Text

Amends 88 & 73 to Licenses NPF-11 & NPF-18,respectively, Eliminating Required Use of Rod Sequence Control Sys & Reducing Low Power Setpoint Initiation for Turnoff of Rod Worth Minimizer
	ML20125C402
Person / Time
Site:	LaSalle
Issue date:	12/04/1992
From:	Dyer J; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20125C405	List: ML20125C402; ML20125C411;
References
	NUDOCS 9212110173
	Download: ML20125C402 (36)
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. UNITED STATES 4

i E-NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o

a WASHINGTON. D.C. 20886 A

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COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

--00twET NO. 50-373 LASALLE COUNTY STATION. UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 88 License No. NPF-11 l.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission). has found that:--

A.

The application for amendment filed by the Commonwealth-Edison'-

Company. (the licensee), dated April-2, -1991, 'as supplemented June 2,-1992, complies with the standards and requirements-of'the:

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's. regulations-set forth-in:10 CFR Chapter I;

-B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the-provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance: (i) that'the activities. authorized-by'this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health-and safety of the public, and (ii) that-such activities-will be.

conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations:. set-forth in 10 CFR_ Chapter I; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the.public; and 4

E.-

The issuance of this amendment.is in accordance with '10:CFR'

- Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and ? all. applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2..

Accordingly, the license!is: amended by changes to the Technical.

Specifications as indicated _in the' enclosure to this license amendment and paragraph'2.C.(2) of-the Faci 11ty Operating License No. NPF-ll-is hereby amended to read-as follows:

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-9212110173 921204 L

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'PDR ADOCK 05000373 l:

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Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 88, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license.

The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3.

This amendment is effective upon date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY. COMMISSION l

A k $.

OV James E. Dyer, Director Project Directorate III-2 Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV/V-Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:

December 4, 1992 l

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b ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 88 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-11 DOCKET NO. 50-373 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages.

The revised pages are identified by amendment number and-contain a vertical line indicating the area of change.

Pages indicated with an asterisk are provided for convenience.

REMOVE INSERT IV IV X

X XVI XVI-3/4 1-4 3/4 1-4 3/4 1-11 3/4 1-11

3/4 1-12

3/4 1-12 3/4 1-13 3/4 1-13

3/4 1-15

3/4 1-15 3/4 1-16 3/4 1-16 3/4 1-17 3/4 1-17

3/4 10-1

3/4 10-1 3/4 10-2 3/4 10-2 B 3/4 1-3 8 3/4 1-3 8 3/4 10-1 B 3/4 10-1

B 3/4 10-2

B 3/4 10-2

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4 INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS'FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS-SECTION

PAGE' 3/4.0:' APPLICABILITY...................................................

3/4 0-l' 3/4.1 REACTIVITY' CONTROL' SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN..............................................

3/4L1-1 3/4.1.2 REACTIVITY AN0MALIES.........................................-

3/4/1-2' 3/4.1.3 CONTROL RODS-Control Rod Operability......................................-

- 3/4 1-3 Control Rod Maximum Scram Insertion Times....................

3/4 1 Control Rod Average Scram Insertion Times....................

3/4 1-7 Four Control Rod Group Scram Insertion Times.................

--3/4.1-8 -;

Control Rod Scram Accumulators...............................

3/4 1-9 Control Rod Drive Coupling...................................

-3/4 1-11:

Control Rod Position Indication..............................

3/4 1-13 Control Rod Drive Housing Support............................

3/4 1-15 3/4.1.4 CONTROL ROD PROGRAM' CONTROLS Rod Worth Minimizer..........................................

3/4 1-16 Rod Block Monitor............................................

3/4'l-18

-3/4.1.5 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL' SYSTEM................................

3/4 1 3/4.1.6 ECONOMIC GENERATION CONTROL SYSTEM...........................

3/4 1-23.

U 3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3/4.2.1 AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENIRATION RATE...................

3/4 2-1

- 3/4.2.2 APRM SETP0INTS...............................................

3/4 2-2 3/4.2.3 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATI0.................................

3/4.2-3; 3/4.2.4.

LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE..................................

-3/4'2-5'

- LA SALLE - UNIT 1 IV Amendment No. 88-

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o INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.1 REACTOR MODE SWITCH..........................................

3/4 9-1 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION..............................................

3/4 9-3 3/4.9.3 CONTROL ROD P0SITION.........................................

3/4 9-5 3/4.9.4 DECAY TIME...................................................

3/4 9-6 3/4.9.5 CO MM U N I C AT I O N S...............................................

3/4 9-7 3/4.9.6 CRANE AND H0lST..............................................

3/4 9-8 3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL.................................................

3/4 9-9 3/4.9.8 WATER LEVE L - REACTOR VESSEL.................................

3/4 9-10 3/4.9.9 WATER LEVEL - SPENT FUEL STORAGE P00L........................

3/4 9-11 3/4.9.10 CONTROL R0D REMOVAL Single Control Rod Remova1...................................

3/4 9-12 Multiple Control Rod Removal.................................

3/4 9-14 3/4.9.11 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION High Water Leve1.............................................

3/4 9-16 Low Water Level..............................................

3/4 9-17 3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/<.10.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY................................

3/4 10-1 3/4.10.2 R00 WORTH MINIMIZER....................................

3/4 10-2 3/4.10.3 SNUTDOWN MARGIN DEMONSTRATIONS...............................

3/4 10-3 3/4.10.4 DELETED......................................................

3/4 10-4 3/4.10.5 OXYGEN CONCENTRATION.........................................

3/4 10-5 3/4.10.6 TRAINING STARTUPS............................................

3/4 10-6 3/4.10.7 DELETED......................................................

3/4 10-7 3/4.10.8 SUPPRESSION CHAMBER WATER TEMPERATURE........................

3/4 10-8 LA SALLE - UNIT 1 X

Amendment No. 88 l

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o INDEX BASES SECTION PAGE 3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY...........................

B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.2 R00 WORTH MINIMIZER.....................................

B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.3 SHUTDOWN MARGIN DEMONSTRATIONS..........................

B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.4 RECIRCULATION L00PS.....................................

B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.5 OXYGEN CONCENTRATION....................................

B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.6 TRAINING STARTUPS.......................................

B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.7 CONFIRMATORY FLOW INDUCED VIBRATION TEST................

B 3/4 10-1 3/4 10.8 SUPPRESSION CHAMBER WATER TEMPERATURE...................

B 3/4 10-2 3/4.11 RADI0 ACTIVE EFFLUENTS 3/4.11.1 LIQUID EFFLUENTS Liquid Holdup Tanks.....................................

B 3/4 11-1 3/4.11.2 GASE0US EFFLUENTS Explosive Gas Mixture...................................

B 3/4 11-1 Main Condenser..........................................

B 3/4 11-1 LA SALLE - UNIT 1 XVI Amendment No. 88

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

ACTION (Continued) 2.

If the inoperable control rod (s) is inserted:

a)

Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months disarm the associated directional control valves

either:

1)

Electrically, or 2)

Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves.

b)

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

3.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

c.

With more than 8 control rods inoperable, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.3.1.1 The scram discharge volume drain and vent valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a.

At least once per 31 days verifying each valve to be open**, and b.

At least once per 92 days cycling each valve through at least one complete cycle of full travel.

4.1.3.1.2 When above the low power setpoint of the RW, all withdrawn l

control rods not required to have their directional control valves disarmed electrically or hydraulically shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by moving each control rod at least one notch:

a.

At least once per 7 days, and b.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months when any control rod is immovable as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interference.

4.1.3.1.3 All control rods shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of Surveillance Requirements 4.1.3.2, 4.1.3.4, 4.1.3.5, 4.1.3.6 and 4.1.3.7.

"May be rearmed intermittently, under administrative control, to permit testing associated with restoring the control rod to OPERABLE status.

- These valves may be closed intermittently for testing under administrative control.

i LA SALLE - UNIT 1 3/4 1-4 Amendment No. 88 l

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM CONTROL R0D DRIVE COUPLING LIMITING COND? TION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.6 All control' rods shall be coupled to their drive mechanisms.

APPLICABILITY:

OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 5*.

ACTION:

a.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 and 2 with one control rod not coupled to its associated drive mechanism:

1.

Within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , either:

a)

If permitted by the RWM, insert the control rod drive mechanism to accomplish recoupling and verify recoupling by withdrawing the control rod, and:

1)

Observing any indicated response of the nuclear instrumentation, and 2)

Demonstrating that the control rod will not go to the overtravel position.

b)

If recoupling is not accomplished on the first attempt or, e

if not permitted by the RWH then until permitted by the RWM, I

declare the control rod inoperable and insert the control rod and disarm the associated directional control valves **

either:

1)

Electrically, or 2)

Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves.

2.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

b.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5* with a withdrawn control rod not coupled to its associated drive mechanism, within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , either:

1.

Insert the control rod to accomplish recoupling and verify recoupling by withdrawing the control rod and demonstrating that the control rod will-not go to the overtravel position, or 2.

If recoupling is not accomplished, insert the control rod and disarm the associated directional control valves ** either:

a)

Electrically, or b)

Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves.

c.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

"At least each withdrawn control rod.

Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

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- May be rearmed intermittently, under administrative control, to permit testing associated with restoring the control rod to OPERABLE status.

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LA SALLE - UNIT 1 3/4 1-11 Amendment No. 88 l

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.3.6 A control rod shall be demonstrated to be coupled to its drive mechanism by observing any indicated response of the nuclear instrumentation while withdrawing the control rod to the fully withdrawn position and then verifying that the control rod drive does not go to the overtravel position:

Prior to reactor criticality after completing CORE ALTERATIONS that a.

could have affected the control rod drive coupling integrity, b.

Anytime the control rod is withdrawn to the " Full out" position in subsequent operation, and Following maintenance on or modification to the control rod or c.

control rod drive system which could have affected the control rod orive coupling integrity, LA SALLE - UNIT 1 4/41-12

l REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM CONTROL ROD POSITION INDICATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.7 The control rod position indication system shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 5*.

ACTION.

a.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 or 2 with one or more control rod position indicators inoperable, within one hour:

1.

Determine the position of the control rod by:

(a) Moving the control rod, by single notch movement, to a position with an OPERABLE position indicator, (b) Returning the control rod, by single notch movement, to its original position, and (c) Verifying no control rod drift alarm at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , or 2.

Move the control rod to a position with an OPERABLE position indicator, or 3.

When THERMAL POWER is:

(a) Within the low power setpoint of the RWM:

l 1)

Declare the control rod inoperable, 2)

Verify the p'osition and bypassing of control rods with inoperable Full in" and/or " Full out" position indi-cators by a second licensed operator or other techni-cally qualified member of the unit technical staff.

(b) Greater than the low power setpoint of the RWN, declare the l

control rod inoperable, insert the control rod and disarm the associated directional control valves ** either:

1)

Electrically, or 2)

Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves.

4.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

"At least each withdrawn control rod.

Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

- May be rearmed intermittently, under administrative control, to permit testing associated with restoring the control rod to OPERABLE STATUS.

LA SALLE - UNIT 1 3/4 1-13 Amendment No. 88 1

1: _ ______ ________

' REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM CONTROL R00 DRIVE HOUSING SUPPORT LIMITING CONDITION'FOR OPERATION

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3.1.3.8~ The control rod drive housing support shall be in place.

APPLICABILITY:

OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2.and 3..

ACTION:

With the control rod drive housing support not in place, be in 'at least H0T--

-SHUTOOWN_within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24. hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS -4.1.3.8: The control-rod drive housing support shall:be verified to be in.

place by a: visual inspection prior to startup any time it has been disas -

sembled or when maintenance has been performed in the control rod drive housing support area.

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LA SALLE - UNIT 1 3/4 1-15

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c REACTIVITY CONTROL' SYSTEM ~

3/4.1.4 CONTROL = ROD PROGRAM CONTROLS R00 WORTH MINIMIZER LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.4.1 The rod worth minimizer (RWM) shall be'0PERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS-1 and 2*, when THERMAL POWER is less-than or equal to 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER, the minimum allowable low power.

setpoint.

ACTION:

a.

With the RWM ino)erable, verify control rod movement and compliance with the prescriaed control rod pattern by a second licensed operator or other technically qualified member of the unit technical' staff who is present at the reactor control console. Otherwise, control rod movement may be only by actuating the manual scram or placing the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position, b.

With an inoperable control rod (s), OPERABLE control rod movement may-continue by bypassing the inoperable control rod (s) in the RWM-provided that:

4 1.

The position and bypassing of-inoperable control rods is verified by a second licensed operator or other technically:

'0 qualified member of the unit technical-staff, and.

2.

There are not more than 3 inoperable control rods in'any RWM

group, c.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable, with the exception that control-rod withdrawal for reactor startup shall not l

begin with the RWM inoperable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l

4.1.4.1 The RWM'shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 prior to withdrawal of control rods for the purpose of making the reactor critical, and in 0PERATIONAL CONDITION 1 prior to reaching 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER when reducing l

THERMAL POWER,- by verifying proper annunciation of the selection error of at least one out-of-sequence control rod.

Entry into OPEMTIONAL CONDITION 2 and withdrawal of selected control rods is permitted for the purpose of determining the OPERABILITY of the RWM prioF to withdrawal of control rods for the purpose of bringing the reactor to

' criticality.

LA SALLE - UNIT 1 3/4 1-16 Amendment No. 88 5

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l REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM 3/4.1.4 CONTROL R00 PROGRAM CONTROLS ROD WORTH MINIMIZER SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) b.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 prior to withdrawal of control rods for the purpose of making the reactor critical, by verifying the rod block function by demonstrating inability to withdraw an out-of-sequence control rod.

c.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 within one hour after RWM automatic initiation when reducing THERMAL POWER, by verifying the rod block function by demonstrating inability to withdraw an out-of-sequence control rod.

d.

By verifying the control rod patterns and scquence input to the RWM computer is correctly loaded following any loading of the program into the computer.

LA SALLE - UNIT 1 3/4 1-17 Amendment No. 88

4 3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.10.1 The provisions of Specifications 3.6.1.1, 3.6.1.3 and 3.9.1 and Table 1.2 may be suspended to permit the reactor. pressure vessel closure head and the drywell head to be removed and the primary containment air lock doors to be open when the reactor mode switch is in the Startup position during low power PHYSICS TESTS with THERMAL POWER less than 1% of RATED THERMAL POWER and reactor coolant temperature less than 200'F.

APPLICABILITY:

OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2, during low power PHYSICS TESTS.

ACTION:

With THERMAL POWER greater than or equal to 1% of RATED THERMAL POWER or with the reactor coolant temperature greater than or equal to 200*F, immediately place the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.10.1 The THERMAL POWER and reactor coolant temperature shall be verified to be within the limits at least once per hour during low power PHYSICS TESTS.

1 LA SALLE - UNIT 1 3/4 10-1

SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.2 ROD WORTH MINIMIZER LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.10.2 The sequence constraints imposed on control rod groups by the Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) per Specification 3.1.4.1 may be suspended by means of bypassing the RWM for the following tests, provided that control rod movement prescribed for this testing is verified by a second licensed operator, or other technically qualified member of the unit technical staff, who is present at the reactor control console.

a.

Shutdown margin demonstrations, Specification 4.1.1.

b.

Control rod scram, Specification 4.1.3.2.

c.

Control rod friction measurements.

d.

Startup Test Program with the THERMAL POWER less than 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

APPLICABILITY:

OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2.

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, verify that the RWM is OPERABLE per Specification 3.1.4.1.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.10.2 When the sequence constraints imposed oh control rod groups by the RWM are bypassed, verify; a.

DELETED b.

That movement of control rods from 75% R0D DENSITY to the RWM low power setpoint is limited to the approved control rod withdrawal sequence during scram and friction tests, c.

That movement of control rods during shutdown margin demonstrations is limited to the prescribed sequence per Specification 3.10.3, and d.

Conformance with this specification and test procedures by a second licensed operator or other technically qualified member of the unit technical staff.

LA SALLE UNIT 1 3/4 10-2 Amendment No. 88

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

+

BASES CONTROLR005(Continueo)

In addition, the automatic CR0 charging water header low pressure scram-(see Table 2.2.1-1) initiates well before any accumulator loses 'its full capa-bility to insert the control rod. With this added automatic scram feature, the surveillance of each individual accumulator check valve is no: longer necessary to demonstrate adequate stored energy is available for normal: scram.

action.

Control rod coupling integrity is required to ensure compliance with the-analysis of the rod drop accident in the FSAR.

The overtravel position feature -

provides the only positive means of determining that a rod is properly coupled:

and therefore this check must be performed prior to achieving criticality after completing CORE ALTERATIONS that could have affected the control rod drive coupling integrity.

The subsequent check is performed as a backup to the. initial' demonstration.

In order to ensure that the control rod patterns can be followed and-there-fore that other parameters are within their limits, the control rod-position indication system must be OPERABLE.

The control rod housing support restricts the outward movement' of-a control-rod to less than 3 inches-in the event of a-housing failure.

The amount of rod reactivity which could be added by this small amount of rod withdrawal is less than a normal withdrawal increment and will not contribute to any damage to the-primary coolant system.

The support is not required when there is no pressure toactasadrivingforcetorapidlyejectadrivehousing.

The required surveillance intervals are adequate to determine that-the rods are OPERABLE and not so frequent as to cause-exce.uive wear on tiie system components.

3/4.1.4-CONTROL R0D PROGRAM CONTROLS Control rod withdrawal and insertion sequences are established to assure that the maximum insequence individual control rod or control rod segments which are withdrawn at any time during the fuel-~ cycle could not be worth enough to result in~a peak fuel enthalpy greater than 280 cal /gm in the event of~a control-rod drop accident.

The specified sequences'are characterized by homogeneous, scattered patterns of control rod withdrawal. When-THERMAL POWER is greater; than 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER, there is no possible rod worth whic l

280 cal /gm.gn rate of the velocity limiter at-the desi could result in a 3eak en than or equal to-10% quiring the RWM to be 6PERABLE when THERMA Thus re of RATED THERMAL POWER provides adequate control.

The RWH provide automatic supervision to assure that out-of-sequence. rods-l will not be withdrawn or. inserted.

The analysis of the rod dro) accident is presented in Section 15.4.9 of the FSAR and the techniques of tie analysis are presented in a topical report,

[

Reference 1, and two supplements, References 2 and 3.

LA SALLE - UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-3 Amendment No. 88

3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS BASES 3/4.10.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY The requirement for PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is removed during the-period when open vessel tests are being performed during the low power PHYSICS TESTS.

3/4.10.2 R00 WORTH MINIMIZER In order to perfors _the tests required in the technical spacifications it is necessary to typass the sequence restraints on control rod movement.

The-additional surveillance requirements-ensure that the specifications on heat generation rates and shutdown margin requirements are not exceeded during the period when these tests are being performed and that individual rod worths do not exceed the values assumed in the safety analysis.

3/4.10.3 SHUTDOWN MARGIN DEMONSTRATIONS Performance of shutdown margin demonstrations with the vessel head removed requires additional restrictions in order to ensure that criticality does~not occur.

These additional restrictions are specified in this LCO.

3/4.10.4 RECIRCULATION LOOPS This special test exception permits reactor criticality under no flow conditions and is required to perform certain startup and PHYSICS TESTS while at low THERMAL POWER levels.

3/4.10.5 OXYGEN CONCENTRATION Relief from the oxygen concentration specifications is necessary in order to provide access to the primary containment during the intial startup and testing phase of operation. Without this access tht startup and test program could be restricted and delayed.

3/4.10.6 TRAINING STARTUPS This special test exception permits training startups to be performed with the reactor vessel depressurized at low' THERMAL POWER and temperature while controlling RCS temperature with one RHR subsystem aligned in the shutdown cooling mode in-order to minimize contaminated water discharge to the radioactive waste disposal system.

3/4.10.7 CONFIRMATORY FLOW INDUCED VIBRATION TEST This special test exception permits the primary containment to be open and the RCIC system to be inoperable during' performance of the required test' provided that the test is performed prior to the initial criticality of the reactor and the heatup to and maintenance of HOT SHUT 00WN is not performed with nuclear heat.

LA SALLE - UNIT 1 8 3/4 10-1 Amendment No. 88

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SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS BASES 3/4.10.8 SUPPRESSION CHAMBER WATER TEMPERATURE In order to obtain information on thermal' mixing of-the suppression chamber water during'S/RV discharge, extended blowdowns are performed as part of the In-Plant SRV Test. - To best understand the effects of these blowdowns,-they; must be performed'over a maximum temperature range.

In order to collect data in the region of interest, the suppression chamber shall. remain OPERA 8LE with a pool water maximum average temperature of 110*F.

Conservative calculations show that-with restricted reactor power history and THERMAL POWER at less than 60% of RATED THERMAL POWCR the suppression chamber water' temperature does not exceed acceptable limits.

LA SALLE - UNIT 1 B 3/4 10-2

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COMMONWEALTH EDIS0N COMPANY-DOCKET NO. 50-374 LASALLE COUNTY STATION. UNIT 2-AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

- Amendment No.-73 License No. NPF-18 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment filed by the Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee), dated April 2, 1991, as. supplemented June 2, 1992, complies with the standards and' requirements'of the

- Atomic Energy Act-of 1954, as. amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations. set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The _ facility will operate in conformity with the _ application, the -

provisions of the Act, and.the regulations of.the Commission; e

C.

There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the_ activities authorized-by this amendment can be conducted without endangering _the health

~

and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with-the Commission's. regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

-D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to.the health and safety of _the-public;-

and E.

The issuance of this. amendment is-in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51-of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to_the Technical Specifications as indicated in the enclosure to.this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of the Facility Operating License =No NPF-18 is-hereby amended to read as follows:

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, (2)

Technical Soecifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained ir. Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.

73, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license.

The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3.

This amendment is effective upon date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

, llW { h 6V f

James E. Dyer, Director Project Directorate III-2 Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV/V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:

December 4, 1992

O ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMEN 0 MENT NO.

73 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-18 DOCKET NO. 50-374 Replace the follcwing pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain a vertical line indicating the area of change.

Pages identified by an asterisk are provided for convenience.

REMOVE INSERT IV IV X

X XVI XVI 3/4 1-4 3/4 1-4 3/4 1-11 3/4 1-11

3/4 1-12

3/4 1-12 3/4 1-13 3/4 1-13

3/4 1-15

3/4 1-15 3/4 1-16 3/4 1-16 3/4 1-17 3/4 1-17

3/4 10-1 3/4 10-1 3/4 10-2 3/4 10-2 B 3/4 1-3 B 3/4 1-3

B 3/4 1-4

B 3/4 1 4 8 3/4 10-1 B 3/4 10-1 e m w

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INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4.0 APPLICABILITY...................................................

3/4 0-1 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN..............................................

3/4 1-1 3/4.1.2 REACTIVITY AN0MALIES.........................................

3/4 1-2 3/4.1.3 CONTROL RODS Control Rod Operability......................................

3/4 1-3 Control Rod Maximum Scram Insertion Times....................

3/4 1-6 Control Rod Average Scram Insertion Times..............

3/4 1-7 Four Control Rod Group Scram Insertion Times.................

3/4 1-8 Control Rod Scram Accumulators...............................

3/4 1-9 Control Rod Drive Coupling...................................

3/4 1-11 Control Rod Position Indication..............................

3/4 1-13 Control Rod Drive Housing Support............................

3/4 1-15 3/4.1.4 CONTROL R00 PROGRAM CONTROLS Rod Worth Minimizer..........................................

3/4 1-16 Rod Block Monitor............................................

3/4 1-18 3/4.1.5 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM................................

3/4 1 3/4.1.6 ECONOMIC GENERATION CONTROL SYSTEM...........................

3/4 1-23 3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3/4.2.1 AVEP. AGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE...................

3/4 2-1 3/4.2.2 APRM SETP0INTS...............................................

3/4 2-2 3/4.2.3 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATI0.................................

3/4 2-3 3/4.2.4 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE..................................

3/4 2-5 LA SALLE - UNIT 2 IV Amendment No. 73

INDEX H

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

-SECTION

'PAGE-3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS L /4.9.1-REACTOR MODE SWITCH..........................................

3/4 9-1 3

3/4.9.2-INSTRUMENTATION..............................................

~~3/4 9.

i 3/4.9.3 CONTROL R00 P0SITION.........................................

3/4-9-5 3/4.9.4

_ DECAY TIME...................................................

3/4.9-6 4

3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS.............................................. -3/4 9-7 3/4.9.6 CRANE AND H0IST..............................................

3/4 9-8; 3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL................................................. -3/4-9-9 3/4.9.8 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL.................................

3/4'9-10 3/4.9.9 - WATER LEVEL - SPENT FUEL STORAGE P00L........................

3/4-9 3/4.9.10 CONTROL R00 REMOVAL Single Control Rod Remova1...................................

'3/4 9-12f

' Multiple Control Rod Remova1.................................

3/4L9-14?

- 3/4.9.11 RESIDUAL. HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION High Water Leve1.............................................

-3/4 9-16 Low Water Leve1..............................................

3/4'9-17 3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY................................

3/4 10. 3/4.10.2 R00 WORTH MINIMIZER..........................................

3/4 10-2 3/4.10.3 SHUTDOWN MARGIN DEMONSTRATIONS...............................

3/4 10-3 3/4.10.4-DELETED......................................................

3/4 10-4' 3/4.10.5 '0XYGEN CONCENTRATION.........................................

3/4'10-5 3/4.10.6 TRAINING STARTUPS............................................

3/4.10-6 3/4.10.7 DELETE0......................................................

3/4-10-7 LA SALLE - UNIT 2 X

Amendment No. 73

1 9

INDEX BASES i

SECTION PAGE 3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.1 PRIMARY CONTAINHENT INTEGRITY...........................

B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.2 ROD WORTH MINIMIZER.....................................

B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.3 SHUTDOWN MARGIN DEH0NSTRAT UNS............

B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.4 RECI RCU LATION L00PS.....................................

B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.5 OXYGEN CONCENTRATION....................................

B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.6 TRAINING STARTVPS.......................................

B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.7 CONFIRMATORY FLOW INDUCED VIBRATION TEST................

B 3/4 10-1 j

3/4.11 RADI0 ACTIVE EFFLUENTS 3/4.11.1 LIQUIDEFFLUENTS Liquid Holdup Tanks.....................................

a 3/4 11-1 3/4.11.2 GASE0US EFFLUENTS Explosive Gas Mixture...................................

B 3/4 11-1 Main Condenser..........................................

B 3/4 11-1 i

e t

LA SALLE - UNIT 2 XVI Amendment No. 73 l

4 l

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM l

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

ACTION (Continued) 2.

If the inoperable control rod (s) is inserted:

a)

Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months disarm the associated directional control i

valves

either:

1)

Electrically, or i

2)

Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves.

b)

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

3.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not 9pplicable.

c.

With more than 8 control rods inoperable, be in at least HOT SHtlTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

3 2

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS m

4.1.3.1.1 The scram discharge volume drain and vent valves shall be demonstrated 1

OPERABLE by:

a.

At least once per 31 days verifying each valve to be open**, and b.

At least once per 92 days cycling each valve through at least one complete cycle of full travel.

4.1.3.1.2,When above the low power setpoint of the RWM, all withdrawn control rods not required to have their directional control valves disars.ed electrically or hydraulically shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by moving each control rod at least one notch:

a.

At least once per 7 days, and b.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months when any control rod is immovable as a result of excessive friction or mechaaical interference.

4. 7. 3.1. 3 All control rods shall be demonstrated OPERABLE'by performance of Surveillance Requirements 4.1. 3. 2, 4.1. 3. 4, 4.1. 3. 5, 4.1. 3. 6, - and 4.1. 3. 7.

May be rearmed intermittently, under administrative control, to permit testing.

l associated with restoring the control rod to OPERABLE status.

- These valves tray be closed intermittently for testing under atin' stive control.

LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-4 Amendment No. 73

1 I

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM CONTROL R00 DRIVE COUPLING j

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.6 All control rods shall be coupled to their drive mechanisms.

APPLICABILITY:

OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 5*.

ACTION:

a.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2 with one control rod not coupled to 1

its associated drive mechanism:

1.

Within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , either:

a)

If permitted by the RWM, insert the control rod drive l

mechanism to accomplish recoupling and verify recouph t by withdrawing the control rod, and:

1)

Observing any indicated response of the nuclear instrumentation, and 2)

Demonstrating that the control rod will not go to the overtravel position, b)

If recoupling is noc accomplished on the first attempt or, if not permitted by the RWM then until permitted by the RWM, l

declare the control rod inoperable and insert the control rod and disarm the associated directional control valves **

either:

1)

Electrically, or 2)

Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves.

2.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , b.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5* with a withdrawn control rod not coupled to its associated drive mechanism, within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , either:

1.

'osert the control rod to accomplish recoupling and verify recoupling by withdrawing the control rod and demonstrating that the control rod will not go to the overtravel position, or 2.

If recoupling is not accomplished, insert the control rod and disarm the associated directional control valves ** either:

a)

Electrically, or b)

Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves, c.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

"At least each withdrawn control rod.

Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

- May be rearmed intermittently, under administrative control, to permit testing associated with restoring the control ro ' to OPERABLE status.

LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-11 Amendment No. 73

r REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.3.6 A control rod shall be demonstrated to be coupled to its drive mechanism by observing any indicated response of the nuclear instrumentation while withdrawing the control rod to the fully withdrawn position and then verifying that the control rod drive does not go to the overtravel position:

a.

Prior to reactor criticality after completing CORE ALTERATIONS that could have affected the control rod drive coupling integrity, b.

Anytime the control red is withdrawn to the " Full out" position in-subsequent operation, and c.

Following maintenance on or modification to the control rod or-control rod drive system which could have affe".ted the control rod drive coupling integrity.

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LA SALLE - UNIT 2

-3/4 1-12

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM CONTROL R00 POSITION INDICATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.7 The control rod position indication system shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 5*.

ACTION:

a.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 or 2 with one or more control rod position indicators inoperable within one hour:

1.

Determine the position of the control rod by:

(a) Moving the control rod, by single notch movement, to a position with an OPERABLE position indicator, (b) Returning the control rod, by single notch movement, to its original position, and (c) Verifying no control rod drift alarm at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , or 2.

Nya the control rod to a position with an OPERABLE position indicator, or 3.

When THERMAL POWER is:

(a) Within the low power setpoint of the RWH:

l (1) Declare the control rod inoperable, (2)

Verify the p' Full in" and/or " Full out" position indi-osition and inoperable cators by a second licensed operator or other techni-cally qualified member of the unit technical staff.

b)

Greater than the low power setpoint of the RWM, declare l

the control rod inoperable, insert the control rod and disarm the astociated directional control valves ** either:

(1) Electrically, or (2) Hydraulically by closing the dri;e water and exhaust water isolation valves.

4.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

"At least each withdrawn control rod.

Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

- May be rearmed intermittently, under administrative control, to permit test kg associated with restoring the control rod to OPERABLE status.

LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-13 Amendment No. 73

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM CONTROL ROD DRIVE HOUSING SUPPORT LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.8 The control rod drive housing support shell be in place.

APPLICABILITY:

OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

With the control rod drive housing support not in place, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.3.8 The control rod drive housing support shall be verified to be in place by a visual inspection prior to startup any time it has been disas-sembled or when maintenance has been performed in the control rod drive housing support area.

LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-15

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM 3/4.1.4 CONTROL R0D PROGRAM CONTROLS ROD WORTH MINIMIZER LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.4.1 The rod worth minimizer (RWM) shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILI_TY:

OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2*, when THERMAL POWER is less than or equal to 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER, the minimum allowable low power setpoint.

ACTION:

a.

With the RWM inoperable, verify control rod movement and compliance with the prescriaed control rod pattern by a second licensed operator or other technically qualified member of the unit technical staff who is present at the reactor control console.

Otherwise, control rod movement may be only by actuating the manual scram or placing the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position.

b.

With an inoperable control rod (s), OPERABLE control rod movement may continue by bypassing the inoperable control rod (s) in the RWM provided that:

1.

The position and bypassing of inoperable control rods is verified by a second licensed operator or other technically qualified member of the unit technical staff, and 2.

There are not more than 3 inoperable control rods in any RWM group.

c.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable, with the exception that control rod withdrawal for reactor startup shall not begin with the RWM inoperable.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.1.4.1 The RWM shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 prior to withdrawal of control rods for the purpose of making the reactor critical, and in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 prior to reaching 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER when reducing THERMAL POWER, by verifying proper annunciation of the selection error of at least one out-of-sequence control rod.

Entry into OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 and withdrawal of selected control rods is permitted for the purpose of determining the OPERABILITY of the RWM prior to withdrawal of control rods ior the purpose of bringing the reactor to criticality.

LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-16 Amendment No. 73

{

l

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM 3/4.1.4 CONTROL ROD PROGRAM CONTROLS ROD WORTH HINIMIZER SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) b.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 prior to withdrawal of control rods for the purpose of making the reactor critical, by verifying the rod block function by demonstrating inability to withdraw an out-of-sequence control rod, c.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 within one hour after RWM automatic initiation when reducing THERMAL POWER, by verifying the rod block function by demonstrating inability to withdraw an out-of-sequence control rod.

d.

By verifying the control rod patterns and sequence input to the RWH computer is correctly loaded following any loading of the program into the computer.

LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-17 Amendment No. 73 i

-__.__.m._..__-_._m

__._____m_____

3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.10.1 The provisions of Specifications 3.6.1.1, 3.6.1.3 and 3.9.1 and Table 1.2 mdy be suspended to permit the reactor pressure vessel closure head and the drywell head to be removed and the primary containment air lock doors to be open when the reactor mode switch is in the Startup position during low power PHYSICS TESTS with THERMAL POWER less than 1% of RATED THERMAL POWER and reactor coolant temperature less than 200 F.

APPLICABILITY:

OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2, during low power PHYSICS TESTS.

ACTION:

With THERMAL POWER greater than or equal to 1% of RATED THERMAL POWER or with the reactor coolant temperature greater than or equal to 200 F, immediately place the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.10.1 The THERMAL POWER and reactor coolant temperature shall be verified to be within the limits at least once per hour during low power PHYSICS TESTS.

LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 10-1

= _ _ _

4 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.2 ROD WORTH MINIMIZER LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.10.2 The sequence constraints imposed on control rod groups by the Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) per Specification 3.1.4.1 may be suspended by means of bypassing the RWM for the following tests, provided that control rod movement prescribed for this testing is verified by a second licensed operator, or other technically qualified member of the unit technical staff, who is present at the reactor control console.

a.

Shutdown margin demonstrations, Specification 4.1.1.

b.

Control rod scram, Specification 4.1.3.2.

c.

Control rod friction measurements, d.

Startup Test Program with the THERMAL POWER less u.an 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

APPLICABILITY:

OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2.

A_C, TION:

C With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, verify that the RWM is OPERABLE per Specification 3.1.4.1.

l SURVEILLANCE REQUIPEMENTS 4.10.2 When the sequence constraints imposed on control rod groups by the RWM are bypassed, verify; a.

DELETED b.

That movement of control rods from 75% R0D DENSITY to the RWH low power setpoint is limited to the approved control rod withdrawal sequence during scram and friction tests, c.

That movement of control rods during shutdown margin demonstrations is limited to the prescribed sequence per Specification 3.10.3, and d.

Conformance with this specification and test procedures by a second licensed operator or other technically qualified member of the unit technical staff.

LASALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 10-2 Amendment No. 73

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES CONTROL RODS (Continued)

In addition, the automatic CRD charging water header low pressure scram (see Table 2.2.1-1) initiates well before any accumulator loses its full capa-bility t0 insert the control rod.

With this added automatic scram feature, the surveillance of each individual accumulator check valve is no longer necessary to demonstrate adequate stored energy is available for normal scram action.

Control rod coupling integrity is required to ensure compliance with the analysis of the rod drop accident in the FSAR.

The overtravel position feature provides the only positive means of determining that a rod is properly coupled and therefore this check must be performed prior to achieving criticality after completing CORE ALTERATIONS that could have affected the control rod drive coupling integrity.

The subsequent check is performed as a backup to the initial demonstration.

In order to ensure that the control rod patterns can be followed and there-fore that other parameters are within their limits, the control rod position indication system must be OPERABLE.

The control rod housing support restricts the outward movement of a control rod to less than 3 inches in the event of a housing failure.

The amount of rod reactivity which could be added by this small amount of rod withdrawal is less than a normal withdrawal increment and will not contribute to any damage to the primary coolant system.

The support is not required when there is no pressure to act as a driving force to rapidly eject a drive housing.

The required surveillance intervals are adequate to determine that the rods are OPERABLE and not so frequent as to cause excessive wear on the system components.

3/4.1.4 CONTROL ROD PROGRAM CONTROLS Control rod withdrawal and insertion sequences are established to assure that the maximum insequence individual control rod or control rod segments which are withdrawn at any time during the fuel cycle could not be worth enough to result in a peak fuel enthalpy greater than 280 cal /gm in the event of a control rod drop accident.

The specified sequences are characterized by homogeneous, scattered patterns of control rod withdrawal.

When THERMAL POWER is greater than 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER, there is no possible rod worth which, if dropped l

at the design rate of the velocity limiter, could result in a peak enthalpy of 280 cal /gm.

Thus re than or equal to 10% quiring the RWM to be OPERABLE when THERMAL POWER is of RATED THERMAL POWER provides adequate control.

The RWM provide automatic supervision to assure that out-of-sequence rods l

will not be withdrawn or inserted.

The analysis of the rod drop accident is presented in Section 15.4.9 of the FSAR and the techniques of the analysis are presented in a topical report, Reference 1, and two supplements, References 2 and 3.

LA SALLE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-3 Amendment No. 73

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.1.5 STANDEY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM The standby liquid control system provides a backup capability for bringing the reactor from full power to a cold, Xenon-free shutdown, assuming that the withdrawn control rods remain fixed in the rated power pattern.

To meet this objective it is necessary to inject a quantity of boron which produces a concentration of 660 ppm in the reactor core in approximately 50 to 125 minutes.

A normal quantity of 4587 gallons net of solution having a 13.4% sodium pentaborate concentration is required to meet a shutdown requirement of 3%.

There is an additional allowance of 25% in the reactor core to account for imperfect mixing.

The time requirement was selected to override the reactivity insertion rate due to cooldown following the Xenon poison peak and the required pumping rate is 41.2 gpm.

The minimum storage volume of the solution is established to allow for the portion below the pump suction that cannot be inserted and the filling of other piping systems connected to the reactor vessel.

The temperature requirement on the sodium pentaborate solution is necessary to maintain the solubility of the solution as it was initially mixed to the appropriate concentration.

Checking the volume of fluid and the temperature once each 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months assures that the solution is available for injection.

With redundant pumps and explosive injection valves and with a highly reliable control rod scram system, operation of the reactor is permitted to continue for short periods of time with the system inoperable or for longer periods of time with one of the redundant components inoperable.

Surveillance requirements'are established on a frequency that assures a high reliability of the system.

Once the solution is established, boron concentration will not vary unless more boron or water is added, thus a check on the temperature and volume once eat.h 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months assures that the solution is available for use.

Replacement of the explosive charges in the valves at regular intervals will assure that these valves will not fail because of deterioration of the charges.

1.

C. J. Paone, R. C. Stirn and J. A. Woolley, " Rod Drop Accident Analysis for Large BWR's," G. E. Topical Report NEDO-10527, March 1972 2.

C. J. Paone, R. C. Stirn and R. H. Young, Supplement i to NE00-10527, July 1972 3.

J. H. Haun, C. J. Paone and R. C. Stirn, Addendum 2,'" Exposed Cores,"

Supplement 2 to NE00-10527, January 1973 LA SALLE - UNIT 2 8 3/4 1-4

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i 3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS BASES 3/4.10.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY The requirement for PRIMARY CONTAINHENT INTEGRITY is removed during the period when open vessel tests are being performed during the low power PHYSICS TESTS.

3/4.10.2 R00 WORTH MINIMIZER In order to perform the tests required in the technical specifications it is necessary to bypass the sequence restraints on control rod movement.

The additional surveillance requirements ensure that the specifications on heat generation rates and shutdown margin requirements are not exceeded during the period when these tests are being performed and that individual rod worths do not exceed the values assumed in the safety analysis.

3/4.10.3 SHUTOOWN MARGIN DEMONSTRATIONS Performance of shutdown margin demonstrations with the vessel head removed requires additional restrictions in order to ensure that criticality does not occur.

These additional restrictions are specified in this LCO.

3/4.10.4 RECIRCULATION LOOPS This special test exception permits reactor criticality under no flow conditions and is required to perform certain startup and PHYSICS TESTS while at low THERMAL POWER levels.

3/4.10.5 0XYGEN CONCENTRATION Relief from the oxygen concentration specifications is necessary in order to provide access to the primary containment during the intial startup and testing phase of opeiation.

Without this access the startup and test program could be restricted ard delayed.

3/4.10.6 TRAINING STARTUPS This special test exception permits training startups to be performed with the reactor vessel depressurized at low THERMAL POWER and temperature while controlling RCS temperature with one RHR subsystem aligned in the shutdown cooling mode in order to minimize contaminated water discharge to the radioactive waste disposal system.

i 3/4.10.7 CONFIRMATORY FLOW INDUCED VIBRATION TEST This special test exception permits the primary containment to be open and the RCIC system to be inoperable during performance of the required test provided that the test is performed prior to the initial criticality of the reactor and the heatup to and maintenance of HOT SHUTDOWN is not performed with nuclear heat.

LA SALLE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 10-1 Amendment No. 73 L

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ML20125C402

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