ML20129G619
| ML20129G619 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 08/05/1996 |
| From: | Dums D CITIZENS' UTILITY BOARD |
| To: | Racquel Powell NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20129G560 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-96-322 NUDOCS 9610030105 | |
| Download: ML20129G619 (47) | |
Text
-
CITIZENS' UTILITY BOARD l
16 N. Carroll St., Suite 300 Madison, WI 53703 + (608) 251-3322 + FAX (608) 251-7609 -
EREIDOM 0F INFORMATION i
ACT REQUEST August 5, 1996 Porn-16
.32t Mr. Russell Powell Branch Chief FOIA/LPDR Nec/d 9 /M7d Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Re:
Freedom of Information Act Request
Dear Mr. Powell:
Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.
522, as amended and 10 C.F.R. Part 9.41, the Wisconsin Citizens' Utility Board (CUB) requests the following documents:
1.
Please provide any and all documents that make a specific reference to the event at the Point Beach nuclear power plant, Dockets 50-266 and 50-301, involving a gaseous ignition incident during the welding of a spent fuel cask.
This event was identified by the NRC in Preliminary Notification of Event or Unusual Occurrence PNO-III-96-033 on May 28, 1996; i
2.
Please provide any and all documents that address the generation of explosive gases during any phase of operation of the VSC-24 system; 3.
Please provide any and all documents that address the ignition of explosive gases during any phase of operation of the VSC-24 system.
- On June 4, 1996 CUB submitted a FOIA request to the NRC requesting documents responsive to items 1-3.
The NRC completed its response to CUB's June 4, 1996 FOIA, identified by the NRC as FOIA-96-244/ June 10, 1996, on July 25, 1996.
CUB is re-submitting its FOIA request for items 1-3 to obtain documents in the agencies possession for the period of time following the date the NRC received CUB's June 4, 1996 FOIA to the date the NRC receives this FOIA request.
9610030105 960923 PDR FOIA DUMS96-322 PDR
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4.
Please provide any and all documents that address increased neutron multiplication in the fuel in a cask because of boron precipitation from a chemical reaction among the borated water and cask materials.
5.
Please provide any and all documents that address the effect of.a precipitate formed by a chemical reaction of zine with acidic borated water from a spent fuel pool on fuel cladding integrity.
6.
Please provide any and all documents that address the effect
)
of a precipitate-formed by a chemical reaction of zine with i
acidic borated water from a spent fuel pool on the heat i
transfer characteristics of a VSC dry storage cask.
7.
Please provide any and all documents that address the behavior of a precipitate formed by a chemical reaction of zine with acidic borated water from a spent fuel pool under long-term exposure to neutron and gamma radiation.
8.
. Please provide any and all documents that address the behavior of a precipitate formed by a chemical reaction of zine with acidic borated water from a spent fuel pool under high temperatures.
9.
Please provide any and all documents that address the effect of a zinc reaction with the acidic borated wator from a spent fuel pool on the characteristics of MSB anti-corrosion coatings.
10.
Please provide any and all documents that address the effect i
of a zinc reaction with the acidic borated water from a spent fuel pool on the retrievability of sp6nt fuel.
11.
Please provide any and all documents that address the effect of a zinc reaction with the acidic borated water from a spent fuel pool on the reactor coolant system.
For purposes of this request, please consider " documents" to include reports, studies, test results, correspondence, memoranda, meeting notes, meeting minutes, working papers, graphs, charts, diagrams, notes and summaries _ of conversations and interviews, computer records, and any other form of written communications including internal NRC memoranda.
Pursuant to and in compliance with 10 C.F.R. 9.41 of the agency's regulations and 5 U.S.C. 552 governing requests for waiver of fees, CUB puts forth the following information.
CUB was incorporated pursuant to Chapter 181, 1979, of the 1 l
l
O Wisconsin Statutes.
CUB is exempt from Federal income tax under Section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code.
CUB is also exempt from Wisconsin franchise tax.
The restricted fund (public interest fund) is exempt from Federal income tax under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.
The fund is also exempt from Wisconsin income taxes.
The restricted fund (public interest fund) was established on February 1, 1981, and reorganized on April 28, 1986 to cocrespond to the new structure of the CUB.
The fund engages in charitable, scientific, literary and educational activities on behalf of CUB.
CUB has 20,000 members who are residential ratepayers in Wisconsin.
CUB represents the more than two million residential ratepayers in the state.
CUB's purpose continues to be the statutory purpose set forth under sec. 199.02, Wis. Stats.:
- ...to promote the health, welfare and prosperity of all the citizens of this state by ensuring effective and democratic representation of individual farmers and other individual residential utility consumers before regulatory agencies, the legislature and other public bodies and by providing for consumer education on utility service costs and on benefits and methods of energy conservation.
CUB seeks the requested information to become informed of the causes, consequences, and remedies of and for an incident which took place on May 28, 1996 involving the use of the VSC-24 storage system for spent nuclear fuel.
CUB intends to use the information to assist in its participation in any proceedings before the NRC, before state regulatory agencies, and as part of CUB's ongoing ef fort to educate the public on nuclear waste storage issues in Wisconsin.
The information sought, is not, to the best of our knowledge, in the public domain.
The general public in Wisconsin has displayed great interest in nuclear waste issues and have a direct interest in NRC actions regarding the VSC-24 dry cask storage system.
CUB has demonstrated its ability and commitment to inform the public on all important nuclear waste storage issues in Wisconsin.
CUB provides this information free of charge through newsletters, educational pamphlets, and correspondence to its members, other residential ratepayers, legislators, and policy makers, and has neither a commercial nor a private interest in the agency records sought.
Under the amended fee waiver standard, CUB is clearly entitled to a full waiver of all search, review and duplication fees.
This standard calls for such a waiver, "if disclosure of the information is in the public interest because it is likely to contribute significantly to the public understanding of the operation or
]
activities of the government and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester." 5 U.S.C. 552 (1)(4)(A)(111).
In light of the foregoing, CUB meets this standard on its i
face.
CUB has no commercial interest in this matter, but rather seeks this information to help the general public better understand the role of government in regulating the nuclear industry's radioactive waste storage activities.
For the reasons cited above, CUB's request falls squarely within the Congressional intent in enacting the Freedom of Information Act and the fee waiver provision. CUB, therefore, asks that the NRC grant a full fee waiver for this FOIA request.
Thank you for your anticipated cooperation.
If you have any questions in regards to this request, please feel free to contact me at your earliest convenience.
Please contact me before acquiring and sending the requested information if the fee waiver is not applied.
Sincerely, b
e Dennis Dums i
Research Director 4
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QUESTIONS FOR WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY Related to VSC-24 Cask Loading Incident A.
Backcround Information, 1.
Please provide a detailed description of the circumstances leading up to the event. If possible, please describe details on how the lid lifted, other sources of combustible materials present at the time, and other evolutions in progress in the vicinity of the cask decontari.' nation area.
Had there been any problems or abnormalities during fuel movement or transfer?
Any personnel contaminations?
2.
What were the characteristics of the spent fuel placed in the affected MSB? Were there any significant fuel characteristic differences compared to previous cask loadings?
(Initial enrichments, burnups, heat generation rates, etc.)
3.
What was the condition of the fuel assemblies placed in the MSB? Were there previously known leakers? What inspections were performed to verify the condition of the fuel before loading into the MSB?
4.
When and how much water was drained from the MSB prior to beginning welding preparations? How was the water drained out of the MSB?
5.
Were the drain and fill ver.ts opened or closed at the time of the event?
6.
Was any cover gas used to backfill the space voided by water draw-down? If so, what type?
7.
What is the typical time between removing the cask from the pool to wold commencement? Is the 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> typical?
11 Qtrrent Conditions / Status 1.
What is being done to maintain " safe conditions?"
2.
What actions are being taken to determine the type of explosive gas that ignited?
What is the current generation rate?
3.
What sort of gas sampling was done before, during and after the event?
4.
What were the assumptions used to determine the 55 hour6.365741e-4 days <br />0.0153 hours <br />9.093915e-5 weeks <br />2.09275e-5 months <br /> time limit for drain down....what is assumed to occupy the annulus between the MSB and the transfer cask?
t t
5.
What weld method was used? Type of shield gas?
6.
What inspections / actions are planned for examining the fuel and MSB? Is there an estimate of pressure induced damage to the MSB following the event? Are there plans for sampling or monitoring the water in the MSB? What actions will be taken after the sample analyses are obtained?
C Potential Generic Issues 1.
ilas Point Beach notified others? Press release?
2.
Plans for notifying other vendors and licensees?
4 0
i CHRONOLOGY OF RELEVANT DRY CASK OPERATIONS ELAPSED TIME (HRS: MINS)
EVENT LOAD #1 LOAD #2 LOAD #3 Serial #
(MSB-01)
(MSB-03)
(MSB-02)
Start MSB fill 0
0 0
1Aad fuel 15:19 12 hr 19.30 12.5 hr
~ 13.57 10.7 hr Shield lid in place 19:04 22:45 17:05 MSB breaks SFP surface 23:09 26:35 18:25 30 gal. Pump down 23:19 26:41 18:35 MSB out of SFP 23:49 27:00 19:00 Tack welds begin 36:34 37:10
~29:00 Shield weld complete '
42:19 42:30
.{
Weld structural lid 54:19 6.5 hr 65:00 12 hr Stnictural lid seal weld 56:04 68:00 Drain MSB -
61:19 70:00
- - Not performe<!
MSB - Multi-Assembly Sealed Basket SFP - Spent Fuel Pool 1
i
i e CHRONOLOGY OF RELEVANT DRY CASK OPERATIONS TIME AND DATE OF EVENT EVENT LOAD #1 LOAD #2 i
LOAD #3 9
i 4
Serial #
(MSB-01)
(MSB-03)
(MSB-02) j-Start MSB fill 0911 : 12/11/95 1800e : 5/20/96.
2145 : 5/26/96 l
.1030 2215 2300e Load fuel 1235-0030 : 12/12 0100-1330 : 5/21 0100e-1142 : 5/27 4
Shield lid in place 0415 1645 1450 MSB breaks SFP surface 0820 2035 1610 30 gal. Pump down 0830e 2041 1620e MSB out of SFP 0900 2100 1645 Tack welds begin 2145 0700e : 5/22 0245 : 5/28 Shield weld complete 0330 : 12/13 1230 Weld structural lid 0900-1530 2300-1100e :
(
5/23 Structural lid seal weld 1640-1715 1400e Drain MSB 2145-2230 1600e-1641 e - Time of event not recorded; estimate based on adjacent recorded events, i
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CHRONOLOGY OF RELEVANT DRY CASK OPERATIONS
]
ELAPSED TIME (HRS: MINS)
EVENT LOAD #1 LOAD #2 -
LOAD #3 Serial #
(MSB-01)
(MSB-03)
(MSB-02)
Start MSB fill 0
0 0
MSB into SFP 1:19 4:15 1:15 Load fuel 15:19 12 hr 19:30 12.5 hr 13:57 10.7 hr Shield lid in place 19:04 22:45 17:05 MSB breaks SFP surface 23:09 26:35 18:25 30 gal. Pump down 23:19 26:41 18:35 MSB out of SFP 23:49 27:00 19:00 Tack welds begin 36:34 37:00 29:00 Shield weld complete 42:19 42:30 Weld structural lid 54:19 6.5 hr 65:00 12 hr Structural lid seal weld 56:04 106:00' Drain MSB 61:19 70:00
- - Not performed 4
MSB - Multi-Assembly Scaled Basket l
SFP - Spent Fuel Pool 1 - Drained down prior to completing structural lid seal weld 19/%
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TIME AND DATE OF EVENT EVENT LOAD #1 LOAD #2 LOAD #3 Serial #
(MSB-01)
(MSB-03)
(MSB-02)
Start MSB fill 0911 : 12/11/95 1800e : 5/20/96 2145 : 5/26/96 MSB into SFP 1030 2215 2300e Load fuel 1235-0030 : 12/12 0100-1330 : 5/21 0100e-1142 : 5/27 Shield lid in place 0415 1645 1450 MSB breaks SFP surface 0820 2035 1610 30 gal. hmp down 0830e 2041 1620e MSB out of SFP 0900 2100 1645 Tack welds begin 2145 0700e : 5/22 0245 : 5/28 Shield weld complete 0330 : 12/13 1230 Weld structural lid 0900-1530 2300-1100e :
5/23 Structural lid seal weld 1640-1715 0405e' 5/25 Drain MSB 2145-2230 1600e-1641 :
5/23 e - Time of event not recorded; estimate based on adjacent recorded events.
- - Not performed MSB - Multi-Assembly Sealed Basket 1 - Drained down prior to completing structural lid seal weld SFP - Spent Fuel Pool
4
, a ISSUE STATUS AND EXIT NOTES Item 5 Determine if approoriate attention was given to the condition of systems and components associated with dry cn* evolutions. including comnatability of the dry end with soent fuel oool conditions.
I examined the licensee's overview and control of the multi-assembly stoage basket (MSB) during fabrication and upon receipt. I was verified that licensee were very involved in the oversight of fabrication by the contracted fabricators at the various fabrication sites. The licensee had essentially full time representation at the fabrication sites and documented their presence through the use of HOLD POINTS in the contruction documents. I observed that licensee representatives independently verified important parameters such as cleanliness, weld size, and material certifications. Their verifications included detailed parameters such as paint thickness. I verified that on site receipt inspection also independently verified that the casks received on site had been maintained in aquality condition. I reviewed the procedures records for using the MSB and verified quality conditions had been maintained.
I concluded that the licensee had given appropriate attention to the condition of equipment-associated with the dry cask storage evolutions.
The occurrence of the event makes it clear that appropriate attention was not given to the chemical compatibility of the MSB zine paint and the SFP boric acid conditions. Neither the j
i designer nor the licensee forsaw the potential for the chemical reaction that occurred. Several suggestions, that might have alerted the involved parties, were available. First, the paint manufacturer's specification sheet stated that the paint was not reccommended for immersion in acids. Secondly, the licensee studied the incompatibility of the paint and SFP boric acid in a study they conducted in July 1995. The study noted the potential for a zine borate pricipitate and possible coating on SFP fuel. Hydrogen generation was not addressed.. The study was a proactive effort and showed a good reflective atttude. Unfortunately, the study only focused on potential reactor plant effects and not on the potential effects on dry cask storage. I concluded that the problem occurred due to inadequate design review for chemical compatibility.
Ite m 6 Determine any notential generic implications of the event. Evalunie the technical supoort by the vendor for the prevention of similar events.
Preliminarily we determined the following potential generic issues as lessons learned from this event:
- 1. The adequacy.of the chemical compatibility studies conducted during design reviews for all cask designs and facility environments should be reviewed. For cases
- where a detailed review was not conducted appropriate action should be taken.
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2.
The potential for the presence of chemical reaction residues on fuel and storage cask components currently in day storage should be assessed. Additionally, the acceptability of any effects of the residue should be assessed for the remainder of the interim storage period.
3.
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POINT BEACH QUESTIONS For John Jankovich:
OUR AIT CHARTER ITEMS 5 &6 ARE: (5)TO DETERMINE IF APPROPRIATE ATTENTION WAS GIVEN TO THE CONDITION OF COMPONENTS AND THEIR COMPATIBILITY WITH SPENT FUEL POOL CONDITIONS AND (6) DETERMINE ANY GENERIC ISSUES, AND EVALUATE THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT BY SNC FOR THE PREVENTION OF SIMILAR EVENTS The SNC inspection team should focus on items 5 and 6 and the following specific questions.
f j
- 1. Did the SNC design review include a corrosion engineer. Should the designers have anticipated the Hydrogen generation in the SFP?
- 2. What was the design basis for the paint selection? Reference the COC pg A-2 " potential for fire and explosion should be addressed." and SER Sect 2.6. What environmental
- i compatibility study was done? How did they address the paint specification proldbition against the use of Zine with acid?
- 3. What is SNC's investigative plan for this event'?
- 4. Was their Part 21 evaluation performed? Were we and the customers notified?
SFP (from the MSB) in July 1995. What was their assessment and action?
6.
n, Why was the paint not considered important to safety?
I 7.
Was SNC aware of MSB lid welding problems (moisture and blowouts) enchntered at 4
g Palisades? What was their action?
h 8.
Reportedly the paint was qualified at Oak Ridge. What were the paint qualification
..V requirements?
- 9. The SAR Pgs 1-8,1-9 state the purpose of the paint was to " protect fuel pool I
chemistry." What was meant by this statement.
- 10. Is SNC involved with the VSC-24 user's group?
NOTE for John: Wisconsin Electric is authorized by SNC to fabricate their own VSC-24's.
They did so using PCC, US Tool and Die, Regal Industrial Inc (for painting), and (in the future) March Metalfab d/f
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For Charlie liaughney 1.
Please arrange to have the team briefed on the VSC-17 problems with hydrogen addressed by Fawn Shillingslaw..We need to have a cohesive story on why those problems did or did not relate to the VSC-24 problem.
2.
What did the NRC design review include? Was the chemical compatibility of paint /SFP water included? Does the SRP have an item on this? We expect this question after the exit. Will someone fandliar with the review process be at the exit ?
3.
Please have a chemist review the chemical reaction that occurred. Are there ways to mitigate / prevent the reaction with PH control, etc.
e
Status ofIncident Investigation Hydrogen Burn During Loading of Third VSC-24 Investigation Scope and Status:
- Root Cause Evaluation Main effort thus far has been data gathering and interviews. Preliminary events and causal factors chart completed (6/5). Investigation team consensus is that the root cause lies in design issues category. This is based on preliminary review of the investigation into why CZ-i l was being used as a coating for the VSC-24 internals. Additional analyn of all causal factors is in progress.
- Source of Gas Substantial evidence has been gathered that shows the source of gas to be hydrogen produced by Zinc-Acid reaction. No substantial evidence has been found that would gove any of the following theories directly contributed to the production of hydrogen:
Faulty Carbo Zine iI paint Contamination of CZ 11 paint Improper Application of CZ lI paint Radiolysis production of112 gas inadvertent introduction Combustible gas during loading process Welding issues Review of welding issues has not revealed any direct contributor to this event.
- Experience at Utilities Palisades is considered the most relevant experience to compare. Two Consumers Power dry storage e.sperts arrived on 6/5/96. Further analysis of differences and similarities is needed and is proceeding.
Review of Precursors Four Precursors have been identified:
Small burn during grinding in 2nd cask loading.
Indication of pressure build up on 2nd cask after installation of shield lid.
Chemical evaluation of compatibility of coatings.
Visual Evidence of gas production.
An additional possible precursor is: Film' residue seen during initial filling of MSBs i
/M
Incident Investigation Process 1.
Investigation Planning identify personn-l involve e
Develop a preliminary E&CF chart Identify objective (s) of the Incident Investigation team identify areas requiring investigation e
2.
Information Collection Collection of physical evidence a
Interviewing of personnel Collection of records, logs, drawings, etc e
3.
Determine Sequence of Events Develop a detailed E&CF chan e
4.
Identify events causal factors / conditions Barrier Analysis Change Analysis 5.
Identify Root Cause(s) includes identification of any " generic" causes e
6.
Develop correctise actions 7.
Report development
POINT BEACH VSC-24 STORAGE CASK EVENT - MAY 28, 1996 DISCUSSION e
' Event Followuo AIT Findings & Conclusions Vendor Inspection Findings Sumary of Public Concerns hitial Reaulatory Acticas 6
Issued IN 96-34 on May 31, 1996, CALs Issued June 3. 1996 to Affected Licensees (Pt. Beach. Palisades ANO).
Future Reaulatory Actions e
Generic Comunications:-
Cask Vendors Utilities operating or planning ISFSIs Modify SRP for-Storage Casks b
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A Good rning and welcome to this exit meeting following the completion of the NRC Mit I am Roy Caniano, Chief of the Plant Support Branch in Region III. Over tYe past ten days I also served aj% t0 7ipM s the eam leader for this inspection effort.
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4 tris is tne fui v i u n iur we wrr and = standard policy fcr the';c type:; of p
' meetinal inspe on, his open for puou servation. For, he pur ose of this spe t
discussi our inspec ings will be b n the NRC and
,j p, y Point Fol ing the s ~ ns we wil en ed to opc floor for y ques any observe ma ave. To ass his effort, Jack r.obe, D uty Divis,on D1 tor fr Region III will facilita that portion of the meeting.
At this time I would like to go through a round of introductions of both NRC and Point Beach staff. (INTROS...)
Thank You. Before we get started with further discussions, and for the benefit of attendees that may not be familiar'with dry cask operations and the event that occurred here on May 28, Tim Kobetz, the Senior NRC Resident Inspector here will give a brief overview of the cask system utilized here at Point Beach and will briefly summarize the event. As findicated earlier, I would appreciate that any questions arising from the summ4ry be held until later.
((
(TIM'S OVERVIEW) f
- / Thank you Tim.
I Last Thursday was the formal initi ion of the fkt/and the entrance meeting with I
Point Beach management. At that me we summarized the principle reason for the I
')W which was attaining an un rstanding of the root cause of the hydrogen generation causing the -hydrogen burrr during the welding operation on May 28th.
In addition at the entrance meeting we also discussed several other objectives V) t g
These included :
, M J In addition to the NRC staff here at Point Beach we also had several NRC staff m24 members at the Sierra Nuclear facility in California. Sierra Pcle:Hs4he AMY -designeMor--the-cask-system-used-here-at Point-Beach. C,/2 We believe that over the past week and a half that we have gained a good understanding of the root cause of the event as well as an understanding of the circumstances leading up to the event. In addition,we were also able to assess, by direct observations, your initial response activities immediately following the event. As you are aware, Tim Kobetz followed the event immediately after its occurrence with additional NRC staff being dispatched from Region III, soon after we became aware of the event. Until the cask was safely moved back into the spent fuel pool NRC provided round the clock oversight.
I would now like to provide a general overview of our assessment of the event as well as the circumstances leading up to the event and your response to it.
I will then turn the discussions over to each of the/4Wteam members introduced earlier who will provide a more detailed summarization of our findin s.
770 W Our initial evaluation of the event confirmed that the/e were no releases of radioactive materials from the cask following the b e ouen h en and no increase y
in radiation levels surrounding the cask. As I
employees the environment or members of the public.such there was no \\ptEF 7
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Although some #Gihvweaknesses we identified during re ery operations which will be discussed later, overall, your raspense and af-f returning the cask
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to the spent fuel pool,4 W W -
a~v d Ifg/IWithregardtotheeventitselfandasTimipdcatedearlier,thec se of the
.bes(on the welding of the third c sk was Me rxM af hydrogen present p
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at the location of one of the wel
. The hydrogen was pr nt as a result of the chemical reaction when the ntfuelpoolwaterwasaddedtothecaskf during loading operations. Basef pon our review of the pr ious two cask loads of t!.e sec^ " M tt.:x:: ^" ' - s Thk D=+cgen generait meing:Imrdimy
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Although these problems were n ed by severa a'-
~ 'ayees involved in the loading of the aneombcask.rthere was limited followup to the occurrences in i,
an attempt to identify the causes.
Had a detailed technical review been accomplished you may have identified hydrogen was present and as such, it is quite possible that the event with the third cask could have been prevented.
n At this time I would like each of the individual
. staff members to summarize their inspection findings and identify any issues that will warrant additional followup. Following each summary I would request that you respond to our assessment.
~
~~
Closing:
you for 1me today. The, re ort 1inmarizing our fi Trg's wi3J -
be within t xt three weeks.
s indicated,there w ever ems ill warrantin followup.
Thesa be identifieo in the nspect report.
this time the exit M is concluded. I uld now like to en the meeting for estions form members o e public or medi.
s previously 1 cated Jack i/p Grobe wi facilitating that e and at this tfiil would like to rn the d
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I Number 1.
The adequacy of the chemical compatibility studies conducted during design reviews for all cask dcrigns and facility environments should be reviewed. For cases where a detailed review was not conducted, appropriate action should be taken.
$ Examples versights i ntified from thi event inc the po ' bili]ty of the tion
'h ogen from inc paint -
borated water
- etion, j
i water ~
sion in id's shieldi material (in desig
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includes dy of the etting of Q7 which occ gat Pal j
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( ANOl Number 2.
The potential for the presence of chemical reaction residues and other foreign material on fuel and storage cask components currently in dry storage should be assessed. I say the " potential" for the presence of material because although it is fairly certain that these Point Beach casks have residue it is not yet clear whether other cask systems would have unanticipated materials.
Additionally, the acceptability of any effects of the residue should be assessed.
i Number 3.
The cask evolutions introduced ionic zine and silica into the spent fuel pool.
Consequently, ionic zine and silica were introduced into the reactor coolant system from the spent fuel pool. Although tilis can be controlled, the amount of zinc and silica introduced and acceptability limits should be determined.
Likewise, for other cask systems any material introduced into the spent fuel pools which have a potential for entering the reactor coolant system should be assessed.
Number 4 The suitability of this.Daint,in other nuclear applications where exposure to boric acid is a potential should be re-reviewed. We have considered the effects of hydrogen generation in containment applications but a broader review may be in order.
Number 5 The adequacy of cask cleanliness controls should be assessed generically.
[The casks were not cleaned with water before immersion and soap was introduced during the decontamination process.]
i-I Third, I Evaluated the technical suonort by the vendor for the orevention ofsimilar events.
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After the event, the ner, Sierra Nuclear, had an rations engineer onsite pro ' e technical expertise and ist in the unloading of the
- k. Additionally, freque elepho conference calls were hel ith Wisconsin Electric sta and Sierra Nuclear A Jgners i lifornia to discuss technic issues. Additionally, sta from Palisades and
%ansas Nuc cat (other users of the cask) h participated in the telep conferences.
As Dr. Jankovich p iously stated, Sierra Nucl as developed a detail
' vestigation and
'on plan but also the d some deficiencies in im enting their design co of process.
Consequ we consider the tech (cal support provided by Nuclear for this ev to be adequate.
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Aug-14-96 04:48P PBNP NRC Res idernt Office 414-755-4374 07 NIMS
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te3f5 hue.
Shun At a D. [T.':
soak. e ne.
ens 6 c e le U *13 o.
5 FP 'rk c,6cea.f.r= %
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9Fppb.
sismitteen** (if otential g:<' sty or q "'% loses, siens enmeems and Mk p the R33 Manager or DSS) ~
P 2 he 15 Q,
four melhny
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Ab [kr}(93Mu'th is Ce@
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rtes.Olh id 3
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a fsCb ' cant 'lQJECMn Q
b*i Nup On fhe bel oo (MQg gQQ t'c "W _ _-;
Con =ctlye acticos complee9rl or la proTia ilj(1f a WO has been t.
ea>,.
ik. 9 'Fn w a or pois.,.
Q 95 g
i Ve>
< h4 no crec hcAb r-S
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Lov melHn3 pnt meh.-
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Oppl.c Nahr, C d,.{^ A -)
eftC.f GM.kck tat %
Car %%'.n &
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Recomm odauoos C o n h k 9.
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,ih6 c,., c(; @ c-e.ppj-M tuc Lthy pupses.
Th.s hswt vdI be casJ prior-to 5
placA %
fhe.
MS6 tnto 4hR. 5 Ff.
3 Izferczeca aisiator (Print namc/ dais) hA @. O _
Def,n,/S ELes / 7-:IM Hased dedher ao ase mesher.sto tJasemed andMessifer amabissed s
'RO Review Nose
"./.. DSF '- "% yasser @ is amarted yes.
a
~ % '. 9 uny systena. structurce, or compoucats inoperabic7 O No O Yes w
9 Further Evaluation Requirod.
f
-%i~
I the C00ditl00 reportable 7 (Ref. DCS 2.1.1 or 2.1.2)
O N.
Ov Further Evahastion Required A
Bh (SigE/Date)
Mame la work control centre CR beskat.
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_-~~
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.: Manager Initial Review (Sign /Dess)
Plant Manager Closcout Review (Sign /Date) 1552 anon 0 06/24/94
____.--m__._._________
v Aug-14-96 04:4BP PBNP NRC Re s 1 cie rit Office 414-755-4374
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! STATU5: CLOSED UIllT: 0 ST5fgMs $F INITIATE 0s 07/11/95 CL0$80: 07/26/95 Msg #
,jM.
47tTIATOR: Otmult EVERS A0048mISTRATOR: SCOTT PFAFF i NupmER OF OPEN ACTIOles t o 199ut MellAGER: $(XITT PF)F ausg8R OF CLOSED ACTIONS : 1 TOTAL InsseER OF ACTIONS't Multi Astestpty seated Booket Costing ites Potentist tg Leech Zing Into the Sptfit fuCl P001 DESCRIPTIdelt wee
~
lt hee been dieeevered that the Cartmanic 11 coettne used on the nutt.eeeenesty seetess see l
~~
sterser hoe the setentist to teach sinc into the egent fust poe,t teien tasserseet. Lets teachehltity c ste ha day w.f the ase outd v4eid. erP sine ~~entreuen up to 5pp.
$fgnificences Zinc is a teu sueltfne point metet which fe controlled try leP 3.1.9 l
fus. essembties.
and hee the potentlet to ferti scale huitaiwp en 4
mote:
A aCs sinc injection ettely sereducted et Feeley reeutted in en asteepeeted easte buttehge en fust rede j
not have e specif teetten for ere sine sensentrattene. Cheetstry la surrently owelusting thle potentlet eendittet.
. %feettrighouse dose ove4essesen of 44 ase eseqstesed preer se any segg iesseny seetvtttto in me gfp gre geignonses j
fnte.
ITATue UPDATE:
(07/36/95 3AP) This Ca le belns closed hesed tgeen the sanctuelene of the evolustfort performed try Ch ansineertne (see post 95 04A0 for detalle). N -ry of the evetuotten con tre seen taider evoluetten et unde N e't "
enfatTyT*
ectlene taken for this inaue heve adequately addressed the oltuetten. This CA is belne closed bened upon i
othe ered completed.
u en i CittENES ST : SCOTT PFAFF
~
g, DATEe 07/13/95 i
treutATORT REPORTA4Lt.....(Y/4): Il T5 VIOLATION..............(Y/N): N TE LC0..................
N OPERA 31LITT EMPACT PER TI.(T/N)e W l
10 Cpn 21.................(T/w): W j
Mes agvigw..............
.(T/N):
JC0 4toulaEO............
{
.(Y/W); N 3CAe......................(T/N): N COMN!Tastu f............... ( T/w ):
s, l
0/ups n u l UPPDRTING DETERMINAi!DNS:
e a s e seem reportante event, currently westinghouse does not have any ser specificatione for sine concentra d
is net' W "
conducted try Cheelstry to determine whether there is en actual concern recording the buildup of sinc scale on
.AnevetustionIlebing In thJ 5FP. Pending the outcome of this Investigation ** edditionet coerective sneuures may be uerrented eaubtles
. g*.O 4EmplCC I2 FORMATION:
k 40e g NCta-0UTAGE
~C^*
i IQ_,,,,.
WUDOQ THtRD QUARTER OF 1995 E
47
. PtookSH WAe esof AseTictr4TCD tente ecslestCD I (AC: CIU 151RT RELATED
=~
! *$ttn 3rtNT futL COOLING end FILTRATION
)
1 i
j'FEtt:CES: hP 3.1.1 PeM 95 0460 1
I
.C.A 95-358 - _ _......ACT!0N tlupot.e.se..1 l
- z
.: x i'
j as sus e4Tes er/ sins resseerve.tes
- eat 2 e OP/13/tp Ott GC0ft NAFF enTemescue mRees t 1 RK DQuts R$CllVfDI 07/19/M CH FtLtr.lA heleittty FCLICIA pessNsEssY APPROVED
- 07/21/95 FELICIA MEINfESSFA E! PIED : 07/26/95 SCOTT PFAFF CLotto a 07/36/95 SCOTT PFAFF L
3 1 stunts tha potential ef fects that the Certoonic 11 M84 coating and teached Ilnc concentration in the Spent i si essemblite in the Spent Fuel Poet. Determine enr necessary corrective measures as appropriate.
ost egerve on j
e i 807/19/95 FPN) Received Actlen Inte ereups cet
[
! Responeltte Pereen FPW:FSLICIA II0lHISatY Ove Date: 07/31/99 i
i 107/21/95 FPit) cheeletry hee sempleted en ewetuotten of the use of sortealns es a primer for the M00s. This evet
/
j doenmented in PeM 95-0440. The evoluetten Cencluded titet White it le seceptable to use the ti.e Mete uhleh lie asinted trith cerherine, un should net une the eschemine point in the future ts11eoe ett surfaces pr11gg 1
ve elrse. u n i
Pesolue a ese use ad u-
. e-
- t s 6 4-. -.= -.. w ws e r enemissry netos to sainte the scen hgg siga enagjnt j
mee 6.
b A-.re.d en she poes. a t neon tevoto et atne are toen, ese need to ensure that the opent fust poet le ust i.
through the spent fust poet deelne mtit the sine to resueved. (An activity hee been plesed i rwy cQtated 4
ensure thle happene.) 2) fuel prior to releeding it in the core. 3) um need to ensure that cerbesinc coated with epony n the shutdeun resolutfeh.6 et to sultet>te etternettve.
4 oesn't teoch end/or find.e
.' (07/I1/95 PPn) Pessocf to SCOTT PFAFF for Verf fication.
9 (07/2&/95 149) DLA Ctesure ed 34.ai.
[
N evslust100 dissunsec In PeM 95 06&O have been reviewed and the renomseendetiene end sanctusta i
aatten leen 4 Chemierry tube) to destruf ne the zinc concentrattswie (and ensure that they are ecceptible) ha the teenefer e eeund..an posetutten List for the felt refueline outsee.
4 Ne additlenet actime are necessary et this time. Closed.
e o the Shutdown 4
dB
i -
.Au3-14.96 04:49P PBNP NRC Resident Office 414-755-4374
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COWITION RfPORT PAGEs
. of 9
ca 05 3ss 6Afs.
0'//26/96
%o
.sm. a s
.ame e i.
trer.cuers: Pen 95 0460 i
SIGNAftats cat
.............................................r.........st
.sgy leaue Manageet Dates
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Aug-14-9G 04249P PONP NRC Renident Of'1' i c e 414-755-4374 -
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~
NUCLEAR POWER DEPAR'INENT
~' g -
Screening Results IDENTIFIER (trkid)
CR 95_358 b
/
INITIATOR:
- Dcr,
- DgutfIS EVERS S
..... - - _... - - - - - - -. - - - _ - - - - - - - _ - _ _ oURCE DOCUMENT DATE : 07/2lCClrs
__---... --. -- f_
SCREENING RESULTS:
(Y/N)
N)
Regulatory Reportable.....
H TS Violation............. @
10 CFR 21.................
N TS LCO..:.................
N Operability. Impact per TS.
N JCO Required..............
.N I
MSS Review................
N SCAQ......................
[N COMMENTS SUPPORTING SCREENING DETERMINATIONS:
This event is not a violation of any PBNP ?.:hnical Soecifications era.-
licer) sing commitment to the NRC and it i not a reportable.even ryently W2stinghousse dges not have an An evaluation la being conduc ed bvSFP e eci ications tor za.nc c nc.. acionb.e en en actual concern regarding t e bull up of zinc, scale on fuehem stry to determine w ethW2t:. re s
thn SFP. Pending the outcome of th:.s investigation -- additional corre.cn;s':::;n asse mansures may be warranted.
i:Crve
REFERENCES:
'h NP 3.1.1 o
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....................................................................e.
SCREENED BY SAP -
7 SCOTT PFAFF
.w.t J
S
.....I.ONATURE O
Aud-14-90 04:47P P5NP NRC Resident Office 414-755-4374 I
04 y
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-*EE NIMS --.. Y.~2. -
M_
e PBM 95 0460 M
TO:
K.
R. Anundson P377 W. J. Hennestyy R. D.
Bronk N. L. Hoefert c.
A. Castell P377 FROM:
F. P. Hennessy D.
C. Ryggs M. G. Keshan P377 DATE:
July 18, 1995
SUBJECT:
USF, OF CARBOEINC PAINr As A PRIMER FOR TME MULTIAssmMBLY STomAss i
asANNTe E..,
REFEARHCE(4) e Eine injection in the Primary Systasa at the J. M. Farley Muclear '
Plant, by Prince Patton, presanted at the INPO Radiological (j
Prot ** tion Managgra MorXgnQp play 22-23. 199E An Engineering Assessment of Zine Ad'dition to PWR Primary Coolant
~
by Westinghouse Electric Corporation, SG-94-02-006, February 7'1'99,4Q COPY TO:
M.
F.
Baumann P377 M. K. Conry C
A. J. Cayim E. D. Schultz File R.
E.
Soisert On July 14, Dennis and Mark had compiled concerning the use of carboxinc paint 1995 Den spent fuel pool.
Our concern stame from the fact that in the the levels of sino and lead in the carborina paint are in excess of the levels allowed in NF 3.1.1 chemi a1 consamtmation control per corresten n,s1.etant Alleysi that while it its sancludsn is acceptable to use the two MSBs which have already been painted with carbozine, we should not use the carbozine in the future unless..i"~"
all surfaces primed with the carbozine paint receive a top coating of epox g i j (We are currently in the process of investigating the leachability of th carbozine with an epoxy topcoat.)
e This memo documents our review and analysia.
The carbozinc is used to coat the Multiassembly storage Basket will be innerset in the spent fuel pool.
(Nas) which While the carbosino outer surface o; I'"
the HSB is sealed with an epoxy coating, the arboninc on the inner sulface of the Man will be caractly CKDOStd to the acidic anvirnnmans ei r.nh f w
11,..e.m, usi soci. "
it is not intended for inanersion in acidic solutions.z.tseracure rrom the manuf to conduct laboratory tests for leachability.
This statement led us The tests showed that an b
uncoated carbozine surface will leach significant amounts of sinc into' y
colution when exposed to simulated spent fuel pool cooling water.
=
No. 55-0130 Calculation
~
iner.ama estimates that the level of sinc in the spent fuci pool will immersed in the spent fuel D001 for at houra.os ppb if th sosal uncontea surface of the c
"",~,,
time in much longer than we would actually expect,wkil. A 4s W i===rown 2
i t.
is would be oubmerged that long.
femmible tnat the MSB 7 4
<O
.- - -. - -. _, - - - ~
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- Aug-14-96 04:47P P5NP NRC Resident Office 414-755-4374
! 05
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v.go a
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. s.
The limits set forth in MP 3.1.1 are in terms of contaminant neerial to be used itself.
levels in the in materials which are to be used in critical applications suchcinc and lead are limited coolant system or the spent fuel pool. The level of sinc in the carbosing' as the remotor paist is while the level of &ead as ggg peu noth matar a a
]
stainless steel compartment)eh w&11 he used streetly (ger nassanc.
e autrisants on aeur peeeeduwe gewes as well as materials which will be used u '-
indirectly (for exaspie, cleanaers to be used on a carbon steel comptEre'.M
-e which will contac*, secondary coolant which will then contact stainless se
.T.
components).
The limits in the procedure for low melting point metals' (1tuei
==,
sine or lead) are hosed on direet eenteess we taelude these limite en f
materials used indirectly to be ocaservative, e
accause 250 ppe is allowable for direct contact, the 95 ppb sinc level in the spent fuel pool will not be detrimental to corrosion rates of the apent fuel peel or any ceaponents in cd )
spent fuel pool.
The lead conoestration le 50 times less than CD9 31DC
._-a._,
. a %
,n, eyonc run pool w&1l Dt insignificant.
y, a,_
pool or in the reactor coolant system. Westinghouse has no specific limits on zine c
_m=:r.
In fact, one PWR (Farley) recently4 _ y '-
e fuel began injecting zine acetate into the primary, st reduce radiation levels in the primary system (Reference 1). coolant system in order to.g..u !'
i i
In order to
support the sinc addition at rarisy.
on primary system materials was performed (Reference 2).an angtneering assessmen a
i concluded that; zine levels of 10 The assessmenc l
Parley injected zine acetate into their primary coolant-40 ppb can actually reduce corrosion rates. -
months.
system for nine The zinc concentration in their primary coolant the zinc injection was successful at lowering outage dose rateswas = 40 ppb.
While ^
thick black scale was discovered on the fuel.
4
, an unusually conclusively linked to the sinc injection, an alternate explanation has notWhile this scale has j
yet been foune.
Until the Farley experience is fully evaluated, we eerseialy i
would not be willing to introdues sinc into the primary coolant system and subject it to high temperatures and pressure of power operation.
O zine borate, s
However.
I a possible precipitate in the spent fuel pool water. is m6*chtmor,e*
.e soluble at room temperature than at elevated temperatures.
temperature borate la (essentially spent fuel pool temperature),
In fact, at xcca t...
which would be eagseated due to teaching foem the unesated Addttionally. Farley injected siac for nine months, whereas the sine S'.h l
Mst.
one month due to removal of the sino by the spent fugl pool dem I
j Therefore, the sDent fuel in the pool will ka suP*=.4 ** the sine for less v
4 s.han' a.o percent et the time that the Farley fuel was. The combination of lower temperature and reduced contact l
not form on the' fuel in the spent fuel pool and that use of the existing Mstime leads with the uncoated carboxinc is acceptable.
E.'
To ensure that our conclusions transfer tube to insure that eine ingrese into the RCS is minimitedthe spe
- correct, i
Addita==a11,
7 any previsualy irraalataa rual which im g
j cpent fuel poS1 will be visually inspected for unusual scale.asape.ed to minc in cne l
i 4
h p.
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.v ug-1C-C3 OC:47P PSNP NRC Resident Of'f' 1 ce C14-755-4374 03 (y
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.N f
PBM 95-0460 July 18, 1925 l
Page 3 f
- 8 These mitigating motions are sufficient to allow use of the two MSB's whose internal surfaces are uncoated carborinc.
carbo 21nc is not acceptable in the lens erua for two reasone.However, use of the uncoated scale on the Parley fuel is conclusively emplained, sino atmuld continue to be First, until the.
treated as an undesirable contaminant which should be minimised.
35 ppb level of sino in the spent fuel pool will cause us Secondly,*a a s.a persens es our spees smet poea M altser, vale resta to mesa to exhaust expensive to replace and expensive to dispose of. Additionally, using the will limit our ability to use that same dominera11 er to remove co from the kWST.
Coating all carboxino surfaces with epoxy or finding a #
M suitable alternative primer will allow um to eliminate this logistical prob 1'e
.s. J and extend the life of our domine.
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- AU0-14-96 04:46P PBNP NRC Resident Office 414-755-4374
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' ***WI'* %
Nuclear Power BusinessMnit Route Original to S.i.t.
J Report #
96-311
~.S
_QAS to copy:
J moha-(assigned by QAS)
WORK MONITORINC RF' PORT J. Paltner. E. Schultre%o/h i
T. Jessessky, J. "Thot/crscri' '
P!le: Ql.1.I g ver: Sean P. McGinty Date: 5/22/95 Shift: 1 L.ocation of Activity: PAB Truck Access fwnnrnminarian A res Group Observed Work Document (s)
Functional Area Observation Program:
j Process #
Oroup Job Observation (GJO)
MTN WO # 9604669 Mansaement Job Observation (MJ0).
Other hP.7 Part 6 L98 Work Monitoring Report (WMR)h u:tiviry(s) Observed:
Nelding the ahiald lid during the second MSB loading.
2 ed Le arks:
- Romarts showd peio, oeias for *=a senerna.aritum ram:4 aies
.)
[.{
L2. G.5) At the beginning of my shift, Malatenance had installed the automatic welding rig and laserted the sinms around'tfiMdlEld lid.
The welders bcEan by verifying the proper centering of the welding rig relative to the ID of the MSB. They also verifiedih@rrect witch lincup on the welding machine. Although they did not have a procedure that specified this switch lineup, they set up'.tjic ma' chine crrectly based on their knowledge of the process and then verified it by consulting with the welding engineer. After thes8c ecks they l
aantured an are on tha MSD and timed the travel of the welding rig through the arc to verify proper torch travel speed. ThedeIorted a I
-n:asured speed sli htly less than twenty inches per minute. Based on this speed the welding engineer told them to set their voltage to 31 6
' olts sad n observe a cu Tent limit of 350 amps. The welding engineer had this information on a hand written note which he had nrr -d from a verified table availabic in (bc welder's toolbox with tbc welding procedurcs. The wcldcrs then welded a test bcad y
stely ten inches long on a test coupon placed on top of the shield lid. All of their equipment operated properly within the
. eqw.. parameters during this test.
.2) Tbc welders used the automatic welding snachine to place tack welds about two inches long at each or the eightjo;nts where the birn segments met. Once they finished the tack welds, the welders used a pair of pilers to break off the taba that held the shims in place.
.2, 5.2,15.3) With the shima securely in ptsee to serve as a backing ring, the two welders set up the welding machine for the root pass.
They began the pass at about the 180* position. As they started the pass. the current rose to approximately 360 ampsgThe welder perrting the welding machine immediately recogniz.ed that he had exceeded his allowable cutTent and adjusted it to.3 Lamps.~~This took ive or six seconds and resulted in an area of tbc weld that had noticeable porosity. Maintenance documented this nocconprmance o_n CR
. 6-357. After completing the weld pass, one of the welders removed this area of the weld with a band grinder. This welder re,r--c-to so welding enginect that he observed a flame under the Srinding wheel which went out when he stopped grinding. The welders -
oncluded that residual solvent from c! caning and decontaminating the MSB caused the flame and resumed work. The observer ide te deenmmination area could not see the name because the MTC and MSD shell blocked thelt line of sight, After grindinr f' reldcd ever this acetion using the automatic welding machine.
.2) Foll: wing NDE of the root pas, the welders finished welding the shield lid using three passes with the automatic weldin inchine.
They remitned whhin their required parameters throuF.hout these passes.
- ey Words: (Key words or phrans so be emered imo WMR database for word scarch.)
SFSI, MSB. Welding. CR 96-357. S-P-96-02 tecrptable Attributes Deficient Attributes:
g,
.3 Exceptional terrormance:
1.0 hiinor. Quicidr Corrected Ifems
.0 Fully Acceptable: G.3, 2.2.15.3 3.0 Less Significant Deficiency:
(CR/QCR Generation Necessary) 5.2
.I inally Acceptable:
4.0 Significant Deficiency:
(CR/QCR Generation Neceasary)
E
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eAug 14-DO 04:40P PONP NRC Re:m i de nt Office 414-705-4374 uE.03
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ATTRIBUTES M,
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li Jfuting R.1 Surveys 1.2 Independeaca 11.2To.e %,
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B.3 Job Cuordinsuos R.3 Contaminadon Coatrois
-M yd.jp @ _g_c
- ;9 11.3 Test Evaluarnoa Q.4 Parts Aratiabtilry R.4 RWP Adhersece 2.1 Wortier Quettiy II.4 Tcas Qualiracesion 5.3 Joh Pre-Sanging R.5 Accesa curarol 2.2 Craf'-. M 11.6 Poes Maisseanace Tesana Chandstry;
- n, R.6 A 4.tiver" t 2.3 Treintog A.Pyy****ECpahel'.h4c.r,..c C.! Sample Points R.7 A! ARA 2.4 QA Requittments 12.3 Callhfasion
,a.
C.2 L4 Pracetces
' K.8 Kadwasan Reduction T'.7 Design Coottolia..
12TCalibra@7 C.3 Chendcal Control N.CM;. +
3.1 A~fn~_9n dy @ h". W '
C.4 Clsendci Conaut Program S.1 Post. Manning 3.2 Design %
13.1 l' " _
QT Eamergemey Pins.f. vy.,
3.2 accurley $quipmem 3.3 Teseovery Modificesions 13.2 Sassage i
El n,s. Cimirmanon t.2 Ingr.as Con I 2.4 Dwign eering L2.3 ~ ;; N r
tL2 Off-Sisc insirfac.o
!!.J Eacnri Dudes g.--nurDec.IContralf
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C.3 Drill Lemie.
E.6 v.bese C ar.4 4.1 5%,.t"*6 14' A 18u'reemen Besu Co,neri.e E.4 Drtil Crtrique
";InduatdalSafetylc 4.2 CGI fWoon 14.2 Equipsment IsonanonT_.'.
l Fire Prntactica T. ) I!ossdag/ Rigging 4.3 D~.~ntation Requirernents 14.3 Operat on S-sev h..j-j F.I Combumble Sanrage T.2 Environmental CondJoons 44 Record Storage
-i.~TihCaEdloon~ Reports.
l
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E3 Emergency Ligbung T.3 Warning Donca
', tut / Proc /Drwg H.
15.1 Norconformances locnofled i
E3 FP Equ'pasons laepsea.an T.4 Proa.caive Equipmani/Ue3Be 5.1 Work'Insw/pme/Drwg Adequacy 15.2 Cond.tions beefwd.-
i j
8.4 Igrunin Control Ponrus 13 Scaffolding /1.addcri 5.2 Wmk Instr /Prnc/Drwg Adhererrs
!$.3 Conddions Ducurnrnted 1.3 Watcli T.6 Confined Space Doc t Concret -
15.4 herns Segregated
,ctner Penetranons T.7 Posmans of People 6.1 Work Instr /ProuDrwg Approval 15.5 CRs Disposinoped
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From: Mary Carpenter May 28,1996 Wisconsin Electric suspends loading of spent fuel containers after combustible gas causes brief gas burn TWO CREEKG, Wis. - Loading of spent nuclear fuelinto dry storage containers was suspended at Point Beach Nuclear Plant after combustible gas was detected and caused a brief gas burn during a welding procedure early this mornin0 Fuel assemblies had been placed into a container and removed from the spent fuel pool. While a shield lid was being mechanically welded to the top of the container, combustible gas was detected and a brief gas burn occurred. Point Beach employees diccontinued the welding procedure. No one was injured and there was no risk to the general public. The occurrence did not result in any release of radiation.
- We are conducting a thorough investigation and we will not resume loading spent fuel until we have a clear understanding of the cause of the gas bum," ocid Bob Link, vice president of nuclear power for Wisconsin Electric. "We will thoroughly review all of the related information to determine the root cause of this mornin0's occurmnca.'
Plant employees previuusly luaded two containers successfully, one as decently as last week using the same loading process. These containers are now located at the dry cask storage facility on the plant site.
Spent fuel has been safely managed at Point Beach since the plant went into operation in 1970. However, the spent fuel storage poolinside the plant is becoming full, and additional storage capacity is necessary for the continued operation of the plant.
Wisconsin Electric Power Co., a subsidiary of Wisconsin Energy Corp., provides electn*c natural gas and/or steam service to about 2.3 million people in snuthenstem Wiscansin (including the Milwaukee ama), the Appleton nmn, the Prairie du Chien area, and portions of northeastern Wisconsin and Michigan's Upper Perrinsule.
ll##
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l May 28, 1996 PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE PN0-III-96-033 This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially received without verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by Region III staff (Lisle, Illinois) on this date.
Facility Licensee Emergency Classification Wisconsin Electric Power Co.
Notification of Unusual Event Point Beach 1 2 Alert Two Rivers, Wisconsin Site Area Emergency Dockets: 50-266,50-301 General Emergency X Not Applicable
Subject:
UNIDENTIFIED GAS IGNITED DURING SPENT FUEL CASK WELDING At 2:45 a.m. (CDT) on May 28, 1996, an unidentified gas ignited inside a dry cask spent fuel storage container during initiation of welding the shield lid inside the container. The container had been loaded with spent fuel and removed from the spent fuel storage pool. The gas ignition, which was heard and observed by plant technicians, displaced the shield lid, leaving it in place but tipped at a slight angle -- with one edge about 1 inch higher than normal. The shield lid is 9 inches thick and weighs about 4,400 pounds.
The VSC-24 cask was removed from the spent fuel storage pool about 4:10 p.m. on May 27 and placed in the cask decontamination area in the auxiliary building. The cask remained filled with water, and about 30 gallons was removed to create an air space under the shield lid. A welding machine is used to weld the shield lid in place. The gaseous ignition occurred during initiation of welding, but before any welding took place.
There was no evidence of any damage to the spent fuel in the cask qs a result of the gaseous ignition. ContinuoJs air measurements in the cask decontamination area showed no measurable radioactivity. There were no injuries.
The licensee is investigating the incident and is attempting to identify the gas which ignited. After a preliminary investigation, the licensee plans to return the cask to the spent fuel storage pool for further examination. The licensee is continuing to monitor for radioactivity and combustible gases.
The NRC senior resident inspector responded to the plant site after being notified of the event and is continuing to monitor the licensee's activities. Additional inspectors are being sent to the site from the regional office.
4;,oM40pW pg.
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. ~ _
.. _.... = _ _. _ _ _.. _ _ _. _ _.... _ _ _ -. _ -. _.
I PNG-Ill-96-033 !
L l
This is the third VSC-24 cask loaded by the licensee. The other two casks have been placed on the outdoor storage pad. Each cask holds 24 fuel assemblies, l
The-licensee plans to issue a news release. The State of Wisconsin will be notified. The information in this preliminary notification has been
-reviewed with licensee management.
Region III (Chicago) was notified of this event by the resident inspector at 3:40 a.m. on May 28, 1996. This information is current as of 10 a.m.
on May 28, 1996.
Contact:
TIMOTHY K08TEZ MARTIN FARBER (414)755-2309 (708)829-9605 4
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ustE. K.UNotS 80632-4355 May 29, 1996 MEMORANDUM To:
Roy J. Caniano, Team Leader
. Augmented Inspection Team (AIT)
Point Beach Nuclear Plant FROM:
John A. Grobe, Deputy Directo Division of Reactor Safety
SUBJECT:
AIT CHARTER FOR POINT BEACH DRY CASK EVENT On May 28, 1996, a gas ignition event occurred during dry cask activities at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant. Based on discussions with the Offices of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards, and Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, and on initial inspection findings regarding the event, an AIT has been chartered in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0325 (e.g., significant or unexpected system interaction).
Attached for your implementation is an AIT Charter for the inspection of the i
dry cask gas ignition event of May 28 at Point Beach.
The objectives of the team are to identify and communicate both'the facts of the event and any generic safety concerns, and to document the findings and conclusions of the onsite inspection.
Should you have any questions regarding these objectives or the attached Charter, please do not hesitate to contact me.
Attachment:
AIT Charter cc w/att:
J.-M. Taylor, EDO G. H. Marcus, NRR J. L. Hilhoan, OEDO C. J. Paperiello, NMSS H. L. Thompson, OEDO W. O. Travers, NMSS H. J. Miller, RIII C. J. Haughney, NMSS A. B. Beach, RIII E. J. Leeds, NMSS W. L. Axelson, RIII E. L. Jordan, AEOD l
G. E. Grant, RIII R. J. Barrett, AE00 C. D. Pederson, RIII
- 8. C. McCabe, OEDO W. T. Russell, NRR A. J. Kugler, LPM /NRR R. E. Zimmeman, NRR A. G. Hansen, LPM /NRR J. W. Roe, NRR T. J. Kobetz, SRI
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.FROM'; Panasonic PPF Auomented Insnection Team Charter - Point Beach Nuclear Plant l
Examine the circumstances surrounding the dry cask ignition event at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant on May i
28, 1996, including but not limited to the following:
1.
Develop and validate a chronological sequence of events and activities for the dry cask evolution, detailing events just prior to and immediately after the gas ignition.
2.
Compare this sequence of events to other dry cask loading evolutions at Point Beach to identify any anomalies associated with this particular load.
3.
Evaluate the licensee's actions during and followin the event; including their immediate response to the event, is lementation of emergency plans and management response. procedures, event reporting, fo lowup actions, and 4.
Evaluate the extent of the licensee's analysis and determination of the root cause for the event, including potential source (s) of hydrogen generation, and the initial evaluation of appropriate corrective actions.
5.
Determine if appropriate attention was given to the condition of systems and components associated with dry cask evolutions, including compatibility of the dry cask with spent fuel pool conditions.
I 6.
Determine any potential generic implications of the event.
Evaluate the technical' support by the vendor for the prevention of similar events.
7.
Evaluate the adequacy and appropriateness of radiation protection.
precautions taken by the licensee as part of the dry cask loading activity.
8.
Evaluate the radiation protection consequences of the event to both the plant staff and the general public.
i I
i
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- 4 INTERNAL i
CORRESPONDENCE e
PBM 96-0320 To: C. A. Castell B. D. O'Connell S. A. Pfaff S. J. Zepplin
'~
Frean:
G. J. Maxfield 4
Date: May 29,1996 3
Subject:
INCIDENTINVESTIGATIONII 96-01 BRIEF COMBUSTIBLE GAS BURN DURING DRY STORAGE CONTAINER SHIFTD LID WELDING i
Copy To: R. E. Link W. B. Fromm T. C. Guay G. J. Maxfield j
J. G. Schweitzer R. D. Seizert T7A.3 At approximately 0245 hours0.00284 days <br />0.0681 hours <br />4.050926e-4 weeks <br />9.32225e-5 months <br /> on Monday, May 28,1996, during initiation ofwelding the shield i
lid inside the third dry fuel storage container, an unidentified combustible gas briefly igni l
ignition slightly cocked the shield lid. Continuous air measurements in the cask decontaminat 3
area showed no measurable radioactivity. There were no personnelinjuries as a result of this event. An initial activity plan focused on notification of the NRC resident inspector; determination ofimmediate reporting requirements; identification and monitoring of the source
- i the gas; removal of the shims and replacement of the shield lid; and preparations for rel d
loaded container to the spent fuel pool I would like you to participate on an incident investigation team to review this event. T of the investigation should include:
Determination of the root cause(s) of this event using Taproot root cause tec$iiques.
s.
o Identification of the source of the gas.
o A review of welding procedures, processes, and work practices, includiag purging o
welding as is the normal practice for primary side welding activities, positioning of the person performing the welding and sampling for combustible gases.
An evaluation ofoperating experience at other utilities using the VSC-24 multi-asse o
. scaled basket and with CarboZinc coating.
A review ofprecursors to this event. The precursors may include, but not be limited to o
previous evaluations of the protective coating and experiences during the loading of the previous two containers.
N/Y 9e?Mora y
~-... -
I May 29,1996 Page 2 Mr. Castell is appointed chairman of this incident investigation team. It is anticipated that scope of this investigation will not need to be more broad then detailed above; however, shou the team believe that the scope needs to be changed, this should be discussed with me. I anticipate that this investigation can be completed by Friday, June 7,1996, The investigation should follow the instructions provided in procedure NP 5.3.3, " Post-Inc 1
Critique and Investigation." Thus, your team will prepare a report ofyour investigati and will present your report to the Manager's Supervisory Staff. The report shoul Friday, June 14,1996.
G. J.
eld Plant Manager l
,e I
i
9 Ff tan: OEce of Pubhc Mars Ts: 58Wid Pt Beach Date:F29/96 Tirne:C:18:12 Page 1 of 2 b-U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Region III Office of Public Affairs 801 Warrenville Road, Lisle IL 60532-4351 NEWS ANNOUNCEMENT:
RIII-96-21 May 29, 1996 CONTACT:
Jan Strasma 708/829-9663 Angela Dauginas 708/829-9662 E-mail:
crpa30 nrc. gov NRC SENDS AUGHENTED INSPECTION TEAM TO REVIEW GASEOUS IGNITION INCIDENT IN SPENT FUEL CASK AT POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff is sending an Augmented Inspection Team to the Point Beach Nuclear Power Station to review the unexpectect burning of a combustible gas during the welding of a lid on a spent fuel storage cask early Tuesday.
The Point Beach plant, located near Two Rivers, Wisconsin, is operated by Wisconsin Electric Power Cornpany.
The storage cask had been loaded with 24 spent fuel assemblies and moved from the spent fuel storage pool at the plant to an adjacent work area.
As technicians began welding a-4,400 pound lid on the container, combustible gas inside the container ignited.
Pressure from the burning gas moved the lid slightly, leaving it about one-inch out of place.
The cask was filled with water at the time of the incident with a small air space at the top.
The utility stopped the welding proceduro and is now investigating the cause of the gaseous ignition.
Air monitors showed there was no roloaso of radioactivity from tho container, and there is no evidence of damage to the spent fuel.
No one was injured in the incident.
Both reactors at the Point Beach plant were operating at the time and were not affected by the incident.
Members of the NRC inspection team will join the NRC Senior Resident Inspector whc went to the plant early today Tuesday to monitor the utility's a.ctivities.
The team members are from j
the NRC's Region III off:.co in Lisle, Illinois, and the NRC's l
Headquarters in Rockville, Maryland.
6/M
from: Ofrwe of Pubbc Apars To: $RMtlPt Beach Dde:W29/96 Tane:08:19:16 e
Page 2 ef 2 S
^
The team will review the incident and monitor the utility's investigation.
At the ceanpletion of its onsite review, the inspection team will present its findings to utility representatives in a meeting which is open to public observation.
The schedule and location of the mooting will be announced later.
A written report of the inspection findings will be issued several weeks after the conclusion of the inspection.
This was the third spant fuel storage cask loaded at the Point Beach facility.
The other two were loaded without incident and placed on an outdoor storage pad.
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A gas emplestem inside a higtr level naclear 1 smote silo at Wisconsist Electric Power DeM's (WESCO) Point femah Emaclear Flast has aw w'==== man's rarot =r ~g
' anclear weste deep for the seceand time la five ansatans.
" tham is the first medianotive weste stowere euspissiest at a U.S. meclear plass, seis Devia Meczist, wtwo Dimeetese of the citisees* Uttitty sense (CIB).
att's time for IEEPCO to stop eag.a7-- = e== =ith moel er weste on san. =:-=< s==,
said w et.
Assesding to the meelear hogalatexy camadssion M) imittel at 2:45 a.m. on aqr 24th, an insiaantified gas. ignited a its11 -Leaded etek of *=e1L==se temste===8 =<=seg 14 team of asi 3
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pei*e to the welp the 9 i" *S *-goesk lid that tseiple ehest.
4, The d'ide 'tne Lited tape 2 ten lid, Leeving it tipped at a with 1 lack higher than mosam1. emere =enee no injuries.
WEFC0 has suspended fasther 1"<i of anclear - waste cayks
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tantil it can dee-t== the cease of the m arf atant and whether may spent reel aves woes eessaged er taas ensplostem. Each 18 foot higts cask is imeded with 14 toes of medicestive waste, incloding 170 pommes of plutantum.
Eena leessa maio contains the musiyaient sedioeotivikr of 340 Bir== nema-type emiplestems.
&oomaining to Fedasal guidelines, the weeto mest he )suyt safe far 10,000 years,.
om o.oeme,es as, isss, amo. < a-arr cirsuit' co==s audse mark Frankel ekset down the panleau weste eng far the first time. Judge teamhmL ruled that the minblic servios Commission's (PSC)
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The PSC on May 20th Leeemd its use emeer roependay the daup.
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i cut win be eekaar fee em immediate Fac 1 wM7 +'en and ma esses svvessaame unear zoom-L Mica to racpen the dump.
- M For amore infaamet. Lea, contacts 10mpid Hasseitt (808)-251-3322.
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95/89/96 31:38 T1/RX No.0645 P.001 g
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NRC AIT ENTRANCE MEETING MAY 30.1996 Attendancs Wisconsin F,lectric Power Company R. E. Link Vice President-Nuclear Power (by telecon)
G. J. Maxfield Manager-PBNP G. M. Krieser Manager-Industry & Regu!atory Services S, A. Patuiski Manager-Nuclear Engineering A. J. Cayia Production Manager W. B. Fromm
. Manager-Site Engineering D. D. Schoon Manager-Chemistry M. F. Baumann Manager-Nuclear Fuel Services J. A. Palmer Manager-Maintenance P. B. Tindall
- Manager-Health Physics T. C. Guay Manager-Regulatory Services J. A. Holmes Training Coordinator E. J. Epstein Acting General Supervisor-Health Physics T. J. Jessessky Senior Project Engineer-Site QA
. T. G. Malanowski Senior Project Engineer-Licensing F. A. Flentje Regulatory Specialist
{
Root Cause Evaluation Team C. A. Castell(Team Leader)
Senior Engineer-Licensing -
i S. A. Pfaff Senior Engineer-Operating Experience S. J. Zepplin Training Specialist B. D. O'Connell Senior Engineer-Systems Engineering Sierra Nuclear Cornoretion T. McNulty i
i i
1 4
Nuclear Regulatory Commissian R. J. Caniano (Team Leader)
Chief, Plant Support Section #2, DRS, RIII T. J. Kobetz Senior Resident Inspector R. Laufer NRR Project Manager-KNPP R. Paul Reactor Inspector-RP, RIII J. Davis C. Withee
(
l
INTERNAL
' CORRESPONDENCE I
PBM 96-0329 To: W. J. Hennessy A. J. Cayia C. A. Castell E. J. Enste:n M. F. Baumann From: G. J. Maxfield i
Date: May 30,1996 1
Subject:
NRC AUGMENTED INSPECTION TEAM (AIT) copy To:
W. B. Fromm G. M. Krieser T. G. Staskal G. J. Mrsfield i
P. B. Tindall.
T. C. Guay T. G. Malanowski R. E. :d i
Al.4.1 1
An entrance meeting was held today between NRC and NPBU representc:i.
augmented inspection team (AIT) effort which commences today and is e,.;
approximately one week.
The NRC team members and areas of expenise are: '
i i
Roy Caniano (Team Leader and Chief, Plant Support Branch 2, Division e'
- P Safety, Region III).
Ron Paul (reports to Mr Caniano and will address radiation protenu consequences).
Tim Kobetz (PBNP Senior Resident Inspector)
Jim Davis (NRC headquaners, Ph.D. in metallurgy, will address materich it: 0 Rich Laufer (NRR Project Manager for Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant)
Carl Withee (NRR, areas of expenise include shielding, criticality safety; w','
addressing fuelissues)
Paul Narbut (former resident inspector in Region V, NRR Vendor Brr nd.;
vendorissues)
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May 30,1996 1
l Page 2 i
1 The eight areas which will be the focus of the AIT, the NRC team assignment, and the WE lead individuals are:
l.
1.
Chronological sequence of events prior to and immediately after gas ignition.
(Kobetz/Cayia) 2.
Comparison of sequence of events to other cask loadings, identifying similarities and -
differences. (Withee/W.Hennessy) i 3.
Evaluation of actions during and following event (including EP event categories, other notifications, etc.) (Kobetz/Cayia) 4.
Analysis of event (root cause evaluation) and corrective actions. (Davis /Castell) 5.
Appropriate attention to system and component interfaces, including compatibility of cask with spent fuel.- (Narbut/ Wood)'
(Duane Schoon will address chemistry-related areas) 6.
Generic implications of event, including notifications made by vendor to other users of cask. (Davis and Narbut/Baumann)-
7.
Adequacy of overall radiation protection precautions. (Paul /E. Epstein) 1 8.
Radiological consequences of this event. (Paul /E. Epstein)-
G.J.M eld Plant Manager i
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05/30/96 AIT/PBNP CONTACT LIST NRC PBNP Ext #
1.
Kobetz Cayia 6668 2.
Withee Hennessy 6573 3.
Kobetz Cayia 6668 4.
Davis Castell 6132 (through 06/01 TSC-A (06/03-End) 5.
Narbut Wood 6317 Schoon (Chem) 6680 6.
Davis /Narbut Baumann Page or 6221 i.
7.
Paul Epstein 6228 8.
Paul Epstein 6228 Other Contacts 1.
Fritzie Flentje 6221 2.
Terry Guay (Reg Services Mgr) 6430 3.
Greg Maxfield (PBNP Manager) 6212 f
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION
. OFFICE-0F NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION r
WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 l
l May 31, 1996 l
l NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 96-XX: HYDROGEN GAS IGhiTION DURING VSC-24 MSB CLOSURE-WELDING l
Addressees All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power reactors.
Independent spent _ fuel. storage installation designers and fabricators.
l i
-Purpose l
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information l-notice to alert addressees to a hydrogen gas ignition event which occurred during the welding of the shield lid on a spent fuel storage cask at the Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant.
It is expected that recipients will review the information for. applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore,;no specific action or written response is required.
Description of Cirggastances
.e u
l On'May.28, 1996, a hydrogen gas ignition occurred during the welding of-the; j
, shield lid on a VSC-24 MSB (multi-assembly sealed basket).
The gas ignition displaced the shield-lid, leaving it in-place but tipped at a slight angle, l
with one edge about-= ir.d higher than normal.
~3 tuema L
The VSC-24 MTC (multi-assembly transfer cask), a shielded lifting device I
utilized to transfer the MSB loaded with spent-fuel to the VCC (ventilated concrete cask) for storage, had been placed-in the cask decontamination work area in'the auxiliary building. 'Approximately 30 gallons of spent fuel pool water had been drained to facilitato shield lid welding by creating an air space below the lid. The hydrogen gas ignition occurred during the-initiai. ion of-the shield lid welding, approximately 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> after the loaded MTC had been removed from the spent fuel storage pool.
Discussion Following the event, gas and water samples collected from the MSB internals showed detectable levels of hydrogen in the air space beneath the shield lid and dissolved in the MSC water. -The licensee then continuously purged the air space beneath the lid with nitrogen to prevent the accumulation of' combustible i
gases, and moved the shield lid back into its original position.
The MSB was then fully flooded.to eliminate the air space under the shield lid, and transferred back to the spent fuel storage pool. The licensee unloaded the spent fuel assemblies and placed them_in the spent fuel pool storage racks.
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, u The'MTC/MSB was subsequently moved back to the decontamination work area for j.
further inspection as part of the licensee's investigation of the combustible gas burn.- A visual examination of the spent fuel assemblies, MSB and MTC
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showed no evidence of damage as a result of the combustible gas ignition.
'The investigation into the possible sources of hydrogen is. focusing on a zinc-based coating applied to the internal surfaces of the MSB. The zinc may have reacted chemically with the acidic water from the spent fuel storage pool to produce hydrogen. A minimum boron concentration is required to be maintained, j
as a criticality control, in the spent fuel storage pool water at Pressurized WaterReactors-(PWRs),
i An NRC Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) has been formed and is on-site to investigate the event.
The objectives of the AIT are to identify and i
connunicate both the facts of the event and any generic safety concerns, and to document'the findings and conclusions of the on-site inspection.
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IN 9X-XX Month XX, 199X Page X of X Related Generic Co-inications (An optional list of other generic communications that have previously addressed the subject of the information notice.)
This information notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact (one of) the technical contact (s) listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
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Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Technical contact (s):
Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
, jut 4-03-1996 11:30 SIEPRA iUCLEAR COPP 408 438 52c5 P.02 tb Oh u
q 6/3/%
SELECTION OF CARBO ZINC 11 l
FOR USE IN COATING MSBs l
i MSBs require coating to protect the spent fuel pool from corrosion e
products of the carbon steel shcIl and internals.
An evaluation was completed in 1990 of available coating materials that could meet VSC operational requirements.
- Resistance to radiation.
Maintain intergity at relatively high 700'F temperature inside MSB.
Using all information sources available at the time including paint e
vendors, operators ofnuclear power plants, and relevent nuclear industry i
experience, zine based inorganic coatings were selected.
)
Carbo Zinc 11 e
Dimetcote 6
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Carbo Zinc 11 was selected because it was extensively used in the nuclear industry and significant testing confirmed its performance.
Carbo Zinc 11 was the only coating approved for use in the Palisades spent fuel pool at the time of coating selection.
Main focus of selection involved performance in the spent fuel pool.
Discussions with several nuclear organizations did not identify concerns with hydrogen generation due to contact with spent fuel pool water.
Hydrogen generation in a closed spent fuel cask filled with fuel pool water was never identified as a concern.
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~ JL2K$3-1995~11:38 SIERRA IU1. EAR CORP 408 438 5206 P.03 SELECTION OF CARBO ZINC 11 FOR USE IN COATING MSBs (Continued)
Until incident at Point Beach, SNC was not aware of any combustible e
gas concerns with the VSC.
SNC has put together an action plan to address hydrogen generation e
within the MSB during loading operations.
- Preliminary conclusion is that procedural changes will eliminate the potential for combustible concentrations of hydrogen being present during MSB closure operations.
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JUi-ONiW6 11!38 SIEPPA FUCLEAR COPP 408 438 5206 P.04 t
RELEVANT DIFFERENCES IN LOADING PROCEDURES PALISADES VS. POINT BEACH 5
Point Beach Vent in shield lid closed prior to and during welding.
30 Gals. of water pumped out prior to welding shield lid.
e Amount of water pumped out determined by pumping time.
MSB #3 sat for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after pumpdown prior to start of welding.
Appearance ofloose Carbo Zinc on surface of spent fuel pool.
Increases potential for hydrogen generation Shims for shield lid installed using pneumatic tool (tighter fit).
Palisades 4
Vent in shield lid open prior to and during welding.
- Slight negative pressure created in air space prior to and during welding.
75 gals. of water pumped out prior to welding shield lid.
e Amount of water pumped out is measured.
Lid welding activities started immediately after pumpdown.
e No appearance ofloose Carbo Zinc on surface of spent fuel pool.
Shims for shield lid installed by hand (looser fit).
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w es-issi '111.59 stERRd thiNUN CORP 408 38 5206 P.OS j
RECOMMENDED ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE Follow approach used in 13 previously successful loadings at Palisades.
Assure loose Carbo Zine is removed from interior of MSB.
Pump out at least 75 gals. of water prior to welding shield lid.
- Measure amount of water pumped out to assure accuracy.
Keep vent in shield lid open until water is completely removed.
Maintain slight negative pressure in air space prior to and during welding.
l Check for combustible gas in area of welding prior to start of
=
welding.
i Start shield lid welding activities immediately after pumpdown.
TOTAL P.05
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MarissaBailey(MGB))Nfdbb'.RASI From:
. NCD2. CHI.' JAG, ARDl.ARPl TD:3 A 680% M
- To:
i Date: Monday,= June.3, 1996 11:57 am i
Subject:
Draf t -CAL for the VSC-24 1
I Attached, in WP5.2 format, is-the draft CAL for the VSC-24 cask users.
Comments from Hugh Thompson and 0GC have already beer incorporated.
j d
We did not add a sentence stating that NMSS will provide support to the Regions.
If the Regions feel this is necessary, please suggest some wording.
j We would like.to assure you that NMSS/SFP0 will support the Regions in resolving the issues in the CAL.
- The Office of Public Affairs at HQ is planning to issue a press release upon issuance of the three CALs.
Please contact Eric Leeds at (301) 415-8540 when~
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the CALs have been issued.
If you have any questions, please contact'me at (301) 415-8531 or Eric Leeds.
Thank you, l
CC:
NCD2.ARI.KMK, NCD2.CHl.TJK1, NCD2.CHl.MEP, EJL, CJ i
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6/3 9:15 am i
CAL No. X-XX-XXX Consumers Power. Company Wisconsin Electric. Power Company Entergy Operations', Inc.
SUBJECT:
CONFIRMATORY ACTION-LETTER
Dear Sir (s):
.j On June XX, 1996, representatives from NRC Headquarters, Regions III & IV and your company held a conference call to discuss your use of.the Pacific Sierra Nuclear Associate's Ventilated Storage Cask (VSC)-24 system. We initiated the conference call as a result of the May 28, 1996 event at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant involving a VSC-24 spent fuel storage cask. During the Point 1
Beach event, a hydrogen gas ignition occurred'during the. welding of the shield j
lid ~on a VSC-24 multi-assembly sealed basket.(MSB). The gas ignition displaced the shield lid, leaving it in place but tipped'at a slight. angle.
j The VSC-24 multi-assembly. transfer cask (MTC), a shielded lifting device used to transfer the MSB loaded with spent fuel for storage, had been placed in the
- cask. decontamination work area in the auxiliary building. Approximately 30 gallons of spent fuel pool water had been drained to facilitate welding of the shield lid by creating an air. space below the lid.. The' hydrogen gas' ignition occurred during the initiation of the shield' lid welding, approximately 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> after the loaded MTC had been removed from the' spent fuel storage pool.
Although the gas ignition caused no injuries.or radiological releases and no 8
(
damage to the spent fuel or to the VSC components, the staff is concerned that such an event has not been evaluated and could potentially result in more severe consequences. Therefore, on May 29, 1996, an NRC Augmented Team Inspection (AIT) was formed and sent to the site to investigate the event.
The objectives of the AIT are to identify and communicate both the facts of the event and any generic safety concerns and to document the findings and conclusions of the onsite inspection.
Pursuant to a telephone conversation between (names and nositions of orincioal individuals reoresentina the licensee) and (names and nositions of *orincioal individuals reoresentina the NRC) on (date)
, it is our understanding that you have'taken (or will take) the following actions prior to loading, or unloading, any spent fuel in a VSC-24 cask or placing a VSC-24 cask into the spent fuel pool:
(1)
You will have assessed the potential for the generation and ignition of explosive gases during.all phases of operation of the VSC-24 system-i (2)'
You.will have compensatory actions in place to minimize the potential
'i for the generation and ignition of explosive gases; (3)
You will have in place procedures to respond in the event of a gas ignition and the applicable personnel trained and briefed accordingly; and i
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M (4) 14 days prior to loading, or unloading, any spent fuel in a VSC-24 cask, D[
the applicable plant personnel will contact the Director, Division of Reactor Projects, (applicable Region).
y Pursuant to Section 182 of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, you are k'
required to:
l 1)
Notify me immediately if your understanding differs from that set forth above; 2)
Notify me if for any reason you cannot complete the actions within the specified schedule and advise me in writing of your modified schedule in advance of the change; and 4
3)
Notify me in writing when you have completed the actions addressed in this Confirmatory Action Letter.
Issuance of this Confirmatory Action Letter does not preclude issuance of an order formalizing the above commitments or requiring other actions on the part of the licensee; nor does it preclude the NRC from taking enforcement action for violations of NRC requirements that may have prompted the issuance of this letter.
In addition, failure to take the actions addressed in this Confirmatory Action Letter may result in enforcement action.
l The responses directed by this letter are not subject to the clearance procedures of the Office of Nanagement and Budget as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.96-511.
I In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure ((s), and your response will be placed in the NRC 3
Public Document Room (PDR).
To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. However, if you find it necessary to include such information, you should clearly indicate the specific information that you desire not to be placed in the PDR, and provide the legal basis to support your request for withholding the information from the public.
Sincerely, Regional Administrator (or designee)
(Director, NRR) (or designee)
(Director, HMSS) (or designee) l Docket No.
License No.
nr./xf1T~ksu ID:7085151096 JUN 04'96 9: 47No.bb2kO1 o
o NOTE FOR ROY CANIANO:
Here's the draft announcement on the meeting-Any comments?
Jan e-mail: rjs2 g/a /Ja* #w phone: 708/829-9663 i
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igfygg g g g-gg,,g4 96 9: 47 r40,002 p,02 i :
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- DRAFT -
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Region III Office of Public Affairs 801 Warrenv111e Road, Lisle IL 60532-4351 NEWS ANNOUNCEMENT:
RIII-96-23 CONTACT:
Jan Strasma 708 June 4, 1996 Angela Dauginas/829-9663 i
708/829-9662 E-mails opa30nrc. gov 4
i NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION TEAM TO PRESENT FINDINGS OF OF GAS BURN IN SPENT FUEL CASK AT POINT BEACH NUC i
will meet Friday _A Nuclear Regulatory Commission Augmented Inspection Team officials to discu(June 7) with Wisconsin Electric Power Company i
burn in a spent fuel storage container May 28 at the Point Beachs Nuclear Power Station.
The Station is near Two Rivers, The meeting will be-at 10-a.p.m. in the Two Creeks Town Rivers, Wisconsin. Hall, located at State Highway 42 and Tapawingo Road north of T i
i The six-person inspection team is headed b 4
l Branch Chief from the NRC's Region III Office. y Roy Caniano, a Paperiello, Director of the NRC's Office of Nuclear Naterial Dr. Carl i
Safety and Safeguards, and other NRc staff members will also attend the meeting.
to weld a shield lid on the spent fuel storage container after i
was loaded with 24 fuel assemblies.
There was no evidence of damage to the storage container er to the fuel assemblies as a result of the gas burn.
j The spent fuel assemblies were subsequently placed back in the spent fuel storage pool.
The investigation into the cause of the incident is focussing on a zinc-based coating used on internal surfaces of the container.
acidic water from the spent fuel storage pool to produceThe coating m hydrogen.
The meeting between the NRC staff and Wisconsin Electric officials will be open to public observation.
At the close of the meeting there will be an opportunity for questions and comments from members of the public.
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