ML20010G636
| ML20010G636 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hartsville, Phipps Bend  |
| Issue date: | 09/14/1981 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| REF-PT21-81 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8109220337 | |
| Download: ML20010G636 (2) | |
Text
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-s TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY # _
CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 374ot 400 Chestnut Street Tower II a
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September 14, 1981 HTRD-50-518/81-21, -519/81-17
-520/81-19,.-521'01-17 PBRD-50-553/81-23, -554/81-17 Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II - Suite 3100 101 Marietta Street Atlanta, Georgia ~ 30303
Dear Mr..O'teilty:
HARTSVILLE A3D PHIPPS BEND NUCLEAR PLANTS - REPORTABLE DEFICIENCY -
CROSBY SAFETY RELIEF VALVE SOLEN 0 IDS - HTRD-50-518/81-2', -519/81-17,
-520/81-19, -521/81 PBRD-50-553/81-23, -554/81-17 Initial notification of the subject deficiency was made to NRC-0IE, Region II, Inspector P. A. Taylor on August 13, 1981 as NCR PRC 81-28.
In compliance with paragraph 50.55(e) of 10 CFR Part 50, we are enclosing the final report on the subject deficiency. We consider 10 CFR. Part 21 applicable to thi', nonconfor"9nce.
If you have any questions regarding this subject, please call Jim Domer at FTS 857-2014.
Very truly yours, a
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L. M. Mills, Maneger u.s.wga y " 7 I
Nuclear Regulation and Safety,n
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Mr. Victor Stello, Director (Enclosure) i gg Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 f6Y s
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A109220337 810914 PDR A00CK 05000519 0
. An Equal Opportunity Employer
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a ENCLOSURE HARTSVILLE AND PHIPPS BEND NUCLEAR PLANT CROSBY SAFETY RELIEF VALVE-(SRV) SOLENOIDS 10CFR50.55(e) REPORT NO.1 - (FINAL)
HTRD-50-518/81-21, -519/81-17, -520/81-10 -521/81-17 PBRD-5-553/81-23, -554/81-17 Description of Deficiency An environmental qualification test was performed at Wyle Laboratories
.under GE contract on a Crosby SRV actuator and solenoid assembly to demonstratecompliancewithIEEE-323-3974 The test identified that during the simulated 340 F, 105 lb/in g steam LOCA condition, the talenoids required 130V de power to be actuated. A separate Wyle evaluation done for i =Salle showed that at least 125V de are required to actuate the solenoit <alves for ADS application under LaSa11e environmental and operating conditions.
A review of the applicable GE plant de power supply specification for Hartsville and Phipps Bend utilizing the Crosby SRV solenoids in question specifies tha* the system voltage should be between 110V de and 135V de normally with 4n extreme low of 105V de during peak loading or at the end of dische?ge during an emergency. Therefore, the minimum voltage available to actuate the solenoid is 105V de under worst case conditions, not t'.e required 125V dc.
Safety Imotications In the event of a small break LOCA and a subsequent'ioss of offsite power, serious core degradation could result if the Automatic Depressurization System is unable to perform its function when called upon due to failure of the subject solenoids. This condition would adversely a'fect the safe operations of the plants.
Corrective Actions Recent tests performed by General Electric at Crosby Valve and Gage Company have identified the necessary criteria to assure solenoid operation at a 340 F LOCA condition with a 105V de power supply source applied.
A11 assemblies manufactured and/or in the field uiti be inspected using a stricter acceptance criteria.
Those assemblies which do not meet the acceptance criteria will be replaced. All corrective actions will be completed July 31, 1984.
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