ML20134P822
| ML20134P822 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 11/22/1996 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20134P802 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-254-96-15, 50-265-96-15, NUDOCS 9611290305 | |
| Download: ML20134P822 (15) | |
See also: IR 05000254/1996015
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION lli
Docket Nos:
50-254;50-265
License Nos:
Report No:
50-254/96015 (D RS); 50-265/96015 (D RS)
Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company (Comed)
Facility:
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2
Location:
22710 206th Avenua North
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Cordova, IL 61242
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Dates:
October 1 through November 6,1996
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Inspectors:
E. Duncan, Reactor Engineer
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L. Collins, Resident inspector
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Approved by:
Mark Ring, Chief, Lead Engineers Branch
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Division of Reactor Safety
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9611290305 961122
ADOCK 05000254
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Ouad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2
NRC Inspection Report No. 50-254/96015 ( D RS); 50-265 /96015 (D RS)
This inspection report contains the findings and conclusions for a specialinspection
conducted from October 1 through November 6,1996, to review the following issues:
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Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-254/95002," Improperly Sized Overloads Found on
the Control Room Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) System Due to
inadequate Original Design Analysis"
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Unresolved item (URI) 92201-06," Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Heat Exchanger
(HX) Room Cooler inoperable"
Unresolved item 50-254/94020-05,"RHR System Water Hammer issue"
Assessment of Performance
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immediate and long-term corrective actions for a problem regarding undersized
thermal overloads on the "B" train control room HVAC booster fans and supply fan
appeared adequate to provent recurrence. A discrepancy regarding the evaluation
of the safety significance of the problem between Dresden and Quad Cities was
identified (Section E1.1).
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A licensee calculation concerning RHR room cooler operability assumed a non-
conservative cooler inlet temperature. However, other conservative assumptions in
the calculation coupled with the age of the problem and actions being taken to
inspect the coolers every refueling outage led the inspectors to conclude that a
further review of the calculations was not warranted (Section E1.2).
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The identification of weaknesses in the trending of RHR cooler differential pressure
testing was an example of a weak performance trending program and was a
deviation from corrective actions committed to in LERs 50-254/92008and
50-265/92007(Section E1.2).
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Procedure revisions concerning the potential for water hammer following a loss-of-
offsite-power (LOOPn while in suppression pool cooling were appropriate, but were
not initiated in a tirmly manner (Section E1.3).
Summary of Ooen Items
Deviations: Identified in Section E1.2
Violations: None identified
Unresolved items: None Identified
Inspector Follow-up Items: None Identified
Non-Cited Violations: None Identind
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REPORT DETAILS
Ill. Enaineerina
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E1
Conduct of Engineering
E1.1
LER 50-254/95002."Imoronerly Sized Overloads Found on the Control Room HVAC
System Due to inadeouate Oriainal Desian Analysis"
a.
Insoection Scoce
The inspector reviewed LER 50-254/95002," Improperly Sized Overloads Found on
the Control Room HVAC System Due to inadequate Original Design Analysis."
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b.
Qbservations and Findinas
1.
Q.qssriotion of the Event
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On January 3,1995, during a routine surveillance of the safety-related "B"
train control room HVAC system at Dresden Station, the Air Filtration Unit
(AFU) booster fan tripped unexpectedly. A root cause evaluation determined
that the booster fan thermal overloads were undersized. in addition, the
licensee determined that due to the improper sizing, the booster fans could
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fail to operate during a degraded voltage condition. The fans were
subsequently declared inoperable and the overloads were replaced with the
correct size.
Subsequently, Quad Cities was notified of the Dresden Station control room
HVAC event, since the HVAC system at Quad Cities was similar to the
Dresden design. Subsequently, the licensee determined that the same
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condition existed at Quad Cities for the "B" train control room HVAC booster
fans as well as the "B" train HVAC supply fan. The "B" train of control room
HVAC was declared inoperable on January 20,1995, and the licensee
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entered a 14-day, dual unit, limiting condition for operation (LCO).
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Setpoint changes were subsequently written to replace the thermal overloads
for the control room HVAC booster fans and supply fan. The thermal
overloads were replaced with properly sized parts, the system was retested
satisfactorily, and the "B" train c,f control room HVAC was declared operable
on January 21,1995.
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2.
Control Room Ventilation Svstem and Thermal Overload Device Descriotions
Control Room Ventilation Svstem Descriotion
The control room ventilation system at Quad Cities and Dresden consists of
two trains. The "A" train is a nonsafety-related system built at the time of
plant construction. It utilizes nonsafety-related power supplies, nonsafety-
related service water for chiller cooling, and commercial components and
design. The "B" train was installed in about 1982 in response to
NUREG-0737. The "B" train was designed, procured, and installed as
safety-related. A safety-related power supply, and safety-related backup
cooling water supply was provided in the design. The "B" train also contains
an air filtration unit (AFU) used to provide filtered makeup air to the control
room emergency zone to pressurize the control room and minimize in-leakage
following an accident. The AFU is required to meet general design criteria
(GDC) 19 radiological limits for control room personnel following an accident.
Except for the limited redundancy within the "B" train, the control room
ventilation system does not meet safety-related redundancy and single failure
criteria. There is only one safety-related train powered from a single safety-
related motor control center, if the accident included a loss of off-site
power, the "A" train power and cooling water is unavailable and the
recirculation dampers fail to align the "B" train air handling unit (AHU).
Thermal Overload Device Descriotion
The most commonly used device for protection of small alternating current
(AC) motors at operating loads is a thermal overload device. It simulates the
temperature condition in the motor winding by means of current in a heating
element which varies with motor current. In the event of a current of
sufficient magnitude and duration which causes excessive heating of the
motor winding, the heating element causes a control circuit contact to open
for de-energizing the contactor in the motor circuit.
For continuous duty motors with a service factor of 1.0, which is the case
for the control room HVAC fans in question, the thermal overloads should be
selected such that 90 percent of the motor fullload running current falls
within the range specified in the manufacturer's table. In addition, the trip
rating should be about 110 percent of the fullload current for motors with a
service factor of 1.0, but cannot exceed 130 percent of the fullload current.
3.
Root Cause
The licensee attributed the cause of the event to failure of the "B" control
room HVAC design to properly consider operation under degraded voltage
conditions during selection of the thermal overload devices. Specifically,
although the thermal overload devices were originally selected using the
Commonwealth Edison thermal overload selection guide, tolerances in the
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thermal overload relay tripping characteristics were not appropriately
considered in the guide. As a result, the thermal overload was undersized.
In addition, motors procured for the "B" train of control room HVAC were
found with a nameplate rating of 480 Vac Motors for this system should
have been rated at 460 Vac. The motor vendor was contacted by the
licensee to determine the impact of sustained operation at degraded voltage
for the higher nominal voltage rating. The motor was determined to be
acceptable. However, this error contributed to the problem, since higher
normal operating currents due to the larger motor size decreased the margin
to the thermal overload setpoint.
4.
Safety Sianificance
The licensee determined that in the event of a design basis LOCA congruent
with a degraded voltage condition, the "B" train of control room ventilation
could have failed due to the undersized thermal overloads. If the "B" control
room HVAC system failed, unfiltered air could have entered the control room,
subjecting the operators to increased dose.
5.
Licensee Corrective Actions
As part of the licensee's immediate corrective actions, setpoint changes
were immediately written to replace the undersized thermal overloads for the
affected control room HVAC booster fans and the supply fan.
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As part of the licensee's long-term corrective actions, a search was
performed for other safety-related, three phase induction motors rated for
480 Vac. No other motors were identified. In addition, the licensee
investigated whether other undersized thermal overload devices were
installed. None were identified.
At the time of the inspection, the licensee had engineering procedures and a
tracking mechanism in place to evaluate load additions as they related to
degraded voltage. Therefore, prior to any motor changes, nameplate data
was to be evaluated for fit, form, and function. If an evaluation revealed
that the change is not like-for-like, a design change was to be performed.
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6.
Insoector Review
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The inspectors reviewed the licensee's immediate and long-term corrective
actions and concluded that the actions taken in response to this event were
appropriate. However, during a review of Dresden LER 50-237/95001,
which reported the findings and conclusions at Dresden, the inspectors noted
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that although the event at Dresden appeared identical to the event at Quad
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Cities, the Dresden evaluation of safety significance was different. The
Dresden LER stated that the safety significance of the event was minimal
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because a means was readily available for the operators to manually restart
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the booster fans within a reasonable time period, and because only one of
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the fans would be needed at a time to support the operation of the control
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room HVAC system. The inspectors concluded that although problems
concerning undersized thermal overloads were identified at both Dresden and
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Ouad Cities, the licensees' evaluation of the safety significance of the events
inexplicably differed from one another.
c.
Conclusions
immediate and long-term corrective actions for a problem regarding undersized
thermal overloads on the "B" train control room HVAC booster fans and supply f an
appeared adequate to prevent recurrence.
A discrepancy regarding the evaluation of the safety significance of the problem
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between Dresden and Quad Cities was identified. This LER is open pending a
resolution of the differing evaluations.
E1.2 Unresolved item 92201-06,"RHR Heat Exchanaer Room Cooler fnocerable"
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Insoection Scooe
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The inspectors reviewed URI 92201-06,"RHR Heat Exchanger Room Cooler
b.
Observations and Findinas
1.
Descriotion of the Event
As documented in a 1992 service water system operational performance
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inspection, the licensee identified significant flow restrictions on the 1 A and
1B RHR room coolers following internal cooler inspections conducted in
November 1990 and January 1991 in response to Generic Letter (GL) 89-13
concerns.
In addition, although the licensee determined that the flow restriction
affected the heat removal capability beyond the cooler's 17 percent design
margin, the licensee f ailed to recognize and subsequently address the
plugging of the Unit 1 coolers as a potential operability issue. Consequently,
required NRC notification of the degraded condition of the Unit 1 safety-
related coolers was not promptly made. The inspection report also
documented that similar coolers on Unit 2 were not inspected until March
1992. Inspection of the Unit 2 RHR room coolers also identified substantial
plugging in excess of design margin limits. Following completion of those
inspections, the licensee determined that both Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHR room
coolers were potentially inoperable and generated Licensee Event Reports
(LERs) 50-254/92008and 50-265/92007to report the findings.
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The inspection report conclusions stated that the licensee failed to take
appropriate corrective action to address the degraded Unit 1 RHR room
coolers that wer9 identified as plugged because timely action was not taken
to inspect and evaluate the operability of the Unit 2 RHR room coolers. The
inspectors also concluded that the Unit 2 RHR room coolers appeared to
have been inoperable for about one year while Unit 2 was on line, which
could have affected the operability of the RHR system during this period. As
a result, URI 92201-06 was opened to track this issue.
In a letter dated July 14,1992, which responded to URI 92201-06, the
licensee stated that an engineering evaluation verified that the fouling of the
RHR room coolers would not have prevented the RHR system from
performing its immediate safety function.
2.
Root Cause
The licensee identified that the RHR room coolers were fouled due to
insufficient cleaning, since the coolers had not been inspected in more than
ten years. Since regular inspection and cleaning was not required or
performed for the coolers in over ten years, blockage occurred due to
accumulation of silt and debris.
3.
Licensee Corrective Actions
As part of the licensee's immediate corrective actions, the RHR room coolers
were cleaned when the individual coolers were identified as fouled. This
action ensured that the RHR room coolers would be capable of removing the
design heat loads from the RHR corner rooms, and maintain the rooms below
their equipment qualification (EO) temperature limits.
In addition, the licensee made the following commitmont in the July 14,
1992, letter which responded to URI 92201-06 and in the LERs which
documented the fouling events:
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To prevent the recurrence of significant fouling due to long periods
without cleaning, the station was to inspect the "A" and "B" RHR
rooms coolers at least once per cycle through cycle 13 with a long-
term inspection frequency to be determined prior to the cycle 14
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refueling outage.
A method of monitoring the room coolers was being implemented
through the installation of pressure gauges on the cooling water
piping at the inlet and outlet of the coolers. In addition, a procedure
to trend and analyze these pressures was to be developed to ensure
that if a cooler was becoming blocked, action could be taken before
the design margin was exceeded.
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4.
Insoector Review
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Corrective Actions Review
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions and verified that
the RHR room coolers were inspected at least once per cycle as committed
to in the licensee's response to URI 92201-06. The inspectors noted that
the results of those subsequent inspections identified some minor fouling
which did not adversely impact cooler performance. The inspectors also
determined that the licensee planned to conservatively continue to conduct
RHR room cooler inspections every refueling outage beyond cycle 13.
The inspectors conducted a plant tour and verified that pressure gauges had .
been installed on the RHR room cooler cooling water piping. The inspectors
reviewed the licensee's program developed to trend and analyze these
pressures and noted the following weaknesses:
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At the time of the inspection, although surveillances to measure
cooler differential pressure had been performed monthly, the data had
not been entered into the trending system for the last 12 months.
System engineering personnel subsequently determined that trending
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of the data was inadvertently discontinued following a turnover of
responsibilities to another individual. The inspectors also determined
that a procedure to trend and analyze these pressures had not been
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implemented as committed to in the subject LERs. The failure to
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accomplish this action is considered a deviation for which a Notice of
Deviation is being issued (50-254/96015-01(DRS); 50-265/.
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96015-01(DRS)).
A concern regarding trending of plant parameters was identified
during a July 1996 Engineering and Technical Support inspection
documented in inspection Report No. 50-254/96010(DRS);
50-265/96010(DRS). The inspectors concluded that identification of
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weaknesses in the trending of RHR cooler differential pressure testing
results was another example of a weak trending program,
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The inspectors reviewed Quad Cities Operating Surveillance (OCOS)
5750-09," Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) and Diesel
Generator Cooling Water Pump (DGCWP) Cubicle Cooler Monthly
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Surveillance." This procedure was implemented to obtain RHR room
cooler cooling water differential pressure data. During that review,
the inspectors identified that on July 7,1996, an incorrect 1 A RHR
room cooler differential pressure was recorded in OCOS 5750-09 due
to an arithmetic error in calculating the difference between the inlet
and outlet cooling water pressures. However, due to a weak
operations review which failed to identify the error, and a weak
trending process which failed to input tne data into the trending
program, the error went undetected, although the value recorded was
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double the values recorded during the previous six months. In
addition, the inspectors noted that OCOS 5750-09 failed to include
acceptance criteria related to the measured differential pressures,
which could have provided an additional opportunity to identify the
error.
Walkdown Observations
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The inspectors walked down portions of the RHR system, including the RHR
room coolers. During the walkdown, the inspectors identified that RHR room
cooler louvers were in some cases inadvertently mispositioned to block flow
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rather than direct flow, or in poor materiel condition due to being either bent
or disconnected. Although the overall operability of the coolers did not
appear to be impacted, the condition of the louvers indicated that actions to
improve the materiel condition of the cooler louvers could benefit cooler
performance in addition, the inspectors noted housekeeping problems, such
as graffiti and unnecessary materials in the rooms, including a large piece of
garlock draped over a section of RHR piping.
Enaineerina Evaluation Review
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's engineering evaluation, which
concluded that the room coolers would have performed their safety function.
During that review, the inspectors identified that for the 2B RHR room cooler
(worst case), the calculated heat removal was 333,539 british thermal units
per hour (BTUs/hr), which slightly exceeded the RHR room design heat load
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of 330,000 BTUs/hr. However, the calculated heat removal was obtained by
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assuming a cooler inlet water temperature of 87oF, which was somewhat
less than the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) design
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temperature of 95oF. The licensee's response letter to URI 92201-06
discussed this assumption, and added that the maximum historical
Mississippi river temperature recorded at the station was 88.7oF, with the
majority of river water temperatures less than 86 F. The calculation also
assumed a blockage of 40 tubes, although 38 tubes were identified as
blocked during inspections of the 2B RHR room cooler.
The inspectors discussed this information with licensee personnel who stated
that in addition to the factors discussed above, the calculations did not take
credit for heat removal losses from natural circulation which are present in
the 1 A,1B, and 2A RHR rooms due to the physical room configurations and
the ability to obtain natural circulation heat removal in the 2B RHR room
through removal of the RHR room floor plug.
The inspectors concluded that non-conservative assumptions were
incorporated into the licensee's calculations. However, due to the age of the
issue, calculational conservatisms, heat removallosses not taken credit for,
and the licensee's actions to inspect RHR room coolers every refueling
outage, a further review of the calculations was not warranted.
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c.
Conclusions
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Although a licensee evaluation concerning RHR room cooler operability assumed a
non-conservative cooler inlet temperature, other conservative assumptions coupled
with the age of the problem and actions being taken to inspect the coolers every
refueling outage led the inspectors to conclude that further effort on this issue was
not warranted.
The inspectors concluded that the failure to implement a procedure to trend and
analyze RHR room cooler cooling water differential pressures was a deviation from
corrective actions committed to in LERs 50-254/92008and 50-265/92007. In
addition, the identification of weaknesses in the trending of RHR room cooler
differential pressure testing results coupled with trending program weaknesses
identified in inspection Report No. 50-254/96010(D RS); 50-265 /96010( D R S)
indicated a weak performance trending program.
Unresolved item 92201-06is closed.
E1.3 Unresolved item @-j254/94020-05."RHR System Water Hammer issue"
a.
insoection Scooe
The inspectors reviewed URI 50-254/94020-05,"RHR System Water Hammer
issue," related to the potential for water hammer in the RHR system if a loss-of-
coolant-accident (LOCA) concurrent with a loss-of-offsite-power (LOOP) were to
occur while the system was aligned for suppression pool cooling (SPC).
b.
Observations and Findinas
1.
Descriotion of the Event
As documented in Inspection Report No. 50-254/93026(DRP);
50-265/93026(DRP),the licensee's evaluation of Information Notice (IN) 87-10, " Potential For Water Hammer During Restart of Residual Heat
Removal Pumps," concluded that followup actions were not required and
provided an explanation to support that position. However, the inspectors
reviewed the licensee's explanation and concluded that the evaluation
performed was inadequate and a potential existed for a water hammer under
the stated conditions. As a result, inspection followup item (IFI)
50-254/265-93026-03 was opened.
As documented in inspection Report No. 50-254/94016(DRP);
50-265/94016(DRP), the licensee re-evaluated IN 87-10 and concluded that
the potential for a water hammer was considered remote and that an
analysis had been perforrned which indicated that if a water hammer were to
occur at the time emergency core cooling was required, the system would
still perform its design function. As a result, IFl 50-254/265-93026-03was
closed.
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As documented in inspection Report No. 50-254/94020(DRS);
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50-265/94020(DRS),the inspectors re-opened this issue following concerns
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raised during an Engineering and Technical Support (E&TS) inspection.
During that inspection, the inspectors identified that although the licensee's
evaluation of IN 87-10 concluded that the residual heat removal (RHR)
system would have only minimal susceptibility to water hammer, in fact, a
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substantial loss of water could occur given the initial conditions prescribed
by IN 87-10, resulting in a severe water hammer. In addition, the licensee
was unable to retrieve the water hammer analysis which demonstrated that
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if a water hammer were to occur, the emergency core cooling system
(ECCS) would still function as designed. As a result, IFl
50-254/94020-05(DRS)was opened.
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During this inspection, the licensee provided General Electric (GE) report
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NEDC-32513," Suppression Pool Cooling and Water Hammer," dated
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December 29,1995. This report was prepared for the Boiling Water Reactor
Owners' Group (BWROG) Residual Heat Removal / Suppression Pool Cooling
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(RHR/SPC) Committee to address the concerns raised by IN 87-10. In that
report, the following conclusions were reached:
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The intent of the original LOOP licensing basis was to " assume offsite
power was not available" and did not require that a LOOP be
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considered mechanistically in the licensing basis assumptions.
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The probability of occurrence of the postulated event scenario of a
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LOOP /LOCA with one or more RHR loops in the SPC mode that leads
to water hammer was extremely low (< 10E-6 per year).
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Predictions of piping system response due to water hammer loads
tends to be unrealistically conservative because of conservatisms in
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the modeling and assumptions. As a result, actual water hammer
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events indicate that the damage is less severe than predictions and
usually limited to pipe hangars and mounts.
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Given the extremely low probability of the postulated concurrent
LOOP /LOCA scenario that leads to a water hammer, and the low
likelihood that the water hammer would totally incapacitate the
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affected system, a significant public risk did not exist and substantial
additional effort for resolution may not be supported by a cost / benefit
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analysis.
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2.
Information Notice 87-10 Descriotion
Information Notice 87-10, " Potential for Water Hammer During Restart of
Residual Heat Removal Pumps," was issued on February 11,1987, to alert
licensee's of the potential for water hammer in the RHR system. The
specific condition of concern involved a design basis LOCA coincident with a
LOOP, with one or more RHR loops in the suppression pool cooling mode.
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During the power loss and subsequent valve re-alignment, portions of the
RHR system could void because of the drain down to the suppression pool as
a result of elevation differences. A water hammer may occur in those RHR
loops that were in the SPC mode when the RHR pumps restart after the
diesel generators re-energize their respective buses. As a result, the integrity
of the RHR system could be in jeopardy, which could endanger all modos of
RHR, including low pressure coolant injection.
3.
Licensee Corrective Actions
The inspectors determined that although no system modifications were being
considered, the licensee planned to revise appropriate procedures to reduce
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the probability of this event from occurring. These planned procedure
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revisions included caution statements to warn operators of the potential
consequences in the event of a LOOP while in suppression pool cooling, as
well as to allow only one loop of RHR to operate in suppression pool cooling
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at a time.
4.
Insoector Review
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions concerning the
proposed procedure changes. The proposed changes appeared appropriate.
However, the inspectors concluded that the licensee's actions to revise the
procedures were not timely, since the licensee was aware that they were
susceptible to water hammer following discussions in 1994.
In addition, the inspectors questioned whether GE report NEDC-32513 was
accurate concerning a conclusion that the intent of the licensing basis did
not require that a LOOP be considered mechanistically in the licensing basis
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assumptions. This question hes been forwarded to NRC headquarters for
technical review.
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c.
Conclusions
A question concerning the intent of the original licensing basis was forwarded to
NRR for review. Procedure revisions concerning the potential for water hammer
following a LOOP while in suppression pool cooling were appropriate, but were not
initiated in a timely manner.
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Unresolved item 50-254/94020-05(DRS),"RHR System Water Hammer issue,"
remains open pending a technical review by NRC headquarters staff regarding the
LOOP licensing basis.
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E2
Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment
E2.1
Uodated Final Safety Analvsis Reoort (UFSAR) Review
A recent discovery of a licensee operating their facility in a manner contrary to the
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) description highlighted the need for a
special focused review that compares plant practices, procedures and/or parameters
to the UFSAR descriptions. While performing the inspections discussed in this
report, the inspectors reviewed the applicable portions of the UFSAR that related to
the areas inspected. The inspectors verified that the UFSAR wording was
consistent with the observed plant practices, procedures and/or parameters.
V. Management Meetinas
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Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors presented the preliminary inspection results to members of licensee
management on October 3,1996. In addition, the final inspection results were presented
on November 6,1996. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection
should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
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Licensee
D. Craddick, System Engineering Supervisor
R. Baumer, Regulatory Assurance
R. Luebbe, System Engineering
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W. Quinn, System Engineering
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R. Robbins, System Engineering
B. Strub, System Engineering
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
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IP 37551:
On Site Engineering
IP 92700:
Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor
Facilities
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ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
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Ooened
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DEV
50-254/96015-01(DRS);
Deviation from commitment to trend RHR room cooler
50-265/96015-01(DRS)
differential pressure and to develop a procedure for this
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trending
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Closed
URI 92201-06:
RHR Heat Exchanger Room Cooler inoperable
Discussed
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LER 50-254/95002:
Improperly Sized Overloads Found on the Control Room
HVAC System Due to inadequate Original Design
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Analysis
RHR System Water Hammer Issue
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
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Alternating Current
AFU
Air Filtration Unit
j
Air Handling Unit
l
BTU
British Thermal Unit
i
BTUs/hr
British Thermal Units Per Hour
Boiling Water Reactor Owners' Group
.
Comed
Commonwealth Edison Company
!
DGCWP
Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump
j
F
Degrees Fahrenheit
E&TS
Engineering and Technical Support
Equipment Qualification
Final Safety Analysis Report
.
GDC
General Design Criteria
,
4
GL
Generic Letter
-
Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning
,
i
Heat Exchanger
IFl
inspection Followup Item
IN
Information Notice
IR
Inspection Report
i
LCO
Limiting Condition for Operation
1
LER
Licensee Event Report
Loss-Of-Coolant-Accident
.
Loss-Of-Offsite-Power
+
Motor Control Center
$
OCOS
Quad Cities Operating Surveillance
i
!
Suppression Pool Cooling
i
TS
Technical Specification
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
Unresolved Item
?
Vac
Volts Alternating Current
j
Violation
.
i
1
<
!
i
1
i
l
15