ML20070F012
| ML20070F012 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hartsville  |
| Issue date: | 12/13/1982 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| REF-PT21-82 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8212200052 | |
| Download: ML20070F012 (4) | |
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l TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
'4g d."ed CH ATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 37401 ia e
400 Chestnut Street Tower II 8
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December 13, 1982 4g HTRD-50-518/81-29, -520/81-28
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II ATTN: James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
HARTSVILLE NUCLEAR PLANT - REPORTABLE DEFICIENCY - ATLAS QA DOCUMENTATION FOR AUXILIARY AND FUEL BUILDINGS' STRUCTURAL STEEL -
l HTRD-50-518/81-29, -520/81-28, The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-0IE, Region II, Inspector P. A. Ta ylor on November 13, 1981 as NCR HTA CEB 8102. In accordance with pa agraph 50.55(e) of 10 CFR Part 50, we are enclosing the final report on the subject deficiency. We consider 10 CPR Part 21 applicable to this nonconformance, i
a If you have any questions, please call Jim Domer at FTS 858-2725.
c Very truly yours, i
i TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY l
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J L. M. Mill,
' nager Nuclear Licensing i
Enclosure ec:
Mr. R. C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
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l ENCLOSURE HARTSVILLE NUCLEAR PLANT A l
j ATLAS QA DOCUMENTATICN ON AUZILIARY BUILDING AND FUEL BUILDING STRUCTURAL STEEL j
10CFR50.55(e) REPORT NO. 2 (FINAL)
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NCR HTACEB8102 IITRD-50-518/82-29, -520/81-28 1
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Description of Deficiency I
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A QA audit was perfomed at Atlas Machine and Iron Workc on October 13 j
through 16, 1981, for the purpose of verifying the quality and J
j acceptability of the subject material fabricated under TVA contracts 77K71-821398 and 77K72-821399. Since approximately 75 percent of this j
material had been shipped and material fabrication for Hartsville a
Plant A was essentially 99 percent complete, the t.udit was limited to 4
performing a detailed review of hardware identification and j
j manufacturing records on a selectiort.of pieces determined to be representative of the work performed. An examination of these records I
l indicated that the quality of the material supplied on the contracts could not be verified frem the manufacturer's records. The
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j deficiencies caserved and supported by the evidence examined included various inadequate traceability of welding documentation on items, particularly where multiple weld joints were involved. The i
following ite=s are exa=ples observed during the audit which indicate
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1 the unacceptable imple=entation of the basic requirement of preparing l
sufficient records as work is performed in ceder to furnish j
l documentary evidence of quality assurance.
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Numerous undccusented changes to shop travelers in the for= of j
write-overs and opaqued dates with other data recorded in place I
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without recording the date of the change and identification of the t
person =aking the change. Examples of data items changed included
_ _ _.2' heat codes, purchase order numbers, heat numbers, dates and j
j initials of personnel performing and verifying operations, types and lot nu=bers of welding consumables, and peccedure numbers.
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i 2.
Magnetic Particle Test Reportn with errors, insufficient data, and l
omissions. Exa:ples observed included procedure or procedure-revision level not recorded, interpreter's signature missing, serial nu=ber of MT =achine used not recorded, and in some cases CC inspector's signature was copied (preprinted). Also, in one example reviewed, the PC inspectica report was dated before the joint weld date.
l 3.
Magnetic Particle Inspection Reports showed weld repairs j
reinspected; however, traveler did not document repair procedure, j
repair welder, ner weld consu= ables used.
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Changes were =ade to travelers and additional data was added up to three years after the work was perfor ed.
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S.
Welding documentation on Column Frames and Platform Frames included:
inconsistent and ince:plete procedure references, lack of welder i
identification to specific joints, and failure to identify weld censumables used on each joint.
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6.
Heat code traceability to heat numbers cannot be assured because of undocumented changes (see item 1 above) and an evample of one heat code (M4Y) which was not on cross-referenc~e 1ist but recorded on traveler.
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7 Verification of heat code transfer during material cutting operations and issuance of weld consumables not verified by inspection personnel on shop travelers after space provided was removed from the forts.
- 8. -Information on acceptability of nuclear coatings application was not verified or recorded.
9 Ultrasonic Testing (UT) was performed on Platform Frames (50PF1B) instead of Radiography Testing (RT) as specified by contract.. In addition, the 'IT test procedure (UT-1 Revision 0) used was not approved.
Safety I=plications Had this condition remained uncorrected, unacceptable welds and materials might have gT.e undetected in the structural steel of the i
i fuel and auxiliary buildings. The presence of deficient welds or j
materials could jeopardise the integrity of the fuel and/or auxiliary buildings, thereby adnesely affecting safe plant operations.
Ce.'ective Action T7A has perfor=ed an independent evaluation of the quality and 1
fitness-for-service of the fabricated structural steel. The purpose 1
of this evaluatica was to determine whether or not the material and i
fabricatien were acceptable fec= a quality assurance standpoint. The
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steps involved in the independent evaluation were as follows:
- 1.. An independent TVA task force made up of both design and construction personnel was for=ed to perfor= an organized and E
conscienticus exa=ina' tion and evaluation of the material and the supporting delumentatica.
2.
Visits by se:bers of the task force were made to Hartsville, Phipps Bend, and Atlas' facilities to visually inspect the material and to obtain heat code numbers which were sta= ped on the material.
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3 The task force identified a representative sa=ple of welds on the i
fuel building rcof girders at Hartsville to be both visually and magnetic particle exa=ined in accordance with appropriate site QA precedures. Site personnel at Hartsville performed the tests and sent the results to the task force in Knoxville for evaluation.
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4.
TVA inspectors cc= pared the heat code nu=bers taken from the J
f material at Hart:ville with the appropriate certified mill test reports in order to deter =ine if the =aterial was in compliance with the specification. The results of this cc=parison were sent to the task force in Knoxville for evaluation.
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A review of the contract requirements concerning nuclear coatings application was performed. by the task force. This review led to the conclusion that the material furnished on the subject contract was to be installed in areas at the nuclear plant sites where only minimal verification of coatings is required. Further, they determined that the required verification was in fact confirmed by l
TVA inspectors through various inspection visits to Atlas' facilities during the course of the fabr?. cation of the material.
j After reviewing the results of the heat code verifications and the i
site weld exa,inations with the Technical Engineer, GE/CFBraun, the 4
j task force concluded that both the material and fabrication were technically acceptable with the exception of eight items at.Hartsville j
j identified as RER restraints. During a search of the weld records it l
Atlas, it was discovered that the welds on these restraints had not j
been radiographed in accordance with the specification. Therefore, a 1
QA hold will be placed on the following eight items and they will not l
be used until further testing has been performed en them at the ti=e that ccastructica is restarted at Hartsville. This furthet corrective i
action for these ite=s will be handled by the Division of '
j Construction.
J HTA-1 HTB-1 41PF1B 41PF1B 41FF23 41PF23 50FF1B 50FF1B 50FF2B SCPF2B i
The re=ainder of the material that Atlas has fabricated will be shipped to the appropriate sites, and T7A considers this material to be structurally sound. All pertinent test data and other information will be l
3 asse= bled with a copy kept en file at the construction sites and in Knoxville.
The deficiency described ir this report was caused by the vendor's lack of understanding of quality assurance in general and in particular his failure to properly implement an acceptable quality assurance program. TVA has taken steps to prevent recurrence of this deficiency by terminating the re=aining work on the subject contracts and not allcwing the vender to fabricate any further =aterial for TVA. Also, no future quality assurance contracts will be awarded to this vendor until TVA is satisfied that the vendor understands and is willing to properly i=plement an acceptable quality assurance prcgram. No other TVA nuclear plants have been affected by this deficiency.
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