ML20093K853
| ML20093K853 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 07/27/1984 |
| From: | Andrews R OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT |
| To: | John Miller Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.E.1.1, TASK-TM GL-83-37, LIC-84-239, NUDOCS 8407310215 | |
| Download: ML20093K853 (2) | |
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Omaha Public Power District 1623 Harney Omaha. Nebraska 68102 402/536 4000 July 27, 1984 L IC-84-239 Mr. James R. Miller, Chief U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Division of Licensing Operating Reactors Branch No. 3 Washington, D.C.
20555
Reference:
Docket No. 50-285
Dear Mr. Miller:
NUREG-0737 Technical Specifications (Generic Letter 83-37)
NUREG-0737, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirenents," identified certain itens for which Technical Specificatfors would be required.
Generic Letter 83-37, dated No-vember 1,1983, provided guidance concerning the scope of the specifications and sam-ples in Standard Technical Specification fortnat which the staff would find acceptable.
Accordingly, in a letter to the Commission dated March 27, 1984, the Omaha Public Power District provided discussion on the current Fort Calhoun Station Technical Spec-ifications regarding the Fort Calhoun Station Auxiliary Feedwater System. We stated that, based on this discussion, we believed that no changes to our current specifica-tions would be required.
Subsequently, the District received the Commission's Safety Evaluation Report (SER) dated June 15, 1984, on this topic. The Commission stated, with reference to Section 4.7.1.2.a.5, that this section is "not applicable." The District believes that this is indeed the correct conclusion. However, we believe our discussion on which this conclusion was based is in need of additional clarification.
Accordingly, please find attached additional discussion and infortnation regarding Sec-tion 4.7.1.2.a.5 of the suggested Technical Specifications from Generic Letter 83-37.
We believe that this will amplify our position that Section 4.7.1.2.a.5 is, indeed, not applicable and no changes to the Technical Specifications are necessary.
Si y,
8407310215 840727
.g PDR ADOCK 05000285 P
PDR R. L. Andrews Division Manager u ear ucd on RLA/DJM/th-S Attachment cc:
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036 Mr. E. G. Tourigny, NRC Project Manager Mr. L. A. Yandell, Senior Resident Inspector I
45 5Q4 Employmengnh ua opponunny
.l Attachment Long Term Auxiliary Feedwater Technical Specification Evaluation (NUREG-0737,Section II.E.1)
Supplemental Information Surveillance Requirements Generic Letter 83-37, Enclosure 3, provides model Technical Specifications.
for the Auxiliary Feedwater System...Section 4.7.1.2.a.5 requires:
(
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Providing a dedicated individual during surveillance testing who will be in comunication with the control room.
This individual shall be stationed near any (locally) manu-ally realigned valves when only one auxiliary feedwater train is available.)
Fort Calhoun Station utilizes two (2) surveillance tests.for the auxiliary feedwater system. The first.is Surveillance Test ST-FW-3, F.2.
This test-is divided into two parts. The first places one auxiliary feedwater (AFW) chan-i nel in bypass at a time and no valves are manually realigned.
If a valid aux-iliary feedwater signal should occur during this portion of the test, the sys-tem would align itself automatically to feed the appropriate steam genera-tor (s) with auxiliary feedwater.
l The second part of this test places both the electric and turbine driven aux--
i iliary feedwater pumps and the auxiliary feedwater isolation valves in "over-ride" for one steam generator at a time. That is, if "A" Steam Generator were under test and a valid AFW initiation signal was received, the AFW sys-l tem would respond normally for "B" Steam Generator. However, "A" Steam Gener-i ator would not be fed with AFW until the operator returned the overridden i
switches to their normal positions.
Because of the equipment arrangement at Fort Calhoun Station, an operator per-forms this portion of the test in conjunction with an Instrument and Control (18C) technician. The operator is located in the control room at the AFW pan-l els. This operator is also in communication with the I&C technician who is either located in the switchgear room or in the upper penetration room. A step has been added to ST-FW-3, F.2 to remind the operator to return the override switches to their normal positions in the event of a valid AFW initiation signal. No valves are (locally) manually realigned. Any valve i
repositioning or override is done from the control room.
The second applicable surveillance test is ST-FW-1, F.2.
This test actuates both AFW pumps and AFW isolation valves from various locations in the plant.
i During any portion of this test, a valid AFW initiation signal would initiate auxiliary feedwater without requiring operator intervention.
l
- This is applicable only for plants with one auxiliary feedwater train available during surveillance..."
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