ML20132E499
| ML20132E499 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 07/26/1985 |
| From: | Wright G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20132E498 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-341-85-29, NUDOCS 8508020003 | |
| Download: ML20132E499 (13) | |
See also: IR 05000341/1985029
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U. 5. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-341/85029(DRP)
Docket No. 50-341
Operating License No. NPF-33
Licensee: Detroit Edison Company
2000 Second Avenue
Detroit, MI 48226
Facility Name: Fermi 2
Inspection At: Fermi Site, Newport, MI
Inspection Conducted: June 1-30, 1985
Inspectors:
P. M. Byron
M. E. Parker
D. C. Jones
R. A. Paul
Q L O /1A
Approved by:
G. C. Wright, Chief
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Projects Section 2C
Date
Inspection Summary
Inspection on June 1-30, 1985, (Report No. 50-341/85029(DRP))
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of
licensee action on previous inspector identified items; independent inspection;
maintenance; surveillance; operational safety - ESF system walkdown; fire
prevention / protection program implementation; allegations, management meetings,
SALP, and initial criticality. The inspection involved a total of 323
inspector-hours onsite by four NRC inspectors, including 82 inspector-hours
onsite during off-shifts.
Results: Five open items, three license condition attachments (one of which
was also an open item), and one noncompliance were closed. Two unresolved and
one open item resulted from this inspection. Within the areas inspected, no
violations, deviations, or significant safety issues were identified.
8500020003 850729
ADOCK 05000341
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
- F. Agosti, Manager, Nuclear Operations
- L.
Bregni, Licensing Engineer
J. DuBay, Director, Planning and Control
0. Earle, Supervisor, Licensing
R. Eberhardt, Rad-Chem Engineer
P. Fessler, Assistant Maintenance Engineer
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- E. Griffing, Assistant Manager, Nuclear Operations
W.'Jens, Vice-President, Nuclear Operations
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W. Kaczor, Director, SAFETEAM (DECO)
R. Kunkle, Director, SAFETEAM (UTS)
S. Leach, Director, Nuclear Security
J. Leman, Maintenance Engineer
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-L. Lessor, Advisor to the Superintendent, Nuclear Production
- R. Lenart, Superintendent, Nuclear Production
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R. Mays, Director, Project Planning
- W. Miller, QA Supervisor, Operational Assurance
S. Noetzel, Site Manager
J. Nyquist, Assistant to Superintendent, Nuclear Production
G. Overbeck, Assistant Plant Superintendent
J. Plona, Technical Engineer
E. Preston, Operations Engineer
W. Ripley, Startup Director
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C. P. Sexauer, Nuclear Production Administrator
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G. Trahey, Director, Nuclear QA
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- Denotes those who attended the exit meetings.
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The-inspectors also interviewed others of the licensee's staff during
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this inspection.
2.
Followup on Inspector Identified Items
a.
-(Closed) Open Item (341/84003-06(DRSS)), and License Condition
Attachment 1, B.2.b:
Fabricate and install an intrinsic germanium
detector system post-accident collimator prior to exceeding ~five
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percent power. The licensee fabricated several lead shield
collimators for accident condition use with the detector system,
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and a calibration was performed for use with a multi-channel
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analyzer. The licensee demonstrated the use of the collimators
for the inspectors. ,The inspectors also reviewed selected sections
of Radiological Engineering Report.No. 85-02, " Calibration of High-
Purity-Germanium Detector-for Use with~ Lead Collimators to Analyze
.High activity Post-Accident Samples."
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(Closed) Open Item (341/84039-01(DRP)), and License Condition
Attachment 1, B.1.a:
Accessibility of safety-related valves for
serviceability and manual operation. This item identified numerous
inaccessible safety-related valves that would require ladders or
platforms to operate, inspect, and maintain the valves.
(1) Concerning the manual operation of safety-related valves, the
licensee conducted a program that reviewed 217 safety-related
valves for accessibility. Of the 217 valves, 69 or 32 percent
required some form of accessibility aid
The results of this
accessibility program are as follows
Temporary scaffolding and lar.ders have been installed in
several cases which will proside an interim resolution
until permanent design chang ss can be implemented.
Portable stands, air hoists, and rolling platforms have
been chained and locked in strategic locations for the
other cases, which will provide a more permanent accessi-
bility. All operators have a key to the locks and have
been briefed on the operation and the locations of these
devices.
(2) Although the accessibility of safety-related valves for
operation was the primary issue of concern, the licensee
has developed a program which will address the issue of
serviceability. The program will consider the same 217
safety-related valves as the operability program, but from
a maintenance perspective. This will be accomplished through
the Engineering Evaluation Request (EER) process which shall
provide an evaluation and design for the permanent installation
of serviceability aids. This item requires further review and
evaluation and is considered an unresolved item (341/85029-
01(DRP)) pending completion of the serviceability program and
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subsequent NRC inspection.
The licensee has demonstrated adequate accessibility to all con-
cerned safety-related valves. This satisfies the license condition
for criticality and this item is considered closed.
c.
(Closed) Open Item (341/84043-05(DRSS)): Complete Installation of
Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) sample line heat tracing prior
to exceeding five percent power. The heat tracing has been
installed, and the functional tests have been completed and
reviewed. The inspectors verified the installation of the heat
tracing.
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d.
(Closed) Open Item (341/84043-10(DRSS)), and License Condition
Attachment 1, B.2.c:
Complete a comprehensive review of technical
adequacy, commitment compliance, necessary corrective actions and
associated training for the accident radioactive effluent release
quantification program prior to exceeding five percent power. The
licensee has completed the comprehensive review of technical adequacy
and commitment compliance and taken corrective action by revising
certain emergency response and plant procedures. These actions are
described in a licensee internal document entitled " Accident Radio-
active Release Quantification Program," which the inspectors reviewed.
Also completed are the approval of revised procedures and the training
of personnel on these revised procedures.
e.
(Closed) Open Item (341/85010-02(DRP)): Verification of the proper
operation of 24 single coil Target Rock solenoid valves. The 24
single coil Target Rock valves consist of 16 valves in the Post
Accident Sampling System, and 8 valves in the MSIV Leakage Control
System. Preoperational Test Procedure PRET.P3323.001, " Post
Accident Sampling System," included proper operation verification
for 14 of the valves. Plant Operations Manual (POM) Surveillance
Procedure 24.127.20, "MSIV Leakage Control System Local Valve
Position Indication Verification Test," included proper operation
verification for eight of the valves. POM Surveillance Procedure
43.401.383, " Local Leakage Rate Testing For Penetration X-215,"
included proper operation verification for two of the valves. All
single coil Target Rock solenoid valves operated properly. This
item is considered closed.
f.
(Closed) Noncompliance (341/85021-01(DRP)):
Inadequate implementa-
tion and review of Engineering Design Package EDP-1996 and the accompany-
ing Engineering Change Requests (ECR's) used to verify installation of
test, vent, and drain connection caps. This resulted in:
(a) the EDP
verification sheet not adequately reflecting the EDP and its accompanying
ECR's, (b) not all test, vent, and drain (TVD) caps being installed, and
(c) Plant Operations Manual (POM) Procedure 47.000.77, " Test, Vent, and
Drain (TVD) Cap and Plug Verification," omitting a penetration (X-220)
which consists of eight TVD caps. The following licensee corrective
action was implemented:
(1) The EDP verification sheet was corrected to incorporate all
revisions to EDP-1996 and the walkdown was reperformed. Also,
the EDP Implementation Plan was revised as required by POM
Procedure 12.000.64, "EDP Implementation." The individual who
incorrectly implemented this procedure was instructed to read
the procedure again and fully acquaint himself with all of its
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requirements,
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(2) Completion of PN-21 No. 992725 and the revised verification
walkdown documents that all caps are now installed in accordance
with EDP 1996 and ECP's 1996-1 and 1996-2.
Surveillance Pro-
cedure 47.000.77 has been issued to administrative 1y control
the subject caps. Also, all associated plant drawings will be
updated in accordance with proper procedure to reflect as-built
conditions.
(3) The preparer and the technical reviewer reanalyzed all informa-
tion used to generate Procedure 47.000.77 and corrected the
procedural _ deficiency. They were then instructed by their
immediate supervisors of the importance of checking and
auditing large amounts of technical data systematically and
logically to preclude recurrence of this type of error. The
licensee has guidelines to follow in writing procedures which
are used to ensure correct technical and work content. The
individual was also instructed to acquaint himself with all
the requirements of this procedure.
The plant drawings shall be updated to reflect the as-built condition
of the TVD connection caps by November 30,1985. This item is con-
sidered closed.
g.
(Closed) License Condition 2.c.(12): Operability of the permanent
liquid radwaste treatment system prior to exceeding five percent
power. The licensee has completed the preoperational tests and
demonstrated that the system is operable. The system has been
turned over to operations. Several test exceptions which do not
affect the operability of the system remain open. A selected review
of preoperational test results (G1120.001 and G1125.001) was made by
the inspectors.
In addition the inspectors walked down several
sections of the liquid radwaste system.
h.
(Closed) License Condition 2.c.(16): Operability of the Post-
Accident Sampling System (PASS), THI Action Item II.B.3.
The
SER, Supplement No. 5 dated March 1985, states that the applicant
must demonstrate the capability of promptly obtaining a reactor
water coolant sample in the case of an accident, and that the PASS
meets all the requirements of Task Action Item II.B.3 and is
therefore acceptable. Since the SER was written, the licensee has:
demonstrated the PASS operable; approved POM procedure 78.000.14
which provides detailed instructions for the collection and analysis
of samples obtained by the PASS; provided training in the required
procedures; and performed a time and motion study to demonstrate
that PASS samples can be collected, transported, and analyzed in
accordance with NUREG 0737, Regulatory Guide 1.97, and GDC-19 dose
criteria. Selected review of the procedures, training records, and
the time and motion study was made by the inspectors.
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3.
Independent Inspection
a.
Temporary Solid Radwaste System
The licensee intends to use a portable solid radwaste treatment
system (NUS) to meet their technical specification requirements
until the completion of the preoperational tests and final approval
of the permanent solidification system. The system, which is
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located in the radwaste building, is operable and will be used by
NUS contractor personnel in accordance with approved licensee
procedures. The licensee tested the portable system by solidifying
88 cubic feet of mixed bed bead resin from floor drain and waste
collector tanks to verify the system met the licensee acceptance
criteria. Selected results of these tests were reviewed by the
inspectors; no problems were noted. The inspectors also: discussed
the results of a licensee conducted ALARA review of the temporary
system with radwaste personnel; walked down the system to verify
installation; and observed selected components to identify potential
radiological problem areas. No significant problems were identified.
In a letter to the licensee from the NRC dated July 3, 1985, NRR
approved the licensee Process Control Program (PCP) for the
temporary radwaste system. Based on the acceptance of the PCP, the
demonstration test of the system, and the inspector's review of the
system, it appears the portable system will function as described in
the vendor's topical report (NUS Topical Report PS-53-00378) which
was submitted to the NRC by the licensee.
No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this
program area.
b.
Onsite Storage Facility (OSSF)
The licensee's onsite storage facility is described in Section 11B.1
of the FSAR. The facility is intended to provide interim storage
capacity for an amotint of waste which could be generated in five
years of plant operation. -During this inspection, and a previous
inspection (Report No. 50-341/85017(DRSS)), tours and discussions
concerning the OSSF were made. The tours were made to verify that
selected systems and components (including area radiation and
effluent monitors) were installed in accordance with the FSAR and to
identify any potential radiological problem areas. No problems were
noted.
During these tours and discussions with the licensee, special atten-
tion was given to the handling, decontamination, smearing, and
surveying of dry active and solidified waste drums; to the HVAC
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system; to the design features to ensure ALARA; and to the portable
solid radwaste system located in the truck bay area of the OSSF.
Radiation protection features of the OSSF include: protective
barriers around the stored waste to prevent uncontrolled releases to
the environment, remote handling of the waste drums, routing of all
potentially contaminated drains from the OSSF to plant liquid
radwaste system (the licensee verified each floor drain from the
OSSF is routed to the liquid radwaste system), and monitoring and
filtration of gaseous and particulate effluents.
One ALARA problem was noted in that no shielding had been provided
in the radwaste barrel readout area, nor had provisions been made to
read out the barrels remotely. The licensee stated they would
review the read out system and make improvements where feasible.
This program area requires further review and evaluation and is
considered an open item (50-341/85029-02(DRP))
No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this
program area.
c.
SAFETEAM
The Office of Investigation (OI) reviewed the investigative results
of SAFETEAM concerns based on issues raised during the licensing
process of another utility. June 11-13, 1985, OI investigators
reviewed the SAFETEAM investigators' packages for those concerns
which had been identified as wrongdoing. The wrongdoing concerns
had been forwarded to Region III as they had been identified. OI
investigators expanded the scope of their review when they returned
June 18-20, 1985, to include the completed investigative packages of
those concerns which the investigators deemed as potential wrongdoing
based on the description listed in the SAFETEAM computor printout.
The review included listening to the tapes, reading the transcription,
and reviewing the documentation in the packages.
The Director of OI, members of his staff, and NRR attended a
briefing at the site on June 19, 1985, by the licensee and the OI
investigators.
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As a result of the OI concerns, a task force composed of individuals
from NRR, I&E, and Region III were at the site June 27 and 28, 1985,
to perform a more detailed investigation of SAFETEAM concerns for
technical merit and a comparison of the SAFETEAM off ort with that of
a similar undertaking by another utility.
The inspectors supported the OI and task force efforts.
In conjunction with this effort, the inspectors and the licensee
performed an inspection of the safety-related SAFETEAM findings at
the request of Region III. The inspectors reviewed the SAFETEAM
findings to determine if investigative effort adequately addressed
the concern and if the corrective action had been completed.
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Also, the licensee performed an independent inspection of the
SAFETEAM findings to verify adequacy of investigation and corrective
acti'on. Through discussions with the licensee, the licensee agreed
to review fifty percent of the hardware and software safety-related
concerns. The inspectors reviewed a sampling of the remaining fifty
percent of the safety-related concerns. The results of these
inspections will be documented in Inspection Report 50-341/85037.
No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this
program area.
d.
Operational Readiness
The licensee continues to make progress in its preparations for
power ascension. Fire detector installation, fire door inspection,
and the off gas system appear to be the most significant critical
path items.
Senior Region III management met with licensee management twice
during the inspection period to review the status of items affecting
initial criticality and power ascension, license conditions and
other areas of mutual interest.
No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this
program area.
e.
Independent Operational Readiness Assessment Inspection
A Region III team composed of experienced resident inspectors per-
formed an operational readiness inspection at Fermi 2 during
June 17-22, 1985. The purpose of the team inspection was to observe
the licensee's operations and review proceduras to identify strengths
and weaknesses. The team concluded that there were no significant
weaknesses observed and the plant was ready for power ascension.
This inspection is documented in Inspection Report 50-341/85031(DRP).
No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this
program area.
4.
Fire Prevention / Protection Program Implementation
The inspectors observed the progress of License Condition 9.e. which
requires that prior to exceeding five percent power, all early warning
fire detectors shall be installed and all fire door assemblies shall be
labeled or listed by a nationally recognized testing laboratory. The
inspectors additionally performed a more detailed examination of the
corrective action by the licensee on a sample basis to determine if the
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programmatic requirements were being met.
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No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program
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5.
Monthly Maintenance Observation
Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components
listed below were observed to ascertain that they were conducted in
accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, and industry
codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting
conditions for operation were met while components or systems were
removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the
work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were
inspected as applicable; the procedures used were adequate to control
the activity; quality control records were maintained; activities were
accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were
properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire
prevention controls were implemented.
The following maintenance activity was observed:
Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) Recirculation Pump Rotating
Assembly-Removal and Installation
Removal of RWCU recirculation pump "A" rotating assembly was performed
to replace seals and the impeller.
Plant Operations Manual (POM)
Maintenance Procedure 35.000.68, Revision 1 dated February 21, 1979,
"RWCU Recirculation Pump Rotating Assembly-Removal and Installation,"
was used to provide detailed instructions for removal, disassembly,
inspection, assembly, and installation of the RWCU pump. The inspectors
witnessed portions of this maintenance and identified several areas of
concern.
a.
Sections 7.1.4.1 through 7.1.4.4 of Procedure 35.000.68 describe
the steps used in draining the bearing housing oil. This was to be
done prior to the removal of the back pull-out section of the pump.
However, this was not done, resulting in the oil draining out onto
the floor during transfer to the rolling cart, and oil draining out
onto the rolling cart which, in turn, tracked the oil as it was
rolled to the workshop.
b.
Sections 7.1.7 and 7.1.8 and Reference 3.10 (POM Procedure
32,000.06, " Rigging") of Procedure 35.000.68 provide instructions
for the use of. a chain hoist and suitable sling. The hoist and
sling are used to support the back pull-out when the casing stud
nuts are removed and to facilitate simplified removal of the back
pull-out section. However, the maintenance personnel transferred
the back pull-out section to the rolling cart by hand. This
resulted in three men lifting and carrying the heavy and awkward
pump to the cart with oil draining significantly (see preceding
paragraph). Also, Procedure 35.000.68 requires that reference 3.10,
POM Procedure 32.000.06 " Rigging," is to be "used".
Section 3.0,
" Rigging Preplanning," of this procedure states "... determine the
weight of the load." The inspectors observed that the licensee did
not observe this requirement of the procedure.
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c.
The note on page 3 of Procedure 35.000.68 states, " Procedure steps
may be performed out of sequence with the prior approval of the
DECO Maintenance Foreman (as a minimum). This statement is
applicable until fuel load." However, section 7.5.11 which states. .
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"to refill the bearing house with Shell Vitrea Oil," was performed
af ter Sections 7.5.12 and 7.5.13.
Therefore, the procedure was
performed out of sequence which is a failure to adhere to procedural
requirements.
d.
There is no procedural step requiring the removal of the casing
studs. Removal of the back pull-out section is obstructed by the
casing studs and might cause damage to the studs, the pump shaft,
the motor shaft, or the coupling hubs. This item has been discussed
with the licensee.
e.
There are two alignment screws on the pump that are used to align
the pump shaft with the motor shaft. These screws, once the pump is
properly aligned, are maintained in their proper positions during
operation by tightening down the nut on each screw. However, the
inspector observed that this had not been done and subsequently
requested the maintenance personnel resolve the problem.
In a
discussion with the System Engineer and the Assistant Maintenance
Engineer it was concluded that the vibration during operation could
have shifted the alignment of the pump and, in turn, possibly caused
damage to the pump.
f.
The RWCU pumps receive reactor water at a temperature of up to
575* F.
This high temperature on the pump side may present a
coupling alignment problem due to thermal expansion. This issue
is not addressed in the coupling alignment section of Procedure
35.000.68.
The licensee is performing an analysis that shall
resolve this issue.
The inspector will perform additional inspection of this program area to
determine if there is a widespread problem. This shall be accomplished
by further inspection of the adequacy of the licensee's maintenance
supervision and performance of maintenance activities. The above
concerns in this program area are considered to be an unresolved item
(341/85029-03(DRP)) pending further evaluation as to whether these
items are isolated cases are are more widespread.
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6.
Monthly Surveillance Observation
The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by technical speci-
fications and verified that: testing was performed in accordance with
adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting condi-
tions for operation were met, removal and restoration of the affected
components were accomplished, test results conformed with technical
specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel
other than the individual directing the test, and any deficiencies identi-
fled during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate
management personnel.
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The inspectors also witnessed portions of the following test activities:
Local Leakage Rate Testing for Penetration X-13A
RHR Pressure Isolation Valve Leakage Test
Local Leakage Rate Testing for Penetration X35B,C,D,E,F
No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program
area.
7.
Operational Safety Verification
The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable
logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators during the
period from June 1 to June 30, 1985. The inspectors verified the
operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records, and
verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the
reactor building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant
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equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and
excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been
initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
During the inspection period the inspectors verified that surveillance
tests were conducted, containment integrity requirements were met, and
emergency systems were available hs necessary.
The inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that the
physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the
station security plan.
The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and
verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the
inspection, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the
Low Pressure Coolant Irjection System and Core Spray System to verify
operability by comparing system lineup with plant drawings, as-built
configuration or present valve lineup lists; observed equipment condi-
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tions that could degrade performance; and verified that instrumentation
was properly valved, functioning, and calibrated.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility
operations were in conformance with the requirements established under
technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
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No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program
area.
8.
Allegation
An anonymous allegation was made to Region III stating that frequent door
checks by security personnel increase the potential for radiation exposure
and therefore are contrary to ALARA guidelines.
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This allegation was discussed with licensee personnel, who walked down
each vital area door which is routinely checked by security personnel.
The results of the licensee's review indicated that of all vital area
doors which are routinely checked by security personnel, only one is
located in a potential radiation area (between the auxiliary and off-gas
buildings), and none are located in high radiation areas. Entries into
areas posted and controlled as radiation areas are routine and are not
normally cause for significant ALARA concerns. No significant ALARA
concern was identified in this case.
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This allegation was not substantiated.
No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program
area.
9.
Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP)
A mid-term SALP was performed prior to the Commission briefing for the
full power license. The assessment period was frcs October 1, 1984, to
June 30, 1985. Major activities which occurred during the assessment
period were the completion of preoperational testing, initial fueling and
initial criticality. The SALP Board met on June 28, 1985, to review the
assessments, rate each functional area, and make recommendations as to
both licensee and NRC attention. The mid-term SALP will be presented on
July 2, 1985, at Newport, Michigan, and documented in Inspection Report
50-341/85027.
No violations or deviations were identified in review of this program
area.
10.
Initial Criticality
The licensee achieved initial criticality on June 21, 1985, at 5:19 a.m.
EDT. The event was witnessed by the Deputy Regional Administrator -
Region III, the assigned Section Chief, and a regional inspector in
addition to the Senior Resident Inspector. Criticality was achieved
within two steps of the predicted step of the rod pull sequence.
Additional details of this event are documented in Inspection Report
50-341/85036(DRS).
No violations or deviations were identified in review of this program
area.
11.
Management Meetings
A management meeting was held at Region III on June 14, 1985, at the
request of the licensee. The licensee discussed their proposed
reorganization of Nuclear Operations. The current organization is
considered to be structurally flat in that all organizations, with the
exception of Quality Assurance, report directly to the Manager of Nuclear
Operations. The licensee determined that the current organizational
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structure was unwieldy to manage and has proposed a more streamlined
organization. The new organization has been segregated into four
functional groups, Plant, Engineering, Services, and Regulation and
compliance, all reporting to the Manager of Nuclear Operations. This
should result in a more manageable and responsive organization.
In
addition, the new organization incorporates " institutional memory" in the
proposed staffing.
The licensee plans to implement the new organization after the issuance
of the full power license.
12.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in
order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations or
deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are
discussed in Paragraphs 2.b. (2), and 5.
13.
Open Items
Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which
will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action
on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. An open item disclosed
during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph 3.b.
14.
Exit Interview
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
on June 24, 1985,.and informally throughout the inspection period and
summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The
inspect:+ also discussed the likely informational content of the
inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the
inspector during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such
documents / processes as proprietary. The licensee acknowledged the
findings of the inspection.
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