ML20009H560
| ML20009H560 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 07/22/1981 |
| From: | Gallo R, Lazarus W, Petrone C, Swetland P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20009H552 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-309-81-13, NUDOCS 8108100242 | |
| Download: ML20009H560 (15) | |
See also: IR 05000309/1981013
Text
-
,
.
.
.
DNS Nos.
50309-810602
.
50309-810521
-
50309-810509
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
50309-810401
0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
50309-810417
50309-810418
Region I
Report No. 81-12
Docket No. 50-309
License No. DPR-36
Priority
--
Category
C
Licensee:
Maine Yankee Atomic Powe" Comnany
1671 Worcester Road
Framinaham. Massachusetts 01701
Facility Name:
Maine Yankee Nuclear Power Station
Inspection at:
Wiscasset, Line
Inspection conducted: April 27 - June 5, 1981
Inspectors: /
- Crov/ _
7p
,
'
R. Ldh rusL Aeactor Inspector
date signed
fS
)
7lt3)r/
a
P. Swetland, Reactor Inspector
date signed ~
%GDAL
7lldti
C. Petrone, Reactor Inspector
' date si ned
Approved by
~f
f/
R'. Gallo, ChW, Reactor Projects
IdateIsigned
Section No. 1A, DRPI
Insoection Summary:
s
Inspection on: April 27 - June 5, 1981
(Report No. 50-309/81-13)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, regular and backshift inspections by three resident and
region-based inspectors (213 hours0.00247 days <br />0.0592 hours <br />3.521825e-4 weeks <br />8.10465e-5 months <br />). Areas inspected included the Control Room,
Turbine building, Primary Auxiliary Building, Spray Building, Auxiliary Feed Pump
Room, Reactor Containment, and Spent Fuel Poc,1. Activi ties / Records inspected included
Radiation Protection, physical security, plant operations, preparation for refueling,
refueling operations, maintenance and surveillance testing, followup on IE Bulletins,
followup on previous inspection findings, followup of licensee events, and review of
periodic reports.
Results: Of the ten areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identified in
nine areas; two items of noncompliance were identified by the licensee in one area.
Failure to maintain decay Seat removai capability in accordance with Technical Speci-
fications; Failure to filter containment purge gases prior to release in accordance
with Technical Specifications
Region I Form 12
(Rev. April 77)
_
8100100242 810724
PDR ADOCK 05000309
G
_ _
.
,
_
.
.
,
.
DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
R. Arsenault, Plant Shift Superintendent
D. Boynton, Reactor Engineer
J. Brinkler, Technical Support Department Head
G. Cochrane, Health Physics Supervisor
J. Hebert, Director, Plant Engineering
R. Jutras, Plant Engineer
R. Lawton, Director, Operational Quality Assurance
W. Paine, Operations Department Head
R. Prouty, Maintenance Department Head
D. Sturniolo, Technical Assistant to the Plant Marager
M. Veilleux, Plant Engineer
E. Wood, Plant Manager
The inspectors also interviewed several plant operators, technicians
and members of the engineering and administrative staffs.
2.
Followup on Previous Inspection Findings
a.
(Closed) Follo>.up Item (3V'78-08-06) The inspector reviewed the
licensee's proceuure 3.17.6 E, Inspection of Class I Spring Hangers,
Revision 1, dated May 5, 1981. This procedure now requires
removal of pipe insulation which covers the area where the hanger
and pipe are attached. The inspector had no further questions in
this area.
b.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (309/78-09-01) The inspector reviewed
procedure 3.1.10, Refueling Interlocks Test, Revision 6, dated May
14, 1981, to verify that all safety features were tested and that
air pressure tolerances were specified. Hoist set points are to
be incorporated in this procedure prior to the next refueling
(reference Item f below).
c.
(Closed) Followup Item (309/79-06-02) The inspector verified that
valve tags were installed on the remaining valves from the locked
valve checklist.
No further inadequacies were identified.
d.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (309/79-16-01) The inspector verified
that as a result of discussions with the licensee in October 1980
(reference IE Inspection Report 50-309/80-15) witness / hold points
are being utilized in accordance with the approved Quality Assurance
Program.
.
-
. - .
..
~
I
.
,
3
e.
(Closed) Followup Item (309/80-04-09) During the June 1981
refueling, the inspector observed operations in the spent fuel
pool area frequently. Work requiring personnel to remove safety
lines was conducted by approved procedures, and supervised by
licensee personnel. No fu ther inadequacies were identified.
f.
(0 pen) Followup Item (309/80-04-10) During preparations for the
June 1981 refueling, the licensee determined the proper settings
for the Refueling Machine grapple zones. The inspector verified
the alignment of the machine to these settings prior to fuel
movement. The licensee will incorporate these settings into the
Refueling Machine Interlocks Test prior to the next refueling
outage.
g.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (309/80-09-02) Revised calculations of
the maximum gassing rates for the batteries based on IEEE standard
484-1975, Recommended Practice for Installation Design of Main
Storage Batteries, indicates a ventilation flow of 315 CFM to each
Battery room is adequate. Present air flows meet this specifica-
tion. Ventilation specifications listed in the Maine Yankee
Fire Protection Program have been revised to reflect the capabilities
of ins talled equipment. A battery room air flow indicator is being
instal'ed which will prevent recurrence of this event. Conpletion
of this installation is tracked by item 309/81-04-02. The inspector
had no further questions.
h.
(Closed) Followup Item (309/80-11-01) Review of licensee compliance
with Radiation Work Permit Procedures was conducted by the NRC
Health Physics Appraisal Team (reference IE Inspection Report
50-309/81-01), and by the resident inspectors on a continuing
basis. No items of noncompliance have been identified.
i.
(Closed) "nresolved Item (309/81-03-02) The licensee has modified
the component cooling systems to provide adequate separation and
redundancy of components to satisfy single failure criteria with
the present Technical Specification requirements. The inspector
had no further questions in this area.
3.
Review of Plant Operations - Plant Inspections
The inspector reviewed plant operation through direct observation throughout
the reporting period. Except as noted below, conditions were found to be
in compliance with the following licensee documents:
-- Maine Yankee Technical Specification
Maine Yankee Technical Data Book
--
-- Maine Yankee Fire Protection Program
Maine Yankee Radiatioa Protection Program
--
Maiu Yankee Tagging Rules
--
Adirinistrative and Operating Frocedures
--
!
l
L
-
.
.
,
.
.
4
a.
Instrumentation
Control room process instruments were observed for correlation between
channels and for conformance with Technical Specification requirements.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
b.
Annunciator Alarms
The inspector observed various alarm conditions which had been
received and acknowledged. These conditions were discussed with
2
shift personnel who were knowledgeable of the alarms and actions
required. Operator response was verified to be in accordance with
procedure 2-100-1, Response to Panalarms, Revision 4, dated June
1979. During plant inspections, the inspector observed the conditions
of equipn.ent associated with various alarms. No unacceptable
conditions were identified.
c.
Shift Manning
The operating shifts were observed to be staffed to meet the operating
requirements of Technical Specifications, Section 5, both to the
number and type of licenses. Control room and shift manning were
observed to be in conformance with 10 CFR 50.54.
d.
Radiation Protection Controls
Radiation Protection control areas were inspected. Radiation Work
Permits in use were reviewed, and compliance with those documents,
as to protective clothing and required monitoring instruments, was
inspected. Proper posting and control of radiation and high radiation
areas was reviewed in addition to verifying requirements for wearing
of appropriate personal monitoring devices. There were no unaccep-
table conditions identified.
e.
Plant Housekeeping Controls
Storage of material and components was observed with respect to
prevention of fire and safety hazards.
Plant housekeeping was also
evaluated with respect to controlling the spread of surface and air-
borne contamination. There were no unacceptable conditions. identified.
f.
Fire Protection / Prevention
The inspector examined the condition of selected pieces of fire
i
fighting equipment. Combustible materials were being controlled
and were not found near vital areas. Selected cable penetrations
were examined and fire barriers were found intact. Cable trays were
clear of debris. No abnormal conditions were identified.
.
"'
&
s-
&
-
r--r
m
+
w-I
m-
~e-
9
.
.-
.
5
h.
Equipment Lineups
The inspector verified that the major valve and switch positions
were correct to insure operability of the Shutdown Cooling Systems,
by observation of the Main Control Board and inspections in the
Diesel Generator Rooms, Spray and Turbine Buildings. Except as
noted in paragraph 11, no unacceptable conditions were identified.
4.
Review of Plant Operations - Logs and Records
During the inspection period, the inspector reviewed operating logs and
records covering the inspection time period against Technical Specifi-
cations and Administrative Procedurc Requirements.
Included in the
review were:
Control Room Log
- daily during control room surveillance
Jumper and Lifted Leads Log
- all active entries
Maintenance Requests and Job
Orders
- all active entries
Safety Tag Log
- all active entries
Plant Recorder Traces
- daily during control room surveillance
Plant Process Computer Printed
Output
- daily during control room surveillance
.
Night Orders
- daily during control room surveillance
The logs and records were reviewed to verify that entries are properly
made and communicate equipment status / deficiencies; records are being
reviewed by management; operating orders do not conflict with the Tech-
nical Specifications; logs detail no violations of Technical Specification
or reporting requirements; logs and records are maintained in accordance
with Technical Specification and Administrative Control Procedure re-
quirements.
Several entries in these logs were the subject of additional review and
discussion with licensee personnel.
No unacceptable conditions were
identified.
5.
Observation of Physical Security
The resident inspector made observations, witnessed and/or verified,
during regular and off-shift hours, that the selected aspects of the
security plan were in accordance with regulatory requirements, physical
security plans and approved procedures.
--
Maine Yankee Security Plan, dated October 1979
--
15-1, Security Organization and Responsibilities, Revision 6,
April 1980
15-2, Security Force Duties, Revision 9, February 1981
--
-
,.,
-
- ,
-
,_,
-
.
'
.
.
6
--
15-3, Plant Personnel Security, Revision 9, February 1981
15-7, Access Authorization and Control, Revision 1, April 1981
--
15-8, Protected Area Entry / Exit Control, Revision 1, September 1980
--
a.
Physical Protection Security Organization
Observations and personnel interviews indicated that a full
--
time member of the security organization with authority to
direct physical security actions was present, as required.
--
Manning of all three shifts on various days was observed to
be as required.
b.
Physical Barriers
Selected barriers in the protected area, access controlled area,
and the vital areas were observed and random monitoring of iso-
lation zones was performed. Observations of truck and car searches
were made,
c.
Access Control
Observations of the following items were made:
--
Identification, authorization and badging
Access control searches
--
Escorting
--
Communications
--
Compensatory measures when required
--
No items of noncompliance were identified.
6.
Followup on IE Bulletins
.
Licensee action concerning the following IE Bulletins was reviewed to
verify that:
The Bulletin was forwarded to appropriate onsite management.
--
--
A review for applicability was performed.
--
Written response (when required) was within the stated time period
and contains the required information.
Written. response contains adequate corrective action commitments.
--
Information on the licensee's written response was accurate.
--
Corrective action taken by the licensee is as described in the
--
written response.
,
s
,
. _ - . - - -
m.
,-
,
.
7
a.
IEB 81-01, Surveillance of Mechanical Snubbers
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response (Maine Yankee letter
FMY 81-27 dated March 6, 1981) which states that Maine Yankee has
no mechanical snubbers installed. The inspector verified by
inspection of selected snubbers that no mechanical snubbers were
in use. The inspector had no further questions in this area.
b.
IEB 81-02, Failure of Gate Valves to Close Aga 1st Differential
Pressure
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response (Maine Yankee letter
FMY 81-69, dated April 30,1981) which states that none of the
subject valves are installed at Maine Yankee.
Inspector review
of the site component and valve listing verified the licensee's
response. The licensee is, however, evaluating the capability of
the installed PORV block valves to close under differential pressure.
A modification to the Anchor Wedge Disc Gate Valves was performed
(Plant Design Change Request 14-81) to equalize the bonnet area
to the pressurizer in order to prevent thermal-hydraulic lock up.
An operational test of these block valves at design differential
pressure will be conducted prior to start-up from the current re-
fueling outage. The inspector reviewed this test procedure 4.118,
PORV Block Valve Closure with Flow, Revision 1, dated June 1981.
The inspector had no further questions in this area pending success-
ful completion of this operational test.
c.
IEB 81-03, Flow Blockage of Cooling Water to Safety System Components
The licensee's response (Maine Yankee letter FMY 81-83, dated May
21,1981) states that mussel fouling of sea water cooling systems
was predicted in the plant design and that measures have been in
use since initial startup to control mussel growth by recirculation
of hot water through the heat exchangers. The inspector reviewed
procedure i-100-3, Mussel Control Operation, Revision 10, dated
i
December 1960, which specifies these measures required for mussel
control. The licensee did not perform system flow rate measure-
i
ments. The inspector concluded that the routine heat exchanger
component cooling outlet temperature)ger performance (gauged by
'
cleaning program based on heat exchan
adequately maintains the heat
exchangers clear of flow blockage. Staggered cleaning of redundant
heat exchangers ensures adequate cooling available to safety system
components. The inspector had no further questions ii, this area.
Except as noted above, the licensee's evaluations / corrective actions for
these Bulletins were appropriate.
.. - ._
.-.
-
.
-
..
.
.
-
,-
..
_
.
.
,
8
7.
Preparation for Refueling
a.
New Fuel Receipt Inspection
References:
MYM-5-129 New Fuel Handling and Storage, Revision 6,
--
dated July, 1979
MYM-5-128 New Fuel Container Unloading and Transfer,
--
Revision 6, dated July, 1979
MYP-13-20 New Fuel Detailed Inspection, Revision 3,
--
dated June,1979
The inspector reviewed the documentation of receipt inspections
for the 72 new fuel assemblies.
The inspector observed the un-
loading of three shipment containers (6 assemblies) and the receipt
inspections of 5 assemblies.(K010, K011, K012, K014, K047)
Guide
tube upper end fittings were rejected on four assemblies and were
replaced.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
b.
Approved Procedures Available for Use
The inspector reviewed licensee procedures to verify that approved
procedures were available and technically adequate for the following
evolutions:
New fuel handling and inspection
--
Fuel transfer
--
Core loading and verification
--
--
c.
Core Reload Package Submittal
The inspector reviewed the licensee's submittal for modification of
Technical Specifications (Haine Yankee letter FMY 81-65 dated April
28,1981) based on the Cycle 6 core reload.
Inspector inputs were
requested by the NRC Licensing Project Manager involving the areas
of minimum shutdown margin, WASH 1400 Event V configurations and the
main steam line break safety analysis. The inspector will verify
implementation of the revised Technical Specifications prior to
plant start-up.
_
_.
____
.
_
_
_
.
..
.
.
.
.
9
d.
Refueling Catage Control
,
The inspector reviewed the licensee's plan for coordination of
'
refueling outage activities. Outage control is to be supplied
by round-the-clock management coordinators supported by a con-
tracted critical path updating / coordinating service. The inspector
had no questions in this area.
8.
Refueling Operations
a.
Procedure Review
The inspector reviewed the following licensee procedures to verify
that:
procedures are current and approved-
'
--
-- procedures are technically adequate
The inspector observed the activity and/or verified by documentation
the completion of these evolutions.
--
3.1.10, Refueling System Interlocks Check, Revision 6,
dated 5/14/81 (Completed 5/18/81).
-- 13.6, Manipulator Crane Position Indication Alignment,
Revision 4, dated 11/26/79 (Completed 5/19/81).
13.2, Fuel Handling in the Spent Fuel Pool, Revision 9,
--
dated 11/14/80 (Initial condition completed 5/15/81).
-- 13,1, Fuel Transfer New Fuel to Spent Fuel Pool, Revision
2, dated 11/26/79 (Completed 5/15/81).
--
13.4, Refueling Machine Operation, Revision 8, dated
5/14/81 (Initial conditions completed 5/15/81).
--
10.1, Core Reloading, Revision 6, dated 5/8/81.
13.23, Removal / Replacement of CEA Extension Shafts, Re-
--
vision 1, dated'11/26/79.
--
1-12-1, Containment Ventilation and Purging, Revision 8,
dated 12/18/80, (Performed on 5/12/81).
No items of noncompliance were identified.
i
. . . _
_
_
.
..
,
.
.
10
b.
Fuel Handling Activities
The inspector observed fuel handling operations in the refueling
cavity, spent fuel pool, and the Control Room frequently during
this inspection, including portions of all three shifts. The follow-
ing items were reviewed:
Core monitoring performed
--
Fuel handling, fuel accountability conducted in accordance
--
with approved procedures
Core internals stored to protect from damage
--
Housekeeping and cleanliness conditions acceptable
--
Make-up and qualification of refueling crews
--
Refueling Cavity and Spent Fuel Pool water level as required
--
by Technical Specification 3.13.E-
Boron concentration (shutdown margin) as required by Tech-
--
nical Specification 3.13.A.6
Constant direct communication maintained between the Control
--
Room and fuel handling personnel when core alterations were
in progress
RHR flow maintained to Refueling Cavity as required by Tech-
--
nical Specification 3.13.A.4
Audible count rate monitoring functioning in the Refueling
--
Cavity Area and Control Room
Radiation protection requirements
--
Fuel Building ventilation lineup as required by Technical
--
Specification 3.13.C
Core Component verification Checklist RE-CV-1.1
--
Core Reloading Check-off sheets 235 through 243
--
Core Component Check-off sheets 6-IC-1 through 6-IC-3; 6-2-1
--
through 6-2-62 and 6-2-186 through 6-6-243
No items of noncompliance were identified.
'
l
[
/
-
..
.
,
_
.
,
i
'
11
9.
Observation of Maintenance and Surveillance Testing
The inspector observed various maintenance and problem investigation
activities. The inspector reviewed these activities to verify compli-
ance with regulatory requirements, including those stated in the Tech-
nical Specifications; compliance with applicable codes and standards;
required QA/QC involvement; proper use of safety tags; proper equipment
alignment and use of jumpers; appropriate personnel qualifications;
proper radiological controls for worker protection; adequate fire pro-
tection; and appropriate retest requirements. The inspector also ascer-
tained reportability as required by Technical Specifications.
The inspector witnessed the performance of surveillance testing of
selected components to verify that the surveillance test procedure was
properly approved and in use; test instrumentation required by the
procedure was properly calibrated and in use; technical specifications
were satisfied prior to removal of the system from service; test was
performed by qualified personnel; the procedure was adequately detailed
to assure performance of a satufactory Arveillance; and, test results
satisfied the procedural acceptance criteria, or were properly disposi-
tioned.
The follcwing documents were reviewed:
EDCR 81-45, Modification of PCC/ SCC Systems
--
Procedure 4-112, Partial Draining of SCC System
--
Procedure 4-113, Partial Draining of PCC System
--
Procedure 4-114, Hard Seat Check Valve Repair
--
Procedure 5-100, 101, Overload Heater Replacement for .T.H.
--
and T.C. Valves
Procedure 3.1.4, EDG Monthly Surveillance Testing
--
Procedure 3.6.2.1.1, Pressurizer Pressure Protection and
--
Safeguards Channel Calibration
Procedure 3-17-2, Surveillance Functional Testing of Hydraulic
--
Shock Suppressors
Procedure 3-17-6.4, Surveillance Inspection of Hydraulic Shock
--
Suppressors
Procedure 3-17-6.5, Inspection of Class I Spring Hangers
--
Procedure 5-5, Testing and Setting of Steam Generator Safety
--
Valves
Radiation Work Permits 81-05-178, 243, 305 and 378.
--
The inspector observed the following maintenance and surveillance tests
during the report period:
i
l
l
l
. . _ - _ _ . . _ , _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _
__-___ ,_ __
, , __
__
,
,-
..
,
.
12
--
Modification of Primary and Secondary Component Cooling
systems
--
Inspection of HSI-17, Loop 1 hard seat check valve
Functional test of Hydraulic Snubber RC-HSS-103
--
Surveillance test of Steam Generator Safety Valve MS-S-23
--
Calibration of RPS Channel A Pressurizer Pressure Device
--
Except as noted below, no abnormal nnditions were identified.
a.
Maintenance was performed on May 10-17, 1981, on check valve HSI-
17 to determine the cause of back-leakage through the valve. The
work location had high radiation levels requiring significant portable
,
shielding. The inspector reviewed radiation work permits and personnel
exposure records to determine that adequate measures were used to
control and limit personnel exposure. The inspector verified that
licensee maintenance personnel (certified a:, supervisors by the
Maintenance Department Head) supervised job progress and certified
compliance with the work procedure. Tre valve components were found
to be intact but disc to seat contact was significantly impaired
due to warping. Since a new flapper disc was not available and signi-
ficant exposure would be expended to mochine the valve internals,
HSI-17 was reassembled without repair. Another check valve was
installed at a different location to restore the no back-leakage
feature of the high ressure injection piping.
Subsequent retests
verified the integrity of the reactor coolant boundary. No items of
noncompliance were identified.
b.
Surveillance of hydraulic shock suppressors was performed on May
27-28, 1981. The inspector observed the test for snubber RC-HSS--
103. A rod end bearing failed during the lock up testing of this
2h" Grb nel shock suppressor. The licensea representative stated
that this failure was due to the lack of proper shimming of the rod
end when installed in the test machine. This apparently allowed
the bearing to move partially out of the rod end during the lock
up test, causing bearing failure. The bearing was replaced and all
subsequent testing was performed with rod end.; shimmed in the test
machine to a tolerance equal to that required for snubbers installed
in the plant. The licensee also inspected the bearings on the
other tested snubbers and found no damage. The licensee comitted
to revise the functional test procedure to require that the snubbers
be tested with rod ends shimed to duplicate the plant installed
condition and to require visual inspection of these bearings after
functional testing. This item will be followed in a subsequent
inspection.
(309/81-13-01),
c.
Surveillance was performed on May 8, 1981 to verify the lift set-
points of six of the steam generator code safety valves. The inspector
observed the testing for valve MS-S-23.
This valve and three others
of the six safeties tested were not found within the tolerance
specified by the procedure and the ASP 2 Code Section III. The valves
-_ _
_ _
_
_
._ __ ~-
_
_
.
.
-_.
.
,-
..
,
.
-
13
were adjusted to the specified lift setpoint. Failure of these
valves to operate within the specified tolerance is reportable
under Technical Specification 5.9.
This item is unresolved pending
submittal of a Licensee Event Report.
(309/81-13-02).
10.
In-Office Review of Licensee Event Reports (LERs)
The inspector reviewed the following LERs received in the RI office
to verify that details of the event were clearly reported including
the accuracy of the description of cause and adequacy of corrective
action. The inspector also determined whether further information was
required from the licensee, whether generic implications were indicated,
and whether the event warranted on site followup. The following LERs
were reviewed:
--
81-02, Failure of Service Air Line Containment Isolation Valve
81-03, Exceeding Containment Leakrate during Operations /Unplai.aed
--
Release (deta'Is: ., Report 50-309/81-12)
81-04, Failure of AFW Flow Indicator Power Supply
--
--
81-05, Failure of RWST Level Switch
- --
81-06, Failure to Filter Containment Purge
- --
81-07, Loss of Shutdown Cooling
Reports selected for onsite followup.
11.
On Site Followup of LERs
During on site followup, the inspector verified that reporting require-
ments of Technical Specifications and Regulatory Guide 1.16 had been
met, that appropriate corrective action had been taken, that the event
was reviewed by the licensee as required, and that continued operation
of the facility was conducted within Technical Specification limits.
The review included discussions with licensee personnel, review of PORC
meeting minutes, and applicable logs. The following LERs were reviewed:
81-06, Failure to Filter Containment Purge. The maintenance procedure
--
(Engineering Design Change Request 81-16) for installation of three
10" check valves in the Safety Injection piping required the filters
in the containment purge lines to be bypassed to prevent filter bed
exhaustion due to welding fumes. This procedure was approved and
implemented disregarding the Technical Specification 3.17 require-
ment to filter the purge during refueling evolutions. The purge was
unfiltered for the 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> between 6:00 p.m. May 21, 1981 and
'
10:00 a.m. May 22, 1981. The licensee identified this noncompliance
--
-- .
-
..
,
.
.
14
and promptly redirected the purge air through the filters and
terminated the welding inside containment. The inspector verified
that containment air samples during this period showed activity
less than the minimum permissible concentrations, and that the
containment purge isolation valves were operable. The licensee
revised procedure 10.1, Core Reloading Revision 6, dated May 8,
1981 (PCR 61-91) to include, as an ir.itial condition for fuel handling,
meeting the Technical Specification requirement for filtering the
purge gases. Operators were infoemed of this event and cautioned to
insure that all refueling requirements were reviewed and verified at
regular intervals. Training in this area will be incorporated into
the annual retraining program. This event constitutes a licensee
identified item of noncompliance.
(309/81-13-03).
81-07, Loss of Shutdown Cooling. While performing maintenance on
--
half of the 4160 volt AC electrical distribution system, both 4R0
volt vital buses were being supplied by one 4160 volt vital bus
(through a normally open manual bus tie breaker). Two service
water (SW) pumps (250 HP) are powered from each 480 volt vital bus.
On June 2, 1981, the plant was in a refueling shutdown condition
with two SW pumps running. Control room operators were asked to
test a third SW pump currently under repair. The load of this third
SW pump tripped the breaker (ACB 6081), supplying both 480 volt
buses. Power was retui ned to one 480 volt bus directly from its
4160 volt bus after inspecting and resetting the tripped circuit
breaker. The manual bus tie breaker could not be reclosed to ener-
gize the second 480 volt bus. Maintenance was terminated on the
electrical distribution system and tags removed to normalize the
system.
Both buses were re-energized after 24 minutes.
No SW pumps
ran during the 24 minute bus outage, but coolant temperature did
not rise significantly. Reactor coolant continued to circulate
during this period because the residual heat removal pumps were
unaffected.
Inspection of the malfunctioning manual bus tie breaker
revealed no abnormal conditions and subsequent operation of the breaker
was satisfactory.
Technical Specifications 3.8 and 3.13 require residual heat removal
systems to be operable during shutdown conditions. The SW pumps
which supply the heat sink for decay heat removal were unavailable
while the 480 volt vital buses were de-energized. This constitutes
a licensee identified item cf noncompliance.
(309/81-13-04).
12.
Review of Periodic Reports
The inspector reviewed the following periodic reports to verify that
the reporting requirements of Technical Specification 5.9 were met.
.
-. -
-
-
-
.-
--
.
.
-
-
. -_ .
-
-
..
.
_ . .
-
-
.-_
,
1
^
l
-
,.
-
.
!
15
i.
Monthly Operating Reports for February - May 1981.
--
l
Annual Report of Changes under 10 CFR 50.59a, (1980).
--
No inadequacies were identified.
.
13.
Unresolved Items
,
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required
in order to determine whether they are acceptable items or items of
noncompliance. Unresolved items identified during this inspection are
'
discussed in paragraph 9c.
14.
Exit Interviews
j
At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were
held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope
i
and findings.
,
8
J
).
,
5
i
I
.
.
. .
.
.
. .
.
.
.
.