ML20052A319
| ML20052A319 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinch River |
| Issue date: | 04/26/1982 |
| From: | Bradley Jones NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| To: | National Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20052A313 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8204280194 | |
| Download: ML20052A319 (10) | |
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04/26/82 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of UNITEDSTATESDEPARTMENTOFENERGY)
Docket No. 50-537 PROJECT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
)
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
)
)
(Clinch River Breeder Reactor
)
Plant)
)
NRC STAFF'S ANSWERS TO INTERVENORS', NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. AND THE SIERRA CLUB, TWENTY-THIRD SET OF INTERROGATORIES, AND REQUEST TO PRODUCE TO THE STAFF The Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff (Staff) hereby responds to Intervenors' Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and the Sierra Club Twenty-third Set of Interrogatories to the Staff filed on March 26, 1982.
Attached hereto are the Staff's answers to NRDC's and the Sierra Club's interrogatories, together with the affidavit of Mr. Robert J. Dube.1/
On March 4, 1982, the parties in this proceeding developed a Protocol for Discovery.
NRDC has requested that answers to interrogatory questions be provided in six parts. The following six parts are:
A)
Provide the direct answer to the question.
B)
Identify all documents and studies, and the particular parts thereof, relied upon by the Staff, now or in the past, which serve as the basis for the answer.
In lieu thereof, at the St6ff's option, a copy of such document and study may be attached to the answer.
C)
Identify principal documents and studies, and the particular parts thereof, specifically examined
-1/
The affidavit of Mr. Robert J. Dube is unsigned. However, a copy of his signed, notarized affidavit will be filed shortly.
820428o WM
. but not cited in (b).
In lieu thereof, at Staff's option a copy of each such document and study may be attached to the answer.
D)
Identify by name, title and affiliation the primary Staff employee (s) or consultant (s) who provided the answer to the question.
E)
Explain whether the Staff is presently engaged in or intends to engage in any further, on-going research program which may affect Staff's answer. This answer need be provided only in cases where Staff intends to rely upon ongoing research not included in Section 1.5 of the PSAR at the LWA or construction permit hearing on the CRBR.
Failure to provide such an answer means that the Staff does not intend to rely upon the existence of any such research at the LWA or construction permit hearing on the CRBR.
F)
Identify the expert (s), if any, which the Staff intends to have testify on the subject matter questioned, and state the qualifications of each such expert. This answer may be provided for each separate question or for a group of related questions. This answer need not be provided until the Staff has in fact identified the expert (s) in question or determined that no expert will testify, as long as such answer provides rea-sonable notice to Intervenors.
For all the responses to interrogatories in this set the following are the answers to the requested parts in the Protocol for Discovery.
l B)
All documents and studies, and the particular i
parts thereof, relied upon by the Staff now or in l
the past which serve as the basis for the answer are mentioned in the direct answer to the question unless otherwise noted.
C)
There were no principal documents and studies specifically examined but not cited in (b) unless otherwise noted.
D)
The name, title and affiliation of the Staff employee (s) or consultant (s) who provided the answer to the question are available in the affidavits unless otherwise noted.
E)
The Staff is not presently engaged in nor intends l
to engage in any further, on-going research program which may affect the Staff's answer unless otherwise noted.
t y
e
' F)
At this time, the Staff has not determined who will testify on the subject matter questioned.
Reasonable notice will be given to all parties after the Staff has made this determination. At that time, a statement of professional qualifica-tions will be provided for each witness.
Additionally, the Licensing Board ruled at the April 6,1982 Prehearing Conference that the Staff did not have to answer inter-rogatory questions #2 through #19.
Respectfully submitted,
^
Bradley W. Jones Counsel for ICC Staff Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 26th day of April,1982 l
i
MJ NRC STAFF'S ANSWERS TO NRDC'S AND THE SIERRA CLUB'S INTERR0GATORIES Interrogatory 1 Which of the following new technologies, techniques or safeguard systems, referred to in DOE, Draft Environmental Impact Statement (Supplement ERDA-1535, December 1975) Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor Program (December 1981), are planned to be utilized at the CRBR plant and supporting fuel cycle facilities:
(a) Electronic (fiberoptic and/or acoustically read) seals; (b) Microwave, ultrasonic and/or buried cable motion detectors; (c) Computerized alarm display systems; (d) Continuous surveillance (video -- closed circuit television) cameras; (e) Automated computerized measurement systems; (f) Multiple integrated laser engagement systems; (g) DYMAC and RETIMAC systems; (h) Burnup calculations and isotopic correlation techniques; (i) Non-destructive analysis (NDA techniques)? With respect to each such technology, technique or safeguards system, identify and produce any and all documents in the possession of the Staff which describe their deployment and operation and/or provide an assessment of the effectiveness thereof.
Response
A)
The Staff's environmental review of CRBR safeguards will not be performed at the level of detail required to answer this interrogatory.
The purpose of the review is to assess the reasonableness of the Applicant's
' proposed safeguards on a systems basis.
It is not necessary for this purpose for the Staff to know exactly which technologies or devices the Applicant may eventually use as part of his safeguards systems.
D)
R. Davis Hurt, MC&A Program Analyst, Division of Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, provided the answer to the question.
Interrogatory 20 What system, if any, has been developed to provide for continuing, a
timely review of safeguards and physical security requirements to take into account " dynamic factors at work in society"?
If such a system has been developed, explain how it has been applied with reference to events occurring since April 25, 1977. What does the Staff consider to be a reasonable time in a dynamic system to respond to changes in the nature and scope of the threat to nuclear facilities?
Response
A)
The NRC Staff, in fulfillment of its continuing threat assessment mission, maintains working liaison with other Federal agencies to obtain any available information on individuals or groups who could pose a threat to nuclear facilities.
In addition, it has l
performed, or contracted for the performance of, studies to examine historical data relating to a variety of potential threats to the j
licensed nuclear industry, including terrorists, organized criminals, I
extremist-protest groups and insiders. The Staff also participates with DOE and 000 in an ad hoc working group on threat and safeguards related l
l research.
Representatives of DOE and NRC safeguards staffs meet
. periodically under the aegis of the DOE /NRC Liaison Board to discuss common interests and share the results of research tasks.
NRC's safeguards staff also publishes a biannual compilation of safeguards-related events at licensed nuclear facilities and analyzes the data therein to identify trends.
NRC's Information Assessment Team (IAT) provides an on-call, multi-office group within the Commission to review safeguards incidents rapidly and to assess the seriousness of threats involving licensed activities. An important ancillary function of the IAT is to ensure that appropriate levels of NRC management are promptly informed of safeguards events and that IAT notification procedures are effectively integrated with those of NRC's Regicnal Offices and Headquarters Operation Center.
In conjunction with DOE, FBI, and others, NRC participates in the Coninunicated Threat Credibility Assessment Program, which is aimed at rapid assessment of the credibility of verbal or written threats to nuclear facilities.
Licensees themselves are required to establish liaison with local law enforcement authorities and to execute safeguards contingency plans dealing with threats, thefts and radiological sabotage. Thus, they, too consider dynamic factors at work in their localized areas and have i
arrangements for countering site-specific threats.
Since April 25, 1977, this system has been applied in two areas:
rulemaking and threat / incident response.
In November 1979, the Commission published in final form the Physical Protection Upgrade Rule, l
which codified for the first time a design basis threat for theft or I
diversion of formula quantity of SSNM. The Generic Adversary Characteristics Summary Report (NUREG-0459 published in March 1979 I
l o
, analyzed the characteristics of potential adversaries to nuclear programs and formed a confirmatory basis for the design basis threat published in the Upgrade Rule.
The Insider Study (NUREG-0703) published in July 1980 added more substance to the regulatory foundations undergirding the requirements in 10 C.F.R. Part 73, and its results have been factored into proposed new requirements for protection against insider sabotage at power reactors (Access Authorization Rule).
As a result of NRC's continual examination of the adequacy of its regulation for the protection of the public health and safety against deliberate acts, and in conjunction with its threat assessment activities, the Staff published an interim final rule in July 1979 governing the physical protection of irradiated reactor fuel in transit.
Effective amendments to this rule were published in July 1980.
Staff's response to interrogatory number 62 of Set 20 describes in general terms options available for maintaining a prudent level of safeguards protection in the face of a specific threat to power reactors.
Licensee implementation of contingency plans has occurred frequently in response to bomb threats and other events.
(See reference 6below.)
The amount of time deemed reasonable for responding to changes in the nature and scope of the threat to nuclear facilities is threat dependent.
Should a site-specific threat be judged imminent (e.g., a confirmed vital area intrusion), the licensee would activate his contingency plan and take immediate action.
Should a precipitous increase in the potential threat to all licensed power reactors occur 1
. (the announced intention of a terrorist group to target U.S. reactors, for example), NRC could issue within hours an immediately effective rulemaking modification to upgrade their physical security posture.
If the increased threat were localized site-specific license conditions could be issued within the same time frame.
Should the Staff perceive a gradually escalating level of threat, perhaps resulting from analysis of safeguards-related events over time, normal rulemaking channels would probably be used to effect the necessary changes over a period of months.
In the ultimate case, when NRC is convinced, due to the nature and credibility of the threat, that a facility cannot operate safely or securely, the facility can be immediately closed with an appropriate increase in security force.
B.
1.
2.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Physical Protection Upgrade Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 44, No. 230, Nov. 28,1979.
3.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Guide 5.54,
" Standard Format and Content of Safeguards Contingency Plans for Nuclear Power Plant," March 1978.
4.
J. B. Stewart, Jr., J. J. Davidson, H. B. Jones, Jr.,
C. H. Fulwiler, and S. A. Mullen, Generic Adversary Characteristics Summary Report.
NUREG-0459,ONMSS(Washington:
U.S. NRC, March 1979).
5.
S. A. Mullen, J. J. Davidson, and H. B. Jones, Jr.,
Potential Threat to Licensed Nuclear Activities from Insiders (Insider Study). NUREG-0703, ONMSS (Washington:
U.S. NRC, July 1980).
l l
l
<' 6.
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Safegt.rds Sumary Event List (SSEL). NUREG-0525, Revision 4 (Washington:
U.S. NRC, September 1981).
7.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, " Physical Protection of Irradiated Reactor Fuel in Transit," Statement of Consideration, Federal Register Vol. 44, July 24, 1979.
8.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Physical Protection of Irradiated Reactor Fuel in Transit," Statement of Consideration, Federal Register Vol. 45, October 14,1980).
D)
Sarah A. Mullen, Safeguards Analyst, Division of Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, provided the answer to the question.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY Docket No. 50-537 PROJECT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
)
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
)
)
(Clinch River Breeder Reactor
)
Plant)
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT J. DUBE I, Robert J. Dube, being duly sworn, state as follows:
'1.
I am employed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission as a Section Chief of Regulatory Activities and Analyses Section, Fuels Facilities Safeguards Licensing Branch, Division of Safe-guards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
2.
I am duly authorized to participate in answering Interragatories l
- 1 and #20 of the 23rd Set and I hereby certify that the answers l
given are true to the best of my knowledge.
l l
ROBERT J. DUBE Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of April, 1982.
l Notary Public l
ily Commission expires:
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