ML20133P309
| ML20133P309 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 07/17/1985 |
| From: | Jape F, Mathis J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20133P276 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-85-27, NUDOCS 8508140256 | |
| Download: ML20133P309 (6) | |
See also: IR 05000302/1985027
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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ATI.ANTA, GEORGI A N323
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Report No.: 50-302/85-27
Licensee:
Florida Power Corporation
320134th Street, Sout'h
St. Petersburg, FL 33733
Docket No.: 50-302
License No.:
Facility Name: Crystal River
Inspection Conducted: June 17 - 21, 1985
Inspectcr:
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7 -/ 7 - f.T
/ M . L. Mathi
Date Signed
Approved by:
6w1-
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F. Jape, Section Chief
Date Signed
p Engineering Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 50 inspector-hours on site
in the areas of refueling activities, spent fuel pool activities and the followup
on IEB 84-03.
Results:
One violation was identified - Failure to comply with the Limiting
Condition for Operation (LC0) as specified by TS 3.9.2(a) regarding the audible
source range count rate in the control room during core alteration (paragraph 5).
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- P. F. McKee, Plant Manager
- R. T. Wittman, Operations Superintendent
- W. L. Rossfeld, Site Nuclear Manager
- D. G. Green, Licensing Specialist
- J. L. Bufe, Nuclear Compliance Specialist
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- C. M. Callihan, Nuclear Fuel Management Engineer
- B. Herbert, Nuclear Technical Specification Coordinator
M. R. Casade, Nuclear Technical Superintendent Analyst
- M. E. Colling Nuclear Safety and Realiability Superintendent
- J. H. Lander, Nuclear Outage and Mods Manager
- G. R. Westafer, Manager, Licensing and Fuel Management
Other licensee employees contacted included two engineers, technicians,
three operators, mechanics, security office members, and office personnel.
Other Organization
R. J. Finnin, B&W Resident Engineer
NRC Resident Inspector
- T. Stetka, Senior Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview
- Per telephone conversation
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 21, 1985, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspector described the
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
Following the inspection, on June 27, 1985, the Manager of Licensing and
Fuel Management was notified by telephone of the violation and unresolved
item listed below,
a.
(Violation) 50-302/85-27-01, Failure to comply with the Limiting
Conditions for Operation (LCO) specified by Technical Specification 3.9.2(a) regarding the audible source range count rate indication in
the control room during core alteration (paragraph 5).
b.
(Unresolved) 50-302/85-27-02, Retention of records regarding surveil-
lance of the audible source range count rate required by TS 4.9.2(c)
(paragraph 5).
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The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided
to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
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3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
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This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
4.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to
determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or devia-
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tions.
One new unresolved item identified during this inspection is dis-
cussed in paragraph 5.
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5.
Refueling Activities (60710)
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During the core reloading for cycle 6, the inspector observed refueling
activities from the control room, reactor building and spent fuel pool to
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verify that activities were being accomplished in accordance with TSs,
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license conditions, and NRC requirements.
The inspector reviewed the
following fuel handling procedures:
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Containment Penetrations Weekly Check During Refueling
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Operations
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Demonstration of Auxiliary Building Overhead Crane (FHCR-5)
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Interlock Operability
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Reactor Building Fuel Handling Bridges (FHCR-1&2) Load Test
Spent Fuel Handling Bridge Load Surveillance
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Functional Test of the Fuel Transfer System
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Radiation Monitoring System Surveillance Program
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Defueling and Refueling Operation
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Miscellaneous Cranes and Hoists Load Test
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Fuel Handling Equipment Operation
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Irradiated Fuel Assembly Inspection
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Spent Fuel Handling
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Fuel Transfer Tube Covers
The inspector interviewed licensee personnel performing fuel assembly
handling evolutions to ensure that personnel were properly trained and
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following approved procedures. Reloading activities during the backshift as
well as day shift were observed to verify the following:
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Direct communication was established between the control room and
reactor building
Source range neutron flux monitors are operable in accordance with TS
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3.9.2, both visible and audible
The licensee maintained good housekeeping in the refueling areas
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Refueling interlocks were properly tested and operable
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Radiological controls in the refueling area, including precautions
against foreign objects falling into the reactor vessel, were satis-
factory
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Changes to procedures were made in accordance with administrative
procedures
Appropriate procedure steps and Quality Assurance hold points were
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signed off
On June 19, 1985, at 1105 hours0.0128 days <br />0.307 hours <br />0.00183 weeks <br />4.204525e-4 months <br /> while fuel movement was in progress within
the reactor vessel the inspector observed that there was no audible indica-
tion in the control room of neutron flux as required by TS 3.9.2(a).
The
shift foreman and licensed operators were aware that core alterations were
in process and of the TS requirement to have an audible correct rate signal.
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The licensee immediately suspended all fuel movement at approximately 1120
hours when the inspector notified the shift foreman of his observations.
Operations personnel investigated the problem.
Results showed that the
volume control knob was turned down to the minimum level.
However, the
audible indication of neutron flux was operable and could be heard by the
operators on the main fuel bridge within the reactor building. TS 3.9.2(a)
LC0 requires that two source range neutron flux monitors, each with visual
indication in the control romn and one with audible indication in the
control room be operable.
Failure to maintain the control room count rate
signal audible is a violation (302/85-27-01).
TS surveillance requirement 4.9.2.(c) requires that each source range
neutron flux monitor be demonstrated operable by the performance of a
channel check at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> during core alterations.
The
inspector reviewed procedure SP-406, Refueling Operation Daily Data Require-
ments, which provided an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> shift channel check for audible indication
of source range count rate in the containment only.
There were no records
or provision provided by SP-406 for the licensee to perform a channel check
of audible indication in the control room of source range neutron flux. A
review of the channel check records for audible indication of source range
count rate in the control room will be performed during a future inspection.
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This item will be tracked as unresolved item 50-302/85-27-02, Retention of
records regarding TS 4.9.2(c) surveillance of audible source range count
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rate in control room.
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6.
Spent Fuel Pool Activities (86700)
The inspector observed fue.1 handling operations during fuel movement in the
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spent fuel pool area and reviewed procedures related to fuel handling to
verify that the procedures included the following:
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a.
A limitation on the number of fuel assemblies that can be out of safe
geometry locations at the same time.
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b.
Provisions for verifying prior to fuel handling that the spent fuel pit
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area crane interlocks or physical stops will prevent the crane from
passing over fuel storage locations.
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c.
Provisions for verifying prior to . fuel handling that the spent fuel
pool area ventilation system is operable.
d.
Provisions for verifying prior to fuel handling that the loaded ship-
ping cask is within the veight limit of the spent fuel pool area crane,
e.
Provisions for verifying that the spent fuel storage ' area isolation
occurs on a high radiation signal.
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Provisions for verifying that minimum water level requirements are
monitored during fuel handling operations.
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g.
Provisions for verifying that the spent fuel pool storage area radia-
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tion and airborne radioactivity monitors are operable.
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h.
Provisions for verifying that the spent fuel pool cooling and clean-up
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system is operable.
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No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspected.
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7.
Followup on IE Bulletin 84-03, Refueling Cavity Water Seal, (92703), Unit 3
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The licensee's November 20, 1984, response to IE Bulletin 84-03 provided a
summary of the licensee evaluation of the potential and consequences of a
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refueling cavity water seal failure for the Crystal River Nuclear Station.
The licensee considered the differences in the seal plate used at Crystal
River to those used at Haddam Neck and concluded that a gross seal failure
of the magnitude experienced at Haddam Neck is not a credible event at
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Crystal River.
The passive seal system at Crystal River consist of a circular, steel,
annular plate which is gasketed and attached to machined ledges on the
reactor vessel (RV) flange and shield plate.
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The rubber seal rings are compressed between the surfaces with stainless
bol ts.
The inspector verified that the procedure FP-411, Canal Seal Plate
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Installation, specified sequencing and torque values for the 72 bolts used
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to provide for leak tight integrity.
In response to concerns in report
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number 85-19, the licensee provided additional information by letter dated
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June 5, 1985.
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The maximum credible leakage is estimated to be approximately 3900 gallons
per minute (gpm) based on a gross failure of 50% of the inner rubber seal
ring.
The inspector verified that the refueling cavity water level is
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monitored and alarms locally in the control room.
In the event of seal
failure, an operator would have sufficient time, upon receipt of the low
water level alarm, to safely place fuel suspended in the fuel handling
bridge into the deep end of the transfer canal.
In addition, the inspector reviewed the procedure, AP-1080, Refueling Canal
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Water Level Decrease, to assure that guidance is provided to operations * on
how to respond to an uncontrolled decrease in refueling cavity water level,
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Approximately 13,500 gallons of water are available for makeup in the
Borated Water Storage Tank.
Additionally, water leaking from the refueling
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cavity will collect in the Reactor Building Sump. Water can be pumped from
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both of these sources to the reactor vessel cavity at the rate of 3000 gpm
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using one Decay Heat Removal Pump.
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Based on the above considerations and followup of the licensee's response to
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IEB 84-03, assurance that gross seal failure such as experienced at Haddam
Neck would not occur at Crystal River Nuclear Plant.
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IEB 84-03 at Crystal River Nuclear Plant is closed.
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