ML20072H712
| ML20072H712 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 03/15/1983 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20072H709 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8303290540 | |
| Download: ML20072H712 (3) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES f
egi NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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W ASH U4GT ON, D. C. 20555
- WE@ f E o,g w.f SAFETY EVALUATIC'. BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMEfDME!.T !.0.55 TO FACILITY OPERATII G LICEf
- SE f0. DPR-71 r
CAF0 LINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICKSTEAMELECTRICPLANT,U$1T1 DOCKET NO. 50-325 1:0 Introduction By letter dated November 8,1982 as supplemented January 6, and February 8, 1983, the Carolina Power & Light Company (the licensee) requested an amendment to Facility Operating License No. OPR-71 for the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP) Unit No. 1.
The amendment would permit postponement of one full-flow test of the core spray pumps until the primary containment suppression chamber is restored to it's operational condition.
2.0 Backaround Brunswick Unit 1 was shut cown on December 10, 1982 for refueling, main-tenance work and modification of the Mark I torus suppression pool.
In conjunction with the latter, the suppression pool has been drained and there-fore it is now not possible to perform the usual full-flow surveillance test of the Core $ pray System (CSS) wherein water is pumped from the suppression pool and back into it.
Technical Specification 4.5.3.1.c.1 states:
4.5.3.1 Each CSS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
c.
At least once per 92 days by:
1.
Verifying tha; each CSS pump can be started from the control room and develops a flow of at least 4625 gpm on recirculation flow against a system head corresponding to a reactor vessel l
pressure of g 113.psig.
In regard to this requirement, the full flow test was last performed on December 9th and December 10, 1982. However, the modifications to the suppression pool will extend beyond 92 days and are not expected to be completed until approximately 130 days after the last full-flow test. The I
maximum permissible interval between full flow tests is presently 92 days, plus a 25 percent extension of surveillance intervals generally permitted by Technical Specification 4.0.2.a.
Thus, the maximum permissible interval is presently 115 days.
8303290540 830315 PDR ADOCK 05000325 p
. The' licensee has requested that the maximum surveillance interval be ex-tended until two days after the suppression pool is restored to operable status.
Based on present planning, this would extend the surveillance in-terval from the present maximum 115 days to approximately 132 days.
If another 55 days is allowed for contingencies in the completion of modification to the suppression pool, the total allowable surveillance interval would be approximately 187 days and would terminate on June 15, 1983.
The licensee agrees that this termination date would provide ample time for the comple' tion of modifications to the suppression pool and. performance of the full flow test of the CSS.
3.0 Evaluation We have considered the safety significance of extending the present surveillance interval for performing a full flow test of the Core Spray System.
The interval would be extended from a r.ominal 92-day interval to a maximum of 187 days. We have considered the potential need for a CSS during this shutdown period, the availability of the CSS, the verification of operability of the CSS by other surveillance tests, the availablity of other means of cooling the reactor core and the past performance of the CSS.
The licensee has provided the following information in response to these considerations.
l<
Normal,1y, in the refueling condition (OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5), the, CSS is not required to be operable (and thus to have sutveillance. tasting performed if all of the following _cend.itions are met:
(1) t,h.e reactor vessel head is removed, (2) the refueling cavity is flooded, and (3.) the spent fuel pool gates are removed.
The CSS will be available for operation, if needed, during the relatively short interval when operability is required due to plant conditions (i.e.,
draining the refueling cavity during week 14 of the outage until refilling of the suppression chamber).
2.
The CSS consists of two independ'ent subsystems, each with 100% capacity, thus providing redundant safety system. subsystems.
[
3.
One subsystem of the CSS will remain unaffected by the vent valve re-location modification.
l 4.
Redundant systems that will be availatle to supply' core reflood capability include the condensate system and the service water injection system, with a small volume available from the control rod drive system.
l 5.
Surveillance is being performeo every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to verify that the CSS has an operable water source (TS 4 ~ 5.3.1.a).
i i
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_ _. Surveillance is being perform *ed every 31 days to verify that the CSS is filled with water (TS 4.5.3.1.b.1).
Surveillance is being performed every 31 days to verify that all valves in the CSS flow path are properly aligned (TS4.5.3.1.b.2).
Sarseillance -is being performed every 92 days to verify the operability of the core spray header differential pressure instrumentation (TS 4.5.3.1.c.2).
6.
A review of previous CSS operability testing shows that the system is extremely reliable, as no failures have been identified since 1978.
Besed on this information and the considerations above, we have concluded that extending the surveillance interval for a full flow test of the CSS from 92 days to 187 days does not consititute a significant reduction in the verification of operability or the availablity of this system.
Furthermore, if the CSS were not available, other systems would be available to provide adequate cooling of reactor core. Therefore, we find the proposed amendment to be acceptable.
4.0 Environmental Consideration We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this cetermination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of envirorcental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 551.5(d)(4), that an enviror. mental impact statement, or negative declaration and environ-mental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
5.0 Ccnclusion We have cor.claded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) because the amendment does not involve' a'significant increase in the prcbability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, does net create the possibility of,an accident of a type different from ar.y evaluated previously, and does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities.will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Dated: " arch 15, 1983 Principal Contributor:
Sam MacKay