ML20065K583
| ML20065K583 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 10/09/1990 |
| From: | DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20065K581 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9012030023 | |
| Download: ML20065K583 (3) | |
Text
. _ -
i ATTACHMENT A I
l Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 46 l
Revise the Technical Specifications as follows:
l l
Remo s Paae Insert Pace 3
i 3/4 6-9 3/4 6-9 I
i I
1 l
J i
4 i
i l
5 1
I 90120.30023 i'0 1 0 0 0 FDR ADOCt! 05000412 F
PDC 4
l
r-------
1 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY LIMI'!NO CONSITION FOR OPERATION
- 3. 6.1. 6 The structural integrity of the containment shall be maintained at a level consistent with the acceptance criteria in Specification 4.6.1.6.1.
APPLICABILITY: M30ES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
ACTION:
With the structural integrity of the containment not conforming to the above requirements, restore the structural integrity to within the limits prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System taperature above 200*F.
RWLN.E wtTR TNMU N SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS h.6.1.6.1 Liner Plate and Concrete The struccural integrity of the contain-ment liner plate and concrete shall be determined during the shutdown for each Type A containment leakage rate test (reference Specification 4.6.1.2) by:
a visual inspection of the accessible surfaces and verifying no a.
apparent changes in appearance or other abnormal degradation, b.
t visual inspection of accessible containment liner test channels prior to each Type A containment leakage rate test.
Any containment liner test channel which is found to be damaged to the extent that channel integrity is impaired or which is discovered with a vent plug removed, shall be removed and a protective coating shall be applied
,'to the liner in that area, a visual inspection of the dome area prior to each Type A containment j
c.
leakage rate test to insure the integrity of the protective coating, j
4.6.1.6.2 Reports An initial report of any abnormal degradation of the contain-ment structure detected during the above required tests and inspections shall be made within 10 days after completion of the surveillance requirements of this specification, and the detailed report shall be submitted pursuant to 1
Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days after completion.
This report shall include a description of the condition of the liner plate and concrete, the inspection procedure, the tolerances on cracking and the corrective actions taken.
-)(-- S ut 0 t Mc4 wtt reguittmen) 4 4.b 6.\\.b i,s owiy ca liccW e (or 4ht 7}pe A 4es4ig conducAed ektm th e. m h r v ei, in c behg 4
tekehyovh 4ht Second ce4ueb ou
,k9 e4h Su e unb e t.gg.r y
- M % d '4 fee hke_ rsev4 seksA ed 7 Aed M pse 3
BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 6-9
(,fropes ed Word
f Attachment to " Containment Strugtural InteBrity" Insert "A"
4.6.1.6.1 Containment structural integrity shall be determined by performing ONE of the following surveillances;
- a. Liner Plate and Concrete The structural integrity of the containment liner plate and concrete shall be determined during the shutdown for each Type A
containment leakage rate test (reference Specification 4.6.1.2) by:
1.
a visual inspection of the accessible surfaces and verifying no apparent changes in appearance or other abnormal degradation.
2.
a visual inspection of accessible containment liner test channels prior to each Type A containment leakage rate test.
Any containment liner test channel which is found to be damaged to the extent that channel integrity is impaired or which is discovered with a
vent plug
- removed, shall be removed and a
protective coating shall be applied to the liner in that area.
3.
a visual inspection of the dome area prior to each Type A containment 1cakage rate test to insure the integrity of the protective coating.
b.* Containment. Vessel Surfacgg The structural integrity of the exposed accessible interior and exterior surfaces of the containment
- vessel, including the liner
- plate, shall be determined during the shutdown for each Type A
containment leakage rate test (reference Specification 4.6.1.2) by a
visual inspection of these surfaces.
This inspection shall be performed prior to the Type A containment leakage rate test to verify no apparent changes in appearance or other abnormal degradation.
BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 (Proposed Wording)
i
(
ATTACHMENT B Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 46 REVISION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 4.6.1.6.1 4
A.
DESCRIPTION OF AMENDMENT REQUEST The proposed amendment would revise surveillance requirement 4.6.1.6.1 to include an alternative to the present surveillance requirement.
The alternate surveillance requirement is consistent with the Standard Technical Specifications (STS), and does not contain specific details on the required actions pertaining to test channels.
In addition, a footnote was added which limits the duration for which the alternate surveillance is applicable.
B.
BACKGROUND The Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS)
Unit No. 2 containment building has a
continuously welded carbon steel
- membrane, supported by and anchored to the inside of the containment structure.
Its' function is to act as a leak tight membrane in the event of an accident.
The cylindrical portion of the liner is 3/8"
- thick, the hemispherical dome liner is 1/2" thick, the flat e
floor liner covering the mat is 1/4" thick, with the exception of areas where the transfer of loads requires either bridging bars or bridging plates.
The floor liner plate is covered with approximately 2
ft of reinforced concrete that insulates it from transient temperature effects.
At the intersection of the containment l_nor and the concrete
- floor, a
1/2" joint is provided.
This joint is filled with a 1/2 inch premolded joint filler.
The top of the joint is sealed with Sikaflex-la elastic sealant / adhesive.
All welded seams are covered with continuously welded test channels which are zoned into test areas by dams welded to the ends of the sections of the channels.
Channels in the.honispherical dome and containment mat are covered with concrete while those on the cylindrical liner wall are exposed.
These test channels were installed to facilitate leak testing of welds during the containment liner erection.
Test ports were provided for each zone of the leak chase channels and after completion of weld testing, 1/8 - inch NPT pipe plugs (vent plugs) were installed in the test ports.
These plugs remain in place during subsequent Type A leak-rate testing.
The design, analysis, and construction of the BVPS Unit No. 2 containment building is similar to VEPCO's Surry and North Anna containment buildings.
(
Reference:
Unit 2 UFSAR Section 3.8)
The test channels in BVPS Unit 2 are constructed utilizing larger channel but installed in a manner similar to BVPS Unit 1.
There have been instances where several vent plugs have been found missing which would necessitate extensive grinding and cutting inside containment in order to satisfy the existing surveillance requirement.
This action was performed at BVPS Unit 1 in 1982,
- however, the cutting and grinding of the test channels was not excessive.
We have identified 25 vent plugs missing during the second refueling outage liner inspection on Unit 2 in preparation of conducting our Type A
containment leakage rate test and are currently evaluating approximately 1500 feet of test channel against surveillance requirement 4.6.1.6.1.b.
Y
@f_ _ ____ - _ __ _ _
I
)
ATTACHMENT B, continued
)
Proposed Technical. Specification Change No. 46 i
Page 2 l
C. JUSTIFICATION The proposed alternate surveillance requirement is consist ;nt with the Standard Technical Specifications and 10 CFR 50 Appendix J.
This proposed change adds a surveillance requirement that does not contain specific details on the required actions necessary if a test channel _ is found to be damaged or is discovered with a vent plug-removed.
The test channels, as stated in a Stone.& Webster (S&W)
Report titled " Containment Liner Test Channels at BVPS Unit No.
2" (Attachment
- 1) are capable of withstanding all loads that might be imposed on them during normal, test, and upset conditions without any loss of function.
The presence of the test channels do not in any way impair the performance of the containment liner itself.
This report was prepared for Unit No.
2 and is an equivalent report when compared to the Unit No. 1 report submitted with Change Request 1A-181/2A-45.
The NRC recently (1989) determined the acceptability of these test channels as the containment pressure boundary at VEPCOs' Surry and North Anna
-Power Plants.
The containment liner welds associated with those test channels with missing vent plugs are considered acceptable for continued operation based on completion of the following activities:
1.
inspections 2.
chemical analyses 3.
Type A testing Visual inspection into the test channels associated with vent L
connections found with missing plugs was attempted using a 2 mm fiberoptic borascope with a
video monitor.
The borascope was passed through the vent connection tubing in an attempt to reach the associated test channel.
Passage through the tubing was L
hampered by several 90 degree bends _present in the tubing run.
I' Each bend added additional resistance to movement of the borascope, and 'if too many bends t'e re ent 'untered, forward progress-was-prevented all together.
Inspection results were video-recorded for future reference.
The borascope provided very g
p good resolution, but had a-limited area of view (approximately 3/8" dia).
Because of _the limited area-of view the L
1/4" l
borascope resultc were inconclusive, however, boraricope inspection l
was attempted for test channels associated with vent connections 90A, 90B,-90C, 92E, 89F, 54A, 56B and 99B.
L Borascope inspection at vent connections 54A, 56B and 99B was not successful due to the number of 90 degree bends encountered (3 to 4),
and tubing length (maximum insertion depth was approximately 4
1/2').
The tubing run provided-too-much resistance for borascope insertion into the test channel.
The ver.t connection tubing which was observable was clean with minor corrosion noted at the pipe fittings.
-,.w e.,--
,-4 r
e
L f
ATTACHMENT B, continusd i
Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 46 Page 3 Vent connection 90B was originally found with a missing vent plug, however its tubing was clogged with debris.
Removal of debris was attempted using a
metal
- brush, flexible auger, and an awl.
A vacuum cleaner was used to suction out loose material.
Samples of removed debris were also collected which appeared to be sand and/or sandblasting material.
The debris was very difficult to bore through, and appeared cement like.
Total length of tubing cleared was approximately 3".
No further cleaning was attempted so as not to damage the vent connection tubing.
Vent connections 90A and 90C were originally found with plugs installed.
The test channel associated with 90A and 90C is also common with 90B; and therefore were used to gain access to the test channel.
Entry into the test channel for 90A was successful.
An area of liner metal approximately 3/8" in diameter was visible.
Indications of minor corrosion was
- visible, along with what appeared to be traces of moisture.
The test channel in this area is for the horizontal weld in the base liner.
Entry into the test channel for 90C was also successful resulting in a
visible area of liner metal approximately 3/8" in diameter.
Indications of minor corrosion was visible, however there were no traces of moisture.
The test channel in this area is for a vertical weld in the base to wall liner transition.
Vent connection 89F was originally found with a plug installed and the test channel associated with 89F did not have any missing plugs.
Inspection of this test channel was attempted to determine the condition of a
sealed test channel.
Entry into the test channel for 89F was successful and an area of liner metal approximately 3/8" in diameter was visible.
Indications of minor corrosion was
- visible, along with what appeared to be traces of moisture.
The test channel in this area is for the horizontal weld in the base liner Vent connection 92E was originally found with a missing vent plug and was clogged with debris.
Removal of this debris was attempted using a
metal
- brush, flexible
- auger, and an awl and a vacuum cleaner was used to suction out loose material.
The debris was not tightly compacted.
However, difficulty was encountered in the removal of debris after the first 90 degree bond.
The total length or tubing cleared was approximately 15".
No further inspection could be attempted due to failure of the glass strands in the borascope probe which rendered the borascope inoperative.
Further borascopic visual inspections were not continued since previous inspections failed to provide adequate information to assess the condition of the liner or weld, l
~ _ - - ~
i.
j ATTACHMENT.B, continued proposed Technical Specification Change-No. 46 page 4
^
The concern of a missing test _ channel vent plug is the possibility of moisture entering the channel and causing corrosion.
Therefore, sampling of any accumulated water was considered asia means to evaluate the possible extent of corrosion which'may have occurred in the test channel.
Sampling for-water was performed by-inserting 1/8" diameter poly tubing into the vent connection and applying a suction source through a sample bottle.- Sampling for water was performed at vent connections 85C, 85D, 85E, BSF, 85G, 13B, 90A, 92A, 92B, 83A, 83B, 83C.
The 83 and 85 test channels were considered to be the most likely channels to contain water due to their close proximity _to the containment sump.
Water samples were obtainable from 83A and 85G only.
The results of.the analysis of the samples revealed a pH of 10.1 and
-11.4 with sodium (Na) in the range of 19 to 44 ppm.
It is therefore assumed that the primary corrosive present is NaOH.
In accordance with the information presented on page 1177 of_ Volume 13 of the ASM Handbook titled " Corrosion",.the corrosion rates-for Sodium Hydroxide solutions from very low molar solutions-to very high solutions (<.0001 to >500) at. room temperature range (60*F to 150'F) from a
maximum of 2 mils per year to zero.
The higher pH levels (11+)
listed-corrosion rates of.7 mila per year or less.
Therefore-a conservative rate of 2 mils per year is assumed.
A total. expected corrosion of 86 mils (40 year life plus 3 years of preservice) is bounded by the Stone and Webster evaluation on the 88 mils total allowance-(Attachment 1).
This evaluation considered. condensation present in' the test channels due to a.
failed test-channel fillet weld or a removed vent plug and. is the worst case scenario due to oxygen supply replacement.
This results in a corrosion allowance of 88 mils
- over a
forty-year lifetime ~
There is sufficient margin in the containment liner thickness to accommodate-a total, worst case corrosion of 88 mils over the life of the plant.
Based-on current sample analyses, the S&W. report conclusions and bases _in the area of corrosion life are generally acceptable.
Any
-test channel subsequently-identified-'as holding free standing
-water Lwill require further analyses and an evaluation of'the-corrosive' properties of the sample to assure the containment. liner
- remains capable-of performing _its' design function _for the' life of-the plant.
_The : completion - of the above evaluations in' conjunction with the Type A-test will provide _ assurance of the integrity of the 2
containment liner for the duration of this request for a Technical Specification change.
The. proposed wording for the alternate surveillance requirement 4.6.1.6.1.b contains specific requirements to inspect the exposed
. accessible interior and exterior surfaces of the containment vessel.
This inspection will verify that no apparent changes in
-appearance or other abnormal degradation have occurred.
e
. ATTACHMENT B, continued
(
Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 46 Page 5 The visual inspection will continue to include the accessible exposed test channels and associated vent plugs.
This proposed change to the Technical Specifications does not relax the requirement to assure the containment liner remains capable of performing
.its' intended function.
Repairs, if any, to the liner will be-made in accordance with the ASME Boiler and pressure Vessel-Code.
Therefore, this proposed change to include an alternate surveillance requirement 4.6.1.6.1.b does not affect the
-structural integrity or leak tightness of the containment vessel.
The structural-integrity of the containment vessel will still be verified-by inspections and tests as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix J,
to ensure the containment structure will remain capable of performing its' intended function.
We will replace the missing vent plugs or, otherwise, seal off each test connection-found with a
missing vent plug following-completion of the Type A test and dispositioning the subject liner welds.
This will be done to preclude a corrosion rate that exceeds that assumed in the S&W containment liner test channel report by eliminating the source of possible reoxygenation to the test channels and prevent the introduction of fluids to the test channel environment, which could lower the pH.
D.
SAFETY ANALYSIS The structural integrity and leak tightness of the containment vessel will continue to be maintained to the original design standards for the life of the facility.
The proposed change will not affect the capability of the containment vessel to withstand the_ maximum pressure expected for any postulmted accident.
The proposed wording for the~ alternate surveillance requirement is consistent with STS and the inspectit :riteria as stated in 10 CFR 150 Appendix J.
The non-exi0tance of the specific details pertaining
?.o_ test channels and v6nt plugs in the alternate surveillance will not' affect the ability of the containment vessel to meet _ its design function.
Any apparent changes in' appearance or other abnormal degradation discovered-during the-required inspection-of the accessible interior and exterior: surfaces of-the containment vessel will be corrected in accordance with the ASME Boiler and-Pressure Vessel Code-prior to plant start-up..This inspection will continue to include accessible test channels, vent plugs and protective coatings.
Therefore, this. change is considered safe based on the fact that'the proposed amendment will-continue to verify the structural integrity and leak tightness of the containment vessel.
This verification will ensure that the-original design, standards, including the ability to withstand the maximum pressure expected in the event of a design basis accident, are being maintained-for the containment vessel.
E.
NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATION i
The no significant hazards considerations
-involved with the proposed amendment have been evaluated, focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted below:
~
i ATTACHMENT B, continund Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 46
'Page 6 The commission may make a final determination, pursuant to the~ procedures in paragraph 50.91, that a proposed amendment to an operating license for a
facility licensed under paragraph 50.21(b) or paragraph 50.22 or for a
testing facility involves no significant hazards consideration, if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
1)
Involve a
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or 2)
Create the possibility of a
new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or 3)
Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The following evaluation is provided for the no significant hazards consideration standards:
1.
Does _ the change involve a
significant increase in the probability or consequences cf an accident previously evaluated?
The structural integrity and leak-tightness of the containment vessel will continue to be maintained.
The ability to provide a
leak-tight barrier against the uncontrolled release of radioactive material to the environment remains unchanged.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
2.
Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident form any previously evaluated?
There would be no change to system configurations, plant equipment or analysis as a
result of this proposed amendment.
The containment structural integrity and leak-tightness will not be affected by this proposed change.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident previously evaluated.
3.
Does the change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
The containment steel liner and external concrete surfaces will continue to provide the same structural integrity and leak-tightness assumed in the original design.
Although not
- required, the existence of the plugged / sealed test channels l
provide additional protection in the form of a redundant L
barrier to the steel liner welds.
The proposed amendment will continue to require that an inspection is conducted on the exposed accessible surfaces to verify no apparent changes in appearance or other abnormal degradation has occurred.
ATTACHMENT B, continued
- Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 46 Page-7 Therefore,- the proposes-change does not involve a significant reduction ~in a margin of safety.
- F. NO SIGNIFICANT HAZAFOS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION Based on. the cons.darations expressed above, it is concluded that the'_ activities arsociated-with this.1icense amendment request satisfies -the no 41gnificant hazards consideration standards of 10 CFR-50.92(c)
- End, accordingly, a'
no significant hazards consideration finuing is justified.
G.
ENVIRONMENTAL EV7LUATION-The. -proposed changes have been evaluated and-it has been determined that the changes do not involvt (1) a significant-hazards consideration, (ii) a significant' change in the types or significant increase in the arounts of-any effluerts-that may be-released.offsite, or (iii) a'significant increase in individual cnr cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
Accordingly, the proposed changes meet. the eligibility criterion for; categorical exclusion' set forth in 10 CPR 51.22(c)(9)..Thereforo,' pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22' (b),
an environmental assessment of the proposed changes is not required..
t
ATTACHMENT 1 7
Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 Proposed-Technical Specification Change No. 46 Containment Liner Test Channel Report Attached is a Stone & Webster Engineering Report, dated September 14, 1983, which provides information relative to the evaluation of the function and the predicted performance of both the containment liner and test channels to demonstrate that the existing containment system presently provides and will continue to provide a leak-tight enclosure.
l
. _ - - - - - ~
~
12241 -S ( B )-08. 21 s
September 14,. 'l983 s
/"
t
-t i
CONTAINMENT. LINER TEST CHANNELS
-I AT-
' BEAVER' VALLEY POWER STATION - UNIT NO. 2 h
Prepared'for Duquesne Light Company.
t by Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation i
- by.
P. W. Ward 1
i
-- Approved Bys:
'V h
"* /
k' Projec8 (Responsib, Engineer
. Division Head '
le Engineer)
/
Engine 6 ring M gement
-i (n
i 1
ri}
a m
. Copyright 1983..
.p
- Stone & Webster-Engineering-Corporation Boston,-Massachusetts
-)
^
I f
'rti w
w-
<w-f e
M t -
T7BLE OF CONTENTS 6
Section Page Summary 2
List of Figures 3
Introduction 4
Conclusions Technical Section 6
1.
General Description of Containment Liner and Test Channels 6 2.
Details of Construction, Materials, and Design 13 References 26 Figures Appendixes 4
i J
i I
(This page left intentionally blank)
- f..
L l
)
i l
1 I
c r
4 4
1 1
4
_ _-_. ~.__
SUMMARY
This
- report, for Beaver Valley Power Station - Unit No. 2 (BVPS-2), is a summary of the containment liner test channel evaluation which demonstrates that the existing containment system provides a leaktight boundary.
The report further demonstrates that the leak chase channels and the associated welds meet the requirements associated with the primary containment boundary acceptance criteria, for attachments, as made applicable for the BVPS-2.
l l
l l
2 l
l-
LIST OF FIGURES 1.
Details of Materials - Liner and Test Channels (2 sheets) 2.
a.
Liner Floor - Test Channel Arrangement b.
Liner Details c.
Liner Elevati*on 3.
a.
Test Channels - Floor Details (2 sheets) b.
Test Channels - Wall Details c.
Test Channels - Dome Details 4.
Dome - Sectional Elevation 5.
Effect of pH on Corrosion of Hild Steel 1
3 l
l
.=.
1 L2NTRODUCTION The purpose of this report is to demonstrate that the; existing e>ntainment' system provides a~leaktight boundary.
Section 1 'of this report presents a general description of the containment-.systemi-including -
the concrete - containment structure, metal containment lineri and liner test channels.
, This, section describes the configuration, materials, construction procedures, tests, and inspections employed in.the erection of the containment system.
- Section 2 of: this ' report presents detailed information pertaining to the control--during fabrication, the control of materials, and integrity of the test channels.
4 b
p
li
~
CCNCLUSIONS-The evaluation demonstrates that although the containmentfliner1 test: channels were provided primarily for-the testing 'of -the liner seam welds during construction, and were not designed as part of the leaktight membrane, they are. completely compatible-with the liners providing the same degree of leak tightness. The-test channels are capable of withstanding all loads that.might be imposed on them during normal. -test, emergency and severe operational ~ conditions.vithout any loss of -integrity.
The presence of the test channels does not in any way impair the.
performance of the containment liner itself.
i) 9 a
.;l 5
_ _ _. _ _, __~
^
i A:
s
- e
- TECHNICAL SECTION l i
GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF~ CONTAINMENT LINER AND TEST CHANNELS
.The containment liner" as a welded-carbon steel plate membrane, supported by. and-anchored to the inside of the reinforced concrete containment-structure. The liner's function is to act as a' leak tight membrane. The BVPS-2 liner is not an ASME code stamped vessel: the ASME code is used only as a guide for the
. selection'of materials and fabrication.
- The basic -geometry of the containment structure consists of a cylindrical wall portion, anchored at its base to a 10 ft thick circular - foundation, mat and ' closed at the upper end with a hemispherical dome. The reinforced concretc shell varies in thickness. from 4 1/2 ft in the cylinder to S 1/2 ft in the dome.
-The inside diameter of the containment structure is 126 ft; the-interior? vertical height is 185 ft measured from the top of the
. foundation mat to.the interior spex of the dome.
The cylindrical -portion of' the liner -is 3/8 in thick, the hemisph'erical: dome liner'is.1/2 in thick, the' flat f1cer : liner covering the. mat: 'is.1/4 in thic'k,-with the' exception of areas where the transfer of-loads requires either: bridging ~ bars or bridging. plates.
The floor -liner plate-is ' covered with approximately.2-ft of reinforced concrete that insulates-it from~
- transient. temperature-effects.
All: welds -of the 1/4 inffloor plate to either bridging bars or
-bridging plates'are mad'e'with a. backing bar.
6
The 3/8 in thick cyl.indrical liner also serves as the internal form for the placement of concrete during construction.
All liner seams in the cylindrical shell are double butt welded, except for the lower 30 ft of the cylinder, insert plates, and 4
penetrations where the liner, plates are welded with a backing bar. The liner is anchored to the concrete shell with headed concrete anchor studs.
The 1/2 in thick hemispherical dome liner also serves as an internal form for the placement of concrete during construction.
All liner seams in the dome liner are double butt welded. The dome liner is anchored to the reinforced concrete dome with headed concrete anchor studs.
The wall to dome liner junction is a double butt welded joint.
All welded liner seems on.
the mat, cylindrical wall, hemispherical
- dome, and penetrations are covered with continuously welded test channels (sectioned into 100 ft maximum length sones). The nondestructive examination (NDE) of the liner seam welds was performed in accordance with specification No. 2BVS-65 and the Erector's NDT procedures.
Liner Materials The ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Division 1, Nuclear Vessels,1971 edition t - ough and including 7
the 1972 winter addenda, is used as a guide in the selection of materials and fabrication of the containment's metal liner.
The liner material is SA 537 Gr B (quenched and tempered). The SA 537 Gr B material has a specified minimum tensile strength of 80.000 psi, a minimum yield strength of 60,000 psi, and a minimum elongation of 22 percent in a standard 2 in specimen.
The material, by test, has a nil ductility transition temperature (NDTT) equal to or less than -10'F.
The test channels are fabricated of ASTM-131 Gr C material. The ASTM-131 Gr C material has a specified minimum tensile strength of 58,000 psi, a minimum yield strength of 32,000 psi, and a minimum elongation of 24 percent in a standard 2 in, specimen.
The materitl is not_ impact tested for NDTT.
Both materials are required to be capable of being cold bent 180 degree s with no cracking.
Tests and Inspections A
testing and surveillance program is conducted during construction and operation to verify that the containment can perform its intended function.
The program consists of examinations performed during erection, local pressure test of each channel section, a structural acceptance test, an-initial preoperational integrated leakage rate test, periodic integrated leakage rate retesting and continuous subatmospheric pressure monitoring.
8 l
i
-All._ applic able - welding:-procedures-and tests, specified in Section IX of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code for Welding._ Qualifications, _1971-edition through and including 1972 Winter -Addenda, are adhered to for qualifying the welding procedures, performance of welding machines, and welding operators _who are engaged in the construction of the containment liner
' including. -' the test channels.
The weld qualifications includ'es 180 degree bend tests of-each weld test sample.
These procedures ensure that the ductility of the welded seams is comparable to 'the-. ductility of. the containment liner plate material,-
Production 1-quality control of the liner seam welds is performed i
"through random radiography, as described in Regulatory Guide 1.19
~
-and f-required by Specification No. 2BVS-65, using the techniques
' of Section V _of the ASME ' Boiler and.Pressurc Vessel Code for-Nuclear.' Poweri Plant' Components, -1971= Edition through and including 1972 "finter _ Addenda.-
As - shown -in Figure-1, the:
-radiography (R7) of the liner se'ams. welds is 100 percent for the firstl10 ft of each position,1 each welder. -Total-RT of all. liner seam-welds'; exceeds -2 percent.
Other nondestructive testing (NDT),c tabulated-on Figure 1, includes visual, magnetic particle.
-t and pressure / leak testing.
'The'. leak tidhtness of all; liner and penetration _ welds is' verified during; construction-by-the ability lto retain pressure in the test channels using' air-or halogen.
9 c
e' Leak tests are performed section by section. On the mat and cylindrical portions of the liner, the test channels are on the inside of the liner. On the dome portion of the liner, the test channels are on the outside (concrete side) of the liner.
All of the test channel welds and liner butt welds are tested by either a halide leak detection test or a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> pressure drop test.
The halide leak detection test is performed by evacuating the test channels to a pressure of 5.0 to 10.0 psia then pressurizing the test channel to 50 psig (minimum) with Freon R-22.
This method assures a homogeneous test gas throughout the test channel.
The welds are tested by use of a leak detection unit.
After testing, the gas 'is vented and the test channels are evacuated to a pressure of 5.0 to 10.0 psia to assure the removal of the Freon R-22 gas. After the test, the test channels are sealed -by insertion of a threaded plug.
A 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> pressure drop test is an alternate method of testing the test channels. The test is performed by pressurizing the channel to 45 psig and monitoring the pressure over a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> period.
If there is_a pressure drop, other than that due to temperature
- changes, the channel-to-liner and liner butt welds are soap bubble tested to locate the leak.
After testing the test channels are sealed by insertion of a threaded plug. Leaks detected by either method are repaired using approved welding procedures and the channel is retested.
10
y
.3
'ihg,
For. the. dome portioniof th'e liner, where the test channels are on
~
the outside, the threaded connections, after leak testing, are.
i
~
' sealed: by insertion of a threaded plug and seal welded prior to (theplacementofconcrete.
1 j
' Containment structural Acceptance Test l
The, containment-structure will be _ subjected to.a structural acceptance test'in accordance with. Regulatory Guide 1.18; during-j 1
y
- vhich the Leontainment internal pressure will be 1.15 times the
,1 containment design pressure (i.e.,
52 psig).
This test is.
'I performed lafter the' liner is completed, the concrete cured,.and
)'
I all penetration sleeves and hatches are' installed and closed or
~-j
~ blanked off.
a
~
r containment Leakage Rate Tests
'The. containment integrated leakage rate tests will be performed s
d
'in.accordance with " Appendix'J of~ 10CFR50,
" Primary Reactor L1 Containment - Leakage Testing-for Water Cooled Power Reactors," as.
LpublishedLin the Federal: Register.
'(
- The ' containment ::' integrated leakage testing program includes thel
~
1' Lperformanca.of Type A'testsL to measure the containment' overall 1
a integrated : leakage ~ ' rate,. Type B tests, to detect local ' leaks' or -
y 0
to measure leakage of certain containment components,_and Type C-H a
' tests, to measure containment isolation valve leakage. rates.
' The D measured - overall integrated leakage rate of the containment -
-during Type A testing:must_not exceed 0.1' percent:per 24 hr,: of 11
the weight of containment air at the calculated peak containment pressure of 44.6 psig.
e 9"
9 1
12
]
- Fq ;
,L 1
-TECHNICAL 3ECTION 2 DETAILS OF CONSTRUCTION, MATERIALS, AND DESIGN-As. indicated--in the introduction of this report--our; evaluation i
shows1that although the-test channels were-not designed as a part of_ the. leakage barrier,' they are completely _ compatible with the -
liner _ in terms of. materials, construccion procedures and tests, and the
' ability to withstand. the ' loads -and associated
. differential movements which _might be imposed during normal,-
.l test, emergency and severe operational-conditions. The following
- discussions _will provide'a summary of the materials, construction I
pr'ocedures' and; tests, and the design-of the leak chase channels.-
4 j
q i
s.j
- l
-]a l
.d g
{-;f j
'l 13 l
i; a
t
I 1
Liner Test Channels
!!aterials Identification and Construction Procedures The properties of the materials used in the construction of the containment liner and test channels are listed on Figure 1, Sheets 1 and 2.
The liner plate and test channel materials were purchased with certified mill documentation to assure compliance with the level of quality required for fabrication and s
design service.
Figures 2a, 2b, 2c, 3a, 3b, 3c, and 4 illustrate the different test channel types provided for the floor, shell, and dome sections.
The material used for the liner is ASTM A537 Gr. B.
Test channels are ASTM A131 Gr. C material. Figure 2C shows where the differences in test channel configurations occur.
Test channel plugs are 1/8 in Carbon Steel NPT pipe plugs, with socket hex heads.
Testing and Inspection
-)
~
All test. channel welds are 100 percent visually and magnetic particle inspected. The welds on the test channels were pressure tested simultaneously with the liner seam welds.
14
~
-1 4
U.M Regulatory Guide '1.19 criteria is used for the testing of test. channel and liner seam welds at Beaver = valley-Power Station Unit No. 2.
except for the following
-deviation i
Requirement i
i
'Where 1eak-chase' system channels are installed over liner velds, channel to liner plate welds should be tested-for leak tightness. by.
i pressurizing the channels to containment design Ll pressure-and held.for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> with no loss'of i
z l
. channel test pressure allowed. - Leaks are to be
~
detected with a soap solution.
.r.
[D,EVIATION All. test channels were pressure tested-to
~
45 psig with air or to 50 psig with halogen and i
. held ! for :- a minimum of 30' minutes. Channel to 1
liner 7 plate welds owere. checked with.a -soap solution or. halogen detectionLequipment.. The) 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> pressure test was:used as an acceptable; d
-1 alternate.
-i q
.i J1 1
s :.
f.)
15
_.4i Structural-Integrity of Test Channels for Maintaining i
Leak-Tightness The
. reinforced concrete contair. ment structure is designed to withstand the effects of emergency,
- test, normal, and' severe environment conditions without any strength = credit being taken for the liner. Since the
~ liner is 'anchdred to the containment structure by closely spaced anchor studs, forces on.the liner are.
- displacement limited by the structural response of the containment structure. The 1971 edition through and
. including 1972 Winter Addenda of the ASME Code,
-Section III, was used as'a guide in estabJishing liaer stress limits.
Stress calculations were -made to ascertain the design _ adequacy of the liner. The liner material was chosen to provide the necessary ductility to withstand the displacements of the containment structure and perform the design function of providing i
a leaktight membrane for'the containment.
The liner-thicknesses were chosen to facilitate construction,,
i.e., ~ to act as. a form for pouring concrete and a' free standing structure prior to placement.of concrete. At the= time) the ' liner-was designed,- there' were no:
j directly applicable industry codes in effect, nor were
- there any industry codes-available which recognized
~
displacement (strain) limits.
16 l'
l 1
._.q l
~
- .?e f.~.
An analytical model of-the liner was developed by
~i cepresenting the composite reinforcing steel-and liner steel as an equivalent orthotropic shell. This model was subjected to the combined axisymmetric loadings of test,.
normal, emergency and ' severe environmental
={
i conditions in order to establish the membrane and
=!
bending stresses in the liner.
The seismic shear
-l force in the reinforced concrete containment vall was i
applied to the liner-in order to establish the liner
~
shear stress. The liner shear stress was combined with the-liner membrane and bending stresses to de te rmine the-stress intensities.
Chese stress intensities were-compared to-and found to be less than the established ASME code allowablem.
The test channels were welded to the liner in order to
-leak test liner seam _ welds during construction.
The test channels' --however, inherently provide additional l
containment leak protection since they cover all liner-
'i seam welds"and are fabricated with material and weld quality similar to,that of the liner.
'The test channels, similar to the liner itself, are deformation-limited by the structural response of : -the cor erete ' containment structure, and will-continue to provide added leakage protection for all design conditions.-.This is particularly true for the design conditions where the liner is in a general state of-17
compressien due to the containment temperature effects. Any undetected flaws in the velds or base metal would not propagate in a state of compressien.
In this regard, the pressure testing of the containment provides a much more severe environment a
for the liner than the normal, emergency, or severe environment eondition because the test pressure produces a general state of tension in the liner and test channels.
The test channels are attached to the liner with (3/16 in) fillet u, elds. Channel-to-channel welds are partial penetration groove welds.
The pressure testing of the test channels provides assurance that the liner seam welds and the test channel welds are leaktight.
The test channel welds are also 100 percent magnetic particle and visually examined to ensure weld integrity.
These test and analyses preclude any concern for the test channels becoming detached from the liner for any design or test conditions.
Surface Treatment i
All exposed interior surfaces of the Be:ver valley Unit No. 2 reactor containment lincr are coated in accordance with Specification 2BVS-920, which 18 i
1
.e e
incorporates the requirements of ANSI N101.2, and AN$1
',i N101.4.
1 3
The surface preparation of the exposed carbon steel I
a prior to coating is performed in accordance with the
=$5PC-SP10.
A prime coat, average 3 mils thick, of Carboline Carbo Zine 11 inorganic zine primer is applied to the properly prepared substrate.
The finish coat is Du Pont Corler Epoxy Chemical Resistant Enamel (2-mil DFT min).
When the liner plates were shop primed the field weld 1
preps were masked from paint within 2 in of these-i edges.-
A ' temporary rust preventative coating was-l t
applied to the unpainted areas. on site, during liner
- erection, the rust preventative centing, as well as.
all oil, grease, and ether conteminants were removed-prior to welding.
After welding, each reactor containment liner veld e
seam was magnetic particle inspected in accordance f
with approved 1 procedures.
The approved procedures require that the weld seam and adjacent base metal be cleaned by wire brushing. This cleaning would also remove any residual mill contamination from those
- portions of_ the liner' surface which would be later epvered by test channels.
19-i l
'r..
,,..J.we
,... ~.,
...r_,.
,.. _..,y-py,yy
,..,._.,,,_.e,..m.,%,e,_,.w.w.m.%m.m,,.m3
. m%.
m m.,,w s - %m m
After the tett channels were installed and used for leak testing the liner seam welds, the channel plugs were installed to seal the channels from contamination.
The exterior surface of the test channels and associated fillet velds, as well as the adjacent uncoated liner plate, are eleaned of slag, weld spatter, etc. and prepared and painted with the Carbo Zine 11/ Corlar Epoxy Coating system as detailed
- above, The coating system should require little or no maintenance during plant life.
However, a visual examination, for structural integrity per Appendix J of 10CTR50, is performed inside the containment prior to each Type A Integrated Leak Rate Test, at which time any significant coating failures would be noted and appropriate remedial action taken.
It should be noted that the coating system applied to the interior exposed carbon steel surfaces of the BVPS-2 containment liner aids in decontamination only and is not required by any existing code or standard.
l 20 j
Cchdensation and Corrosien Inside the Test Chennels During the testing of the liner seam welds, each test channel is pressurized with air.
If an in-line air o
dryer is not used, or if the air dryer malfunctioned, moisture carry over into the test channel could have occurred, resulting in condensation forming within the channel.
After erection of the reactor containment, postulating an undetected failed test channel fillet weld or removed plug, condensation within the test channel could result from containment pressure / temperature transients or from moisture produced by primary or secondary system leakage inside the reactor containment.
The moisture which could condense within the test channels as a result of condensation from either of the above sources would be similar in nature to normal power plant condensate, which has a low ionic content and which is normally contained in carbon steel systems.
As such, corrosion data relating to condensate in carbon steel piping was used in the evaluation of the potential corrosion within the test channels.
The effect of pH upon corrosion rate in the range of fluids present within the reactor containment was 21 h,
k
examined.
Tluids ranging in pH from 10.5 (reactor l
coolant high end and sodium hydroxide caustic spray) to 4.2 (boric acid in the safety injection accumulators at 2,200 ppm boron concentration) are, or may be present within the reactor containment.
Figure 5. extracted from CORROSION HANDBOOK, is a plot of corrosion rates at various temperatures versus pH.
The zone of interest, with a pH ranging from 4.0 to 10.5, has been highlighted. The curves demonstrate that, as pH is increased from 4.0 the corrosion rate will either remain constant or decrease as the pH increased.
The worst case of potential corrosion inside the test channels would occur where a failed fillet veld or removed plug allowed oxygen supply replenishment to the test channel interior. Since relative humidity in the channel would be less than 100 percent, corrosion would occur only in the portion of the test channel interior which was immersed in condensate.
The condensate would be stagnant (less than 2 fps flow rate) and at a temperature of approximately 100 T.
Corrosion allowances published by the General Electric Corporation which are directly applicable to carbon steel condensate systems, with system conditions the same as those present in the worst-case test channel
- scenario, (that is, stagnant.
fully oxygenated 22
condensate at a temperature of 100 r, with full oxygen supply replenishment),
specify a corrosion allowance of BS mils for a forty year lifetime.
There is a sufficient margin in the containment liner thickness to easily accommodate a total, wor.t case :orrosion of 88 mils over the life of t6.e plant.
Any corrosion 'which would occur within the test channels would be general in nature.
Review of technical literature and discussions with Professor Emeritus H. H. Uhlig, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has determined that pitting corresion will not occur within the test channels.
The determination is based on the nature of the condensed fluids coupled with the material cleaning requirements of the liner seams prior to leak chase installation.
In summary, corrosion within the BVPS 2 reactor containment test channels will not present a problem during the plant lifetime.
Surveillance and Removal of Failed Test Channels As described in previous sections, the test channel materials, welds, and workmanship are such that they will not be easily da.naged. Routine activities inside the containment would not result in failure of test chat.nels.
23 i
r-e
'y
+
r -*w,
=
's Y
P e
-w+-+
e re-W
. --.. ---_-.... - - -. ~. -
Visual surveillance of interior containment liner surfaces is performed prior to preservice and periodic T)Te A leakage testing.
Due to the fact that no repairs have been required, no procedures for repair of test channels have been developed.
If a test channel vere found damaged, the cause would be evaluated and the extent of the damage determined.
The affected test channel could be
- removed, repaired, replaced, or accepted as is, depending on the nature of the damage and the accessiblity of the channel.
4 4
e 24 i
I
+
<m
.-,y e
.-,n--,y w -,,. - - -.
_.____m.__._.
4 Floor Liner Leak Chase Channels Plugs are installed in the floor test channel test port panels and extension tubing to prevent I
condensation from entering.into the channels.
J 1
The -test connection and panels are located in regions 7
of the mat away from low spots inside containment and consequently _
vould not trap water under normal conditions. Figure 2a locates the various test panels on the floor.
L The floor of the containment is sloped to where a sump provides entrapment of any fluid. Pumps are provided 4-to remove any fluid accumulation.
i Approximately 80 percent.of.the test channel
- test
- l r
connections are terminated in test panels on vertical S
' concrete surfaces 2 3 ft above the concr te e floor.
- The test channel extensions are under no load and because of their location.are protected from damage, r
As previously discussed, even if water were introduced,
-corrosion would not produce an unacceptable condition, n
I 25 I
L
_. _ _ _,,.,,, _ _ _ _., _ _, - _. ~., _
.m~,.,,,..m....,..._
2,._,.
u.y_.m....-,,
l
)
REFERENCES 1.
2BVS-950-Protective Coating Materials Within the Reactor Containment 2,
2BVS-950A Application of Protective Coating Materials Within the Reactor Containment
-3, 2BVS 6$
Shop Fabricated and Field Erection
. Containment Steel Plate Liner l
t 4.
Testing of Protective Coatings Under Design Basis Accident
' Environment, April 1973,- by the Franklin Institute Research Laboratories.
This report was submitted to the Commission under
-docket (50-388).
5.
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Sections II, III, V, and IX 1971 edition through and including 1972 Winter Addenda.
f 6.
NRC Regulatory Guide 1.18 Revision 1, dated December 28, 1972, Structural Acceptance Test for Concrete
' Prima ry Reactor Containments.
7.
-NRC Regulatory Guide' 1.19,.
Revision '1, dated August 11,'1972,
' Nondestructive Examination of Primary Containment Liner Welds.
8.
Appendix J.-10CFR$0, Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for, Water Cooled Reactor Containment, 1973.
9.
BVPS-2-Final Safety Analysis Report.
s w
26
~.. __. _..
10.
ANSI N101.2 1972 Protective Coatings (Paints) for Light Water Nuclear Containreent Facalities.
11.
ANSI N101.4 1972 Quality Assurance for Protective Coatings Applied to Nuclear Facilities 12.
SSPC-SP10 Near White Blast Cluning, Steel St.uctures Painting Council.
13.
Corrosion Handbook, 5th edition, Prof, E.H.H. Uhlig, M.I.T.
t e
27 l
. -.. =
LINER PLATE TEST CHANNEL L MATERIAL SPECIFICATION FLOOR,SHELL AND DOME ASTM - A537, GR.B ASTM-Al31, GR.C LINER QUENCHED GTEMPERED IMPACT TEST ON THE ABOVE-MIN NOTT-10'F N/A CHEMICALS AND PHYSICALS YES YES
- 2. WELDING (e) WETH00 FULL PENETRATION BUTT FlLLET (b) CODE (WELDING QUALIFICATIONS) 80lLER & PRESSURE YESSEL 80lLER & PRES $URE CODE, SECT. IX, SECT.111 YESSEL CODE, SECT.1)
S ECT.' lli (c)
PROCEDURE N0.
I - VERTICAL 70-84A WPS 76-15 70-85A WPS 74 -39A 2 - HORIZONTAL 71-75A WPS 73-22
- 3. TESTING AND INSPECrl0NS (e) YlSUAL - 100%'
YES YES (b) WAG. PARTICLE-100%
YES YES (c) DYF PENETRANT - 100%
NO NO (d) RADIOGRAPH - 2 % (PLUS FIRST SECT Y, BolLER C N/A 10 FT EACH WE FOR EACH PRESSURE VESSEL CODE POSITION-100 (e) AIR PRES $URE TEST - 45 PSI YES YES (f) HALO 6EN LEAK TEST - 50 PSI YES YES FIGURE I (SHEET I OF 2)
DETAILS OF M ATERI ALS-LINER AND TEST CHANNELS CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION-UNIT NO.21 0000ESNE LIGHT COMPANY
ASTM ASME CHEMISTRY / PROPERTY A-131-GRC SA-537-GRB CARBON, M AX, %
0.23 0.24 M ANG AN ES E, '4 0.60 - 0.90, 0.70 -1.35 PHOSPHORUS, M AX, %
0.04 0.035 SULFUR, MAX, %
0.05 0.04 SILICON,%
0.15 -0.30 0.15-0.50 TENSILE STRENGTH,KSI 58 -71 80 100 YlELD POINT, MIN, MSI 32 60 ELONG ATION IN 8 IN., MIN,%
21 ELONG ATION IN 2 IN., MIN, %
24 22 i
FIGURE I (SHEET 2 0F 2)
DETAILS OF M ATERIALS LINER AND TEST CHANNELS CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION UNIT NO,2 OUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY
N I3 lI Q
,I i
li FF, ;l.
(4_c/
- l l i !}l t;
7[O t"L
.1 3
'j
,_d_4
- tli,
- 1. ]
I t:
' 4.J !
'l
(
J s!ll ill av d
tw"p s,i m
-25 s= g
, _n i,
s m :
i sige w
m
- IlI, m'g V
Ik., 53
'I!
.I h>1
[
.o ir i
2 < m-rA a+
E:,,,
el) s g
)
as
-F il a
tv o z >. s E
.* I w
I.
(@
M>
g H4
(
,r 5 k h"a
.' b, gH J
g U
d-e
?
s 5e$
Aud".a,.,
t.t Pi
-bqil>
L
$ e ;e..g w
a m
$n i i/Ms V a,i ma 55Bsi 1
i aJ [k b5 h' I h nJ _7._n n r 1
$l4ni, I m m
a 4
~0 gI '
1 i
I 8,i 9'I I i
j t.!I l' 3,,E;??:-i,,
N.I J /
3 H
91.);1 n i,,!
_, al Lue
.T J
5 p
mr,B~
i l
EE NI** --
[
{
]
f j
~
@his
,p$w, u,o,,
i-aa y
[pN.. 4.._.#n r
/
- - u u
i_. 4 W:U u. J i
i i
i 7,!
,)
i d
m c'o ti, 3
~1 9 t
mM 6
3 m I
I I
I
~
~
t 11 22bt l
- p
- 'r [
& ~ht,,, ~ Q [%'
l l,
i
\\
Qn
\\
w y
y
< et" v fk
, [L 8
d l
U g' l, hy it.
n e
\\
t, 1
./
.,p.,
(-
mM
,f, y
w g_
'_.' j j
l e
., _' u_
'1 a
l, l8 ll
?
i iJ 2s Lg@ 3,J
, if nc-1,,a I
!/ A B
%,5
'i ;"" p:_ H Q !! l T
~
f i
f.0
[,
4 L
n. #y i
.l ',?q v
J y3i q, ;jDf,tue) 4717,
H d J u E
j!
o i
1 I b; n
q
-i h h+Y/
'Qt f "ip['d!
g 3ju[( n,1,n ' i,0 ij.o I
f i-I J t p, o
i_
r4 u,,
9 g
!. n.,
- s., c'
,J -
c.
r
',a b,r)
._ t_ g a.I a
r il,
n a
1 1.i4 iy:
' h" g g [,,ld /
r *e,,y l I
Ol
!,qL,'
i
_)
,NQ. g.
gi u
- e..,
u.m.,
W.t '
_4
,*-L-.'---
.._._.->....~,i e
s...
. _ q r-r,-1J i
~ = = -
_2.=..
,,/, f,l..
E-=*-- f.w '. -
.w n.
.,3 =
_.g._
_e
//
,,,e ~ x,, -
- xu x-
= =.
ge n
j o,
e L_m.L.
...a 3
... i, x
r_----
4 l
j (.
+
[,~~ j l
l
^
3 r.__ _s i
i
._i__
l.... _l __...
_l_.
rw.e rg. _. e
=
g y
--- - _. _a i dq.ri~ -i_,
i-- "!,
I inj f'tw-(
r -* <
- \\
-f.
i i
s-iI i.
i:1 1=
u I
i 1
1 I. li
- - + -
._._..r_.
l j
i
= = = - -
I
- l. ;.. b r-j =.
1 l
g
.,..eL lj y-. =:.- -
j --- r-I l
l l-
,d;--,"'~
~
l f
f 1
a, r
c._-.
e.
e y
FIGURE 2(b)
=..r.._m1_..
LINER DETAILS E6U53#
E.=- ;.
... s.7, CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE
- "r.r:.._
- r-r'~~~
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION-UNIT NO 2 Or.r~~ -- -
o :;.:,:- ~ :;. g -*
DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY r
9:::.'...
- ..=:M -~'
V j,
o
- b I
t
/
)
I 00WC TE37 CHANNELS iv.,..
...-a f
3/6' TY P. -
- 'd; REGE293%
4 6"TYP-*
/ W I
1
' r?
m J..~.
h -
WALT. TEST
- =.:r; vvi,au:::::'t..'.'t:
CHANewELS
.m.%...
WITHOUT SACKING BARS n
-r WALL TEST CHANNELS a
WITH SACKING SAR$
v FLOCR TEST CHANNELS WITH OONNECTIONS FIGURE 2(c)
LINER ELEVATION CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION-UNIT NO,2 DUQUESNE LIGHT' COMPANY l
l
--- -( RtCCES TYP CAJON CA CQUAL L
SOC WC.LD FCMALC CONN rYPC3tb SST h* PIPC TO(CD TUBC m-FACC CF" CONCRCTEf
-7&
'i-
?-
/ T~
SCC HD PtPC PLUGJ h6
,p. P;L-.
.}
i 00 5.c45' WALL k,-
SST TUBC TvpC 31b TYP 7
I
/
CD TUSC FEMALC = b.
NP T M ALC g
SEAL WELON/
k,CONNCC. TOR TYPC 316 4Pf HMF CouPuuG TYP 1.' FLOOR LINER t
/
s [4 p;i.
)
um em xxu
//
~ BRIDGING PLATE TYP PIPING ASSEMBLY SC ALL
- NONC FIGURE 3 (c) (SHEET 1 OF 2)
TEST CHANNELS FLOOR DETAILS CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATCN UNIT t)3 2 OUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY
6 3'- O R. REF'--
- h. FEMALE CONN - TYPE 316 SST 8,D.).*g HPT x f*OD TURt d[{
4r s 7.*!e CONC. FL'00R I
5 17 SURFACE l
SCH 80 NfPPt CS REMovt EL. 692'- 11
]I, VTER CONC (REPLAct I
WITH PLUGS) s i
i'
.\\ _
s 4..4 V,:
wWye----t
.>l tt-sqa,. (
wa 1
1 p.
l e
sn Is I
L----
i g
g,
,.- s g NPT HALF COUPLING I
g l
k l
~
s TEST CHANNEL l
i
)!
AT ANUCKLC JOINT 5 l
/
l I
/
/
6e'-l' R Rtr--
I l
'.fl.& !
/
J r-
/
//
i
, - _. _. 3 i.'-
.eh /
,9 s-
/
...i$','4 /
CL. o,9 o'.i ik,
/
'~M f >dm
. 3.g*{-}',;,..I*N
\\
/
"w
- )
p
\\
1-1 L_
SCAL C: N O N E".
FIGURE 3 (c) (SHEET 2 0F 2)
TEST CH ANNELS-FLOOR DETAILS CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE BE AVER VALLEY POWER STATION UNIT NO.2 DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY
~
a 126*- 0* Ou D.
~ 12 6'- O* 0. D.
\\ ~ LIME R
-LINER
\\
\\
N r.r==>
2 TYP PLATE p.
s
\\,
a.
4 k
m <n-TYP p
fI q
a
\\
' r/f
- f I
TYPICAL TEST CONNECTIO0f
(- 4.000 LB. SCREWED MALF COUPLING WITH PIPE PLUS k
w
--- {
g -
TYPICAL WALL JOINT TYPICALWALL JOINT W:THOUT SACMle86 PLATE WITH SACNMBS PLATE FIGURE 3 (b)
TEST CHANNELS-WALL DETAILS CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION-UNIT NO.2 DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY
~
s/e l/8 >
TEST CH ANNEL PLUG LINER SEALWELDED TYP. TEST CONNCCTION 1/8" 6,000 LOS. SCREWED H A LF COUPLING WITH SOCxCT H[ AD PlPC PLUG ONE E ACH TEST $[GWENT
\\
TYP/msV y
-v/
7
\\g O \\ y,
\\
i TYPICAL DOME JOINT
=
FIGURE 3(c)
TEST CHANNELS-DOME DETAILS CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE BE AVER VALLEY POWER STATION-UNIT NO. 2 DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY
4
~
[0IA t 6 LG CONCRCTE ANCHOR S T UD (TYPICAL) g.
- THK. 00M E #
l 8
LINE R 3[ CLEAR l
NOMIN AL l
In 3"a[
\\\\
CHANNELS N
TYP.
I I
I SEAL WELD ys
\\
A#TER TEST
/
w l
(- 6000 ' H A LF l
COUPLtNG WITH TNPT SOCKET w" O EL U O'a rr s a" i
18 RESA IIAI Loso LEAK T857 l
. i ?. ?r'l
\\
r.
- M,,.;.t:.?
s e.:t. :. ? ); '.. 6. ),9 1
y :.v.:
..,.;b\\.'.F.p;.f:-
- t . ;.::i..::2.
lg N
$... y.
\\
f k9;p li
\\
F l
s e
\\
iI y
co.. 1.
"J I
FIGURE 4 DOME SECTIONAL ELEVATION CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE BE AVER VALLEY POWER STAtl0N. UNIT Na 2 DUQUESNE LIGHT, COMPANY l
,e
(
0.009 f /
\\
s s
f O.000
i l
/
/
/
I i 0407 a
/
/
/
,s
>a
/
/
-(
1
/
Y f*
0.00s
/
, I w.J
/
/
l L 2
/
j l
/
,/"
oN 0.005
/
GW
/
l l
C$
/
f f
a w>
0.004 4
yy f
/
" O 'C If f
Wg 4003 -'l
,/
H, tv0Luflor;,/l W
s 7
g 7
2 C
/
0 002 5
/Mh
/,
,,0,
/
/
/
a
/
l
/
g 14 13 tt 11 to 3 3
7 6
4 3
2 pH l
FIGURE 5 EFFECT OF pH ON CORROSION OF MILD STEEL CONTAIN MENT STRUCTURE BE AVER VALLEY POWER STATION-UNIT NO.2 OUQUESNE LIGHT CCLMPANY l
1
N ATTACHMENT C Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 46 Typed Pages:
3/4 6-9 3/4 6-9a l
1 1
(
s' CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS
=
CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l
3.6.1.6 The structural integrity of the containment shall be maintained at a level consistent with the acceptance criteria in specification 4.6.1.6.1.
l hPPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2,
3 and 4.
ACTION:
l With the ctructural integrity of the containment not conforming to the-above -tequirements, restore the structural integrity to within the limits prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature above 200*F.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.1.6.1 Containment ~ structural integrity shall be determined by i
I performing ONE of the following surveillances:
- a. Liner Plate and Concrete
_The structural integrity of Ithe l-containment liner plate and concrete-shall be determined during the shutdown for each Type A
containment leakage rate test i
(reference Specification 4.6.1.2) by:
1.
ar-Visual inspection of the accessible surfaces and verifying I
no apparent changes
.in appearance or -other abnormal i
degradation.
2.
a visual inspection of accessible containment liner test l
{
channels prior-to each Type A containment leakage rate test.
Any containment liner. test _ channel which is found to be damaged to the extent that channel integrity is impaired or which is discovered with a
vent plug. removed, shall be removed and a
protective coating shall_ be applied to the.
liner in that area.
3.
a visual inspection of the dome area prior to each-Type A l
containment leakage rate test to insure the integrity of the protective coating.
BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 6-9 (Proposed Wording)
E c' pontainment Systems I
a SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS, (Continued) b.*gontainment Vessel Surfaces The structurcl integrity of the exposed accessible interior and exterior surfaces of the containment
- vessel, including the liner
- plate, shall be determined during the shutdown for each Type A
containment leakage rate test (reference Specification 4.6.1.2) by a
visual inspection of these surfaces.
This inspection shall be performed prior to the Type A containment leakage rate test to verify no apparent changes in appearance or other abnormal degradation.
4.6.1.6.2 ReDorts An initial report of any abnormal degradation of the containment structure detected during the above required tests and inspections shall be made within 10 days after completion of the surveillance requirements of this specification, and the detailed report shall be submitted pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days after completion.
This report shall include a description of the condition of the liner plate and
- concrete, the inspection procedure, the tolerances on cracking and the corrective actions taken.
Surveillance requirement 4.6.1.6.1.b is only applicable for the
- interval, inclOding the Type A testing conducted during the second refueling
- outage, up to the refueling outage for the next scheduled Type A test as por surveillance requirement 4.6.1.2.a BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 6-9a (Proposed Wording)
- - - -.