ML20090J910
| ML20090J910 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron  |
| Issue date: | 12/31/1991 |
| From: | Schuster T COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | Murley T NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9203180108 | |
| Download: ML20090J910 (46) | |
Text
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Commonwealth Edison 6
1400 Opus Place Downeis Grove, IUinois 60515 March 11, 1992 Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attn: Document Control Desk
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Subject:
Byron Station Units 1 & 2 10 CFR 50.59 Annual Report liRClocktt_ tim _.50- 95 Land _50.- 455
Dear Dr. Murley:
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59(b)(2), Commonwealth Edison is providing the required annual report for Byron Station (Facility Operating License Nos.
NPF-37 and NPF-66) in Enclosure 1.
The report has been provided for the 1991 calendar year and consists of descriptions and safety evaluations for changes to the facility as described in the safety analysis report, and tests not described in the safety analysis report.
No experiments governed by paragraph (a) of 10 CFR 50.59 were performed. Al'a included as part of this report, are changes made to features of the fire protection program not previously presented to the NRC staff. contains a list of undefined abbreviations and acronyms used in this report.
Please direct any questions regarding this matter to this office.
Respectfully,
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Terence K. Schuster Nuclear Licensing Adminstrator Enclosures cc:
A.H. Hsia, Project Manager - NRR A.B. Davis - R!!!
Byron Resident inspector 9203180100 911231 l
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ENCLOSURE I f
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i DYR0!1 NUCLEAR POWER STATIOtt ANNUAL 10 CFR 50.59 REPORT r
1991 COMMONNEALTl! EDISON COMPANY
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NRC DOCKET NO. 50-454 AND 50-455 LICENSE NO. 11PF-37 AND HPF-66 I
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MODIEICATID!Lh0 Lia-003 r
Dt: SCRIPT 10th L
The modification relocated sarnple taps for gan sample vessel OGWO1M upstretun I
of the automatic gas analyzer on OGWO1J to eliminate pressure transients at the gas analyzers.' sensors.
SAEETLEVA!4UAT10tLSUMMAHL1 1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or snalfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR la not increased because the operator of the automatic waste gas sampling and manual grab samples remained the same as described in the UTSAR Section 11.3.2.
The relocation of the sample tape enhanced the tellability of the automatic gas analyzing system.
2.
The possibility-for an accident or rnalfunction of a ;
oront type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR la not created m nune this modification did not alter the operation of the gas analyzing loop in the Waste Gas system. The reliability of the gas analyzJng systern has been enhanced to prevent high back pressures on the analyzer during grab sampling.
3.
The reargin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the perfortnance of the automatic gas analyzing system, which is rJguired to be operable per Technical Specification 3.3.3.10. was enhanced.
It does not alter the ability to grab sample per Tech Spec 3/4.11.
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(3792M/VS/020192) i lo
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MODIEICAT10!LH0-1-00 30-lil DEUCHIP210tfI M6-1-08-36-lil was the 11nni partial modification to modification Mb-1-88-36.
The purpose of M6-1-88-36 was to modify the reactor coolant crossover leg piping to allow dialning of the reactor coolant from a low point in order to l
minimize radiation exposure during outages when the steam generator requires maintenance and testing. Modification M6-1-88-36-D1 Insta12cd the modl11 cation completely on the IA, 1C and ID reactor coolant loops. The 114 HC loop was completed previously undet the Al partial.
DATETLlWAI,UATION_SUMMAHY :
1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment Important. to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not increased because the previous design limits on valve and vessel nozzles are met, or have been quellfled as per acceptable ASME Code allowables in accordance with the UFSAR criteria.
2.
The possibility for an accident. or malfunction of a dif forent type than any previously evaluated in the Uf5AR is not created because the leakage from the 3/4" drain will be smell and manageable within the small break IXX'A analysis.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the new piping arrangement meets the previous design limit.
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9 (3792M/VS/020192)
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'i MODIT1 CATION _ HE0.-D 0 101 pt:SCRit'710H1 This modification provided a flow path f rom the tendon tunnel stunps eil;.cnarge to the regeneration waste drain tank inlet header.
During norms 1 conditions, the tendon tunnel sump discharge is routed to the fire and r:11 stunp.
Upon anticipation or detection of contamination in the fire and oil sump, due to contaminated tendon tunnel sump discharge, local manue.1 operator action at the iIre and oli sump routes the diacharge of the tendon tunnel sumps to the regeneration waste drain tank.
This allows proce:. sing of the contaminated 3
waste without processing all of the additional non-contaminated weter in the wastewater trenunent system.
S AFE*1 LEVA 1.UATION_SUt9(ARY 1 4
l 1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment-important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR is'not inctehsed because the routing of tendon tunnel sump pump discharge is not a factor in any accident scenario analyzed in the UFSAR.
Additional piping.of sump discharge to the regeneration waste drain tank does not impact any safety or important to safety system.
2.
The possibility for an accldent or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR la not created because an additional flow path from tendon tunnel sump pump discharge to the regeneration waste draln tank does not affect any safety systems or structures. The new piping does not reduca the.cffectiveness of any system, structure, or component necessary for safe shutdown of the reactor.
t 3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Speci11 cation, is not reduced because tendon tunnel stunp ptunp dincharge, regeneration waste drain tank input, and Turbine' Building Floor Drain system components are not addressed in the Technical Specifications.
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The modification deleted t he autoclosur e Interlock (ACl) function on the Residual !! eat Removal (RilR) suction isolation valves, IRil8702A/11 and j
1Ril8702 A/ D.
In place of the AC1 function, an alarm was provided on the main control board.
f SATETt_CYA1.UAT19tLSUMKAHU 1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not increased because the RHR suction relief valves are used as a means of cold overpressure protection, the cold overpressure protection system is designed to ensure the limits of Appendix G to 10CFR50 are not exceeded when one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to 350*F.
Transient analyses were performed to determine the worst case mass input and heat input events per UfSAR, Section 5.2.2.11.2.
Removal of the ACI did not impact-the transient analyses.
Ilowever, removal of the AC1 helps ensure that the RilR suction relief valves are available to mitigate potential overpressure transienta.
Additionally, removing the ACI reduced the potential for inadvertent irolation of the RilR system which could have caused a how Temperature Ovotpressure.(LTOP) transient (reduced letdown combined with a loss of
' decay heat removal) while also isolating an overpressure mitigation path.
Removal of the AC1 has a positive impact on LTOP mitigation, thereby reducing the probability of an occurrence of an accident.
Analyses were also performed to confirm that on RHR relief valve has the capability of maintaining the RllR system maximum pressure within code 11mits in UFSAR, Section 5.4.7.2.3.
Removal of the ACI does not affect this analyses. Should a-peak pressure occur-while the RiiR system pressure RHR system would bo mitigated by the RHR suction relief valves. The i
deletion of the ACI feature has no effect on the ability of the Ri1R system to_ survive pressure transients when the RilR system is connected to the RCS, _sinceEthe RllR suction isolation valves are slow acting and no credlt ls taken for their actuation.
i The impact of removal of the ACI to Event V, LOCA outside containment, t
frequency was also considered. The dominant failure mode is rupture of the valve disc in each of the two series motor-operated valves (MOVs) in the RilR suction line when closed during. normal power operation. This failure mode is independent of the ACI. _Another less influential contributor to Event V frequency was found to be'rooture of one valve while the other valve has failed open. The results demonstrated that, in l-_
this case, removal of the ACI is beneficial when compared to retaining it.
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(3792M/VS/020192) g L
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SUMMARY
- (Con't) 1.
Analyses were performed to determine the impact of removal of the ACI on RilR system unavailability.
The analyses ladicate that the reliability of the RilR system is unchanced during RilR initiatlon and that it improved during short and long te.m cooling. The ACI becomes more of a detrimental factor as the length of time in which RilR is required to operate increases.
Removal of the ACI reduces the probability of malfunction of equipment important to safety.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UTSAR is not created because the effect of an overpressure transient hcs not changed due to the removal of the ACI.
The RilR suction relief valves were designed to maintain the RHR systm pressure within design limits.
Although the ACI isointed the RCS from the RifR suttlon relief valves on high RCS pressure, overpressure protection of the Ri!R system is provided by the RilR suctiou relief valves not by the slow acting suction isolation valves.
The purpose of the interlocks la to assure double isolation between the RilR system and the RCS when the plant is at normal operating conditions. The interlock prevents the possibility of an Event V due to operator error.
Analyses were performed to demonstrate the impact of removal of the ACI on Event V frequency, RHR system reliability and overpressure transients.
The analyses performed compared the results with and without the ACI.
Iloweve r, the results were contingent upon providing a alarm to alert the operator that a RCS-RHR series suction Isolation valve (s) is not fully closed and that double isolation is not being maintained.
The modification did not impact the opening circuitry, nor did it effect the MOV position Indication in the control room. The setpoint for the alarm is within the range of the open permisslve cetpoint pressure and the RHR system design pressure minus the RilR pump head pressure.- Operating procedures were rt>1 sed to direct the operator to take the necessary actions to close the open valve (if it is not closed), or if this la not possible, to return to the safe shutdown mode of operation. The analyses performed ludicated an overall increase in safety due to the removal of the ACI, implementation of the modification, and procedural changes.
3.
-The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because deletion of the ACI had no effect on the ability of the RHR system to survive pressure transients when the Ri!R system is connected to the RCS, since the RHR suction isolation valves are slow acting and no credit is taken for their actuation, floweve r, removal of the ACI helps ensure that the RHR suction relief valves are available to mitigate potential overpressure transients.
Additionally, removal of the ACI improved RIIR system reliability, increasing the margin of safety. (3792M/VS/020192)
e MODIELCATlotL11E111.1920Z9-M1 DI:SCILil'TIMI The modif# cation replaced the Kerotest accumulator till line isolation valves and associated piping between the subject valves and the accumulatora.
The new valves were supplied by Anchor Darling.
It was datermined that post cracking of fill lines had occurred due to vibratior caused by backflow (slicing) through the Keretest valves.
The Anchor Darling valves were not diaphragm operated and therefore, no vjbration was created during backflow through these valves.
SAfETLEVALUAIIW_
SUMMARY
J 1.
The probability cf an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not increased because new valves and piping allow operation of accumulators per UFSAR Section 6.3.
Valves were qualified for use in the cystem.
2.
The possibility for an accident.or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because replacement parts installed were qualified for'use and do not change the original design conditior.s.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basir for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because Tech Spec 3/4.5.1 requires all accumulators operable in rodes ic 2, and 3.
Replacement of valves and associated piping was performed in mode 6 and cracking of the accumulator till lines due to vibration caused by clicing, which could result in a loss of ECCS is not longer a concern.
. (3792M/VS/020192) r
tiG0lflCATIGLMfL-1 B92010 4
6F211'130H1 The modification provided an audible alarm to enhance the two redundant low-lcw level status lamps that were used for the level of HaOH solution in the_ containment spray add 1 Live tank by. connecting an annunciator point / window to those tank iavel type switches.
Additionally, the spray additive tank window alarms were arranged into descending priority positions on the main control board (MCB) to addrers human f actors.
SAEETY_ EVALUATION _
SUMMARY
1 1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safe'-
rs previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not increased because the w ch t i..lon was for low energy electrical circuitry which had no invola with reactor coolant r-a
'ential ivr creating a LOCA or for boundaries and did not have increasing its consequences. The work was for the contaimnent syray (CS) system and the new alarm setpoint was identical to the existing status l amp.
The installation did not increase the probability for failure of CS system equipment.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction'of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the analysis of failure modes and effects proved the modification wes not subject to nor created any single failure event that could disable the design basis accident indication for containment spray additive tank depletion to the low-low level or the operation of CS system.
3.
The margin _of safety. as defined in t.he basis for any Technical Specification,-is not reduced because the modification provided more positive indication for the discharge of NaOH solution from a new audible alarm as opposed to low-low status lamps on the MCB.
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(3792M/VS/020192)
i MOP 3 FlCATIotLM.-i-&O32 DESCRIEIIQi1 This modification upgraded the existing Residual Heat Removal (RHR) heat enchanger outlet temperature instrument loop to safety related and added indication in-the main control board (Mth).
SATETLIVAINAT10tLEUMMAR11 1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not increased because this modificatlon upgraded the existing RHF' heat exchanger outlet temperature loop and added indication in the MCB.
Appropriate isolators were installed to segregate safety from non-safety components and an_ analysis was performed to insure the seismic Integrity of the equipment. No new accident or failure moder, were Jdentified, or existing ones altered, that have not been previously analyzed.
2 The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because this modification upgraded the existing RHR heat exchanger outlet temperature loop and added indicat.lon to the MCB.
The appropriate isolators were installed-and an analysis was performed to ensure system and component integrity. No new accident or failure modes were identified.
3.-
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the new Indication added to the MCB allows the operator to monitor RHR system temperature from the control room.
This allows the operator to take the appropriate action upon recognizing a temperature deviation which in effect increases the margin
'of safety due to early detection of the deviation.
h (3792H/VS/020192)
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MODIEiCAT10tLM0:1109:035 UESCRIlTIQMI This modification revised the solid state protection system to provide automatic isolation of steam generator blowdown isolation valves on Jow-low stemn generator level.
It also revised the safeguards test cabinet circuits to allow on line testing of the new isolation function.
SAEETI_EVALUATL0tLEUNMARY1 1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not increased because the probability of decrease in secondary cooling events is unchanged and consequeaces of such events are reduced since automatic closure of the steam generator blowdown valves preserves steam generator inventory. The probability cr consequences of failure of the reactor. protection system due to selsmic effects is unchanged.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because redundant trains of reactor protection system are utilized to actuate redundant solenoids on the isolation valves. The effects of a steam generator sample line failure without isolation of the corresponding isolation valve and the ef fects of continuous sampling f rom all steam generators during auxiliary feedwater events have been evaluated.
3.
The margin of. safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical
. Specification. is not reduced because automatic isolation of steam generator blowdown ensures that auxiliary feedwater can provide sufficient heat sink to cool down the reactor coolant system as discussed in the basis for Technical' Specifications.
Containment isolation function of blowdown valves is unchenged. Mitigation of accident and transient conditions is enhanced by preservation of steam generator inventory during auxiliary feedwater events.
- (3792M/VS/020192)
MOD 1f:ICATIDtll&D:8.9z031 DESCRIPT10 tit.
The modification redirected floor drains within the release tank enclosed area from the turbine building floor drain to the auxiliary building floor drain system via a 2" line (OTE70AB-2").
This modification also added a cample sink in the release tank area to f acilitate release tank sampling.
SAff l'Y_EVAIAIATIOtLSUMMAIR 1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not 3 ncro ased bectiuse the flowpath of the drain is.not considered in any-accident analyzed in Chapter 15.
2.
The possibJllty for an accider or malfunction of a different type-than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because rerouting the drain provides' additional monitoring and processing options of contaminated water.
No new failure effects were determined to exist as a result of this modification.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis _for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because radioactive effluent limits in Technical Specification 3/4.11.1 are maintained.
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. (3792M/VS/020192)
MODIEJCAT1RILhD-&033A i
DESCRIE*[1W t The partial modification installed a 1" sample line from 401' elevation to j
369* elevation in the Tutbine Bldg. The partial modification supports a modification to redirect the Essential Service Water System (SX) sampling to I
an instrument skid located at 369' elevation. A future partial modification
'l will incorporate the final electrical and mechanical tie-ins.
SMXTLEYALUATION._SUMMAEh 1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously-evaluated in the UFSAR is not increased because the non-safety sample line, Class D does not impact the SX systom as referenced in subsections 7.3.1.1.7, 9.241.2.5, or 9.2.1.
Sampli.ng can be malucained manually during initial tie-ins.
The Essential Se.vice Water St' stem operability is not, impacted by the partial modification.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a dif ferent type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because SX sampling is not. Impacted. Manual sampling can be accomplished during SX sampling out of service. The tie into the SX system can be isolated and does not increase the potential for a malfunction.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the non-safety sample line does not change the design basis for any Technical Specifications, specifically Tech Spec 3/4.7.4.
4 d (3792M/VS/020192)
1 i
MORIflCAT101UM=lL2:ll92039 DCSCRLi'ELON1 This modification rerouted the steam jet air ejector after condenser through
-the loop seal and tied inter condenser drains to the main condenser.
It also routed off-gas drains to main condenser.
SAFETY EVALUAIL C 9UMMARII 1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not increased because gas drain piping is nat considered in any UFSAR accident.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously. evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the modification does not impact any safety related systems or structures.
No new failure offects have been determined to exist as a result of these modifications.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because rena of the systems, structures, and components altered in this modification is the basis for any Technical Specitication. (3792M/VS/020192)
H2DIUCAT10!LM0:2-M M0
' DESCR1RT10 tit This modification provided routing to direct drain line 2WE98AB-2" to the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building floor drain sump.
This prevented leakage of equipment drains in auxiliary building via opened drain line 2WE98AB-2",
liAfm_INALUATIONJi'M1 AMU 1.
The probability of an occurrence _or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equapment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not increased because this modification did not impact any safety-related systems. The piping has been seismically qualified and no interaction exists with adjaccat components. There was no contribution to any accident described in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously_ evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because this modification provided routing to direct drain line 2WE98AD-2" to the Unit
-2 Auxiliary Building floor drain sump.
As a result of thir no new failure offects had been determined to exist.
3 The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the routing of the drain line is not the basis.for any Technical Specification.
1 (3792M/VS/020192).
h MOPRICAT10N_H02.1 M:044 Dl;SCRIPI1W1
.This modification added automatic isolation capability to the upper Steam lines a ter a High Energy Line Break (HELD).
The Oenerator Blowdown (SD) r modification utilized existing temperature sensors that provided HELB
' isolation for the lower SD lines. The llELB auto isolation feature allows usage of the upper SD lines for SD flow above 15 gpm per steam generator for Unit 1 BAffJLEYMNATiDN SUMMARI.i 1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR in not increased because this modification does not affect the function of the steam generator blowdown. Therefore, the accidents described'in the UFSAR remain unchanged.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because there are no accident or malfunctions evaluated in the UFSAR that-are affected by the modification. The reliability of the rteam generator blowdown system is expected to improve by sharing the blowdown between lower and upper lines. No new failures were created.
Isolntion following a IIELB ensures
-that: area EQ temperature limits are not exceeded.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification,.is not reduced because this modification does not affect the function of the steam generator blowdown system.
It is not addressed in the basis for any Technical Specification. '
(3792M/VS/020192)_
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MODiflCATIQILihl:09f fi21
~DESCRIPT10Rt This minor change added blind flanges and steel pipe caps after cutting SX strainer drain lines downstream of their associated manual isolation valves.
SAEETY.3YALUATION_SUMMhEU 1.
The probability of an occurrence or the concequence of an accident, or malf unction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not increased because this minor change adds only passive piping bland flanges and pipe caps which e'o not alter the function of the Essential Service Water Strainers or their drain lines.
The non-safety related WE drain lines have no impact on accidents described in UFSAR section 15.
2.
The possibility for an accident or saalfunction of a different type than any praviously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the UFSAR, Table 3.2-1_ describes the equipment drain (WE) system as non-safety related; Table 3.6-1 does not identify WE as a system important to plant safety, and Table 3.6-2 does not identify WE as a high or moderate energy system. Therefore, the addition of these blind flanges and pipe caps added to the WE piping does not create accidents not previously analyzed in the UFSAR section 15.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the addition of the low energy,-
passive blind: flanges and pipe caps does not change the function of the WE drain lines from the SX strainers, nor does it affect the WE. system as described in Tech Spec section 11.2.2.2.1.
This minor change isolates the current SX strainer drain -flow path of non-contaminated water to the liquid radwaste system, while allowing strainer drainage for maintenance reasons, as necessary. (3792M/VS/020192)
-m MORIrlCATILtuild-JG-ft26 fx M6-1-. & l21 DESCRIPTI0 tit The modifications provided line-stop fittings and blind flanges on the SX strainer backwash drain lines.
SAEEEVALUAT10ft_SUMMI.H11 1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not increased because the operatlou of the SX system as described in the UfSAR is not altered.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the system operation retaains the same and no new failures are introduced.
3.
The margin of safety, 64 defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because this change does not affect the bases of Technical Specification 3/4.7.5 since operational parameters of the system are not altered.
. (3792M/VS/020192)
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MODIElCATJ01LME:D _90:002 Mf4CR111totit This modification installed a sight glass in pipe OWE 88A downstream of valve OGW9307.
This allowed operators to open the gas decay tank drain valves (0GW9305 A-F) to determine if there is any water present in the gas decay tanks and to verify that any water present in tanks has been drained before reclosing the drain valves.
SAEEII_IYAINATIGLEUtIMARIA 1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipmont important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not increased because the pipe 0WE88A is classified ar, non-safety reinted and does not interact with equipment important to safety.
It does not affect any accident analyzed in the UFSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different-type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the installed sight glass in pipe OWE 88A aids operators in determining water accumulation in drain lines. The system flow path remains the same, therefore, the operation of the system is unchanged.
3.
The margin.of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because installation of this sight glass in pipe OWE 88A does not affect the basis for any Technical Specification.
, (3792M/VS/020192)
MODif1CAllDtLNh 0:9h10A1 DESCRIPTION The modification replaced the Robertshaw Vibra switches on the essential service water cooling tower fan gear box with an IRD model.
EAfETLEVALUATICRLSWMARIA 1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not increased because the modification replaces an existing Vibra switch.
The function of the system does not change.
Additionally, the system is not required to respond to an accident.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in 6.he UFSAR is not created because this chenge upgrades; the system timt performs the same function. No new failures are introduced.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the vibration monitor is not addressed in Tech Specs.
1 '
!(3792M/VS/020192)
MQDlILCATIDILME-12902011 DESCRIP110til This modification added two pressure gauges and a flow orifice and gauge to the Essential Service (SX) booste r pump piping, The instruments allow for the collection of pump perfaxmance data and trending of parameters. The SX llocster pump is driven by the Auxiliary Feedwater diesel.
SAEETLIYAIAJAT10tLEUMMARY3 1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in
-the UFSAR is not increased because the piping and valves installed by the modification are designed and supported to meet sein.mic requirements as described in the UFSAR.
The additional equipment does not prevent the AF or SX systems from performing their designed function.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the additional piping, valves and instrumentation are designed in accordance with existing SX system safety clarifications. The new valves and instrumentation-for the AF diesel driven SX booster pump do not alter the safety function of the AF system.
3.
The margin of safety, as-defined in the basis for any Technical
. Specification, is not reduced because the intended safety functions of the AF diesel AF pump and GX system are not affected by this modification.
SX flow to the SX booster pump is adequate to meet the requirements of cooling-for the AF diesel. (3792M/VS/020192)
- - - -. - _ - ~.. = -..
l M0niflCAT10tLM(i-1-20-112 DESCRII! TION 1 This modification replaced the smoke detectors above the Unit 1 Reactor i
Coolant Pumps (RCP) Fire Detection Zones 1D-2, ID-3, 1D-4, and ID-5 with 225' F heat detectors.
Also, one extra heat detector was added to Zone 1D-5 (RCPD) to provide extra fire detection for the pressurizer area.
The heat detectors have a longer life span lu high radiation areas than the smoke detectors did.
SAEELT__EV_ALUATIC3_SUtMABI.1 1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equi ment important to safety as previously evaluated in l
the UFSAR is not increased because the RCP Fire Detection System only provides an alarm. This system does not initiate an automatic fire suppression _ system. The RCP Fire Detection System is not required to reduce the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment involving the reactor coolant system. This system operates as described in Fire Protection Report Sections 2.3.1.1 and 2.3.1.2.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the RCP Fire Detection System functions as originally designed per Fire Protection Report Sections 2.3.1.1 and 2.3.1.2 a fire in the RCP area causes a fire alarm in the Control Room.
A f ailed detector causes a trouble alarm in the Control Room.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the the heat detectors provide the s ame lovel of fire protection for the RCP's as the smoks detectors did.
Therefore, the margin of safety as_ defined in Administrative Technical Requirement 3/4.3.3 is not affected. (3792M/VS/020192)
4 MODIFICAllDIL11ft-1-90-013 DESCRIETLONI This modification provided the capability to manually vent the reactor vessel head.
Previously, venting was provided by solenoid operated vent valves.
If power was discontinued (Mode 5 & 6), or in the unlikely event, lost, venting of the reactor vessel was not possible.
This modification allows venting to occur under those circumstances.
SAEETX_IYALUAIIDtLSUMMABX1 1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not increased because both the added manual and existing solenoid operated vent paths are designed to the sans decign criteria, and are no more probable of a malfunction than any other small bcre valves in the RC system. A malfunction of the manual operated vent valves (leaking) would be bounded by the small break LOCA analysis where a small break LOCA has been determined to be of no consequencas to public exposure to offsite radiation per UFSAR 15.6.5.4.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the addition of the manual-operated vent valves is bounded by the small break LOCA analysis. No new accident scenarios are created.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because all changes to the parameters or conditions usen to establish the Technical Specification requirements are in a conservative direction.
'ech Spec 3/4.4.11 requires that the solenoid _ operated vent path _be operable in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Addition of a manuni operated vent path, which could be used only in Modes 5 & 6, does not' affect solenoid valves / path operation. (3792M/VS/020192)
~.-
. =.
liODlf_1CAIIDtL1LL-D 99:D.13 DESCR1L"RW L The modification installed piping and valves to allow chilled water to flow through station heat coil in the machine shop air handling unit for cooling during the summer months.
SAFETL EVAWATiW_SUMMARit 1.
The. probability of.an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safoty as previously evaluated in the UFSAR ja not increased because the affected equipment is not addressed in the UTSAR.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than
-any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because this modification do's not affect any' equipment associated with an accident.
No new failures are created.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the modified systems are not addressed in the basis for any Technical Specification.
q.
I (3792M/VS/020192)
MOIIIELCAIIDILMft-1-9D 016-AL1htagILL1 DESCR1rlimi The modifications installed an automatic door operator en doors D420, SD171, SD170, D427, SD169, and SD175 to reduce the number of door alarme due to the doors being left open.
SAfriLEVAI,UAT10tLEUMMAE11 1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR is' not increased because the doors f unction in the same manner with or without the modification. The modifications are to ascist people; it does not alter the security, fire ruting, or safety of the doors.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than eny previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the function i
of the doors is not changed.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reducod because although not directly addressed in Tech Specs,-the modifications do not affect the safety of the plant since the door operates in the same manner with or without the operator energized. (3792H/VS/020192)
. _ _.... _... _ _ _ _ _ _.. _ _. _ _ -. _ _ __ _ _ _ ~ -. _..
6 MODiflfAILQiL116:1:90 D21 DESCRIPTION 1 This modification replaced the existing opposite division powered D.C.
Operated " Fail As Left" solenoid operated valve in each train of the H2 monitoring system with a D.C. operated " Fall Open" solenoid operated valve.
-With the new configuration in place, a loss of power in one ESF division would not leave a failed closed valve in the opposite division would H2 monitoring train. Completion of this modification satisfied a NRC commitment.
SAFE'iT_KVALUATION_
SUMMARY
1 1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in ry the-UFSAR is not increased because this equipment has no function in an accident other than containment isolation. Thia funttion has not changed and the probability of the accident has not increased.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the U!SAR is not created because the modified valves would fail open upon a loss of a D.C.
ESF Cus which is different than previously assumed. The containment isolation would still be maintained through the c,ther valve in series.
This configuration has been evaluated by NRC and found acceptable.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because valve will still provide containment isolation function in the event of a loss of one division of D.C. ESF power containment isolation is maintained and hydrogen monitoring is sr.111 achievable.
l t
i (3792M/VS/020192)
-. - ~.
MODlflfATIQtLN6-0-99-101 Dr, SCRIPT 10th The modification added a threaded union to the piping downstream of relief valve 0 COO 34 in order to facilitate maintenance on this valve. This relief
- valve is associated with the carbon dioxide (CO ) tank (OCOO2T) located at 2
the River Screen House.
SbPITI..EYALUAT10ti._SU191AIRt L
1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not increased because addition of the threaded union downstream of relief valve OCOO34 does not degrade the operability of the CO2 System at the River Screen House.
The setting of the relief valve has not been changed.
Furthermore, the operation of any plant safety related system was not impacted..The CO2 system functions as described in Fire Protection Report sections 2.3.18.25, 2.3.18.26, and 2.3.18.
9 2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a dif ferent type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the function of the RSH CO2 System. is the same as originally designed as described in Fire Protection Report snctions 2.3.18.25, 2.3.18.26, and-2.3.18.27.
(The Fire Protection Report is incorporated in the UFSAk by reference).
3.
The' margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the change did not reduce the level of fire protection at the River Screen House. The margin of safety as defined in Administrative Technical Requirement 3/4.7.10.3 is not affected.
i s
l l
-27 (3792M/VS/020192)-
m
.m___
4 MODIU CAT 10tL N0:1/21902014 I
DESCRLEIl0H1 The modification installed a raised floor in the Unit I and 2 Plant Process Computer (PPC) room to allow cables to be routed and to provide proper airflow.
SMTAT_EYALUATIDfi_SUMMARIl 1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not increased because Appendix E of the UFSAR mentions the Process Computer, but it is not specifically addressed in any section.
The PPC is not assumed in any safety analysis.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the installation of the raised floor does not affect the functionality or operability of the Plant Process Computer or any safety related equipment.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the Plant Process Computer is not assumed in any basis for any Technical Specification.
The raised floor
'does not affect the Plant Process Computer or any safety related equipment.
l 4
L I (3792M/VS/020192) i
1
]
l tiORITJGIIDHJ4ft-Q:90-695 i
. Dl; SCRIP.TIOKt The modification lengthened the fire protection sprinkler header pipe nipples to the sprinkler heads in the operator briefing room (Turbine Building 451' G/18) so that the entire sprinkler head is below the suspended ceiling.
- SAFETLIYALUAT10tLSUMMARLt 1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment imprrtant to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not increased because no safety related equipment is located in the. area of the Operator Briefing Room.
No new equipment has been added.- The sprinkler heads were 1ergthened below the suspended ceiling tiles.
r
-2.
The. possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the function of the fire protection system has not been changed.
Sprinkler head performance-has been increased by lowering them below the colling. The added weight of the longer nipples is negligible.
3.
The margin of-safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because these sprinklers are not addressed in Tech Specs. The Limiting Conditions for Operation as identified in the Byron Administrative Technical Requirements are not affected.
l
[.
l
( -(3792M/VS/020192)
MQDif_IfNIlotL110:D:10-101 DESCR11710tti The modification removed valve OFP774B and installed a new style of valve.
It also changed tellet valve OPP 775B model 218-1 to new model 218-KP.
SAEETLEVALUATLQLSUMMARL:
1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not increased because the fire protection system function as described in the Fire Protection Report, does not change. The Fire Protection Report is incorporated into the UFSAR by reference.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because replacing the check valve-and relief valve did not alter the operation of the fire protection water supply system.
By replacing a chronically damaged valve with a more reliable design, the fire protection water supply system has been made more reliable.
3.
The margin of safety, es defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the Byron fire protection implementation program are not altered. Plant systems addressed in Tech Specs or Administrative Technical Requirements are not affected.
i
. (3792M/VS/020192)
(
MODIEICATIO!L Mb_1/2.-9h001 DES.CRiPTICR41 The modification installed a jumper to inhibit the close-intercept-valve (CIV) function of the digital electrical hydraulic control system.
CIV was intended to fast-close the turbine intercept valves in the event of a steam flow / generator load mismatch. Because the intercept valves at Dyron do not have past closing capability, CIV function was unable to operate per design.
This modification was installed to prevent spurious intercept valve closures caused by CIV activation.
SAEETLEVAWAT10tL
SUMMARY
1 1.
The probabl]ity of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malf unction of equipment important t.o safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not lucreased because the turbine overspeed protection trips are not affected by removal of the CIV function.. Chapter 15 accident analysis does not take credit for the CIV function.
Both trains of independent / redundant overspeed trip remain unaffected and operable.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of-a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because removal of
.the CIV function.does not affect operation of the turbine, generator, or overspeed protection trip. With CIV inhibited,.a stenm pressure / generator load mismatch can, at worst, cause a 108% overspeed, at which point the overspeed trip system causes closure of al1~ steam inlet valves, preventing excessive overspeed.
3..
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because no margin of safety involves the CIV i.
function. Technical Specification 3/4.3.4, turbine overspeed protection, is.not affected by inhibition of the.CIV function L
l l
l L
. (3792M/VS/020192)
I
. ~
HODlEICATIOtWM-0:Sl-003 DESCRIl210NI The modification replaced a freon based decontamination unit with a water hased abrasive unit.
This eliminated the mixed waste generated by the existing machine and eliminated the need for freon in accordance with corporate and government goals.
SMEEVALUATI0tLSUMMAIR1 1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction'of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not increased because the decontamination unit is not addressed in the UFSAR. No accident analysis sections discuss this component.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the decon unit adds combustible materials to fire area 11-2-0 of the Auxiliary building. The total increase in fire load is approximately 2% and has been analyzed and found to be acceptable.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the decontamination unit is not addressed in the basis for any Technical Specification.
-.( 3792M/VS / 0201L92 )
- 1..
MQDIEICAT10tLM6-1-91W2 DESCRIET10!til 1The modificat.lon provided connections to Essential Service Water System (SX) lines for the Reactor Containment Fan Coolers to provide capability for backwash.
SAEETLIVALUATIQL
SUMMARY
1 1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not increased because the SX system and minor change to the system has been designed to Category I criteria. Thus, the seismic design is not changed.
In event of train falls, adequate redundancies exist to precluded loss of safety function.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because this change does not affect the operation of the system or any other systems in all modes and operation.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification,-is not reduced because the connections or backwash capability is not the basis for any Technical Specification.
i l-l
^
l' 5 (3792M/VS/020192)
..~
MODJrICAIlotL.M0-h 91 033-DESCHIPTION:
The modification removed the Unit I blowdown condenser secondary vent (ISD50A-3/4) because it was originally installed without adequate support, therefore, it was not seismically qualified.
SAEETUNALUATION_SUMMARn 1.
'Iae probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not increased because the chango ensures that the integrity of the blowdown condenser and the room the blowdown condenser is housed in in maintained so the previous accident analyses are still valid.
2.- The possibility for at accident or malfunction of a different type than any -previously evaluat.ed in the UFSAR is not created because the removal of pipe ISD50A-3/4 and the associated valve does not create new types of failures, system operation is unaffected.
3.
The margin-of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because this pipe and associated valve are not described in the basis for eny Technical Specification.
1 4 (3792M/VS/020192)
~.
a HODIT_1CATID1LMft-1_91-103 DESCRII:Il0H1 This minor change was designed to reduce eroclon and corrosion problem on the moisture separator reheater cold reheat drain lines near the main condenser.
As previously installed, the lines were carbon steel and were routed with i
several direction changes prior to entering the main condenser.
This configuration had led to significant damage to pipes and fittings including a
. number of leaks on these lines. The new design rerouted the lines to eliminate bends and replaced a portion of carbon steel pipe and fittings with stainless steel.
4 SMEILEVEUAT10tLSUMMAna 1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident,.or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not increased because the function of the affected extraction steam piping is not changed.
Interfaces with the main condenser are not impacted. The events resulting from a loss of condenser vacuum are unchanged.
4 2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the use of erosion resistance material and rerouting the lines to eliminate bends reduces the chances of steam leakage from these lines.
The interfaces with the other' systems is unaffected.
J-3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the change increases the reliability of Extraction stemn system. Technical Specifications do not adoress
-Extraction Steam system.
2 4
4
! -(3792M/VS/020192) t
S!M _91-O'<9 tbt ough 07 4
{-
DOUCRIPTION
!;t enm generator nar r ow range level t ransmit terr, ILT-0517, 11,7-0518, ILT-0519, 1L7-0527, 107-0528, ILT-0529. 117-0537, 1L7 0538, ILT-b39, ILT 0547, ILT-05GB, ILT-Ob49, 1L7-0$56, 'LT-0557, ILT-0550 and ILT-0559 were rescaled from 227.H5-64.85 luches wat er coltunn t o 224.09-57.41 inches wat et column.
This reduced overall error to actual design icquirement s.
This change was required to co: rect design miscalculations, correct 10: Tnog, main r, team pressure, and r educe over all 5,ystem cont rol err ot t.o wi t.hi n 4 5% as asswned in cer tain accidents.
The overall system error was 4 0. 6%
9.5%.
SAflyIT INAhUATION _UUMMA!W t 1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, on malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not increased because the steam generator level transmittera st 111 f unct ion as designed in protection of tutblue on high-high level e
trip and provido adequate heat nink to coro on low-low level.
The stotun generator integilt y is not affected.
All equipment, reactor protection
/igh-high wil) occur setpoints are unchartged. The feedwater pump
- rip
- r at a level 4 lecher. higher, hcwever, this trle a still bounded by the h
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than b
any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because this rescaling will bring the steam generator level transmitter and associated setpoints more into the cester of tuo UFSAi< buandarlen.
This wlil return the steam generator level to its Int ended and actual scaling requirements and associated safety-related setroints.
3.
The mar gin of saf ety, as defined in the basis for any Technical r
Specification, is not reduced because the parameters used t o est ablinh the re Tdchnical Specification requirement n are unchanged.
Therefore no Technical Specifications are impacted an.d no reduction in margin of safety exists.
_ (3792M/VS/020192)
m 00C8 M - 0 7 5, 70, 77, 79 Dr.UCRIPTIONI The set point of tempetatute swit.rhos DTS-SXO40, DTS-SXO91, OTS-Sx04!:, atel OTS-SXO!'3 w a s cha nge<l t o 70' F ftom t he t, t a v i ou s value of 79 F.
This
e l l': i tit wa s <te t e a rnitivet by t he ult imat e heat e i t.r.
design tasis t erencillat ien t ask fetce.
Escentini Setvice Wat et (SX) seturn watet is s e Jult ed t o f.l o w t ht e'agh the tiset9 in Ordet to ptovide atlaquat e cooling.
The et udy was I ase 1 on ir3it t al wet bul b t ertpe t at ut e of 7P F,
thos i' in equi t ed t hat SX : et urn wat er flows t ht eugh the risets tathot t han quitry t hrough t ha l'ypa s s va lve s.
SArf:TT EVALUATION _SVIHARYt
>nme pience of an at "i dant, er 1.
Tha probnbility of in occurrenra or t he
+
malf unct ion of e qu i prne nt irnpor t ant to saf et y as pr evieualy e"41ont ed in the UFSAR is not increasad becausa the c h a n g e=
wt old closa the l'y p ass valves easilet aci. ws? >,2 t eittat at ut e taachas 70 F.
Adequate rovling watet t o SX heat l o.s d e is eti11 ensuted.
7he 1ypass valves wiii mti11 epen when wat et t ertret at u t e diops 1+elew EO'F te }: event f i eo r i mj of tha tower.
i, t ; cider t or malf 2nct ion of a dif f erent type t han 2.
The possibility f any previously evaA. r.. d i n t he t'FSAR is not et eat ed l acause the SX return wate; l e r equi r ed t o f le > ',hs ough t he risers when wet bulb temperat.ute is 70'F.
This is to ensure the tower performs adequately to cool SX wat at during design basis accidents.
3.
Tha margin of sa f et y, as dafinad in t ha lasis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the bylass set roint s are riot addressed in t ha Tech Specs.
The change closes the iypass valvea at the corteet water t ettpe r a t. u t e to provide adequate cooling to SX when an accident occuts.
_37 O
SSCR.91-019 end 91:000 DESCRIPTI(N s The net point s of 1!1Y-HC%, INY-8036 adjur.*ed intermediate range (IR) N%
chnnnel 20% rod stop, and ?% tr ip setpoint s required during iefueling.
Revised setpoints are requistni during refueling to account tot di!!erences; in cose fuol assembly loading patturns.
6 AFUTLEVAtMATRH_ SUMMA!41 1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or mal f unct.lon of equ8,ement import ant. t o saf ety as previously evaluated in the tirSAH in not increased berar.se these setpoints have no effect on core openatlans ueless they are emv.eded.
Setpoint changes do not affect the protective functions they on'iy change the do t e c t.o r cuirent level at which t hat fo.iction is init iated, an addressed in tirSAR sections 7.2.1, 7.5, 7.7-1, 14.2, and 15.4.
2.
The possibility f or an accident or malf unction of a dif f erent type than any previously evnlunted in the tirSAH is not created beenune the intermediate range rod stop and reactor trip setpoints were designed into the nrelear instrumentation system t o reduce the consequences of accidenth described in t he UAH.
Changing these setpoints does not create the possibility of an accident not evaluated in '.he SAR since those setpoints are a protective function and only actuate i t. the event of an accldont.
3.
The mergin of safety, ne defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because, with the revised intermedinti range setpoln'.s, the reactor is protrcted from rapid power i nc r ear.e s.
In t.he event of an uncontt '. led powec increase during a power ascension from 0%
power, the tevised IR setpolats that are now based cn t.he new fuel assembly loading pattern are either stop rod withdrawal or trip the teactor, as required ia Tech Spec. 3/4.3. (3792M/VS/020192)
,e sstis.91-001, tQ, DL end_04 pt:SCillPT!W:
The SSCits changed pressurizer safety injection setjoints of inst r wnent loops 1RY-0455, 1RY-0456, IRY-0457, and 1RY-045H from 1b50 psig to 1829 pulg.
The chnnges were bnsed on setpoint seconcillation program, which evnlont ed act unt plant tolerances and ter.t equipment errors and determined that the setpoint is wit hin t he safety analysis unit.
13M'!;TY.1: vat,UATION
SUMMARY
1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of' on accident, or malf unct.lon of equipment Inipor tant to safety as previously evaluated in the U!SAR is not inciensed becaune this change ensuren a safet y inject lon occuru at the proper setpoint.
Due to conceanu arising fiom i ns t r wnn nt raeasuring equipment accuracy, the cetpoint was raised to 1850 pnly, rollowing the setroint reconcl11ation program study, the i n r.t r wne n t rneasuring equipment tolerances were vetifled and specified to ensure the 1829 psig setpoint wan within the safety nnalysis limitn.
or malfunction of a different type than 2.
The possibility for an accident any previously evaluated in the UFSAR ls not created because the setpoint change in baned on the results of the set point reconcl11ation i r ogr am.
The new measurement and t est equipment ( MT f.T. ) values ensure the safety injection occurs within the safety analysis limits for safety injection.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basia for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because thin change to the setpoint in consistent wit.h t.he Technlen1 Specification value in Table 3.3-4.
The setpoint reconelliation program has validated this itetpoint based on new MT&E used to callbtate the lus t r wnen* loops. (3792M/VS/020192)
SSCIC 91-091,_92, 93,_.ond 91 DimCHipTIUtil Tempei nt ut o loops l it C - 0 41 1, 421, 431, and 441 were r escaled t o change full powet della tempe:ature valuu faom 57.02"7 to 58.70'r.
Dolta temperatute was alno rescaled to reflect nev mensured values derived fro.m the parformance of liVS XPI-15.
The une of the measuted delta tempera'"re values ensures accutate ti1p setpoints for over t emperature delta t emper at. e and overpower delta temperature as well as accurate loop della temperat.ur e indientions.
SAFUTY INAINATlW_
SUMMARY
1.
The probability of an occurrence or the conuequence of nu accident, or rnalf unction of equipment important t o saf et y as pr eviously evaluated in the UFSAR is not increased becaur.e rescaling the delta t.emper atur e loops based on sur veillance measuz ements have no dliect inte: action with the probabilities of occurrence of the accident.
The consequences of the accident are unchanged from thore analyred in the tirSAR since rescaling delta temperature ensures bounded trips and initiation of mitigation.
Fescaling the delta temperat.ut e loops prese ves the f unct.lon of the della temperature ludications and associated delta temper atut o mitigat ion.
The consequenceu of a malfunction of equipment itnpor tant to saf et y ar e not.
Increased stince overpower delta temperat.ure and overt empernture delto temperature trips perform av designed and analyzed.
2.
The possibility for an accident or mnifunction of a different. type than any previously evaluated in the UrSAR is not cicated because the rescaled delta temperature loops do not adversely impact system functions. The function of the delta temperature limiting safety system setpoints lu preserved as designed and analys.ed in the UFSAR.
3.
The margin of nafety, as defined in the basin for any Technical Speelfication, is not reduced necause the safety features extracted from the della temperature loop siquals function as Intended and assumed in Technical Specification 3/4.3.
3 i (3792M/VS/020192)
s ___ _. - -.... _.._ _._ _... _. _.._.-. _ _ _ _ _ _ _.__ _. _ _.
r10CtlA!!<!Ll3rr fil-20 DEliCHIPTICNI 1
The procedure allows use of a secondary restraint on the fuel building crane to meet the single fallure proof guidelines in llUREG-0612 and 0S$4.
This allows the 125 Ton load block (hook) to nemain on the crane during 4 11 phases of fuel handling act.lvities.
IMt'l:TLINAWATIDtLSUl#iARY1 1
1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or i
annifunction of equlpraent important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not increased because the restriction in section 15.7 to keep loads from travelling over the spent fuel storage area is maintained.
This prevents objects from dropping on spent fuel.
2.
The possibllity for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created because the secondary restraint is passive'and there is no effect on plant operation.
If a.
i single falleza were to occur, the secondary restraint would be taut to ensure no acceleration forces are possible. No new failures are created because single failure proof guidelines in NUREG-0612 are used.
3.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Spe ci fica t.lon, is not reduced because the limits in Techulcal Specification 3/4.9.7. are maintained. The secondary restraint meets the single failure proof criteria, thus the load block is no longer classified I
as a load or heavy load and is allowed over the spent fuel pool. The bases for Technical Specification 3/4.9.7 are unchanged.
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(3792M/VS/020192).
Ett 91-007 l>0SCh!!'IICH I The llFSAR was tevised to allow t.he new fuel elevator to bw used for moving objects other thnn new fue.1 assemblien, including irradiated fuel assemblies.
SAFETY EVALUATION SUMARYI 1.
The probability of en occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or mnitunction of equipment important to safety an previously evaluated in the tirSAk is not increased because the minirnum chleiding distance specified remains the same.
Iriadiated assemblies ate inherently less reactive than new ones for which the elevator is already designed.
A fallute involving a dropped fuel assembly is bounded by existi.1) analyses.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the U f'S AR is not created becauce the change addresses protective measures to handlo uncontrolled upwar d novement of an irradiated asnembly. Other postulated failures are bounded by t he analyses of a fuel hand 18ng accident in Section 15.7.
3.
The marglu of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not. teduced hacause the new fuel elevator la not.
addressed in the ba91s for any Technical Speciflection.
~42-(3792M/VS/020192)
~.-.-.-- - - - - - - - - -.._..- - --- - -..-.-.-...----- - -
i; i
6 EPP_91:010 4
Dr.SCitICT10til This procedute governed performance of a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> test of the Economic Generction Control System with the RCS TAVG operating deadband expanded to 3 4'T rather than the normal deadband of A 1.5'r.
I SAFETI_EVALUAT10tlSUl94AltY t 3
1.- The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluat.ed in the UFSAR is not. Increased because the range of operating temperat.utes allowed during the executlon of this test is explicitly bounded by the existing U7SAR safety analyses. No other change to equipment or operating procedure is encompassed.
J.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a dif ferent type t.han any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created beceuse all equipment and operational strategies remain unchanged with the exception of the l
temperature deadband for TAVG.
Plant equipment is designed and quallfled to operat.e over a wide range-of temperat.utes, and t.he In eased range allowed will not go-beyond existing limits.
3.
The marryin of safety, an defined in cce basls for any Technical Spec i fic at.lon, is not redur:cd because no Technical Specificat.lon is impacted during the performanco of this procedure.
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-. ( 3792M/VS/020192')
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VfSAR fpel410L Actisn l'rocedm ec DFSCRIPTICH Section 15.0 of the UFSAR was revised to reflect revision I A of the Westinghouse Owners Group ernergency procedures.
The operator actions were swnmar ized f or cer toln events.
SMTTLEVAI,U ATIOfL
SUMMARY
t 1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, ot malf unction of equipment. Arnportant to safety ac provlously evaluated in tue UFSAk is not increased because the changes do not affect the accident analyses In chapter 15.
There is no change in plant operation.
The revision provides clarificat.lon of Westinghouse owners Group procedur e guidance.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously cvaluated in the UFSAR is act er cated because t.he change provides a der.cr lption of st.ation pr ocedur es used as addit.lonal requirementu for operator action. Oposator action lu still from approved ntation procedures, which undergo a 10CrF50.54 saf ety evalunt lon prior to use.
3.
The margin of safet.y, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced becauno the change does not affect the basis for any Technical Specification.
. (3Y92M/VS/020192)
. as e I
Re nttor_.Ir.l p-.and.lSr ActuAtio1L.Sy s tenL7e s t ing 11CSCRIET12 1 sections 7.1 and 7.3 of the UTSAR to more Clarifying information was added e
completely describe testing the reactor trip and engineered safety features actuation system.
5AfETL3VALUAT10tLWriMARYt i
1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UTSAR is not increased because there are no changes to plant operation or testing requirements or methods.
Any failure of the system to maintain valva position has been analyzed previously.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than r
any previously evaluated in the UFSAR la not created because maintaining the valves in a closed position is assumed in the basis for the analysis and that the Technical Specification requirements are initial satlsfied.
No new failures are introduced.
3.
The margiu of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical
' Speci f1ct't '.on, is not reduced because the salves remain in their i
safeguarrr_. actuated condition listed in LCO 3.6.1.7.
The Technical Specification manual initiation surveillance requirement for trip actuating devjce operational tests for phase A, phase B, and manual safety injection is consistent with LCO 3.6.1.7.
'Because of this, there are no interactions,or adverse effects.
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_m 1
1 MSELSetroint Out OLToler ance l
Df;SCIHl'TlW t
]
Safety Evalua'lon SECh 91-391, prepared by Westinghouse, addresses the linpac t of Main Steam Safety Valve (MSSV) set-pressure drift. outside the permitted values given in the Technical Specifications on past operations.
l BAff,EUVAIAIAT10N_SUMMAlW I l
1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an acc)Jent, or malfunction of equipment important. to safoty as previously evaluated in the UFSAR 18 act. lucreased because the MSSVa are nn accident init Agatos and can therefore not increase the probability of an accident.
Since Peak Cladding Temperature and other criteria were met, there la no increase in LOCA conseouences. All applicable non-LOCA criteria as e snet as well.
2.
The possiblilty for an accident or malf2nction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not, cr eated because t.he only accident different than already analyzed would be a small break LOCA with steam generator secondary shell failure 3eading to a loss of aux 111ary foodwater' flow.
Since n small break LOCA cannot lift the highest set pressure MSSV, there is no concern for steam generator secondary shell failure.
No ot.her equipment. Import. ant. to saf et y is impacted by operat.lon of out of tolerance MSSVs.
3.
The margin of nnfety, an defined in the baals for any Technlcal Specification, is not reduced because the calculated Peak Cladding Temperature remains under the NRC acceptance limit. of 2200*r listed in the Dases for the LOCA peaking factor.
b b (3792M/VS/020192)
~.
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Un d e f.i ned _Ab b r e v i a t i on s _U t i l l zed.. I n_ t h e.. Ann u a l _Repor t Aux 111ary feedwater Af BFP
- Byron fuel Handling Procedure EGC Economical Generation Control FP
- fire Protection and Detection System Haste Gas System GH HY
- Hydrogen System RC
- Reactor Coolant RHR Residual Heat Removal Pressurizer System RY SD
- Steam Generator Blowdown System SSCR Setpoint Scaling Change Request SPP
- Special Procedure TAVG
- Average RC Temperature TE Turbine Building Equipment Drain System HE
- Auxillary Building Equipment Drain System
, Final
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