Text

Amend 104 to License DPR-53,changing Tech Specs for Startup Testing & Operation for Fuel Cycle 8
	ML20129E097
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	05/20/1985
From:	Tourigny E; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20129E102	List: ML20129E097;
References
	NUDOCS 8506060346
	Download: ML20129E097 (38)
	v • d • e

a nc

. [p

[(

UNITED STATES y-

-- g -

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g

j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 e

e

't

,o BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET N0. 50-317 CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.104 License No. DPR-53 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The applications for amendment by Baltimore Gas & Electric Company (the licensee) dated December 31,1984, February 22, 1985, and February 26, 1985 comply with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the applications, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the

-Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance.(i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of.the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Connission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this. amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Corx11ssion's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

n 8

. 2.

' Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-53 is hereby amended'to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.104, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

~

f/9 W

<f' E.G.Touriony,ActingChief Operating Reactdrs Branch #3 Division of Licensing

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: May 20, 1985 4

e 9

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.104 FACILTIY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-53 DOCKET NO. 50-317 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change. The corresponding everleaf pages are provided to maintain document completeness.

~

Remove Pages Insert Pages 3/4 1-1 3/4 1-1 3/4 1-5 3/4 1-5 3/4 1-9 3/4 1-9 3/4 1-11 3/4 1-11 3/4 1-13 3/4 1-13 3/4 1-16 3/4 1-16 3/4 1-16a 3/4 2-2 3/4 2-2 3/4 2-5 3/4 2-5 3/4 2-11 3/4 2-11 3/4 5-Sa 3/4 5-Sa 3/4 7-1 3/4 7-1 3/4 7-4 3/4 7-4 3/4 10-1 3/4 10-1 8 3/4 1-1 8 3/4 1-1 B 3/4 1-2 B 3/4 1-2 B 3/4 2-1 8 3/4 2-1 B 3/4 2-2 B 3/4 2-2 B 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 7-1 B 3/4 7-1 I

8 I

,~.

l!!

~ REACTIVITY C0"TRCL SYSTEMS

,iMODERATORTEMPERATURE.COE.:FICIENT

' LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 1;

3.1.1.4 Thd moderator. temperature oefficient (MTC) shall be:

Less' positive than 0.7 x '10-4.tk/k/ F whenever THERMAL POWER a.

is 1 70!F cf RATED THERMAL POWER.

-b. 'Less.cositive than 0.2 x 10-# sk/k/ F whenever THERMAL POWER U

i Jis > 70.i ci-RATED THERMAL POWER, anc Less negative than -2.7 x~ 10-' ak/k/oF at RATED THERMAL POWER.

c.

'-ALICAEILITY:

MODES 1 and 2"#

' l

{ ACTION:

9':- the.m:derit:r te cerature c:sfficier.t cu: side any c E cf tr.e abcVe

~

-limits, e in at least HOT STAND 5Y within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.1.4.1 The MTC'shall be determined to be within its limits by confirmatory measurements.

MTC measured values shall be extrapolated and/or compensated to

! permit direct comparison with the above limits.

4

. ~.

+

ll-

.i l

t.

. g.

'*With Keff ' 1.0.

See Special Test Exception 3.10.2.

I CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 1-5 Amendment No. 42, SS,104

~

i 0;I CTI'!ITY CONTROL SYSTEMS jf j{SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS-(Continued)~

,c I4.1.1.4.2 -The :1TC :shall be. determined at the following frequencies and THER!iAL POWER conditions during each fuel cycle:

1-

.a.

Prior to initial. coeration above 5%;of RATED THERMAL POWER, after~

l-

.each fuel loading.

i

b.

'At any THERMAL POWEREabove 90% of'. RATED THERMAL POWER, within 7

- P EFPD afterl initially. reaching an. equilibrium condition at or

.above 905 of RATED THERMAL POWER.

c.

At any THERMAL POWER, within 7'EFPD after reaching a RATED THERMAL -

~

PO,4ER equilibrium baron concentration of 300 ppm.

l g

4 i

l CALVERT CLIFFS'- UNIT 1 3/4 1-6 Amendment No.S 8 l

r;

.1 I d.1 REACTIVITV' CONTROL SYSTEMS

., 3/4.1.1 E0 RATION CONTROL

!SHUTDOWNMARGIN-T

> 200 7 c

avg L

l c.

n i

LDiITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION j, 3.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be > 3.5%* ak/k.

I A;;LICAEILITY: MODES 1, 2**, 3 and 4.

!! ACTION:

4r With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN < 3.5%* ak/k, immediately initiate and continue l

boration at > 40 com of 2300 com boric acid solution or ecuivalent until

.e r.e requirec ShuTD3h!, MARSIN is restored.

.i-I-

S'JRVEILLANCE RE0 SIRE.YENTS

4.1.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be > 3.5%* ak/k:

a.

Within one hour after detection of an inoperable CEA(s) and at least l

once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter while the CEA(s) is inoperable.

If the inoperable CEA is imovable or untrippable, the above required SHUT-DOWN MARGIN shall be increased by an amount at least equal to the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable CEA(s).

b.

When in MODES 1 or 2, at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months by verifying that CEA group withdrawal is within the Transient Insertion Limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.

c.

When in MODE-2

, within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months prior to achieving reactor critical-ity by verifying that the predicted critical CEA position is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.

t lj d.

Prior to initial operation above 5% RATED THERMAL POWER after each jj fuel loading, by consideration of the factors of e below, with the CEA groups at the Transient Insertion Limits of S;:ecification 3.1.3.6.

l

Adnsrence to Technical Specification 3.1.2.6 as specified in Surveillance Requirements 4.1.1.1.1 assures that there is sufficient available shutdown margin to match the shutdown margin requirements of the safety analyses.

- See Special Test Exception 3.10.1.

With Keff

1.0.

1. 1. With Keff < 1.0.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 1-1 Amendment No. /E, 7J, EE,104

Q j

qFEiCTIVITY=CONTROLSYSTEMS E T!EILLANCE REOUIREMENTS (Centinued) e.

When in MODES 3 or 4, at ; east once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by con-sideration of the following factors:

1.

Reactor coolant shtem boron concentration, 2.

CEA position, 3.

Reactor coolant system average temperature, 4.

. Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation, 5.

Xencn concentration, and 6..

Samarium concentration.

-- _ 4.1 l.1.2 The ovarall core reactivity balance shall be coroared to il :redicted values-to demonstrate agreement witnin + 1.05 ak/k a: least once per 31 Effective Full Power Da*ys (EFPD).

This comparison snall consider at least those factors stated in Specification 4.1.1.1.-l.e, h, W ys.

The credicted reactivity values shall be adjusted (normalized) its correspond to the actual core conditions prior to exceeding E-fuel braup of 60. Effective Full-Fower Days after each fuel leading.

g.

.~

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 1-2

o ii

?.E'CTIVITY CC';T?OL SY!'h'S

,, FLOW PATHS - OPERATINti

.[LIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPEPATION-ii

!'3.1.2.2 At least two of the folic..ing three boron injection flow paths and cne associated heat tracing circuit shall be OPERABLE:

Two flow paths from the b'oric acid storage tanks required to be a.

i OPERABLE pursuant to Specifications 3.1.2.8 and 3.1.2.9 via either a boric acid cump or a gravity feed connection, and a charging

,um; :o the Reactor Coolant System, and ll b.

The flow path from the refueling water tank via a chargi. 9 pump to the Reactor Coolant System.

LICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

iiACTION:

[t

.i ith only cne of the above required boron ir,jection flow raths to the Reactor I::lant Syster 0?ERAELE. restcre at least two boron injection flow paths to

,e Reactor Ccciant System to OPERABLE status witnin 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be n at i

least HOT STANDBY and borated to a 5HUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 3 f.k/k at 200*F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; restore at least two flow paths to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the rext 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE RE0UIREMENTS 4.1.2.2 At least two of the above required flow paths shall be demonstrated i,OPERAELE:

a.

At least once per 7 days by verifying that the temperature of the heat traced portion of the flow path from the concentrated boric acid tanks is above the temperature limit line shown on Figure ll 3.1-1.

n b.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, pon'er operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, i,

sealec, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

c.

At lea:t on:e per 10 montns during snutdoan by verifying on a SIAS test signal that 1) each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position, and 2) each boric acid pump starts.

1 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 1-9 Amendment No. 48,104

ft 1

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CHARGING FUMP - SHUTDOWN LIMITING-CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.3 ;At least one charging pump or one high pressure safety injection pump in the boron injection flow path required OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an CPERABLE emergency bus.

APDLICASIL:TY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no charging pump or high pressure safety injection pump OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS ce pcsitive reactivity

~

changes until at least one of the required pumps is restored to OPERABLE status.

S!JRVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.1.2.3 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 1-10 i

.. =

':E :T:'!:Tv C^';TE L SYSTEMS

' CMA:.GI::G DUMPS - OPERAT:"G

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

~

!3.1.2.4 At least two charging pumps shall be OPERABLE.

AF?LICO BIL*[T),:

MODES 1, 2, 3 anc 4.

:~;:

'! With only one charging pump OPEP,ABLE, restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLEstatuswithin72hoursorbeinatleastHOTSfANDBYandboratedto a SHUTDOWN MARGI" ecuivalent to at least 3*l Lk/k at 200 F within the next 6 r.:.rs; restore a: leas: :<.c charging pumps to GPEF.ABLE status v.i:r.ir the ljnex: 7 days cr be in CCLD SHUTDOWN withir, the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

l 1

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.1.2.4 At least two charging pumps shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

,1 a.

At least once per 18 months by verifying that each charging pumo starts automatically upon receipt of a Safety Injection Activation i

Test Signal.

l b.

No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required I.,-

by Specification 4.0.5.

ll i

ti

!CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 1-11 Amendment No. !!, 104

REACTIVITY ~ CONTROL SYSTEMS 10RIC ACIC' ?L'.*'PS - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.5 At least one boric acid pump shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus if only the flow path through the boric acid pump in Specification 3.1.2.la above, is OPERABLE.

-AP?LICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With-no boric acid pump OPERABLE as required.to complete the flow path of Specification 3.1.2.la, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERA-

~

T: NS_ or p0sitive reactivity changes until at least one boric acid pump is restored to OPERAELE status.

O SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.1.2.5 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 1-12 u

- ll.EACTIVITY CO.*;TP.0L -SYSTEMS -

llm.....

.i u nu. u g.. _..-s

- ve

..mii..;

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

~

3.1.2.6 At least the boric acid pump (s) in the boron injection flow path (s) required OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.1.2.2a shall be OPERABLE and capable of being power'ed from an OPERABLE energency bus if the flow path _-through the boric acid pump (s).in Specification 2.1.2.2a j

is 0?ERAELE.

O AFFLICASILITY:

MCDES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

!l1:5 'one beric acid cume required for the boren.injecticn ficw :ath(s) cursuant to Scecification 3.1.2.2a inope able, restore the boric acid pump to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and borated to a SHUTDOWN '4ARGIN ectivalent to ea leas: 3 5 ; *./,: a: 200'F; res ore tne above recuired ccric a:i: cu c(s) c:. E aE'E s 1:;I n1:r.in tne next 7 cays or ~ce in C0c0 SHL~3C....sicnin

ne next 30 neurs.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.6 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specifications 4.0.5 and 4.1.2.2.

l Il i

i I

l CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 1-13 Amendment No. /YB,104 i

l

~

EACTIVITY: CONTRCL-SYSTEYS 20 RATED WATER SOURCES - SHUTCOWN -

LIMITING. CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1;2.7 As a minimum, one of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:

a.

One boric acid storage tank and one associated heat ' tracing circuit with the tank centents in accordance rith Figure 3.1-1.

e b.

1The refueling water tank with:

.. l.

A minimum contained borated water volume of 9,844 gallons, l

2.

A minimum boron concentration of 2300 ppm, and l

3.

A minimum solutien tem:erature of 2E'F.

i AF0LICABILITY: MODES 5 and E.

ACTION:

With no borated water sources OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or. positive reactivity changes until at least one borated water. source is restored to OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.7 The above required borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 7 days by:

l.

Verifying the boron concentration of the water, 2.

Verifying the contained borated water volume of the tank, and l

'4ri'ying the baric acid storege tent solution ten;erature when it is the source of borated water.

b.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by verifying the RWT temperature l-when it is the source of borated water and the outside air l

temperature is 35'F.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 1-14 Amendment No. 11,48 D

4

{

170 1

-:f:==i== =m==?==

+:=: i E=

T - '- i ni. - j..- --.

130

==-

=---! --CE!E= =:!~d i==ii==Eir rEE El::.ri ai"I==.

.. Mil-

_ __=.__=.==_..=;.... i.nuxu u.5_:.: : n _a n: gj ;.,,. g

. p..

q g ;s g

._..._..f

_, u _.__ _ 7

,. : ':C- ;**.*.C*' *rtrf : :* ~_C-'-

C _ _ _...= -~ :

5EEEf " f i Z Z ::Ff ""=-:.,icitin-#f=:-!!L"=~-ii=Qi-ME5i-120

_/.

g 130. n. _ ___ ___. -

_ _... __ _. 2 - _-! _f:r < = ;- - +

z

_ = =. = = _. _ _..__ :- : -- - -

w

=A __.

f.,_ _, _, _,

____;_.... = _ _. _

_=n_____._.

____._;=

e b

-- - x =. ==== :--- :=_ _ =. _== f.x c

=.. = u=... _ = =. = _..

. _ : \\--

.: --- r n

g E

=55?E-N==. i==-d= ':V' % :-3M D.i W E H E2.!MZ5SEE==ri= -._

I

.f _

n N_.. _ _

1-

.._.._..__..._a w

w 110

.f

- _.~'~

=f

.. _ _ ~

c:

. _. _ ~ _..___100

~

=:--=..=_.

=._.._..z.

-::.=_=_=....=_...=._=____._==._==.__.=... _. _ _.. _... : :..=_= _

s-y s_<

- =;_

r_=2: ----- ----- :- - -

n_

r

=_- _- -

=-._ = =.2_:

t_ M O D ES 1, 2, 3, & 4_. : :---- - - =

___ r=: r-

==u n =..

x--

90 W

.r..._

4..._.4....:._

! --.- ' i : :

Q rr. _n.: ~. ; -- ;. In. c.

(

-."-~' -*

. '. J.; '. '..r ' 1 ~. ;

.:..C*,

g m

C

.... :!. _:J_:.... _

..=-----L...;-._.;.;._...._.

=-==:=====-

J

.....N. --..

___---7

.: __ =_.. : ::t

_=n_.; _

. _ u :-r

_ u. =lT - *~ ~ ~

. :. 7" 22_

_. $.J.

T f ; IG=

.= 3 77.-- - --- *C-7~

_=t =_n 2 :.

g

. r.

i_.

..,. _., _ =. _.. _.... _. _ =. _ _ _.

n._ :: n= -: : =na z

.u r= = r

-, = =r : r= =. t;;r ne : _ -

80 U

...._m:

.. n _:._nx _ :2_.

n:_

2.2.... :.-.... j

- :== :_ t..n:r n

g r-

_ _ __ ____. _ - r +: :- n...y : =_2.

a _.. r-r--+ ---

2

-T n,. 7=. _. _ p _....__ p_ _ - p- -.,_...... _ ; _---';---

f==

t= =._.4 as 50

_m=_ _.= :. 2 =:.....rn r u n. n _ -

g E E iL_= i_E:..

__.. __.,;= 7_m __;... _....j...,g.g.:- :r-==T=

A -

__Z.,. _ = :=_.==... :=--- - v - - _=. {_=.=1_ { =_ __-._=. r- -- _..._. r _...-- T_: =_=_.

w

D

-~ _' J_. ~__ _ : __ -- "

.._.:Z________Z--~~~_.._-~..

_2_

__,_____a..

_.g_

g a_________.._._..

_._-..i..___._.--........ _.._ _. _.._. r_ ~ ' _ _~_.11~

E 20

... _. : --.. -... _...._. r.. 1. 2__ _ =.. _ ; _xx.. __.. _ r_.. r.- --

-.-..: _. :-._.;...: ::.. u. : _: - _...

..... _...... _.. _ _.. _.. _. _------- = ; -- -- :.== - :. =. 2:== ::=2 -2. un = t p...==t- - =... q =_= -

_ ~ ;'== =E... ~ : fi_ii_:=__ =..._=. __=_r:. : iiE O__=..J c E=_*=_E_H.-.i_.b=. i =_.I_M.._r..

- r 10

-~~

- 1;.- : J:

1..

' - '~ - ' = = ' M ---- 4

..t ='~ E T;ri =[=- " ~~ ~

==IiiE--L =. : =+ r: a.

_c-u.

ter.=;;.3 MODES 5 & 6

-:"c.i=id ha - _2:

. =.di:'=52 5

. _. ! =_;._ :..

.. _;..a _: _

0 6

7 8

9 10 11 12 STORED BORIC ACID CONCENTRATION (WT%)

FIGURE 3.11 Minimum Boric Acid Storage Tank Volume and Temperature as a Function of Stored Boric Acid Concentration CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 Amendment No. 27, 48 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 1-15 Amendment No. 6. 31

-C'

~

REACTTVfTY CONTROL SYSTEMS

-iCRATEDW4TER-SOURCES-CFERATING j[LDITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION E

j[

3.1.2.8 ~ At-least one of the following two combinations of. borated water i

sources shall be OPERABLE:

l Two boric.' acid storage tank (s) and one associated heat tracing a.

circuit per tank with'the. contents.of the tanks-in accordance

..j with Figure ~3.1-1 and the boron concentration limited to < 8%, or i

ll

,~

b.

Boric Acid Storage Tank 12 OPERABLE per Specification 3.1.2.8.a j

and the refueling water tank.with

-1.

A minimum contained borated water volume of 400,000 gallons, 2.

A boron concentration of between 2300 and 2700 pp,

I 3.

A minimum solution temperature of 40 F, and 0

1-4.

A maximum solution temperature of 100 F in MODE 1.

AnLICASILITY:

MODE 1 > 50a of RATED THERMAL POWER.

p ACTION

a.

With neither combination of borated water sources OPER'SLE but at l

least two of the individual borated water sources OPERABLE, restore at least one of-the combinations defined in Specification 3.1.2.8 to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or reduce power to less than 80% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , b.

With only one borated water source OPERABLE, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months either restore at least two of the individual borated water sources to OPERABLE. status or reduce power below 80% of RATED THERMAL POWER and comply with Specification 3.1.2.9.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ii;; 4.1.2.8 At least two borated water sources shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a..A: letst once per 7 days by:

1.

Verifjir.g tne ::rcn ccncentratica in eacn.sater sc.rce,

'I 2.

Verifying the contained borated water volume in each water source, and 3.

Verifying the boric acid storage tank solution terrperature, b.

Atleastonceper24hoursbyvgrifyingtheRWTtemperaturewhenthe l

outside air temperature is < 40 F.

l t

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 1-16 Amendment No. 48, 55' 104

'lREACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS E0 RATED L'ATER SOURCES - OPERATIt'G llLIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION 3.1.2.9 At least two of the folleging three borated water sources shall be i

j OPEPASLE:

a.

Two boric acid storage tank (s) and one associated heat tracing circuit per tank with the ' contents of the tanks in accordance Ij with Figure 3.1-1 and the boron concentration limited to < 8%, and i

b.

The refueling water tank with:

1 1.

A minimum contained barated water volume of 400,000 gallons, 2.

A boron concentration of between 2300 and 2700 ppm,

'i 3.

A minimum solution temperature of 40 F, and 4.

A maximum solution temperature of 100 F in MODE 1.

'"L :: AE!'_: Y :

C:E l',

2, 3 t.nd *.

ACTION:

With only one borated water source OPERABLE, restore at least two borated water sources to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY withinthenext6hogrsandboratedtoaSHUTDOWNMARGINequivalenttoat least 3% ak/k at 200 F; restore at least two borated water sources to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE ~REOUIREMENTS 4.1.2.9 At least two borated water sources shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

l a.

At least once per 7 days by:

1.

Verifying the boron concentration in each water source.

l 2.

Verifying the contained borated water volume in each water lj source, and 3.

Verifying the b:ric acid stora;s tank solution cr: erat..re.

\\

P b.

1.as t On;.. p.: 24 f.c;rs f or::gr.; the T4 tspera;are <,nen tne outside air temperature is < 40 F.

At < 801, of RATED THERMAL POWER.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 1-16a Amendment No. /2, 55,104 i

1 ll 3/* 2 PO'.:ER DISTRIEUTIC." LL't!TS 4

(

LIfEAR HEAT RATE LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.2.1 The liilear haat rate shall.not exceed the limits shown on Fioure 3.2-1.

ADPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

ACTION:

With the linear heat rate exceeding its limits, as indicated by four or more coincident incore channels or by the AXIAL SHAPE INDEX outside of r

9.a cotcar ce:endent con:rci limits of Figure 3.2-2, wi-hin 15 minutes initiate corrective action to reduce the linear neat rate to within the limits and either:

l a.

estare the iSear nea ra:e to witnin its limits wi;m n ene j

hear, er b.

Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS j

l 4.2.1.1. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

l 4.2.1.2 The linear heat rate shall be detennined to be within its limits by continuously monitoring the core power distribution with either the excore detector monitoring system or with the incore detector monitoring system.

i 4.2.1.3 Excore Detector Monitorino System - The excore detector moni-l toring system may be useo for monitoring the core power distribution by:

l a..

Verifying at least ence per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months that the full length CEAs i

are si*hd on *9 and esintained at or bevond the Lon-Terr

" et:y 5::,;3 'r.section Limit of Specifiestien 3.1.3.E.

il L.

. e r i i,r i o; e; ;cas; ona per 3; dos that the A,uA LiUE LZEX t

alarm :etpcints are acjusted to within the limits she,sn on Figure 3.2-2.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 2-1 Amendnont No. 2J,33 4

II Ie 40WER-D:SToIBUTI0'! LIMITS SURVEILL*!;CE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 4 c.

Verifying at least once per 31 days that the AXIAL SHAPE INDEX is maintained within the limits of Figure 3.2-2, where 100 percent of the allowable power represents the maximum THERMAL POWER allowed by the following.expressi'on:

MxN wrere:

1.

M is the maximum allowable THERMAL POWER level for the existing Reactor Coolant Pump combination.

2.

N is the maximum allowgble fraction of RATED THERM.AL POWER asdeterminedbytheFjy curve of Figure 3.2-3b.

4.2.1.4

_Incore Detector Monitorina System - The incore detector monitoring system may :s usec for monitoring tne core power distribution by verifying

that tne incore detector Local Power Density alarms:

a.

Are adjusted to satisfy the requirements of the core power distribu-tion map which shall be updated at least once per 31 days of accumulated operation in MODE 1.

b.

Have their alarm setpoint adjusted to less than or equal to the limits shown on Figure 3.2-1 when the following factors are appro-priately included in the setting of these alarms:

1.

A measurement-calculational uncertainty factor of 1.062, i

2.

An engineering uncertainty factor of 1.03, i

3.

/. linear heat rate uncertainty factor of 1.002 due to axial i

fuel densification and thermal expansion, and

1 "

4 A THERMAL POWER measurement uncertainty factor of 1.02.

i

.i l'

II llCALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 2-2 Amendment No. 22,23,39,7J,104

,c

6 i

l I

t i

DELETED i

i i

l CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 2-5 Amendment No. /2.104 l

llFCWERDISTRIBUT10t; LIMITS ll TOTAL FLA:.AR RADIAL PEAR;Iii3 FhCTOR - F LIMITING C0!;DITION FOR'0PERATION T

T

Y(1+T ), shall be 3.2.2.1 The. calculated value of F*#, defined as F

=F

Y 9

limited to <-1.70.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1*.

ACTION:

With' Fjj > 1.70, within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months either:

l a.

Reduce THERMAL POWER to bring the combination of THERitAL POWER Ff to within the limits of ~ Figure 3.2-3a and withdraw the s r.

full length CEAs to or beyond the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limits of Specification 3.1.3.6; or i

b.

Se in c: leas HOT STA:;DBY.

SURVEILLAf;CE REOUIREMENTS

,I 4. 2. 2.1.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

T xy(1+T ) and 42.2.1.2 F shall be calculated by the expression F

=F xy q

F shall be determined to be within its limit at the following intervals:

xy a.

Prior to operation above 70 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER af ter each fuel loading, b.

At least once per 31 days of accumulated operation in MODE 1 and c.

Within four hours if the AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT (T ) is > 0.030.

q i

l'

'See Special Test Exception 3.10.2.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 2-6 Amendment f;o. 32, 33, /B,g/f. C S

r-

~

r I.2 l

1 I

l 1.1

~.

=

(- 0.10, 1.0) -

^ (0.15.1.0) 1.0 g.2 E#

UNACCEPTABLE UNACCEPTABLE mg OPERATION OP ERATION REGION REGION 5G o.s

'Eh 25 29

&E k E' ACCEPTABLE (0.30. 0 80)

( 0.30. 0.80, <

OPERATION 23 0.8 REGION w e Co zS 9d

+>

Ow 4a 5

0.7 0.6 I

I I

0.5 0.6 0.4 0.2 0

0.2 0.4 0.6 PERIPHERAL AXIAL SHAPE INDEX. Y, Figure 3.2-4 DNB Axial Flux Offset Control Limits l

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 2-11 Amendment f40. AB, 7J. 104 1

" ??.!!R CISTO.IEUTION LD'ITS m

1 l'AZIMUTHALPOWERTILT,-Ta LIMITING'CONDITIONFOROPERATION 3.2.4 The' AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT;(Tq) shall not exceed 0.030.-

APPLICAsILITY: MODE 1 above 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER.*

o tCTION:

a.

With the indicated AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT determined to be > 0.030 l-but < 0.10, either correct the power tilt within two hours or

~

. determine within the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months and at least once per subse-cuentShours,thattheTOTALPLANARRADIALPEAY,IGFACTOR(Ffy) and the TOTAL INTEGRATED RADIAL PEAKING FACTOR (F ) are within r

a the limits of Specifications 3.2.2 and 3.2.3.

b.

With the indicated AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT determined to be > 0.10,-

operation may proceed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months provided that the TOTAL INTEGRATEDRADIALPEAKINGFACTOR(Ff)andTOTALPLANARRA T

PEAKING FACTOR (F,) are within the limits of Specifications x

-3.2.2 and 3.2.3.

Subsequent operation for the purpose of measurement and to identify the cause of the tilt is allowable provided the THERMAL POWER level is restricted to < 20% of the maximum allowable THERMAL POWER level for the iixisting Reactor Coolant Pump combination.

SURVEILLANCE' REQUIREMENT' 4.2.4.1 -The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4-2.4.2 The AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT shall be determined to be within the limit by:

r a.

Calculating the tilt at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , and b.

Using the intere detectors to determine the AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months when one excore channel is inoperable and THERMAL POWER IS > 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

r "See Special Test Exception 3.10.2.

~

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 2-12 Amendment No. ZJ,32

7

~

.;..EFEo.GENCY'C0;E COCLUa SYSTE"e R

I SURVEILLANCE REQUIRET'Et1TS (Continued)

It ieast once per 18 mont.s-by:

e.

1.

Verifying automatic *, isolation and interlock action of the shutdown cooling system from the Reactor Cociant System when the Reactor Coolant System pressure is above-300 psia.

.2.

A visual inspection of the containment cump and verifying' that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the. sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of' structural distress or corrosien.

3.

Verifying that a minimum total of 100. cubic feet of l

solid granular trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) g is contained within the TSP storage baskets.

q 1.'erif vinc tnat when a representative sanie cf 4.C + 0.1 i

q

~

grams cf' TSP from a TSP s:crage basket is submergedT without i

agitation, in 3.~5 -: 0.1 liters of 77 -: 10 F borated water l

from the RWT, the pH of the mixed solution is raised to

> 6 within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

f.

At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:

1.

Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a Safety Injection Actuation test signal.

2.

. Verifying that each of the following pumps start auto-matically upon receipt of'a Safety. Injection Actuation Test Signal:

a.

High-Pressure Safety Injection pump.

.l b.

Low-Pressure Safety Injection pump.

l g.

By verifying the correct ocsition e' ea:n elec:ried ::sition ll sto;; for the following Emergency Core Cooling System throttle valves:

1.

During each performance of valve cycling required by Specification 4.0.5 by observation of valve position en the control boards.

C ALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 5-5 Amendment tio #,43

v:

ii

lD'.ERGENCY CORE CCOLING SYSTEMS

.!!SURVEILLA"CEREQUIREMENTS: (Continued)

{

l.

l

~ 2.

Within.4. hours Lfollowing compl'etion of. maintenance on the valve or its operator by measurement of stem travel when the ECCS subsystems are required'to be OPERABLE:

HPSI SYSTEM-Valve Number Valve Number j.

'MOV-616-MOV-617 MOV-626.

MOV-627 MOV-636 MOV-637 MOV-646 MOV-647

.h.

By; performing a flow balance test during shutdown following comple-tion of HPSI' system modifications that alter system flow character-

,i istics and verifying the following flow rates for a single HPSI i

pump system *:

I i!

1. 'The sum of the three lowest flow legs shall be greater than'470** gpm.

i.- By ve.rifying'that the HPSI pumps develop a total head of 2900 ft.

on recirculation flow'toLthe refueling water tank when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

li tf ll* A HPSI pump system is a HPSI pump and one of two safety injection headers.

't **These limits contain allowances for instrument error, drift or fluctuation.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 5-Sa Amendment No. 3f, 75,104

z t

. i, i.

! 3/.7 FLANT SYSTE"S 3.4.7.1 TUR3INE CYCLE II SAFETY VALVES

' LIITING CCNDITION FOR OPERATION

.,3.7.1.1 All main steam line code ' safety valves shall be OPERAELE*.

l Il,A?PLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

a.

With both reactor coolant loops and associated steam generators in operation and with one or more main steam line code safety valves inoterable, creration in MODES 1, E a-d 3 may pre:eed : :. iced that, within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , either the inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE status or the Power Level-High trip setpcint is reduced per Table 3.7-1; otherwise, be in at least HOT STAND 3Y within the j

cilc. sing 32 nours.

With one reacter ecclant loo; and a:seciated s: ear generat:r ir.

operation and with one or more main steam line code safety valves associated with the operating steam generator inoperable, opera-tion in MODES 1, 2 and 3 may proceed provided:

1.

That at least 2 main steam line code safety valves on the l

non-operating steam generator are OPERABLE, and 2.

That within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , either the inoperable valve is restored

'to OPERABLE status or the Power Level-High trip setpoint is reduced per Table 3.7-2; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTD0'N witnin the 4

l following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

c.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

l!3RVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS l.7.1.1 No additional Surveillance Require ents other than :":te re:Utred by S.necification 4.0.5 are applicable for the main steam line c 14 Wat,

..:.c: Of T;;;c '.7-1.

l ll* Entry into MODE 3 is cermitted to determine operability of maic steam line

code safety valves.

During this time, at least 2 main steam line code safety l

l ljvalvespersteamgeneratorshallbeoperable.

l l

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 7-1 Amendment No.104 l

TABLE 3.7-I h

f1AV,li1UM All.0WABLE POWER LEVEL-illGli 'IR l' f.ETP0lfH WITil Il10PIl'ABLE M

S_TL.N1 LillE SAFETY VALVES DURiflG OPERAT..IUit 111111 B0lli STEAM Gl.flLRA10RS c,

Maximum Allowable Power C

Q tiaximum flumber of Inoperable Safety Level-liigh irlp Setpoint

_ Percent of RATED TilERMAL POWER)

(

Valves on Any O yrating Steam Generator T

J Ep 1

93 m

79 2

66 3

Y

~

D e

+

' TABLE.3.7-?

R G

MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE POWER LEVEL-ilIGli TiilP SETPOIlli WITil INOPERABLE

~

.]

Si~l'S_t LINE SAFETY VALVES DURING OPERAjl1@il41Til 0111 STEAM GU4GihiliR-

~

~ ~

P llaximtun Allowable Power

?'

Maxiuum !! umber of Inoperable Safety Level-liigh Trip Setpoint y

- Valves on_The Operating Steam Generator

.(Percent of RATED lilERMAL POWER)

O

-4 1-40 2

35 3

29 R

u w

_ __ _ - - __ - _ - _______ _ -___ - =__ ___

J

'i e

q I

-TABLE 4.7-1 n

?'

l 4

STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVL5 elR LO0p 31 p

VALVE LIFT 'SETTlflGS*_ ALLOWADLE_

ORIFICE SIZE' M

?

a.

RV-3992/4000 935-995 psig R

b b.

RV-3993/4001 935-995 psig R'

3 3

\\

c.'

RV-3994/4002' 935-1035 psig R

1 d.

RV-3995/4003 935-1035 psig R

e.

RV-3996/4004 935-1065 psig R

f.

RV-3997/4005 935-1065 psig R

i i

l w

l 2

9 RV-3998/4006 935-1065 psig R-w 1.

h.

RV-3999/4007 935.-1065 psig R

l l

Lift settings for a given steam line are also acceptable if any 2 valves lift between 935 and 995 psig, L'

any 2 other valves lift between 935 and 1035 psig and the 4 remaining valves lift between 935 and 1065

{

psig.

R a

?

e C

!!SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTf0NS is i

I l?:EEs OR TEMOERATURE C0 EFFICIENT, CEA I':SEF'!07: A"2 r0'.:E2 L u.... _ _.. :

l

;.. :..s.., _.,..

w..w.

ti IILIMITING CONDITION-FOR OPERATION 3.10.2 The moderator temperature ?. efficient, the' CEA insertier and the i t power distetbution limits of Specifications 3.1.1. 4, 3.1. 3.1, 3.1. 3. 5, 3.1. 3. 5, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, and 3.2.4 may be suspended during the performance of PHYSICS TESTS provided:

a.

The THERMAL POWER is restricted to below 85~ of RATED THER..AL PC'.lER, a nd b.

The limits of Specification 3.2.1 are maintained and determined as specified in Specification 4.10.2.2 below.

APDLICASILITY:

MODES 1 anc 2.

) ACTION:

.I

'. i'. lith any of the limits of Specification 3.2.1 being exceeced while the reouire-

.Ter.:s of Specificatiors 3.1.1. 4, 3.1. 3.1, 3.1. 3. 5, 3.1. 3. 5, 2. 2. 2, 3. 2. 2 a n d

, 3.2.1 are suspended, eitner:

a.

Reduce THERMAL POWER sufficiently to satisfy the require-ments of Specification 3.2.1, or b.

Be in H0T STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.10.2.1 The THERMAL POWER shall be determined at least once per hour during PHYSICS TESTS in which the requirements of Specifications 3.1.1. 4, 3.1. 3.1, 3.1.3.5, 3.1.3.6, 3.2.2, 3.2.3 or 3.2.4 are suspended and shall be verified l

to be within the test power plateau.

4.10.2.2 The linear heat rate shall be determined to be within the limits of Soucification 3.2.1 by monitoring it continuously with the Incore Detector i.Mo'n'itoring System pursuant to.the requirements of Specifications 4.2.1.3 lland 3.3.3.2 during PHYSICS TESTS above 5' of RATED THERMAL POWER in which ths

)

j requirements of Specifications 3.1.1.4, 3.1.3.1 3.1.3.5, 3.1.3.6, 3.2.2,

3.2.3 or 3.2.4 are suspended.

CAL'/ERT CLIFFS -' UNIT l 3/4 10-2 Amendment Na. 2J, 55 I

f I-

r_._

~

t.-

-a l

'i3!?.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS

.-SHUTDOW.*1 MARGIN ll t

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.10.1 'The SHUTDOWN _ MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 may be.

suspended for measuremeat of CEA worth and shutdown margin provided reactiv-i ity equivalent to-at least the highest estimated CEA worth is available for l; trip insertion from OPERABLE CEA(s).

'A??LICABILITY:

MODE.2.

~

ACTION:

.i a '.

With any full length CEA not fully inserted and with less than tne above reactivity equivalent available for trip insertion, y

immediately initiate and continue boration at > 40 gpm of 2300 ppm boric acid solution or its equivalent untiT the SHUTDOWN m

M'RGIN required oy-Specification 3.1.1.1 is restored.

b.

With all full length CEAs inserted and the reactor'subtritical by less than the above reactivity equivalent, immediately initiate and continue boration at > 40 gpm of 2300 ppm boric acid solution or its equivalent until the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Specification 3.1.1.1 is restored.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.10.1.1 -The position of each full length CEA required either partially or fully withdrawn shall be-determined at least once per 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

4.10.1.2 Each CEA not fully inserted shall be demonstrated capable of full insertion when tripped from at least the 50% withdrawn position within 7 days prior to reducing the SHUTDOWN MARGIN'to less than the limits of l

l'-Specification 3.1.1.1.

'i,

'lCALVERTCLIFFS~-UNIT 1 3/4 10-1 Amendment No. 32, AE,104 I

11

' ' 3 /4.1 REACTI'!ITY CONTRCL SYSTEMS 3;SES I 3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL 3/4.1.1.1 and 3/4.1.1.2' SHUTDOWN MARGIN

.a-A sufficient SHUTDOWN MARGIN ensures that 1) the reactor can be made sub-critical from all operating condit, ions, 2) the reactivity transients associated

with costulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits,

,:and 3) :ne reactor will be maintained sufficiently subcritical to preclude

,,inadver:ent criticality in the snutdown condition.

j SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements vary throughout core life as a function of fuel depletion, RCS boron concentration and RCS Tavg.

The minimum available SHUTDOWN MARGIN for no load operating conditions at beginning of life is 3.5%

ak/k and at end of life is 3.5% ak/k. The SHUTDOWN MARGIN is based on the afs:y analyses :erforme: for a s:eam line ru;ture event initia ed at ro lead jiconditions.

Tne most restrictive steam line rupture event occurs at EOC conditions.

For the steam line rupture event at beginning of cycle conditions,

! a minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN of less than 3.5% tk/k is recuired to control the reactivity transient, and end of cycle conditions recuire 2.50 tk/k. Accord-

iy,: ne Sr.UTDLN MARGIN requirement is based upon this limiting condition anc is censistent witn FSAR safety analysis assumptions.

Witn Tave < 2000F, the reactivity transients resulting from any postulated accident are minimal

.and a 3% :k/k shutdown margin provides adequate protection.

With the pressurizer level less than 90 inches, the sources of non-borated water are restricted to increase the time to criticality during a boron dilution event.

3/4.1.1.3 BORON DILUTION

.A minimum flow rate of at least 3000 GPM provides adequate mixing, prevents stratification and ensures that reactivity changes will be gradual during boron concentration reductions in the Reactor Coolant System.

A flow rate of at least 3000 GPM will circulate an equivalent Reactor Coolant System volume of 9,601 cubic feet in approximately 24 minutes.

The reactivity change rate associated with boron concentration reductions will therefore be within the capability of operator recognition and control.

3/4.1.1.4 MODERATOR TEMDERATURE COEFFICIENT (MTC) i!!

The limitations on MTC are provided to ensure that the assumptions used

i. tne ac:ident and transient analyses remain valid througn ea:n fuel cycle.

l

'Tne surveiiiance requirements for measurement of :ne MTC during each fuel l

_ 9 ve ace:ua:e c c:r"

ne :C value sin c :his coeffic.en cnarges q i:iowly cue principally to the reduction in RCS boron concentra: ion associated l

~ with. fuel burnup.

The confirmation that tne measured MTC value is within its limit provides assurances that the coefficient will be maintained within il acceptable values throughout each fuel cycle.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-1 Amendment No. 32, 48, 7J, 38, 10_4

7..

ii_,

!, REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

-EASES ll '

I' 3/4.1.1.5 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY This specification ensures that the reactor will not be made critical with the Reactor Coolant System average temperature less than 5150F.

This

"' limitation is required to ensure 1) the moderator temperature coefficient is within its analyzed temperature range, 2) the protective instrumentation is within its normal operating rangei 3) the pressurizer is capable of being in jljanOPERABLEstatuswithasteambubble,and4)thereactorpressurevessel

above its' minimum RTriDT temperature.

i i 3/4.1.2 B0 RATION SYSTEMS The boron injection system ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation.

The system also provides ccolant flow following an SIAS (e.g., during a Small Sreak LOCA) to supplement flow from the Safety Injection System.

Tne Smali Break LOCA analyses assume flow from a single charging pump, accounting for measurement uncertainties and

' flow mal-distribution effects in calculating a conservative value of charging

' low actually delivereo to the RCS.

The components requirec :: perform this 5rn:en include 1) borated water sources, 2) cnarginc pur:s, 3) separate flow pa:ns, /) boric acid pumps, 5) associated heat tracing systems, and 5) an emergency power supply from OPERABLE diesel generators.

U With the RCS average temperature above 200 F, a minimum of two separate and redundant boron injection systems are provided to ensure single functional capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the systems inoper-able.

Allowable out-of-service periods ensure that minor component repair or corrective action may be completed without undue risk to overall facility safety from injection system failures during the repair period.

The boration capability of either system is sufficient to provide a SHUT-DOWN MARGIN from all operating conditions of 3.0% ak/k after xenon decay and cooldown to 200oF.

The maximum boration capability requirement occurs at EOL from full power equilibrium xenon conditions and requires 5500 gallons of 7.25% boric acid solution from the boric acid tanks or 55,627 gallons of 2300 ppm borated water from the refueling water tank.

However, to be consistent

d th the ECCS requirements, the RWT is required to have a mininum contained

~ j volume of 400,000 gallons during MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

The maximum boron i concentration of the refueling water tank shall be limited to 2700 ppm and I the maximum boren concentration of the boric acid stcrace tanks snail be

,lilmitedtoS.5toprecludetnepossibilityofbaronprecipitationinthe c:rt during icng term ECCS cooling.

+[

With the RCS temperature below 2000F, one injection system is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity

,. condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE

ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity change in the event the single injection

!! system becomes inoperable.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-2 Amendment No. 27, M, 53,104

?

);

a6

' ' I 4. 2 POWER DISTR:EUT:0*; LIM:TS iASES vi' 3/4.2.1 LI!4 EAR HEAT RATE The limitation on linear her. rate ensures that in the ev;-qt of a LOCA,

,; :ne peak timperature of the fuel c; adding will not exceed 220C ~.

Either of the two core power' distribution monitoring systems, the Excore

!l Cetector Monitoring System and the Incore Detector Monitoring System, provide

<' adequate monitoring of the core power distribution and are capable of verify-i.9 nat the linear neat rate does not exceed its limits.

The Excore Detector

br.itoring Sjstem performs this function by continuously moni cring the AX:AL SHAPE INDEX with the OPERABLE quadrant symmetric excore neutron flux detectors

,and verifying that the AXIAL SHAPE INDEX is maintained within the allowable limits of Figure 3.2-2.

In conjunction with the use of the excore monitoring

' system and in establishing the AXIAL SHAPE INDEX limits, the following assump-

!: -icas are mace:

i) tne CEA insertion limits of Specifications 3.1.3.5 and j3.1.3.6aresatisfied,2)tneAZIMUTHALPOWERTILTrestrictionsofSpecifica-3 j tion 3.2.4 are satisfied, and 3) the TOTAL PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTOR does

~t exceed the !"its c' Specificatien 3.2.2.

The In:cre ste::Or-Monitoring System centinuously provices a dire :

.l measure of the peaking factors ano the alarms wnich have been established for t

i. the individual incore detector segments ensure that the peak linear heat rates will be maintained within the allowable limits of Figure 3.2-1.

The setpoints for these alarms include allowances, set in the conservative directions, for

1) a measurement-calculational uncertainty factor of 1.062, 2) an engineering uncertainty factor of 1.03, 3) an allowance of 1.002 for axial fuel densifica-tion and thermal expansion, and 4) a THERMAL POWER measurement uncertainty factor of 1.02.

3/4.2.2, 3/4.2.3 and 3/4.2.4 TOTAL PLANAR AND INTEGRATED RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS - F'y ANDF)ANDAZIMUTHALPOWERTILT-T x

4 i

The limitations on F' and T are provided to-ensure that the assumptions usedintheanalysisfore$tablishingtheLinearHeatRateandLocalPower Density - High LCOs and LSSS setpoints remain valid during operation at the

!: Various ellowable CEA group insertion limits.

The limitations on Fi and To ll areprovidectoensurethattheassumptionsusedintheanalysisesEablishing ll tne DNS Margin LCO, and Thermal Margin / Low Pressure LSSS setpoints remain

/Cid during o:eration at the various allowabie CEA group inse : ion limits.

f Fjy,itund r n:.i::icn: exceed tnear basic limitations, c; era: ion may continue uncer Fg or Tc

u uc im;; sed b th: A:T::. s;;. w.ents since tnce i-

., a:citicr.a1 restrictions provide adequate previsions to assure that the assump-tions used in establishing the Linear Heat Rate, Thermal Margin / Low Pressure and Local Power Density - High LCOs and LSSS setpoints remain valid. An l

' ?ZIMUTHAL POWER TILT > 0.10 is not expected and if it should occur, subseouent

l o: eration would not be restricted to only those operations recuired to identify jj ne cause of this unexpected tilt.

i CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 2 1 Amendment No. 23, D, 104 l

d..

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

!+

.! EASES li T

.The value of T that must be used'in the equation F*# = F*# (1 + T ) and 9

FT=gr (1 + T-)-is the measured tilt.

q within their limits provide assurance that the actual va5u,es[of Fj, he.

The surveillance requirements -for verifying that FT F and Tq and T y

q do not exceed the assumed values., Verifying FTy and FT after each fuel loading

' prior to exceeding 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER provides additional assurance l that the core was properly loaded.

$3/4.2.5 0"3 ?ARAMETERS The limits on the DNB related parameters assure that each of the param-eters are maintained within the normal steady state envelope of operation assumed in the transient'and accident analyses. The limits are consistent

.i:n :ne safe:y. analyses assumptions and have been analytically demonstrated

' acequate to maintain a minimum DNBR cf 1.E3 throughout each analyzed transient.

In addition to the DNS criteria, there are two other criteria which set M s:acifica:icn in Figure 3.2-4.

The second criteria is to ensure that the is:ing ccre rewer dis:riou ion at full pcwer is less severe Inan the power distribution factored into :ne.small-break LOCA analysis.

This results in a limitation on the allowed negative AXIAL SHAPE INDEX value at full power.

The third criteria is to maintain limitations on peak linear heat rate at low power levels resulting from Anticipated Operational Occurrences (A00s).

Figure 3.2-4 is used to assure the LHR criteria for this condition because.

the linear. heat rate LCO, for both ex-core and in-core monitoring, is set to maintain only the LOCA kw/ft requirements which are limiting at high power levels.

At reduced power levels, the kw/ft requirements of certain A00s (e.g., CEA withdrawal), tend to become more limiting than that for LOCA.

~The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months periodic surveillance of these parameters through instru-ment readout is sufficient to ensure that the parameters are restored within.

their limits following load changes and other expected transient operation.

The 18 month periodic measurement of the RCS total flow rate is adequate to detect flow degradation and ensure correlation of the flow indication channels with measured flow such that the indicated percent flow will

!o?cvide sufficient verification of flow rate on a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months basis, i

!!CALVERTCLIFFS-UNIT 1 B 3/4 2-2 Amendment No. 39, 43,55!77, 104 i

li.

3/c.5 :E".ERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3ASES b3/4.5.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS The 0PERASILITY of each of the RCS safety injection tanks ensures that a

' sufficient volume of borated water kill be.immediately forced into the reactor

~

core through eacn of'the cold legs' in the event the RCS. pressure falls below the pressure of the safety injectio,n tanks. This initial surge of water into

_((thecoreprovidestheinitialcoolingmechanismduringlargeRCSpiperuptures.

++

ihe limits on safety injection tank volume, boron concentration and

' pressure ensure that the assu ptiens used for safety injection tank ir.jection jintheaccidentanalysisaremet.

._The safety injection tank power operated isolation valves are considered

-.;-to be " operating bypasses" in the context of IEEE Std. 279-1971, which requires that bypasses of a prctective function be removec autor.atically whenever i.

In addition, as :nese safety injection tank l!.permissiveconditionsarenotmet.

isolation valves fail to meet single failure criteria, removal of power to the I: valves is required.

Tne limits fer c; era i.cr. with a safe:y injection taak inocerable for any reason except an isciation valve closed minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring cencurrent with failure of an additional safety

~

injection tank which may result in unacceptable peak claddino temperatures.

If a closed isolation valve cannot be immediately opened, the. full capability of one safety injection tank is not available and prompt acticr. is required to place ~the reactor in a mode where this capability is not required.

3/4.5.2 and 3/4.E.3-ECCS SUBSYSTEMS f

.The OPERABILITY of two separate ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA L

4 assuming the. loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration.

Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the safety injection tanks is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging

f'r'om the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward.

In

!. addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long t'erm core cooling capability in

!j :ne recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

Portions of the low pressare safety injectica (LFSI) system flospatn are l

l

~

c to x :n m., m M s incluces the Ica ;re m re 56 irj r.icn

!! ficw control valve, CV-305, the flow orifice downstream cf CV-30h, and the l

four low pressure safety injection loop isolation valves.

Although the l

l portions of the flowpath are common, the system design is adequate to ensure

. reliable ECCS operation due to the short period of LPSI system operation

+

!! following a design basis Loss of Coolant Incident prior to recirculation.

The 4 LFSI system design is consistent with the assumptions in the safety analysis.

11 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. 103 l

r I

w_

~

NEMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS EASES

!I

_ The trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) stored in dissolving baskets located in the containment basement is provided to minimize the possibility of corrosion cracking of certain metal

components during operation of the ECCS i; following a LOCA. The TSP provides this protection by dissolving in the sump water and causing its final pH to be raised to > 7.0.

The requirement to dissolve a representative sample of'. TSP in a sample of RWT water provides

. assurance that the stored TSP will dissolve in borated water at the postulated

{.postLOCAtemperatures.

4 N

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERAEILITY of each l component ensures the at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained.

Surveillance requirements for throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing provide assurance

_d that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of. a LOCA.

Maintenance

, of proper fic v resistance and pressure drop in the piping syster to each injec-

-ll tion point is necessary to:

(1) prevent total pump flow from exceeoing runout N conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration,

' (2) orovide the proper flow s:: lit between injection points in accordance with m usunctiers used in :ne ECCS-LOCA analyse:, and (3) prccide ar accep::ble t r.c'. of totai ECCS flow to ali injection points ecual to or at:ye that assured in :ne ECCS-LOCA analyses.

Minimum HPSI flow requirements ire based upon small break LOCA calculations which credit charging pump flow following an SIAS.

Surveillance testing includes allowances for instrumentation and system leakage uncertainties.

The 470 gpm requirement for minimum HPSI flow from the three lowest flow legs includes instrument uncertainties but not system check valve leakage. The OPERABILITY of the charging pumps and the associated flow paths is assured by the Boration System Specification 3/4.1.2.

Specification of safety injection pump total developed head ensures pump performance is consistent with safety analysis assumptions.

3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER TANK (RWT)

The OPERABILITY of the RWT as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. The limits on RWT minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that 1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recircula-

!!:icn cooling flow to the core, and 2) the reactor will remain subcritical in utne cold condition following mixing of the RWT and the RCS water volumes with

!!all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly.

.:Tnese assumptions are centistent with the LOCA analyses.

Tne contained wa:er volume limit includes an allowance for water not

'iusable because of tank discharge line location or other pnysical character-istics.

t-Il b

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. M,104

7_

_. ~.

3J.7 PLAST SYSTEMS EASES N3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE N

, 3/c.7.1.1 5;FETY VALVES

}

The OPERABILITY of the main steam line code safety valves ensures that the

, seccndary system pressure will be limited Ic within 110% of its cesign pressure of 1000 psig during tne most severe anticipated system operational transient.

The total relieving caoacity for all valves on all of the steam lines is 12.iE x 1C0 lbs/nr at 1005 RATED THER'<AL POWER.

The maximum relieving capacity

,jis associated witn a turbine trip from 100% RATED THERMAL POWER coincident with

!an assumed loss of condenser heat sink (i.e., no steam bypass to the condenser).

The main steam line code safety valves are tested and maintained in accordance with the requirements of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, IE" Edition.

Tne as-lef: lif: settings will te no less Inan gli psig to

,, ensure that the lift setpoints will remain within specification curing the i

Mcycle.

ll In G E 3, t.w.m&in steam safety vaives are requirec OPERAELE rer steam y e v.ar.

Tnese valves.vili provice acequate relieving capacity for removai cf cotn decay heat and reactor coolant pump neat from the reacter coolant system '

via either of the two steam generators. This requirement is provided to facilitate the post-overhaul setting and OPERABILITY testing of the safety valves which can only be conducted when the RCS is at or above 5000F.

It allows entry into MODE 3 with a minimum number of main steam safety valves OPERABLE so that the set pressure for the remaining valves can be adjusted in the plant.

This is the most accurate means for adjusting safety valve set pressures since the valves will be in thermal equilibrium with the operating environment.

STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION is allowable with safety valves inoperable

,within the limitations of the ACTION requirements on the basis of the reduction Uin secondary system steam flow and THERMAL POWER required by the reduced I; reactor trip settings of the Power Level-High channels.

The reactor trip

'setpoint reductions are derived on the following bases:

For two 1000 operation SP = (X) - (Y)'"') x 106.5 l

X i

l,i For single 1000 operation (two reactor coc!an: ru os e eratinc in the same looD)

SP = 5 0 - I x 46.8 X

t j

where:

SP reduced reactor trip setpoint in percent of RATED THERMAL

=

1 l

h POWER ll j

V maximum number of inoperable safety valves per steam line

=

I CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-1 Amendment No.104 l

l:,E!FLANT SYSTEMS.

.}3;SES

.Y U

' = maximum number of inoperable safety valves per operating steam.line 106.5 = Power Level - High Trip Setpoint for two loop operation 46.8 = Power Level - High Trip Setpoint for single loop I

operation with two reactor coolant pumps operating jj in the same. loop X

Total relieving capacity of all safety valves per

=

steam line in lbs/ hour Y

= - Maximum relieving capacity of any one safety valve

-in lbs/ hour I3/a.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM I

Tne CFERASILITY of the-auxiliary feedwater system ensures that the

-e::sr Ccciant System can be cooled down to less than 300*F from normai operating conditions in the event of a total less of offsite power. A capacity of 400 gpm is sufficient to ensure that adequate feedwater flow is available to remove decay heat and reduce the Reactor Coolant System tempera-ture to less than-300*F when the. shutdown cooling system may be placed_into operation.

Flow control valves, installed in each leg supplying the steam generators, are set to maintain a nominal flow setpoint of 200 gpm plus or minus 10 gpm for operator 4 setting band.

The nominal flow setpoint of 200 gpm incorperates a total instrument loop error band of plus 25 gpm and minus 26 gpm for the motor-driven pump train. The corresponding values for the steam-driven pump train are plus 37 gpm and minus 40 gpm. The operator setting band, when cornbined with the instrument loop error, results in a total flow band of 164 gpm (minimum) and 235 gpm (maximum) for the motor-driven pump train.

The corresponding values for the steam-driven pump train are 150 gpm (minimum)

,and 247 gpm (maximum).

Safety analyses show that more flow during an over-

,j c60' ling transient and less flow during an undercooling transient could be

* :olerated; i.e., flow fluctuations outside this flow band but within the j! assumptions used in the analyses listed below, are allowable.

In the saectrum of events analyzed in wnicn automatic initiation of w.iiicej feecv.a:er cccurs, tne following ficw concitions are allcaed with an operator action time of 10 minutes.

a I

)

l j'CALVERTCLIFFS-UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-2 Amendment No. 59, 57, 78,8 g L

ML20129E097

Text

Attachment:

f==

Navigation menu

Search