ML20132C665
| ML20132C665 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 01/10/1985 |
| From: | Lieberman J NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20132C669 | List: |
| References | |
| 2.206, NUDOCS 8501290673 | |
| Download: ML20132C665 (7) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES g
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g
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- j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
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January 10, 1985 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM:
James Lieberman Director and Chief Counsel Regional Operations and Enforcement Division Office of the Executive Legal Director
SUBJECT:
PETITION OF R.L. ANTHONY / FRIENDS OF THE EARTH SEEKING REVOCATION OF LICENSE NPF-27 ISSUED FOR THE LIMERICK FACILITY OF THE PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY On December 23, 1984, Robert L. Anthony, on behalf of himself and Friends of the Earth (Petitioners) filed a Petition with the Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, seeking the institution of proceedings pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202 by serving an order to show cause upon the Philadelphia Electric Company (Licensee) why License No. NPF-27 for its Limerick Facility should not be revoked. The Petition is being treated pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 of the Commission's regulations. As the Petition seeks revocation of the low power license issued to the Licensee on October 26, 1984 by your office and raises concerns regarding the conduct of the Licensee's activities under that license which may bear on future licensing action by your office, it is appropriate for your office to respond to this Petition.
The Petition sets forth four general arguments for the relief sought.
First, Petitioners argue that exemptions granted to the Licensee when License NPF-27 was issued were improvidently granted and that, consequently, public health and safety concerns presently exist in activities conducted by the Licensee under that license. Specific areas identified are control room habitability, standby gas treatment system operability, compliance with 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix J, and the adequacy of isolation valves for certain systems.' Secondly, the Petition claims that the License Events Reports (LER's) which have been filed by the Licensee since it has undertaken licensed activities are excessive in number and identify problems related to public health and safety which require immediate action. Thirdly, the Petition refers to Inspection Reports issued by the NRC and extensive correspondence between th~e Licensee and the NRC as identifying additional deficiencies requiring action by the agency, specifically license revocation, to protect the public health and safety. Finally, the Petition makes reference to the Independent Design Verification Program for the Limerick Facility and suggests that that effort may not have been to adequate to support issuance CONTACT:
Richard K. Hoefling, OELD x27013
~8508090598 850729 PDR ADOCK 05000352 P
PDR rw
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. of license NPF-27 in October 1984.
For these reasons, Petitioners request the immediate issuance of a show cause order.
My staff will work with your staff to develop an appropriate response to the Petition. Enclosed for your use are:
1.
A draft acknowledgement letter. Please note that this letter must address the Petitioner's request for immediate action.
2.
A draft notice of receipt of the petition under 10 CFR 2.206 for publication in the Federal Register and 3.
The original Petition.
Please provide me at your earliest convenience with copies of license NPF-27, any amendments which have been issued, and any related Safety Evaluation Reports that discuss the issues raised in the Petition so that my staff may become familiar with these documents and effectively assist you in the preparation of a final decision. Should you determine, following review of the Petition, that additional information from the Licensee regarding the subject of the Petition would be useful to you in preparing a Director's Decision, such additional information may be solicited from the Licensee by utilizing 10 CFR % 50.54(f) and 5 182 of the Atomic Energy Act.
Please provide us copies of all documents related to the Petition.
Notify us of any meeting that you or your staff have on this matter and place our office on concurrence for all correspondence initiated by the staff relating to this Petition.
) James Lieberman Director and Chief Counsel Regional Operations and Enforcement Division, OELD
Enclosures:
a/s cc: (w/ encl.)
R. DeYoung, IE J. Axelrad, IE T. Murley, Reg. I J. Gutierrez, Reg. I E. Christenbury, OELD J. Rutberg, OELD A. Hodgdon, OELD R. Martin, NRR A. Schwencer, NRR
{l Docket No. 50-352, 50-353 (10 CFR 2.206)
Mr. Robert L. Anthony Box 186 Meylan, Pennsylvania 19065
Dear Mr. Anthony:
This letter acknowledges receipt of the Petition filed by you on behalf of yourself and Friends of the Earth (Petitioners) on December 23, 1984 The Petition requests that the Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement institute proceedings pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202 by serving an
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order to show cause on the ' Philadelphia Electric Company (Licensee) why License NPF-27 issued for the Limerick Facility should not be revoked. The Petition sets forth four general concerns as the basis for the request.
First, the Petition argues that certain exemptions granted to the Licensee when License No..NPF-27 was issued were improvidently granted and that the public health and safety is thereby endangered. Specific exemptions are identified concerned with control and habitability, the standby gas treatment system, compliance with 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix J, and the alfequacy of isolation valves for certain systems.
Secondly, the Petition argues that Licensee Event Reports issued by the Licensee since the commencement of operation under the low power license have been frequent in number and are further indication that activities under the license are being conducted
. in an unsafe fashion. Thirdly, the Petition'makes reference to various Inspection Reports issued by the NRC and to correspondence between the Licensee and the NRC as identifying additional deficiencies warranting revocation of the license.
Finally, the Petition suggests that the Independent Design Verification Program undertaken for the Limerick Facility was' insufficient to support issuance of the low power license.
Although your Petition was directed to the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, my office will respond to your Petition in that it deals directly with matters related to the low power license for the Limerick Facility which this office issued and also raises matters which bear directly on future licensing decisions for the Limerick Facility which may be taken by my office.
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The Petition is being treated under 10 CFR 2.206 of the r nnmission's regulations. The Staff will review the Petition and I will iss0e a formal decision in regard to it within a reasonable time. The Petition does request the immediate issuance of a show cause order to the (icensee based -
on the concerns identified in the Petition.
Preliminary review of the Petition indicates that the Petition raises no new information. The exemptions referred to in the Petition were considered by the NRC staff prior to issuance of the low power license. LER's are required to be filed with the NRC and are promptly evaluated. This has in fact occurred with the LER's that have issued for the Limerick Facility.
The NRC review of those L
i LERs does not justify any immediate actions with respect to the facility.
1
e 3-Nor do the allegations in the Petition that other deficiencies exist based on NRC Inspection Reports or correspondence between the NRC and the Licensee or the NRC's review of the Independent Design Verification Program raise any new information. These are all matters of which the NRC is well aware and matters which do not require any immediate action regarding continued I
operation of the facility.
[ Provide additional substance on these matters.]
s Consequently, I decline to,take any immediate action on the basis of your Petition. A copy of the Notice that is being filed for publication with the Office of the Federal Register is enclosed for your information.
Sincerely, i
Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
.l
Enclosure:
a/s cc: (w/ encl.)
Philadelphia Electric Co.
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[7590-01]
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[DocketNos. 50-352,50-353]
PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY
-- --(Limerick Facility)
Request For Action Under 10 CFR 2.206 Regarding Continued Operation At The Limerick Facility Notice is hereby given that, by a Petition dated December 23, 1984, R.L. Anthony and Friends of the Earth (Petitioners) requested that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission institute proceedings by issuing an order to show cause to the Philadelphia Electric Company (Licensee) why License No. NPF-27 for its Limerick Facility should not be revoked. The Petition bases its request for license revocation upon four concerns, namely; that exemptions granted with the issuance of license NPF-27 were improperly granted and consequently continued operation raises public health and safety concerns; that Licensee Event Reports filed since the issuance of the License have been numerous and demonstrate th,at continued operation of the facility is unsafe; that NRC Inspection Reports and correspondence between the NRC and the Licensee further indicate deficiencies at the facility requiring license revocation; and that the Independent Design Verification Program conducted for the facility was insufficient to provide assurance of safe operation under license No. NPF-27.
e
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- - - - + ~ -,. -,,....
The Petition is being treated pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 of the Commission's regulations and accordingly appropriate action will be taken on the request within a reasonable time. A copy of the Petition is available for inspection in the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20555 and at the local public document room for the Limerick facility located at [ insert address ].
Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this day of January 1985.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION s
Harold R. Denton, Directo'r Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation t
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U.S. NUCLElR REC. COMMISS... DIRECTOR,0FFICO OF DSPECTIDN & ENFORCEEM T
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RE: Phile.. Electric Cs. Limorick G,cn Sta. Unit 1.
D:ckot No.: 50-352.353 PETITION BY INTERVENOR, R.L.1NTHONT/ FRIENDS OF THE EARTH,TO TEE DIRECTOR,0FF.0F INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT TO I5STITUTE PROCEEDDGS TO REV0KE LICENSE NPF-27, ISSUED TO PEC0;1ND TO ISSUE 15 ORDER TO SE0W CAUSE WEY THIS LICENSE.SHOULD NOT BE REVOKEH.
12/23/84 BiCKGROUND FOR PETITION.
'y.g inthony/F0E has been an intervener in the Limerick lice,nsing prec.ee; dings
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since 1981.
From the time of our first knowledge in February.1984 of'alPart 70
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license application up to the present we have batered appeals with NRC agencies against the issuance of a fuel license and a low power operating lican se for PECo.
We have appeals awaiting decisions with NRC and the U.S.Th$rd Gircuit Appeals Court. Ye believe these appeals will be decided in our favor.
Meanwhile PECe is assuming,apparently,tha%t does not have to respect our appeale,and,we under-stand, has started or is about to start the fission process in # 1 reacter. We assert th'at PECe is in violation of NRC regulatiens and is subjecting us md the public to the risk of extensive unauthorized health and safety dangers by start-ing the nuclear r*a tor whthout the required safety previsiens.
c Ye therefore seek to step the threat to our health and safety through the revoking of 'the" low power" license issued.te PECe em 10/26/84 by NRC Off. of Nuclear Reacter Regulation.
Anthony /F0E petitiens the Director,hereby, under 10 CFR 2.200 to revoke License NPF-27,and,te that end, under 10CFR 2.201(c)to find that the public health and safety are at risk because of RECe 's operation of this reacter,and,further, to find that PECe has willfully violated our he lth, a
safety and interests and those of the public.
And in addition we petition the Director,under 10*CFR 2.202 (a) to institute proceedings and to serve en the licensee an order to show cause why License NPF -27 should not be revoked.
We submit below the evidence which proves PECe is not qualified to operate this reacter safely a d the specific dericiencies and violations in equipment,preced-n ures, training, tes ting and saf eguards, from NRC a d PECo records n
WILLPUL ACTION.
We claim that PECe's application for exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR 50 constitute willful sacrifice of public safety in the interest of speeding the reactor getting inte arrice.The details in J.S.Kemper's letter, 10/25/84, to H.R.Denten,NRC demonstrate thie s (Request for Exeuption fran 10 CFR, App. 1,GDC 19)
Para.1.... main control room becomes either inoperative er uninhabitable.
- 2...makes it highly unlikely.......... simultan e ously unavailable.
3.The likeliheed..the centrol reem uninhabitable is very small...
- 4. The likeliheed that the Remote Shutdown Systems would not function as designed is small...
5...using equipment presently installed..in conjunction with temporary jumpers...
Q(~, C[;lb BDO -- 999238
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. Tho quotations abovo chen a casus 1 ottitudo tocard the loss of the centrol room,and ability to shut down the plant in case of an accident. Such a less would bring a catastreyhy to the public,and the werkers in the plant. To dismiss this possibility with unsubstantiated assumptions such as these abers,
" highly unlikely" and "likeliheed is very small" is irresponsible at the least, and we assert that it constitutes a deliberate, willful neglect of public safety.
The concluding paragraphs of Mr.Kemper's letter are included below (1. ).
Ye conclude that as Yice President Engineering and Rese rch,he speaks for a
PECe.
PEco,thereby,and NRC,in issuing the license a d granting the esenytions, n
enderse. the dismissing of the importance of public hegith and safety with:
"Only the potential impact en public health and s fety is at issue". This is a
the key issueland the one that must centrol, net the secondary one that Mr.
Kemper stresses, " a delay in the att tument of commercial operation ( and sub-s further sequent increase in ratepayerAs cost)"
The final paragraph is wishful thinking 3
and unsupported by any firm evidence,"..we have concluded that granting the re-quested eremytien will not endancer life er Dreierty... and is otherwise in the public interest." (Emphasis added).Te emphatic lly deny PECe's(and NRC's) emn-a clusions above and assert the extreme threat to our health and saefety and that of the public involved in the risk of less of eyeration er habitability of the centrol reen.
In granting the exemptions, including the abo ve, NRC-NER (at 2 D, license one
- ,NPF-27) is in violation of 10 CFH 50.12 since the exemptions violate the public health, safety and interest. (~.Ye quote frem the draft "Fa ility Operating License" c
supplied to us by V.S. Heyer en 10/17/84, since we were never sent: a copy of Lic. NPF-27 when it was iseued.)
OTHER EXEMPTIONS.
Grariting of an ezemytien fren 10 CFR 50 App. A.cDC-61 as requested in the le tter, I.S. Beyer to H.R.Denten,. 9/21/84, inNPF-27,is in violation of 10CFR 50.12.
Not connecting the standby gas treatment system to the refueling area prier to the first refueling outage riska discharging radioactive gas to the public's (1.)
(Emphasis added.)
The requested exegt f on does not impact the comen defense and security. Only the potential Im act on pubile health and safety Is at issue.
The requested exemption is in the pubile Interest In that any delay in ccmnencanent of low power testing and pcwer ascension would cause a delay In the attalrment of ccmnercial operation Cand subsequent increase in ratepayer's cost) and since, as shown above, the health and safety of the public will be adequately protected.
Based upon the foregoing, we have concluded that granting the requested exemption will not endanger Ilfe or property or the comon defense and security and is otherwise jn the pubile Interest, a
d
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ct.coeyhoro in caso cf cn tecident.
To assert that (y.2) "Thoso cc mitcaots
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cff'cetively procludo the rolcano of radicactivity to the refuoI5k." do not guar ntee that they are sufficient er will be carried out,ner is there evidence a
to substantiate the assumptions summed up in,.." we have concluded that granting the requested exemption will not enda ger life er property er the commen defense n
and security and is otherwide in the public interest". We cacclude the exact ey-yesite,and further declare that connecting SGTS services to the refueling area is essential to protect the public,is neessaary and in the public interest.
".. delaying the operation of Limerick" is,and must be secondary to public safety!
Having the SGTS functiening ie vital yretection for the public against the acei-dental release of radioactive gases since lic. NPF-27 does not exclude exceeding 50% yower eyeration ( C.( 10) (f) nor 100% power ( C. (1.) ).
Granting an eresytien from 10 CPR 50 A y.J,as requested in J.S.Kemper's P
letter of 9/14/84 to H.R.Denten is not justified and is in violation of 10CFR 50.12 bec use it enda gers the public health and safety. Public safety is ignored on a
n page 2, "..it can be concluded that there is reasonable assurance against undue air lock' leakage..."
Public safety requires more than " reasonable assurance";
it is a question of human lives, and nothing short of all possible assurance is satisfactory. It is not true that there could be (p.2)" ne significant increase in the environmental impact beyond that erperienced with no exemption." And we deny (y.4) "That it can be concluded that there is reasonable assurance against undue TIP guide tube leakage.." We further assert that(y 4. D.)" aremytien from the requirement to perform local leak rateStesting 6n seven RER relief v lver.."
a makes safe shutdown uncertain and is a threat to public health and safety and is in viol tion of 10 CPR 50.12.
a It is centrary to NRC regulations and NEPA and AE1 that public safety should (p.5.)" Changes te fa ilitate such testing at the pres-be put in second place te c
eat time would have,an adverse inyaet en system turnover and plant startup,"and (p.6.) "If literal compliance were mandated...Ifdesign ch nges were undertaken, a
a corresyending delay in the eyeration... Any delay in the eyeration of Limerick
..would caase the cost of g unit to increase." The last sentence (y.6.) shows where PECe's priorities lie 4ts disreguard of the public safety and interest, f
" Denial...,would have a substantial financial impact en PECe.and its customers to s d is not warranted..." NRC must not allow PECO's financial straights compromise u
the safety and lives of the public.
A further eremytien requested by PECe in a letter,V.S.Beyer to H.H.Denten, 9/21/84, poses a severe threat to public s fety and interest by yestyening until a
the first refueling outage adequate isolation valves fsr the hydrogen recombiner lines and the Drywell Chilled Water and Reacter Enclosure Coeling Water.. Public safety is at risk because of the absence of these valves the operation of the reactor is unsafe and 10 CFR 50.12 w s violatsed by the granting of this eresytten a
by NRC in lic.NFP-27. Any penetr tions of the prim a y containment have the potential r
a
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hN rcdicactive role soo to tho public environnont and no safegu rds econceted
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with these should be emitted,eepecially in the first phase of operation of thc re cter. It cannot be assured to eyer te safely a d te shut down without risk a
a n
to the public with the emmission of the valves cancelled by this exemption. Titre is ne substantiation to PECO's assertion (p.3)" The probability of a release to the environment through these closed systems inside containment is les" PECe goes en to explain the exact kind of accident which could cause such a release.
Ye disagree with NRC's finding tha,t (p.3) "This deviation represents a justifiable, temporary exemption from 10 CFR 50,1py.1, ceneral Design Criteria 56.",and (y.4.)
en the centrary
- ne significant increase in environmental inyaet". There iaghe risk of fatal impact en the public in the event of a nuclear accident and emergency.
We call especial attention to Mr.Beyer's use of the same woram as quoted ffen Mr.Kemper's letter,10/25/84 (y.2 above)" (p.4.) only the yetenfial impact on public he lth and safety is at issue.
This certainly ayyears to discount a
and probably dismiss the issue of public..hsalth and safety as of any centrolling relevance.
On the other hand he also stressda the avoidance ef" delay (y.4.) in the attainment of commercial *peration","If literal compliance..were mandated..
a corresponding delay in the operation",and "would cause the cost of the unit to increase." Te repeat that " literal compliance" is ne less than is preyer to protect lives and it is what the regulations and NEB 1 and 1El require. Cen-sider tions of syeed in getting Limerick in, eyer tion and the financial effects a
a of delay en PECO are secondary iesues which must yield to the protection of the public. Justification of the above exemptions by PECe show its deliberate and willful disregard of the public health, safety and interest.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS.
We have received copies of licensee event reyerts starting with 84-001, dated 10/27/84,but only reported-11/26/84 We have apparently not been supplied with copies of all these reports since there are gays in numbers smd me de not knew ehether there were operating inci* dents before # 84-001, connected with the nuclear fuel.
In any case the 12 reports that we have been sent demonstrate that the Limerick plant and personnel are not in condition to operate the # 1 reacter safely and that License NPF-27 should be,. revoked immediately to protect the public health-and safety.
The 12 reports are listed here LER f Event Report Summary 84-001 10/27/84 11/26/84 - Def'iciencys. channel eheck de radiation moniter 84-002 10/31 11/30 channel byysse, trip signal, full scram.84-003 10/31 11/30 CO2 pilot gas supply valve elesed for 5 days84-005 11/9 12/10 Trip coils burnt out, full scra,a signal 84-006 11/13 12/13 Drywell purge fan,less yewer to chlorine analyser 84-007 11/14 12/14 Improper venting-start core spray,RER, diesel gen.84-008,010 11/15 & 18 12/14 Equipment malfunction, control reen vent. isolation 84-009 11/16 12/14 Radittien monitor out, radioactivity sample missed 84-011 11 18 12/17 Technician short circuit, damage high radiation men.
84-13 11 20 12/19 RHR 1. elation valv failed te open frew remote panel 84-02'l 11 15 12/14-Short in test cable plug-isolation water eleanup
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Thoco cacylos of Licensoo Reports only giro a hint of tho truc picture of equipnont fcilure(construction defociencies,yroceduro gays cud maintonacco cud
,ey4rator ' blunders by PECe at the Limerick y1 ant.
The list above shows 12 ex-amples, practically all of which could have enda gered the public with a serious n
accident affecting saf ety systems at the plant,and consequent involvument of the reacter and the threat of radioactivity to the enrirennent.
The record above included 12 License Events in 25 days and w* do not knew whether all the evouts were reported er whether we were supplied a complete record. For example f 04 and
- 12' are missing mad there is a gap between # 13 and # 021.
Tmis record,however, of 12 events in 25 days ( ayyreximately 3f/ ieek ) without the fieri.n pree..
started,is a serious warning of the dangers to the public in actual operation, which we understand started about 12/15 since we have no event record since
- 84-13en11/15,wehave..noideahowmanymere there have been from then to the present. 'is an eranyle of events which could have been concealed, we found the notice of a fuel bundle hitting g
g nt fuel yeel wall en 8/22/84 en the (p.27) of NRC awgten L Inspec.s 4-43 and 84-11 in para. 6 which cenelud-last page 8
es (we claim with willful deceptiveness) "Ne violations were identified."
The record above conclusively proves that PECe is not able to operate the Limerick.reacter in conferm nce with NRC regulations and without the probability a
of accidents and errors which would threaten the he lth, safety and interest of a
the public.
A sample of the Licensee Events abord demonstrate PECe's inability to carry eut s fety responsibilities and call for the reveking of Lic. NPF-27:
a 3
- 84-001 (p.A-1).." channel checks of the volume level transmitters and the f our refueling area,f our scram discharge ventilation erhaust duct radiation:
monitors were not performed as required.."
- 84-002 (p.1-3)
" This event was c used by personnel error-the failure a
of the I&C Technician to check with Shif t Supervision prior to re c onnec tierg the cable to the detector.
The subsequent scram event would t ot have occurred if the IRM had been byyassed..."
884-005 (P.1-1) ".. source voltage was slightly high,.. feeder tripped open..
With shorting links removed..RPS trip systen... caused a full scram sigual.."
- 84-006 (p.1-2) "The cguse of the event was inadequate investigation by tae operators attempting to resolve the drywell purge problen..."
- 84-00J ( y. 1-2)
".. a reacter low level isolation, signal. The
'C' core spray pump and the'C' EHR pump eyerated en minimum flew rdeirculation to the suyyression. peel. D 13 diesel generater output breaker did not close ente its emer6ency bus, s."..." Cause of the event was improper. venting..."
OTHER DEFICIENCIES.
of While we de not have a couplete record deficiencies and eyen er unresolved 3
construction er operation items which disqualify PECe from being able te o pe ra te which the nuclear reacter safely,we include a sampling of some sneuld prevent PECe from 3
holding Lic.NPF-27 Inspection 84-49,-12. Open : y.11 Dieselt Unreselved,y. 17 Inspection Brookhaven'Nat. Lab.,10/4/84 Starostecki Eemper, para.10.1 Open Findings (10)
--6--
To ingludo cdditional roporto involving 'sefoty issuos that are enresolved,
, Yoir cntiroty)but eith cyocici referoncos indicated,
(n.
t Insp. 84-47 (p. 7,15,17,18) 84-27 ( y.16,20) 84-29 (p.9) 12 welds with rejectable indications.
84-50 (p. 5,6.)
Murley-Daltreff11/9/84(deficioney re. security guards.)
84-52 (Ittes.1 p. 14,20,23.)
84-54 Exceptions (p.3,4,7.)
84-55 ( y.13,14,15 )
84-56 Training ( y.2.)
84-62 Test exceptions (p.4,5.)
84-60,-13
( p. 13,14,15,16 )
84-59 Shutdown marci: 24 w.rr instead of 30 minutes.
Centrol Reen Design Re iew 10/84 Incomplete,M$e ing ( y.11,16,20. )
(p.4.)
v s
Schwencer-Hauer 10/16/84 Tech. Eval,Centrol Reem.
Incomplete, inadequate ( y.18',19,20)
Kemper-Schwencer 10/15/84 No NRS safety evaluation en the resolution of generic issue ( y.2.)
Kemper-Schwencer 8/1/84 Deferzel RHESY PRM radistien moniter{y.2.)
Daltreff-Martin 9/27/84 Emergency Preparedness deficiencies, Deferrals Att.B 84-18
( #1 through # 49.)
Kemper-Schwencer 8/8/84 Sprinklers deferred.
84-24,08 Inspector question of deferred Standby Gas Treatment System (p.5.)
84-39 Uncom-yleted mainten nce ' tr ining(p.6).
a a
Kemper-Schwencer 9/12/84 Deferral of 8 surveillance tests.
Daltreff-Martin 9/7/84 Deferral of Emergency Preparations ( y.5,6,8,13,18,24,25,28,34,35,38.)
Kemper-Starostecki 11/7/84 Brookhaven Review of EST (p.4,5.)
84-31 Maintenance Trending (p.17.)
Kenyer-Schwencer9/6/84 Seismic /Dynamicqualificationdeter-ral (y.2.)
Kemper-Schwencer 9/4/84 Deferral Pressure Iselation Yalves Leak Testing ( Para. 3,(3) )
Kemper-Schwencer 9/27/84 Heacter Coelant deferral (para.( 3 l 84-63 Guard deficiencier (y.2,3, Attach.1 7.7-04,78-17,f79-03,79-16,80-09.)
Three letters Kemper-Schwencer en the same feedwater check valves (lF074 1 and 1F074 B) cast doubt en PECe's records and show a degrading of standards and safety. letters 9/7 and 10/4/84 both specify " minimum crack length of 3t inches" (para.2.) while letter 10/12 emits this.
Kemper-Schweneer 10/12/84 Down-grading turbine steam v lve test weekly,te 31 days.
Kemper-Starostecki. 9/7/84 Downgrading a
leak rate testing; lQ12/84 Leakage reduction tests; '9/26/84 Nitrogen inerting system 3 redesign deferral.
The letters en tornade missiles and damage to the Ultimate Heat Sink,Kemper and Beyer to Murley and Schwencer 8/23,9/4,9/ll,9/24,and 10/19/84 emit altogether the threat to safe shutdown from the design railway erylosion which could simulta-neously collapse the cooling to ers and disable the water' infake structure at the w
river. Lic. NPF-27 should be revoked bec use there is ne prevision to mitigate this.
a We assert NRC. violated 10CFR 50.12. in granting Exemption from 10 CPR 50 lyy.1, GDC 2&4, Ultimate Heat Sink, Beyer-Denten 10/lgr/84.
INDEPENDENT DESIGN VERIFICATION PROGRAM.
We h Pines report. We conclude Schwencer-Bauer lette@r has not been gere
" find-
".WithoutassuranceLic.N s
ing. that would yetentially delay the startup program 3
should never have been issued.
i On the ba is of the violations, deficiencies and willful acts by the j
CONCLUSION.
s licensee set forth above we petition the Director to proceed to revoke Lic. NPF-27 and issue an immedigte show c use order to this effect.
a cct NRC: Cermiss Staff Counsel Hes e fu ly submittad Conner &Wetterhahn, AB LB,3rd Cir.Ct. LEA,Decketing,NRR.
, 8.S.
, eth ers enServ.Lis t ki Ber 186,Meylan, a.19065
U.S. $UCLEAR REC. COEEISS...DIESCTOR, OFFICE OF DSPECTIDN & I'NPCHCEEDT "7
n EEi 'Phila. Eloctric Co. Limerick G,cn Sta, Unit 1.
D:ckot No.: 50-352,353
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P'ETITION SY INTERVENOE, R.L.1NTEOFT/FEIENDS OF THE ELETE,TO TEE DMCTOR,0FF.0F INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT TO INSTITUTE PROCELDDGS TO EE70EE LICZ3SE HPF-27, ISSUED TO PECO;1ND TO ISSUE 15 ORDER TO SEOW CAUSE TdY TEIS LICEN.SE.SHOULD NOT BE RE70EEII.
12/23/84
',' ? -- n on, BACIGEOUND POR PETITION.
inthony/POE h'as been an intervener in the Limeriet licensing proceedings since 1981.
From the time of our first knowledge in February.'.lc84 of ai.Part'70
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license application up to the present we have entered appeals with NRC agencies against the issuance of a fuel license and a low power operating lican se for PECo.
Ye hayw appeals awaiting decisions with NEC and the U.S. Third Circuit Apymala Court. We believe these appeals will be decided in our favor.
Meanwhile PECe is assuming,apparently,tba%t does not have to respect our appeals,and,we under-stand, has started er is about to start the fission process in # 1 reactor. We assert th'at PECe is' in violation of NEC Tegulations and is subjecting us ed the public to the risk of e= tensive unauthorized health and safety dangers by start-ing the nu, clear r*acter w$rthout the required safety previsions.
Ye therefore seek to step the threat to our health and safety through the reveking of the" low power" license issued to PEC'e em 10/26/84 by NEC Off. of Nuclear Beacter Regulatien_,
Anthony /F0E petitiens' the Director,hereby, under 10 CFR 2.200 to revoke License NPF-27,and, te that end, under 10CFE 2.201(c)te find that the public health. and safety are at risk because of EEco's eperation of this reacter,and,further, to find that PECe has willfully violated our he lth, a
safety a d interests and those ef the public.
And in addition we petition the n
Director,un d e r 10*CF2 2.202 (a) to institute proceedings and te~ serve en the j
V licensee an order to show cause why Licecre NPF -27 should not be revoked.
We submit below the evidence wh'ich proves PECe is not qualified to operaie This reacter safely a d the specific de riciencies and violations in equipment, preced-n ures, training, testing and saf eguards, from NEC a d PECe records n
WILLFUL 10 TION.,.
We claim that PECe's application for exemptions from the requireasota of 10'CFR 50 constitute willful sacrifice of public safety.in the interest.f speeding the reactor getting inte service.The details.in J.S.Kemper's letter, 10/25/84, to H.R.Denten,NRC demonstrate this (Request for Ereuptien fran 10 CFR, App. 1,GDC 19)
Para.1....nain centrol room becomes either inoperative er uninhabitable.
- 2...make s it highly unlikely........... simultaneously unavailable.
3.The likeliheed..the centrol reem uninhabitpble is very small...
- 4. The likelibe*d that the Remote Shutdown Systems would not function as designed is small...
5...using equipment presently installed..in conjunction with temporary u h A.94py, jump lers...
I l
/
EDO - 000238 OyTK f ic
Tho quotations abovo shen c. casual a ttitudo toward the loos of tho T
ocotrol roo gand abili.ty to shut down the plant in ecso cf cn accident. Suck e.
ess would bring a estastrvphy to the public,and the werkers in the plant. To
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dismiss this possibility with unsubstantiated assumptions such as these above,
" highly unlikely" and "likeliheed is very small" is irresponsible at the least, and we assert that it constitutes a deliberate, willful negleet of public safety.
The concluding paragraphs of Mr.Komper's letter are included below (1. ).
Ye conclude that as Tice President Engineering and Rese arch,he speaks for PECo.
PECe,thereby,and NRC,in issuing the liesnse a d granting the exenytions, n
enderse. the dismissing of the importance of public hegith and safety with:
"Only the yetectial iaya.ct en public he lth and s fe ty is at issue". This is a
a the key issuelAnd the one that must centrol, net the secondary one that Er.
Kemper stresses, " a delay in the att tument of commercial eyeration( and sub-s further sequent increase in ratepayerAs cost)"
The final paragraph is wishful thinking 3
and unsupported by any fi:na evidence,"..we have concluded that granting the re-quested eremytien will not end.crer life e r neverty... and is otherwise in the public intereet." (Enyhasis added).We emy'aatic lly deny PEC 's(and NHC's) oen-a clusions ebeve and assert the extreme threat to our health and saf ety and that of the public involved in the risk of less of eyeration er habitability of the centrol ree's.
- ~ ~ ~
In granting the exemytions, including the one above, NHC-NER (at 2 D, license f,NFF-27) is in violation of 10 cFR 50.12 since the exemptions violate the public health, saf ety and intere s t. (*.Te quote from the draf.t "Fa ility Operating License "
c supplied to us by V.S. Heyer en 10/17/84,since we were never sent-a copy of Lic. NPF-27 when it was issued.)
OTHER EXEMPTIONS.
Granting of an eremytien from 10 CFE 50 Apy. 1.GDC-61 as requested in the le tter, I.S. Beyer to E.E.Denten, 9/21/84, inE?F-27,is in violation of 10CF2 50.12.-
Net connecting the standby gas treatment _ system to the_ refueling area-yrier to th e first refueling euT, age riska discharging radioactive gas to th e,yublic's (1.)
(Enyhaeis added.)
The requested exmptIon does not irrpact the ccmnon defense and security. Only the potential irreact on pubile health and safety is at issue.
The requested ex mption is in the pubile Interest in that any delay in ecmnencment of Icw pcwer testing and pcwer ascension would cause a delay in the attairment of ecmnercial operation (and subsequent increase In ratepayer's cost) and since, as shown above, the health and safety of the public will be adequately protected.
Based upon the foregoing, we have concluded that granting the requested exerrotion will not endanger life or property or the ccmron defense and security and is otherwise,In the public Interest.
ctcoephero in caso of on cecident.
To assort that (3 2) "Thoso ccrsitcao to eff'oetivwly procludo the rolocso of rodicactivity to the rofuoI$nkg.a do not guar n t e e th'at th ey are sufficient er will be carried out,ner is there evideuce a
to substantiate the assumptions summed up in,.." we have concluded that granting the requested exemption will not enda ger life er property or the commen defense n
and security and is otherwise in the public interest". Te cacclude the exact ey-yesite,and further declare that connecting SGTS services to the refueling area is essential to protect the public,is ne essaary and in the iublic interest.
.. delaying the operation of Limerick" is,and must be secondary to public safety!
Having the SGTS functiening ir vital pro tection for the yublic against the acci-dental release of. radioactive gases since lie. NPF-27 does not exclude arceeding 50% y.wer eyeration ( C.( 10) (f) nor 100% power ( C. (1.) ).
Cranting an eremytien from 10 CPR 50 lyy.J,as requested in J.S.Iemper's letter of 9/14/84 to H.R.Denten is not justified and is in violation of 10CFR 50.1:
bec use it enda gers the public health and safety. Public safety is ignored en a
n page 2,
"..it can be concluded tha.t there is reasonable nasurance against undue air lock' leakage..."
Public safety requires more than " reasonable assurance";
it is a question of human lives, and nothing short of all vessible assurance is satisfactory. It is not true that there could be (p.2)" ne significant increase in the environmental impact beyond that experienced with no eresytion." And we deny (y.4) "That it can be concluded that there is reasonable assurance against undue TIP cuide tube leakage.."
We further assert that(y 4. D.)" arenytien from
~ -. _ _ -
the requirement to perf orm local leak rstattesting 6n seven PCP relief v lver.."
a makes safe shutdown uncertain and is a tirest to public health and safety and is in viol tion ef 10 CfR 50]12[-~
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a It is centrary to NRC regulations and NEP1 and 1El that public safety should be yut in second place te (p.5.)" Changer to fa ilitate cuct terting at the yr.s.
c eut time would have an adverse inyaet en system turnover and plant startuy,"and (y.6.) "If literal cearlia mandated...Ifdesign ch nges were undertaken, nce were a
a corres7endi'ng delay in the operation...iny delay in the eyeration of Limerick
..would cause the cost of thask unit to increase." The last sentence (y.6.)shows where PECe's priorities lie 4ts disreguard of the public safety and interest,
" Denial...,would have a substantial financial impact en PEQe.and its customers n
to a d is not warran ted..." NEC must not allow PECO's financial straig'a ts compromise the' safety and lives of the public.
1 further eremytion requested by PEC in a letter,Y.S.Beyer to H.E.Denten, 9/21/84, poses a severe threat to public s fety and interest by yestyening until a
the first refueling outate adequate isolation va_lves. far the hydrogen receabiner lines and the Drywell Chilled Water and Reacter Enclosure Cooling Water.. Public safety is at risk because of the absence of these valves;tme operation At the reacter is unsafe and 10 CFR 50.12 w s violated by the granting of this eresytten a
by FRC in lic.NPP-27. Any penetr tions of the prima y containment havc the potentic r
a
t
--4--
for rcdiocetivo rele sos to the 'public cuvironocut cad no enf cgu rds econceted a
a 61th theso shculd bo caitted,ocyocially in the first phaco of oparatice of the re cter. It cannet be assured to eyer te safely a d to shut down without risk a
a n
to the public with the emmission of tid valves cancelled by this azemytion. There is ne substantiation to PECO'e assertion (y.3)" The probability of a release to the environment through these closed systems inside containment is lew" PECe goes en to erylain the exact kind of accident which could cause such a release.
Ye disagree with NRC 's finding tha,t (y.)) "This deviation represents a justifiable, 33 1, ceneral Design Cr4 teria }ra.=,and (3 4. )
6 truyerary exemption fren 10 CFR 50,1 en he con.
ry signific nt increase in environmental inyaet". There isyke risk of fatal
- ns a
impact en the public in the event of a nuclear accident and emergency.
We call especial attention to Er.Beyer's use of the same weres as quoted ff ea Mr.Eemper's letteT,10/25/84 (y.2 above)" (p.4.) Only the yetenfial inyact en public he lth and safety is at issue.
This certainly ayyears te discount a
and probably dismiss the issue of public..ksalth and safety as of any controlling relevance.
On th e other hand he also streesde the avoidance of" delay (y.4.)in the attainment of commercial *yeration","If literal compliance..were mandated..
a corresponding delay in the eyeration",and "would cause the cost of the unit to increate."
Te repeat that "11 tere.1 compliance" is ne less than is yroyer to protect lives and it is what the regulations and NEPA and 1El require. Cen-sider tions of syeed in getting Limerick in, oper tion and the financial effects a
a of delay en PECO are secondery 1 sines which must yield to the protection of the public.
Justification of the above exemptions by PECe show its deliber te and a
willful disregard of the public health,eafety and interest.
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS.
We have received copies of licensee event reyerte starting with 84-001, dated 10/27/84,but only reported.'11/26/84 We have ayyarently not been suyylied with copies of all these reports since there are gays in numbers and we de not know ehether there were operating incidentz before # 84-001, connected with the nuclear fuel.
In any case the 12 reports that we have been sent demonstrate that the Limerick plant a d Personnel are not in_c.endition to operate the 81 n
~
m reacter safely and that License NPF-27 sieuld be, revoked'_immefia_tely to protect 7
the public health-and safety.
The 12 reports are-listed here:
LEE f Event Report Summary 84-001 10/27/84 11/26/84 - Deficioney:.ehannel~eieck & radiation moniter 84-002 10/31 11/30 Ciannel bypasa, trip signal, full scram.84-003 10/31 11/30 CO2 yilet gas supply valve elesed for 5 days84-005 11/9 12/10 Trip e.ils burnt out, full nera,a signal 84-006 11/13 12/13 Drywell purge fan,less yewer to chlorine analyser i
84-007 11/14 12/14 Inyreyer venting-start core spray,REH, diesel gen.
i 84-008,010 11/15 & 18 12/14 Equipment malfunction. control reen vent. iselation 84-009 11/16 12/14 Radiation monitor out, radioactivity sample missed 84-011 11/18 12/17 Technician short circuit, damage high radiation men.1 84-13 11/20 12/19 RHE iselati on valve failed to eyen free remete panci 84-021 11/15 12/14~
Short in test c ble ylng-isolation water eleanup a
. k'hodo complos of Licensoo Reyerts only givo a hint of tho tne picturo of
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eqtilynont f ailuresi, construction defociencies,preceduro gays and maintenanco and o'yorator blundoro by PSCo et tho Linerick plant.
Tac list abovo okowo 12 oz-amples,yractically all of which could have enda gered the public with a serious n
accident e.ffecting saf ety systems at the plant,and consequent involvement of the reacter and the threat of radioactivity to the environment.
The record above included 12 License Events in 25 days and we de not know whether all the events were reported er whet'mer we were supplied a complete record. Per eranyle 8 04 and
- 12'are missing and there is a gay between # 13 and ! 021.
Tais record,however, of 12 events in 25 days { ayyreriaately $/ week ) without the finsten process started,is a serious warning of the dangers to the public in actual eyeraties, wk,ich we understand started about 12/15 since we have no event rec.rd since
! 84-13 en 11/15,we have..no idea how many more there have been from then to the present.
'As an eranyle of events which could have been concealed, we found the notice of a fuel bundle hitting ntfuelyeelwallen8/22/_84enthe (y.27) of NRC 2sgien I. Inspec.x 4-43 and 84-11 in para. ( which conclud-last yace 8
(we clain wit'a willful deceptiveness) "No violations were identified."
es The record above conclusively proves that PECe is not able to eyerate the Limerick.~reacter in conform nce with NRC regulations and without the probability a
of acciden'ts and errors w'aich would threaten the he lti, safety and icterest of a
the public.
A sauyle of the Licensee Events abere Benenstrate PECo's inability to carry eut safety resyensibilities, and call for the reveking of Lic. NPF-27:
- 84-001 (p.1-1).." channel checks of the,four scram discharge volume level transmitters and the four refueling area ventilation erbaust duct radiation; monitors were not perf ormed as required.."
- 84-002 (y. 1-3)
This event was c used by personnel error-the failure a
of the I&C Technician to check with Shif t Supervision yrier to rncennecting the cable to the detector.
The subsequent scram event would not have occurred if the IRM had been bypassed..."
884-005 (p.1-1) ".. source voltage was slig's tly high,..f eeder tripped eyen..
With shorting links re m oved..RPS trip system... caused a full scram-signal.."
884-006 (p.1-2) "The eguse of the event was inadequate investigation by t'me eyerators attempting to resolve the drywell yurge problen..."
f 84-00J ( y. 1-2)
.. a reacter low level isolation, signal. The
'C' core sygay pump and t'ae 'C' EEE yump eyerated on minimum flew recirculation to the suyyression.yeel. D 13 diesel generater output breaker did not close ente its emergency bus,e."..." Cause of the event was improper. venting..."
OTHER DEFICIENCIES.
of While we de net have a complete record, deficiencies and eyen er unresolved construction er eyeration items which disqualify PECe from being able to eyerate the nuclear reacter safely,we include a sampling of some,ichseeuld prevent PECe from wh holding Lic.NPF-27 Inspection 84-49,-12. Open : y.11 Dieselt Onreselved,y. 17 Inspection Brookhaven' Nat. Lab.,10/4/84 Staros tecki Kemper, yara.10.1 Open Findings (10)
Wo ingludo cdditional rayerts involving
- oef oty issues that are unn soly-A, (n[nt$1rentiroty)buteithcyocialreferoncosindicated, Inay. 84-47 (p. 7,15,17,18) 84-27 ( y.16,20) 84-29 (y.9) 12 welds with rejectable indications.
84-50 (p. 5,6.)
Eurley-Daltreff 11/9/84 (defieteney re. security guards.)
84-52 (Ittnh.1 y. 14,20,23.)
84-54 Ereeytions (p.3,4,7.)
84-55 ( y.13,14,15) 84-56 Training ( y.2.)
84-62 Test exceptions (3 4,5.)
84-60,-13
( p. 13,14,15,16 )
84-59 shutdown margiu 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> instead of 30 minutes.
(p.4.)
Centrol Reen Design Review 10/84 Incomplete, Mis ing ( y.11,16,20. )
s Schwencer-Sauer 10/16/84 Tech. Eval,Centrol Heem.
Ince=ylete, inadequate (y.18',19,20)
Kemper-Schwencer 10/15/84 N* NH" safety evaluation en the resoluti.o of generie issue ( y.2.)
remyer-Schwencer8/1/84 hef erral REP.SY PEE radiation moniter(p.2.)
Daltreff-Eartin 9/27/84 Emergency Preparedness deficiencies, Deferrals Att.3 84-18
( #1 through # 49.)
Iemyrr-Schwencer 8/8/84 Syrinklers deferred.
84-24,08 l
Inspector question of deferred Standby Gas Treatment System (y.5.)
84-39 Uncem-yleted maintenance ' tr ining(p.6).
a Iemper-Schwencer 9/12/84 Deferral of 8 surveillance tests.
Daltreff-Eartin 9/7/84 Deferral of Emergency Preparations (y.5,6,8,13,18,24,25,28,34,35,38.]
I Kenyer-Starostecki 11/7/84 Brookhaven Review of EST (y.4/5.)
84-31 raintenance l
Trending (3 17.)
Kenyer-Schweneer9/6/84 Seismic / Dynamic Qualification defer-ral (y.2.)
Iemper-Schwencer 9/4/84 Deferral Pressure Isolation Yalves Leak Testing ( Para. 3,(3) )
Iemper-Schwencer 9/27/84 Heacter Coelant deferra1(yara.( 3j 84-63 Guard deficiencies (y.2,3, Attach.1 7.7-04,78-17,f79-03,79-16,80-09 )
Three letters Eemper-Schwencer en the same feedwater check valver (lF074 1 and 17074 3) cast doubt en PECo's records and show a degrading of standards and safety. Letters 9/7 and 10/4/84 both specify " minimum crack length of 3i inches" (p rs.2.) while letter 10/12 emits this.
Eemper-Schweneer 10/12/84 Lown-grading turbine steen.v lve te e t weekly,te 31 days.
Iemper-Starostecki. 9/7/84 Downgrading a
leak rate testing; 1C/L2/84 Leakage reduction tests; '9/26/84 Nitrogen inerting.
, system 3 redesign deferral.
The letters en tornade missiles and damage to the Ultimata Eeat Sink,Iemper and Beyer to Murley and Schwencer 8/23,9/4,9/11,9/24,and 10/19/84 emit altogether the threat to safe shutdown from the design railway erylosien which could simulta-neously collapse the cooling towers and disable the water'iniake structure at thw river. Lic. NPF-27 should be revoked bec use there is ne prevision to mitigate thin a
c We assert NHC. violated 10CFR 50.12. in granting Exemption from 10 CPH 501y7 1,
GDC 2&4, Ultimate Heat Sink, Seyer-Denten 10/1gr/84, INDEPENDENT DESIGN 7EEIFICATION PROGRAM.
Weh@2MerbeengivenafinalTerrey Pitre s re p o rt. We conclude Schwencer-Bauer letter has not been gered as to " find-s ing. that would yetentially delay the startup program ". Wit'neut assurance Lic.NPP'21 3
should never have been issue,d.
C ONC LU SION.
On the ba is of the violations, deficiencies and willful acts by the s
yetition the Director to proceed to revoke Lic. FPF-27 licensee set forth above we and issue an immedigte show c use order to this effect.
a Conner &Wetterhahn,13 LB'3rd Cir.Ct. LEA, ethersStaff Counsel,Decketing,NRR.
Hes etfully submitte ce: NRC: Corniss
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45.50-352/353 (2.206) togging Date 17 /11/Ad NRC SECRETARIAT 4
TO:
Commissioner Date M Exec. DirdOper.
O cen. counsee O cona. Liaison solicitor O Public Affairs O secretary O
incoming:
From: Rnhert i Anthnny F0E (Friends of the Farth) ro: Commissioners care 12/23/84 License; subject:. Petition to Institute Proceedinos to Revoke _
and to Isuse an Order to Show Cause Why This License Should no-t be Revoked b Prepare reply for signature of:
O chairman O commissioner O EoO. cc. ct. sot. PA. sECY signature block omitted O Return original of incomia9 *ith '*5a "'La a -
DE!C...I.
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O Fordirect reply *
.. c..xxo
$ For appropriate action O Forinformation O For recommendation Cys Chairman. Commissioner Asselstino. OCA. OPA.
Remarks:
OGC, OPE, Chilk. Bates. Records (ELD,E00)
For the Commission: Eugenia
' send three (3) copies of reply to secy Mail Facility mac42A ACTION stiP
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T_ Gen. Counsel l K 1 L:
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Incoming:
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From: Rnhart i Anthnnv i '9 '
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- ' cit;d12/23/84 License;SubiI. Petition to Institute Proceedinos to Revoke an to Isuse an Order to Show Cause Whv This I I' --License Should no-t be Revoked g.e-O Prensre repiv eor signature or:s P
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@ For appropriate action 3
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. For recommendation Remarks: -Cys Chairman. Commissioner Asselst'ine. OCA. OPA.
c OGC, OPE. Chilk. Bates. Records I re n,,
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i For the Commission: Eugenia
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ACTION SLIP Nac42A L.-
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UNITED STATES y
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g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
.. E WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
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ED0_ PRINCIPAL CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL 7
(_.$ '
FROM:
DUE: 01/31/85 EDO CONTROL: 060238 DOC DT: 12/23/84 ROBERT L.
ANTHONY FINAL REPLY:
COMMISSIONERS 3. IE FOR SIGNATURE OF: Denton GREEN SECY NO:
DESC:
ROUTING:
2.206 PETITION TO REVOKE LICENSE OF PHILA.
DENTON ELECTRIC CO. FOR LIMERICK, UNIT 1 AND TO ISSUE DEYOUNO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THIS LICENSE SHOULD NOT BE MlJRLEY REVOKED ASSIGNED TO: ELD DATE: 01/02/85 CONTACT: CUNNINGHAM SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS:
7 contact: Eisenhut M
b ifsw Received NRR 1/14/85 e
cc: Case /Denton M
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PPAS e
e853005'
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o AIR and WATER Pollution Patrol
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BROAD AXE,PA.
SN C
=='5N:-4dLsrec0 15 a 22 m s April 16, 1985 VI f Dr. Harold Denton U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Washington, D.C. 20555
Dear Dr. Denton:
Enclosed is a copy of a letter 1 wrote you on March 11, 1985 relating to the fact that the public was kept ignorant of " shelter-ing" as an option to evacuation. Sheltering is another word for death trap and must be tested just as all aspects of evacuation to other areas from the Limerick reactor.
We have not received a reply to date, If we do-not receive a reply by return main I will contact Chairman Nunzio Palladino, Se'n-ator Schweiker and Congressman Lawrence Coughlin, the latter two t
l being personal acquaintances and live in the Montgomery County area of Limerick, as I do.
Very truly yours,
]
F nk R. Ro an Chairman 1
M ir & Water Pollution Patrol 61 Forest Ave.
Ambler, Pa. 19002 I certify copies of the above have been served on the latest service list.
~
l b
- G~iO425G557 850416 gDR ADOCK 05000352
\\
l p, PDR
AIR and WATER Pollution Patrol BROAD AXE, PA.
March 111)NE585 Dr. Harold Denton.
15 art 22 4159 NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Washington, D.C.
20555 0FFICE OF SECRtiiAF t 00CKETING & SE8vlCr
Dear Dr. Denton:
You may remember four years ago I wrote you regarding blast-ing at the Trap Rock Co. on the same rock upon which the Limer-ick reactor is built.
I thank you for having required a second look by PECO and the NRC relative to that issue.
The blasting was only one of the many factors not taken into consideration by PECO.
In fact one of my admitted contentions in-volved Limerick welding inspections...in particular IE-76-06-01 where a welder marked off a weld as O.K.
and P.E. also checked it out as O.K..
Later an NRC inspector, over claims by PECO that the weld was 0.K., insistedona[Enspectionandthenfoundatot-ally unacceptable weld.
What I had originally put in as a contention was a " pattern of carelessness", starting through 1974 on welding, electrical, concrete work, etc.
But the ASLB denied the pattern contention but ultimately permitted litigation on the contention only to welds that I could find improperly inspected and improperly dis-positioned.
How is a citizen not permitted to go into the reactor to investigate able to do such?
It was in the 76-06-01 " Broomstick Affair", as I called it, that proved the carelessness--and worse--bordering on the crimin-al, namely, falsification.of records and fraud, wherein Mark J.
Wetterhahn, Attorney for PECO repeatedly stated "all welds inspec-ted by subject inspector (a Mr. Ferretti), both visible and invis-ible, were re-inspected".
It was on the basis of that statement that the ASLB was influ-enced to deny my original contention.
But on my insisting for proof, by affidavit from PECO, that all welds both visible and in-N B50416 PDR ADOCK 05000352 PDR
.o Ypp.
m
.o AIR and WATER Pollution Patrol BROAD AXE, PA.
(2)
. Letter to Harold Denton of 3/11/85 continued:
visible were re-inspected, Mr. Wetterhahn could not corroborate his previously repeated statement regarding inspection of all welds.
Thereupon, my contention, limited to welds, was admitted.
In the 76-06-01 incident wereas PECO at first said 435 welds were involved, it then raised t'he number to over seven hundred then to over twelve hundred.
In a mixed-up, unbelievable state-ment as to how PECO missed.certain welds, and how they inspected others, and ultimately dispositioned welds by engineering or computer, a classsical example of PECO's contempt for NRC reg-ulations became obvious.
I join with Mr. Robert Anthony / FOE in calling for a show cause order on the revocation of P.E.'s low power testing licen-se issued 10/26/84.
As detailed in Mr. Anthony's letter to you of 2/25/85, I have all the Licensee " Event Reports", and there is no industry in the U.S.
that would not immediately discharge all management and quality control with such a disgraceful rec-ord that borders on the comical if the errors were not capable of tragedy in the near furtue if an operating license is given to operate limerick.
Above and beyond the instances listed by Mr. Anthony is the lack of protection that the errors definitely suggest will be needed.
I refer to the possibility of a General Emergency Acci-dent that will require " sheltering".
The public has not been adequately informed as to what sheltering is and what their chan-ces are of injury and death, for example, in 3AM darkness with bilzzard blocked roads, so that people could not leave their homes, nor could people reach them.
I ask that PECO not be pernitted to operate until " shelter-ing" has been fully tested; until the public is told what their
AIR and WATER W
Pollution Patrol BROAD AXE, PA.
~
(3)
Letter to Harold Denton of 3/11/85 continued:
chances of injury and survival are; until sheltering practice drills similar to evacuation study; until the public is assured
~
that the benifits from Limerick are worth the hideous risk of the death trap referred to as sheltering.
MS. Margaret A. Reilly, Chief, Division of Environmental Resources, testimony before the ASLB re sheltering was an abject p_
and sorry indication of that death trap being desguised by the
[
use of the word sheltering.
(see enclosure)
Think of it 0.08
~
dose reduction of " general shine".
How can an 0.08 reduction be considered anything but suicidal?
Is Ms. Reilly afraid to use the term gamma rays for " general shine" because people might then know an average house could never protect against high intensity gamma rays?
Are you, Dr. Denton, going to permit such careless contempt for lives of people and genetic damage to children yet unborn?
It is your re,sponsibility, more important your duty, to insure f_
no operation ~ of Limerick until, like evacuation, the public is informed, tests are done, and acceptance by the people who will n.
have to take the risks.
Please advise.
Very truly yours, ATER POL TION PATROL
\\- Qevt 2 FrA'nIR. Romano, Ch' airman' 61 Forest Ave.
FRR/jch Ambler, PA. 19002 S
O
30 LAW OFFICES CoxxEn & WETTERH AHN. P.C.
17 4 7 P E N N S Y LVA N I A AV E N U E. N. W.
-Tao v s. cOh N En J R.
WA S HIN G TON. D. C. 2 0000 MARK J. WETTE RM AHN ROB E RT M. RA.DE R DOU O LA S X.OLSON J E S SICA H.LAVERTY 88'52 x cao' 5 April 12, 1985 ROBERT H.PL*ML gao-y p33 33oo BERNHA RD O. BECH HOEFER w copeat C A BLE ADDNESS. ATO4 L Aw Mr. Harold R.
Denton Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 In the Matter of Philadelphia Electric Compar.y (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2)
Docket Nos. 50-352 and 50-353
Dear Mr. Denton:
By letter dated February 6, 1985, Philadelphia Electric Company responded to the petition submitted to you on December 23, 1984 by Robert L.
Anthony for himself and on behalf of Friends of the Earth (collectively " FOE").
That petition requested relief pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 52.206 and was treated accordingly by the NRC.
50 Fed.
Reg.
7152 (February 20, 1985).
In response, your letter to Mr. Anth'ny of February 13, o
1985, stated that "[n}one of [the matters cited by FOE in its request]
requires immediate action sought by the petition regarding continued operation of the facility."
FOE supplemented its request by letter dated February 25, 1985.
^
For the reasons stated in the attached comments of Philadelphia Electric Company, none of the other matters recently raised by FOE warrants the relief requested.
M Oil'041G 850412 DR ADOCK 0500 2
[p$
s
T:
-Mr. Harold R. Danton s.
" ' ~
April 12, 1985 Page 2 Accordingly, the petition for relief under Section 2.206 should be denied.
Sincerely, Mark J. Wetterhahn Counsel for the Licensee MJW/dlf Enclosure cc:
Eugene J.
Bradley, Esq.
Robert L. Anthony I
)
i
s SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTS OF PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY ON FOE'S LETTER DATED FEBRUARY 25, 1985 RELATING TO ITS REQUEST UNDER 10 C.F.R.
S2.206 On February 6,
- 1985, Philadelphia Electric Company
("PECO")
com.mented upon FOE's request under 10 C.F.R. 52.206, pointing out that no basis in fact or law had been shown for FOE's request that the NRC initiate proceedings to revoke the operating license for Unit 1 cf the Limerick Generating Station
(" Limerick") by issuing an order to show cause.
In its letter dated February 25,
- 1985, FOE sets forth additional matters in support of its request for relief.
As discussed belcw, the specific items set fcrth by FOE demonstrate a misunderstanding of the facts as well as the importance of the matters it seeks to raise.
The documents cited by FOE were generated by PECO and the NRC in their ongoing inspections and safety reviews and therefore do not constitute any new information.
Moreover the items raised by FOE do not pose any threat to the public health and safety.
The various documents cited by FOE include a Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance
("SALP")
<eport, NRC inspection reports, PECO's Licensee Event Reports
("LER's")
and related correspondence.l_/
In adjudicatory proceedings, the boards have rejected similar claims presented on the basis of such information already in the record.
Before addressing the specific matters raised by FOE, PECO there-fore will review some of those decisions.
Adjudicatory Decisions Allegations like FOE's have typically been, raised in licensing proceedings in the context of quality assurance issues.
The Boards have ruled that the mere recitation of isolated deficiencies and violations does not raise any litigable issue and has no particular safety significance to the plant.
For example, in Callaway, the Appeal Board stated:
In any project even remotely ap-proaching in magnitude and complexity the erection of a nuclear power plant, there inevitably will be some con-struction defects tied to quality assurance lapses.
It would therefore be totally unreasonable to hinge the grant of an NRC operating license upon a
demonstration of error-free con-struction.
Nor is such a result mandat-ed by either the Atomic Energy Act of
- 1954, as amended, or the Commission's implementing regulations.
What they require is simply a finding of reason-able assurance
- that, as
- built, the facility can and will be opereted without endangering the public health and safety.
- Thus, in examining 1/
Inasmuch as all of the matters raised by FOE pertain to documents in the
- record, we assume that the Comission's Statement of Policy on hanfiling late allegations is inapplicable.
See 50 Fed. Reg. 11030 (March 19, 1985).
v'
~
claims of quality assurance defi-ciencies, one must look to the implica-
- ~ ~
tion of those deficiencies in terms of safe plant operation.2/
Reiterating this standard in Shoreham, the Appeal Board rejected intervenor's argument that "every deficiency, however minor, reflects an attitude or lack of discipline that undermines confidence that the QA program has been successful."3/
The Board agreed that deficiencies or violations. lack safety significance where found "to be minor, readily correctable, and posing no concern about the adequacy of (plant) design, construction or installation."d/
The Licensing Board in Shoreham disapproved an inter-venor's use of the same approach taken by FOE in its Section 2.206 petition, which it characterized as " bean counting. "
It stated:
This Board is not about to become involved in a " numbers game" of counting beans of different colors in viewing the examples of QA failures relied on by (petitioner).
Rather,- we have kept foremost in our minds the intent of the NRC requirements and the actual and practical measures taken to meet these requirements to assure no undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
We seek a
solid foundation for finding reasonable assurance of adequate pro-tection of the health and safety of'the
-2/
Union Electric Company (Callaway
- plant, Unit 1),
ALAB-740, 18 NRC 343, 346 (1983).
3/
Long Island Lighting Companv (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-788, 20 NRC 1102, 1141 (1984).
4/
Id. at 1142.
1
4_
i public.
We do not seek evidence of a sterile application of ritualistic
~ ~ ~
methodology.5_/
As the Licensing Board in Perry similarly stated:
The test of a QA program, however, l
lies not only in its ability to uncover discrepancies in QA but also in its ability to cope with them successfully l
so that they are remedied and that l
assurance of safe construction can ultimately be found.6/
i In issuing its Partial Initial Decision on a quality assur-ance contention, the Board in Perry rejected far more sweeping claims than those alleged by FOE and held:
The construction of Perry is a
massive task.
We are not surprised that applicant's quality assurance program has detected thousands of nonconfor-mances that have arisen during con-struction.
There is no indication that there are serious problems that have escaped detection or are not being carefully tracked and resolved.7/
Regarding the matter of corrective actions for noncon-formance reports identified in notices of violation and SALP's, the Board in Perry further stated:
-5/
Shoreham, supra, LBP-83-57, 18 NRC 445, 579-60 (1983),
aff'd, ALAB-788, 20 NRC 1102 (1984).
The Board noted that the'NPC Staff "has looked at many different ways of counting violations, and has found such
' bean' counting to be essentially meaningless."
- M.
at 604-05.
6_/
Cleveland Electric Illuminatina Ccmpany (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-74, 18 NRC 1241, 1252 (1983).
7,/
Perry, supra, LBP-83-77, 18 NRC 1365, 1367-68 (1983).
_S_
The intervenors have not raised any serious doubts about the adequacy of the closecut systems.
The Board is entirely satisfied that applicant's system is closely tracking the status of NRs at
- Perry, and that nonconformances are being properly closed out in a manner consistent with their safety signifi-Cance.
These matters must be examined in context.
We would be concerned if it' appeared that applicant was not ade-quately monitoring the safety signifi-cance and status of ARs (audit action reports}; however, the record indicates otherwise.
Applicant's procedural system, and its use of this system to correct, problems, in our view reflect a proper degree of involvement and con-trol.
Intervenors have not indicated any evidence that casts doubt on this conclusion.8_/
Overall, the Board in Perry found that violations and deficiencies discussed in NRC investigative reports and SALP's " disclosed no serious inadequacies" and were general-ly " associated with the first phase of a major new work activity, where ' start-up' deficiencies may be more likely."
The Board concluded that, considering the breadth of the Staff's investigation and inspections, there was not a
" disproportionate number of noncompliances," which "were of a relatively low severity level."9/
8/
Id. at 1387, 1389.
9/
Id. at 1393-94.
... Other boards have similarly found that minor violations
~ ~ ~
and deficiencies do not raise any substantial issues regard-ing the public health and safety.
In Comanche Peak, the Licensing Board rejected a
late contention relating to deficiencies in the applicant's hot functional testing where the petitioner simply
- recited, "without any analytical differentiation or sense of priority, dozens of specific omissions and problems."bI The Board stated:
We do not find these omissions or the discovery of problems to have been startling or disturbing.
The staff states that the plant cannot load fuel until staff is satisfied that it is safe to go to power.
The staff must be satisfied that it is safe to load fuel even though certain items have not received hot functional testing.
It also must be sure that each of the problem areas has been resolved.
[The proposed contention] contains a very detailed description of omissions of equipment during hot functional testing, but it does not give a basis for believing that any of those omissions has safety significance.
Similarly, it points out problems found by applicant during its own test, but it does not provide any basis for believing that the discovery of these problems indicates some safety deficiency in the construction of the plant.ll/
M/
Texas Utilities Generating Company (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-75A, 18 NRC 1260, 1262 (1983).
11/
Id.
at 1262-63.
As the Board added:
" Individual problems found in the course of a testing program only indicate that the program is working.
Unlest there is (Footnote Continued)
.. In the Byron proceeding, the Licensing Board rejected
- ~ ~
requests to reopen the record based upon NRC inspection reports on preoperational testing, which noted minor noncom-pliances equivalent to those cited by FOE in its petition.
The Board held that "the events reported in the inspection reports did not seem to rise to [the] level" of indicating any institutional incapacity in applicant's quality assur-ance program.bI Notably, the Staff testified in an affida-vit opposing reopening.that Severity Level IV violations are not a significant safety issue and that, due to the complex-ity and scope of the preoperational testing program at a nuclear power plant, including the large number of inspector hours, "the identification of many items of noncompliance is not unexpected."NI During the hearing in Byron, the Staff reiterated its testimony that a higher number of deficiencies would be expected during inspection of precperational testing activ-ities, and that the safety significance of noncompliances must be analyzed "in the context of the SALP evaluations and other controlling factors such as the civil penalties, (Footnote Continued) additional
- basis, discovered problems are not in themselves grounds for admittina a contention."
Id. at 1264 n.6.
M/
Commonwealth Edison Company (Byron Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2),
LBP-83-41, 18 NRC 104, 110 (1983).
13/
Id. at 107.
A F
.~..
. ~. a..
8-the severity levels of the noncompliances, the amount of
^~
activity at a particular site, the phase of the activity (e.g., construction approaching fuel loading), the number of inspector-hours, the age of the plant, and the utility's response to the citations." M/
The Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforce-ment denied relief under Section 2.206 in Point Beach where the petitioner, like FOE, argued that Severity Level IV and l
V violations warranted the relief.
After examining the SALP i
reports for Point Beach "to determine whether they illus-trate a ' decline in performance that is significant enough to require issuance of an order to show cause why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked," the Staff I
" concluded that they do not" inasmuch as the overall perfor-1 mance of the licensee "was never considered unsatisfac-tory."El As in Point Beach, the Staff should also conclude in this instance that the Severity Leve? IV and V violations cited by petitioner, which "had limited safety signifi-cance," do not justify " escalated enforcement action" such as issuance of an order to show cause.EI I
I i
M/
Byron, supra, LBP-84-2, 19 NRC 36, 119 (1984).
15/
Wisconsin Electric Power Company (Point Beach Nuclear
~
Plant, Units 1 and 2),
DD-83-13, 18 NRC 721, 722-23 (1983).
i l
16/
Id. at 722.
-9 Matters Allecad By FOE
~ ~ ~
With the approach of the adjudicatory boards and Staff in other proceedings as background, we now address the various categories of items raised by FOE.
The first matter raised by FOE is an NRC SALP Report for Limerick dated January 14, 1985.
FOE cites construction deficiency reports filed from December 1,
1983 through November 30, 1984 as listed in Table 1 of the SALP Report.
The reporting of such deficiencies,
- however, is merely evidence that PECO's quality assurance program is working and does not indicate any hazard to the public health and safety in the operation of Limerick.
Similarly, the mere recitation of Severity Level IV and V violations in Table 3, in,a project of the magnitude of Limerick, does not indicate any problem in meeting regulatory standards or any hazard to the public health and safety.
The particular items upon which FOE has focused do not demonstrate any basis for instituting license revocation proceedings.
As with any SALP Report, areas in which the
.NRC has found a need for improvement are discussed.
The summary of the SALP Report, nevertheless, exp,ressly states that "the quality of construction activities remained high" during the assessment period and that "[m]anagement involve-ment was evident." b The SALP Report further states that jl/
SALP Report at 6 (January 14, 1985).
- go -
the " level of performance of preoperational testing activ-
~ ~~
ities improved over that shown in the previous assessment" and that
" licensee management took adequate corrective actions to address (previously identified) weaknesses after they were identified by the NRC."E
- Further, the NRC found in the SALP Report that the contribution to the cverall quality of the program made by the licensee's Test Review Board to be " noteworthy," and
" amply demonstrated during NRC's programmatic reviews."E In conclusion, the NRC determined that the " level of perfor-mance attained by the end of the preoperational phase appears to have carried over into the startup phase."E#
Accordingly, the NRC rated PECO's performance in con-struction activities as Category I, consistent trend.EI 18/
Id.
19/
Id.
20/
Id.
In. the more detailed discussion of construction Etivities, the SALP Report states:
"The licensee maintained good performance throughout this assessment period.
Significant amounts of NRC inspection effort bore out the conclusion that the ' quality of construction was maintained at a high level."
I d,. at 9.
21/
Id. at 11.
A SALP Report designation of Category 1 means:
" Reduced NRC attention may be appropriate.
Licensee management attention and involvement are aggressive and oriented toward nuclear safety; licensee resources are ample and ef fectively used such that a high level of performance with respect to operational safety or construction is being achieved."
- g. at 4.
.s l
l Thereafter, FOE cites a
number of NRC inspection
- ~
reports and PECO LER's, whose results were incorporated within the SALP Report.
FOE's discussion of these report.
is wholly lacking in any analysis of demonstrated or poten-I tial safety significance.
No basis exists to support the sweeping allegation that each of the events reported by PECO "had the potential to precipitate a nuclear accident."M/
For example, the most recent report cited by FOE, Inspection Report No.
50-352/85-08 (February 1,
1985),
contains a
l single Severity Level IV violation.
Page four of the Report describes the short-term and long-term corrective actions proposed by the licensee to enhance operator familiarity with Technical Specification requirements and procedural, guidance t,o operators.
FOE also cites inspection reports not analyzed in the February 14, 1985 SALP Report.
None of those reports, however, cites violations more serious than a l
Severity Level IV. E I l
l FOE asserts that it has "no indication that there was l
any summary or review of open inspection items, exceptions, 1
l 22/
Letter dated February 25, 1985 from Robert L.
Anthony to Harold R.
Denton, Director, NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (" FOE letter of February 25, 1985")
,at 1.
23/
See FOE letter dated February 25, 1985 at 3.
- Moreover,
~
l FOE has apparently misinterpreted certain
- reports, l
1.e.,
treating the discussion of open items in Inspection Report 50-352/84-72 and 50-352/84-66 as I
involving new items.
l l
i i
I l
l
violations or deviations which were required to be resc1ved" prior to criticality for Unit 1.U/
No reference is made to
- ~ ~
any specific item listed in the license.EI Inasmuch as the NRC need not accord
" presumptive validity"E to FOE's conjecture that certain requirements might not have been met, it is unnecessary for the NRC to institute a proceeding to establish affirmatively that those conditions have been met.
Obviously, this is a matter of ongoing staff review and will necessarily be examined in the issuance of a full-power license.E 24/
Id.
25/
See License No. NPF-27 (Attachment 1, Item 4)
(October
~
26, 1984).
26/
Northern Indiana Public Service Company (Bailly
~
Generating Station, Nuclear-1), CLI-78-7, 7 NRC 429, 432 (1978).
The Bailly standard was recently reiterated by the Licensing Board in Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation (Kress Creek Decontamination),
Docket No.
40-2061-SC, "Second Prehearing Conference Memorandum and Order" (February 7, 1985)
(slip op, at
- 7).
.27/
See 10 C.F.R. 550.57(a).
As the Appeal Board stated in summer, it is the Staf f which is obligated "to insure the existence of an adequate basis for each of the requisite Section 50.57 determinations
- before the issuance of the operating license.
South Carolina Electric Gas Company (Virgil C.
Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1),
ALAB-642, 13 NRC 881, 896 (1981).
Subsequently in that case, the Licensing Board denied a motion to reopen on the ground that it "could do no more than order that (alleged deficiencies) be corrected and that the corrections be monitored by Staff - a procedure that is already in ef fect without l
Board intervention."
- Summer, supra,
" Memorandum and order" (April 28, 1982) (slip op at 4).
l
.f.,
I In effect, FOE has disregarded the presumption that tne
" ~ ~
Staff will perform its statutory and regulatory functions properly.EI As the Commission found in the WPPSS proceed-ing: "Past practice clearly indicates that the agency has ' faithfully discharged' its responsibility to give full l
consideration to petitions seeking relief under section 2.206."El The next portion of FOE's supplemental request asserts i
the " inevitability" of, an accident at Limerick due to the number of LER's from October 26, 1984 through January 31, 1985.
A few particular LER's are briefly described, but l
l there is ne discussion of the significance of the reported event in terms of any specific relief alleged to be appro-l priate under Section 2.206.
Contrary to FOE's implicit l
assertion, the Director has never held that the mere filing of an LER or a number of LER's provides a basis for relief under Section 2.206.
The Commission's statements of consid-l eration in adopting 10 C.F.R. 550.73 make it clear that an LER does not necessarily involve an incident of such safety
. significance as to justify the extraordinary relief sought M/
E.c.,
Consumers Power Company (Midland Plant, Units 1 l
and 2), Docket Nos. 50-329-OL and 50-330-OL, "Special Prehearing Conference Order" (February 23, 1979)
(slip i
op, at 2).
l M/
Washincton Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Pro]ect Nos.
I t.
2),
CLI-82-29, 16 NRC
- 1221, 1229 (1982).
by FOE. W
~~
As the Board noted in Shearon lia rri s, the number of LER's depends greatly upon the age of the
- plant, the utility's relationship with the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, and the licensee's attitude in reporting reportable occurrences.
The Staff testified that a high number of LER's may be "due to the licensee's determination to report all possible reportable items," and the Board agreed that a
licensee's reporting policy "may be an overriding factor" where a high number of LER's are report-ed. b The Board further noted, significantly, that "a
l
/
Thus, the Commission stated that "the LER will be a 30 detailed narrative description of potentially significant safety events," which "will provide the basis for the careful study of events or conditions that might lead to serious accidents."
48 Fed. Reg.
- 33350, 33853 (3uly 26, 1983)
(emphasis added).
The Commission added:
"If the NRC staff decides that the evor.t was ecpecially significant from the standpoint of safety, the staff may request that the licensee provide additional information and data associated with the event."
Id.
The Commission specifically stated that the LER rule requires that events be reported "regardless of the safety significance of the components, systems, or structures involybd."
Id.
The Board in Perry granted summary disposition on a
contention based on LER's because it was " unwilling to assume without more specific argument that issuance of LER's, which are expected to be generated from a
quality assurance program, represent a breakdown in that program."
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-82-114, 16 NRC 1909, 1917 (1982).
l l
M/
Carolina Power and Light company (Shearon liarris Nucicar Power Plant, Units 1,
2, 3 and 4), LDP-79-19, 10 NRC 37, 72 n.16 (1979).
higher number of LER's naturally occur at the startup of a plant."EI
~ ~~
In any event, PECO has responded to the concerns expressed by the NRC regarding the number of LER's.
As stated in recent correspondence to the NRC, the corrective action programs previously discussed with the NRC have been effective in reducing the number of reportable events.EI As noted in that correspondence, corrective action programs have been imple.monted to eliminate recurring design defi-
- ciencies, address personnel errors and make programmatic improvements.
As further stated, positive results have been demonstrated.
FOE's assertions regarding the completion of surveil-lance tests required under License No.
NPF-27 are very unclear.
Contrary to its assertion that certain surveil-lance testa must be completed prior to initial criticality to meet the conditions in License No. NPF-27, Attachment 1,
. 32/
Id. at 72.
M/
See Letter dated April 2,
1985 from Electric,M.J.
- Cooney, Manager, Nuclear Production, Production Department, to Richard W.
Starostocki,
- Director, Division of Projects and Resident Programs, Region I,
NRC.
As a
threnheid
- matter, the number of LER's reported by PECO is substantially attributable to conservative reporting techniques and actuation of emergency safeguard
- features, which merely provides confirmation that the systems perform as designed.
M.
at 4.
No event resulted in serieur degradation of safety barriers or the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown.
M. at 5.
C
d.
those provisions of the license deal with preoperational
~ ~ ~
tests and other items, not surveillance tests.
In any event, Inspection Report No. 84-71 states in Paragraph 3.4 at page 5:
"The inspector reviewed the surveillance tests listed in Appendix B to verify they were conducted prior to entering operational Condition 2."
This led to the follow-ing finding at page 6:
The pre initial criticality activities were adequately accomplished.
The surveillance tests reviewed were accom-plished prior to entoring operational condition 2.
The licensee management was carefully monitoring those activ-ities necessary to enter Operational Condition 2 and was observed to perform overview checks of alarm / annunciator status on at least two occasions.
The last items cited by F0E as a basis for its request are taken from the Independent Design Review of Limerick Generating Station, Unit No.
1, Core Spray System (November 1984)
("IDR"),
prepared by Torrey Pines Technology.
F0E states that I.t is not " persuaded" by the explanation at page 29 of the report which addresses ten items for which docu-ments requir'ed by the General Electric design control program to demonstrate a design adequacy review were not available.
No technical basis is cited by' F0E for its dicagreement with the conclusion by Torrey Pinos that it is 4
v
mz u
s 1
catisfied with the resolution of the unavailable documenta-tion.EI
- ~~
FOE also cites IDR findings which " identified several errors and inconsistencies in the analysis that was used to show plant safe shutdown capability following postulated breaks in the core spray line."E /
FOE overlooks the fact, I
however, that Torrey Pines also found that the corrective l
action adopted by PECO " adequately addresses the concerns raised by the Finding."E This involves a thorouch review and revision of "all safety evaluation calculations associ-ated with jet impingement," including analysis of loss of individual devices with an individual worst single failure l
l l
34/
Specifically, Torrey Pines concluded that "GE's actions
~
in response to the (finding),
when successfully implemented, will edequately address all concerns which led to the Finding classification."
Torrey Pines found that GE's re-creation of the design review and document release process "provided a high degree of assurance that all required reviews were performed and documented," and also noted that "GE will be performing a technical review of the 10 items identified with missing design review documents."
All of
- this, concluded Torrey
- Pines, "will provide the action necessary to assure that no safety problem would be created as a
result of missing design review documents."
Torrey Pines IDR, Vol. 2, at'29.
35/
Those errors related to the availability of certain
~
safety systems when transmitters were lost as a result of jet impingement.
The IDR concluded that determining the impact of those errors "would have required a knowledge of all plant systems and components that could not be gained in this TPT review of the core spray system."
Torrey Pines IDR, Vol. 2, at 56.
36/
Id. at 57.
7
--.1 m
J e
and loss of all devices from a common cause with the worst common single failure.37/
The NRC Staff performed an inspection on January 15, 1985 to verify implementation of this corrective action plan and determined the corrective actions to be acceptable.EI Contrary to FOE's implication, the Torrey Pines IDR did not find that its analysis of postulated breaks in the core spray lines imputed problems to "all plant systems and components."E!
- Rather, Torrey Pines concluded that it could not evaluate the impact of errors it found without performing analyses based upon a knowledge of "all plant systems and components."
This simply means that such analyses were beyond the scope of Torrey Pine's charter in preparing the IDR.
In conclusion, FOE has alleged nothing which would warrant the initiation of a proceeding pursuant to 10 C.F.R.
S2.206 to revoke the operating license for Limerick, Unit 1.
Accordingly, the relief requested by FOE should be denied.
l l
37/
Id. at 56-57.
38_/
Summary of Meeting on Independent Design Verification
?
Program Held January 10, 1985 (February 20, 1985).
39/
Id. at 56.
See FOE letter dated February 25, 1985 at 6.
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D a
AIR and WATER Pollution Patrol BROAD AXE, PA.
March 11, 1985 Dr. Harold Denton i
NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation a
dId*g $ 3 g
(
Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Dr. Denton:
a You may remember four years ago I wrote you regarding blast-i ing at the Trap Rock Co. on the same rock upon which the Limer-ick reactor is built.
I thank you for having required a second look by PECO and the NRC relative to that issue.
The blasting was only one of the many factors not taken into consideration by PECO.
In fact one of my admitted contentions in-volved Limerick welding inspections...in particular IE-76-06-01 where a welder marked off a weld as O.K. and P.E.
also checked it i
out as O.K..
Later an NRC inspector, over claims by PECO that
]
theweldwasO.K.,insistedona[I'nspectionandthenfoundatot-ally unacceptable weld.
What I had originally put in as a contention was a " pattern of carelessness", starting through 1974 on welding, electrical, concrete work, etc.
But the ASLB denied the pattern contention but ultimately permitted litigation on the contention only to welds that I could find improperly inspected and improperly dis-positioned.
How is a citizen not permitted to go into the reactor to investigate able to do such?
It was in the 76-06-01 " Broomstick Affair", as I called it, that proved the carelessness--and worse--borderbug on the crimin-al, namely, falsification of records and fraud, wherein Mark J.
Wetterhahn, Attorney for PECO repeatedly stated "all welds inspec-ted by subject inspector (a Mr. Ferretti), both visible and invis-ible, were re-inspected".
It was on the basis of that statement that the ASLB was influ-enced to deny my original contention.
But on my insisting for proof, by affidavit from PECO, that all welds both visible and in-i. 'd\\
- V...'.s.n, d
r'
%2mno,mnam, o
~
000311 PDR ADO'C'K' 05000352 gf t:$
' E'
I H
PDR 4 pp, il,
1
')
W.
AIR and WATER Pollution Patrol BROAD AXE, PA.
g (2) l!.
Letter to Harold Denton of 3/11/85 continued:
d visible were re-inspected, Mr. Wetterhahn could not corroborate his previously repeated statement regarding inspection of all L'
Thereupon, my contention, limited to welds, was admitted.
In the 76-06-01 incident wereas PECO at first said 435 welds M
were involved, it then raised the number to over seven hundred
-3 j
then to over twelve hundred.
In a mixed-up, unbelievable state-j ment as to how PECO missed.certain welds, and how they inspected i
others, and ultimately dispositioned welds by engineering or f
computer, a classsical example of PECO's contempt for NRC reg-l ulations became obvious.
I I join with Mr. Robert Anthony / FOE in calling for a show cause order on the revocation of P.E.'s low power testing licen-se issued 10/26/84.
As detailed in Mr. Anthony's letter to you l
of 2/25/85, I have all the Licensee " Event Reports", and there is no industry in the U.S. that would not immediately discharge i
l all management and quality control with such a disgraceful rec-
)
ord that borders on the comical if the errors were not capable of tragecy in the near furtue if an operating license is given to operate limerick.
Above and beyond the instandes listed by Mr. Anthony is the lack of protection that the errors definitely suggest will be needed.
I refer to the possibility of a General Emergency Acci-dent that will require " sheltering".
The public has not been adequately informed as to what sheltering is and what their chan-ces are of injury and death, for example, in 3AM darkness with bilzzard blocked roads, so that people could not leave their homes, nor could people reach them.
I ask that PECO not be permitted to operate until " shelter-ing" has been fully tested; until the public is told what their
.m s.u AIR and WATER Pollution Patrol BROAD AXE, PA.
(3)
. 4 Letter to Harold Denton of 3/11/85 continued:
chances of injury and survival are; until sheltering practice i
drills similar to evacuation study; until the public is assured that the benifits from Limerick are worth the hideous risk of the death trap referred to as sheltering.
MS. Margaret A. Reilly, Chief, Division of Environmental Resources, testimony before the ASLB re sheltering was an abject I
and sorry indication of that death trap being desguised by the 3
4 use of the word sheltering.
(see enclosure)
Think of it 0.08 dose reduction of " general shine".
How can an 0.08 reduction be Ij considered anything but suicidal?
Is Ms. Reilly afraid to use j
the term gamma rays for " general shine" because people might then
!j know an average house could never protect against high intensity j
gamma rays?
Are you, Dr. Denton, going to permit such careless contempt 9
for lives of people and genetic damage to children yet unborn?
It is your responsibility, more important your duty, to insure no operation of Limerick until, like evacuation, the public is informed, tests are done, and acceptance by the people who will have to take the risks.
Please advise.
Very truly yours, AIR,0 WATER POLLUTION PATROL Frank R.
Romano, Chairman 61 Forest Ave.
FRR/jch Ambler, PA. 19002 1
't
i
.. m. u.:.,..
c AIR and WATER Pollution Patrol BROAD AXE, PA.
March 11, 1985 Dr. Harold Denton 370 ' g ;1 f 3 0 "q s
NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation g
j Washington, D.C.
20555 I
i l
Dear Dr. Denton:
You may remember four years ago I wrote you regarding blast-ing at the Trap Rock Co. on the same rock upon which the Limer-ick reactor is built.
I thank you for having required a second look by PECO and the NRC relative to that issue.
The blasting was only one of the many factors not taken into consideration by PECO.
In fact one of my admitted contentions in-volved Limerick welding inspections...in particular IE-76-06-01 where a welder marked off a weld as O.K.
and P.E.
also checked it i
out as O.K..
Later an NRC inspector, over claims by PECO that i
the weld was O.K., insistedona[g-inspection and then found a tot-ally unacceptable weld.
What I had originally put in as a contention was a " pattern of carelessness", starting through 1974 on welding, electrical, concretc work, etc.
But the ASLB denied the pattern contention but ultimately permitted litigation on the contention only to welds that I could find improperly inspected and improperly dis-positioned.
How is a citizen not permitted to go into the reactor to investigate able to do such?
It was in the 76-06-01 " Broomstick Affair", as I called it, that proved the carelessness--and worse--bordering on the crimin-al, namely, falsification of records and fraud, wherein Mark J.
Wetterhahn, Attorney for PECO repeatedly stated "all welds inspec-ted by subject inspector (a Mr. Ferretti), both visible and invis-ible, were re-inspected".
It was on the basis of that statement that the ASLB was influ-enced to deny my original contention.
But on my insisting for proof, by affidavit from PECO, that all welds both visible and in-d$.
C,,.n h *:'.O
_ __ ^C:^G7 g50333 u-u-DR 4
ADOCK 050go35g
\\,;39
~ '
LN PDR
~
s) a pp,
.rp.r.
N 6 o
m AIR and WATER Pollution Patrol BROAD AXE, PA.
(2)
Letter to Harold Denton of 3/11/85 continued:
d visible were re-inspected, Mr. Wetterhahn could not corroborate his previously repeated statement regarding inspection of all welds.
]
Thereupon, my contention, limited to welds, was admitted.
9 In>the 76-06-01 incident wereas PECO at first said 435 welds ih were involved, it then raised the number to over seven hundred
'J j
then to over twelve hundred.
In a mixed-up, unbelievable state-i 1
ment as to how PECO missed.certain welds, and how they inspected j
others, and ultimately dispositioned welds by engineering or 1
1 computer, a classsical example of PECO's contempt for NRC reg-1 J
ulations became obvious.
1 I join with Mr. Robert Anthony / FOE in calling for a show j
cause order on the revocation of P.E.'s low power testing licen-1 se issued 10/26/84.
As detailed in Mr. Anthony's letter to you l
of 2/25/85, I have all the Licensee " Event Reports", and there
[
is no industry in the U.S. that would not immediately discharge all management and quality control with such a disgraceful rec-
,j ord that borders on the comical if the errors were not capable of tragedy in the near furtue if an operating license is given to operate limerick.
Above and beyond the instances listed by Mr. Anthony is the lack of protection that the errors definitely suggest will be needed.
I refer to the possibility of a General Emergency Acci-dent that will require " sheltering".
The public has not been adequately informed as to what sheltering is and what their chan-ces are of injury and death, for example, in 3AM darkness with bilzzard blocked roads, so that people could not leave their homes, nor could people reach them.
I ask that PECO not be permitted to operate until " shelter-ing" has been fully tested; until the public is told what their
m
., = o.=
e AIR and WATER Pollution Patrol BROAD AXE, PA.
9 (3)
Letter to Harold Denton of 3/11/85 continued:
chances of injury and survival are; until sheltering practice drills similar to evacuation study; until the public is assured 1
that the benifits from Limerick are worth the hidecus risk of the death trap referred to as sheltering.
MS. Margaret A. Reilly, Chief, Division of Environmental Resources, testimony before the ASLB re sheltering was an abject j
l and sorry indication of that death trap being desguised by the
]
]
use of the word sheltering.
(see enclosure)
Think of it 0.08 1
dose reduction of " general shine".
How can an 0.08 reduction be 3j considered anything but suicidal?
Is Ms. Reilly afraid to use j
the term gamma rays for " general shine" because people might then 1
j know an average house could never protect against high intensity
,1 gamma rays?
Are you, Dr. Denton, going to permit such careless contempt I
for lives of people and genetic damage to children yet unborn?
It is your responsibility, more important your duty, to insure no operation of Limerick until, like evacuation, the public is informed, tests are done, and acceptance by the people who will I
have to take the risks.
Please advise.
Very truly yours, AIR,1 WATER POLLUTION PATROL Frank R.
Romano, Chairman 61 Forest Ave.
FRR/jch Ambler, PA. 19002 4
9
- !I.HaroldR.Denton,3irect)r 3ox 166
- oyl en, Pa.
19065 NRC Office of Huclear Reactor Ragulation He:Phila Elec. Limerick Gen.3ta D s c'e e t N o.
50-352,353 Washington, D. L,. 20555 2/25/a5 De sr L!r. Den ton, This is a response to your letter of February 13,1985 In enswerin, our setition of 12/23/94,asking thet MRC issue s show ceuse order on the revokins of the low power o.eerating license issued to PEC on 10/26/94, you say that your preliminary revi,ew indicates that we have provide no nen information to snat of prompt such an order and kone mattes requires t'se immediate ection we requested, nese g
and you decline to take inmedi.te action in r-spon e to our =etition s
NECES.iITY FOd L31EDIAT.:, ACTION T0 RE70EE TiiE LICSESS.
We res,aectfully esk that you reconsider your decision not to. issue a show cause order.
Furthermore, we su' emit here additional information from the NRC records on Limerick system s, elant,and o neration n'aich demon.trate conclusively that thi Limerick plant is deficient in vital safe ty equiiment and irocedures, has had is not in compliance with a dumber of essentisl NRC rerulations,and a series of PECo iersonnel errors and supervisory layses since the start of fuel loading,to which the yresent, xdemonstrate t'nat PECo is not able at this time'to cierate the clant without continuing nuclear accident probabilities which threaten the health and safety of the public and PECo employees and 53C taff.
3 3YST:3LATIC A3S ESS'd3NT_OF LICEUSZ' E FEh/CRMCE 12/1/83-11/30/9.4 (Dated 1/14/95 Ny,C)
IV =
TABLi 3. Violations of NRC regulations, Severity Level,16, Level V-10= total 26 Since the stPrt of fuel loading in October, t'a r o u g's Nov. '34 - S viol tions involving Startup Testing, Overational rea dice ss, and Se curity.
There were a total of 22 Con truction Deficiency Reports esused by Parsonnel error,Jesign error, Co:ponen t error, and Cons truc tion error. (T.shLE 1.)
page 10. "..yerforcanca in the area of preservice in pection was weaker s
than that in ot'aer con truction areas."
Tais weakness in ureitration to operat.
s is reinforced by:
- y. 16:.." a summary of weaknesses identified at each exit meeting.."
" 1. Additional training..needed... control room logie.."
- 2. !nc re a s e d training..... manual scrams..
- 3. Additionel trainine..erea of fire fi-hting,.. radiation monitering.. refueling..
goc 4 An overal weaknes s..curren t simulator text ma terials..
mmo not
$8 PECO RESF0MSE TO FOUR VIOLATIONS RE00RDED Ei NRC INS?ECTION 84-65,94-14 (2/11/85) on co "T13LE 1. -CAUSEJ OF INCIDSNTS. "
PECo classifies the Licensee Events which it i nc reported from the start of fuel lo. ding, 10/26/84 to 12/31/c4, and the evants
- (8 frns 1/1/85 to 1/31/a5; 48 and 26 Events respectively,- 74 Total.
oc 7<
This is an average of one Event / 1 35 Days -
10/26 to 12 31 3
/ 1.2 1/1 to I 31/95 f
oc OQ 91,It aseears that each of these Events i.4 the votential to are:iittate a nuclear accident, and the r+e at which t'sey are hay sening incre sed in January 1995 e
a e
nt.t a c'a i,3& 4 '
n 7
.t a er ue'ie t enc.'Perr o[e el Error. 27 ;3e.ign..Deficiencey-31 ; Procedure end 4
rn Ih.0 C
es =
. Total - 74 i P)-
i o
T
.. ~ --
~5e tet.1 of 71 *icensee Events in the 96 days since FiCo std rted to load nuelamr fuel to the end of Janu ry, cons titu*es
= warnins that FICO i, no t qu=11-fied to condu:t the nuclear re= tion erosess cafely.
One third of the Iyents ere caused by personnel error and sore thsra t"ird rara c*u.=et by deficiencies
- it the elant.
FECo a =e3rs unable to control the former cat gory and many d-sign deficiencies csnnot be chan.ted.it assears.
~
Con 9?n
.J.Cooney (FEco), ley. A.. 1. exiresses the :::i sny 's,bu t offers no spe:ific slan of cetion to correct t,e errors.
Ee =erely says t' mat FICo will " stress to e aloyees that they cust take sufficient time to pro =rly evaluate and eerfor; tasks independent of schedule naeda.
Ther-a s ecars to be no cesur-nee that Findings on Viol tions 3,C, sni D, 1,3,e A.e. 5 -7 w ill n o t t e re s e a t e d :
o arstars startine recir:ule. tion pure without t9e required tests and verific.* ion, floor drain t.nk released to blondown line, and restoring the Ranctor Protection supply bre.kers without following the es tablished prosefures, and Violation 1, p.
3," disassembly and recoval of re-quired eine whip restraints..".
yVIl.) 0F.!dC I:.3?ECTIv.. 4.30.C3 -sip 2C.32 1734 to Ja..U..H loS5
'!HC'l
- ALP 3e *0rt,1/14/55, TA3LI 3, s.3-5 recoris 12 Viol tions of ::EC a
X-re:ulations Infough deport S4-63.
lesorts S5-01 and 95-CS add two core viola-tions e.nd'one Cevintion tnroueh 1/21/95 These reperts testify as to PZCo's inability to o=errte the Limerick re9 tor saf-ly.
In adrition to the.vto'.ations. ther are a series of exc=>tions and d e via ti on s which r-=31n o nen.
Te are not enare of any suc ery which close' out these caen ite:S eseecially the ones required before initial critienlity. 3ome of t'ae in e 'e e c tors ' wa rn in rs about FECo's unsatisfactory overation follow:
Insa. 94-65 (1/11/95) 3.1.
In addition I note that eince the stirt of f 2el load activities there have been s=versi instances of problets which ?.yiarenti;. have involved personnel errors.... t'ie.v may be indi:n'ive of an afverse trend. "
94-70 (2/7/a5). ara s. ".. shif t turnover activities resulted in a very n:isy and di,tracted period, principally due to the various work grouis an d other per-sonnel not displaying the discioline that should be exere. s e ' in the a:ntral ro3."
85-01 (1/22/85) 3.1.
the iroole: with the two contain=-nt isolation valves resulted froc a personnel error which occurred during the p re s s era t ion s.1 tcat pro?ron.... we are con:erned that the error has gone undetected by both the ;uel-ity 1snur?nce and el.nt testing prorrs:s.
95-0S (2/1/95)
=.1.
error made by a licensed operator.
T-is error was
..an not de tec t-d =.nd iro:.tly correc ted by the senior-licensed su arvisors on shift.
We are concern-d about the avsarent neskness in t '- a controls exeretsed by these s:wervisors over licensed oierster activities..."
2-f5. ".J.Cooney to ':RC ( 2/11/95,Aip.A.
p.1.
"?ICo ca:=:e ent has also teen concerned with the numb-r of License Eveet de sorte and sueye:ted licensee event tesorts...
It a n n en rs,s so, t'n a t the NHC Commissioners have beer a = e.r e of these errors since the issuance of a low power license to FECo.
Fro: trans:riet of 1/9/95 Cor. i ssion meetine ( p.35) " Commissioner Ce:h:
My review of the Limerick ver-formance durinr tkeir lin yoner tentine indicates th=t they ' a ce been 'avide some probl=ts mainly due-it seets to e
in t'a= area of personnel errors,cerhaps a few mora than we mi gh t expect."
3 --
v OTHE3 DFJICIM CI4S II; PLANT SAF TY 3ASEJ C NRC I';d. ECT IO': EXCE.' TIC:;3 AND DiVIATICi Some of the uredominant deficiencies esrried as unrasolved iteca in the Inspection Reports are summarized below.
In t'a i s section and tue following sec-tions we attemet to =ake the connections b-tween Limerick's deficient equiytent
.._and procedures which,in interaction with poorly trained personnel and ques tionable supervision,have combined to produce such an alarming series of licensee events, and which are headed in the direction of nuclear accidents if PECO is a.llo n ed to continue to operate the reactor under tne current conditions.
We sense that t'ae disjointed activities at Limerick under the low nower license have been brought about largely by tue lack of confidence of t'me personnel:
in their own training and the workability and safety of t'ae plant.
Ta e denger-operating anybaintenance mistakes ' nave involved the control roo=,the recc or ous primary contginment and the auto =atic sefety systems, testing and =enitoring procedures and activity have afforded the setting for mistakes as rell.
Violations, exceptions, Plant' location or Syst-=
deviations Insiection 84-53 cables control room s,84-57 Imerteney ventil-tion. detectors access doors solid, liquid,cas monitoring yest accident raa:to '197 standby gas treatment 94-66 satyling (16 unresdived items) 7
.desidual Eeat Removal puty valves 8'4-64 Puel bundle channel severely scr tched in handling
- efueliny floor g
a 29 osen test exceptions; 11 closed by PECo no NRC
- ( Also fuel bundle hit pool wall, 8/22/84.#knlI" 84-45, c/21/84, pe.ra.6.)
v 4J65 equir:ent for aabitability, unresolved control rocs 2
personnel errors: yise whip restrgints, reactor building recirculating pump without required test, floor drain relegse, imuro.ner restoring service reactor protestion, Loss of -20 VDC neutron =onitoring
,84-70 ventilation control room 31 osen test exceptions (practically the same ite=s as 84-F.4,above.)
94-72 equipment f ailure, ecergency ven tilati en control roo:
discrepancy, inboard and outboord valve ir lation reactor wa'er cleanus loss of -20VDC power, caused by technician.horting reactor b1dg.
45-01 testing, rework and ins pec tion error containment isolation diring error in monitor relay. This necessitsted refueling area verifying doeunautation 'or all secondary contain:ent isolation for autocatie closure frce all isolation signals 85-08 operator error: 'coth containment isol tion valves smater wat-r cleanup rendered inoperable for seven minutes SAFETY EVALUl? ION REVIEW BEFORE INITILL C*ITICALITY Te have no indiention that there was any summary or review of cyan inspec-tion its=n, e xc e ntions, violations or deviations which were re:uired to ha resolved before the # 1 reactor fission process was started on 12/22/92 and initial criti-eality reaggeg;lved before 7e have no aMaranee t'n a t the itens in tse ins pec tion re.oorts f above j
,wnich were reso initial critic lity, were resolvad,and t'ast sore of a
the still may be osen at t'ais ti:e.
Lackin the fulfillcent of all re,uirements reactorepera_fien for eriticality, we assert the is not in c o = li a n c e with URC regulgttons-and tue low power license s'uould be revoked inmediately.
fi.ivITibILITY OF i.140d a.D ACCIDidT I:. THI LI?..Id! 'E SUCLi.x 0?2RA!!vd PECo's analysis of the causes of the in cid en ts (potential accidents) at Linerick from 10/26/64 to 1/31/95, total - 74, ( Cooney FICo response to NRC Insp. 8J-65,2/11/95 Attacha nt, p 3,4.) a,,igns 27 to Pereo-nel Error,
, _31 to Design Manufacturing, Construction /Instrllation Leficiency, an d 16 to Procedure Deficioney and Other Causes, Under Personnel Error the eeneral categories are:
Failure to follow p roc e du re. rul e s, re gula ti o n s 10 Failure to communicate, observe changing ecnditions, interpret infor:stion 8
Failure to nerform required inspec tions/te s ts 5
Other Fersonnel Irrors 4
We assu=e that many of these errors derive from the co:plexity of tha plant and will continue to occur because the processes and equip:ent will never be successfully understood by the operators and maintenance worke'rs.
It should be noted that PECo 's reliance on training at its Peesch Bottom plant. c euld caus e false confidence since t'me difference in complexity of t'me two plenta can me.ke much of t'se experience not transferr ble.
a Under Desirn.. Deficiencies there may be so e factors which can be corrected or codified,but many of these deficiencies will continue to interact with,sn d aug-ment versonnel errors.
They can continue to bring about employee disillueienrent and carelessness.
Under Frocedure Deficiencies and Otaer there are factors waich can mislaed emuloyees,or subject them to bla e for errers in observation or jud r:.ent. Eere taere is, also,the potential for continued degrading of personnel morale.
The record of 71 incidents (potentiel accidents) in 96 days afford a measure of the design and construc tion deficiencies and {a-g personnel errors.
Cn clo3er examination they show that there is no eure and tne" incidents" will continue to escumulete as long as the deficiencies in
)lant and persennel persist in t'ae nresent fora.
There can be so solution withsut a revoking of t'ao license a.nd s'autting down the resetion process,followed by a radical review of and correction of and replace ent of all construction and procedure deficiencies.
In addition taere will have to be a re-defining and si plification of operating procedures witn re-education end requalificgtion of operators and supervisors.
For the present t'aere is no way to everce:e t'a e deficiencies or to rebuild t'ae ability of the personnel to function s3fely in an environ =ent where th ey de n o t have confidence in t'ae plant er t'aeir understanding of the process or their effe:to iveness to handle it.
As ex ples of t'se fectore weich have unden:ined rorale a
we cite the de=oralizing effect on exployees of :
22 unexpe:pected autocatie isolations during the first 75 deys with fuel in tse reacter, 10 incidents during surveillance tests, and 5
somplete aute=atie shut downs of tae reaeter.
Repeated incidents Sc$ured, isolating t'ae centrol roo: because of tee treaking of the tape en a tenitor. LEls(84 -06,08,10,20,28,33,. 46 )
Mysterious isolation of t'ae reactor enclosure occured,epparently es t'a e result of a monitor recordf.ng higi winde outside the plant. ( e4-45, 85-5 )
Autot-tio isolation of the teactor Tater Cleanup Syste: resulted 6 times w'aen operrters switehed t'= e conitor to " Rend". ( 94-12,26,34,35,36, 85-01 )
To overcome this repeated 2 1 functioning the opers'ers opened bet's inboard and pufremrd sower breakers of the isolation v.1ves for t'ae reacter wet-r elesrus syster.
Tais left t'a e syste: for 7 =inutes without isoletion iretection eni/15/85
i c
in direct violation of NRC reculRtions.
Esd t'ae reactor been cyerating at 'migaer yewer at t'a6 time of this incident there would bave been the potential for rele se of consider ble rad,iosctivity to ti buildirg in case of a nuclear eccident.( NR0 Inay.e5-08, dated 2/1/85,yera.3.)
RELA.TIONSEIP CP INCIDCTS (LERs)
TO LICENSE RE(TI.R.E'ENT3 I:C E7.E"FTIO:;S.
There are undoubtedly many causal s onnections be tween f aulty construc tion and faulty procedures n'a i e's we have not had time to relate te specifie incidents, but t'me PECo le tter (Above) wit'n Atts ksent, Table 2 sets fort'n t'a e deficiencies e
under these eategories:
Inadequate arylication of design urinciples, Construe-tion / installation error, Poor workmans'aiy, Testing no-
'acilitated by design, E710 air balancing not performed.
Nost of t'ae 31 eategories of design and construction defielencies listed in Table 2 (above) 'aave contributed to operating incidents and will. accelerate / te con serious safety breac'ces if PECo is allowed to continue eyeration of
'the reactor.
We further and that NRC cust be held responsible for ;be 1sek of review of all t'ae surveillanse tes ts required before initial critie.lity as set forth in License NFF 27, 10/26/94, Attachment 1.
There are 11 eategories (para.l.)
and 4 categories (para. 2.)
listed in Ayyendii 3,(NhC Insy. 84-70, 2/7/55). Para 6.
'hese tests are specifies a total of 120 surveillance tests required prior to initial eriticality.
In t'a i s inspection we find that the inspector reviewed enly a e: ele, "12 select-s l
(denoted by R in lyyendix 3)for specific cotylie. nee with ed conf ated surveillance t'a e technical syecifications and also reviewed seven selected procedures ( denoted by P in the appendix ).."
Je are not sware of any certification that the remaining 101 surveillanee tes ts were re viewed by NRC.
In NRC In y. 84-72,1/21/85, Initial Criticelity s
Preparation,,s a ra. 6.1, t'm e re is t'a i s general statement : "111 test exceptions designated as initial critic lity iters were satisfactorily resolved prior to a
concencing the reac tor s tartup.
We have seen ne record te substantiate that the require:ents of Attachment 1,to License NPF 27, relating to terta and t-et exceptions were fulfilled priJr to initial criticality.PECe and NRC are,t'aerefore, not in ecryliance with NRC regulations and the public is being subjected to consequent risks because of deficient safety facilities and erotections The licente aheuli te revoked.
The co'nections wit's incocylete tests,exesytions,violatiene and unresolved safety ite s 'a o w up in t'a e reaerd 6f incidents tircugh 1/10/S5 Tiere are 10 connected wit's the control roo=,
9 connected with t'ae rea'stor enelesure, and 11 connected wit's reactor water cleanup syste.
T'a e e r.e: s t i c a s it e ro s e rl*y se ~g:e*co* trol "< rented b
in Licens eNFP 27 also==.ie these areas more vulne reble.;3 f er.1 n
3 3.n e l for the control roo=;
incorslete isoletion erotection for the hydroger recorbiner, def erred inspection of airlock dcors, and absence of standby gas treat?.ent to the refueling floor for the reastor enclosure.
FURTEI? UNCERTA INT'r OVER DESI1N AND CCNSTRCCTION.
T's e In d e.s e n d a n t Design Review of t'ne Limerick No 1 Core Syrsy Syster,ee -
riscioned by PECe and ectyleted by Torrey Pines Technology in ':ovember 19ad,
eencludes t'm a t th e systes was protsbly con s truc t e d and will function as planned.
T'aere are two disturbing feetures,homever, w'a i c's cast a cloud ever t'me d e a i rn work at Limeriek done by G.E. and t'a e planning and calculatier for safety features by 3e a'ntel Pow er Corp.
T'a e G.E. design control prerr.c was tissing 10 itecs for the Cere S y r.; Systen desirt,needed to aut'mentisate t 'a e d e s ign ad equ.ey re vi e w.
Despite G.E.'s attenyt
f
..C--
at e"technicel review" f tae 10 it+=s, we are not persue!ed thtt the n o s :ibili ty of desirm flaws have been ruled out.
This yert of t'ae Core Cyrey System is,there-fare, suspect.(Terrey Pines Report, Vol. 2 p.29)More f ar reae'ain g,h ow ever, is the
,_upeert inty about other C.E. designs for Limeri:2 of t=e
.s a e period in niich a design sdequ.cy review may be hampered by t'se lack of doourantatien of a G.E.
de si rn control pro-re.
We ' nave not seen any docu:entation to warrent the Re p ort'o optizistic conclusion (p.29): "T ese procedures and description,ce ;nlel with ef-h fidsvits....provided a high degree of sseursnee tmat all required reviews were perforced and desurented..."
Tae Limerick operating license s'aould be revoked until proper verification of this asyect of G.3. 's design for equipment and s/ste=a has been completed.
Tae Torrey Pines study also brought to light serious flaws in the Limerick
" slant safe s'auteown empsbility following postulated breeks in the core saray line."
{FFR's 2524-C23 and 2524-024,
- p. 56 )
Tae study found errers i'n evtluating safe shutcown because of " (a) taking credit for instruments n'aish couli also te lost e s a consequence of a line break; (b) taking eredit for instrutects w'sich were not identified on the instrument list and not in the plant dezi-n; snd (e) not assuring t'ae wors t case single active failure with t'ae line break."
Tus study discovered that t'nese errori applied to t'm elu t o:a t i c De p re s su ri z ing Syster, the Ree tor Trote: tion Sys te= and t'ne Centainn.ent Isolation Systen a s well
?s the Core Sprsy Sys ten, but corsluded :" Determining the icys:t of these various errors would have required a knowledge of all ytant syste$s end components..."
Tae Terrey Fines study was not authorized to adke a desig adequacy review of any of the safety systems for asfe s'aut denn except tae Core Spray Syster.
The w a ning in its report,however, should have caused NAC to stop FECe from r
bringing tae reactor to initi.1 criticality, sud should 'save suapended t'ae license sEnc-the safe siutdawn capability was tarown into question because of th e"e rrors and inconsistencies in tse analysis tist was used to s'aow plant safe,iutdown.."(? ?
The eenclusive evidence was:
.." Because Torrey Pines (TPT) was unable to assess the i:pset of t'sesa errors,and because t'a e repetitive nature of tse errors suggested that etaer errors migit oscur, the two PFas were elessified as findings.
Tae corrective action pronosed by PECe (s.56) " safety evaluatirn c al cul a t io n s ssroei-tei with jet impingscent does net address Torrey Pines questions about "all 1
3 ;nt systems and cc ponents" and " taking credit for instruments whien could also 'ae lo s t,.. in s t rum en ts... not in the ylsnt design " and the other"errere and in a cr sis t e n c ie s " (y.56)
As a result of the Terrey Pines Report FRC sk>uld have insi:ted on a corelete review of design and construction of ill systers and soryonents relsted to t'a s plant safe shutdown esysbility before approving o p e re tin a. t'a e re ?. : te r. This it cast now require, and the license must be suspended during this yrc:ess.
Te believe that we have pre:ented conclusive proof t'ast PECc 's present opers-tien of tue Li=erisk reestor is a threat to the s a f e ty e.e 4
'n e s i t's of t'se public, FECo employees and t'ae VIC Staff,and is not in eempliance wit's the require:ents of li erse NFF 27 We ureently repost our petition to NRC to insedistely institute proceedings for the issusnee of a s'n: n o use order w'ay tae NRC lisense issued to*FECo to op-s erste t'ae No I rer eter at licariei s 'a o ul d not now be revoked.
e:: N3C L3,13,Staf f Coun s el,3eek e ting Serv.
le 3 p e c t f ull*y *ours, v
?ECo, LEA, F.R ota n s, Ot'n e rs on Serv. List Senator Arler Specter,Sen. Jcin Eeinz Jhl,f
, kz<ltu
^
C ongre ssmen 'obe rt Ed gar, Feter Kost:syer, nor 1Sc yoylen,Pa. 19065 Jilliam Cray, Lawrence Cougalin
' b,
.. +.
5 LAW OFFICES CON NER & WETTERH AHN. P.C.
174 7 P E N N S Y LVA N I A AV E N U E. N. W.
TROY B CON NER. JR WA S H I N G TO N. D. C. 2 0 0 0 0 MARR J wETTERHAHN ROBERT M RADER DO U Oy 5 M OLSON JESSICA H LAVERTY a rtsa w:CHOLS February 6, 1985 ARCH A M O O R E. J R.*
f 20 21 5 33-3 500 BERNHARD0 BECHHOEFER or cot wsst CABLE ADDRESS. ATOM LAW
- n o T A D ee l T T E D t as 3. C Mr. Harold R. Denton Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 In the Matter of Philed'elphia Electric Company (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2)
Docket Nos. 50-352 and 50-353
Dear Mr. Denton:
In response to the petition submitted to you by Robert L. Anthony for himself and on behalf of Friends cf the Earth (collectively " FOE"),
dated December 23, 1984, requesting relief pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 52.206, I am hereby submitting comments of Philadelphia Electric Company.
For the reasons stated therein, the matters raised by petitioners do not warrant the relief requested.
Accordingly, the relief requested by FOE should be denied.
Sincerely, Mark J. Wetterhahn Counsel for the Licensee MJW:sdd Enclosure cc:
Eugene J.
Bradley, Esq.
Rcbert L. Anthony
[9
~ -~- w 850206 w
i PDEdDOCK 05000352 PDR g
13 pp.
s CO!'J.ENTS CF PHILADELPHIA ELECTPIC COMPANY ON FOE'S REQUEST UNDER 10 C.F.R. 52.206 On December 23, 1984, Mr.
R.L.
Anthony, for himself and as representing Friends of the Earth in the Delaware Valley (collectively " FOE" or " petitioner"), submitted a petition to the Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, to institute proceedings to revoke the operating license for Unit 1 and to issue an order to show cause why this license should not.be revoked.1/
Petitioner claims that "PECO is in violation of NRC regulations and is subjecting us and the public to the risk of extensive unauthorized health and safety dangers by starting the nuclear reactor without the required safety provisions."2/
Petitioner also claims that Philadelphia Electric Company
("PECO")
has "will ful.ly violated our health, safety and interests and those of the public" and "is not qualified to operate this reactor safely."3/
As basis for these charges, petitioner cites portions of publicly available documents prepared by either l_/
" Petition by Intervenor, R.L.
Anthony / Friends of the
- Earth, to the
- Director, Off, of Inspection and Enforcement to Institute Proceedings to Revoke License NPF-27, Issued to PECO; and to Issue an Order to Show Cause Why This License Should Not be Revoked" (December 23, 1984)
(" Petition").
2/
Petition at 1.
3/
Id.
e
~
', PECO or the NRC Staff.
Certain of these documents were made available directly to the representative of petitioner because of his participation in the Limerick operating license proceeding.
As discussed in detail below, none of the matters raised by petitioner, either examined alone or taken collectively, supports the requested relief.
FOE has failed to demonstrate that a proceeding should be instituted pursuant to 52.206 of the Commission's Rules of Practice.
The Director, upon receipt of a request to initiate a proceeding pursuant to 10 C.F.R.
S2.206, is required to make an inquiry appropriate to the facts which have been assert-ed.
He is free to rely on a variety of sources of informa-tion including Staff analyses of generic issues, documents issued by other agencies and the comments of the Licensee on the factual allegations in deciding whether further action is required.
See Nerthern Indiana Public Service Company (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), CLI-78-7, 7 NRC 429, 432, 433 (1978) citing Consolidated Edison Company of New York (Indian Point, Units 1, 2 and 3), CLI-75-8, 2 NRC 173, 175 (1975).
In reaching his determination, the Director need not accord presumptive validity to each, assertion of fact, irrespective of the degree of substantiation, or to convene an adjudicatory proceeding in order to determine whether an adjudicatory proceeding is warranted.
Id.
FOE makes a number of accusations regarding actions of Philadelphia Electric Company and the NRC.
For example, it asserts that "PECO is in violation of NRC regulations,"
q
. ~
"PECC has willfully violated our health safety and interests and interests and those of the public," "PECO is not qual-ified to operate this reactor safely," and there exists a
" deliberate, willful neglect of public safety."AI These assertions are unfounded and entirely without basis.
The entire request is conclusory and without factual or legal foundation.
It merely notes various publically available reports and filings with the NPC made by PECO and various NRC reports and evaluations.
In each instance, petitioner concludes without more that the evaluations in each document are inadequate.
When such documents discuss why the public health and safety is not affected, FOE merely takes the conclusions of such documents which are based upon lengthy evaluation and discussion and simply states that they are unfounded.
Petitioner then, without basis, merely states the negative of the conclusions which had been substantiated in Licensee's presentation.
This is insufficient as discussed above to require the institution of a proceeding pursuant to 52.206.
Initially, FOE claims that PECO's applications for exemptions from the requirements of 10 C.F,.R.
Part 50
" constitute willful sacrifice of public safety."5/
FOE fails to state any reason why it waited until now to raise 4/
Petition at 1, 2.
5/
Id. at 1.
Q
~
these matters.
The latest of these exemption requests was requested in October.
FOE fails to appreciate that matters discussed in the first exemption request it discusses related to modifications to the Remote Shutdown System, and others filed by the Company, address the legal standard contained in the NRC's own regulations, in particular 10 C.F.R. 550.12.
Such standards have recently been endorsed and ratified by the Commission.6/
Section 50.12 requires that a request for exemption must not endanger life o r, property or the common defense and security and be otherwise in the public interest.7/
The FOE petition cites various phrases from this exemption request and baldly concludes without anything further that this shows "a casual attitude toward the loss of the control room and ability to shut down the plant in case of accident."
M.
Feference to the October 25, 1984 request demonstrates that this accusation is entirely 6/
Mississippi Power & Licht Company (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-84-9, 20 NRC (slip op. at 7, n.7) (October 25, 1984).
7/
FOE mischaracterizes portions of Mr. Kempe'r's letter of October 25, 1984.
FOE attempts to argue that the Company is minimizing public health and safety.
The portion of the letter quoted at n.1, Petition at 2,
states that only the potential impact on public health and safety is at issue.
It was contrasting this to the previous sentence which concluded that the ccmmon defense and security was not affected and therefore need not be discussed in the exemption request.
It is certainly not any degradation of the importance of public health and safety.
without basis.
After discussing the ability of the control room to provide safe shutdown capabilities and the capabil-ities of the existing Remote Shutdown Panel room, it is explained that procedures will be available to provide redundant remote shutdown capability using equipment pres-ently installed in the plant in conjunction with temporary jumpers.
It further explains that these procedurds will be
- reviewed, approved and in place prior to exceeding five percent power.
It also explains that prior to exceeding five percent
- power, only minimal decay heat requiring removal will exist.
As a
- result, substantial time is available to take mitigative actions.
The NRC has already reviewed this matter and determined that this exemption, as well as all others, was warranted.
In NUREG-0991, Supple-ment No.
3, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Opera-tion of the Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2,
Section 7.4.2.3 and Sections 7.1.4.4 and
'7.4.2.3 cf NUREG-0991, the NRC Staff found that these actions were acceptable.
Thus, FOE has failed to demonstrate that this matter provides any basis for the convening of a hearing.
Similarly, the other examplss of exemptions requested and granted by the NRC do not give rise to anything which would require the institution of proceedings pursuant to S2.206.
Initially, as with the previous example, FOE fails to recognize the necessity for discussing the criteria of 550.12 in exemption regtests.
Secondly, it would impose a criteria that would require a " guarantee" of the public
. - health and safety.8/
This is simply not the licensing stan-dard which is required for utilization facilities.9/
Moreover, as noted above, the exemption requests cited by FOE are even earlier than the October 25 example discussed above.
There ir ab.colutely no reason why FOE has waited this long to raise these matters.
- Finally, aside from general assertions where it states the negativ'e of all matters discussed by Licensee in detail, it presents no reason at all why a hearing must be convened.
Pursuant to 52.206 it had the opportunity to submit affidavits or other technical material supportive of its request for relief, but did not choose to do so.
It has produced absolutely nothing which would call into question the analyses presented by Applicant or the Staff in approving each of the exemptions.10/
In summary, the institution of a proceeding is net warranted based upon the material presented.
The next section of the petition discusses Licensee Event Reports that have been submitted by Philadelphia 8/
Petition at 3.
9_/
Power Reactor Development Co. v.
International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, 367 U.S.
- 396, 414 (1961); Carstens v.
NRC, 742 F.2d 1546, 1557 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
M/
The citations to the portions of the Safety Analysis Report in which the NEC Staff has reviewed and approved each cf the exemption requests granted are contained in Section D of Facility Operating License, NPF-27, issued Octcber ?A, 1984.
m
.~
Electric Company to the Commission concerning the Limerick Generating Station, Unit 1 pursuant to the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 550.73.11 While it is alleged that " practically all of (the cited LER's] could have endangered the public with a serious accident affecting safety systems at the plant, and consequent involvement of the reactor and the threat of radioactivity to the environment,"
p'etitioner fails to discuss any instance wherein the public health and safety was affected or even where it was even remotely threatened.
It fails to show any any significance or pattern associated with these reports.
Some, such as LER 84-002, show that a scram occurred and thus that the safety systems were functional during the time.
See also LER 84-005.
FOE also cites two inspection reports regarding a fuel bundle hitting the spent fuel pool wall while it was being positioned for placement into the spent fuel pool.12/
While FOE claims there was " willful deceptiveness" involved, it points to no specific deficiency.
The discussion of this matter in NRC Inspection Report 84-43 at 27 clearly discuss-es the reasonable steps that were taken to determine if any damage resulted from this matter.
FOE fails to raise any matter requiring further review.
In
- sum, none of the
_1_1_ / Petition at 4-5.
12/
Id. at 5.
Licensee Event Reports or the other matters raised in this
~~
section warrant the institution of a proceeding.
In its next section, FOE lists a number of open items from NRC inspection reports and a number of pieces of correspondence between the NRC Staff and Applicant.13/
It does not analyze these matters in any detail whatsoever, merely concluding that the license should be revoked based upon a listing of these matters.
Open items are matters which have been found not to be a violation of the NFC requirements but which an inspector may wish to follow up.14/
Thus, while unresolved items may exist, it does not mean that the Applicant has not fulfilled all requirements.
In any event many of the items noted by Mr.
Anthony have already been closed.
FOE does not recognize this even though open items from previous inspection reports were closed in inspection reports which FOE cites, e.g., unresolved Item 84-24-01 referenced on p.
5 of the FOE Petition was closed in Inspection Report 84-60, also referenced by FOE on the same page.
13/
Id. at 5-6.
1_4 /
03.06 Open Item.
Matters that require further review and evaluation by the inspectors.
Open items are used to document, track, and ensure adequate followup on matters of concern to the inspector.
Inspection and Enforcement
- Manual, Chapter 0610-03
" Inspection Peports," Definitions.
Issue Date: 1/27/84.
i
-9_
FOE points to a number of other letters and gives their general subject matter, but fails to discuss how NRC re-quirements have not been met.
FOE has failed to demonstrate that anything in these letters rises to a matter which warrants the institution of a proceeding for the revocation of the operating license.
The last paragraph of this section discu'sses the potential for damage to the ultimate heat sink from tornado missiles.
FOE complains that the Licensee's letter does not include a discussion of the threat to safe shutdown from the design railroad explosion which could simultaneously collapse the cooling towers and disable the water intake structure at the river."
There are several problems with this argument.
Initially, this matter of the design rail-road explosion was the subject of a contention filed by FOE.
It was rejected by the Licensing Board.16/
FGE did not appeal such denial.17/
The S2.206 process may 'not be used as a
vehicle for reconsideration of issues previously decided.
Consolidated Edison of New York, Inc.
(Indian 15/
Id. at 6.
,1_6 /
" Order (Concerning Proposed FOE Contentions on Ha::a rd s 6
from Industrial Activities), "
(November 22, 1982)
(unpublished).
M/
See R.L.
Anthony / FOE Brief in Support of Appeal to Appeal Board of 10/23/84 from Second Partial Initial
- Decision, LBP-84-31, on Contentions V 3a and V 3b (November 23, 1984).
nr
-.~
i
=
Point, Unit Nos.
1, 2 and 3), CLI-75-8, 2 NRC 173, 177 (1975);
Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-81-6, 13 NRC 443, i
446 (1981).
See also Texas Utilities Generating company (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2),
DD-83-11, 18 NRC 293, 295 (1983).
Second, F0E is factually incorrect in its assertion.
Assuming arguendo 'that the design railway explosion collapsed the cooling towers and disabled t.he water intake structure on the Schuylkill, the ultimate heat sink which is independent of these two could shut down both reactors and keep them in a safe condition.
This is contemplated by the design bases of the ultimate heat sink and fully discussed in the application.EI FOE next claims it has never been given a final report of the Torrey Pines corporation.
By letter dated December 12, 1984 to Philadelphia Electric Company from Torrey Pines Technology, the
" Independent Design Review of Limerick Generating Station, Unit 1,
No. 1 Spray System" was trans-mitted.
Mr. Anthony is indicated as having been sent a copy
'of this document with its enclosure.
FOE has shown nothing which would require the institution of a proceeding to consider the independent design verification program.
In conclusion, nothing in the petition, taken indi-vidually or collectively, warrants the institution of a M/
FSAR 59.2.6.2.
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c..*. :
pr'oceeding pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 52.206 for the revocation
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. of'.the operating' license for Limerick, Unit-1.
Therefore, the relief requested by FOE should be denied.
O e
.h, s
l e
4
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