Accum. TK-90 Isol. SI-V-47 a j do-ene rgized) Valve SI Accum. TK-9A SI-fV-2475, e Poworod by 125 V de sourco Vent Valvos 2 76 SI Accum. TK-98 SI-TV-2482, e Powered by 125 V de sourco Vent Valves 2483 SI Accum. TK-9C SI-FV-2477, o Powered by 125 V de source Vent Valves 2486 SI Accum. TK-90 SI-FV-2495, o Powered by 125 V de sourco Vent Valves 2496

I c TABLE 7.4-1 (Sheet 4 of 7) Description Device Category Reason Bus E52 Feeder Dreaker AW9 NA Dreakers normally open, not to MCC E522 affected by degraded source Bus E62 Feeder Greaker AWO NA Dreakers normally open, not to MCC E622 affected by degraded source

3) Reactivity Monitoring and Control Noutron Flux Indicators / Monitors (Excore)

Intermediate Rango Flux Rate NI-NI-6690-1 e Powered by UPS Intermediate Rango Flux Rato NI-NI-6690-2 o Powered by UPS Intermediate Range Flux Rate NI-NI-6690-3 e Poworod by UPS Source Range Flux NI-NI-6690-4 e Powered by UPS Intermediate Range Flux Rate NI-NI-6691-1 e Powered by UPS Intermediate Rango Flux NI-NI-6691-2 e Powered by UPS Intermediate Range Flux NI-NI-6691-3 e Powered by UPS Source Range Flux NI-NI-6691-4 e Powered by UPS Shutdown Monitor NI-NM-6690-1 e Powered by UPS ' Shutdown Monitor NI-NM-6691-1 e Powered by UPS Doric Acid Trans. Pump CS-P-3A ) c One pump in standby Doric Acid Trans, Pump CS-P-30 ) DA to Chg. Pump Isol. CS-V-426 a Not operating Valve Gravity Feed Doration Valve CS-V-423 b Does not rely on electric power Gravity Food Doration Valve CS-V-431 b Does not rely on electric power Gravity Feed Doration Valve CS-V-437 b Does not rely on electric power Gravity Food Doration Valvo CS-V-439 b Does not rely on electric power Gravity Feed Doration Valve CS-V-442 b Does not rely on electric power RMW Pump Isol. Valvo RMW-V-31 b Does not roly on electric power RMW Pump Isol. Valve RMW-V-34 b Does not rely on olectric power

4) Servico Water (SW)

Service Water Pump SW-P-41A S c One pump on each train in standby Sorvico Water Pump SW-P-410 Servico Water Pump SW-P-41C Service Water Pump SW-P-410 /

i i# v. TABLE 7.4-1 (Sheet 5 of 7) Description Device Category Reason DG Hx Discharge SW-V-16 o Powered by 125 V de source DG Hx Discharge SW-V-18 e Powered by 125 V de source SCCW Heat Exchanger SW-V-4 a Not operating Inlet Valve SCCW Heat Exchanger SW-V-5 a Not operating Inlet Valve SW Pump Disch. Valve SW-V-2 a Not operating (see note below) SW Pump Disch. Valve SW-V-22 a Not operating (see note below) SW Pump Disch. Valve SW-V-29 a Not operating (see note below) SW Pump Disch. Valve SW-V-31 a Not operating (see note below) Note: Automatic control from pump start circuitry only.

5) Primary Component Cooling (PCCW}

PCCW Pump CC-P-11A S c One pump on each train in standby PCCW Pump CC-P-110 PCCW Pump CC-P-11C PCCW Pump CC-P-110 / PCCW Loop A Temp. CV CC-T V-2171-1 e Powered by 125 V de source CC-TV-2171-2 PCCW Loop A Temp. CV CC-TV-2271-1 e Powered by 125 V de source CC-TV-2271-2 RHR Hx E-9A Outlet Valve CC-V-145 a Not operating RHR Hx E-98 Outlet Valve CC-V-272 a Not operating PCCW Loop A Temp. CC-TI-2171-1 e Powered by UPS CC-TI-2197 PCCW Loop B Temp. CC-TI-2271-1 e Powered by UPS CC-TI-2297

6) HVAC Emerg. Switchgear Area CHA-FN-19, 32 d

Margin between equipment rating Supply Fans and duty Emerg. Switchgear Area CHA-fN-20, 33 d Margin between equipment rating Return Fans and duty L..

r-TABLE 7.4-1 (Sheet 6 of 7) Description Device Categong Reason Battory Room Exhaust CBA-FN-21A \\ c One fan in standby Fan A Battery Room Exhaust CDA-FN-218 f Fan 8 Train A Nech, Room CDA-DP-24A b Does not rely on electric power Intake Damper Train A Mech. Room CDA-DP-240 b Does not rely on electric power Recirc. Damper Train A Moch. Room C8A-DP-24C b Does not rely on electric power Exhaust Damper Train D Mech. Room C8A-DP-240 b Does not rely on electric power Intake Damper Train 8 Mech. Room CBA-DP-24E b Does not rely on electric power Recirc, Damper Train 8 Mech. Room CBA-DP-24F b Does not rely on electric power Exhaust Damper DG Room Supply Fans DAH-FN-25A,8 d Margin between equipment rating and duty DG Room Exhaust Fans DAH-FN-26A,0 d Margin betwoon equipment rating and duty DG Room Supply Dampers DAH-DP-15A,8 NA Not affected by degraded source DG Room Exhaust Dampers DAH-DP-16A,8 NA Not affected by degraded source Containment Enclosure Fans EAH-FN-5A,8 c One fan in standby Containment Enclosure fans EAH-FN-314.8 c One fan in standby Emerg. Foodpump Houso epa-FN-47A,8 c One fan in standby fans Emerg, feedpump House EPA-DP-373, NA Not affected by degraded source Dampers 374 Emerg. Feedpump House EPA-DP-371, NA Not affected by degraded source Dampers 372 PAD PCC Pump Area PAH-FN-42A,8 c One fan in standby Supply fans PA0 PCC Pump Area PAH-DP-43A,0 NA Not af fected by degraded source Supply Dampers PAB PCC Pump Area PAH-DP-357,358 NA Not af fected by degraded source Exhaust Dampers SW Pump House Area SWA-FN-40A,0 c One fan in standby Supply fans l L

I ~ TABLE 7.4-1 (Sheet 7 of 7) Description Device Category Reason

7) Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

RHR Pump RH-P-8A a Not normally running RHR Pump RH-P-88 a Not normally running RHR System Valve RC-V-88 a Not operating RHR System Valve RC-V-23 a Not operating RHR System Valve RC-V-22 a Not operating RHR System Valve RC-V-87 a Not operating RHR Hx Bypass Valve RH-FCV-618 e Powered by 125 V de source RHR Hx Bypass Valve RH-FCV-619 e Powered by 125 V de source RHR Hx Valve RH-HCV-606 e Powered by 125 V de source RHR Hx Valve RH-HCV-607 e Powered by 125 V de source c. RHR Suction From RWST CBS-V-2 a Not c~ .ating (Loop A) RHR Suction From RWST CBS-V-5 a Not operating (Loop B)

8) Sampling RCS Sampling (Loop 1)

RC-FV-2832 e Powered by 125 V de source RC-FV-2894 a Not energized (powered from MCC E522) RCS Sampling (Loop 3) RC-FV-2833 e Powered by 125 V de source RC-FV-2896 a Not energized (powered from NCC E622) RHR Local Sample RH-V-8 b Does not rely on electric power Valves RH-V-44 b Does not rely on electric power

9) Solid _ State Protection System (SSPS)

SSPS Output Train A MM-CP-12 e Powered by UPS SSPS Output Train 8 MM-CP-12 e Powered by UPS l )

Additions! Equipment Description Device Catemory Reason Battery chargers ~BC-1A, 18, 1C, ID f See coversheet Spare battery charger BC-1P a Equipment not canected i s = 3 I ( i.- - -..

Y ". % ST o F C 4 K A- )))) MR/RCVD 004,U,13-NOV-85,10:10:29 (SG8 ?*** 8'3'I*I'O NOV 13 1985 1011 4761C45UNENGRS WU INFOMASTER 1-004117C317 11/13/85

CJ IPMTDWA MLTN OZC 00001 CRYSTAL LAKE, IL 11-12 (1-0016551317 TWX POWER CON PROD)

_X 714761045 4761045UNENGRS iTTN= S. M. MOLCHANOW ' SUPERVISING ELECTRICAL ENGINEER ET RE PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE ET AL. NEW HAMPSHIRE YANKEE DIVISION CEAABROOK STATION P. O. SNH-174, 97E3.006-137-E

URSUANT TO YOUR TELEA DATED 11/11/65, PLEASE BE ADVISED THE
HARGER WILL NOT PE DA'1Ali: ED BY PROLONGED EXPOSURE TO INPUT VOLTAGE LOWER THAN 4f4 VAC.

THE UNIT WILL NOT OPERATE PROPERLY = THE OUTPUT VOLTAGE REGULATION WILL EE EFFECTED. AT SOME VOLTAGE LOWER THAN 40C VAC. THE OUTPUT VOLTAGE OF THE UNIT WILL l LOLLAPSE AND THE UNIT WILL TURN OFF. IF YOU HAVE ANY DUESTIONS, FEEL FREE TO CONTACT US. 1 LAWRENCE G. LUT2 HANAGER, PRODUCT DESIGN POWER CONVERSION PRODUCTS INC. g 4 .NNN hAdOfkTUS6R OF CA AF Cm6ES C ---

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p ) c pXGF C-2%cg e _ SB 1 & 2 Amendment 52 FSAR December 1903 ( After synchronism is verified by the synch scope, the - transfer is initiated by manually closing (by means of the MCB mounted control switch) the desired source breaker, which automatically trips the other source breaker. 4. Undervoltage and Load Shedding (a) First Level Undervoltage Protection Upon loss of voltage on a 4.16 kV emergency bus, 1.2 seconds are allowed for the automatic transfer described in Subsection 8.3.1.1.b.3(c) above to be completed. If undervoltage persists after this time, the first level of undervoltage protection will be activated. The follow-ing actions occur simultaneously: 1) Bus loads are tripped as required, 2) UAT and RAT breakers are tripped to isolate the

bus, 3)

Automatic transfer schemes are disabled, and 4) (- Standby power supply (diesel generator) is started and subsequently connected to the emergency bus as described in Subsection 8.3.1.1.e. l 51 On an emergency bus, if the UAT incoming line breaker trips open and the RAT source is unavailable, the transfer schemes are not initiated. The standby power supply (diesel generator) is inanediately started and connected l to the emergency bus as described in Subsection 8.3.1.1.e. I 51 (b) Second 1.evel Undervoltage Protection 48 If the voltage on a 4.16 kV emergency bus is below that required to ensure the continued operation of safety related equipment, the second level undervoltage protec-i tion scheme is activated. If the activation occurs coincidently with an accident signal, then the UAT and l RAT incoming line breakers are automatically tripped after a time delay to prevent spurious operation due to transients such as starting of large motors. This will 8 l result in total loss of voltage to the bus with ensuing actions described in Subsection 8.3.1.1.b 4(a) above. If the second level undervoltage protection scheme is activated without the coincident presence of an accident signal, then only an alare is received. Established plant procedures require the operator to take specific o 8.3-5

r PAS.T OF C ( Ts3 Paw c.L to t.t ) c SB 1&2 Amendment 52 FSAR December 1983 ( steps to assess the magnitude and expected duration of the disturbance causing the undervoltage. If he is not assured that the disturbance is transitory, and that recovery is imminent, he may choose to manually trip the of fsite power circuit breakers af ter ensuring that further deterioration of safety will not result from his proposed action. Systems and equipment used for safe shutdown as listed in Section 7.4 will be available in the event of a degraded grid voltage because of one or aore of the following reasons: (a) Not powered by the degt sded power source; (b) Does not rely on electric power; (c) In standby and, there fore, not connected to the degraded source; (d) Equipment will continue to run unimpeded under degraded voltage conditions because of margin between equipment rating and duty; (e) Not sensitive to degraded voltage (resistive load); or (f) Time is available for corrective action. This equipment will not be exposed to or rendered inoper-ative by degraded voltage and, therefore, would be avail-able to place the plant in a safe shutdown status under non-accident conditions. 62. 5. 480 Volt Substation Feeders Feeders from the 4.16 kV emergency buses are taken to 450 volt unit substations te supply the engineered safety feature loads requiring 480 volt supply. The 4.16 kV breakers feeding load centers are normally closed during the plant operation, and control is provided at the 4.16 kV switchgear. Breaker position indication is provided on the main control board, 6. Bus Ties No bus ties exist between the redundant 4.16 kV emergency

buses, s

8.3-6

% (t.T dF (.- "L7 - SB 1 & 2 Amendment 48 FSAR January 1983 C= w o u..O fa len conductor is minimal. The distribution line, which is required f con truction power, will be removed after completion of construction. There e no other structures, such as lighting towers, located a h that, if they 11, they could cause failure of more than one 345 kV reuit. The low pro e of the bus runs minimizes wind loadings onf e support struc- ~ tures and cons vative design of the common support strugnres and their foundation foott a provides assurance that the probabTity of a 345 kV bus support structure iling is extremely low. Protection against veht es on the controlled ac ss bridges and on the roads adjacent to SF6 bus runs provided by a guar ~ rail along the plant access road and by guard rails on e bridges which ass over SF6 insulated bus runs. The guardrails on the idges are dyligned in accordance with AASHO requirements (American Associat n of St te Highway Officials). The rail is 2'-8 3/4" total overall height ab et road surface and it is made of 5" extra stroa.g pipe. Each horizontal ardrail at the supporting structures will accept a horizontal load of /50 ounds, a total of 10,000 pounds at each impact point. The bridges nemsel are conservatively designed for the largest loads required dur" g construc on or operation of the plant. The possibility of a vehic1 causing damage the SF6 insulated bus runs is further minimized by the et that roadways a cent to the SF6 bus runs are on plant property, acce is controlled, and ve 'cles are subject to strict plant regulated speed imits. The above consid tions demonstrate that GDC 17 has en met since the like-lihood of sim aneous failure of the off-site power et uits has been minimized to the exte practical. Furthermore, we believe that o design, using SF6 insulate ircuits, is superior to a design using pole-mou ed, air-insulated circui RAI 430.5 The voltage levels at the safety-related buses should be optimi: 2d for the full load and minimum load conditions that are expected throughout the anticipated range of voltage variations of the offsite power source by appropriate adjustment of the voltage tap settings of the intervening trans-formers. Submit the planned range of normal operating voltages for each safety-related bus.

RESPONSE

Exhibit 430.5-1 is the Voltage Regulation Study for the Seabrook Station. This study provides the voltage analysis required by BTP PSB-1 (See RAI 430.14). 48 h RAI 430-4

F t .,e \\ SB 1 & 2 Amendment 48 FSAR January 1983 IEEE 387-1977, it is our engineering judgement that the Seabro design meets thi standard. IEEE 7-1976: All major electrical containment penetrati s were manufactured to meet the 1976 version of the standard. Some minor ele rical penetrations, 3/4" to " size which are associated with the personnel r lock, the equip-ment hate and the containment recirculation sump isola ton valve encapsulation tank, were anufactured to meet the 1972 version. It s our engineering judgement t t these minor penetrations meet all the mportant design require-ments necess y to perform their safety function, quirements that may be lacking are i the areas of QA documentation, Serv" e Classification docu-mentation, and efinition of certain production t ts. IEEE 384-1974: e Seabrook design meets the r quirements of this standard. i i IEEE 338-1977: Th Seabrook design meets th requirements of this standard. IEEE 484-1975: Refe to RAI 430.31 for co ents on this standard. IEEE 450-1975: The Se rook design mee the requirements of this standard. RAI 430.4 The three off-site power cire it are routed in close proximity between the transmission line terminating. uctures and the switchyard as indicated on Figures 8.2-7 and 8.2-8 of the. AR. In addition, the two off-site circuits from the switchyard to the ge er or step-up transformers and the reserve auxiliary transformers are ted in close proximity. Describe, as so r required by GDC 17, how th subjec routings are designed and located so as to minimize, to the exten practica the likelihood of their simultaneous failure under operating d postulate accident and environmental conditions.

RESPONSE

The SF6 insulated c' cuits connecting the 345 kV transmission lines to the 345 kV switching s tion, and those conne ing the switching station to the generator step-up nd reserve auxiliary tra sformers, have complete electrical isolation from e ch other. Each phase condu tor is located within a cylindrical aluminum encio re which is at ground potenti 1. The completely sealed, 1/4-inch thic aluminum bus enclosures provi physical and electrical pro-tection fro environmental conditions such as w d, ice, snow, and lightning which are concern when locating a standard de ign (air-insulated) trans-mission l' e. Because no phase-to phase electric 1 faults are possible, and because e circuits are protected from environmen 1 hazards, close physical proximi y between circuits is possible. Structures in the vicinity of the SF6 insulated bus i lude a 34.5 kV, wood pole, distribution line which crosces over the bus run connecting the line termination area to the switching station. The conduct s of this line are fully insulated so that the possibility of damage to the F6 buses dus to a as RAI 430-3 l

{i $ T O f ( " 1 b (TM ha% %=3.I.I.3} Amendment 48 January 1983 EXHIBIT 430.5-1 (Sheet 1 of 21) PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEL. HAMPSEIRE SEABROOK STATION VOLTAGE REGULATION STUDY 9

2 EXHIBIT 430.5-1 Amendment 48 ""

I (Sheet 2 of 21)

TABLES OF CONTEhiS SECTION NO. DESCRIPTION PAGE NO. I Purpose 1 II System Model 1 III Load Model 9 IV Netheds 10 V Tab 1 cation of Results 11 VI Conclusions 19 t l l l I

EXHIBIT 430.5-1 Amendment 48 January 1983 (Sheet 3 of 21) PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW BAMPSHIRE SEABROOK STATION VOLTAGE REGULATION STUDY I. FURPOSE l The purpose of this calculation is to determine voltages present at various buses and motors throughout the plant during the folicving conditions: I A. Unit at full load (maximum anticipated unit steady state load) with the utility grid at the minimum anticipated voltage. B. Unit at full load with the utility grid at the minimum anticipated voltage and simultaneous start of all accident loads or start of other large motor loads. C. Unit at Cold Shutdown or Refueling (minimum anticipated load) with the utility grid at the maximum anticipated voltage. II. SYSTEM MODEL This section contains all assumed and actual data to establish the system being studied. A. Utility Crid The utility grid is assumed to be an infinite bus with a resultant zero impendance. The 345 kv bus voltage is assumed to vary between 105% and 97.5%. There are two available connections to the offsite power supply (utility grid); one through the Unit Auxiliary Transformer (UAT) and the other through the Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (RAT). B. Main Generator and Isolated Phase Bus Duct It is assumed that during running and starting conditions the utility grid voltage dip will be limited to 97.5% of rated. To compensate for the Generator Step-Up Transformer (CSU) regulation

EXHIBIT 630.5-1 Amendment 48 (Sheet 4 of 21) January 1983 the generator output voltage must exceed the voltage of 97.5% of rated on the GSU high voltage terminals. Due to this higher generator (and hence, Unit Auxiliary Transformer primary) voltage, the lowest source voltage can not be obtained with the generator connected. Therefore, it is assumed that the main generator is disconnected and that the auxiliary system is being back fed from the utility grid through the CSU. Light load condition is assumed to occur during shutdown with the main generator disconnected and the grid voltage at 105%. The iso-lated phase bus duct connecting the CSU and Unit Auxiliary Transformer has such a small impedance that it is neglected during voltage drop considerations. C. Generator Step-Up Transformer The generator step-up transformer (CSU) has an impedance of 10% on a 1230 MV/. base. This impedance is insignificant compared to other transformer impedances (UAT and unit substation transformers) so that the actual resultant voltage drop is a very small percentage of the total voltage drop. In addition, the computer program used te solve for the voltages in this calculation has convergence difficulties when impedances which differ by several orders of magnitude are incorporated into the impedance digram. For these reasons, the GSU impedance has been neglected in this study. D. Unit Auxiliary Transformer (UAT) The UAT has the following ratings:

1) Voltages:

24.5-13.8-4.3 kV

2) MVA Ratings of windings (in OA/FA/(Future) TOA) a) Primary:

27/36/45 MVA b) 13.8 kV: 18/24/30 MVA c) 4.3 kV : 12/16/20 MVA

3) Leakage reactances between windings a) Primary to 13.8 kV (H-X):

7.5% on 27 MVA base b) Primary to 4.3 kV (H-Y): 12% on 27 MVA base c) 13.8 kV to 4.3 kV (X-Y): 18.53% on 27 MVA base The above leakage reactances are subject to a + 10% manufacturing tolerance.

EXHIBIT 430.5-1 Amendment 48

I (Sheet 5 of 21)

E. Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (RAT) The RAT has the following ratings:

1) Voltages: 345-13.8-4.3 kV

2) MVA ratings of the windings (in OA/FA/(Future)FOA) a) Primary:

27/36/45 MVA b) 13.8 kV: 18/24/30 MVA c) 4.3 kV: 12/16/20 MVA

3) Leakage reactances between windings:

a) Primary to 13.8 kV (H-X): 8.265% on 27 MVA base b) Primary to 4.3 kV (E-Y): 10.395% on 27 MVA base c) 13.8 kV to 4.3 kV (X-Y): 20.12% on 27 MVA base The above leakage reactances are tested values. F. Secondarv Unit Substation Transformers 1. All transformers, except that for unit substation (US) #64, have the following ratings: a) Voltages: 13.8 kV (or 4.16 kV) - 480V b) KVA rating: 1000/1333 KVA, AA/FA c) Impedance: 8% on 1000 KVA base ) Tested values of all ) unit substations are ) approximately equal d) X_ g R ) to 8%. l 2. Transformer connected to unit substation (US) #64 has the following rating: a) Voltages: 4.16 kV - 480V b) KVA rating: 1000 KVA, Ak c) Impedance: 5.75% on 1000 KVA base ) Subject to + 7.5% ) tolerance, d) X ) 6 R ) = l

4 EXHIBIT 430.5-1 Amendment 48 January 1983 (Sheet 6 of 21) C. Non-Serreasted Phase Bus Duet For the purpose of this calculation, there are two types of non-segregated phase bus duct:

1) Type I has the following rating:

a) Voltage: 13.8 kV b) Impedance: (11.4 + j56.5)x10-6 ohms / foot

2) Type 2 has the following ratings:

a) Voltage: 4.16 kV b) Impedances: (6.1 + j43.1)x10-6 ohms / foot H. Cables Cables are copper conductor throughout and have lengths and sizes as indicated on Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 Lengths of all cables have been selected on a worst case basis. That is, the longest cable run within reason has been used in order to yield conservative results. I. Transformer Tap, Settings All transformer taps are on the primary winding. Therefore, a tap set on the UAT or RAT has an effect on both low voltage windings. A tap set in the minus direction has the effect of raising the secondary voltage. For the assumed utility system voltage variation of 97.5% to 105% of 345 kV, transformer taps are assumed to be set as follows:

1) GSU: +2%

2) RAT: + 5%

3) UAT: Normal tap

4) All US transformers, except for US #64: -5%

l

5) US #64 transformer: -2 %

EXHIBIT 430.5-1 Amendment 48 """

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EXHIBIT 430.5-1 Amendment 48 (Sheet 11 of 21) III. LOAD MODEL This section contains all assumed and actual data for the loads being studied. A. Starting Motors The motors shown on figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 were chosen beca.se of their large size and/or long feeder l'ength All motors were specified to start successfully with 80% of their voltage at their terminals. B. Running Loads - UAT or RAT Power Supp1v For the purpose of this calculation, the total running loads on the medium voltage buses are assumed to be as follows:

1) Bus #1:

(20.66) + j (11.21) MVA

2) Bus #2:

(18.01) + j ( 9.37) MVA

3) Bus #3 & ES:

(11.662)+ j (5.521) MVA

4) Bus #4 & E6:

(10.473)+ j (5.126) MVA The above bus loading represents worst case loads on these buses during normal and accident conditions. Running load for the equipment shown on Figures 1, 2, 3 & 4 is derived in the following manner: a) Motors - Manufacturer's data (when available) or catalog information is used to determine running MVA and power factor, b) Unit Substations - All 1000/1333 KVA unit substations except US #64 are assumed loaded to 1000 KVA at .85 power factor and 0.8 diversity factor in lieu of detailing all their connected loads. US #64 is assumed loaded to 600 KVA at 0.85 power factor.

EXHIBIT 430.5-1 Amendment 48 January 1983 (Sheet 12 of 21) c) Motor Control Centers - The total running *- ds on the MCC were estimated to be as follows: MCC # MV MVAR 523 0.338 0.210 612 0.313 0.164 C. Light Loads (Unit at Cold Shutdown) The following loads are assumed to be running simultaneously: 1) R.H. Removal pumps 8A/B (400 hp), service water pumps 41A/B (600 hp) and PCC water pumps 11A/B (700 hp) are running at full load.

2) Each unit substation, except US #64, is loaded to 400 kVA at 0.8 pf.

3) Unit substation No. 64 is loaded to 100 kVA at 0.8 pf.

IV METHODS Computer assisted calculations were made to evaluate the voltage regulation performance of the electrical power system. The computer program employed was the VOLTS Program; a United Engineers and Constructors Inc. computer program. The VOLTS Program is r 25 bus load flov and voltage regulation computer program which utilizes a Causs-Seidel iterative method to obtain the load flow solution. This calculation is done on a worst case basis. For equipment whose parameters are known, the actual values are used, plus a margin where applicable. For equipment whose parameters are unknown, values were assumed which represent the worst reasonable case. Consequently, resultant voltages should be the lowest voltages to be expected during the lifetime of the plant. )

EXHIBIT 430.5-1 Amendment 48 (Sheet 13 of 21) V. TABULATION OF RESULTS The results of the computer calculated voltages are tabulated as follows: A. TABLE 1 --- Bus and Motor Terminal Voltages when running at full load and utility grid at the minimum anticipated voltage. TABLE 2 --- Bus and Motor Terminal Voltages when starting individual motors and the utility grid at the minimum anticipated voltage. TABLE 3 --- Bus and Motor Terminal Voltages when starting all accident loads simulaneously and the utility grid at the minimum anticipated voltage. TABLE 4 --- Bus Voltaget when running at light load and the utility grid at the maximum anticipated voltage. i B. 120V ac System Voltages. O C -~

e EXHIBIT 430.5-1 Amendment 48 (Sheet 14 of 21) January 1983 TABLE 1 BUS AND MOTOR TERMINAL VOLTAGES WRDi RUNNING AT FULL LOAD UTILITY GRID AT MINIMUM ANTICIPAT G VOLTAGE (ALL VOLTAGES ARE ON MOTOR VOLTAGE BASE) BUS OR NOMINAL SOURCE: M TOR TAG # HP VOLTAGE, V FROM UAT. Du FiiOM RAT. Du 4160 0.9500 0.9458 4.16 kV Bus ES 4160 0.9595 0.9545 4.16 kV Bus E6

CO-P-30A 3500 4000 0.9482 0.9440 480 0.9586 0.9537 480V Bus E52 480 0.9551 0.9504 480V Bus E53 480 0.9656 0.9601 480V Bus E61 480 0.9557 0.9504 480V Bus E64 460 0.9407 0.9357 MCC 523 460 0.96?7 0.9571 MCC 612
- CAH-TN-Ic 200 460 0.9345 0.9297 EAE-FN-5A 125 460 0.9446 0.9396 FAH-FN-11B 60 460 0.9530 0.9474 2SW-FN-51B 250 460 0.9434 0.9380 SF-P-10B 20 460 0.9481 0.9425 NOTES:
CO-P-30A -- CONDENSATE PUMP IS A 3500 HP NON SAFETY LOAD. THIS REPRESEh75 THE WORST VOLTAGE DROP DN THE 4160 VOLT SYSTDi.
- NON SAFETY RELATED.

I

EXHIBIT 430.5-1 Amendment 48 (Sheet 15 of 21) January 1983 _ TABLE 2 BUS AND MOTOR TERMINAL VOLTAGES _ UHEN STARTING INDIVIDUAL' MOTORS UTILITY GRID AT MINIMUM ANTICIPATED VOLTAGE (ALL VOLTAGES ARE ON MOTOR VOLTAGE BASE) BUS OR NOMINAL SOURCE: MOTOR TAG # g VOLTAGE. V FROM UAT. pu FROM RAT. Du 4160 .8412 .8517 4.16 kV Bus E5 4160 .8537 .8607 4.16 kV Bus E6

CO-P-30A 3500 4000

.8339 .8445 480 .8318 .8433 480V Bus E52 480 .8325 .8445 480V Bus E55 480 .8431 .8547 4SOV Bus E61 480 .8391 .8500 480 Bus E64 460 .8097 .8217 MCC 523 460 .8398 .8515 MCC 612

CAR-FN-1C 200 460

.7622 .7628 EAH-FN-5A 125 460 .8660 .8663 FAH-FN-11B 60 460 .8430 .8392 2Sk'-FN-51B 250 460 .8282 .8247 SF-P-10B 20 460 .9229 .9177 NOTES: 1) FOR BUS VOLTAGES, THIS TABLE REPRESENTS MINIMUM VOLTAGE AT THE BUS kTEN STARTING ANY ONE MOTOR FED FROM ANY BUS IN THE PLANT.

2) THIS TABLE SUMMARIZES THE RESULTS OF MANY COMPUTER RUNS. THE BUS VOLTAGES LISTED REPRESENT THE LOWEST VOLTAGES EXPERIENCED AT THAT BUS kTEN STARTING AhT INDIVIDUAL MOTOR. CLASS 1E OR NON-CLASS 1E, TK '!TE PLANT.

THE MOTOR VOLTAGES LISTG ARE THE LOWEST REPRESENTATIVE MOTOR TERMINAL VOLTAGES UPON MOTOR START. CO-P-30A, A NON SAFETY LOAD, REPRESENTS THE WORST VOLTAGE DROP ON THE 4160 VOLT SYSTDI, INCLUDING THE SAFETY BUSES. THIS IS A NON SAFETT RELAT D MOTOR. HOWEVER ITS CAPABILIIY TO SUCCESSTL*LLY START AND ACCELERATE AT THE ~AVAILABLE VOLTAGE HAS BEEN VERIFIED BY CALCULATION.

EXHIBIT 430.5-1 Amendment 48 (Steet 16 ot 21) January 1983 TABLE 3 BUS AND MOTOR TERMINAL VOLTAGES WHEN STARTING ALL ACCIDENT LOADS SIMULTANEOUSLY UTILITY GRID AT MINIMUM ANTICIPATED VOLTAGE (ALL VOLTAGE ARE ON MOTOR VOLTAGE BASE) EUS OR , NOMINAL SOURCE: MOTOR TAG # EP VOLTAGE. V FROM UAT. pu FROM RAT. pu 4160 .8856 .8944 4.16 kV Bus ES 4160 .8661 .8749 4.16 kV Bus E6 0 SI-P-6B 450 4000 .8640 .8727 0 RH-P-8B 400 4000 .8646 .8733

CS-P-2B 600 4000

.8626 .8713 0 FW-P-37B 900 4000 .8592 .8679 480 .8811 .8911 480V Bus ESI 480 .8797 .8897 480V Bus ES2 480 .8832 .8932 480V Bus E53 480 .8597 .8696 480V Bus E61 480 .8631 .8724 480V Bus E64 460 .8786 .8886 NCC 512 460 ,8564 .8663 MCC 612 CAH-TN-3B 30 460 .8313 .8416 CBA-TN-32 40 460 .8499 .8599 2-SW-FN-51B 250 460 .8494 .8589 NOTES:

STARTING LOAD

1) OTHER SAFETY LOADS SUCH AS SERVICE WATER 1"JMPS, ETC., ARE RUNNING.

2) TABLE LISTS TRAIN B ACCIDENT LOADS. WHICH IS WORST CASE.

h

EXHIBIT 430.5-1 Amendment 48 (Sheet 17 of 21) ' January 1983 TABLE 4 BUS TERMINAL VOLTAGES WHEN RUNNING AT LIGHT LOAD UTLITY GRID AT MAXIMUM ANTICIPATED VOLTAGE (ALL VOLTAGE ARE ON MOTOR VOLTAGE BASE) BUS OR NOMINAL SOURCE: MOTOR TAG # g VOLTAGE, V FROM UAT Du FROM RAT. eu 4160 1.0920 1.0639 4.16 kV Bus ES 4160 1.0910 1.0627 4.16 kV Bus E6 480 1.1293 1.1009 480V Bus E52 480 1.1294 1.1010 480V Bus E53 480 1.1293 1.0988 480V Bus E61 480 l'.1176 1.08S4 480V Bus E64 460 1.1241 1.0956 MCC 523 460 1.1283 1.0978 NCC 612 cfp - e o

EXHIBIT 430.5-1 Amendment 48 (Sheet 18 of 21) January 1983 B. 120V AC SYSTEM VOLTAGES 1. Most of the control and instrumentation circuits for safety related systems at Seabrook Station are powered from vital ac distribution panels supplied by 118V ac regulated Uninterruptible Power supply units. The output voltage from these regulated power supply units is practically unaffected by the system voltage variations caused by motor starting etc. on the input side of these units. 2. For the remaining safety related circuits which are powered from non-regulated Class 1E 120V ac power distribution panels (powered from motor control centers), our analysis is as follows: The 120/240 volt distribution panels are each energired from the 460 volt motor control center bus. Under the worst conditions, the voltage at the motor control center bus varies between 442.8 volts during full load operation and 519.0 volts during light load operation. In addition to the steady state voltage variation, the minimum voltage at the notor control center bus, which will occur during motor starting, is 386.3 volts. 2.1 EQUIPMENT DATA a. Distribution Transformers connecting 460V HCC's to 120V distribution panels have the following ratings: (a) KVA rating: 15 KVA Single Phase (b) Voltages: 480V to 120V l l (c) Taps: 0, -5%, -10% l (d) Impedance 1.9% (from catalog data) (e) X/R ratio: 0.41 (from catalog data) The equipment connected to these distribution panels consists of control relays, solenoids, indicating and instrumentation devices with the following l ratings and operating characteristics. b. Relays I (a) Type: I.T.E. Class J (b) Coil Voltage rating: 120 ac (c) Minimum pickup voltage: 84 volts (d) Drop-out voltage: 72 volts I In one specific system, relays with a drop-out voltage of 102V ac are used. This circuit will be suitably redesigned to provide proper operation under l ~ all voltage variations. i

EXHIBIT 430.5-1 Amendment 48 [ Sheet 19 of 21) January 1983 c. Solenoids (a) Type: ASCO Solenoid Valves (b) Coil rating: 120V ac (c) Operating range 85% - 110% of rated voltage (d) Minimum holding voltage: 80 volts d. Indicating Lamps (a) Type: GE-ET16 (b) Rated 120V ac (c) Minimum circuit voltage: 95 volts (d) Maximum circuit voltage: 130 volts e. Level Indicators 4 to 20 ra converters (a) Input Voltage: 115V + 10% (b) Frequency: 60Hz + 5% (c) Pcwer consumption: 3VA Max. 2.2 DESIGN BASIS The analysis for the 120 volt non-regulated Class 1E equipment is made on the worst case basis. In calculating the voltage drop between the distribution panel buses and the terminals of relays coils, solenoids and instrumentation devices the following f actors were taken into account. (a) Longest length of cable run (b) Maximum load in the single phase circuit (c) The reactance on ac circuit as well as the resistance of the wire.

2.3 CONCLUSION

S Under the above conditions, the voltages at the 120/240V distribution panel buses will vary between 109.9 volts and 128.9 volts. For short periods, during the voltage dips due to motor starting, the bus voltage may drop to 95.8 volts. Our analysis of all safety related 120V circuita has indicated that the safety related loads supplied from the non-regulated c: ass 1E 120V ac distribution panels receive proper operating voltages at their terminals. l During transient voltate dips due to motor starting, the relays ano solenoids will not drop-out. The voltage at their terminals exceeds the minimu.' holding m R9r m m. ]

EXHIBIT 430.5-1 Amendment 48 (Sheet 20 of 21) January 1983

2.3 CONCLUSION

S (Cont'd) A transient under-voltage condition of 95.8 volts and a steady state of 129 volts would have no adverse effect on the instruments for the level indica-tors. These voltage levels, which exceed the 10% tolerance of input voltage to the level indicators 4 to 20 ma converters, l. ave been checked with the vendor and confirmed that these conditions are acceptable. l

,.)o. EXHIBIT 430.5-1 Amendment 48 (Sheet 21 of 21) January 1983 VI. CONCLUSIONS A. Full and Light Load Conditions All motors will receive more than the minimum 90% or their rated voltage during normal plant operating conditions. During light los'd conditions, all buses and motors will receive less J than 110% of their rated voltage except that some 480V buses, when fed via the UAT, may exceed the allowable maximum motor voltage by up to l 2.9%. However, assuming a nominal motor feeder drop of 2 to 3%, 480 V motor terminal voltage should not exceed the allowable maximum voltage when supplied by the UAT. There is no overvoltage problem when the systec is fed via the RAT. B. Motor Starting Conditions All safety-related motors recaive more than 80% of their rated voltage and will accelerate without any problems. The duration of the voltage dips caused by starting of most major motors is between 2 and 5 seconds. In some instances, due to fans starting the duration will exceed 5 seconds. However, these voltage dips are limited to the unit substation buses feeding those fans. The duration of these voltage dips will not cause any equipment damage or malfunction. C. _ Transformer Tap Settings The assumed transformer tap settings are acceptable for the assumed utility system voltage variation of 97.5 to 105 percent of 345 KV. O j 5 e ,r--

C Complianc,with R guletery Guid7 1.9 Earlier revision of FSAR Section 8.1.5.3 had indicated an exception to Position C-5 of Regulatory Guide 1.9. Further study indicated that the Seabrook design meets Position C-5 and, in response to RAI 430.19, we indicated that we will revise the FSAR accordingly to remove the exception. During the site visit, the reviewer verified that the FSAR has been revised accordingly and, therefore, we consider this confirmatory item resolved. A copy of the revised FSAR page is enclosed. s [ 4 ~b I'

Per se c-23 SB 1 & 2 Amendment 48 FSAR January 1983 RG 1.9 " Selection of Diesel Generator Set f. c icity for (Rev 2) Standby Power Supplies" g Position C.14 requires that the engine run at full 48 load for 22 hours following 2 hours at short time rated load. For Seabrook, a " Load Capability Qualifi-cation" test was performed per IEEE 387-1977. The engine was run at full load for 24 hours after reaching equilibrium temperature, but before 2 hours short time rated load test. RG 1.22 " Periodic Testing of Protection System Actuation (Rev 0) Functions" 45 The design is in accordance with RG 1.22 as supplemented by Regulatory Guide 1.108, Rev. 1, entitled " Periodic Testing of Diesel Generator Units Used as Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants". Re fer to Subsection 8.3.1 RG 1.32 " Criteria for Safety-Related Electric Power Systems (Rev 2) for Nuclear Power Plants" Physical Independence of electric systems is in accor-dance with Attachment "C" of AEC letter dated De'cember 14, 1973, entitled " Physical Independence of Electric Systems" (Appendix 8A). Refbr to Subsection R.3.1 RG 1.47 " Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems" With the exception of the Emergency Diesel Generator System, the Electric Power System is not required to have inoperable status indication because it is not expected to be bypassed or deliberately induced inoper-able more frequently than once per year. Reference regulatory position C.3(b). Inoperable status indication is provided for the Emergency Diesel Generator System as a result of data provided by the NRC indicating that Diesel Generator Systems have been declared inoperable more frequently than once per year. For additional information on the design provided, refer to ICSB RAI 420.10. 48 RG 1.63 " Electric Penetration Assemblies in Containment (Rev 2) Structures for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants" The electrical penetration assemblies are designed to withstand, without loss of mechanical integrity, the maximum fault current vs. time conditions that could occur as a result of single random failures of circuit 8.1-6 s

C-24 F*n rfsty Loe.d, powered From Clem 1E AC System This confirmatory item pertains to the capability of the diesel generator to start and run under contingency conditions the 1,500 hp Non-Class lE startup feed pump. The staff requires that we demonstrate this capability as part of the generator load qualification, preoperational and periodic tests. j During the pSB site visit (September 24-26, 1985), we provided to the reviewer i supporting documentation by the diesel generator manufacturer attesting to the l diesel generator load qualification capability to start and run the 1,500 hp startup feed pump. No further documentation was requested at this time. Copies of this docxnentation is enclosed. The confirmation th:.c the diesel generator can start and run the startup feed pump while carrying the maximum Train A load listed in FSAR Table 8.3-1 will remain pending until the preoperational tests are conducted and test results are made available.

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I khT.eF &1Y - ~ Estimbstries 30em PACE ENGINEERING REPORT g/ ser 1 or 4 wo. I hg EmeraVTS-0SS-020482-01R PUBLIC SERV!CE OF NEW PKPSHIRE - SEABROCK PRNECT car February 4, 1982 s user 5.0. 206086 - 16 CYL PC2 RATED 6083KW Y . T. Stonehocker VOLTAGE AND FREQUENCY EXCURSION PREDICTIONS mzs STARTING A 1500HP AN0/0R A 900HP MOTOR APPSO M PfR CUSTOMER'S INPUT AND REQUEST / W I ",.- u', d, - This is a report of the investigation by computer simulation of the effects on the subject unit of the starting of either a 1500 HP or a 900 HP motor upon the i frequency of the unit. Motor characteristics, (speed vs torque curves). and other pertinent data were obtained from the customer. That input is, included as Appendix B included in the file with the original of this report. The speed-l torque data was reduced to tabular form, included as Appendix A. No speed l torque data was included for the motor's inad, so the effect was assumed to follow the cube curve relationship. The motor inertia given by the customer was assumed to include the inertia of the load. l ' The customer was primarily concerned with the capability of the unit to maintain freqi.ency when there was already a considerable load on the unit. These loads were defined as 5585 KW and 5150 KW (The unit is rated at 6083 KW). These loads tcre i! sed along with loads of 20, 40, 60 8 80f. of the unit rating. Table I gives the results in starting the 1500 HP motor. Table It shows results for the 900 HP motor. Both motors can be started at any pre-load condition up to and including 5585 KW.. These motors are not considered severe in that they accelerate rapidly (w(The 1500 HP motor equals 20.47. Rated Load; the 900 H ithin 2 seconds) and are relatively small in comparison to the unit's rating. equals only 12.3 Rated Load.) i i a b 8 d e 200*d 1926 - N0!1W15 >100399351WC 92 811 G8. t!%

UM 1mm PAGE ENGINEERING REPORT ] mrr 2 ' 4 2 NN NUma VTS-935-020432-01R l PURLIC SERVICE OF 4E!4 HAMPSHIRE - SEABROOK PROJECT 04n 5.0. 206086 - 16 CYL PC2 RATE 0 6083KW

"' U ampost VOLTAGE AND FREQUENCY EXCURSION PREDICTIONS ims STARTING A 1500HP AN0/0R A 900HP MOTCR "f,?

PF_R Of9TOMFR'9 TNpilT ann OrnttF97 . M h '.,,. d = / The results given in the tables were based on use of a Beloit Dower Systems generator (IX-36) using the following parameters. Transient Reactance X'du 19.1% Sub-transient React. X"d 11.5% Time Constant T' dp 4.74 Sec. Full Load Field Voltage FLFV 238 Volts No Load Field Voltage NLFV 91 Volts Max. Field Volt (Forcing) MFV 500 Volts Rated XYA GRKVA 8375. XVA Recovery Voltage RXV

90. %

l* The en.jint aarameters were defined as follows: Engine Rating ERXW 6083 XW Engine RPM ERPM 514 Number of Cylinders CYL 16 Strokes per Cycle SPC 4 Percent Overload POL 120% Recovery frequency RXF 98% Engine W - in-lb-sec2 EWR2 233000 lb-ft2 Rack Delay Time Constant ROTC 015 Other Parameters and Program Constants used: Exciter Recovery Constant ERC .5 Generator Dip Constant GDC 1667. System Otp constant SCN 575 Percent Base Load Constant XML .45 (45%) Load Recovery Rate Constant LRR .125 (12.5%/Sec) Voltage Overshoot Constant VOSC .6 (60%) . Time Increnent TINC .1 Sec. Flag 20 FLG20 2. e 900*d C926 - N011W15 >t0088W35 1W9 8t:11 G8. t!'ACH

M PAGE ENGINEERING REPORT = 3or 4 80-3 ne n wimaam '/TS-085-020482-01R JUi1LIC 5tRVIGr. If NEW HM'? SHIRE - SEARROCK PRNECT a ersiscr 5.0. 206086 - 16 CYL PC2 RATE 0 6083KW February 4, 1982 vuumt u.0 MtyUt%T tALuR510N PREDICTIONS sr V. T. Stonehocker amt STARTING A 1500HP AND/OR A 900HP MOTOR Arreoven PER CUSTOMER'S INPUT AND REQUEST 87', f 7,(. e [ u.^ p TAfLE 1 PS.'N '5001P Ntcr Start Peter Loading = Motor W = 15(D, Equivalent XW 9 005 eff. = 1243W (20.4% Rate Load) Running Load =1385W = 1148KW 9 GN. eff. (18.9%RatsfLoad) Loded Retor Currirt = 1145 Anps Inrush = 4.16 * (T

1145 = 82505KVA Motor Inertia - 224 lb ft2 Load Tortp - None given, Cube cune assuned Frtm Cmter Output, Oegree of Severity = 123-125=.

Equivalent Leading 1528-1534 XW for 2 seconds (25% Rated Leal) Peak Loading - 1943 - 211 XW 91.8-1.9 seccrds (34.N. Rated Lee) Camuter Test Run No. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 Load Prior to Step KW 0 1217 2433 3650 4866 S 50 5585 % Rataf Load 0 20 40 60 m 85 92 Voltage Ofp 14.03 14.03 14.03 14.03 14.03 14.0 3 14.03 Time 9 Max Dip See .085 .25 .085 .25 .n85 .0R5 .25 e Time Recs to 905 Sec .16 .16 .18 .19 20 .21 21 Time.Tctal Rec. Sec .32 .35 .31 .41 .46 48 .50 Fripancy 1.87 1.86 1.86 1.86 la la 1.83 T he 9 Max Dip See .51 .51 .51 .60 .51 .51 .51 Tise Recw to 90% Sec TiseTotalRec Sec .95 1.23 1.59 1.86 1R 1.75 2.90 d GOO *d 2926 - NOI1W15 N0088W35 1WC 6Ct!! $9. WI'0)N j

F NM h ENGINEERING REPORT narr 4 or 4 E' 4 Engine Division musu VTS-985-020482-01R PUBLIC SERVICE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE - SEARR00K PROJECT nm meer "# U 5.0. 206086 - 16 CYL PC2 RATED 6083KW m, VOLTAGE AND FREQUENCY EXCURSION PREDICTIONS mu STARTING A 1500HP AN0/OR A 900HP MOTOR MON - f PER CUSTOMER'S INPUT AND REQUEST -Y N. 4.v e. ' TMLE II PS?H - 900W Motor Start MRor Loading = Motor W = TO, Equivalent KW 0 90% eff. = 74T4 (12.3". Rated Load) Laked Rotor Current = 674 ems Innash = 4.16 * (T

674 = 4856SKVA Maar Inertia - 155.5 lb.ft2 Lead Torque - Not given, cube cure assiraf Fren Canputer Output, Degree of Severity = 161?,

E@ivalent Leading 1204 W for 1.5 seconds (19.8". Rated Loaf) Pak Loafing - 148-148 XW @ 1.2 secords (24.5% Rated Load) Comuter Test Run No. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 ) Load Prior to Step KW 0 1217 2433 3550 4866 5150 5585 ' Ratsi Load 0 20 40 60 ID 85 T \\ Voltage Dip L 8.76 8.76 8.76 8.76 8.76 8.76 8.76 Time 9 Max Ofp Sec .053 .053 .053 .053 .053 .053 .053 TimeReccw to 905 Sec Tise Total Rec. Sec .19 .20 .21 .23 .25 .26 .27 Fmatancy 1.23 1.21 1.22 1.45 1.45 1.45 1.45 Time 9 Max Dip Sec .51 .51 .51 .61 .61 .61 .S TimeRecow to 90% Sec Time-Total Rec Sec .76 .92 1.20 1.57 1.44 1.45 1.79 1 j s,26 - scrisis >icoassis two e,iii se. *i nos

' ',.M M APPENDIX A h FACE ENGINEERING REPORT 8= , or, m = Fairmenks Morse ma yTS-985-020482-01R sagine olvisten " " 888 PUBLIC SERVICE OF flew HAMPSHIRE - SEABROOK PROJECT sma S.O. 206085 - 16 CYL PC2 RATED 6083KW February 4, 1982 AM eMer VOLTAGE MD FREQUENGY UGUR5f t;N PREDICi10N5 STARTING A 1500HP AND/OR A 900HP MOTOR, Arysovro, m PER CUSTOMER'S INPUT AND REQUEST 83 ' ' i MOTOR SPEE0/TOROUE CURVES - TAftULATION OF vat.tlES 1500 kP 900 HP E Sceed P Torque Toroue , Torque i 0 90 1230 93.7 5 8.9 1230 93.7 10 87 1230 93.7 15 85 1060 80.7 20 84 1170 89.1 25 83 1260 96. 30 82 1300 99. 35 32 1320 100.5 40 81 1360 103.6 45 81 1390 105.9 50 80 1430 108.9 55 80 1470 112.0 60 81 1520 115.8 65 82 1650 125.7 70 83 1780 135.6 75 85 1950 148.5 80 89 2290 174.4 85 98 2630 200.3 90 125 3220 245.2 95 205 3530 272.7 100 100 100 Pk 97 225 Pk 9 957. Speed Full L.oad Torque - 2188.3 lb-f t Full 1. cad Torque - 1313 lb-ft Rated Speed - 3600 RPM Rated Speed - 3600 RPM e 400'd 1946 - N0!1W15 N0089W35 1WD 198!! G9. Di'00N

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C A) Autom-tic Tran'fer ef Load, B) Electrical Interconnections Between Redundant Divisions A. The first part of this confirmatory item pertains to modification of the power sources to Uninterruptible Power Supplies (UPS) ED-I-2B and ED-I-4. This modification eliminates what the staff considers as potential interconnection between redundant divisions. The enclosed FSAR Figure 8.3-2 has incorporated the modification. As it can be seen, the power sources for UPS ED-I-2B and 4 are all derived from Train A; and there are no connections to Train B. For clarification, it is to be noted that 125 V de Bus 12B is Train A associated. Based on discussions with the reviewer during the site visit, we believe the above information will be adequate to resolve the subject confirmatory item. B. The second part of this confirmatory item pertains to the review by the staff of the studies performed to address interconnections between redundant divisions. These studies were transmitted to the NRC via two letters, SBN-587 dated December 1, 1983 and SBN-671 dated June 20, 1984. During the site visit, these studies were discussed in detail with the reviewer. The reviewer stated that he will have to further review the information provided at the site and other additional information provided, herewith, before he can make a determination on the acceptability of the studies. The following describes the status as a result of the site visit discussions and subsequent discussions during the November 6,1985 meeting of the individual items addressed in the studies: Item 1 The " Analysis / Recommended Modification Evaluation," for this item of our study (SBN-587) will be revised as shown in the enclosed revised Page (1). This revision incorporates additional information as agreed during the November 6,1985 meeting. Items 2. 12 and 14 These items were discussed in detail; pertinent schematics were provided to the reviewer. No additional information was requested at this time. Item 3 The " Analysis / Recommended Modification Evaluation" for this item of our study (SBN-587) will be revised as shown in the enclosed attachment. This revision incorporates additional information regarding the interface between preferred power supply and Train B switchgear. b

Item 4 This item was discussed in detail. The " Analysis / Recommended Nodification Evaluation" of this item in our study (SBN-587) will be revised as shown in the attached revised Page (4) to implement additional information on metal barriers and Class IE breakers. We are providing herewith copies of Drawing No. 9763-N-310105, Sheets E03a and E04a, showing the metal barriers. Item 5 } on this item, the reviewer requested that we provide details on the isolation devices utilized to provide the required separation between f Train A and Train B associated circuits. These isolation devices are the same devices provided as part of the Westinghouse NSSS package. The details for these devices are provided in the following Westinghouse WCAPs: WCAP Nos. 8584 and 8760: FMEA of the Engineering Safeguard Feature Actuation System. WCAP No. 8892-A: " Westinghouse 7300 Series Process Control System Noise Tests." We believe that the above documents have been submitted to the NRC by Westinghouse for review and approval and that they are available for the reviewer's use. Items 6. 7. 8 and 13 ( On this item, the reviewer requested that we provide details for the isolation devices utilized in the Isolation Cabinet No. NN-CP-470. We are providing herewith the requested details consisting of pertinent f sections of UE&C's Specification No. 9763-006-120-11 for the isolation cabinet and excerpts from the environmental and seismic qualification reports for this cabinet. Item 9 The " Analysis / Recommended Nodification Evaluation" for this item of our study (SBN-587) will be revised as shown in the enclosed attachment. This revision incorporates additional information and clarifications requested by the reviewer during the November 6,1985 meeting. Item 15 The arrangement of the terminations of the pressurizer heaters around the bottom of the pressurizer was discussed with the reviewer, and arrangement drawings were provided. The arrangement and the I

1 cpproximatOly four-inch cep:rcticn betwern the tseminaticns of the pressurizer heaters is a standard Westinghouse design. To further analyze and evaluate the pressurizer heater cables physical separation, we will revise the " Analysis / Recommended Modification Evaluation" of Item 15 of our study (SBN-587) as shown in the enclosed attachment. Item 16 The issue of the congestion and existing separation at the Reactor Incore Instrumentation Seal Table was discussed with the reviewer. It was pointed out that because we are using the standard Westinghouse design for the guide tubes, this congestion is unavoidable. The existing separation between cables of redundant separation groups is acceptable for the reasons outlined under Itryn 16 of the study. We are providing the following additional information: The 58 incore detectors are assigned to the two separation groups so that each separation group has adequate coverage of the entire core. The incore guide tubes that connect the vessel to the seal table are routed using the standard Westinghouse design that results in a seal table layout that basically mimics the core layout (the mimic is not exact since the seal table is rectangular whi?e the core is circular). Rerouting the guide tubes to maintain electrical separation above the seal table would have required extensive redesign and rework of the Westinghouse standard design for the guide tubes which we do not believe is necessary based on the analysis we have performed. We have further revised our response to Item 16 of our study (SBN-587) to incorporate additional information on the voltage and current levels that can be expected on the circuits at the Reactor Incore Instrumentation Seal Table. See attached revised Page (13) of our study. Item 10 The reviewer indicated that he will request ICSB to perform an independent review of this item. Item 11 This item was discussed with the reviewer during the site visit and subsequent meetings. Various diagrams and other pertinent information were supplied to the reviewer for further evaluation.

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I83T Cf C"" 1( (C3) 3:4 <s%a. 4 PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF UEW HAMPSHIRE SEABROOK STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 CABLES BETWEEN REDUNDANT SEPARATION GROUPS EQUIPMENT NODE ANALYSIS / RECOMMENDED ITEM DESCRIPTION NO. MODIFICATION EVALUATION 1. 13.8 kV Switchgear A05 The Separation Group A switchgear Feeder Breaker A09 compartments contain Separation Group A Compartments for A20 (Train A Associated) and Separation Group B Reactor Coolant A24 (Train B Associated) cables. The Separation Pumps Group B cables that enter the Separation Group A switchgear compartments are the power feeders for the 13.8 kV Reactor Coolant Pumps and the cables for the power connections to the potential transformers (see Item 2) that is utilized for the solid-state protection system circuits. These cables enter the rear section of the ( switchgear compartment from the bottom and connect to the lugs provided in the rear section. The cables are separated from the Separation Group A control wiring by metal barriers, except for the current transformers, ground sensor and space heaters wiring. Postulated failures and their effects on the separation groups are hereby analyzed: A. Postulated Failure in One of the Above-Mentioned Switchr. ear Compartments such failure (short, ground, fire) will impact the separation Group A circuits contained in this specific compartment of the switchgear, and it may affect the power availability to the Reactor Coolant Pump motor fed from this compartment; it may also affect the connections to the Potential Transformers (PT) mentioned above. The cables used for the connections to the pts are routed in embedded conduits and do not intermix with any other Separation B circuits. The cables providing power to the Reactor Coolant Pump motors are armored cables and are designaiad as Train B. They are routed to the RCPs either in embedded conduits or in dedicated cable trays containing only those cables. These trays are located in the Train B Cable Tunnel (see FSAR, l 0)

i l FAgtt oF C.- M m) I4*aa-t Figura 8.3-44) and, being 13.8 kV Icval trays, they ara located at the top of a stack of other Train B trays. The nominal distance between the trays in a stack within a separation group is 16 inches. The postulated failure in the 13.8 kV Train A associated switt hgear corapartment could not have caused catastrophic failures in the 13.8 kV armored cables which, in turn, could have affected the other Train B cable trays located in the same stack of trays. For such an event to happen, one will have to postulate application of higher than the rated voltage of these circuits. Such a postulated event is eliminated because 13.8 kV is the highest available voltage at the switchgear. B. Postulated Failure at the Reactor Coolant Pump Motor A failure of the motor end which could have caused high short circuit currents and postulated failure of the cables will be isolated by either the Class 1E fuses provided for penetration protection or the 13.8 kV feeder breaker at the 13.8 kV switchgear. The above failure mode analysis indicates that the postulated failures will not challenge redundant separation groups and therefore this interface of the separation groups at the 13.8 kV switchgear is acceptable. e

1 P AST cF c-2 f (f4 3.bw 3 PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE SEABROOK STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 CABLES BETWEEN REDUNDANT SEPARATION CROUPS EQUIPMENT NODE ANALYSIS / RECOMMENDED ITEM DESCRIPTION NO. MODIFICATION EVALUATION 3. 4,160 Volt Preferred power supply has to be provided Switchgear to the Train B 4,160 Volt emergency Compartments for switchgear Bus E6. As allowed by IEEE-308, preferred power there is an interface of the Non-Class 1E Supplies preferred power supply (off-site power supply) and Class IE Train B switchgear (refer to Figure 1 of IEEE-308-1978). For the Seabrook design, the connection from the preferred power supply (UAT or RAT), which is Train A associated to Train B 4,160 Volt switchgear Bus E6, is done utilizing metal, enclosed, nonsegregated three-phase bus duct. For typical construction of the bus duct, see enclosed figure. i The bus ducts originate at the Unit Auxiliary Transformer X-2B and Reserve Auxiliary Transformer X-3B; they enter the Ifeater Bay and run along the length of the Heater Bay roof and finally terminate at the Train B switchgear Bus E6 utilizing Class 1E breakers. (Refer to FSAR Figure 8.2-6.) These bus duct runs are independent three-phase units and do not associate with any other raceway system along their entire length and, therefore, a failure on these l bus ducts will not affect any other raceway system. It is pointed out that the connection of the preferred power supply to the redundant Train A 4,160 Volt emergency switchgear Bus E5 is done by similar independent nonsegregated three-phase bus ducts originating at different Unit Auxiliary and Reserve Auxiliary Transformers. Based on the above description, the interface of the Train A associated preferred power supply and Train B switchgear Bus E6 is a necessary one and is allowed by design and IEEE-308. l l (\\\\

[ PACT cF c-10 (6) I4*w 3 Thn u a of tha ind:p nd:nt n:n::gesgntcd bus ducts and Class IE breakers for the connection to the switchgear ensure nondetrimental interactions between the i redundant trains. (N

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PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE MST g g,g{ SEABROOK STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 %N CABLES'BETVEEN REDUNDAhT SEPARATION CROUPS EQUIPMENT ANALYSIS / RECONNENDED ITEM DESCRIPTION NODE NO. MODIFICATION EVALUATION, 3.*(Cont'd) and the Train B switchgear. The interface is the Class IE 4160 volt UAT and RAT incoming line breakers. This interconnection between separation groups is acceptable and no modifications are recommended. 4. Vital Instrumentation The Separation Gr,gup C Distribution Panels Distribution Panel EDE-PP-1C coatsias Separation Group A EDE-PP-1C E03 (Train A and Train A EDE-PP-ID E04 Associated) cables (i.e., alternate power feede' and Separation Group C (Channel III) cables. Slailarly, the Separation Group D Distribution ( Panel EDE-PP-ID contains Separation Group B (Train B and Train B Associated) and Separation Group D (Channel IV) cables. 4 Uninterruptible Power The Separation Group A UPS Supply EDE-I-IC contains Separation Group A (Train A and Train A EDE-I-1C HE3 Associated) cables and a EDE-I-ID HE4 Separation Group C (Channel III) cable.M The Separation Group B UPS g EDE-1-1D contains Sepa rat ion Group 3 8 (Train B and Train B Associated) M*it C a@ c.j uk es CdA%- (E Lvmker cables and a Separation Croup D 1 t sbib sAkew pcu^ *l CO E-9 9-Ic-(Channel IV) cab C {eds ) NW / I This interface between the above tuk ch h {, c,i p h 1 a'. A -

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mentioned sepa ra tion groups is -t_ acceptable because the plant design 7 ~^- ~ (W RESAR) requi re s the t the powe r (sg eetb\\e. v i cs C(n s$ - ( C b "* O f, supplies for the f our protection o system channels be derived f rom the ( eds lle.N dh fik COC~iE'tb s j two redundant eme rgency powe r wbd R le d ad -81 " 5 C ( " # *( 3 J' sources (i.e. Train A and Train r 3). As a re sult, there is an ~' interface, by design, between Train A and Channel I, Train A and k.. Channel III Train B and Channel II, and Train B Channel (4) I

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F 1 pan or c -2 s" - 4W % (g I,(3 TilIS DOCUMENT IS NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATE J llNITED, ENGINEERS & CONSTRUCTORS, INC. 30 SOUTil 17Til STHEET PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19101 SPECIFICATION FOR ISOLATION CABINETS FOR PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE SEABROOK STATION UNITS 1 & 2 o h b, e u n a oV w Revisions l SPECIFICATION NO. 9763-006-120-11N ,j 1%,1@p MSP du'Af ~ ~ Q/A SDE PEM _lio. Date Prep. Checked [f( @2g..k..._'OATE: August 12, 1983 N6bM l PREPARED BY: M.S. Patel [ "~ CllECKED BY: [l/ L..ql f G.W. Morris a SERhtMQM- ~ ~ ' ~ ~ ~ g/A REVIEW: S.E. Rubenstein N~ r h.M.bAW /h APPROVED BY: G.M. Aggarval b k h APPROVED BY: D.lC ads L

I i' I l 1.0 CENERAL INFORMATION ij ' I! 1.1 OWNER l-Public Service Company of New Hampshire 1 1000 Elm Street l Manchester, NH 03105 l.2 ENGINEERING SUPERVISOR l Yankee Atomic Electric Company l 1671 Worcester Road l P.O. Box 930 Framingham, MA 01101 1.3 ENGINEER-CONSTRUCTOR l l United Engineers & Constructors Inc. l 30 South 17th Street l P.O. Box 8223 l Philadelphia, PA 19101 1.4 CONSTRUCTION MANAGERS United Engineers & Constructors Inc. } ("~ 30 South 17th Street P.O. Box 8223 Philadelphia, PA 19101 1.5 SITE LOCATION I Seabrook Station Approximately 6000 feet cast of Seabrook, New Hampshire, at termination of Rocks Road. 1.6 PLANT DESCRIPTION l { The Seabrook Station is a two-unit nuclear power plant. Each unit is rated at 1200 MWe and includes a four-loop PWR and a tandem compound, six-flow turbine generator. The Isolation Cabinets will.be used for electrical isolation and physical separation of digital signals between Train A to Train B and l Train B to Train A. i l! ll:i i Spec. No. 9763-006-120-11 d4I Page No. 1 l

't : I !I 4 -1 2.0 TECHNICAL REQUIREMEN'TS 2.1 SCOPE OF WORK 2.1.1 The Seller shall design, fabricate, assemble, test and deltver h two (2) Isolation Cabinets with acc essories as included herein. 9'I The Isolation Cabinets will be used for electrical isolation and physical separation of digitals signals between Train A to Train B, and Train B to Train A. 1 2.1.2 The Isolation Cabinets shall have a qualified life of forty i years. The Isolation Cabinets shall be Class IE. { I 2.2 WORK INCLUDED The work shall include the following: l Furnish, test, and deliver the Isolation Cabinets in completely assembled condition in accordance with this Specification. 2.2.1 The seismic qualification shall be in accordance with Specifi-cation 9763-SD-120-II, " Seismic Requirements" and IEEE 344. The Isolation Cabinets shall be qualified to the requirements of IEEE 323 (refer to UE&C Document EQ-1, " Class IE j Qualification Requirements"). l k# 2.2.2 Documentation for Class l'E equipment shall be provided in accordance with 9763-QAS-3, " Quality Assurance Administrative and System Requi,rements for Safety-Related Electrical Equipment" and 9763-EQ-1. 2.3 RELATED WORK NOT INCLUDED 2.3.1 Foundations 'and leveling channels. 2.3.2 All external connections to the equipment. f 2.3.3 Unloading, storing and installation of the equipment. l i 2.3.4 120 V ac power supplies. 2.4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS The Isolation Cabinets shall be capable of satisfactory perfor-mance under the design parameters listed below: Spec. No. 9763-006-120-11 Page No. 2 i l l J

1 N ll' Location Indoors t Altitude 75 '-0" above sea level Ambient Temperature Range Min. 550F; Max. 1040F i '\\ Pressure Min. O psig; Max. (+).011 psig Radiation 103 Rads Camma f Integrated over 40 year life ] Relative ilumidity 10% to 95% i 2.5 DESIGN REQUIREMENTS 2.5.1 Ceneral The Isolation Cabinets shall be suitable for continuous operation at the worst-case service conditions listed in Section 2.4. 2.5.2 Accessories 2.5.2.1 Crounding 2.5.2.1.1 A copper ground bus shall lie provided in each Isolation Cabinet. The ground bus shall have a compression type lug of sufficient size to attach a GS 10 (7 number 10 AWC) Copperweld cable to the bus. I l 2.5.2.2 Terminal Blocks 2.5.2.2.1 Terminal block's shall be States Company type NT sliding link control terminal block, or Purchaser's approved equivalent. 2.5.2.2.2 If States Company type NT sliding link terminal blocks are mounted horizontally, they shall be mounted so that the link will slide open due to gravity when loosened. 2.5.2.2.3 Terminal block identification shall be by the block manufac-turer's standard method. Spec. No. 9763-006-120-11 Page No. 3

k 1 e i 2.5.2.3 Isolation Devices i isolation devices shall be capable of accepting the relay 2.5.2.3.1 The input and providing the relay contact output with the contact rated A600 except the make capacity is 30 amps output contact the make and break capacity is 120 Vac and Q600 except 125 Vdc as described in NEMA Standard ICS 2-125, at 0.5 amp at tables 2-125-1 and 2-125-2. Each device shall have a minimum of two sets of fonn C independent contacts. The number of circuits having interlocks between Train A to 2.5.2.3.2 Train B are 35 and interlocks between Train B to Train A are Expansion capability shall be provided to permit a future 15. total of a minimum of 44 isolation devices in each train section. I 2.5.2.3.3 The minimum voltage IcVels that the isolation device shall with-stand between input and output terminals without degrading the shall be 1500 volts ac and 2150 volts operation of the circuit Electrical isolation and physical separation provided by dc. l isolation device shall meet the requirements of IEEE 384. level shall be Minimum contact to contact withstand voltage 600 Vac. i The isolation devices shall be capable of withstanding surges 2.5.2.3.4 They shall pass the ANSI Surge With-h to all inputs and outputs. stand Capability Test in accordance with ANSI C37.90. The isolation device shall, as a minimum, have a dielectric 2.5.2.3.5 for its classification as a 600 V device in strength suitable l f accordance with ANSI C37.90. The contact chatter shall be of the duration less than 2 milli-l f seconds during the design basis seismic event. 2.5.2.3.6 i shall not effect the remaining 2.5.2.3.7 Fault on any one input or output circuits. i I The isolation device shall be capable of 100,000 operations. f 2.5.2.3.8 } 2.5.2.4 Power Supplies Two power supplies shall be used, one Train A and one Train B. 2.5.2.4.1 furnished by the Seller will be provided 2.5.2.4.2 The isolation equipment The isola-with safety-related power sources by the Purchaser. tion equipment shall operate utilizing a 120 Vac 210% ungrounded The Seller shall indicate which supply @ 60 Hz 10.5 percent. supply is required in the Engineering Data Sheets of Appendix A. Spec. No. 9763-006-120-11 Page No. 4

1 / I REVISIONS o: LTR DESCRIPTION DATE APPROVED cdw s7ej 58 Mevd ret EASE i t-tt@

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P AEtt eF-C-2 5 ) J cn g (6) 14%s Gil,T,13 E E2-EtNIPOt@ETTAL QUALIFICATION rum ~ ISOIATION CABINET (9N94) mR THE PUBLIC SERVICE CEMPANY OF IEW HAMPSHIRE SEABPOOK STATION UNITS 1 & 2 P.O. SNH 800-9763.006-120-11 0'\\9[d O Ulbit,!{ffW ij hN o i l-NA5-470 2-tN-CP-470 REV SHEET REV SHEET z 2. 23 z'+ 2s 26 27 zg z9 30 31 32 33 Su 35 34 37 sc 39 vo 4r 42 43 W vs 94 u' us o REV STATUS REV OF SHEETS SHEET I 1A 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 (1 to si

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'9 p l J. L c* !*belik NE gygg REIAYS KJ7431A RELEASEn PET-tt*2i-y 9#44 SIZE FSCM NO. DWG NO. A 02750

7399/3 NEXT ASSY USED

APPLICATION SCALE WT.Mf SHEET 1 OF 49 l wm A

../ -[k7399/3 Sheet 2 P ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION REPORT FOR THE ISOLATION CABINET 1 9N94 MANUFACTURED FOR UNITED ENGINEERS AND CONSTRUCTORS, INC. PURCHASE ORDER NO. SNH-800-9763-006-120-ll SPECIFICATION NUMBER 9763-006 REVISION 1 DEVICE BEING OUALIFIED: Relay PROCEDURE: KBT7399/4 I hereby certify that the Relay has been designed, manufactured and qualified in accordance with the requirements of the Purchase Order,, Technical Specifications, and the Environmental Qualification Specifications and if fu,lly qualified to withstand the environmental conditions specified in the Purchaser's Specifications without loss of the required safety function. W / '/ ( Prepared by: ' [m ** Date: 4 Approved by: [

v h Date:

///2/ /[/ / CONSOLIDATED CONTROLS CORPORATION 15 Durant Avenue Bethel, Connecticut 06801 SIZE FSCM NO. DWG NO. 1 A 02750 KBT7399/3 SHEET 2 K16 REVISION

./ .I/K[T7399/3 Shnot 3 1.0 PURPOSE This document, prepared by Consolidated Controls Corporation for U51ted Engineers and Constructors, Inc. contains the results of the Environmental Qualification for the Relays CCC Part No. KJ7431A. Consolidated Controls Corporation document KBT7399/4 contains environmental qualification procedures in accordance with IEEE 323-1974 and UE&C specification 9763-006-120-11.

2.0 CONCLUSION

The data collected and observations made as a result of the environmental qualification procedures of Consolidated Controls Corporation document KBT7399/3 are contained in Appendix A of this report. Based on the data collected and observations made, the Relay is qualified for 40 years or more under normal service and design basis event conditions and meets the requirements of IEEE 323-1974 and UE&C specification 9763-006-120-11. l l SIZE FSCM NO. DWG NO. A 02750 KBT7399/3 K16 REVISION SHEET 3

?g REVISIONS LTR DESCRIPTION DATE APPROVED _ c[46 i9% REL NEtd I)GGi w-H K e,T - I4&5 MT A c./9ssn7 ADDEp Sl4. IS Q APPtHD A.I QET eF C.-E cna (,6).:I.kwS 6,1, T, 3 g I SEISMIC QUALIFICATICH REPORP i M EUR ISOIATION CABINET (9N94) EUR THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEN HAMPSHIRE UNITS 1 & 2 P.O. SNH 800-9763.006-120-11 INF0DNtY ~ i 1-Mi-CP-470 2-M4-CP-470 REV SHEET REV SHEET REV STATUS REV A A A OFSHEETS SHEET' t lA 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Il

12. IS MM Consolidated Controls M

Seew.CT useot ORAWN kee 10/29/84 CHECMEn#6 "//@/ SEISMIC QUALIFICATION REPORP gnar APTheJ !!/if/4 EDR RnEASEn fir ti. I c.99 ISOIATION CABINEP 9N94 9NW SIZE FSCM NO. DWG NO. A 02750 za7199 l m rAss' usso = PIUS ATPACHMENP op Sog.tbrfs l APPLICATION SCALE + WT. %Ye SHEET 10F 13 .m

%R7199 Shrct 2 + SEISMIC QUALIFICATION REPORT FOR THE f e 2 ISOLATION CABINET ( l q j ~L s u xx 9N94 MANUFACTURED FOR UNITED ENGINEERS AND CONSTRUCTORS, INC. PURCHASE ORDER NO. SNH-800-9763-006-120-ll SPECIFICATION NUMBER 9763-006-120-11 REVISON 1 DEVICE BEING OUALIFIED: Isolation Cabinet 9N94 PROCEDURE: KVT7317 I hereby certify that the Isolation Cabinet has been designed, manufactured and qualified in accordance with the requirements of the Purchase Order, Technical Specifications, and the Seismic Qualification Specifications and is fully qualified to withstand the environmental conditions specified in the Purchaser's Specifications without loss of the required safety function. Prepared by: Date:

/

f Approved by: M Date: ////S/8/ l l CON OLIDATED CONTROLS CORPORATION 15 Durant Avenue i Bethel, Connecticut 06801 i l SIZE FSCM NO. DWG NO. A 02750 ER7199 l K16 REVISION SHEET 2

PAGtT cF CO 5-CB) Ilcw 'l PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE SEABROOK STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 CABLES BETWEEN REDUNDANT SEPARATION GROUPS EQUIPMENT NODE ANALYSIS / RECOMMENDED ITEM DESCRIPTION NO. MODIFICATION EVALUATION l 9. Switching Station The Separation Group A switching station Relay Cabinets relay cabinets located in the Unit 1 Relay Room contain Separation Group A (Train A SY-CP-87 GAO Associated) and certain Separation Group B SY-CP-87 GA6 (Train B Associated) cables. The switching SY-CP-87 CA7 station relay cabinets provide protective SY-CP-86 GBO relaying systems for the preferred power SY-CP-85 GB3 supplies. The lockout relays associated with SY-CP-85 GB4 these relaying systems provide contact inputs SY-CP-85 GB7 (tripping and block close) in the control SY-CP-84 GCO schemes for the 4,160 V preferred power SY-CP-86 GCl supply breakers to buses ES (Train A) and E6 SY-CP-86 GC4 (Train B). The cables from the 4,160 V SY-CP-84 GC6 switchgear to these relay cabinets are SY-CP-86 CE6 designated " Train A associated" and " Train B SY-CP-87 GE7 associated." The physical separation ( between these cables on their routing from } switchgear to the relay cabinets meets or exceeds Seabrook FSAR requirements. However, at the relay panels the interpanel wiring between various lockout relays within 5 the relay cabinets is run in common wiring harnesses. These wiring harnesses will have { predominantly A associated wiring along with very limited B associated wiring (only from Bus E6). i The de power supply for the above interlock circuits coming from Buses E5 and E6 breakers is provided by safety-related "A Train" and "B Train" batteries respectively. Further, these circuits (trip f and close circuits) are protected by j Class IE fuses provided in Buses E5 and E6 I switchgear. In addition, Class 1E molded case breakers provide back-up protection for l these circuits. l l l l l l l l l 63 l J

9CT CF G*'n,( (.M Z. W 'l Wa hiva r vicwed varicum failura modas, such as open circuits, short circuits, grounds and hot shorts on these circuits for their impact on the 4,160 V breaker control schemes and for impact on other safety-related circuits which could share raceways with these circuits. Our analysis is as follows:

1. Open circuits in Cables Any open circuits in these interlock circuits are equivalent to open contacts in the lockout relays.

a. Impact on Breaker Tripping Schemes The 4,160 V breakers will not trip for problems with the preferred power supply system. However, relaying provided in the 4,160 V switchgear and the emergency power sequencer will operate to trip these breakers. Hence, no adverse impact in foreseen. b. Impact on Breaker Closing Schemes The 4,160 V breakers for the preferred power supplies cannot be closed. However, Class lE power supplies from the diesel generators, which are not affected by the subject circuits, will still be available to both E5 and E6 buses. Hence, no adverse impact is foreseen. c. Impact on Other Class lE Circuits Due to open circuits, the cables to Buses E5 and E6 will not carry any currents. Hence, these cable cannot have any adverse impact on other Class lE cables which could share raceways with these circuits.

2. Short Circuits in Cables Any short circuits in these interlock circuits are equivalent to closed contacts in the lockout relays.

1 (b

PAEr CF c-2X (M) Ib9 a. Imp *ct en Br*rk*r Tripping Schems2 The 4,160 V preferred power supply breakers to the Buses E5 and E6 will trip. However, Class 1E power supplies from the diesel generators, which are not affected by the subject circuits, will still be available to both the E5 and E6 buses. Hence, no adverse impact is foreseen. b. Impact on Breaker Closing Schemes The cables shorts will appear as closed permissive contacts in the 4,160 V preferred power supply breakers closing schemes. Any automatic breaker closing can be attempted by the relays only if the preferred power supply is healthy and trouble free. Since these breakers are already tripped, no adverse impact is foreseen. c. Impact on Other Class lE Cables The cable shorts will appear as closed contacts in the lockout relays. This will not cause any abnormal currents through the affected circuits. Hence, these cables will not have any adverse impact on other Class IE cables which could share raceways with these cables.

3. Grounds All the interlocking contacts from the switching station lockout relays are wired in the positive side of the trip and close schemes of the 4,160 V preferred power supply breakers.

The de supply for these control circuits are from "A Train" and "B Train" safety-related batteries. Since these de systems are ungrounded, any grounds in the relay cabinets will not cause any maloperation. The breaker control schemes will still be functional. The de ground detection schemes will provide alarms at the station computer. \\

PA'3T or C-2.C (tQ Ib i The gr:unds will nut cruza cny tbn:rmal currents in these interlock circuits. Hence, no degradation of other Class IE circuits which could share the same raceways is foreseen.

4. Hot Shorts The maximum voltage on any of the circuits in the switching station relay cabinets is limited to 125 V de or 120 V ac.

Hence, any voltages impressed on the Interlocking circuit cables due to hot shorts will be well within their voltage rating of 600 v. Further, for any abnormal currents caused by hot shorts, these circuits are protected by Class lE fuses provided in the 4,160 V switchgear. The fuses are coordinated with upstream molded case breakers; i.e., a problem in one of these circuits will not cause loss of control power to the whole switchgear lineup that the problem circuits is part of. a. Impact on Breaker Tripping Schemes The Seabrook design includes interposing relays with their own protective fuses for the switching station portion of the 4,160 V preferred power supply breaker trip circuits. For the postulated hot shorts, due to blown fuses, this portica of the trip circuit may not be functional. However, relaying provided in the 4,160 V switchgear and the emergency power sequencer have separate fuses and will still be functional. Hence, no adverse impact is foreseen. b. Impact on Breaker Closina Schemes For the postulated hot shorts, due to blown fuses, the closing circuits of the 4,160 V preferred power supplies may not be functional. However, Class lE power supplies from the diesel generators will still be available to both E5 and E6 buses. Hence, no adverse impact is foreseen. hl

9M.T o F t.- S.T G) I4 m i c. Imp?ct en Oth'r Cit <es IE Circuits For the postulated hot shorts, the voltages impressed on the interlock circuit cables is well within their voltage rating. Also, these cables are protected by Class 1E fuses, against any fault currents. Hence, no adverse impact on other class 1E cables, which could share raceways with these circuits, is foreseen. Conclusion It is acceptable to run the "A Associated" and the "B Associated" wiring for the interlock contacts from the switching station lockout relays in common wiring harnesses within the relay cabinets. This lack of separation will not prevent safety-related functions and will not affect other safety-related circuits. l l I (S)

P AGT OF C-25 (N I4h 6 EQUIPMENT NODE ANALYSIS / RECOMMENDED ITEM DESCRIPTION NO. MODIFICATION EVALUATION 15. Pressurizer Heaters f.nalysis and Evaluation of pressurizer RC-E-10 Heaters Cables Physical Separation The seventy-eight (78) electrically separate pressurizer immersion heaters are spaced around the bottom of the pressurizer with a separation of approximately four (4) inches between individual heaters. Fifteen (15) of these heaters are powered from "B" separation group power supply and the remaining sixty-three (63) are powered from "A" separation group power supplies. Cables for the "B" separation group heaters are routed in "B" train raceways and cables for the "A" separation group heaters are routed i in "A" Train raceways. l Outside containment, "A Train" precsurizer heater cables from the containment electrical penetrations are routed in "A" separation group raceways for approximately 45 feet where they enter the penetration protection panels. Similarly "B Train" pressurizer heater cables outside containment from penetrations are routed in "B" separation group raceways for approximately 45 feet where they enter the penetration protection panels. Throughout the length, the "A" separation group raceways are separated from the "B" separation group raceways according to the requirements of the FSAR. Inside containment, "A Train" pressurizer heater cables from the containment electrical penetrations are routed for approximately 95% of their length in dedicated raceways (approximately 250 feet). Similarly, "B Train" pressurizer heater cables from the containment penetrations are routed for approximately 95% of their length in dedicated raceways (approximately 235 feet). No other cables share these raceways. In close proximity of the pressurizer, under the pressurizer for approximately 5-10 feet, the "A" separation group cables and the "B" separation gtcup cables leave their dedicated raceways in order to approach and terminate at the heater terminals under the pressurizer. Because of the close location (.I

(6) I.6 W cf thm h ter terminals, clcirence betwe:n these cables is limited to only 3-4 inches. Analyzing the possible modes of failures and sources that could initiate such failurea, we consider this spacing between these cables acceptable because of the following features incorporated in the Seabrook design. (a) For most parts, the pressurizer heater cables are routed in dedicated raceways. The only area of limited separation is under the pressurizer heaters. Access to this area is very much restricted and there are no external sources which coulo damage these cables. The cable separation distance in this area is limited by the location of the heater terminals on the pressurizer. (b) The pressurizer heater cables in the vicinity of the pressurizer are provided with silicone rubber insulation with a glass braid jacket. The glass braid jacket ensures safe operation at high temperature. (c) The pressurizer heater cables are protected by two identical Class 1E breakers connected in series at the penetration protection panels. Each of these breakers has a coil rating of 125 amp. These breakers provide redundant protection for the pressurizer heater cables. We believe that in this area, 3-to 4-inch separation is acceptable since the cable jacket is glass braid construction and each esble is protected by redundant Class lE breakers. l )

PAST cF c4C PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE SEABROOK STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 CABLES BETWEEN REDUNDANT SEPARATION GROUPS EQUIPMENT NODE ANALYSIS / RECOMMENDED ITEM DESCRIPTION NO. MODIFICATION EVALUATION

16. (Cont'd)

This is acceptable because of the following facts: The voltage and current level in these circuits is of the following signal levels and there are no power supplies in the circuit to produce damaging fault currents: Incore neutron detectors: 5x10-9 to 600x10-9 amp; thermocouples: 0-51 mV. These circuits, once they leave the congested seal table area, are run in separate solid cover trays or conduits that meet j the FSAR separation criteria. 1 i { l l l L

C B'ttery Supp*rta fer Outeids DC Systamt This item pertains to the concern expressed by the NRC regarding incompatibility between the battery rack and the battery cells which may cause cracking of the battery case. The cracking may be caused in part by the improper support at the battery stress points. In response to RAI 430.33, we provided information describing the battery cell and battery rack construction design utilized at.Seabrook. In this type of rack construction, the cells sit on three steel stringers located under the cell center line and 15 inches from the center. This evenly distributes the cell weight to minimize stress on the cell which was the primary reason for the cracking problem mentioned above. During the site visit, the reviewer examined the battery rack and noted that the construction of the rack incorporates the three stringers in such a manner that there is no excessive overhang of the battery cells. Based on the fact that the Environmental Qualification Report of the Seabrook Batteries (UE&C Foreign print No. 33089, Issue 5) indicates that the seismic test of the batteries was successfully performed utilizing the above-m.ntioned rack design and the cell design that minimizes the stresses at the plate support bridge / container bottom interface, we conclude that the concern expressed in the confirmatory item has been adequately addressed.

C Complirnce cf N"n-Cless lE Circulta to Class IE Requirements This item pertains to the confirmation that the Non-Class IE circuits which are designated as associated circuits meet all the requirements placed on associated circuits as required by the compliance documents listed in the FSAR (i.e., IEEE 384-1974, Sections 4.5(1) and 4.6.1; FSAR Appendix 8A, Sections 4.Sa and 4.6.1; and Position C-4 of Regulatory Guide 1.75, Revision (2)]. As outlined in Sections 8.3.1.3 and 8.3.1.4 of the FSAR, these associated circuits are uniquely identified as such and remain with those Class 1E l circuits with which they are associated. Cables utilized for these associated i circuits are specified, designed, manufactured and installed to the same criteria as Class lE cables. I During the site visit, the reviewer noticed the unique identification of the associated circuits (cables with black jackets with red or white tracers). It was pointed out that the same cable specifications are used for the safety-related and associated cables. We are enclosing pertinent portions of typical cable specification (Specification No. 9763-006-113-3) which shows both safety-related and associated cables covered by the same specification. It was also pointed out that the same procedures are used for the installation and inspection of safety and nonsafety cables and cable terminations that enter, leave, transverse or are within the Nuclear Island. (Refer to FSAR Figure 8.3-58 for identification of Nuclear Island.) Cables that are totally contained outside the Nuclear Island, although they are covered by the same purchase specification as the safety-related cables, do not require the same QC inspection as the cables mentioned above. We are enclosing pertinent portions of the applicable procedures (FEP-504 and 505) indicating the above. I l l l l

PART OF c-M) C, THIS DOCUMENT IS NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED UNITED ENGINEERS & CONSTRUCTORS INC. 30 SOUTH 17TH STREET PHILADELPHIA. PENNSYLVANIA 19101 g, g C. INC* SPECIFICATION FOR DEC 0 9 Epe)- 600 VOLT POWER CABLE gg,ABROOK S N Ol FOR PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW IULMPSHIRE SEABROOK STATION r N' C U, k UNITS 1 & 2 g[ ' ; 'i T332 Revisions Specificatlon@Ob6 113-3 Approved No. Date Prep. Checked Q/A SDE JEM Date: January 23, 1978 / Prepared: 2 //M( gg D. W. Knox Checked: UfwAA.iv, d _ a Q/A Review: o Approved: . P. Rothong \\ _ Approved: ,JV1f. Rhoads Jk

2.0 TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS 2.1 Scope This specification covers the furnishing of two (2) ' types of 600 volt, insulated power cables. One type will consist of single insulated conductor with a color coded flame retardant jacket. The other type will consist of multiple insulated, jacketed conductors with an overall color coded, flame retardant jacket. All cables shall be Class IE. The Design Life shall be 40 years. ( g The basic document providing guidance for qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations is IEEE Std 323. The specific document providing type testing guidance for qualifying Class IE Electric Cables for Nuclear Power Generating Stations is IEEE Std. 383. IEEE Std. 383 supplements IEEE Std. 323. UE&C Document 9763-EQ-1 is invoked in it's entirety to clarify both documents. It is the intent of this specification to procure 600 volt cables that will provide optimum performance in electrical stability, tensile strength, flexibility, non-aging, abrasion resistance, dynamic cut through resistance, minimal heat distortion, radiation stability, self extinguishing - non-propagating fire characteristics. When said cable insulations and coverings are subjected to high heat or open flame, a minimum of corrosive gas (halogens) shall be produced. Cable insulations and coverings shall perform equally 1-- high radiation areas and zero radiation areas and in areas subjected to periodic high and low radiation. 2.2 Work Included Work shall include, but not necessarily be limited to, the following: a) Design b) Manufacture c) Colored cable jackets j TATUABM K @'ftY OY Y I .L L Spec. No. 9763-006-113-3 Page No. 2

.s ssw P W le BILL OF MATERIAL SEABROOK STATION UNITS 1 & 2 600 VOLT POWER CABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) Each Overall Conductor Cable Es. Conduc. Stranding Purch. Order Item Type Jacket Jacket 3ize Number of Each Quantity Cable No. Cable Color Color AWG/MCM Conductors Conductor (Feet) Code 1. 3/c Black 12 3 7 53,500 BCIN Jacketed 2. 3/c Black White 12 3 7 47,500 BC2N h Jacketed 3. 3/c Black Black With 12 3 7 266,500 BC6N Jacketed P.ed Tracer l 4. 3/c Black Black With 12 3 7 6,500 BC7N Jacketed White Trace 5. 3/c Black Red 8 3 7 9,000 BCIL Jacketed k I 6. 3/c Black White 8 3 7 8,500 BC2L Jacketed 7. 3/c Black Black With 8 3 7 76,500 BC6L Jacketed Red Tracer 8. 3/c Black Black With l 8 3 7 4,000 BC7L Jacketed ite Tracer APPENDIX A 'lF' ((,[ Spec. No. 9763-006-113-3 'qy1]f Page No. Al .,u,. ..m.-- y.osa m y Raurso (.assecuTED) C BBt ES

g;gronc.-x, IRE SEABR00K PR0 JECT PROCEDURE NUMBER FEP-504 TITLE: INSTALLATION AND INSPECTION OF CABLE REVISION 1 w EFFECTIVE DATE05-15-85 PREVIOUS REVISION f NUMBER DATE DESCRIPTION 0 7/10/84 Initial Issue i Y \\ SEASROOK STATION DESCRIPTION OF REVISION This procedure has been reformatted to the requirements of ASP-2. Incorporates IPC's 1 thru 7. U. E. & C. INC. MAY 151985 1 I SEABROOK STATION YSQ Prepared by C. F. Esposito g(,[pf Signature Date l I 3 APPROVALS O C- ,f!/7[ ? Project Construction QA Manager j g Signature " N } Bate 4, Director of Engineering and dj() ([ /4 8 Licensing Signature /gllti Date d Yd' Construction Director d Signature' Dfte V Form ASP-02-01, 3/85

3 FEP-504 Revision 0 04/25/85 New Hampshire Yankee Page 1 of 23 I 1.0 SCOPE i This procedure applies to the installation of safety, non-safety and associated 15KV SKV and 600V power, 600V control, 300v instrumentation i and preIaDricated, coaxial and triaxial cable as sp'ecified on the Engineer's s drawings and Computerized Cable and Raceway Schedule (CASP) at Seabrook Station. 2.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this procedure is to define and provide the requirements and instructions for the installation and inspection of cable. 30 FERENCES h 31 rawings - L310991, 310993, 310994 Computerized Cable and Ra way Schedule (CASP) 3.2 Drawin M-300230, Wiring System Notes and Typica - etails VG 33 Drawing F3 210 Key Plan - Nuclear Island a 34 Drawing M30022 Conduit System Notes an Typical Details k n and Traini,ng/ of UE&C Personnel M, 35 FGCP-13 Indoctrinat / 1 7 3.6 FEP-202 - Raceway Cable, Te [nationSlipHandling i Wa 3.7 FEP-203 - Rework Proced re 3.8 QA-2 Indoctri ion, Training Qualification and Certification % 39 QA Non forming Material, Part or Components 3 u 3.10 QCP-17 - Records Review 3.11 F -517 - Installation & Inspection of Undergr d Ducts and Duct Banks .12 QCP-10 In-Process Inspection 4.0 CENERAL 4.1 Responsibilties j i ? 4.1.1. The UE&C Electrical Superintendent shall be responsible for the l following: } l M-Assignment of craftsmen to install the cable in accordance a. l with approved drawings and this procedure. l

4 FEP-504 Revision 0 04/25/85 New Hampshire Yankee Page 2 of 23 t. b. Indoctrination and training of the assigned craftsmen in b ~ accordance with FGCP-13 to ensure compliance with the re-quirements of this procedure. c. Verification that the cable pull slip (CASP) agrees with the Cable Schedule - Report A. d. Verification that raceway is complete, for the cable pull. e. Submittal of safety related and associated cable pull slips tFo the QC Supervisor for verification of acceptance of the ' raceways carouan which the cable will be pulled, prior to jujjipycablem. - f. Rele ast of the cable pull slips to the Construction Group after items are verified. g. Implementation of this procedure. 4.1 The Project Field Quality Control Manager shall be responsible for indoctrination and training and assignment of appropriate qualified / tified QC personnel to perform the necessary inspec na to verify c liance with the requirements of the approved drawings and this rocedure. 4.1.3 The Supe ising Engineer shall be responsibi for the coordination of Enginee ng activites with Constructio roup. 4.2 De finitions 4.2.1 Nuclear Island All seismica qualified structures, except the Waste Process uilding. G - F300210) 43 Attachments 4.3.1 - Qua ty ntrol Installation Report For Electrical Cable Instal);ci (Form P-504-01) (4/85) 4.3.2 Attachment - Quality Contr Installation Report For Removal of Electr al Cable (Form FEP-4-02) (4/85) ~ 4.3 3 Atta ent 3 - Quality Control Ins 11ation Report for 1.5 Inches an aller Cable Jacket Repairs (Fo FEP-504-03) (4/85) f 4.3.4 teachment 4 - Quality Control Installati Report for Cable j Jacket Repairs Greater than 1 5 Inches (For FEP-504-04) (A/35) gl l 4. 5 Attachment 5 - Conditional Release (Form FEP-504-05) (4/85) f ..,...,n. N,i.>as< u.

a s 6 FEP-504 \\ Revision 0 ) [] f } T r { }'rf 04/25/85 d New Hampshire Yankee { t l Page 4 of 23 1 j J J a u n a s, [,I"UL, 2 s-n construction delay is imminent (an NCR is not required for 4 this condition). The Electrical Superintendent shall obtain Engineering signature verifying his review of supports. 5 1.4.1 The QC Electrical Supervisor, or his designee, shall be responsible to review, verify and approve / disapprove the conditional release and issuance and control of the Conditional Release tag (s) ( Attachment 6). The limit of the conditional release will be recorded on the back of the CR tags. 5 1.4.2 Approved CR's shall be assigned a control number, and entered in the CR Status Log (Attachment 7). A copy of the Conditional Release will be filed in the CR suspense file. 5 1.4.3 The QC Engineer shall attach the CR tag (s) to the af fected item until the item is found to be acceptable and the CR is signed by the QC Engineer. 5.1 5 All associated cables that enter, leave, traverse, or are with-in the Nuclear Island, shall require QC inspection of the [ cable using the same criteria as required for Class 1E cable installations. Exceptions to the above, are cables for non-Class 1E systems utilizing dedicated, non-CASP raceways for security, fire protection, communication, etc. The raceway and supports shall be accepted by a QC Engineer prior to turnover of the subject dedicated system. 5 1.6 Cable Reel Identification and Handling: 5.1.6.1 Prior to use, each cable reel shall receive an accept-ance tag from the UE&C QA Receiving and Storage Group. Electrical QC Engineers will verify each cable reel has received a brass tag, indicating the assigned reel number. 5.1.6.2 During cold weather periods, cable may be safely used down to 20*F. Cable which has been exposed to temp-eratures below 20*F shall be moved to a warm area min. (50* - 70*F) for a min. of 18 - 24 hours prior to use. 5.1.6.3 All reel to reel cable transfers must be witnessed by the Quality Control Engineer. The new (take-up) reel must receive the same tagging and identification as the original (prime) reel, with the exception of cables which are cut and respooled for installation in the Containment Building. This (take-up) reel shall require a QA acceptance (green) tag after the QC Engi-neer witnesses the respooling. Each cable on this reel shall be temporarily tagged with the cable / -s

j 15 FEP-504 n, ,,,,y Revision 0 ] j I 04/25/85 i V;. ,j New Hampshire Yankee Page 13 of 23 allow re-termination, the lugs can be cut of f, and physi 1 4 rotection added, before removing the cable from the onduit. B. Th cables must be withdrawn, by hand, observing e same put 'ng criteria as when installed. Apply addit' nal lubri-catio, as necessary, before removing cables. C. If a ca le or cables have not been terminate or if cable slack ca allow retermination, the cables y be carefully withdrawn The constraints of the cables argest minimum bending ra 'us, maximum allowable cable ension (60% of the sum of multt le cables) and the maximu side wall pressure which applie in pulling cables by ha must also be observed in withdrawal.- Apply additional lub ication, as necessary, before removing cables. D. If the pull line d or cables nnot be easily withdrawn by hand, stop withdra *ng them; n additional cables should be added to this condut / duct, d it must be tagged " Additional Cables Forbidden". A list abandoned conduit shall be maintained by the Elec i Superintendent. E. Cables must be repulle hand, observing proper pulling procedures. F. The withdrawal and repull of ables shall be documented on a " Rework Fo and a copy rwarded to the Electrical Superintendent r logging. G. Withdrawal a repulling shall be rmitted only once per conduit. ce completed, the condut shall be tagged " addition cables forbidden". Copi of all " Rework Forms" pertaini to such conduits shall be rwarded weekly to the Electri al Superintendent for logging. 5 13.3 Addition r withdrawal of coaxial, triaxial armored cable is proh ited if the conduit is longer than t feet (10'). Addin or withdrawing cable from a conduit tha contains

1, triaxial or armored cable is prohibite if the conduit coax is nger than ten feet (10').

5 13.4 A og of Rework Forms containing information requi d by the eceding shall be maintained. As a minimum this 1 shall t include the Rework Form numbar, conduit numbers tagg "addi-j tional cables forbidden", " abandoned" cable numbers, ded ej to conduit cable numbers and withdrawn /repulled cable n abers. -Q 1 6.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE / HOLD POINTS E g, 4 N 6.1 Q.C inspections of Safety-related and associated cable pulling shall bc n ~vaa

. 3 16 1 FEP-504 7, q i q- ,,q,, q,y-Revision 0 04/25/85 4 4 j j (,["J, , g ,,j New Hampshire Yankee y,, Page 14 of 23 l I performed in accordance with approved drawings and this nrocedure. 6.1.1 The QC Engineer shall verify acceptance of all safety related cable raceway through which cable will be pulled, prior to cable pulling. The QC Supervisor shall coordinate with the Engineer to approve the Conditional Release per paragraphs 5 1.3, and 5 1.4., on a case by case basis where raceway or support is not complete and accepted. The raceway and supports shall be accepted prior to turnover to subject system dedicated systems. 6.1.2 The QC Engineer shall verify that all cables (safety related i and associated cables) that enter, leave, traverse or are with-in the Nuclear Island, are properly harnessed and tied and bending radii are not violated using the same criteria as required for Class 1E cable installation. 6.2 Quality Assurance Hold Points A. The QC Engineer shall witness swabbing of safety related embedded conduits and exposed conduits (if required), prior to cable pulling. i B. The QC Engineer shall witness the installation of all safety related cables and all associated cables which are installed in safety related raceways per para. 5.1.5. 6.3 In-Process Inspections shall be performed during installation of safety-related and associated electrical cable to assure compliance with the following: 4 6.3.1 Only the latest approved design documents are being used for construction and installation work. 6.3.2 All deviations from design documents shall be made from an Engineering Change Authorization (ECA), except ob' ious omis-v sions or errors on cable pull slips, such as routing path, which may be revised by Electrical Engineering. l 6.4 Installation Inspections 6.4.1 Inspection shall be performed before, during and af ter cable installation. QC Engineer shall verify the current Engineering drawing revision prior to commencing each day's inspection. All QC Hold Points shall be witnessed. A Quality Control Installation Report, (Attachment 1) shall be completed by the j .QC Engineer for each safety-related and associated cable 3 installed in safety - related raceway. -s.e, 1 1 6.4.2 All nonconforming conditions shall be documented and processed in accordance with QA-15. r s ,,., - - - -, - - _, - - - ~ -, - - -

~ / 17 ./. FEP-504 4 y 1 l' Revision 0 ,,, q! 04/25/85 l s ,I'I/j. f[1. s d Ai ai f;cv Hanpshire Yankee ,,a Page 15 of 23 6.4.3 Acceptance or rejection of each item on the checklist shall be.ind'.cated by initialing'and dating'cach entry. 6.4.4 Each c.abic pull, either cenplete or partial, shall be doc-unented on an Installation Report. The Installation Ee, ort

p along v.ith any docunented disc:cpancies, shall be subnitted to the 00 Supervisor for review and approval.

6.4.5 After approval by the QC Ture: visor, all de unentstica shall be f:. :.::d e d to the 'JE}C QA 23/OR C::up for cview an' rea- ,{ cessin; i'a acc ordance with QC?-17-1. 65 Special Instructions 6.5 1 'l reel to Icel :::na fer shall be hand'ed re: E s t a. 5. !. [. .;:c:u:t ing o f s. fe ty :21s ted nd as s::i t:c d :-t'.e :: '. ar ins s'. led in the ':a:'.cs: Is'.and shall be witnessed by :'.- 0 En;i.?er and do:tr.n:cd on an : sre::icn F.er::: in sc:: * ::e vith t,'?-10-1. Cable ends en ba:h reels shall be :27 ed af:er : ::in;. 652 Friar to, 11ing cable, the QC En;ince shall va ify the esb'.e t h e C1.I? c :i '.c r ul '. s l ip v i :h : ? cible :ci:: color c:le n (incl.:'i ; a s :iated c:bic col:: s t r'i r e ) : ' ra:cviy ::::: th:c23h which ibic is :o be ru11cf. A'.1 ' :e zus: he the s:ne in ced:: : .. tin::in t: sin se ::::i:

ritcri2.

If there is a dis:: an:y in any of :he :h.e : 2:s, :: hie pulling vill co:-t aliew:2 u.til evs 1:ed t;. I;c:::i:21 ~ En;ineer and necess-y chan;es have i.cn ::de. 653 Frior to ina: 1112:ica s'

b le t' - QC En:ine:: sh:11 v :ify

...,e............, s.,, ;. :...._......,.e...., e. v. ra:.:vsy is ar.;e:ved i:.r c. le ' n e t t i '. 2 : i:n. 6.5.4 fva5 bin. of :sfety-reis:ed S ? ! ! '<! c :: :.its ;:i:: to ::5:e pull ::. t'.1 Se vi n a s e 21.1 th QC En;i: ::. Due to craec licitati s, r:nc n 4.:le rs k.: ;r ::s ret : ire.

6. 5.5 '

~ re e di:a1 .bly in r!ar :0 pi:11 b ic. Finsi :::e-t e. e o f r :nh le rack :,7 :r:s ;. r. F::.'-5 .h:11

1.: :

.p ! until af ter cab h is te n pol!.:-d :! L:;h L'.e a n'. ale. 7 : !.2 r x y to rull, the r in;ineer sh ill in.:;.:: the ..n!.):e :s..:!fy that cable u 11 n>t be da G;cJ.?uring t e psil. I f 1.; !:. :: 11 suppor t r.e.ae rs o f =in!. ole r.ack s :p; >r t ! ve r.o t b.:e n i n s t.-1 : ed, cables s al'1 b.c teny2rarily supp>rted. Th ,shalls be d3cunen:cd on an -n s pe c t io n.e po r.t. n 656 Re. val of all safety rel'ated cl. etrical cabic in the nucicar land and balance of plant areas or as:ociated . etriest cabic: an the nuclear isla,nd or in safety reisted raceway 'n ;the balacec g 8 +

y.'.. j FEP-504 q Revision 1 IPC E l 05/23/85 M#' h gg,5 New HampshiTe Yankee N Page 17 of 23 g'Ae up. Y

p. n ) *

\\ e +D UE&C SEASROOK STATION FORM FEP-504-Cl 5/85 IFC OtlALITY CONTROL INSTALLATION REPORT FOR ELECTRICAL l CABLE INSTALLATION CABLE NO. CIRCUIT LEVEL SCHEME REEL TA; NO. CASP SLIP ILSUE No. FOCTACE TROM TO NO. CONDUCTORS SIZE REF. DOC. LWA RACEWAY NOT FULLED I HA NCR f CHECKLIST ITEMS DATE I YES NO 1. Verafied that safety-related receways have been l, opproved for cable installation. lf 2. Raceway identification markers instetted. Cable l color, emble code and reenway color are the sese. l 3. Embedded conduit swabbed prior to pullint cable, I 4. Cable trays are free of foreign matter. 5 Cable is routed as specified by CASF slip. 1

6. Beginning footag: marker on cable verified.

e

7. Cable tubricated for pull and is an engineered approved lubrieent.

3. Cable attachment, eheaves, tugger and other pulling equipment are used as required. All cable copper included in ulling eye. Type attachment used :

9. hanisme pulling tension within alloweble or hand laid. Allowables actuelt Tension instrument no.

Cal. due date

10. Cable training or racktag and escuring in tray, aanhole, handbole or junction bom has been com-pleted and proper cable esperatio. maintained.

11.gs te trained without violating minimum cable se radius. E ; $RV, SKV and, #4/0 and larger 600 voit power l R obles are spaced in tray par pera. 5.8 l Ti.fsertical/marisontal run castes are supported per ,,ar. 5.2. q,,ariniedembiau.da. aged.uri.gi..taliat,... I T k notb e.de.

c. bis us.u u.d..d.ested.

i ( RECORDED BY I QC ENGINEER DATE Arpt0VED BYs QC SUPERVISOR DATE U. E. & C. INC. I MAY 241985 t SEABROOK STATION l r, j ATTACHMENT 1

+ ?; M5T e F C - TI 5 COMPANY g g PROFEIETARY SEABROOK STATION

consvucw src FEP-505 FIELD ELECTRICAL PROCEDURE-505 TITLE:

INSTALLATION AND INSPECTION OF CABLE TERMINATIONS l t e l l -s v A 'my A KT1' K i 6 I l. _. e l l I REV. DATE DESCRIPTION PREP. SEM FS-QA ANI PCM PREPARATION APPROVAL APPROVAL PREPARED BY: DATE SI-ENGI RING MGR. DATE AUTHORIZED NUCLEAR INSP. DATE 2'ff%. /fA W ,5cA. L cunu ?U$' f \\ tvw<.- APPROVAL / APPROVAL ISSUANCE FIELD SUPT. QC/QA DATE PROJECT /CONSTR. MGR. DATE DATE ORIG. ISSUE PROC. NO. I gVIo /p & /: 1/64 RP.505 l maga.tec C/.e/p; ffg/. / Thic document is the property of United Engineers & Constructors, Inc. and is to be returned upon esmpletion of the ( SEABROOK STATION ) project. It is loaned in confidence and upon the etndition that it vill not be reproduced in whole or in part nor will the information contained in it be disclosed except as required for this specific project.

t gg g q l g SEABROOK STATION

c "Structo'8 'ac-C0MPANY PRIVAT E emoc no oair onioi=atissue ar visio= =o oarc on arvision FEP-505 6/15/84 0

6/15/84 I 30 past o, 1.0 SCOPE This procedure applies to the termination of safety and non-sefety related cable as specified on UE&C drawings and Cable Termination Slips (CAT System). The OA reauire- ~ ments'of*this= procedure apply to the insp'ection of safety h% reinted cable termination, non-safety related cable terminations to Class IE purchased equipment, and $ermination of all powerecable'at protective devices. 2.0 PURPOSE / I The purpose oh this procedure,is to define and provide j i the requirements and' instructions for insta.llation and' 5 j 5 inspectioti of cable termination. + ____-- ~- - p 3.0 RESPONSIBkLITIES [~"7 t ~n,. } 3.1 ,'1he Electrical Superintendent shall be responsible ( ,/ / \\ for the following: / / .f \\ f \\ 3.1.1 Assignment of qualified craftsmen to \\ terminatecablesinaccordanchwithUE&C ~w._,,_ nnn._n. cs""~' drawings and this procedure.

N q" illeetS SEABROOK STATION S c "S"S COMPANY PRIVAT E ,=oc no part oaisiaat issur aevision no oarc or arvision FEP-505 6/15/84 0 6/15/84 ,ast 8 or 30 5.1.8 Cab - ents (Triax ultiple Conta c.) shall be pro ntil used. 5.1.9 The terminations at the protective devices at the origin and destination end of all ~ N ^ - associated cables that enter, keave, traverse, ^ or are within the Nuclear Island, shall re-f auire OC inspection as Class IE terminations.

5.2 Detail Procedure.s" y

y l 5.2.1 The cable tag number on a cable shall b v ified against the termination slip efore l proce ing.* Cable termidation sha he yer- .i formed in cordance wit.h the te inati n 4 /- slip using crt. riE Ypicified n this procedure ( \\ %,,,/ g y N_ and/or manufacture inst etions. c i N / ,/ ~ ~ .r 5.2.2 Remove,, temporary' cable entification tags and install permanent ca e tag (Raychem)near the point from wh e the cable eket is cut ~** % w s"# n away. When si gle conductors are us in lieu of multi-c ductor cable, a cable tag sh 1 be instal d on a group of conductors of the su - jec' circuit near the breakout point. J

N q'"cineBIS SEABROOK STATION 6 c"*S COMPANY PRIVAT E paoc. =o caTc onioimat issue aevision no care or nevision FEP-505 6/15/84 0 6/15/84 25 30 ,..e or Taping method, as shown in Wiring S em 'otes & Typical Details (M-300 0) may be used fo 600V nonnuclear stub in-line type motor connec ons when t methods described in above _,n ~ ~~ . < paragraphs ot-pdctical to use. ~~~m 5.6.2 Motor Heater d Con etions b / Motor he r leads shall joined by bolting full ring / t / te als together.using appli ble hardware and insu-i ^ ating with heat shrink (Raychem) oducts per Table IV, 6.0 [ OUALITY CONTROL / HOLD POINTS %, 4 i e /f All work ac'complished"in^accordance with this procedure shall be i l 5 l / inspected (with the following Hold Points: e ) ,.-~~ nn--an I OualityControlIspectionofliSlElerminationshalkbeper f g ,e j n r. FEP-505. f j gT / / t OualityControishall, ins.pectallterminationswithinanypiece \\ k'of equipment which has been purchased as Class1E w / safety related or associated cable. 'They dhall also verify that ~%~ _.nn._: nd all cables within the equipment are properly harnessed and tied and bending radii are not violated. All work eust meet the regtIire-ments of Drawing M-300230, Wiring System Notes & Typical Details. ma e db ab db dk

1 i " con **q'":lg SEABROOK STATION g COMPANY ,J'- ' F mVAT E enee. no caTr onioiwatissue atvision no care or nevision s.1 FEP-505 6/15/84 0 6/15/84 26 30 o, S I Ouality Control shall witness the safety related installation of SKV cable terminations. Quality Control shall inspect, to the same documentation criteria as Class IE terminations, the terminations at the protective devices-at,the origin and, destination ends of all H, J, K & L level associated power cables that enter, i leave, traverse, or are within the Nuclear Island. In other i / i O.C. documentation-has to be provided to document that f.,,,,,,

lwords,

,d 3 l A he material and-installation methods used for the associated t , cabletermina$ionare,inaccordancewiththerequirements 1 8 i given in the design

documents, and that the cable has.been I

t terminated'to the correct terminals. Retrofit inspection j g n-----.- i of said cables shall be done fdE*H bles which have been f ( N.%,y/ / [ pulled since December 7, 1983, if the inspection was not { / j already performed.., ~For cases ehere the cable does not i i ~ f i terminate directly to a protective device (e.gi' the cable -\\ /e % terminates to a terminal block with interar.1 vendor wiring), y-the OC ins 3 NElh U fiafI Y a7p3Y 5 to the termination of the field cable to the terminal block. This applies to all power levels H, J, K&L. J

M qingers SEABROOK STATION Sco"S *

Sac COMPANY PRIVAT E amoe ao caTr onioimat issur atvision no care or arvision FEP-505 6/15/84 0

6/15/84 amor 27 or 30 6.1 In-Proce Inspection During the allatio safety-related cable terminations or d Modification Packages (FMP), In-Process spections all be perforned in accor- ~ "d an c e th QCP-10 _1. l / 6.2 Installation Inspection 1 6.2.1 Inspections shall,he performed during or after' l 5 ~ installation! The;0C Engineer shall verify the y /' current Engineering diaving revision prior to commen-j f fcing each dAh's " inspection. A Ouality Control Install- [ ation ep6Yt'TExhibit _I or II) f or each c ble termi-f t nation (origin or destination), shall he' completed [ [ ~1-- -% . l t for safety related cable or cable termination in I 1 Class 1E equipment. f g ,~ l L { f

ew wgw#

.y y ,i N j

% y.

_,yA+W s d

2 FEP-505 EXHIBIT I Revision 0 UE&C Page 1 of 1 IPC # 1 SEABROOK STATION QUALITY CONTROL INSTALLATION REPORT FOR CABLE TERMINATIONS 2/0 AND SMALLER CABLE NO. REF. DOC. REV. UNIT CABLE CODE CABLE SCHEMATIC SH. REV. ORIGIN $$f NODE FEP-505, REV ADDENDUM DESTINATION i SAFETY RELATED ( ) FIELD MODIFICATION PACKAGE REWORK NO. ASSOCIATED ( ) ADDITIONAL REF. DOC. I I CHECKLIST ITEMS DATE YES l NO e NA NCR NO. 1. Cable identified with permanent label 2. Insulation and conductor undamaged on cut back end. l 3. Installed terminals are correct size and type per FEP-505 or engineer drawing. 4 End of conductor flush or extending beyond terminals I barrel without interfering with terminal screw in-stallation. I I a. Crimp acceptable per FEP-505 Crimper ID No. Calibration Due Date b. Termination made with mechanical lug l connection and is tight. L 5. Wire connected to correct terminal points per termination slip. Connection is tight. A 6. Spare wires stowed and identified with ends properly sealed. 7. No more than two lugs on one terminal screw. Lugs are back'to back if two lugs installed. 8. Ins t rument cable shield terminated as designated by drawing or CASP slip. 9. Unterminated end of instrument cable shield cut flush and sealed.

10. Thermocouple connections made without terminal lugs. Conductor is around terminal screw clockwise.

11. Sufficient slack to prevent violation of bend radius.

12. Flexible conduit not over 4 ft. connected and tight.

13. Cables of different separation groups have minimum air space separation of six inches or are isolated by conduit or other enclosure.

U. E. & C. INC, j MAY 0 6196d SEABROOK STAT ION i l RECORDED BY: APPROVED BY: QC ENGINEER DATE OA SUPERVISOR DATE l l 6 l

FEP-505 EXHIBIT II Revision 0 UE&C Page 1 of 1 IPC # 1 SEABROOK STATION OUALITYCONTROLINSTALLATIONREPORTFORCABLETERMINATkONS 15 KV, 5 KV AND 600 V 4/0 AND LARGER CABLE NO. REF. DOC. REV. UNIT CABLE CODE CABLE SCHEMATIC SH.- REV. ORIGIN 5~ NODE FEP-505, REV ADDENDUM DESTINATION SAFETY RELATED ( ) FIELD MODIFICATION PACKAGE REWORK NO. ASSOCIATED ( ) ADDITIONAL REF. DOC. i CHECKLIST ITEMS DATE YES NO NA NCR NO. i i 1. Stripping and shaping of jacket and conductors performed. Wire and insulation undamaged. 2. Correct. termination kit used per FEP-505 and kit material is properly installed. 3. Terminal lugs are correct size and type per FEP-505. Conductors terminated to correct points per termination slip. 4. Crimping of lugs acceptable. Crimp Tool ID Cal. Due Date L5. Continuity of cable determined. 6. Insulation integrity test performed per FEP-505 Megger S/N Volts Calibration Due Date L 7. Hi-pot of SKV/15KV cable performed per FEP-602 prior to connection. Hi-pot S/N Hi-pot Calibration Due Date 8. Power cable shield is grounded as shown by drawing or CAT slip and FEP-505 9. Motor checked for correct phase rotation and grounding prior to connection per FEP-505. Phase rotation meter S/N Cal. Due ~ I . 10. Motor box termination sealed per FEP-505. l. E. 5t C. I N C. ,11. Cable connections to equipment bus are coated with non-corrosive conductive grease type compound. MAY 061985

12. Bolting of bus terminations made using manufacturer's approved hardware.

~ SEA BROC K STATION Torque Wrench ID Torque Calibration Due Date

13. Cable supported or dressed within enclosure.

14. Sufficient slack to prevent violation of bend radius.,

, 15. Flex conduit not over 4 feet. connected and tight.

16. Cable identified with permanent label.

RECORDED BY: APPROVED BY: OC ENGINEER DATE OA SUPERVISOR DATE

C DC Nonr+faty Loric This confirmatory item pertains to the verification of the implementation of a separate, testable, Class 1E trip circuit used to disconnect the Non-Class Inverter I-2A from the Class 1E de System after 15 minutes. We are providing herewith a package of schematic diagrams and other pertinent drawings which give a brief explanation of the design and which show the implementation of the above-described trip circuit. Furthermore, we are also providing a copy of the appropriate page of the Seabrook Technical Specification outlining the surveillance requirements of the trip circuit. Based on discussions with the reviewer during the site visit, this additional l information will be adequate to resolve this confirmatory item. l l l

JGOOLE 3 E9L6 - I 29, r 8 9 %8 n 8Pd gBR y F04ToF f l? n 5>b'3g on-Sgg (HDC$ U P S Y 'N O O O z.1A _._ O.C.. INPUT. csI cs2 OTE 6 ' A.C. INPUT-52 72 OUTPUT 60KVA 25AF AF l 120/2OBVAC,,3 ( 1506 NAT g 76' 62, ~ 300/SA l 3 E l- ~ ~ l i ~ 46cva$ 1-- !=; vo y n =; ' BUS Inc C DWG. F 310042 COOUNG FANS p 400A g / YoLTe%E SEMu&To g (g g DE'TECT taps FEO 120/208VAC 120/208VAC,3p powta uwiT ALTERNATE SUPPLY FRoh LTERNATE SL FROM XEMR ShTTEQ3 ~ FROM XFN % 32 B %- 32 A ET FM OWC F-3tOO26 DWC). F-310C 3 d6 300A J6 VS CB3E@@ 64 NAT DD' q m -4 g-o CB4 400AF NAT STATIC SW -A >~-- p I ' BYPASS pfC.,,4 b5 STL MO Mene; on l/CT 250MCuy 3/C#2 E--4 y;a;-t ) 22}A, 3P y,.'. p=.2 3 em 1.Y (= 1 l l CD I M )IOOA )100A ~ Hy;m. lNSTR BUS 2A [120/208VAC e }P 3p 3 /, 4 W.22} A INSTR DIST PNL 2A PP 'LA a o 1 3/C t/O + 1. 2fC '2 sp (A, B.C ) (N) t t re ~

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s August 1984 s

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..,1 r.. r ~ ; 1, A;. p 1,2 3 rt u, ONSITE POWER DISTRIltllTION TRIP CIRCUIT FOR INVI(R],P y A I LIMITINC CONDITION POR OPERATION a 3.8.3.3 The safety related trip circuit which trips the D.C. feed f rom D.C. P,us llc to inverter I-2A af ter 15 minuten of discharge f rom the battery shall be OPERABLE. Note - this LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION'is applicable only when D.C. Bus llc is required to be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 ACTION: With this scfety related trip circuit inoperable, restore the trip circuit to OPERABLE status within 7 days or de-energize the D.C. feed to inverter I-2A by tripping the D.C. circuit breaker in D.C. Bus 11C. Verify that this breaker is open once per 7 days thereaf ter. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.3.3 The safety related trip circuit shall be demonstrated operable at least once per 18 cienths. A .M ~ C"> ~Tucn DIC AL. S ECI.FIcATIn95 P 9 CD t==M pe-E+ 4 wem F~~R cD M r a 3/4 R- /6 d e e 4 e g

C Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.63 This confirmatory item pertains to the capability of the electrical penetrations to withstand short circuit current from power sources of limited capacity such as control power transformera. We are providing herewith the pertinent part of UE&C Calculation No. 9763-3-ED-00-37-F documenting the capability of the electrical penetrations to withstand such short circuit currents. In the event of a short across a circuit inside containment fed from a control power transformer, the maximum short circuit current of 28.4 amperes will flow in the circuit without causing any damage to the penetration. Based on discussions with the manufacturer of the Control Power Transformers (CPT) used in the Seabrook design, the following is an analysis of the modes of failures of a CPT with a shorted secondary (in this analysis, we consider that the fuse provided on all secondaries does not operate): Based on their experience and technical knowledge, the most probable mode of failure is the opening of the primary winding. The primary winding has the smaller size wire and it will fall turn-to-turn and eventually open. Theoretically, another mode of failure can be postulated; i.e., primary and secondary winding weld together so that the secondary can see the 480 Volt system voltage and short circuit currents. For the reasons outlined below, we consider this kind of failure to have such low probability that it can be disregarded: The winding on the Seabrook CPT are potted. In addition to the potting, there is insulating material separating the primary from the secondary. There has to be some movement of the windings during the short so they can end up welded together. It is pointed out that in a CPT of the sizes used at the Seabrook design, there is not enough magnetic forces during a shorting of the secondary to cause such movement of the windings. Therefore, circuits utilizing electrical penetrations and powered from such power sources do not require dual protective devices.

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s i ( '. APPENDIK B Additional Information and Clarifications for Confirmatory Items not Listed Under Section 1.8 of the SER (Supplement 3) [.

Capability to T ~t Transfsr cf Power Aming th7 Off-Site Circuite SER Paragraph 8.2.3.1 l l As indicated in the SER, we have stated that the transfer of power is i monitored continuously by alarms provided in the Main Control Room but is not periodically tested it power. The SER states that this is acceptable pending incorporation of this statement in the FSAR. The above commitment has been incorporated in Section 8.3.1.2a(2) of the FSAR (see attached page of the FSAR); therefore, we consider this item closed. l

em.eos e.z.g) SB 1 & 2 Amendment 52-FSAR December 1983 v 2. Criterion 18 - Inspection and Testing of Electrical Power Systems Class IE electric equipment is designed and located to permit appropriate periodic inspection and testing to assure avail-ability of systems and condition of components, in line with the provisions for testing and maintenance listed in Subsection 8.3.1.1.j. l These tests will assure the operability and functional per-formance of the components, and the operation of the system as a whole. During unit shutdown, and under conditions as close to normal operation as practical, the full operational sequence that brings the system into operation including portions of the protection system and transfer of power among various offsite and onsite power supplies will be tested. During reactor operation, the capabi~lity to transfer power from the unit auxiliary transformer source to the reserve auxiliary transformer source is continuously monitored. Alarms I are provided in the main control room to alert the operator n if synchronism is lost between the switchgear and the reserve i i source or if control power is lost to the reserve source cir-cuit breaker. Transfer of power from the unit auxiliary transformer source to the reserve auxiliary transformer source is not periodically tested at power because such transfers may introduce unwarranted challenges to the electric power system that may result in a plant trip. -( a For a discussion of transfer of power initiated by operation of the generator breaker, see Subsection 8.2.1.6. 3. Criterion 5 - Sharing of Systems or Components Between Units N Electrical structures, systems and components important to safety in the onsite power system are not shared between the two units, except in the instances discussed below. This sharing will not impair their ability to perform their safety function, including, in the event of an accident in one unit, an orderly shutdown and cooldown of the remaining unit. (a) The seismic Category I service water pump house provides one room and raceway system for the Train A equipment of both units, and another room and separate raceway system 8.3-33

Di^'21 Gen *r-t r Ou'lific*tien Tr+tc SER Paragraph 8.3.1.2.3 This confirmatory item pertains to the review and confirmation of the diesel generator-type Qualification Program Test Reports. It is noted that a summary of the qualification testing program and test results is included in FSAR Section 8.3.1.le(5). The complete test report (2 volumes) is available for review at our Licensing office in Bethesda, Maryland. Pending notification of any problems encountered with this information, we consider this item closed. 1

Die 91 Gen r-ter Automatic Coritralo I SER Paragraph 8.3.1.2.4 This confirmatory item pertains to the verification that the Seabrook design incorporates the requirement that a start diesel signal shall override all other operating modes and return control of the diesel to the Automatic Control System. During the site visit, the reviewer examined schematics showing the design for returning control of the diesel. He had no further questions. We consider this item closed. i l I l l l

Di-^21 Gence-t r Valtago C*p'bility SER Paragraph 8.3.1.2.5 This item pertains to the verification that the diesel generators are designed to limit the output voltage to a minimum of 80% as has been demonstrated by factory load tests of the machine. This can be verified by reviewing the factory test reports which, as stated under SER Paragraph 8.3.1.2.3 above, is available in our Bethesda Licensing office for review. Pending notification of any problems encountered with the review of the factory test reports, we consider this item closed. 1 l L

Capability rf the Die **1 Gen r-ter to Accept th7 De*1gn Le*d SER Paragraph 8.3.1.2.6 This item pertains to the confirmation that the diesel generator has been tested to demonstrate its ability to,successfully start a load larger than the 800 hp cooling tower pump at 52-second loading sequence interval. This can be confirmed by reviewing the factory test reports which, as stated under SER Paragraph 8.3.1.2.3 item above, is available in our Bethesda Licensing office for review. In these test reports, it can be seen that a 1,000 hp motor was successfully started while the diesel was carrying approximately 75% of continuous load. This closely corresponds to the 52-second loading sequence interval shown in the FSAR.

Di'an1 Cen r*ter Prat +ctiv*> Trips SER Paragraph 8.3.1.2.7 This item pertains to the confirmation that the Seabrook design meets the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.9 regarding bypass of diesel generator protective trips. During the site visit, schematic diagrams showing the Seabrook design were reviewed. The reviewer had no further questions. We consider this confirmatory item closed.

Cap-bility ef Di+*e1 Gen rcter to Acc*pt De*lan Lo'd After Operation at Light or No Loads SER Paragraph 8.3.1.7.8 This item pertains to the requirement of having electric preheaters in the diesel generator air intake plenum for no-load operation of the diesel 0 generator when the turbo charger inlet air temperature is below 50 F. As indicated in the attached letter to the NRC (SBN-574, dated October 28, 1983), we have determined that the preheaters are no longer required. We believe, therefore, that this confirmatory item should be deleted from the SER.

Ij, kgT eF DE(E % % 1. 7. E Y i 1 i { Lj t PUBLIC SERVICE SEABRO K SWlON 1 l i l Company of New Hampatw.e Eswine.ing Offic.: 1671 Worceder Rood framingham. Mossochusert 01701 (617). 872 8100 bec: r.D. Baxter J.W. Singleto October 28, 1983 J.P. Cady T.F.B7.1.2 S.D. Floyd G.S. Thomas SSN-574 P.B. Bohan J.E. Tribble/ l T.F. 87.1.2 W.P. Johnson D. Ilunter G. F. Mcdonald UE&C&W (SB-D. fl. Merrill 16732) info. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission D.E. Moody ASLB Washington, D. C. 20555 unC Chrono R.J. Ilarrison H.T. Tracy J.W. Stacey Attention: Mr. George W. Knignton, Chief Projects-All W.N. Fadden Licensing Branch No. 3 Projects-SLA T.M. C1.~.a u s k a t Division of Licensing Ropes & Gray (Dignan/Ritcher/ Gad) G. Tsouderos

References:

(a) Construction Permits CPPR-135 and CPPR-136, Docket A. M. Shepard Nos. 50-443 and 50-444 (b) PSNH Letter, dated February 14, 1983, " Revised Open Item Response (SRP 9 5.4; J. DeVincentis to G. W. Power Systems Branch)", Knignton (c) PSNH Letter, dated June 24, 1983, " Revised Response Outstanding Issue t/1 (SEft to SER Section 2 3 1, Meteorological and Effluent Treat. ment Systems Dranch)", J. DeVincentis to G. W. Knighton

Dear Sir:

Ou t-response to your Request for Additional In for ma tion 430.130 (Reference (b)), whten was subsequently included 48, indicated t na t electric neatera will be installed in tne diesel e,enerat in OL Application Amendment air intake plenum to nest the int i.a air to at leas *. 50'F. At t ha t time, our d :esel v,enera tor.u nufa <:t ur. r 50of or r,reater at had informed us that tne t a r ta : r. i t...r inlet an air temperature of engine air temperature pre-heatin., to allow continuous no loadto assure rmffteient wu necessary witnout L tic accumulation of pratu7tu af combustion and lubricating products in operation the exhaust system. Subaeauent discu sstana wi t:. tne,unu r ic turer na ve revealed tnit there 1s no effect on the diesel v.enerator output or operation under load a f ter t'u n n i n g at no-load throu/,h the ambient air Tnis temperature tempe r iture taan/,e of -20"r' to 104 F. rango is witn n tne n e x t :r ;m ind ::inimum 103-year, 8-naar return period identifted in our re a;)on u e to your Hequest for Additional In fo rma t ion 491.11 (Reference (c)), wnien wes subaequently included in OL Application Amend:n en t 49. i

7 ( Unitec States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Mr. George W. Knighton October 28, 1983 Page 2 It is therefore our position that the need to install electric heater the diesel generator air intake plenum has been obviated. s in annotated FSAR pade which addresses engine response at We have ene.1osed an low temperatures. This will be included in a future OL Application Amendment. Very truly yours, YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY

~r

/ John DeVincentis Project Manader ALL/cs Enclosure Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Service List cc: t t

T a William S. Jordan, III, Esquire '{ Harmon & Weiss Brentwood Board of Selectmen 1725 I Street, N.W. Suite 506 RED Dalton Road u Washington, DC 20006 Brentwood, New Hampshire 03833 Roy P. Lessy, Jr., Esquire Office of the Executive Legal Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Edward F. Meany Washington, DC 20555 Designated Representative of the Town of Rye Robert A. Backus, Esquire 155 Vashington Road 116 Lowell Street Rye, NH 03870 P.O. Box 516 Mancehster, NH 03105 Calvin A. Canney City Manager Philip Ahrens, Esquire City Hall Assistant Attorney General 126 Daniel Street Department of the Attorney General Portsmouth, NH 03801 Augusta, ME 04333 Dana Bisbee, Esquire Mr. John B. Tanzer Assistant Attorr.ey General Designated Representative of Of fice of the Attorney General the Town of Hampton 2G3 State House Annex 5 Horningside Drive Concord, tai 03842 Hampton, NH 03842 Anne Verge, Chairperson Roberta C. Pevear Board of Selectmen Designated Representative of Town Hall ( the Town of Hamptcn Falls South Hampton, NH 03642 Drinkwater Road Hampton Falls, NH 03844 Patrick J. McKeon Selectmen's Office Mrs. Sandra Cavutis 10 Central Road Designated Representative of Rye, NH 03570 the Town of Kensington RfD 1 David R. Lewis, Esquire East Kingston, NH 03827 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board i U.S. Nuclear Regul tory Comission l a s hi n g t on. D. C. 20555 Jo Ann Shotwell, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Bureau Mr. Angie Lchitos Chairman of the board of Selec: men Department of the At torney General Tuva of Newbur) One Ashborton Place. 19th Floor Boston, MA 02108 Newbury. MA 01950 i Senator Cordon J. Humphrey Nynard B. Pe.o r s m. U. S. Sen.s t e 40 Monroe Street Washington, DC 20510 Amesbury, MA 01913 (Attn: Tom Burack) Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Diana P. Randall 1 Pillsbury Street 70 Collins Street Concord, NH 033D] SE4 brook, NH 03874 (Attn: Herb Boynton) Donald E. Chick Richard E. Sullivan. Mayor Town Manager C1ty Hall Tove o f Exe t e r %>-buryport, MA 01950 10 Fiont Street Exeter, NH 03833

s o SB 1 & 2 Amendment 45 FSAR June 1982 of the diesel generator building. ne crankcase exhauster la not s a fe ty related and is not required for operation of the engine. Failure of the exhauster does not affect the starting capability of the engine. Each diesel generator unit is capable of operating at its staximum rated output under the following outdoor service conditions and for the durations indicated during the following weather disturbances: Outdoor Service Conditions: 0-a. -zo b /0 H-1. Amblert air intake: l 2. Humidity: 20 to 80: (in D.C. room) 20 to 100 (outdoors) b. Weather disturbances: 1. A tornado pressure transient causing an atmospheric pressure reduction of 3 psi in 3 seconds followed by a rise to normal pressure in 3 seconds. A shorter transient (1.5 seconds) will not affect engine operation and output. as 2. A hurricane or northeastern storm pressure of 26 inches Hg for a duration of one (1) hour. The engine is capable of Ih h' g s ( continued operation for up to 14 hours at 26" Hg with no affect on operation and output, since the combustion air system is d'esigned for approximately 50: j excess air. 9.5.8.3 _ Safety Evaluation AS here are two re du nd a n t diesel genera tors for each nuclest unit. Each redundant diesel engine has independent combustion air intake and exhaust system. an nis redundancy and independence prevents the loss of func t ion o f mo re than one diesel engine in the event of a component or system failure. l ne air intake and exhaust sy s te ms of each diesel engine are isolated from those of the other die sel engine and are also isolated from any motor-driven equipment by partition walls. Should an incident oc c u r, such as an exhau st leak or an acc identa l d i scha rge of a CO2 extinguisher, it would have no effect on the redundant diesel engine. ne physical location of the air intakes makes the possibility of the of a CO2 extinguisher in the area of the air intakes rather re en t e.

However, use should such ext inguishe rs be discharged in the icmediate area of the air intake, there would be no significant e f fect on engine operat ion.

Based on tests from a diesel manufacturer, a CO2 extinguisher discharging at the air intake for a period of over 30 seconds will dilute the air intake by less than one (1) pe rc e n t. All diesel engines ru n a t 30: excess air, wh ich also helps in c:inimi z ing any effect of such an incident. i

9. s-n O

I ' ', s }/tfdi I ( A lov ambient intake temperature vill have no effect on engine operation under load and output. Combustion air is pre-heated in the turbocharger and is supplied to the eng.ne at a temperature of 1000F ainimum and 2000F maximum. An air temperature of -200F or greater at the turbocharger inlet will result in sufficient engine air temperature pre-heating in the turbocharger to allos continuous no-load operation. To prevent excessive accumulation of unburned combustion products, station procedures will require the diesel generator be operated at 50% or greater load for one hour af ter each 24 hours of running at no load. Should testing be required at less than 25: loading for more than 4 hours cumulative operation for maintenance or trouble-shooting, station procedures will require at least a 30 minute load test, a minimum of 25% loading, at following such operations. This vill maintain the engine in the standby condition, ready to accept load as required. k. m.

a. APPENDIK C Resolution of Three Items Listed on Page 2 of Meeting Summary (Reference d) I l i 4

Item 1 - Auto Stcrt of the Dienol Gen retarn on SI Signal Because of circuit design to satisfy Appendix "R" concerns, when the selector switch in the diesel control panel is in " LOCAL" the diesel generators will not auto start on SI signal. The diesel generator will auto start on loss of power to the emergency buses whether the selector switch is in " LOCAL" or " REMOTE". We will comply with the staff's requirement to include this condition in the list of conditions that can render the diesel generators incapable of responding to an automatic emergency start signal. Item 2 - Redundant Indication for SI-V-93 l The combined recirculation Isolation Valve SI-V-93 from both safety injection pumps is a normally open, motor-operated valve. This valve is closed by the operator from the control room, during the switchover to the recirculation mode of safety injection. ) To prevent spurious operation or operator error and thus satisfy the concerns of Branch Technical Position (BTP) 18, the control circuit for the motor operator is equipped with dual contactor arrangement (see FSAR Figure l 8.3-45). This circuit requires two separate operator actions, involving the I normal valve control switch plus a separate key operated switch to reposition the valve. The special design of the circuit satisfies the BTP-18 concerns and at the same time does not remove power from the valve circuit. Power is i always available and the operator can operate the valve from the Control Room any time by taking the two distinct separate actions described above. The staff disagrees with the philosophy of our design and considers that the dual contactor arrangement constitutes in effect removal of power from the valve and, therefore, dual indication should be provided for the valve as required by BTP-18. We pointed out that red / green valve position indication and valve full closed monitor light is provided on the main control board. Additionally, any time SI-V-93 leaves the full open position, an annunciation alarms for both the "SI Train A Inoperable" and the "SI Train B Inoperable" status monitoring alarms. The staff indicated that although they recognize the above alarms, they all have been provided from the same valve limit switch and because of the importance of this single valve, they would like to see another indication from a diverse device (e.g., stem mounted switch). An alternative could be the incorporation of this valve in a procedure which will assure physical verification of correct position of the valve at some predetermined time interval. In order to satisfy the staff's concerns, we will incorporate another indication from a stem-mounted switch. s

Item 3 - C nteml Power Supply fer Prim'ry and B*ckup P7nstertien Protectirn Based on the review of circuits for penetration protection, the staff requested that the two breakers that provide primary and backup penetration protection for containment structure cooling fan be provided with control power from different batteries. During the November 6, 1985 meeting, it was clarified to the staff that these breakers do not require control power to trip in order to isolate a fault and thus protect the electrical penetration. These breakers utilize a direct f acting electromechanical overcurrent trip device. This device is l self-contained device, which depends on its circuit for tripping power. No I external control power is required for tripping. The staff agreed that there is no need to provide the diverse control power mentioned above. Therefore, no further action is required on this item. 1 i 1}}

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Dear Sir:

SUMMARY

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