ML20134F018
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'4 CONTAINS INFORMATION EXEMPT
._- FROM DISCLOSURE UNDER.
10 CFR S 2.790 '
August 29, 1991 jg, g s
f Mr. James Lieberman Director, Office of Enforcement U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Dear Mr. Lieberman:
By letter dated June 3, 1991, from Mr. James Sniezek, the NRC forwarded to me a Demand for Information concerning my participation in an event which occurred at the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) in October, 1988.
The letter was sent to me as an NRC Licensee under License No. SOP-20467-1.
I hereby request that this letter and enclosure be treated the same as NRC's June 3, 1991 letter and Demand for Information and withheld from placement in the Public Document Room under 10 C.F.R.
S 2.790.
Mr. Sniezek's letter indicates that the NRC Office of Investigations (OI) completed an investigation on March 19, 1991 with regard to the October 12 and 13, 1988 opening of the VEGP Unit 1 Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tank (RMWST) valves to facilitate chemical cleaning of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) l by addition of hydrogen peroxide via the chemical mixing tank.
I Approximately one year prior to the completion of OI's investigation, I was interviewed on March 14, 1990, concerning my actions with respect to Technical Specification 3.4.1.4.2 and the
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chemical cleaning.
The enclosed response to the Demand for Information contains information previously provided to these NRC representatives.
The response also includes additional, detailed information.
As further explained in the enclosure to this letter, at the time of the event I was the highest management represe,ntative licensed as a Senior Reactor Operator at Plant Vogtle.
A Technical Specification clarification was sought by the day shift operators at shift turnover on October 12, 1988.
This matter appeared to involve the type of decision which could be made by licensed SROs with the assistance from Operations management.
The context of the question presented to me was not that Technical Specification 3.4.1.4.2 had been or would be violated.
Rather, this chemical cleaning activity was the first time for the plant to add hydrogen peroxide to the RCS.
This evolution was pre-planned and scheduled by the VEGP's Chemistry and Outage i
and Planning groups as an activity early in the Unit's first Infortnation in this record was deleted' g
in accordance with thefreedom of Information f
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Act, exemptioy 4
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Mr. James Lieberman 4
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l refueling outage.
The on-coming day shift SROs spotted a
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potential conflict between the pre-planned activity and the s
Technical Specification --
the entrance into a Limiting Condition for Operation with an associated Action Statement requiring "immediate" specified action made the situation unusual.
Consistent with their training, these SROs sought help i
from Operations Department management when not sure of the j
application of the Technical Specification.
Consistent with my-own, established principles of safe plant operation, I placed the 1
4 planned and scheduled addition of hydrogen peroxide to the RCS on hold to permit an appropriate review.
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My interpretation of this Technical Spec'fication was deliberative and thorough.
Although my discussion of the issue e
with the On-shift Operations Supervisor and the Deputy Manager of Operations encompassed fifteen minutes or so, during that time the issue was logically addressed, including review of the Technical Specification " Basis" and the relevant portions of the l
Final Safety Analysis' Report (FSAR) for the plant.
Advice provided by the more experienced Deputy Man &ger, while not 3
controlling, was important and confirmatory.
Furthermore, I was contemplating the issue generally since shift turnover when I held up the chemical cleaning.
These efforts, coupled with my general knowledge of the boron dilution event and my earlier, j
1987 experience related to the meaning of'"immediate" in a
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different Action Statement, lead me to a conclusion that the j
evolution could be conducted in accordance with the Technical J
Specifications if the valves were opened for no more than 15 minutes (in Mode 5 loops not filled).
l Fundamental to my October, 1988 intarpretation of the l
Technical Specification was my understanding of the accepted practice in the nuclear industry that voluntary entry into i
Limiting Conditions of Operations (LCOs) is permissible as long j
as the associated Action Statement requirements are met within the specified time intervals.
Technical Specification 3.0.2 also j
defines non-compliance withaa Technical Specifications relative l
to.the failure to meet the Action requirements once an LCO is entered:
L Noncompliance with a specification shall exist when the requirements of the Limiting Condition for Operation And associated Action requirements are not met within the specified time. intervals (emphasis supplied).
l I, and the other licensed operators reviewing the issue in i
October, 1988, applied this same logic.
More specifically, we 9
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t 1-Mr. James Lieberman August 29, 1991' Page 3 i
j considered the opening of the RMWST valves under administrative j
controls as a voluntary entry into a Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) which was permissible, provided the required.
I action of the associated Action-statement-requirements were performed.
In this case the action was to be performed within an i
"immediate" duration.
And, to my knowledge, the required action 1
was taken for.the RMWST valves within the duration which we j
determined was "immediate".
I I believed that I was capable of providing a correct Technical Specification interpretation to this shift.
I knew from experience and my review that the " safety intent" of the i
Technical Specification was to preclude the uncontrolled dilution
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of the boron concentration of the RCS.
The purposeful addition of' hydrogen peroxide under administrative controls (i.e., a 1
functional test under a clearance) was not the concern, in my judgment.
My efforts included a review of applicable portions of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for VEGP.
The NRC representatives in my March, 1990 interview only touched upon this aspect of my decision-making.
As more fully explained in the enclosure to this letter, the FSAR provisions confirmed in my 4
mind that the intentional chemical addition in Mode 5 with Loops Not Filled for the removal of " crud" was both analyzed and expressly contemplated.. Technical Specification 3.4.1.4.2's l
purpose was to place administrative controls on the valves in Mode 5, Loops Not Filled, not to prohibit the opening of the valves.
In short, I was unaware of any prohibition on the chemical cleaning and knew that the VEGP was designed and built to accommodate this activity.
With respect to the time duration of an "immediate" Action i
Statement requirement, the term "immediate" is not defined as a specific length of time in VEGP Tech. Specs.
The FSAR indicated that 15 minutes was assumed in the boron dilution accident analysis as aLlength of time for operator response during cold shutdown (Mode 5).
Further, the Deputy Manager of Operations, a more experienced plant operator than I, advised me that the issue of "immediate" in Technical Specifications had been addressed at J
another plant and that plant had set a guideline of "immediate" as meaning within 15 minutes.
I had also observed the application of compliance with an "immediate" Action Statement in 1987, which I believe was also observed by NRC Resident Inspectors.
In that instance "immediate" action (i.e.,
"immediately open the Reactor Trip System breakers") was required by procedures and Technical Specification 3.1.3.3.
Operators, 1
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August-29, 1991
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j anticipating entry into the Lco, took actions to troubleshoot and j
confirm the source of a problem with a rod position indicator l
prior to opening the Reactor Trip System breakers.
These i
troubleshooting efforts were taken over a relatively short i
duration.
In light of these considerations, in october, 1988 I determined that the word "immediately" in the Action Statement i
for' Technical Specification 3.4.1.4.2 connoted some permissible time duration, in this case 15 minutes.
In order to assure conservatism, we administratively limited the time duration to 5 minutes.
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In its Demand for Information the NRC also expresses concern j
that I may have intentionally disregarded Technical Specification limitations in an attempt to facilitate outage activities.
This i
is simply incorrect.
Licensed operators at VEGP take their responsibility of complying with Technical Specifications and i
assuring safe operation of the plant extremely seriously.
j operational limitations and requirements control outage activities and not the other way around.
In this instance, j
elimination of the hydrogen peroxide addition from the outage i
schedule would'have shortened the schedule.
And, as previously indicated, I did not hesitate to postpone this planned activity l
when a compliance issue arose in order to permit an adequate
- review, i
My review of this Technical Specification was open and r
l obvious to those who were involved on shift.
Such openness and participation, I believe, further demonstrates that I did not know, or should have known, that Technical Specification 3.4.1.4.2 prohibited the opening of RMWST valves in Mode 5 with i
the Reactor Coolant Loops Not Filled.
I honestly believed that the activities were within the latitude permitted by the Action Statement language in the Technical Specification.
Finally, please be assured that I am committed to compliance to Technical Specifications and that my decision-making process j
is deliberative and cautious.
Any other approach is contrary to the policies of the VEGP and my personal responsibilities and standards.
If, as viewed by you in hindsight, I made a mistake in my decision-making, I accept responsibility for that mistake.
At the time of.my efforts in October, 1988, however, the opening of the RMWST valves under the administrative controls in place j
was considered an activity which was expressly contemplated and j
within the " safety intent" of the Technical Specification.
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Mr. James Lieberman August 29, 1991 Page 5 I affirm that this letter and its enclosure are true and correct to-the best of my knowledge and' belief.
Very truly yours, w 1 kJdma W.
F. Kitchens Sworn to and subscribed 9
% % )s ~ g Notary PutFlicf ny commission expires:
% L J.P./GoJB WFK:njf cc:
Regional Administrator, U.S. NRC, Region II Assistant General Counsel for Hearings and Enforcement Office of Enforcement U.S. NRC Mr. C. K. McCoy, Georgia Power Company
t RESPONSE TO DEMAND FOR INFORMATION A.
Exclanation of Licensee's Activities.
In the fall of 1988 Unit 1 of the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (" Plant Vogtle") went into its first refueling outage.
As part of pre-outage planning I was responsible for resolving conflicts between planned evolutions and Technical Specification requirements, since as Operations Manager I was the senior management member holding'a Senior Reactor Operator License.
While I would normally resolve those conflicts, I do not recall a conflict regarding the chemical cleaning of the reactor coolant system ("RCS") by hydrogen peroxide being identified.
I was generally aware that outage management and Chemistry Department representatives planned to chemically clean the RCS using hydrogen peroxide; however, I was not directly involved in outage planning activities such as the selection of plant conditions for the evolution.
I was briefed on the reason for the evolution which, as I recall, would be done at reduced RCS inventory.
I did not think of this planned evolution as involving a Technical Specification compliance issue.
As far as I can recall, while the issue of whether the evolution should be performed at reduced inventory or not had been discussed, that discussion related to the effectiveness of the cleaning process.
The specific means of conducting the evolution, however, was not discussed in meetings which I attended.
During outages I typically came in early, primarily to learn plant status by observing shift relief.
On October 12, 1988, based upon my review of Shift Supervisor Logs and the notation of my initials, I was in the control room at about 4:53 a.m. Central time (5:53 a.m. Eastern).
During the time I was in the control room I observed shift relief and during that time, or shortly thereafter, the on-coming Onshift Operations Supervisor ("OSOS"),
Mr. John Hopkins, informed me that a Unit Shift Supervisor had raised a question concerning Technical Specification compliance relative to the addition of hydrogen peroxide for the RCS chemical cleaning.
The specific Technical Specification was Tech 4
Spec S 3.4.1.4.2 and the addition of hydrogen peroxide would be through the RMWST flow path.
The context in which the issue was presented to me was that the shift would like my concurrence that entrance into an immediate operator action statement for the addition of the hydrogen peroxide by opening RMWST val ~ves was acceptable.
I believe the operators viewed the evolution as a little bit unusual, but it is fair to say that there was no major controversy involving the planned evolution.
The issue did not appear to be an item that required resolution right then and there, and I instructed the OSOS to place the chemical addition activities on hold until we could j
discuss the matter later.
I was aware at that time that the l
particular valves subject to this Technical Specification had been placed under administrative controls in accordance with Unit
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Operating Procedure 12006-C and that those controls were designed 4
to ensure compliance with the Technical Specifications.
I told I
the OSOS that after the 7:00 meeting (a meeting of management and l
on-coming shift representatives of various departments) we could discuss the-issue again.
As I recall, the plant was still i
draining down to "mid-loop" at that time.
At the 7:00 a.m. meeting the chemical addition evolution came up for discussion because it was scheduled-for work that day.
Either the OSOS or I explained that the evolution was on i
hold, and that Operations was looking at whether the Technical Specification relevant to the matter raised a compliance problem.
After the 7:00 meeting, the OSOS and I went to my office.
As I explained to NRC representatives who interviewed me on March 14, 1990, I looked at two issues in my office.
First, as more fully explained below, I decided that the addition of hydrogen peroxide by manipulation of the RMWST valves for a short-duration addition of unborated water from the chemical mixing tank was in compliance with the Technical Specifications.
Second, I reviewed the boron dilution effects, using Plant Technical Data Book Tab 2.0, page 21 of 22 (Exhibit 1), to assure that in addition to TechnicalSpecificationcompliancethep}annedevolutionwasnot i
significant relative to shutdown margin.
In other words, in addition to assuring regulatory compliance, I endeavored to confirm that reactivity management was properly addressed.
This is consistent with my interpretation of Technical Specifications:
the interpretation must be in context to determine the " safety intent" of the Specification and, even if regulatory compliance is assured, the planned action needs to be safe.
As I reviewed the Technical Specification, I assumed that the plant would be in Mode 5,
" loops not filled."
At that time, I reviewed the Technical Specification, the FSAR and the Technical
- Specifications " Basis," considered confirmatory advice from Mr. Walter Marsh (then the Deputy Manager of Operations and I
a more experienced operator than myself), and factored in my understanding that the intent of the Technical Specification was to prevent an gncontrolled boron dilution of the RCS.
When I was interviewed by NRC representatives, I informed them that I had reviewed Chapters 9 and 15 of the FSAR as part of my thought process in reaching a conclusion that the October 12, I I previously explained to NRC representatives that I performed a quick review of the reactivity effects of the chemical addition.
Although I cannot recall the specific numbers which I used, I recall using my calculator to determine that the boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System inventory would not be decreased by even 1 ppm as a result of the planned addition of chemicals.
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4 1988 Day Shift addition of hydrogen peroxide to the RCS through the RMWST valves was acceptable, both in terms of regulatory compliance and nuclear safety.
Had these representatives requested a fuller explanation of my ultimate decision, I would 2
have further responded as follows:
First, I knew that the voluntary entry into Limiting i
conditions of Operations was permissible and was a common industry practice, provided the associated Action Statement is complied with.
As I explained to the NRC representatives, the j
front of the Tech specs (Tech Spec 3.0.2) defines non-compliance as "when the requirements of the Limiting Condition for Operation i
and associated Action requirements are not met within the specified time intervals."
As I viewed it, entrance into LCOs for operational evolutions, such as maintenance of equipment or system outages to improve equipment reliability, was and is a common and acceptable practice.
4 Second, I observed no prohibition in Tech Spec 3.4.1.4.2 for opening the RMWST valves and knew, based on my experience, that i
an uncontrolled boron dilution event was the scenario designed to j
be precluded by the~ Technical Specification.
(I would note that NRC representatives questioned me about Tech Spec 3.9.7 in my interview, which contains an express prohibition and, as I view it, ran counter to the prevailing principle of the acceptability of voluntary entrance into LCOs and associated Action Statements, l
provided the action required is taken within specified time event before Vogtle was licensed.gd review of the boron dilution intervals.)
My experience includ In my review of this matter j
in preparing this response, I located a June, 1985 Westinghouse 3
analysis, a copy of which had been provided to me at that time in conjunction with my responsibilities as operations Superintendent.
The analysis contemplated purposeful chemical addition to the RCS in Mode 5, loops not filled (Exhibit 2, pp.
22, 25-26).
I did not review this document on October 12, 1988.
j My general knowledge, however, did include the understanding that unplanned, inadvertent types of events were the concern addressed by the boron dilution accident.
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I 2I was involved in the preparation and review of, drafts of j
the VEGP Fuel Safety Analysis Report ("FSAR") as early as 1979.
From approximately late 1979 through mid-1981 I coordinated reviews of draft FSAR sections by GPC personnel.
In mid-1981 I transferred to the VEGP site.
Later, beginning in approximately 1984, I became involved in the development of the VEGP Technical Specifications.
As a result of these assignments I obtained a working knowledge of the licensing basis for the VEGP, including i
the FSAR, and the Technical Specifications, and the NRC's Standard Review Plan.
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Third, while concluding that no prohibition existed, but consistent with my established practice of assuring consistency with the " safety intent" of Technical Specifications, I reviewed the FSAR to confirm that I was properly resolving the Technical Specification ambiguity.
My review of the FSAR confirmed, in my mind, that the Technical Specification implemented
" administrative controls" of securing the valves to assure that 1
ch.emical addition evolutions would be controlled and not result in " failure to secure chemical additions" in Modes 3, 4 and 5.
In other words, the Technical Specification was not designed to
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orchibit opening of the valves in Mode 5 loops not filled but, instead, was to assure that one of the " initiators" of uncontrolled boron dilution would not occur.
Why did I believe that the opening of the valves was analyzed and permissible in Mode 5 after review of the FSAR?
With respect to analysis, the FSAR S 15.4.6.2.1.2 expressly i
states that "an analysis was performed" for Modes 3, 4 and 5.3 For these three Modes, the FSAR expressly stated that one of the analyzed initiators of concern was " failure to secure chemical j
addition."
This, to me, stated that controlled or pre-planned chemical addition, such as that scheduled for October 12, 1988, was contemplated in these Modes and that the cause for concern was the failure to close the valves once chemical addition had i
been completed.
This interpretation of the FSAR language was also consistent with my historic knowledge of the boron dilution event.
j Also, the wording in FSAR S 15.4.6.2.2.2, entitled " Dilution During Cold Shutdown," contrasted with wording applicable to Mode 6 " Dilution During Refueling" S 15.4.6.2.2.1, indicating that the safety analysis for the two Modes was different.
This was confirmed by wording which described the "Results" of the l
safety analysis for dilution during COLD SHUTDOWN, HOT STANDBY and HOT SHUTDOWN:
15.4.6.2.2.2 Dilution Durina Cold Shutdown.
For dilution during cold shutdown, the Technical Specifications provide the required shutdown margin as a function of RCS boron i
concentration.
The specified shutdown margin ensures that the operator has 15 min from the time of high flux at shutdown alarm to the total loss of shutdown margin.
15.4.6.2.2.3 Dilution Durina Hot Standby and Hot' Shutdown.
For dilution during hot standby and hot shutdown, the Technical Specifications provide the required shutdown margin as a function of RCS boron concentration.
The 3As explained more fully in Part D of this response, I was unaware that this analysis was incomplete or not current until September 26, 1989.
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specified shutdown margin ensures that the operator has 15 min from the time of the high flux at shutdown alarm to the total loss of shutdown margin.
Thus, all three modes (HOT STANDBY-3, HOT SHUTDOWN-4 and COLD SHUTDOWN-5) rely on shutdown margin as a function of RCS boron concentration, n21 margin as a function of closed and secured valves.
This established to me that the Tech spec in question was designed to provide administrative controls on the valves but not to prohibit chemical cleaning.
The' administrative control of a clearance, as I viewed it, was consistent with the Technical Specification and Unit Operating Procedure 12006 which called for the clearance to be established, thereby implementing those administrative controls.
The last paragraph of FSAR $ 15.4.6.2.1.2 was consistent with my conclusion that the Tech Specs contemplate an administrative control of valves to preclude inadvertent or
. uncontrolled dilution in Mode 5:
Since the active volumes considered are so small in cold shutdown with the reactor coolant. loops drained, it was determined that the same valves locked out in [ REFUELING) would need to be locked out in cold shutdown when the reactor coolant loops are drained.
In context, this meant that in COLD SHUTDOWN (Mode 5)'with loops not filled, the same administrative controls as applied in REFUELING (Mode 6) would be implemented.
The difference in the analysis' wording of the two modes in S 15.4.6.2.1.2, however, indicated that " chemical addition" was permissible in COLD SHUTDOWN loops not filled but not permissible in REFUELING.'
If such were not the case, COLD SHUTDOWN with loops not filled would have been treated like REFUELING -- shutdown margin would not be a function of RCS boron dilution.
Fourth, my review of Chapter 9 of the FSAR, which describes various components of the VEGP, further confirmed my opinion that l
addition of chemicals through the manipulation of the chemical mixing tank valves was permissible in Mode 5.
Chapter 9, I have found in my experience, oftentimes describes limitations or
'I also knew from my experience that the Standard' Review Plan guidance for time intervals for operator action for an unplanned dilution was different for REFUELING than for COLD SHUTDOWN modes.
In addition, I was aware that shutdown margin f
requirements for REFUELING are treated differently in the Technical Specifications than the requirements for COLD SHUTDOWN.
These factors confirmed the difference for the two modes relative to the purpose of the administrative controls of the RMWST valves.-
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i characteristics of components or systems which are not expressly i
stated in Chapter 15, which primarily addresses analyses of accident scenarios.
Section 9.3.4.1.2.5.14, entitled " Chemical Mixing Tank," states, in part:
The chemical mixing tank is used primarily in the preparation of.
chemicals for corrosion oroduct oxidation durina a refuelina shutdown.
4 The hydrogen peroxide addition which I was considering in i
October, 1988 was encompassed excressly by the underlined words.
Having concluded that the safety intent of the Technical specification (i.e., that analysis behind the Tech Specs
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expressly contemplated chemical cleaning) would not be violated i
by the planned evolution, the issue of assuring compliance with j
the Action Statement during the evolution boiled down to what time duration does "immediate" specify?
The FSAR indicated that d
15 minutes was assumed for operator response upon shutdown alarm for this mode and condition, apparently based upon the standard review plan requirennents.
I did not find, and did not know of i
j any. definition of "immediate" in the Technical Specifications; to i
me, the word connotes a time duration.
Also, "immediate" j
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operator action had been addressed in June of 1987, relative to j
the Digital Rod Position Indication system ("DRPI").
From this 1
i experience in the past, I had learned that "immediate" did not necessarily mean "right away" or "the very next thing," since the 3
application of the Technical Specification of the DRPI was viewed as permitting manually switching data trains if the train in use l
was broken or malfunctioning, rather than requiring the "right i
j away" opening of the reactor trip breakers.
In effect, we allowed a few minutes to troubleshoot and confirm that the DRPI i
indication had really been a problem before manual opening of the reactor trip breakers.
I believe our NRC Resident Inspectors
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were aware of this application of an "immediate operator action" Action Statement.
Sae, VEGP Licensee Event Report 87-038,
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July 20, 1987.
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Mr. Marsh joined my discussions with the OSOS when I retrieved my copy of the FSAR from his office.
I understood 4
Mr. Marsh to say that the issue of "immediate" in Technical i
specifications had come up in another context at another plant where he was working and that the plant had set a guideline that "immediate" meant to initiate action within 15 minutes.
This, I mentally noted, was comparable to the 15 minutes considered for operator action upon the sounding of the shutdown alarm.
Based on my knowledge from the FSAR that the flow rate through the RMWST valves as they would be aligned would approximate only several gallons a minute (3.5 gallons a minute is indicated in the FSAR), we conservatively decided to limit the opening of the valves to a 5 minute time duration rather than l
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i using an allowable "immediate" duration of 15 minutes.
This, I recall thinking, would result in less than 20 gallons of water j
added to the RCS.
These valves, then, would remain under the l
administrative control of the clearance procedure to preclude an uncontrolled boron dilution and, further, the Action' Statement j
requiring "immediate" operator action would be complied with by
. assuring closure within 5 minutes of initial opening, substantially less than the 15 minutes which I believed was contemplated by the FSAR analysis for operator action and was the i
Technical Specification guidance at another plant.
My j
understanding is that these administrative controls were, in l
fact, maintained by the OSOS and his shift crew, although I did i
not participate in the actual chemical cleaning evolution, such as the untagging and manipulating of the RMWST valves.
1 B.
Exclanation Relative to Acoropriateness of Sanctions.
l The NRC's June 3, 1991 Demand for Information questions why I should not be removed from all NRC licensed activities, j
essentially because of my interpretation of Technical Specification 3.4.1.4.2 and my decision to permit operators to conduct the chemical cleaning.
First, I did not intentionally or knowingly violate the l
Technical Specifications.
I attempted to interpret these i
requirements in good faith and with reasoned judgment.
I am i
concerned that the NRC has indicated that the Technical Specification in issue is " exceptionally clear and not open to l
interpretation."
To my mind, to be " exceptionally clear" the
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language of this Technical Specification should have contained an express prohibition (like Tech Spec 3.9.7) so that the controlled l
opening of the valves for one of their primary design purposes is clearly not permitted.
In other words, the Tech Spec's language should have indicated that chemical addition was not contemplated in Mode 5 loops not filled.
To not be open to interpretation, I
the FSAR also should have stated that shutdown margin was assured i
by administrative controls of the valves (like REFUELING) and not l
j As viewed in hindsight, the reality of the situation is that chemical cleaning in Mode 5 loops not filled was not contemplated i
i by the safety analysis which was current in October 1988.
However, portions of the FSAR language which reinforce,d my 1
conclusion were initially drafted prior to 1988 to reflect the Westinghouse 1985 analysis of the boron dilution accident during Mode 5 loops not filled wherein chemical cleaning Eng contemplated but opening of valve -111A (another initiator) was not.
The 12/86 amendment to the FSAR did not adequately revise Section 15 to state that chemical addition during Mode 5 loops not filled was no longer encompassed in the analysis.
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Second, relative to my historic interpretation in October, 1988, I have a specific sense of responsibility to ensure compliance with all license conditions for the plant, including i
Technical Specifications.
I believed that my interpretation was i
not only consistent with the intent of the Technical 4
Specifications (both Tech Spec 3.0.2 and 3.4.1.4.2), but also was
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an interpretation that assured safety.
Plant Vogtle's management
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attempts to take action that is right and instill in all licensed j
operators, as well as other employees, the philosophy that safe operation in compliance with all requirements is of paramount l
importance.
For me to con'ur in an interpretation of Technical c
i specifications which I believed violated legal requirements would be contrary to my sense of responsibility and the culture which j
is expected of all licensed operators.
In short, for me to instruct subordinates of an action which I knew violated Technical Specifications is abhorrent to the philosophies which I have attempted to nurture as operations Manager and, since the j
event, as Assistant Plant General Manager.
l Third, I believe that logic and openness of the i
interpretation which I arrived at indicated that I did not know, j
nor had reason to know that in October, 1988 a violation of l
Technical Specification 3.4.1.4.2 would result.from the opening l
valves 1-1208-U4-176 and -177.
The NRC, in its correspondence to j
me, implies that the wording of the Technical Specification j
standing alone should have led a reasonable operator to conclude
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that the opening of valves was not permitted for a short period of time.
As I indicated previously, I do not believe that the J
Technical Specification is that clear.
Nor do I believe that the NRC desires to preclude licensed operators from using sense and judgment'and from referring to available support documents when i
questions arise.
When I confronted the compliance issue in October, 1988, I attempted to carefully and conscientiously reach 4
a decision which complied with the concern addressed by the l
Technical Specifications, that is an uncontrolled dilution of boron concentration of the RCS.
My decision was honestly arrived at and without any pressure to facilitate outage activities.
I l-postponed ongoing shift activities related to the hydrogen peroxide addition until I could review the matter.
I discussed the matter openly with other Operations Department and Plant i
l personnel.
I reviewed the documents which have a major bearing i
on my understanding of the Technical Specifications.. Even though I
a " questioning attitude" is nurtured at Plant Vogtle,,the l
ultimate resolution was not questioned, to my knowledge, by other operators who were aware of the issue.
It may be that, in hindsight, the NRC will conclude that my j
judgment was wrong.
I understand why that conclusion might be j
made.
In hindsight, the FSAR obviously could be more accurate; I was unaware that the planned evolution was unanalyzed at that time.
The NRC may now conclude that entry into an action statement with an "immediate" duration is always prohibited.
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[o I had understood or known of these facts and policies, my i
judgment would have been different.
Hindsight is fundamentally i
unfair, however, if it assumes knowledge which I did not have (and reasonably could not have had) at the time of my decision.
Voluntary entrance into LCOs is more closely evaluated today than in October, 1988.
For example, since October,'1988 the NRC has differentiated between voluntary entrance into LCOs for
" operational convenience" to reduce the scope of subsequent j
refueling outages and entrance in conjunction with pre-planned testing or maintenance (See NRC Inspection Reports 50-424/425 90-19 and 90-14).
In any event, I continue to believe that a j
reasonable operator facing the same facts and circumstances i
presented'to me on October 12, 1988, with the knowledge available i
at that time, could reasonably conclude that the chemical 4
cleaning evolution as planned and implemented complied with j
Technical Specification S 3.4.1.4.2.
Fourth, sanctions are inappropriate in this case, where a difference in professional judgment exists as to the Technical Specification's requirements.
The responsibility for Technical Specification interpretations in October, 1988 was placed on me, as the Operations Manager, as the highest ranking management l
representative with an SRO license.
At each licensed facility i
others are similarly situated.
I do not feel that it will foster clear lines of responsibility and purposeful review of Tech Spec interpretation issues at Plant Vogtle or other licensed facilities if the NRC were to judge my intent and motives simply on the basis of whether my decision in this instance was correct.
I appreciate this opportunity in responding to the Demand for i
Information to provide the NRC with my decision-making efforts in
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October, 1988; I trust that these efforts, and the underlying straightforward logic which I applied, will establish the bona fide, good faith nature of my interpretation.
j j
If, illuminated by the clear light of hindsight, my decision j
j is judged to be incorrect, my removal from NRC licensed activities would be an inappropriate, overly weighty sanction.
Any historic mistake which I may have made does not reflect my philosophies concerning regulatory compliance or my overall performance at Plant Vogtle for over ten years.
Furthermore, i
this interpretive error, if it be so determined, would be an isolated instance among virtually scores of other interpretations l
or clarifications for the plant.
The balance, many re,duced to writing and reviewed by NRC representatives, to my knowledge have not been questioned.
Decisions regarding Technical Specification compliance issues are not always straightforward and, indeed, are occasionally extremely difficult, potentially involving j
countervailing safety, economic or technical considerations.
i Actual "real time" observation of my efforts to cautiously interpret and apply Technical Specifications is a more accurate indicator of my historic and present principles than a distant, historic decision viewed in isolation.
The Senior Resident 9
4 4
3 Inspector, Mr.! Brian Bonser, has observed my day-to-day efforts in providing management oversight, as well as the activities of the operations Department.
I believe he and others who have j
reviewed my day-to-day decisions have observed my bona fide and j
good faith efforts to' address compliance issues.
Fifth, my decision in October, 1988 was not improperly j
i influenced by pressure to expedite outage activities.
I derived j
no personal. benefit, and the Plant did not derive an economic benefit, as a result of the decision which I reached in October, 1988.
The chemical cleaning of the RCS, if eliminated from the planned' outage activities, would have shortened the outage.- The i
only consequences of eliminating this activity would-have been the potential for increased radiation exposure to workers, such as maintenance personnel.
However, the plant had not experienced i
fuel failures and the RCS had, and still has, relatively minor
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amounts of " crud."
And, I do not believe that any planned outage activities would have been precluded or curtailed if the chemical i
cleaning had been eliminated from planned activities.
To observe
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that my decision " facilitated outage activities" fails to consider the fact that the outage duration might have been e
shortened with the elimination of the chemical cleaning and that i
j the activity in and of itself was not vitally important.
As I i
told the NRC representatives in my March 14, 1990 interview, if I had' felt this evolution was wrong, that it would put the Plant
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outside of Tech Spec requirements or that it was otherwise unsafe, I would not have allowed it to proceed because it wasn't i
that important to be done.
j
- Finally, I,
and the Plant staff in general, possess greater experience and insight of greater of depth than we possessed as we entered the first refueling outage of the plant in 1988.
More j
skilled assistance in grappling with compliance issues is available to the plant, facilitated by better communications between on-site and off-site departments.
Communication between the facility licensee and NRC representatives has also been I
enhanced and Resident Inspectors more oftentimes I
contemporaneously review issues and provide helpful input.
These enhancements provide greater assurance that interpretation errors will not be made by line managers (including me) than would any enforcement sanction almost three years after the event.
}
C.
Decision-Makina Recardina Technical Soecification Comoliance First and foremost, I am firmly committed to compliance with the Technical Specifications, as well as other regulatory i
requirements.
I have spent much of my time and efforts over the last ten years ensuring that programs and procedures are in place l
at Plant Vogtle to operate the Units in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
I was personally involved in the initial preparation and review of the Vogtle Technical 10 i
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l 4
i j
4
I Specifications, prior to their issuance as an appendix to the Unit 1 operating license in January, 1987.
A significant effort was made by Georgia Power and the NRC to make these Technical i
Specifications accurate and clearly worded.
As the Operations i
Manager and, later, the Assistant Plant General Manager, I have been in a line-management position responsible for Technical Specification compliance at Plant Vogtle since receipt of the Unit 1 operating license in January, 1987.
I have attempted to i
foster a compliance-oriented, " safety first" culture.
i j
However, situations do arise when interpretations or 1
clarifications of the proper method of compliance are required for a specific plant condition or evolution.
There are several j
key principles or philosophies that I feel must be used when making decisions regarding compliance with the Technical l
R nition of Anolicability.
First, an operator must have sufficient plant knowledge and knowledge of the Tech Specs 1
.to recognize situations that require action by the Tech Specs.
Training is vital to impart this knowledge to operators.
The collective knowledge and experience of the other plant staff members should also be used to identify situations which need i
action.
l 2.
Knowledae of Plant Confiauration and Conditions.
Second, the operator must know the plant or system configuration and design, and the specific plant conditions at the time and for i
the particular situation under review.
Since the Limiting j
conditions for Operation are written for specific systems, subsystems, or components, and are applicable under specific plant conditions, a thorough understanding of these conditions is j
essential to ensuring compliance.
l 3.
The " Intent" of Technical Soecifications.
The Tech l
Specs are designed to address specific events or conditions which represent a safety challenge.
An operator must comply with the
" safety intent" of Tech Specs.
To determine this safety intent, i
operators should review the Tech Spec Basis and, if necessary, the FSAR.
The Tech Specs were developed, in part, from the analyses and evaluations included in the FSAR.
4.
Follow Procedures and Work Controls.
All Op,erations i
personnel must follow written procedures and approved work controls when making changes to plant status and equipment configuration, since these are developed in light of Tech Specs j
and other requirements.
5.
Seek Assistance.
When unsure, get help.
Interpretation or clarification of Tech. Spec. requirements is the ultimate responsibility of Operations line management.
These interpretations and determinations should not be made in a vacuum l
11 4
i I
and the-collective knowledge of the plant and general office staffs can be applied when appropriate.
Procedures concerning Tech Spec interpretations are established to facilitate assistance.
6.
Act Conservativelv.
When applying Technical Specifications, act conservatively.
For example, take corrective or compensatory action for potentially degraded equipment in parallel with evaluating its " operability."
I have shared the general philosophies listed above with my i
co-workers and subordinates in several ways.
The most direct manner of imparting these philosophies is by personal conversations and, at appropriate times, coaching and by applying the principles with them as a team in operating our plant.
- Also, I have attempted to lead by example by my applying Technical Specifications conservatively in licensed operator training, including simulator scenarios that require interpretation and use of the Tech Specs.
More formal action has included my
[
participation as a speaker in a special training program in January, 1988, where principles of compliance were presented to the Vogtle licensed. operators at multiple sessions (Exhibit 3).
" Common Sense Compliance" approaches to Technical Specifications i
and procedural compliance which were conveyed to the operators are set out on pages 26 through 30 of this Exhibit.
As these overlays show, the " safety intent" of Technical Specifications should be determined when dealing with novel or unclear issues.
My efforts in October, 1988 followed these approaches which I had preached.
1 Individual clarifications and guidance which I have issued also stress these conservctive principles of compliance with regulatory compliance.
In February, 1989, for example, I issued to all licensed operators a written " Operability Policy" that included guidance to ensure compliance with the Tech Specs, and highlighted responsibilities for resolving issues concerning
" operability" under the Tech Specs (Exhibit 4).
When difficult questions have arisen, I have requested. help i
from our technical and licensing staff.
In October, 1988 I, as the Operations Manager, was responsible for all practical purposes for Technical Specification interpretations, and the degree of interdepartmental review was much less.
This was, in hindsight, a weakness in our approach.
(See Inspection Reports j
50-424/425, 90-19 and 91-14 at p. 2).
We have revised our i
procedure for Technical Specification clarifications and, today, our approach includes additional assistance and review by the Manager of Technical Support, who currently holds an SRO license.
Today, I believe we have an established, experienced and nature staff at the plant and at the corporate office, willing and capable of answering questions and providing information and opinions to base appropriate actions relative to the Tech Specs.
i 12 r
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e We markedly have increased our ability to work well as a team through the last few years.
When the requirements of Technical Specifications for a particular situation are less than clear, operators should not, and do not, hesitate to request assistance.
I firmly believe that I, and the other managers and officers of Plant Vogtle, have achieved a real measure of success in assuring that all personnel will raise questions, seek assistance and logically, professionally resolve Technical Specifications issues.
I D.
Licensee's Actions Followina the Event.
My recollection of my accions following the event and involvement in and informatien provided to the Vogtle Plant Review Board in the review ot the event is reflected in my transcribed interview with hWC representatives, dated March 14, 1990, beginning at page 35.
First, several days after I had given my concurrence for the addition of hydrogen peroxide under administrative controls through the RMWST valves' pathway I discussed my Technical Specification interpretation with Mr. Jim Swartzwelder, who was then the Manager of Nuclear Safety and Compliance ("NSAC").
Both he and I had worked together on the development of the Tech Specs with the NRC and, due to our SRO licenses, experience and positions, were considered knowledgeable to a greater extent than other licensed operators.
As a matter of professional interest, I told him about the voluntary entrance into an "immediate operator action statement" for the addition of hydrogen peroxide to the RCS.
His view, in effect, was that a noncompliance with Technical Specifications had not occurred, but that the Technical Specifications shouldn't be written so that you would have to enter an immediate operator action statement.
Therefore, in order to avoid the need for interpretation in future, similar evolutions he agreed with my suggestion that a Technical Specification change be pursued.
As I recall, I also filled out an outage " critique sheet" and submitted it to the Outage and Planning Group to propose the need to improve the wording of the Technical Specification so that an interpretation would not be required each time chemical cleaning was planned for subsequent outages.
Approximately 11 months after the October, 1988 chemical i
cleaning,.during the week of September 11, 1989, I was,in SRO requalification training.
Apparently, someone in the Technical Support Department had raised the question of whether the historic, 1988 chemical cleaning was in compliance with Technical Specifications.
On either Wednesday, September 13, 1989 or Thursday, September 14, 1909 I r.ttempted to contact Mr. Allen Mosbaugh and John Aufdenkampe.
Mr. Aufdenkampe was then the Manager of the Technical Support Department, reporting to Mr. Mosbaugh.
I had been told that one of them had stated that the historic addition of hydrogen peroxide during the first 13 f
+
n-,--
..,n,.u--
I I
l refueling outage was an " intentional violation of Technical l
Specifications."
The statement was made either in a management meeting or, perhaps, in a meeting of the Plant Review Board.
I was unable to contact Mr. Mosbaugh, so I called Mr. Aufdenkampe.
At a meeting in Mr. Aufdenkampe's office, I told him of my review of the Technical Specification's application to the addition of hydrogen peroxide in' October, 1988 and of my awareness of the activities.
I asked him whether the chemical cleaning activity had been described as an " intentional" Technical Specification violation.
He confirmed that that phras'e or similar words had been'used.
I explained to him that I didn't believe a Technical Specification violation had occurred and the basis for my i
position.
This meeting.was not confrontational.
However, I did indicate to Mr. Aufdenkampe that he should have more facts before a statement concerning intentional violation of Technical Specifications is brought up in a management meeting.
In this meeting Mr. Aufdenkampe explained to me that a Licensing Document Change Request, for which Westinghouse would charge $50,000 or so for supporting analysis, had been brought up through his organization to him and to Mr. Mosbaugh.
They began to question what was done in the first refueling outage and the question was raised in that context as to whether the historic addition of hydrogen peroxide at mid-loop was a noncompliance with Technical Specifications.
On September 15, 1989, either a day or two after my meeting
~
with Mr. Aufdenkampe, the General Manager of the VEGP, Mr. George Bockhold, called me to his office for a meeting with Mr. Allen Mosbaugh.
Prior to Mr. Bockhold's request for ne to come to his office I had obtained the shift Supervisor logs for October, 1988.
Consistent with my memory and these logs, I had written a page of dates and times and when the shifts had added hydrogen peroxide to the Reactor Coolant System ("RCS").
The handwritten document was basically similar to the chronology attached to my later, September 15, 1989 memorandum to Mr. Bockhold.
At this meeting on September 15, 1989, Mr. Mosbaugh stated that a member of the Technical Support staff had raised a concern about the October 1988 addition of hydrogen peroxide to the RCS.
My impression was that Mr. Bockhold desired to obtain my perspective on the matter, in his capacity as my supervisor and as the Plant's General Manager.
I discussed the event with Messrs. Bockhold and Mosbaugh, including the details as best I could remember at that time, including a chronology of the hydrogen peroxide additions.
I told them that I had been involved in the review of the Technical Specification and its application at the time, and that I had been present in the Control Room when the icsue first arose.
I also informed them that my opinion at that time was that the addition of hydrogen peroxide through the RMWST valves would not violate Technical
' Specifications and that I concurred with the shift's activities.
14
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l' As this meeting ended I agreed to write a Deficiency Card j
for the event.
I-viewed this as a means of assuring an objective i
review of the event by the established Deficiency Card review j
process.
I asked Mr. Mosbaugh whether he felt the information that I had presented was sufficient to resolve the concern.
l Although Mr. Mosbaugh did not indicate that I had collated enough information, he did ask about the actual RCS levels at the time 1
of the event.
To me this indicated that Mr. Mosbaugh believed i
that if the RCS level had never actually reached "mid-loop" j
elevations the Technical Specification would not be applicable.
l That afternoon I further reviewed the Shift Supervisor logs and completed my memorandum to Mr. Bockhold (Exhibit 5).
I wrote j
the memorandum because I wanted reviewers to know as much as I l
knew at the time the Deficiency Card ("DC") would be submitted so a reportability determination could be made.
I also wanted my j
i supervisor, Mr. Bockhold, to have a record of the substance of i
j our conversation.
The contents of the memorandum were from my review of these particular logs and my personal recollection of the event, and were accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief at the time.
This memorandum was attached to the DC which j
I submitted, by procedure, to the Shift Supervisor on my next workday, Monday,, September 18, 1989.
I was not further involved in the processing of the DC or its disposition.
To my knowledge, I
the review by the NSAC was independently conducted in accordance with established procedures for DCs.
4 On September 19, 1989, I attended, as Chairman, the Plant Review Board ("PRB") meeting.
At the prior PRB meeting of September 14, 1989, which I did not attend, the PRB apparently discussed the addition of hydrogen peroxide to the RCS by the RMWST valves and whether it was reportable.
Based upon the minutes of that meeting (Exhibit 6), it appears that the PRB's review and discussion was deferred until I could be in l
attendance.
4 At the September 19, 1989 meeting, I recall, I provided the PRB members a copy of my September 15 memorandum and the DC which I had initiated.
I summarized the information in my memo and I
solicited discussion and questions (Exhibit 7, p. 2 of 3).
There was very little discussion of the operative facts and I
considerable discussion on whether the matter was reportable.
By this time corporate licensing representatives in our cprporate cffice had been requested to review the event and provide an interpretation of whether LCos with associated "immediate" action statements could be voluntarily entered.
Therefore, I suggested that the Board wait for this review and interpretation.
Since a j
DC had been initiated and the licensing review was ongoing, the PRB members concurred to defer review until the development of a
the corporate position.
Y 15 l
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4 w-ei.-r,
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1 is o
j' On September 26, 1989, I was contacted by Mr. Jack Stringfellow concerning the status of the corporate review of the addition of chemicals to the RCS.
Mr. Stringfellow informed me i
that he had already. drafted a position paper concerning voluntary entry into action statements which require "immediate" operator actions, and had submitted the draft to Mr. Ken McCoy, the Vice 3
j President of the VEGP, for approval.
Mr. Stringfellow told me i
that the paper stated that such action statements should not be voluntarily entered because the plant could be placed into an unanalyzed condition, since sometimes analysts use administrative controls as part of their review assumptions.
This position, I understood him to say, was a precautionary approach and he also informed me that such. voluntary entrance was not a " condition prohibited by Technical Specifications."
With respect to the j
addition of hydrogen peroxide in October, 1988, Mr. Stringfellow told me that prior to September, 1986, Westinghouse had analyzed 1
the boron dilution accident assuming 3.5 gpm from the chemical addition tank ar.d demonstrated 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> from receipt of high flux 4
and shutdown alarm to loss of shutdown margin.
In September, 1986, a reviFdd Westinghouse analysis used administrative controls && an assumption -- the RMWST valves were assumed 2
closed.
In other words, he said that the plant was not now analyzed to add chemicals at mid-loop.
This was the first instance when I was aware that the chemical cleaning was not subject to a current analysis.
Later on September 26 I contacted Mr. Aufdenkampe and by phone Mr. Stringfellow.
I initiated discussions between j
Mr. Aufdenkampe and Mr. Stringfellow because of the new information that no current analysis existed for chemical addition with Mode 5, loops not filled.
The conversation turned i
to potential reporting obligations and three possible bases for reporting were identified:
- 1) a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications, 2) the plant may have been in an unanalyzed' condition significantly compromising safety, and i
- 3) the evolution may have been outside the design basis of the plant.
As of this time, the conclusions reached in this call were that the event was not reportable since:
- 1) Mr.
j Stringfellow's review indicated that no legal basis existed to prohibit voluntary entrance into an immediate operator action Action Statement (thus, the entrance was not a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications); 2) the plant could have been placed in an unanalyzed condition but the previou,s analysis j
performed by Westinghouse showed that the RMWST valves could be i
left open for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> with " loops not filled" and the valves in October, 1988 were left open for less than or equal duration of four minutes.
Consequently, the evolution had no significance to safety; and 3) both Mr. Aufdenkampe and Mr. Stringfellow felt that the plant was not outside any design basis.
Notwithstanding these conclusions, Mr. Aufdenkampe and I agreed that the reportability question should be left open until completion of Westinghouse's analysis which had been commissioned 16 1
I
- -. - ~ _. -.
i*'e I f to support the license design change request.
Based upon the conversation, I clearly understood that Mr. Aufdenkampe viewed the matter as not reportable based upon the information then known to Georgia Power.
The reportability of the October, 1988 hydrogen peroxide
)
evolutions was again discussed on November 17, 1989 by the PRB.
In addition to receiving the Westinghouse analysis relative to the safety significance of the unanalyzed condition, the J
corporate office had provided its position or " white paper" developed by Mr. Stringfellow and issued by Mr. McCoy.
Mr. Aufdenkampe, not I, briefed the Board on these matters.
The PRB voted unanimously'that the event was not reportable; I did i
not vote, because by procedure the PRB Chairman votes only if there is a tie.
I would note that by this time the PRB was aware i
that "mid-loop" elevations of the RCS had been reached and the j
Technical Specification applied to the historic additions of hydrogen peroxide.
I had not been aware of this in September, 4
i 1989 when I conducted my review of the Shift Supervisor logs.
l Mr. Mosbaugh, who apparently reviewed the matter independent of my memorandum to some extent, had provided me with a page from the Unit 1 Reactor Operator Control log (p. 3882), attached as Exhibit 8.
I had not reviewed this particular log in developing my September 15th memorandum.
Therefore, the PRB in voting i
unanimously that the event was not reportable, assumed that the Tech Spec did apply.
i Kitchens.Res n
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