ML20133H567
| ML20133H567 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 01/02/1997 |
| From: | Barr K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Ohanlon J VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9701170219 | |
| Download: ML20133H567 (2) | |
Text
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l January 2, 1997
.s, Virginia Electric and Power Company i
ATTN: Mr. J. P. O'Hanlon Senior Vice President - Nuclear l
Innsbrook Technical Center 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060 l
SUBJECT:
FEMA FINAL REPORT FOR THE JULY 23 25, AUGUST 1. AND AUGUST 13 15, 1996.
EXERCISE AT THE NORTH ANNA POWER STATION l
Dear Mr. O'Hanlon:
Enclosed is the final report dated October 25, 1996, from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) discussing their findings of the full participation plume and ingestion exposure pathway exercise at the North Anna Power Station.
i No Deficiencies were identified. However, 24 Areas Requiring Corrective Actions (ARCAs) were identified. A detailed description of the ARCAs is l
included in the enclosed FEMA exercise report.
l We encourage your cooperation with State and local agencies undertaking correction actions for the ARCA's before the next full scale exercise. If you l
have any questions, please contact me at (404) 331-0335.
Sincerely.
(Original signed by K. P. Barr) l Kenneth P. Barr, Chief Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50 338, 50 339 License Nos. NPF-4, NPF-7 l
Enclosure:
FEMA Report cc w/ encl: (See page 2) l l
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l Firal Exercise Report North Anna Power Station i
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l Licensee:
Virginia Power Company Exercise Dates:
August 13-;5, 1996 ll Report Date:
October 25,1996 i
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FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY REGION III j
LIBERTY SQUARE BUILDING j
2ND FLOOR,105 S. SEVENTH STREET PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19106-3316 i
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cc w/ encl:
Attorney General i
M. L. Bowling, Manager Supreme Court Building i
Nuclecr Licensing and Operations 900 East Main Street Support Richmond, VA 23219 i
Virginia Electric & Power Company i
Innsbrook Technical Center Robert B. Strobe, M.D., M.P.H.
i 5000 Dominion Boulevard State Health Commissioner Glen Allen, VA 23060 Office of the Commissioner Virginia Department of Health l'
W. R. Matthews, Manager P. O. Box 2448 North Anna Power Station Richmond, VA 23218 P. O. Box 402 i
Mineral, VA 23117 Distribution w/ encl:
G. Belisle, RII D. A. Christian, Manager L. Garner, RII Surry Power Station B. Buckley NRR i
Virginia Electric & Power Company R. Gibbs, RII 4
j 5570 Hog Island Road P. Fillion, RII Surry, VA 23883 D. Jones, RII 4
W. Stansberry, RII i
Executive Vice President C. Payne, RII j
Old Dominion Electric Cooperative PUBLIC 4201 Dominion Boulevard j
Glen Allen, VA 23060 NRC Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission s
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Dr. W. T. Lough 1024 Haley Drive Virginia Cor) oration Commission Mineral, VA 23117 j
Division of Energy Regulation 1
P. O. Box 1197 NRC Resident Inspector Richmond, VA 23209 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Surry Nuclear Power Station William C. Porter, Jr.
5850 Hog Island Road
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County Administrator Surry, VA 23883 Louisa County P. O. Box 160 4
Louisa, VA 23093 1
Michael W. Maupin, Esq.
Hunton and Williams 3
Riverfront Plaza, East Tower 951 E. Byrd Street i
Richmond, VA 23219 1
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Final Exercise Report North Anna Power Station i
Licensee:
Virginia Power Company Exercise Dates:
August 13-15, 1996 Report Date:
October 25,1996 FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY REGION III LIBERTY SQUARE BUILDING 2ND FLOOR,105 S. SEVENTII STREET PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19106-3316
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont.)
l 2.3 LOUISA COUNTY............................... 44 1
2.3.1 Emergency Operations Center..................... 44 l
2.3.2 Field Monitoring Team......................... 48 2.3.3 Primary Route Alerting 50 2.3.4 Traffic / Access Control......................... 51 2.3.5 Evacuation Assembly Center.....................51 2.3.6 Medical Services Transportation 52
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2.4 ORANGE COUNTY 53 i
i 2.4.1 Emergency Operations Center..................... 53 i
2.4.2 Field Monitoring Team.......................
55 2.4.3 Route Alerting.............................. 56 2.5 SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY 56 2.5.1 Emergency Operations Center..................... 56 2.5.2 Field Monitoring Team......................... 59 2.5.3 Primary Route Alerting 61 2.5.4 Traffic / Access Control......................... 61 2.5.5 Evacuation Assembly Center 62 2.6 MEDICAL SERVICES FACILITY...................... 62
- 3. INGESTION EXPOSURE PATHWAY EXERCISE 63 3.1 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 63 3.1.1 Local Emergency Operations Facility / Accident Assessment... 63 3.1.2 State Field Sampling Team 1..................... 64 3.1.3 State Field Sampling Team 2..................... 67 3.1.4 State Laboratory - Mobile....................... 69 3.1.5 State Emergency Operations Center................. 69 3.2 ALBEMARLE COUNTY / CHARLOTTESVILLE CITY EOC...... 71 3.3 ALEXANDRIA CITY EOC.......................... 71 3.4 AMELIA COUNTY EOC........................... 71 3.5 ARLINGTON COUNTY EOC........................ 72 ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I.
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
1 II. INTRODUCTION........................................
2 III. EXERCISE OVERVIEW....................................
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A. Plume EPZ Description...................................
4 B. Exercise Participants.....................................
5 C. Exercise Timeline...................................... 12 i
i IV. EXERCISE EVALUATION AND RESULTS 14 A. Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation - Table 2.................. 14 1
B. Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated
............................20
- 1. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA........................ 22 1.1 State Emergency Operations Center...................... 22 1.2 Local Emergency Operations Facility / Accident Assessment 27 1.3 Joint Public Information Center........................ 30 1.4 State Field Air Monitoring Team 1...................... 32 1.5 State Field Air Monitoring Team 2...................... 35
- 2. RISK JURISDICTIONS................................ 37 2.1 CAROLINE COUNTY............................. 37 2.1.1 Emergency Operations Center..................... 37 2.1.2 Field Monitoring Team......................... 38 2.1.3 Route Alerting.............................. 39 2.2 HANOVER COUNTY............................. 40 2.2.1 Emergency Operations Center..................... 40 2.2.2 Field Monitoring Team......................... 42 2.2.3 Route Alerting.............................. 43 1
l TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont.)
Page 3.6 BUCKINGHAM COUNTY EOC....................... 72 3.7 CAROLINE COUNTY EO3C......................... 72 3.8 CULPEPER COUNTY EOC 73 3.9 CUMBERLAND COUNTY EOC....................... 73 3.10 ESSEX COUNTY EOC 74 3.11 FAIRFAX COUNTY EOC........................... 74 3.12 FALLS CHURCH CITY EOC 74 3.13 FAUQUIER COUNTY EOC 74 3.14 FLUVANNA COUNTY EOC......................... 75 3.15 FREDERICKSBURG CITY EOC...................... 75 3.16 GOOCHLAND COUNTY EOC........................ 75 3.17 GREENE COUNTY EOC........................... 76 3.18 HANOVER COUNTY EOC.......................... 76 3.19 HENRICO COUNTY EOC 77 3.20 KING AND QUEEN COUNTY EOC.................... 78 3.21 KING GEORGE COUNTY EOC....................... 78 3.22 KING WILLIAM COUNTY EOC...................... 79 3.23 LOUIS A COUNTY EOC............................ 79 3.24 MADISON COUNTY EOC.......................... 80 3.25 ORANGE COUNTY EOC........................... 80 3.26 PAGE COUNTY EOC............................. 81 iii
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i TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont.)
Page 3.27 POWHATAN COUNTY EOC
........................ 81 3.28 PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY EOC..................... 81 3.29 RAPPAHANNOCK COUNTY EOC..................... 82 3.30 RICHMOND COUNTY EOC......................... 82 3.31 ROCKINGHAM COUNTY EOC....................... 83 3.32 SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY EOC...................... 83 3.33 STAFFORD COUNTY EOC......................... 84 3.34 WESTMORELAND COUNTY EOC..................... 84 3.35 STATE OF MARYLAND........................... 85 3.35.1 CHARLES COUNTY EOC 85 APPENDICES APPENDIX 1 - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS................... 87 APPENDIX 2 - EXERCISE EVALUATORS AND TEAM LEADERS
......... 89 APPENDIX 3 - EXERCISE ORIECTIVES AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT.................................. 94 APPENDIX 4 - EXERCISE SCENARIO............................ I 15 LIST OF TABLES Table 1 - Exercise Timeline.................................... 13 Table 2 - Summary Results of 1996 Exercise Evaluation................... 15 iv
II.
INTRODUCTION On December 7,1979, the President directed FEMA to assume the lead responsibility for all offsite nuclear planning and response. FEMA's activities are conducted pursuant to 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 350, 351 and 352. These regulations are a key element in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program established following the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station accident in March 1979.
FEMA Rule 44 CFR 350 establishes the policies and procedures for FEMA's initial and continued approval of State and local governments' radiological emergency planning and preparedness for commercial nuclear power plants. This approval is contingent, in part, on State and local government participation in joint exercises with licensees.
FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:
Taking the lead in offsite emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of RERPs and procedures developed by State and local governments; Determining whether such plans and procedures can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans and procedures conducted by State and local governments; Responding to requests by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and FEMA dated June 17,1993 (Federal Register, Vol. 58, No.176, September 14, 1993).
Coordinating the activities of Federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:
U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Department of the Interior, and U.S. Food and Drug Administration.
Representatives of these agencies serve on the FEMA Region III Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.
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l' The Commonwealth of Virginia and local jurisdictions submitted their RERPs for the North Anna Power Station to FEMA Region III around September 1982. FEMA granted formal approval of the RERPs in February 1983 under 44 CFR 350.
FEMA Region III conducted a REP exercise on August 13-15,1996, and out-of-sequence activities on July 22-23 and August 1,1996, to assess the capabilities of State and local emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their RERPs and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving the North Anna Power Station. The purpose of this exercise l
report is to present the exercise results and findings on the performance of the offsite response organizations (ORO) during a simulated radiological emergency.
i The findings presented in this report are based on the evaluations of the Federal evaluator team, with final determinations made by the FEMA Region III RAC Chairperson, and approved by the Regional Director.
The criteria used in the FEMA evaluation process are contained in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980; FEMA-REP-14, " Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Manual,"
September 1991; and FEMA-REP-15, " Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Evaluation Methodology," September 1991.
Section III of this report, entitled " Exercise Overview," presents basic information and data relevant to the exercise. This section of the report contains a description of the plume pathway EPZ, a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities evaluated, and a tabular presentation of the time of the actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.
Section IV of this report, entitled " Exercise Evaluation and Results," presents detailed information on the demonstration of applicable exercise objectives at each jurisdiction or functional entity evaluated in a jurisdiction-based, issues-only format.
This section also contains: (1) descriptions of all and ARCAs assessed during this exercise, recommended corrective actions, and the State and local governments' schedule of corrective actions for each identified exercise issue and (2) descriptions of unresolved ARCAs assessed during previous exercises and the status of the OROs' efforts to resolve them.
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III.
EXERCISE OVERVIEW This section contains data and basic information relevant to the July 23-25, August 1, and August 13-15,1996, exercise to test the offsite emergency response capabilities in the area surrounding the North Anna Power Station. This section of the exercise report includes a description of the plume pathway EPZ, a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities evaluated, and a tabular presentation of the time of actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.
A.
Plume EPZ Description The North Anna Power Station, located at Mineral, Virginia, is owned and operated by Virginia Power Company. It consists of two pressurized water reactors that can produce 915 megawatts of electrical power. Commercial operations began at Unit 1 in June 1978 and at Unit 2 in December 1980. The operating license will expire for Unit 1 in April 2018 and for Unit 2 in August 2020. The station is located in the northeastern portion of Virginia in I.ouisa County, about 40 miles north-northwest of Richmond, 38 miles east of Charlottesville,24 miles southwest of Fredericksburg, and about 40 miles from the Maryland border. 'Ihe coordinates are 38'03'48" north latitude and 77'47'13" west longitude. The site is on a peninsula along the southern shore of Lake Anna, a newly formed reservoir. The onsite area consists of approximately 1,856 acres.
No population centers within the 10-mile EPZ have a population of 25,000 or more. The Cities of Richmond, Charlottesville, and Fredericksburg lie within the 50-mile EPZ and have populations greater than 25,000. The total population distribution, including transients, shows the following densities:
325 in the 2-mile ring,2,194 in the 5-mile ring, and 14,876 in the 10-mile ring. The largest population area in the 10-mile EPZ is the Town of Mineral with 471 residents. Five risk county boundaries exist within the 10 mile EPZ.
The 50-mile ingestion exposure pathway EPZ involves 30 counties and 3 city jurisdictions with a total population of 1,286,156.
No significant airports lie within the 10-mile EPZ. No railroad lines or major interstate highways pass through the 10-mile EPZ. Because most of the soil is sandy or marshy, the main agricultural crops grown in the area are animal feeds. The few dairies and other food sources primarily serve for local consumption.
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I.
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
On July 23-25, August 1, and August 13-15, 1996, an exercise was conducted in the plume and ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) around the North Anna Power Station. The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. This exercise was held in accordance with the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emergency response plans (RERP) and procedures.
The most recent previous exercise at this site was conducted ~on June 22,1994. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on September 18,1983.
FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals in the Commonwealth of Virginia; the risk counties of Caroline, Hanover, Iouisa, Orange, and Spotsylvania in Virginia; the North Anna ingestion jurisdictions of Albemarle, Amelia, Buckingham, Culpeper, Cumberland, Essex, Fauquier, Fluvanna, Goochland, Greene, Henrico, King George, King and Queen, King William, Madison, Page, Powhatan, Prince Williams, Rappahannock, Rockingham, Stafford, and Westmoreland Counties and the Cities of Charlottesville and Fredericksburg in Virginia; the North Anna ingestion jurisdiction of Charles County in the State of Maryland; and the Calvert Cliffs ingestion jurisdictions of Arlington, Fairfax, and Richmond Counties and the Cities of Alexandria and Falls Church in Virginia.
Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities. Cooperation and teamwork of all the participants were evident during this exercise.
This report contains the final evaluation of the biennial exercise and the out-of-sequence activities conducted during July 22-23 and August 1,1996, related to all ingestion jurisdictions affected by the North Anna Power Station, except for Chesterfield County, New Kent County, and Richmond City. It also includes the ingestion jurisdictions of Alexandria City, Arlington County, Fairfax County, Falls Church City, and Richmond County, associated with the Calvert Cliffs Power Station.
The State and local organizations, except where noted in this report, demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and adequately implemented them. No Deficiencies and twenty-four (24) Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA) were identified as a result of this exercise.
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LOUISA COUNTY
.4 County Department of Emergency Services County Department of Health I
County Department of Parks and Recreation County Department of Planning, Building, and Zoning.
County Department of Social Services 4
County Sheriff Police County Volunteer Rescue Squad
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County Water Authority County Welfare Office County Animal Control Trevilians Elementary School i
Henrico County Fire / Rescue, Hazardous Material Department i
Town of Mineral Fire / Rescue Department Virginia Agriculture Extension 4
ORANGE COUNTY County Department of Emergency Services County 911 Communications Center County Administrator's Office County Board of Supervisors County Department of Health County Department of Recreation County Sheriff's Department Orange County High School Virginia Cooperative Extension SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY County Department of Emergency Services County 911 Communications Center County Department of Finance County Department of Social Services County Department of Utilities County Fire Administration County Fire and Rescue Services County Hazardous Materials Department County Planning Office County School Board County Sheriff's Department County Volunteer Fire Department 1 Fredericksburg Fire Department Mary Washington Hospice Courtland High School 6
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l B.
Exercise Participants The following agencies, org.Jzations, and units of government participated in
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the North Anna Power Station exercise on July 23-25, August 1, and i
August 13-15, 1996.
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Department of Emergency Services (VDES) i Department of Game and Inland Fisheries l
Department of Health, Bureau of Radiological Health (BRH)
I Department of Health, Division of Emergency Medical Services Department of Health, Division of Water Supply Engineering l
Department of Military Affairs Department of Social Services Department of Transportation (VDOT)
Cooperative Extension RISK JURISDICTIONS CAROLINE COUNTY County Department of Emergency Services County 911 Communications Center County Department of Health County Department of Public Works County Department of Recreation and Parks County Department of Social Services County Fire and Rescue County Schools County Sheriff's Department Office of the County Administrator HANOVER COUNTY County Department of Emergency Services County 911 Communications Center County Department of Health County Department of Social Services County Emergency Medical Service County Fire Department County School System County Sheriff's Department Beaver Dam Fire Station 2 5
Rappahannock Area Community Services Board Virginia State Park Service Virginia State Police Area 5 VD(yr Post Oak Area Headquarters Virginia Cooperative Extension i
INGESTION JUIUSDICTIONS - July 23-25,1996, and August 1,1996 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA VDES BRH Department of Health, Office of Written Programs Department of Health, Division of Water Supply Engineering Department of Agricelture and Consumer Services, Dairy and Food Governor's Representative Virginia Cooperative Extension ALBEMARLE COUNTY /CHARI41TESVILLE CITY County Department of Emergency Services Virginia Cooperative Extension ALEXANDRIA CITY County Department of Emergency Services City Manager's Office Alexandria Fire Department AMELIA COUNTY County Department of Emergency Services County Sheriff's Office Virginia Cooperative Extension ARLINGTON COUNTY County Department of Emergency Services J
BUCKINGHAM COUNTY County Department of Emergency Services Virginia Cooperative Extension State Depanment of Health 4
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CAROLINE COUNTY County Department of Emergency Services 4
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County Planning Department l
Virginia Cooperative Extension CULPEPER COUNTY County Department of Emergency Services County Sheriff s Office i
1 CUMBERLAND CObWt i
County Department of Emergency Services County Administrator's Office County Fire / Rescue County Sheriff's Office Virginia Cooperative Extension l
ESSEX COUNTY County Department of Emergency Services
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County Administrator's Office FAIRFAX COUNTY County Department of Emergency Services FALLS CHURCH CITY Department of Emergency Services Office of the City Manager FAUQUIER COUNTY County Department of Emergency Services 4
Virginia Cooperative Extension FLUVANNA COUNTY County Department of Emergency Services Virginia Cooperative Extension 1
FREDERICKSBURG CITY C.ounty Department of Emergency Services J
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i ORANGE COUNTY I
County Department of Emergency Services 1
County Board of Supervisors Virginia Cooperative Extension PAGE COUNTY County Department of Emergency Services County Sheriff's Office Coucty Administrator's Office POWHATAN COUNTY l
County Department of Emergency Services i
Virginia Cooperative Extension 1
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PRINCE WILLIAMS COUNTY County Department of Emergency Services
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County Department of Public Works l
Virginia Cooperative Extension i
9 RAPPAHANNOCK COUNTY 1
i County Department of Emergency Services l
County Sheriff's Department j
Virginia Cooperative Extension i
RICHMOND COUNTY 4
j County Department of Emergency Services j
County Sheriff's Office Virginia Cooperative Extension ROCKINGHAM COUNTY i
County Department of Emergency Services j
Virginia Cooperative Extension SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY j
County Depanment of Emergency Services 4
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i GOOCHLAND COUNTY i
County Department of Emergency Services Virginia Cooperative Extension GREENE COUNTY County Department of Emergency Services County Administrator's Office Virginia Cooperative Extensien HANOVER COUNTY County Department of Emergency Services HENRICO COUNTY County Department of Emergency Services Virginia Cooperative Extension KING AND QUEEN COUNTY County Department of Emergency Services KING GEORGE COUNTY County Department of Emergency Services County Sheriff's Office KING WILLIAM COUNTY County Department of Emergency Services l
Virginia Cooperative Extension j
LOUISA COUNTY I
County Department of Emergency Services Virginia Cooperative Extension MADISON COUNTY County Department of Emergency Services County Administrator's Office County Sheriff's Office VDES Region 2 9
STAFFORD COUNTY County Department of Emergency Services County Emergency Medical Services WESTMORELAND COUNTY l
County Department of Emergency Services County Sheriff's Office County Administrator's Office 4
Virginia Cooperative Extension 1
STATE OF MARYLAND CHARLES COUNTY County Department of Emergency Services PRIVATE / VOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONS American Red Cross Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services (RACES)
Albemarle Amateur Radio Club WJMA Radio Station Rappahannock Amateur Radio Club
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C.
Exercise TimeHne Table 1, on the following page, presents the time at which key events and activities occurred during the North Anna Power Station exercise on August 13-15,1996. Also included are times notifications were made to the participating jurisdictions / functional entities.
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TABLE 1. EXERCISE TIMELINE s
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DATB AND SITE: August 13,1996, North Amta Power Station
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% gg iTinne NotificationWasl Received or Action Was Taken! -
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i R=ergency ClassificaticaIAst? Tis $'Utilisp t,
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Staso EOC State EOC State BRH Coasse Consey EOC Caesay EOC Comany EOC Comany BOC Cauasy EOt Unusual Event N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
]
Alen 0930 0938 0938 0938 N/A 0938 0938 0938 0938 0938 Sies Ana Enwrgency 1101 1107 1807 1101 N/A 1107 1107 1107 1107 1107 Osment Eme:gency 1206 1215 1215 1206 1215 1215 1215 1215 1215 1215 l
Sinsulated Radiation 3telease Stoned 1204 1215 1210 1204 1215 1215 1215 1215 1215 1215 j
Siamleted Radiation Release Tennimated N/A 1418 1418 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Facility Declased Operassoan!
0955 0935 1010 1015 1040 1027 0955 0938 1000 Declaration of Sense of Emergency 1142 1142 N/A II45 1206 1145 1154 1145 1151 Exercise Terminated 1418 1418 1445 1445 1445 1445 1445 1445 Ist Alert & Notification Decision Unw 1151' 1151 N/A N/A 1851 1151 IISI IISI IISI las Sires Activation I159 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1159" N/A N/A Ist EAS/ERS Mesense 1200 N/A N/A N/A N/A M/A N/A N/A N/A 2nd Alest A Natification Decision Time 1304' 1304 N/A N/A 1304 1304 1304 1304 1304 2nd Sirea Activation 1312 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1312' N/A-N/A 2nd EAS/EBS Message 1315 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A les Protective Action Decision (Sectors Affected) 3 1151 1851 N/A N/A 1851 IISI 1151 1851 1151 e Liv stock on Stored Feed & Covered Water:
Zones 2,3,5,6,7,8,9, A 26 out to 10 miles t
2nd Protective Action Decision 1304 1304 N/A N/A 1304 1304 1304 1304 1304 Shcher: Zonen 16-24 Evacuate: Zones 2-15,25 A 26 KI Administrauom Decision 1312 1312 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Emergency Workers Advised Hal to Take LEOEND:
D - Decision Maklag Jurisdiction A - Activating Jurisdiction N/A-Not Applicable 4
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IV.
EXERCISE EVALUATION AND RESULTS Contained in this section are the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities which participated in the July 23-25,1996, August 1,1996, and August 13-15, 1996, exercise to test the offsite emergency response capabilities of State and local governments in the 10- and 50-mile EPZs surrounding the North Anna Power Station.
Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated on the basis of its demonstration of criteria delineated in exercise objectives contained in FEMA-REP-14, REP Exercise Manual, September 1991. Detailed information on the exercise objectives and the extent-of-play agreement used in this exercise are found in Appendix 3 of this report.
A.
Summary Results of Exerrise Evaluation - Table 2 The matrix presented in Table 2, on the following page(s), presents the status of all exercise objectives from FEMA-REP-14 scheduled for demonstration during this exercise by all participating jurisdictions and functional entities.
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Exercise objectives are listed by number and the demonstration status of those j
objectives is indicated by the use of the following letters:
j M - Met (no Deficiency or ARCAs assessed)
D - Deficiency assessed A - ARCA(s) assessed (not affecting the health and safety of the public)
N - Not Demonstrated (reason explained in Section IV.B.)
l U - Unresolved ARCA(s) from prior exercise (s)
Blank - Not scheduled for demonstration O
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TABLE 2.
SUMMARY
RESULTS OF 1996 EXERCISE EVALUATION
,3 DATE AND SITE: Angust 13,1996, Nord Amme Power hda=
3URIBDICTIONSACATION j 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 FLUME EXFOSURE PATHWAY DAYI COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA STATE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER M
M M M M M A
A M M LOCAL EMERGENCY Ors FACILTTY/ ACCIDENT As5**WENT M M M U
M M
3OINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER M
M M
A 5 ATE FIELD MONTTORING TEAM I M M A U
M STATE FIELD MONTTORING TEAM 2 M M M U
M i
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l RISK JURISDICTIONS 4
l CAROLINE COUNTY l
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER M M A
A M A
A M M M M
i FIELD MONTTORING TEAM M M M M
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ROUTE ALERTING t
M M M
M i
j HANOVER COUNTY
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EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER M
M M M A
M M M M M M
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i FIELD MONITORING TEAM U
M M M M
I ROUTE ALERTING A
M M
M i
l LEGEND: M = Met (No De6ciency or ARCAs assessed)
D = DeSciencyfus) assessed Bleak = Not scheduled for demonstrenos A = ARCA(s) =h (Not aNecuag heahh and safety of public)
U = Unuseolved ARCA(e) freen r e enescise(s)
N = Not de-aannesed as scheduled (nam explained in Section IV.B.)
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TABLE 2.
SUMMARY
RESULTS OF 1996 EXERCISE EVALUATION i.
j DATE AND STTE: Aagaw 13,1996, Nord Aans Powr Sanon i
l JURI5 DICTION / LOCATION;,
1 2
3 4
5 6
7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18[19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 1
IDUISA COUNTY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER M
A A M A
A A M M M i
j FIELD MONFTORING TEAM M M M M
j PRIMARY ROUTE ALEiRTING i
M A A
M IRAFFICIACCESS CONIROL M
A M
M t
EVACUATION ASSEMBLY CENTER M M M M M
i MEDICAL SERVICES TRANSPORTATION A
M ORANGE COUNTY
}
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER M
M M M M
M M M M M M
i
{
FIELD MONITORING TEAM M
A M M
i ROUTE ALERTING M M M
M i
SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY j
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER M
A M M U
M M M U M i
FIELD MONITORING TEAM M M M M
t PRIMARY ROUTE ALERTING M M M
M TRAFFIC / ACCESS CONTROL M
A M
M j
EVACUATION ASSEMBLY CENTER M M M M M
1 i
~
i 4
MEDICAL SERVICES FACILITY M
M ii 4
l LEGEND: M = Met (No De6ciency or ARCAs aeonesed)
D = Deficiency (iss) assessed Bleak = Not -LAM for d==aamasson i
A = ARCA(s) ah (Not affecting haakh and eefety of public)
U = Unresolved ARCA(e) fun prior exercies(s)
N = Not demometrated as -LAntad (Reason explained in Section IV.B.)
3 4
i 16
- l M**-t
'754r'w 4-ete q n P-arp--1---
- - * - - + -%*v y%
-FW*4 -ery
-tmem 43 m w-96 9 w WM's7y r---"g---oc*e-e e-m M-'t*$vn 1m Nw -13
~ev'-*'
some' imwe*-t' T-**twv
-t-w4
- W*+'-wPN*r'-7-'I rm ve*st*-**T d'+--'9
- '-tTtw w T 9 1"
'W-U
*'NY Y WT T'"Y*1
- M*
e i
i TABLE 2.
SUMMARY
RESULTS OF 1996 EXERCISE EVALUATION
{
DATE AND SITE: Angasst 14,1996, Nord Anna Power Stantom i
j JURIBDICTIONADCATION 3 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 INGESTION EXFOSURE PATHWAY 4
i DAY 2 i
4
)
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA j
LOCAL EMERGENCY OPS FACERY/ ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT M M j
STATE FIELD SAMPLING TEAM i M
M M M
i i
STATE FIKIn SAMPLING TEAM 2 M
M M M
~
l STATE LABORATORY - MOBILE M M M
i l
I 4
4 i
j s ;
i
+
i j
4
]
LEGEND: M = Met (No Deficiency or ARCAs asasseed)
D = Deficiency (ies) a-w Blank = Not -ham for de--
}
A = ARCA{s) a-M (Not aNecting beekh and safety of public)
U = Unmolved ARCA(s) frome prior exercise (s)
N = Not h-ased as scheduled (Reason explaiand in Section IV.R.)
?
4
=
1 4
l i
l 17 l
t 1
i i
r
-,.-m,,
--,,,,,w--.,..--,...--...,---m,
,----w.,rt_.-,w w
..m-..
w~r,.,,m-,me.,m,....,,,.m.m,,,,,,,m,,.-,..--,_%
.-,,,,--4,wwwr-,m...,v.,,-,,-m-,~.w=
w---+-v w
s, v,..v
t i
TABLE 2.
SUMMARY
RESULTS OF 1996 EXERCISE EVALUATION DATE AND SITE: July 23-25,1996, ami August 1 and 15,1996, North Anna Power Station t
JURISDICTION / LOCATION.
1 2
3 4
5 6
7 8
9 to 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 HANOVER COUNTY EOC M M M
A HENRICO COUNTY EOC M
M M M
KING AND QUEEN COUNTY EOC M
M M M
KING GEORGE COUNTY EOC M
M A
M M
KING, WILLIAM COUNTY EOC M
M M M
IDUISA COUNTY EOC M M M
A MADISON COUNTY EOC M
M M M
ORANGE COUNTY EOC M M M
M PAGE COUNTY EOC M
M M M
POWHATAN COUNTY EOC M
M M M
PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY EOC M
M M M
RAPPAHANNOCK COUNTY EOC M
M M
M RICHMOND COUNTY M
A M
M ROCKINGHAM COUNTY EOC M
M M M
SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY EOC M
M M
A STAFFORD COUNTY EOC M
M M M
WESTMORELAND COUNTY EOC M
M M
M STATE OF MARYLAND CHARLES COUNTY EOC M
M M
M 4
LEGEND: M = Met (No Deficiency or ARCAs ansessed)
D = Deficiency (ies) assessed Blank = Not scheduled for demonstration A = ARCA(s) assessed (Not affecting health and safety of public)
U = Unresolved ARCA(s) fresa prior exercise (s)
N = Not dennonstrated as scheduled (Reason explained in Section IV.B.)
19
?
i l
TABLE 2.
SUMMARY
RESULTS OF 1996 EXERCISE EVALUATION i
l DATE AND SITE: July 23-25,1996, and Angust I and 15,1996, Norsk Aman Power Danon i
l JURISIMCTIONAACATION :
1 2
3 4
5 6
7.
8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 i
INGESTION EXPOSURE FATHWAY i
l DAY 3 i
l j
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 3
4 j
STATE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER M
M M M
M M M M
M M
ALBEMARLE COUNTY /CHARLUITESVELE CITY EOC M
M M M
iis ALEXANDRIA CTlY M
M M M
MMNmW M
M M l
M j
ARLINGTON COUNTY M
M M M
l BUCKINGHAM COUNTY EOC M
M M M
J l
CAROLINE COUNTY EOC M M M
M CULPEPER COUNTY EOC M
M M M
[
j CUMBERLAND COUNTY EOC M
M M M
l ESSEX COUNTY EOC M
M M M
j i
j FARFAX COUNTY EOC M
M M M
FALIS CHURCH CITY EOC M
M M M
FAUQUIER COUNTY EOC M
M M M
i i
FLUVANNA COUNTY EOC M
M M M
1 FREDER]CKSBURG CITY EOC M
M M M
I GOOCHLAND COUNTY EOC M
M M M
?
GREENE COUNTY EOC M
M M M M
l LEGEND: M = Met (No Danciency or ARCAs==M D = Deficiency (iss)====ad Bleak = Nas scheduled for d*%
l A = ARCA(s) aassemed (Nat affecting heakh and esisty of public)
U = Unresolved ARCA(s) fraan prior exercise (s)
N = Not desnoasunned me -wM (n expl an,A in Section IV.B.)
3 l
18 i
I
)
1 I
B.
Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated This subsection provides information on the evaluation of each participating jurisdiction and functional entity, in a jurisdiction based, issues only format.
Presented below is a dermition of the terms used in this subsection relative to objective demonstration status.
1 Met - Listing of the demonstrated exercise objectives under which no Deficiencies or ARCAs were assessed during this exercise and under which no ARCAs swwd during prior exercises remain unresolved.
Deficiency - Listing of the demonstrated exercise objectives under which one or more Deficiencies was assessed during this ' xercise. Included is a e
description of each Deficiency and recommended corrective actions.
4 Area Requiring Corrective Actions - Listing of the demonstrated i
exercise objectives under which one or~ more ARCAs were assessed during i
the current exercise or ARCAs assessed during prior exercises remain unresolved. Included is a description of the ARCAs assessed during this i
exercise and the recommended corrective action to be demonstrated before
{
or during the next biennial exercise.
?
Not Demonstrated - Listing of the exercise objectives which were not I
demonstrated as scheduled during this exercise and the reason they were not demonstrated.
i Prior ARCAs _- Resolved - Descriptions of ARCAs assessed during previous exercises which were resolved in this exercise and the corrective actions demonstrated.
t f
j Prior ARCAs - Unresolved - Descriptions of ARCAs assessed during prior exercises which were not resolved in this exercise. Included is the reason the ARCA remains unresolved and recommended corrective actions to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.
The following are definitions of the two types of exercise issues which are
}
discussed in this report.
A Deficiency is defined in FEMA-REP-14 as "...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that could cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant."
e 4
20
1.
COMMONWEALTII OF VIRGINIA 1.1
. STATE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER MET: Objectives 1, M, 3, 4, 9,10,13, and 14 a.
b.
DEFICIENCY: None AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: Objectives 11 and 12 c.
Issue No.: 41-96-11/12-A-01
==
Description:==
Farmers were not notified of the second set of protective action decisions (PAD) for livestock. When the first PAD was being discussed, it was decided that PADS for humans would be disseminated through Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) messages, and instructions regarding livestock would be disseminated through news releases. News i
release 2, which accompanied EBS message 1, gave instructions for livestock. News release 3, which accompanied EBS message 2, did not give instructions for livestock in eight additional zones that were to evacuate or i
in ninc zones that were to shelter in place.
Emergency classification levels (ECL) and the possibility of a radioactive release were not discussed in news releases. The first news release gave the ECL, but subsequent news releases did not. News release 2 mentioned only
" worsening conditions." News release 3 was similar in content. (NUREG-0654, E.5, E.7, G.3.a, G.4.a, G.4.b, and G.4.c)
Reconunendation: Instructions regarding livestock should be included in news releases whenever such PADS are made. The ECL and the possibility of a radioactive release should be discussed in news releases.
Schedule of Corrective Actions: The Public Information appendix of the Commonwealth of Virginia Radiological Emergency Response Plan will be revised to ensure PADS and ECLs are included in news releases. Further instructions will be given to PIOS on the contents of news releases, d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: Objectives 2, 3, 4, 9,10, and 13 e.
Issue No.: NAX94-01R
==
Description:==
Maps in the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) were confusing and differed from those in the plan. Lines delineating counties and Emergency Planning Zones (EPZ), as well as routes and other labels, 22
An ARCA is defined in FEMA-REP-14 as "...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that is not considered, by itself, to adversely impact public health and ' safety."
FEMA has developed a standardized system for numbering exercise issues (Deficiencies and ARCAs). This system is used to achieve consistency in numbering exercise issues among FEMA Regions and site-specific exercise reports within each Region. It is also used to expedite tracking of exercise issues on a nationwide basis.
The identifying number for Deficiencies and ARCAs includes the following elements, with each element separated by a hyphen (-).
Plant Site Identifier - A two-digit number corresponding to the Utility Billable Plant Site Codes.
Exercise Year - The last two digits of the year the exercise was conducted.
Objective Number - A two-digit number corresponding to the objective numbers in FEMA-REP-14.
Issue Classification Identifier - (D = Deficiency, A = ARCA). Only Deficiencies and ARCAs are included in exercise reports.
Exercise Issue Identification Number - A separate two (or three) digit indexing number assigned to each issue identified in the exercise.
I i
i l
i I
21 t
l
)
3 made the maps difficult to read. After the Protective. Action l
Recommendation (PAR) was received, the staff had problems locating the l
i designated zones on the map. The maps on the wall (with one exception) i indicating the protectiv action zones differed slightly from those in the i
plan. This difference becune apparent when the Bureau of Radiological ~
I Health (BRH) staff was drafting a message for livestock protection. De l
protective action was to include only those sectors within the 5-mile protective action zone. The large maps in the State EOC include a small portion of sector 16 in this zone, while the map in the plan does not.
(Objective 2; NUREG-0654, H.3, J.10.a, J.10.b, and J.11) 3 i
Corrective Action Demonstrated: The maps used to delineate counties, j
zones, and EPZs were clear and easy to read. They were used in conjunction with overlays to indicate the protective action zones affected.
l The overlays matched the shape of the protective action zones and came in j
two colors. Red overlays indicated the evacuated areas, and blue depicted the areas where sheltering was required. These maps were the same as those in the plan.
~
Issue No.: NAX94-02R
==
Description:==
Message 10, which discussed the General Emergency (GE)
Emergency Classification Level (ECL) and the PAR, was received at 1225.
The runner took the message form to the copy machine in the EOC, where she waited 9 minutes, until 1239, for another person to finish making copies of a radiological health statistics document. Finally, the runner took the message to another copier and made copies. She completed this task at 1240. This sequence of events delayed the distribution of crucial information, which delayed the meeting for the development of the PAD until 1252. (Objective 3; NUREG-0654, A.I.d, A.2.a, and A.2.b)
Corrective Action Demonstrated: The message-handling process has been revised. Now, all messages originate from or are faxed to the Virginia Department of Emergency Services (VDES) message center. The message center staff hand-carries Utility messages to the Coordination Officer so that action can be taken. Other routine or jurisdictional messages are immediately hand-carried to the VDES assessment and coordination staff so that they can be handkd immediately or delegated to the appropriate agency for action. The Coordination Officer kept copies of messages requiring delegated action so that they could be tracked to completion.
Issue No.: NAX94-03R
==
Description:==
A second alert and notification (A&N) sequence was not demonstrated. The extent-of-play agreement indicated that a second EBS message would also be transmitted to the radio station in conjunction with a second simulated siren activation, but it would not be acted upon. After 23
4 Issue No.: 62-95-09-A-01 (Surry) l
==
Description:==
When the State EOC received notification of the Site Area 1
Emergency (SAE) ECL from the Utility, the State was aware that nonessential plant personnel had been evacuated during the Alert. In consultation with State staff and local directors, the Director of Operations decided not to implement automatic 2-mile sheltering because the SAE declaration was not driven by a radiological release. The Director of l
Operations described the plan provision concerning automatic 2-mile protective action as giving him the " capability" to implement such action.
However, the State plan, Tab A to Appendix 4, Section C, page 4-11, Site Area Emergency, states, "If the power plant evacuates nonessential personnel, an automatic protective action will be initiated out to two miles off-site (emphasis added)." The Director of Operations' decision was mconsistent with the plan. (Objective 9; NUREG-0654, N.1.a) t i
Cormctive Action Demonstrated: The State plan has been revised to indicate protective action options, not automatic protective actions, at the SAE.
Issue No.: 62-95-09-A-03 (Surry)
)
==
Description:==
In converting the Utility's radii and sectors into protective action zones, State EOC staff treated zones inconsistently. They attempted to evacuate the entire zone even if it was only partially within the affected i
radii and sectors. But they applied this principle inconsistently, as described below:
i (1) They evacuated zones 7 and 14 because small portions of those zones lay within the 5-mile radius, although most of the zones were 5-10 miles crosswind (zone 7) or upwind (zone 14) of the release. But they did not evacuate zone 10; part of this zone is located within the 5-mile radius, but most of it is 5-10 miles outside the 5-mile radius and crosswind.
(2) They evacuated zones 1,2,4,5, and 7 but not zone 3, which does not technically touch the 5-mile radius or sectors N, P, or Q, but lies l
geographically between zones they evacuated. (Objective 9; NUREG-0654, J.9)
Corrective Action Demonstrated: The VDES staff at the State EOC converted the Utility's recommended protective action areas into protective action zones in a logically consistent manner.
f.
PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: Objective 11 Issue No.: NAX94-04R
~
activation of the EBS following the PAD, the Coordination Officer and the controller discussed the need for transmitting a second message to the radio station. They decided that this procedure might cause confusion and result in an inappropriate message being aired. The controller indicated that this demonstration was not n-my, and the second EBS message could be simulated. Nothing was mentioned regarding the coordination and simulation of siren activation. No record of a second EBS message was made, nor were the counties contacted to coordinate simulation of sirens.
(Objective 10; NUREG-0654, E.6) i Corrective Action Demonstrated: Two complete A&N sequences were -
demonstrated, including EBS messages.
Issue No.: SYX93-05R (Surry)
==
Description:==
On several occasions, the BRH team at the State EOC and the BRH team at the local Emergency Operations Facility (LEOF) transmitted i
or received untimely information, or they were unaware of certain events.
l For example, the BRH team at the LEOF did not inform the BRH team at j
the State EOC of the offsite release that occurred at 1245 until 1321. The i
BRH team at the State EOC did not have a detailed understanding of the location of the Utility or county field monitoring team (FMT) activities.
l The BRH team at the LEOF was unaware that a total of three PADS were issued by the State EOC. The BRH team at the LEOF participated in discussions associated with the second PAD but were not informed that it was actually implemented. In fact, they believed that the third PAD was the second and final PAD. They were also unaware that potassium iodide (KI) had been issued to Surry County emergency workers. (Objective 4; NUREG-0654, A.I.d and F) 4 Corrective Action Demonstrated: Communications were established between the BRH personnel at the LEOF and those at the State EOC.
Communications were almost continuous from their arrival at 1010 until the exercise terminated at about 1445. Dose assessment and PAR information 4
~
were compared, and no confusion regarding PARS existed at the LEOF. At one point, the exact final implementation PAD was checked with VDES.
j Issue No.: SYX93-26R (Surry)
==
Description:==
Six rumor calls per hour were required by the extent-of-play agreement, but an average of only two calls per hour were received.
j (Objective 13; NUREG-0654, G.4.b and G.4.c) i Corrective Action Demonstrated: The rumor control teams received the j
prescribed number of calls.
j 24
==
Description:==
The EBS message did not address instructions for transients, items to leave or take when evacuating, how often the EBS message would j
be rebroadcast, rumor control numbers, and information on plant status.
(Objective 11; NUREG-0654, E.5 and E.7) 5 Reason ARCA Unresolved: The pre-scripted EBS messages do not address the following: instructions for transients (addressed only in the first EBS j
message), what to leave behind and what to take along when evacuating, i
and rumor control telephone numbers (discussed in news releases only).
Listeners were told to consult their emergency calendars or the yellow i
pages, which mentioned what to leave behind and what to take along when evacuating.
t Reconunendation: All EBS messages should contain all pertinent j
information (e.g., instructions for transients, items to take or leave behind i
when evacuating, and how often the EBS messages will be broadcast, j
rumor control numbers, and information on plant status).
2 l
State Response: Due to the impending transition to EAS, EBS procedures j
will not be revised to ensure the inclusion of the recommended information.
This information will be provided in news releases.
i Issue No.: NAX92-47R 1
I
==
Description:==
The pre-scripted EBS messages lack critical information and instructions to the public in a number of subject areas. (Objective 11; NUREG-0654, E.5 and G.4.b)
)
l Reason ARCA Unnsolved: The pre-scripted EBS messages do not address i
the following: instructions for transients (addressed only in the first EBS message), what to leave behind and what to take along when evacuating, j.
and rumor control telephone numbers (discussed in news releases only).
l Listeners were told to consult their emergency calendars or the yellow i
pages, which mentioned what to leave behind and what to take along when l
evacuating.
2
)
Reconunendation: All EBS messages should contain all pertinent information (e.g., instructions for transients, items to take or leave behind when evacuating, and how often the EBS messages will be broadcast, l
rumor control numbers, and information on plant status).
State Response: Due to the impending transition to EAS, EBS procedures will not be revised to ensure the inclusion of the recommended information.
j This information will be provided in news releases.
j 26
1.2 LOCAL EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY / ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT a.
MET: Objectives 4, 5, 9, and 14 b.
DEFICIENCY: None c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: Objectives 3, 4, and 7 e.
Issue No.: NAX94-09R
==
Description:==
The FTC at the LEOF did not receive data from all county FMTs. (Objective 7; NUREG4)654, I.8, I.10, and I.11)
Corrective Action Demonstrated: The plan has been modified. The information the plans requires to be sent to the LEOF (i.e., FMT available or on duty) was received in a timely manner at 1057, 1210, 1211, 1212, and 1213, before or about the same time as the start of the release (1205).
Issue No.: NAX90-04R
==
Description:==
Three FMTs performed field monitoring and sampling tasks (Utility, State, and county). However, none of these activities was coordinated. At times, Utility and State FMTs were monitoring and sampling in the same locations. Furthermore, the FMTs did not have a central location for reperting results so that the best use could be made of all information to assist in the accident assessment process. (Objective 3; NUREG-0654, A.I.d and A.2.a)
Corrective Action Demonstrated: The Utility and BRH Field Team Coordinators (FTC) managed the two Utility FMTs and the two State FMTs, respectively. According to the county plans, the county FMTs were to notify their Radiological Officer if any measurements were above background.
Issue No.: NAX90-07R
==
Description:==
Various communications problems were identified on both days of the exercise. Not all the radios worked, and some were on different frequencies; at times, radio transmissions at the LEOF were 6nanswered for up to 15 minutes; the ranges of some 27
2
)
instruments wem limited; and neither the State or county FMTs nor the LEOF BRH personnel prefaced or ended any of their messages with the words, "This is a drill." Reportedly, people reacted to information heard over the radios, thinking the drill was an actual emergency. (Objective 4; NUREG-0654, F.1 and F.2) i I
Corrective Action Demonstrated: Communications were maintained with the State FMTs and the mobile laboratory. Transmissions were concluded with the words, "This is a drill."
Issue No.: SYX93-04R (Surry)
==
Description:==
The State plan, Appendix 17.3, pages 17.3-7, i
Section 4.3 (4.3.5), states: "After the plume has been detected, instruct the team (s) to begin traversing the plume in order to find the centerline." The State FMTs were not instructed to determine the centerline of the plume. Instead, they were sent to preselected monitoring locations (P-5, N-7, and N-4) and remained at these points throughout the exercise. (Objective 7; NUREG-0654, I.11) f Corrective Action Demonstrated: The State FMTs were directed to preselected monitoring locations, one at SK-6 (about 5.5 miles from the plant) and one at SK-7 (about 7 miles from the plant). The FTC at the LEOF instructed them to take measurements. As the plume was detected, they were to find the centerline and collect an air sample.
i Issue No.: SYX93-05R (Surry)
==
Description:==
On several occasions, the BRH team at the State EOC and the BRH team at the LEOF transmitted or received untimely information, or they were unaware of certain events. For example, the l
BRH team at the LEOF did not inform the BRH team at the State EOC of the offsite release that occurred at 1245 until 1321. The BRH i
team at the State EOC did not have a detailed understanding of the location of the Utility or county FMT activities. The BRH team at the j
LEOF was unaware that a total of three PADS were issued by the State EOC. The BRH team at the LEOF participated in discussions associated with the second PAD but were not informed that it was actually implemented. In fact, they believed that the third PAD was the second and final PAD. They were also unaware that KI had been l
issued to Surry County emergency workers. (Objective 4; NUREG-0654, A.I.d and F)
J 28
i
\\
Corrective Action Demonstrated: Communications were established between the BRH personnel at the LEOF and those at the State EOC.
Communications were almost contimious from their arrival at 1010.
J until the exercise terminated at about 1445. Dose assessment and PAR information were compared, and no confusion regr.rding PARS was apparent at the LEOF. At one point, the exact final implementation j
PAD was checked with VDES.
l Issue No.: 62-95-04-A-05 (Surry) l l
==
Description:==
The Radiological Data Network (RADNET) communication system was not operational during the exercise. This problem was identified during the previous exercise at several local 4
EOCs. During this exercise, the system was again reported to be inoperable at the Isle of Wight EOC and the Accident Assessment j
Group in the State EOC. (Objective 4; NUREG-0654, F.1 and F.2) 4
)
Corrective Action Demonstrated: The RADNET has been replaced i
by a new system, called Group Wise, which handles radiological data and has a much greater capability. This near-real-time e-mail system i
can broadcast messages to all local EOCs and selected State agencies.
{
The training for local personnel is scheduled to begin in September.
j Issue No.: 62-95-07-A-06 (Surry) i
==
Description:==
The State BRH team did not provide technical accident assessment assistance to the State EOC staff in developing the PAD.
(Objective 7; NUREG-0654, I.10)
Corrective Action Demonstrated: The BRH staff at the State EOC provided frequent technical input to the VDES decision development process. Information was conveyed from the LEOF and from independent assessments conducted by the BRH staff at the State EOC.
f.
PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: Objective 7 Issue No.: NAX94-08R
==
Description:==
The plume position and FMT position were not plotted on the map. The times of the FMT data were not posted on the status board; previous data were erased as new data became available.
(Objective 7; NUREG-0654, I.10 and I.11) 29
I Reason ARCA Unresolved: Data were not plotted on the map during this exercise. Data were recorded on a status board and the projected j
plume trajectory by sector was added to the 10-mile EPZ map, but no l
actual data points were plotted. Only two data points (locations) were reported for Utility FMTs.
i Recommendation: Additional training should be provided to BRH personnel, with an emphasis on the importance of recording the times j
of the FMT readings and plotting the plume, FMT positions, and FMT data on a map.
State Response: FEMA-REP-14, Objective 7 does not have any requirements for plotting FMT data on maps. BRH believes that the i
combination of status boards, which contain data for field team location by sector and distance, field measurement, and time of i
measurement; and the 10-mile EPZ map, which indicates the pre-selected monitoring points and the downwind sector are adequate to represent the FMT efforts. The FMT is also archived into the communications log for post-plume assessment activities. This ARCA i
should be removed.
FEMA Response: FEMA-REP-14, Objective 7, Paragraph 5, Line 5 states that, "The use of plots on a map or other prearranged format should be used for transmitting the information and recommendations." In addition, FEMA-REP-15, Objective 7, Point of Review I.10.,11.7.6.(a) addresses the questions about plume locations i
plotted on the map.
J i
1.3 JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER a.
MET: Objectives 2, 4, and 12
)
b.
DEFICIENCY: None l
c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: Objective 13 i
Issue No.: 41-96-13-A-02 4
==
Description:==
The extent-of-play agreement called for sufficient messages so that the rumor control staff could identify a trend in the calls they received.
The rumor control staff could not discern any trends, although they were
]
questioned about this subject. (NUREG-0654, G.4.c and N.1.a) l 30
f 4
4 Reconunendation: An effort should be made to inject rumor control messages that indicate trends, and the rumor control staff should identify 4
those trends and report them to the public information staff.
Schedule of Cornetive Actions: Additional emphasis will be given to rumor control staff's ability to identify trends.
I.
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: None I
i e.
PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: Objectives 2,12, and 13 Issue No.: NAX94-06R i
==
Description:==
Press releases wem not corrected when they were found to be i
in error. Press release 3 did not accurately describe'the protective action zones. A corrected press release was issued; however, this correction did l
not include zone 25 among the areas to be evacuated. This second error was never noted or corrected throughout the exercise. (Objective'12; NUREG-0654, E.7) 4 Corrective Action Demonstrated: All State messages were prepared by the
{
EOC and included in the media briefing at the JPIC. One message contained references to both Virginia nuclear sites (i.e., Surry and North Anna). The State Public Information Officer (PIO) corrected this error before the briefing and initiated a cross-checking system to avoid issuing l
incorrect data.
T l
Issue No.: NAX94-07R
==
Description:==
The State provided only one person to staff the rumor control cell, although the extent-of-play agreement called for two persons.
i (Objective 13; NUREG-0654, G.4.a, G.4.b, and G.4.c) i Corrective Action Demonstrated: State staffing for the rumor control group included three VDES employees; one was the supervisor.
l Issue No.: NAX92-04R I
==
Description:==
The VDES PIO's news releases did not describe protective action zones in terms of familiar geographic landmarks and boundaries, nor did they include instructions for transients, use of ad hoc respiratory protection, items to leave and take when evacuating, evacuation routes, or j
information relative to schools. (Objective 12; NUREG-0654, E.5 and G.4.b) l Cornctive Action Demonstrated: The JPIC spokesperson covered the l
essential issues and referred to press releases, EBS messages, the Utility 31 1
5 calendar, and the local telephone book. The spokesperson provided the necessary information to enable the public to evacuate or shelter, as j
appropriate. In addition, the mock media raised specific questions about evacuating and sheltering.
l Issue No.: SYX93-06R (Surry)
==
Description:==
No standing displays of maps, status boards displaying ECLs and PADS, or other information displays were used in or near the media briefing and work areas. There was no media sign-in area nor an area i
where the media could pick up news releases, media kits, EBS messages, or I
other vital information. No area was set aside for media interviews.
j (Objective 2; NUREG-0654, H.3) f l
Corrective Action Demonstrated: The ECLs were displayed in the media briefing area; PADS and other emergency information were included in media briefings and press releases. Appropriate maps and displays were available and used, as required, in the briefing, and EPZ area maps were displayed.
Issue No.: 62-95-12-A-07 (Surry) i
==
Description:==
The VDES PIO gave a comprehensive briefing on protective actions and measures to be taken by the public. Hoviever, instructions on evacuation routes, what to do when evacuating, how te manage transients 4
1 without shelter and special populations (including transport-dependent individuals) were not included. (Objective 12, NUREG-0654, E.7 and i
G.4.a) 1 Corrective Action Demonstrated: The JPIC spokesperson covered the i
essential issues and referred to press releases, EBS messages, the Utility calendar, and the local telephone book. The spokesperson provided the n==ry information to enable the public to evacuate or shelter, as appropriate. In addition, the mock media raised specific questions about i
evacuating and sheltering.
f.
PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None i
1.4 STATE FIELD AIR MONITORING TEAM 1 s.
MET: Objectives 4, 5, and 14 3
b.
DEFICIENCY: None i
4 32
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: Objective 6 c.
Issue No.: 41-96-06-A-03
==
Description:==
The FMT did not check their survey instruments for proper response with a check source, did not perform a battery check, were not familiar with proper use of survey equipment, and were not aware that they had found the plume. There was a 10-minute delay-in reporting elevated ambient radiation levels. (NUREG-0654, H.10, H.12, I.7, I.8, and I.11))
Reconunendation: The FMT should be provided additional training on checking and using their survey equipment, monitoring, and reporting.
~
Schedule of Corrective Actions: Remedial training will be offered to the field team members, d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: None e.
PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: Objectives 3, 4, and 8 l
Issue No.: NAX90-04R
==
Description:==
Three FMTs performed field monitoring and sampling tasks i
(Utility, State, and county). However, none of these activities was coordinated. At times, Utility and State FMTs were monitoring and i
sampling in the same locations. Furthermore, the FMTs did not have a j
central location for reporting results so that the best use could be made of all information to assist in the accident assessment process. (Objective 3;-
NUREG-0654, A.1.d and A.2.a)
Corrective Action Demonstrated: State FMT 1 reported all their results to BRH personnel at the LEOF.
Issue No.: NAX90-07R
==
Description:==
Various communications problems were identified on both days of the exercise. Not all the radios worked, and some were on different frequencies; at times, radio transmissions at the LEOF were unanswered for up to 15 minutes; the ranges of some instruments were limited; and neither the State or county FMTs nor the LEOF BRH personnel prefaced or ended any of their messages with the words, "This is a drill." Reportedly, people reacted to information heard over the radios, thinking the drill was an actual emergency. (Objective 4; NUREG-0654, F.1 and F.2)
Corrective Action Demonstrated: State FMT 1 communicated effectively with the LEOF throughout the exercise. All messages were prefaced with the words, "This is a drill."
33
_._._.____.-.____.c_.____________..__
p I
I a
l State Response: The BRH procedures will be modified to include gamma j
measurements for the beginning, middle, and completion of air sampling.
l l
1.5 STATE FIELD AIR MONITORING TEAM 2 i
i a.
MET: Objectives 4, 5, 6, and 14 l
[
b.
DEFICIENCY: None 2
c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None j
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: None l
e.
PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: Objectives 3, 4, and 8 Issue No.: NAX90-04R l
==
Description:==
Three FMTs performed field nsonitoring and sampling tasks
]
(Utility, State, and county). However, none of these activities was coordinated. At times, Utility and State FMTs were monitoring and i
i sampling in the same locations. Furthermore, the FMTs did not have a 4
central location for reporting results so that the best use cou'd be made of all information to assist in the accident assessment process. (Objective 3; NUREG-0654, A.I.d and A.2.a) i Corrective Action Demonstrated: State FMT 2 was sent to positions SK-6 j
and SK-7 and given specific routes when traversing the plume. They saw a j
Utility FMT at position K5 while traversing the plume. All results were
{
reported to the FTC at the LEOF.
l i
Issue No.: NAX90-07R i
==
Description:==
Various communications problems were identified on both days of the exercise. Not all the radios worked, and some were on different l
frequencies; at times, radio transmissions at the LEOF were unanswered for up to 15 minutes; the ranges of some instruments were limited; and neither the State or county FMTs nor the LEOF BRH personnel prefaced or ended
}
any of their messages with the words, "This is a drill." Reportedly, people reacted to informatic,n heard over the radios, thinking the drill was an actual emergency. (Objective 4; NUREG-0654, F.1 and F.2)
Corrective Action Demonstrated: Two radios on the same frequency were t
used (one hand-held and one car-mounted). Communications were i
maintained with both the FTC at the LEOF and the mobile laboratory. The i
FMT, the FTC, and the radio operator at the staging area consistently used
{
the phrase "This is a drill" during the exercise.
i 35 i
i
Issue No.: 62-9548-A48 (Surry)
==
Description:==
The FTC requested only one air sample. However, the extent-of-play agreement required a minimum of two samples. (Objective 8; NUREG4654, I.9) l Cormetive Action Demonstrated: Two air samples were collected, in accordance with the extent-of-play agreement.
Issue No.: 62-95-08-A-09 (Surry)
Dese 1ption: The one air sample was initiated at 1411, but it took the FMT about 6 minutes to set up the tandem holder with a simulated silver zeolite cartridge and a filter (used for collection of airborne particulates) and to -
connect the holder to the air sampler. However, the sampling procedures l
did not address the need to preload the tandem holder for the air sampler before deployment into the field. (Objective 8; NUREG-0654, I.8) l Corective Action Demonstrated: State FMT I loaded cartridges without undue delay.
Issue No.: 62-95-08-A-11 (Surry)
==
Description:==
The FMT did not collect two air samples at different locations, as required in the extent-of-play agreement. (Objective 8; l
NUREG-0654, I.8)
Cornetive Action Demonstrated: Two air samples were collected, in accordance with the extent-of-play agreement.
i l
j f.
PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: Objective 8 l
Issue No.: 62-95-08-A-10 (Surry)
==
Description:==
Because they were not instructed to do so, FMT 2 did not conduct gamma measurements during and after collection of-the air sample, in accordance with FEMA-REP-14, to verify that the plume remained constant during the sampling period. (Objective 8; NUREG-0654, I.9) l Reason ARCA Unresolved: The plan has not been revised; it only calls for gamma measurement before taking an air sample. The FMT made one measurement, in accordance with their procedures.
i l
Recommendation: The FMT procedures should be revised to include the j
need to conduct gamma measurements before taking an air sample, while l
acquiring the sample, and upon conclusion of the sampling process, in accordance with FEMA-REP-14.
34 i
plume was present. The area reading was reported to the FTC at the LEOF, but the FTC indicated that actual readings were not necessary. With another Controller inject, the FMT decided to move to a low-background area, purge the sample, and count it. The results were not reported to the LEOF.
The second air sample was taken according to procedure, and the results were reported at approximately 1427.
Recarnemendation: The FMT procedures should be revised to include the need to conduct gamma measurements before taking an air sample, while acquiring the sample, and upon conclusion of the sampling process, in accordance with FEMA-REP-14.
State Response: The BRH procedures will be modified to include gamma measurements for the beginning, middle, and completion of air sampling.
2.
RISK JURISDICTIONS 2.1 CAROLINE COUNTY 2.1.1 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER a.
MET: Objectives 1, 2, 5,13,14,15, and 17 b.
DEFICIENCY: None c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: Objectives 3, 4,10, and
'12 Issue No.: 41-%03-A-04
==
Description:==
The EOC staff did not prioritize incoming messages.
(NUREG-0654, A.1.d, 2.a, 2.b, and N.1.a)
Reconunendation: The current internal message-handling procedures should be reviewed and revised to ensure that important messages are prioritized.
Schedule of Corrective Actions: The current message handling system will be reviewed and improved where warranted.
Issue No.: 41-%10-A-05
==
Description:==
The Emergency Services Coordinator (ESC) failed to notify the Sheriff's Office to implement route alerting until 52 minutes after the State decision to activate the A&N system. Although it took the Sheriff's Office 2 minutes to complete the route alerting, the total elapsed time from 37
the decision to activate the A&N system to completion of the route was 54 minutes. (NUREG-0654, A.1.d, 2.a, 2.b, and N.I.a)
Recomunendation: The ESC should use a checklist to follow his procedures.
Schedule of Corrective Actions: The method for transmitting route alerting in.=tructions will be reviewed and improved where warranted.
Issue No.: 41-96-12-A-06 l
==
Description:==
The media briefing and news releases did not include instructions for transients without shelter. (NUREG-0654, E.7 and G.4.b) l Reconunendation: When sheltering is directed as a protective action, all l
news releases and media briefings should contain sheltering information for l
Schedule of Corrective Actions: Procedures will be revised to indicate l
what should be included in briefings and news releases.
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: None e.
PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None f.
PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 2.1.2 FIELD MONITORING TEAM a.
MET: Objectives 4, 5, 6, and 14 b.
DEFICIENCY: None c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: None e.
PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: Objectives 3, 4, and 5 l
Issue No.: NAX90-04R I
i
==
Description:==
Three FMTs performed field monitoring and sampling tasks (Utility, State, and county). However, none of these activities was coordinated. At times, Utility and State FMTs were monitoring and sampling in the same locations. Furthermore, the FMTs did not have a centrallocation for reporting results so that the best use could be made of 38 l
i Issue No.: 62-95-08-A-08 (Surry)
==
Description:==
De FTC requested only one air sample to be taken. However, the extent-of-play agreement required a minimum of two samples.
l (Objective 8; NUREG-0654, I.9)
Cormetive Action Demonstrated: Two air samples were requested and performCd.
Issue No.: 62-95-08-A 09 (Surry)
==
Description:==
The one air sample was initiated at 1411, but it took the FMT about 6 minutes to set up the tandem holder with a simulated silver zeolite cartridge and a filter (used for collection of airborne particulates) and to connect the holder to the air sampler. However, the sampling procedures do l
not address the need to preload the tandem holder for the air sampler prior l
to deployment into the field. (Objective 8; NUREG-0654, I.8)
Corrective Action Demonstrated: State FMT 2 quickly set up the first l
sample. Hey loaded the sample head immediately after removing the first l
sample, thereby minimizing the time necessary for setting up the second sample.
Issue No.: 62-95-08-A-11 (Surry)
==
Description:==
The FMT did not collect two air samples at different i
locations, as required in the extent-of-play agreement. (Objective 8; NUREG-0654, I.8)
Cornetive Action Demonstrated: State FMT 2 took two air samples, as required.
f.
PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: Objective 8 Issue No.: 62-95-08-A-10 (Surry)
==
Description:==
Because they were not instructed to do so, FMT 2 did not conduct gamma measurements during and after collection of the air sample, in accordance with FEMA-REP-14, to verify that the plume remained constant during the sanipling period. (Objective 8; NUREG-0654, I.9)
Reason ARCA Unresolved: The BRH procedures were not revised in the latest edition of the plan, dated July 26,1996. The need for this revision l
was demonstrated during the first air sample. The area readings were taken at 1300, and the air sample was started at 1307. The plume arrived at 1304, l
but the FMT did not realize it until later. After the air sample was taken,
(
the Controller injected that an area reading be taken that indicated that the l
36 1
i all information to assist in the accident assessment process. (Objective 3; NUREG-0654, A.I.d and A.2.a) 1 Corrective Action Demonstrated: No other FMTs were in the area, and the FMT reported their monitoring results to the county Radiological Officer.
l 4
Issue No.: NAX90-07R l
==
Description:==
Various communications problems were identified on both days of the exercise. Not all the radios worked, and some were on different l
frequencies; at times, radio transmissions at the LEOF were unanswered for up to 15 minutes; the ranges of some instruments were limited; and neither the State or county FMTs nor the LEOF BRH personnel prefaced or ended i
any of their messages with the words, "This is a drill." Reportedly, people j
reacted to information heard over the radios, thinking the drill was an l
actual emergency. (Objective 4; NUREG-0654. F.1 and F.2)
Corusctive Action Demonstrated: Both primary and backup communication systems operated without aifficulty. The FMT prefaced and ended their communications with the words, "This is a drill."
l Issue No.: NAX90-09R
- i i
==
Description:==
The FMTs from the Department of Agriculture and the State j
Water Control Board were not provided with radiation detection instruments
)
or protective clothing to minimize personal contamination. Much of the j
equipment neenary to take samples was not provided. The FMTs had only i
plastic bags and writing materials. The equipment list shown in the county plan for FMTs identifies only CD V-742 dosimeters, which have a range of 0-200 R. Used alone, these dosimeters are not acceptable because a dose of
{
0.5 R cannot be measured accurately on a 0-200 R dosimeter.'(Objective 5; i
NUREG-0654, K.3.a, K.3.b, and K.4)
Corrective Action Demonstrated: The Caroline County FMT was issued both a Victoreen model 545 (0-20 R) and a CD V-742 (0-200 R), in accordance with Appendix 7,Section II.B, page 7-1, of the county plan.
f.
PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None l
2.1.3 ROUTE ALERTING
-b i
a.
MET: Objectives 4, 5,10, and 14 i
b.
DEFICIENCY: None l
39
d c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: None e.
PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: Objective 10 Issue No.: NAX94-12R
==
Description:==
The primary route alerting team misinterpreted radio communications from the Caroline County ESC and initiated primary route alerting before the PAD and sounding of the sirens. (Objective 10; NUREG-0654, E.6)
Corrective Action Demonstrated: During the exercise, the police officer initiated primary route alerting after the PAD was communicated to him from the Sheriff's dispatch point.
f.
PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None i
2.2 HANOVER COUNTY 4
2.2.1 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER a.
MET: Objectives 1, 2, 3, 4,10,12,13,14,15, and 17 b.
DEFICIENCY: None AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: Objective 5 c.
Issue No.: 41-964)5-A-07 1
==
Description:==
The Hanover County FMT was not informed of the GE 4
j declaration or to don protective clothing. Although the County was informed of a radiological release and the EOC staff was bri.efed, the FMT was not notified. The Hanover County Radiological Officer's procedure calls for notifying the FMT of the declaration of a GE, however, the FMT was not notified. (NUREG-0654, K.3.b and K.4)
Recommendation: The Hanover County Radiological Officer should l
receive further training on adhering to the actions required by the procedures.
d Schedule of Corrective Actions: Additional training will be offered.
t 4
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
)
40
Issue No.: NAX90-09R
==
Description:==
The FMTs from the Depadment of Agriculture and the State Water Control Board were not provided with radiation detection instruments or protective clothing to minimize personal contamination. Much of the equipment n===y to take samples was not provided. The FMTs had only l
plastic bags and writing materials. The equipment list shown in the county plan for FMTs identifies only CD V-742 dosimeters, which have a range of 0 200 R. Used alone, these dosimeters are not acceptable because a dose of 0.5 R cannot be measured accurately on a 0-200 R dosimeter. (Objective 5; NUREG-0654, K.3.a, K.3.b, and K.4)
Cormctive Action Demonstrated: The Hanover County FMT was issued both a Victoreen model 545 (0-20 R) and a CD V-742 (0-200 R), in l
accordance with Appendix 7,Section II.B, page 7-1, of the county plan.
t f.
PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: Objective 3 1
Issue No.: NAX90-04R
==
Description:==
Three FMTs performed field monitoring and sampling tasks (Utility, State, and county). However, none of these activities was coordinated. At times, Utility and State FMTs were monitoring and sampling in the same locations. Furthermore, the FMTs did not have a central location for reponing results so that the best use could be made of all information to assist in the accident assessment process. (Objective 3; NUREG-0654, A.1.d and A.2.a)
Reason ARCA Unnsolved: The FMT reported to the Operations Chief at the staging area, but according to the FMT Procedures, Appendix 7, page l
2, they should report to the Radiological Officer.
Reconunendation: The FMT should report to the Radiological Officer as required by the plan.
State Response: Procedures will be revised to reflect the actions taken in the field.
2.2.3 ROUTE ALERTING a.
MET: Objectives 5,10, and 14 l
b.
DEFICIENCY: None c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: Objective 4 t
43
e.
PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: Objectives 12 and 13 Issue No.: NAX94-13R
==
Description:==
The Hanover County PIO did not prepare or conduct any media briefings, as required by the plan (Appendix 2, Public Information Officer Procedures) and the extent-of-play agreement. (Objective 12; NUREG-0654, G.3.a, G.4.a, and G.4.b)
]
Corrective Action Demonstrated: Four news releases advised residents of the emergency telephone numbers for the PIO and rumor control, ECL changes, and the sheltering advisory for livestock and poultry. County demographics and emergency facility information were included in a simulated media handout, and the PIO conducted a media briefing concerning protective actions for the county.
l Issue No.: NAX94-14R
==
Description:==
Rumor control forms for recording incoming calls on the rumor control line were not logged consistently. Important information, such as caller name, telephone number, time, and conversation content, was frequently omitted from the record. This inconsistency and ii1 completeness undermines the execution of the plan requirement in Appendix 2,Section II.H, to ensure that a log of all calls on the rumor control telephone line is maintained. (Objective 13; NUREG-0654, G.4.c)
Corrective Action Demonstrated: Calls were documented on appropriate forms listing time, caller information if available, subject, and response.
The ESC was notified of each call; no pattern or trend was apparent.
Issue No.: NAX92-15R
==
Description:==
The PIO did not prepare or conduct media briefings, as stated on page 7-2 of the plan. (Objective 12; NUREG-0654, G.3.a)
Corrective Action Demonstrated: Four news releases advised residents of the emergency telephone numbers for the PIO and rumor control, ECL changes, and the shelter'r.g advisory for livestock and poultry. County demographics and emeigency facility information were included in a simulated media handout, and the PIO conducted a media briefing concerning protective actions for the county.
Issue No.: NAX90-21R
==
Description:==
No instructions to the public, briefings to the media, or press rnleases were developed or distributed at the Hanover County EOC. These activities are required by the plan (Appendix 7, Public Information). In 41
=_..__ _ _ _._.____.__ _ _. __
d addition, rumor control functions were discussed and not actually demonstrated. It is the belief of the ESC that rumor control is the responsibility of the State EOC and the JPIC. No EBS messages for press releases were received from the State EOC or the JPIC. Hanover County should develop its own public information program as outlined in the county plan. The county response staff should be provided 'all information and i
instructions given to the public by the State to use in developing their own 4
briefings and press releases, and the' ability to perform these functions I
should be demonstrated during exercises. (Objectives 12 and 13; NUREG-0654, G, E.2, and E.5) 4 Corrective Action Demonstrated: Four news releases advised residents of the emergency telephone numbers for the PIO and rumor control, ECL changes, and the sheltering advisory for livestock and poultry. County demographics and emergency facility information were included in a simulated media handout, and the PIO conducted a media briefing concerning protective actions for the county.
f.
PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None i
2.2.2 FIELD MONITORING TEAM a.
MET: Objectives 4, 5, 6, and 14 b.
DEFICIENCY: None c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: None e.
PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: Objectives 4 and 5 Issue No.: NAX90-07R
==
Description:==
Various communications problems were identified on both days of the exercise. Not all the radios worked, and some were on different fn quencies; at times, radio transmissions at the LEOF were unanswered for up to 15 minutes; the ranges of some instruments were limited; and neither the State or county FMTs nor the LEOF BRH personnel prefaced or ended any of their messages with the words, "This is a drill." Reportedly, people reacted to information heard over the radios, thinking the drill was an actual emergency. (Objective 4; NUREG-0654, F.1 and F.2) i Corrective Action Demonstrated: The FMT encountered no communication problems and used the words "This is a drill" in their communications with the Operations Chief at the staging area.
42
. - - = ~
i i
Issue No.: 41-%-04-A-08 i
==
Description:==
When communicating periodic dosimetry readings, the l
j Radiological Officer and the Operations Supervisor at the staging area i.
did not use the phrase, "This is a drill." (NUREG-0654, F.1 and F.2)
Recommendation: The Radiological Officer and the Operations Supervisor should use the phrase, "This is a drill," in all 4
l commumcations. -
1 Schedule of Corrective Actions: All players will again be reminded I
to use the phrase, "This is a Drill" during exercises.
{
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: Objective 10 e.
1 Issue No.: NAX94-29R
==
Description:==
The Hanover County primary route alening team never reported to the EOC for a briefing and a map of the route. The team went directly from their field location to the staging area. The FEMA evaluator arrived late at the staging area because he was not informed of the change in plans. (Objective 10; NUREG-0654, E.6)
Corrective Action Demonstrated: The Hanover County primary route alerting team went directly from their field location to the staging area where the FEMA evaluator was in place. The extent-of-play agreement did not specify that the route alening team should report to the Hanover EOC before going to the staging area.
f.
PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 2.3 LOUISA COUNTY 2.3.1 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER a.
MET: Objectives 1, 4,13,14, and 15 b.
DEFICIENCY: None AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: Objectives 2,3,5,10, c.
and 12 44
i i
faxing, internal distribution, or release to the media. In most cases, the PIO used pre-scripted material in the plan as the basis for news releases. But the draft releases did not indicate that this was a drill and did not include information about rumor control telephone numbers. Once the news releases were prepared, they were not copied and distributed to the Imuisa County i
EOC staff. Only the EOC staff members who were directly involved in developing specific news releases (typically, the ESC and the County l
Extension Agent) knew of their content.
4 The extent-of-play agreement specifies that each risk jurisdiction is to provide one media briefing on day 1 of the exercise. No media briefing was demonstrated. The ESC and PIO scheduled a media briefing between 1230 and 1245. However, the GE was declared, several rumor calls came in 4
i (which the PIO handled), and the media briefing never occurred.
(NUREG-0654, E.7, G.4.a, and N.1.a)
Recommendation: The ESC should ensure that the PIO is properly trained.
Checklists would be useful. The PIO fielded rumor control calls rather than using the designated staff for that purpose. Better use of the staff would help the PIO handle fast-breaking events.
Schedule of Colbrective Actions: Additional training will be offered to the PIO.
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: None 4
e.
PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: Objective 2 Issue No.: NAXN-15R
==
Description:==
Although the louisa County EOC was moved to the county's backup facilities, cramped conditions have not changed during the past 4 years. (Objective 2; NUREG-0654, H.3)
Corrective Action Demonstrated: The new EOC facility provides adequate space.
Issue No.: NAX92-27R 4
==
Description:==
The EOC is poorly organized in too small a space, thereby limiting efficient staff participation. (Objective 2; NUREG-0654, H.3)
Corrective Action Demonstrated: The new EOC facility provides adequate space.
Issue No.: NAX90-27R 47 l
Issue No.: 41-96-02-A-09
==
Description:==
A secondary access door to the EOC, which was initially secured, was unlocked by the staff, and unauthorized persons could enter the EOC. The primary access point was not continuously staffed, as required in the county plan, Appendix 1, Paragraph II.I.4. (NUREG-0654, H.3) j Reconunendation: The ESC should ensure that security procedures are 1
maintained at all times, including staffing the primary access point and controlling secondary access points. Electronic magnetic locks requiring a security code or card access should be installed to eliminate accidental i
unlocking of access doors.
Schedule of Corrective Actions: Procedures will be revised to include security precautions necessary at the new louisa EOC.
i Issue No.: 41-96-03-A-10 i
==
Description:==
Several discrepancies were noted in the way in which information was recorded and displayed at the EOC. The plan-specified EOC security log (Appendix 1, Attachment 1) was not used; instead, a yellow legal pad was used as a facility sign-in/ sign-out sheet where the arrival and departure times were not consistently entered. As the exercise progressed, security became lax. The entrance to the EOC was not guarded at all times, a previously locked entrance was opened and left uncontrolled, and several unauthorized persons entered the EOC unchallenged. Messages were recorded on a York County emergency communications center message and routing log instead of a message log (Appendix 1, Attachment 2). Several status boards were not maintained, and two boards (evacuation status and hospital bed availability) were not used at all. The 10-mile EPZ map was not used to track the plume, and information from a previous exercise was left on the map. (NUREG-0654, N.I.a)
Recommendation: The IAuisa County ESC should ensure that the EOC staff uses the proper forms and that all displays and maps are used and j
updated. Also, the ESC should ensure that all security measures are continually enforced at the facility. The EOC staff should receive additional training on the proper use of forms and status boards and security procedures.
Schedule of Corrective Actions: EOC staff will be encouraged to attend training to correct the items noted.
Issue No.: 41-96-05-A-11 45 1
1
==
Description:==
The louisa County EOC does not have sufficient depth in the 5
j Radiological Officer function. The regular Radiological Officer was unavailable, and the acting Radiological Officer was inadequately trained for the position. In addition, a replacement Radiological Officer requested by the ESC also was inadequately trained.
4 1
Whu. the medical services transportation team received dosimetry at the i.
County EOC before they were dispatched, they were not given a complete briefing by the Radiological Officer. The briefing did not include maximum authorized exposure limits, zeroing of the dosimeters, and radiation effects.
The proper complete briefing data are shown in the county plan, Appendix 6, Attachment 5.
The Radiological Officer failed to notify the county FMT of the GE, as required by the plan, Appendix 6, page 5, Paragraph D.3. The Radiological Officer also failed to inform the FMT to don protective clothing after the radiological release at the power station. (NUREG-0654, K.3.b and K.4)
Recomunendation: The ESC should ensure that sufficient personnel properly trained in the Radiological Officer function are available at all times. Additional personnel should receive training in all radiological activities described in the plan and be capable of properly briefing and responding to FMTs.
Schedule of Cornctive Actions: Additional training will be offered to Radiological Officers.
Issue No.: 41-96-10-A-12
==
Description:==
After the first siren activation, the County ESC did not notify the State Department of Game and Inland Fisheries or the Coast Guard Auxiliary to alert and notify boaters on Lake Anna, as called for in the county plan (Appendix 1, pages 1-3,1-4, and 1-6). After the second siren activation, the ESC initiated A&N procedures for the Lake Anna exception area in accordance with the plan. (NUREG-0654, E.6)
Reconunendation: The County ESC should follow procedures in alerting and notifying exception areas in the county.
Schedule of Cornctive Actions: Further training will be offered to the ESC to ensure proper notifications are made.
Issue No.: 41-96-12-A-13
==
Description:==
The news releases required by the Imuisa County plan (Appendix 2, Paragraphs II.C, D, and E; III.B, C, E, and F; and IV.D) were prepared in draft form but not finalized in a form presentable for 46
l
==
Description:==
The EOC is poorly organized in too small a space, thereby limiting efficient staff participation. The EOC operations room should be located in a more spacious area where staff can function together and stay apprised of actions. (Objective 2; NUREG-0654, H.3)
Corrective Action Demonstrated: The new EOC facility provides adequate 1
[
8 Pace.
f.
PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 2.3.2 FIELD MONITORING TEAM a.
MET: Objectives 4,5, 6, and 14 b.
DEFICIENCY: None c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: None e.
PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: Objectives 3, 4, and 6 Issue No.: NAX94-16R
==
Description:==
Ambient radiation readings were taken by the Ieuisa County FMT. The probe was held near head level, and the results on the survey instrument were read. The readings were not taken in accordance with the county plan, Appendix 7,Section III.F, which states that radiation readings, both open and closed window, are to be taken at 3 feet and 3 inches above ground level. Because the readings were not recorded on the Field Team Survey Record Form listed in Appendix 7, Attachment 1, the data could not properly be reported to the County Radiological Officer. Finally, the FMT did not enclose the detectors of their survey instruments in thin plastic, as stated in the county plan, Appendix 7,Section II.F. (Objective 6; NUREG-0654, I.7, I.8, and I.9)
Corective Action Demonstrated: Iouisa County FMT 1 surveyed their assigned location at 3 feet and 3 inches with the survey instrument window open and closed. The data were recorded on the Field Team Survey Record Form and radioed to the Imuisa County EOC. The survey instrument probe was enclosed in a thin plastic bag to reduce the possibility of contamination.
Issue No.: NAX94-17R
==
Description:==
The IAuisa County FMT was issued a CD V-7.15 survey instrument, calibrated in November 1993, that read 0.25 R/hr when it was 48
~
j turned on. The FMT brought out another CD V-715.that was zeroed and i
turned on to the x0.1 R/hr scale. When it was turned to the x1.0 R/hr scale, the instrument read 0.7 R/hr. Both instruments should have read zero l
because no radiation field was present. (Objective 6; NUREG-0654, H.10)
I Cometive Action Demonstrated: CD V-715 and CD V-700 survey instruments have been replaced w;th solid-state Ludlum 2240 survey l
instruments with Ludlum 44-6 and 44-9 probes that operated properly.
1 i
Issue No.: NAX90-04R 1
l
==
Description:==
Three FMTs performed field monitoring and sampling tasks i
(Utility, State, and county). However, none of these activities was i
coordinated. At times, Utility and State.FMTs were monitoring and' l
sampling in the same locations. Furthermore, the FMTs did not have a i
central location for reporting results so that the best use could be made of all information to assist in the accident assessment process. (Objective 3; 4
NUREG-0654, A.1.d and A.2.a)
Cometive Action Demonstrated: Iouisa County FMT 1 was the only.
FMT observed at this location. No Utility or State FMTs were noted.
Issue No.: NAX90-07R Descdption: Various communications problems were identified on both days of the exercise. Not all the radios worked, and some were on different frequencies; at times, radio transmissions at the LEOF were unanswered for up to 15 minutes; the ranges of some instruments were limited; and neither the State or county FMTs nor the LEOF BRH personnel prefaced or ended any of their messages with the words. "' Itis is a drill." Reportedly, people reacted to information heard over the radios, thinking the drill was an actual emergency. (Objective 4; NUREG-0654, F.1 and F.2)
Corrective Action Demonstrated: Louisa County FMT 1 used radios that worked with no failures. The FMT also prefaced or ended each radio tmnsmission with the words, "This is a drill."
Issue No.: NAX90-09R
==
Description:==
The FMTs from the Department of Agriculture and the State Water Control Board were not provided with radiation detection instruments or protective clothing to minimize personal contamination. Much of the equipment neemry to take samples was not provided. The FMTs had only plastic bags and writing materials. The equipment list shown in the county l
plan for FMTs identifies only CD V-742 dosimeters, which have a range of 0-200.R. Used alone, these doQmeters are not acceptable because a dose of l
49 J
f l
0.5 R cannot be measured accurately on a 0-200 R dosimeter. (Objective 5; NUREG-0654, K.3.a, K.3.b, and K.4)
Cometive Action Demonstrated: The louisa County FMT was issued both a Victorcen model 545 (0-20 R) and a CD V-742 (0-200 R), in accordance with Appendix 7,Section II.B, page 7-1, of the county plan.
f.
PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 1
l 2.3.3 PRIMARY ROUTE ALERTING a.
MET: Objectives 4 and 14 b.
DEFICIENCY: None l
l c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: Objectives 5 and 10 i'
Issue No.: 41-%05-A-14 i
)
==
Description:==
The primary route alerting team and traffic control personnel j
were not aware of their emergency worker exposure limits. 'Ihe Ieuisa County plan, page 24, refers to reporting, turn-back, and maximum exposure levels of 3,5, and 8 R, respectively. (NUREG-0654, K.3.b and i
K.4) i l
Reconunendation: All emergency workers should be aware of their j
radiological exposure limits. Additionally, the workers should be provided j
with Emergency Worker Information Cards, which contain this information, before being dispatched for field activities.
Schedule of Cometive Actions: Additional training will be offered to law 1
enforcement officers.
I Issue No.: 41-%10-A-15
==
Description:==
During the SAE, the route alerting teams did not "go directly to the Route's Starting Point," as stated on page 4-21 of the Sheriff Department's procedure. Instead, they remained at the staging area until the l
decision to notify the public was received by the team captain.
~
)
Furthermore, one of the route alerting vehicles was refueled while en route for public notification. (NUREG-0654, E.6) l' Recomunendation: The route alerting teams should proceed to their appropriate " starting points" during the SAE or GE, when applicable, as required by the plan.
50
I Schedule of Corrective Actions: Additional training will be offered to law enforcement officers.
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: None i
e.
PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None a
f.
PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None
}
2.3.4 TRAFFIC / ACCESS CONTROL i
n.
MET: Objectives 4,14, and 17 j
b.
DEFICIENCY: None i
I AREAS REQUIRING CORPECTIVE ACTION: Objective 5 c.
See issue number 41-96-05-A-14 in Section 2.3.3 of this report.
4 d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
+
s e.
PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None f.
PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None i
2.3.5 EVACUATION ASSEMBLY CENTER e
a.
MET: Objectives 4, 5,18,19, and 22 b.
DEFICIENCY: None i
c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None j
3 d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: Objective 18 e.
i Issue No.: NAX94-18R
==
Description:==
The procedures for monitoring evacuees were inadequate. No
}
female monitor was present, in accordance with the county plan (Appendix i
8, Section A.5, page 8-1). The two male monitors were insufficiently j
skilled; they did not monitor the shoe soles or thoroughly monitor the whole body. There were not enough monitors to complete the required monitoring of 20% of the population within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, according to the plan (Appendix j
8, Section C.8, page 8-8). No evacuees appeared at this location; the i
l 51 j
I l
2.4 ORANGE COUNTY 2.4.1 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER a.
MET: Objectives 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,10,12,13,14,15, and 17 b.
DEFICIENCY: None i
j c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None i
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: None i
e.
PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: Objectives 2,12, and 15 i
Issue No.: NAX94-19R
==
Description:==
Sufficient backup power is not available at the EOC to support emergency operations. (Objective 2; NUREG-0654, H.3) l Corrective Action Demonstrated: The'EOC was not equipped with a backup power supply. However, the building is wired for backup power.
The EOC has an arrangement with Coach Auto to deliver a 50-kilowatt 4
generator within 30 minutes in the event of an emergency. The alternate l
EOC is the Orange County Sheriff's Department, which is equipped with a backup generator. If backup power were needed, the alternate EOC could t
be used. Sufficient measures have been taken to ensure the availability of l
backup power.
l Issue No.: NAX94-20R
==
Description:==
The RADNET system was not functional at this. facility.
l Therefore, RADNET communications could not be established with the State EOC, the LEOF, and the Caroline, Hanover, Spotsylvania, and Louisa County EOCs in accordance with the plan (page 1-2, paragraph 2).
3' (Objective 4; NUREG-0654, A.2.a) l l
Corrective Action Demonstrated: The RADNET system has been replaced l
by a new system, called Group Wise. However, the plan still requires i
network capability with RADNET (page 22,1-2 and 1-8). The plan will be l
revised to reflect the new system, and references to RADNET will be
~
deleted.
5 Issue No.: NAX94-21R
.{
==
Description:==
Because the RADNET system was not functioning at the County EOC, the PIO did not receive State news releases and EBS 53
messages. In addition, the PIO failed to request that the messages be sent thmugh alternate means. The PIO did not send the county news releases to the State. (Objective 12; NUREG-0654, E.7 and G.4.b)
Corrective Action Demonstrated: The PIO used alternate means, such as fax and Insta-phone information to keep abreast of the. emergency. The PIO also sent copies of news releases to the State. In addition, the RADNET system has been replaced with the Group Wise system, which operated properly.
Issue No.: NAX94-22R
==
Description:==
The representative from the Department of Health did not contact transportation-dependent individuals to see whether they required transportation, as required by the plan (Appendix 9,Section III.E, page 9-1). (Objective 15; NUREG-0654, E.7, J.10.c, and J.10.d)
Corrective Action Demonstrated: Only two individuals were classified under "Special Population" in the plan. The ESC simulated calling these people, and a current phone number was available for ecah.
Issue No.: NAX92-31R
==
Description:==
There was no backup power for the EOC. (Objective 2; NUREG-0654, H.3)
Corrective Action Demonstrated: The EOC was not equipped with a backup power supply. However, the building is wired for backup power.
]
The EOC has an arrangement.with Coach Auto to deliver a 50-kilowatt generator within 30 minutes in the event of an emergency. The alternate EOC is the Orange County Sheriff's Department, which is equipped with a backup generator. If backup power were needed, the alternate'EOC could be used. Sufficient measures have been taken to ensure the availability of backup power.
Issue No.: NAX92-33R
==
Description:==
No actual press briefings, or the capability to hold briefings, were demonstrated. (Objective 12; NUREG-0654, G.3.a)
Corrective Action Demonstrated: The PIO, who is also a radio station news director, demonstrated an excellent capability to brief the media with good coverage and accurate information. Five briefings were held, approximately one every hour.
f.
PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 54
1 i
i extent-of-play agreement stated that at least six evacuees uould be present l
and monitored. Therefore, the monitors monitored each oMer. (Objective 18; NUREG-0654, H.10 and J.12) i i
Corrective Action Demonstrated: The monitoring team from the Henrico County Fire / Rescue Hazardous Materials Department demonstrated all elements of this objective. Six monitors were on hand. They used a new Ludlum model 52 portal monitor for the initial scan. This new device (along with the hand-held Ludlum model 2240 monitoring instrument) ensured that the center could monitor 20% of the population within the required time. The monitors were well trained (34 monitors are available, including women) and followed all the proper monitoring procedures (scan distance, scan speed, protective measures). Six evacuees were processed; one was determined to be contaminated and was properly decontaminated.
f.
PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 2.3.6 MEDICAL SERVICES TRANSPORTATION a.
MET: Objective 20 b.
DEFICIENCY: None c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: Objective 5 i
Issue No.: 41-96-05-A-16
==
Description:==
The Rescue Squad was not issued all the equipment identified in the Fire and Rescue Procedure, Appendix 11 of the Louisa County plan (July 29,1996). (NUREG-0654, K.3.b)
Reconunendation: A copy of the procedure identifying the required equipment should be made available to the Rescue Squad as well as to the person responsible for issuing the equipment. The equipment issued should be compared with the list of equipment required for adequate exposure control.
Schedule of Corrective Actions: Attempts will be made to ensure that the Rescue Squad is properly equipped in the future.
d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: None e.
PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None f.
PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 52
~.
I j
t 2.4.2 FIELD MONITORING TEAM 1
a.
MET: Objectives 4, 6, and 14 1
1 b.
DEFICIENCY: None AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: Objective 5 c.
Issue No.: 41-96-05-A-17 1'
==
Description:==
The RACES operator who accompanied the Orange County j
FMT was not provided with any dosimetry. (NUREG-0654, K.3.a).
)
Reccennendation: All emergency workers entering the plume should be provided with the appropriate dosimetry indicated in the county plan, j
Appendix 7,Section II.B, page 7-1.
Schedule of Cornctive Actions: Additional training will be offered to the RACES operators.
i d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: None e.
PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: Objectives 3, 4, and 5 Issue No.: NAX90-04R
==
Description:==
Three FMTs performed field monitoring and sampling tasks (Utility, State, and county). However, none of these activities was coordinated. At times, Utility and State FMTs were monitoring and sampling in the same locations. Furthermore, the FMTs did not have a j
central location for reporting results so that the best use could be made of all information to assist in the accident assessment process. (Objective 3; NUREG-0654, A.1.d and A.2.a)
Cornctive Action Demonstrated: The Orange County FMT, in accordance with Appendix 7,Section IV. C, page 7-3, are to transmit all readings above background to the Radiological Officer, who in turn will report the readings to the LEOF. During this exercise, however, no readings taken by the FMT were above background.
Issue No.: NAX90-07R
==
Description:==
Various communications problems were identified on both days of the exercise. Not all the radios worked, and some were on different frequencies; at times, radio transmissions at the LEOF were unanswered for up to 15 minutes; the ranges of some instruments were limited; and neither 55
the State or county FMTs nor the LEOF BRH personnel prefaced or ended any of their messages with the words, "This is a drill." Reportedly, people reacted to information heard over the radios, thinking the drill was an actual emergency. (Objective 4; NUREG-0654, F.1 and F.2)
Cornetive Action Demonstrated: Orange County FMT members prefaced their communications with the words, "This is a drill."
Issue No.: NAX90-09R
==
Description:==
The FMTs from the Department of Agriculture and the State Water Control Board were not provided with radiation detection instruments or protective clothing to minimize personal contamination. Much of the equipment n~**=y to take samples was not provided. The FMTs had only plastic bags and writing materials. The equipment list shown in the county plan for FMTs identifies only CD V-742 dosimeters, which have a range of 0-200 R. Used alone, these dosimeters are not acceptable because a dose of 0.5 R cannot be measured accurately on a 0-200 R dosimeter. (Objective 5; NUREG-0654, K.3.a, K.3.b, and K.4).
Corrective Action Demonstrated: The Orange County FMT member, not the RACES Operator, was issued both a Victoreen model 545 (0-20 R) and a CD V-742 (0-200 R) dosimeter, in accordance with Appendix 7,Section II.B, page 7-1, of the county plan.
f.
PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 2.4.3 ROUTE ALERTING a.
MET: Objectives 4, 5,10, and 14 b.
DEFICIENCY: None c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:.None d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: None e.
PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None -
f.
PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None l
2.5 SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY 2.5.1 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER l
a.
MET: Objectives 1, 3, 4, 5,10,12,13, and 15 56 l
1
- _ - - _ ~..
j Corrective Action Demonstrated: Reference to the representative from the Department of Public Utilities has been deleted from the plan.
Issue No.: NAX94-26R 1
==
Description:==
Press release 4, issued at 1337, did not include information related to sheltering in zone 21 in Spotsylvania County. (Objective 12; 3
NUREG-0654, E.7 and G.4.a)
Corrective Action Demonstrated: Appendix 2 of the PIO procedure describes procedures for news releases concerning maximizing protection when sheltering. News release 10 explained the measures to be taken for sheltering in Spotsylvania County, and all zones affected were mentioned.
Issue No.: NAX94-28R
==
Description:==
'Ihe Social Services representative was aware of lists of special-needs individuals who niight require assistance in implementing protective actions. These lists were not available at the EOC and could not be consulted during the exercise. Additionally, the Department of Mental Health and Mental Re'.ardation was not contacted to determine whether any of their clients required assistance. (Objective 15; NUREG-0654, E.7, J.10.c, and J.10.d)
Corrective Action Demonstrated: An up-to-date list of 12 persons with special needs was available at the Spotsylvania County EOC. A list of seven patients at a hospice who required assistance was also available. At 1217, the Department of Social Services representatives also called the Rappahannock Area Community Services Board to find out whether assistance was needed.
f.
PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: Objectives 5 and 14 Issue No.: NAX94-25R
==
Description:==
The Transportation Supervisor did not coordinate with the Radiological Officer regarding the need for dosimetry for bus drivers.
Therefore, the dosimetry requirement for bus operators was unknown to the Radiological Officer. (Objective 5; NUREG-0654, H.10 and K.3.a)
Reason ARCA Unresolved: At 1210 and 1230, the Transportation Supervisor instructed the bus drivers to go to the staging area at Spotsylv.nia Volunteer Fire Department Company 1 to receive dosimetry.
However, as of 1405, he had not informed the Radiological Officer of the need for dosimetry for bus drivers.
58
b.
DEFICIENCY: None i
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: Objective 2 c.
Issue No.: 41-96-02-A-18 3
1 j
==
Description:==
Critical information was not updated or provided on the EOC i
~
status board. Only two entries were made: (1) the time the EOC was j
declared operational and (2) a hand-drawn EPZ matrix that indicated the i
time of the local disaster declaration. The EPZ matrix was not updated with protective actions as decisions were made. Other key information was never posted. For example, route alerting status, Evacuation Assembly Center (EAC) activation status, and traffic / access control' point (TCP/ACP) activation status were not indicated. 'Ihe county plan and procedures contain? no guidance as to what information is required to be displayed on the status board. (NUREG-0654, A.I.d, A.2.a, and H.3) 1 Reconunendation: The ESC and the EOC staff should identify the essential elements ofinformation to be displayed on the status board. An overlay i
depicting the information in an organized manner should be developed. One individual should be designated to update the status board on the basis of i
input from the EOC staff. County plans and procedures should be updated to reflect changes made to correct this issue.
b Schedule of Corrective Actions: The procedure will be reviewed and revised if necessary. Additional training in status board maintenance will be offered.
I d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: None l
l e.
PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: Objectives 1,12, and 15 i
Issue No.: NAX94-23R l
==
Description:==
Pre-positioning of EOC staff was contrary to the extent-of-l play agreement and the Spotsylvania County plan (Appendix 1, page 1-12).
l (Objective 1; NUREG-0654, E.2)
I Corrective Action Demonstrated: No EOC staff members were pre-positioned, in accordance with the extent-of-play agreement.
Issue No.: NAX94-24R 1
i l
==
Description:==
All staff members were present in the EOC, except a i
representative of the Department of Public Utilities. The plan (Appendix 5, j
page 5.-8) indicates that the Department of Public Utilities should be present. (Objective 1; NUREG-0654, E.1, E.2, and H.4) 57 4
,