ML20006F042
| ML20006F042 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 02/16/1990 |
| From: | SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML13304A456 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9002270109 | |
| Download: ML20006F042 (67) | |
Text
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'L l
e SPENT FUEL POOL RERACKING' LICENSING REPORT 1 :.
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SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR L'
GENERATING STATION' UNITS'2 AND 3 REVISION 6 ADOC O
36 O
1 a M1045
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u TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont) 1
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Page j
5.3.4 Loss of Spent Fuel-Pool Cooling Flow.
5.3-6 i
5.3.5-Radiological Evaluation of Test Equipment Drop Onto the Racks 5.3-7.
5.3.6 Radiological Evaluation of Gate Drop onto the Racks 5.3-8 5.3.7 Shielding Evaluation' 5.3-9 5.3.8 Seismic Events 5.3-9 5.4 References 5.4-1 6.-
RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FROM NRC 6.1-1 6.1 NRC Radiation Protection Branch; June 3,~1988 Meeting in Rockville, Maryland 6.1-1 6.2
'NRC Telephone Conversations, September 6, i
11 and 15, 1989,
Subject:
Spent Fuel Pool-Raracking, SONGS Units 2 and 3 6.2-1 6.3 NRC Telephone Conversation,-December 20, 1989,
Subject:
Spent Fuel Pool Reracking, SONGS g
6-
?
Units 2 and 3 6.3-1
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O OPT 0328. TOC 2/90 iv Revision 6
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont)
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R( ->).=
FIGURES (cont)
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Enga 1
-p 4.7-6 Proposed Rarack Sequencing Step 2
'4.7-7
. Proposed Rerack Sequencing Step 3 4.7-8 Proposed Rerack Sequencing Step 4 4.7-9 Safe Load Paths / Zones Fuel Sandling Building (Unit 2) 4.7-10 Temporary Construction Gantry Crane 4.7-11 : Plan (Cask Pool Cover) 4.7-12 Cask Pool Cover Installation-i 4.7-13 Fuel Eandling Building (Unit 2) Lifting Equipment 4.7-14 Temporary Cask Pool Storage Rack 4.7-15 ' Heavy Load Lifts in the New Fuel Handling 6
Area (Unit 2) 6.2-1 New Rack Lift Rig 6.2 6.2-2 New Rack ~ Lift Rig Initial Load Test Set-Up 6.2-24 i
l1 6.2-3
-Old Rack Lift Rig 6.2-25 6.2-4
.Old Rack Lift Rig Initial Load Test Set-Up
'6.2-27 6.2-5.
Temporary Gantry Crane Lift Beam Arrangement 6.2-28 6.2-6
. Temporary Gantry Crane Lift Rigging Initial Load Test Set-Up 6.2-29 6.2-7 Cask Pool Cover Special Lifting Device 6.2-30 6.2-8 Cask Pool Cover Special Lifting Device t
Initial Load Test Set-Up 6.2-33
' ('N 6.2-9 Cask Handling Crane Interfacing Device 6.2-34 i
6.2-10 Cask Handling Crane Interfacing Device Initial Load Test Set-Up 6.2-35 6.2-11 Temporary Gantry Crane 6.2-88 6.2-12 Hoist Arrangement 35-Ton Design Rated Load Temporary Gantry Crane 6.2-90 6.2-13 Temporary Gantry Crane Hook 6.2-91 6.3-1 Loading on Support Pad 6.3-27 6.3-2' Section and Quadrant Identification for.
Interaction Diagram.
6.3 ;
6.3-3 Interaction Diagrams for First Quadrant 6.3-29 6.3-4 Interaction Diagrams for Second Quadrant 6.3-30 6
6.3-5 Interaction Diagrams for Third Quadrant 6.3-31 6.3-6 Interaction Diagrams for Fourth Quadrant 6.3-32 6.3-7 Region II Rack Pad Location Designation 6.3-33 l
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4.7.MATERIATA. OUALITY CONTROL. AND SPECIAL CONSTRUCTION TECHNIOUES s
4.7.1 ' CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS Construction materials for spent fuel racks conform to the requirements of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Subsection NF.
All the materials used in the construction are compatible with the SFP environment and do not contaminate.
the fuel assemblies or the SFP water.
The racks are constructed from Type 304LN stainless steel except the leveling screws which are SA-564 Type 630 stainless steel and some leveling pads which are either SA-182 Type F-304 stainless steel or SA-240 (or SA-6 479) Type 304' stainless. steel.
The' floor plates under the rack.
support pads are made from SA-240 Type 304 stainless steel,'which has the same corrosion resistance characteristics as the rack -,.
~.
E materials.
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Welds for the rack fabrication will be visually examined.
Westinghouse has used visual examination (in lieu of liquid
- penetrant)' for all rack orders.
Only under special conditions l
and only for a very small percentage of the welds was dye
[
' penetrant ever previously used.
The basis for the use of visual examination-is (ASME Code) Section NF-5230, which allows visual examination for welds with a throat thickness of less than 1 inch.
Welds with a throat thickness greater than 1 inch are I
examined in accordance with that code caction.
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OPT 0328.4-7 2/90 4.7-1 Revision 6 i
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Q(~N -lThe' Unit 2 step four tasks (figure 4.7-8) consist of installing E racks 1-57 removing the TGC; removing the protective cover from over tho' cask handling pool; shuffling the fuel assemblies stored in the cask pool back into the SFP; and removing the fuel storage
' rack from the cask pool (using the cask handling crane).
1 The Unit 3 step four tasks (opposite hand to figure 4.7-8) consist of installing H racks 1-4; removing the TGC; removing the' I
1 cask pool cover; shuffling the fuel assemblies stored in the cask pool back into the SFP; reinstalling the cask pool cover; 1
t.
L L
reinstalling the TGC; removing the cask pool cover; transferring i
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of H rack 5 from the cask pool into the SFP using the TGC; reinstalling the cask pool cover; removing the TGC; and removing the cask pool cover.
The cask pool cc% r is reinstalled several times to protect against handling the TGC over the open cask I
handling pool and potential for tipping over in the storage pool in case of a postulated load drop of the TGC.
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4'.7.4.2 Safe Load Paths / Zones l
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l Safe load paths are used throughout-the project.
Figure 4.7-9 l
depicts the basic load paths within the FHBs at the pool deck level.
Material will enter / leave the pool deck floor (elevation l
63 feet-6 inches) via the new fuel and spent fuel cask access 6
hatches (see figure 4.7-15) which open directly to the access bay
(-
at grade (elevation 30 feet-0 inch).
The existing cask handling crane (CHC) will be used to move material into/out of and about l
.the. southern portion of the building (cask pool, cask washdown l.
OPT 0328.4-7 2/90 4.7-13 Revision 6 o
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area, and spent fuel cask access. hatch area).. Material entering l6 the building.for placement in the SFP where they will be placed s
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on the cask handling pool cover for transfer to the TGC.
The TGC i
can move over the pools in a north-south direction from the wall at the cask washdown area to the fuel transfer pool.
Safe load:
zones and exclusion areas applichble to control of heavy loads in the storage pool are shown in figure 4'.7-9 for the various P
anticipated fuel storage configurations.
Additional load path-restrictions in the SFP apply for the H Region-I racks:.the TGC will hoist a H Region I rack off the cask pool cover and move it to above H. rack 7 location (see figures 4.7-3 and 4.7-9 (mheet 3)) where it will be lowered into the pool to a depth within 3 feet of the top of H rack 7.
Movement of the H Region I rack will then proceed outside from the exclusion area to the _
rack designated location where it will be lowered into place on' the pool floor.
l I
l Material leaving the pool will be placed on the cask pool cover for transfer to the CHC.
The northern and of the cask pool cover will be an exclusion area not to-be used for the temporary storage of heavy loads, to protect against the potential for falling in the storage pool in case of a postulated earthquake (see paragraph 4.7.4.5).
Material leaving the pool will normally be taken from the cask pool cover (by-the CHC) to the cask washdown area for further decon/ packaging prior to leaving the-building.
From there the material will be moved by the CHC to the access' hatch and lowered to grade.
Down-ending of the existing racks may be performed at the cask washdown area if
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OPT 0328.4-7 2/90 4.7-14 Revision 6
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. paths are not defined and the load can move anywhere within that Exclu,sion areas will be established where fuel is stored zone.
in the SFP as shown in the figures.
Exclusion areas shall not be entered by heavy loads, and the location of area boundaries will be~ clearly marked around the SFP on the operating deck.
All exclusion areas and safe load paths / zones will be administratively controlled with approved procedures (r6fer to section 6.2, Response to NRC Question 7d'for additional information on procedures).
Administrative controls will additionally control the parking of j
the CHC and the TGC to preclude impact between the two cranes.
1 Construction heavy load lifts (administratively controlled to a-maximum drop height of 5 feet above the concrete floor) will be f
made by.the new fuel handling crane (NFHC) in the new fuel handling area.
These-construction heavy load lifts are identified in the Response to NRC Question 7a in table 6.2-2.
These heavy loads will only be handled when no new fuel is stored in the new fuel handling area.
The area serviced by the NFHC for the movement of these construction loads will be administratively 6
)
controlled to the space which is north of (for Unit 2) the new fuel racks including the east and west sides of the new fuel hatch (see figure 4.7-15).
The NFHC is shown in figure 10 of Enclosure (1)- to the July 7, 1981, heavy loads submittal (reference 27).
Access to and from the FHB for these lifts will be via the new fuel hatch.
The NFHC heavy load lifts in the new fuel handling area will not be carried over unprotected safe shutdown equipment.
The fire water pumper will be relocated to OPT 0328.4-7 if Revision 6 2/90 4.7-16 6
I
the other _ unit's FHB truck-bay, or to other locations outside the
,s truck bay, when these heavy loads are being lifted by.the NFHC.
I No heavy loads will be carried over unprotected safe shutdown-equipment.- Specifically, the fire water. tankers will be removed to outside tiedowns (by the diesel generator building), into-the-other Unit's FHB truck bay, or to other-locations when heavy loads are being lifted in the FHB by the CHC.
Evaluations of postulated heavy load drops show that the FHB y
operating deck concrete does not spall; therefore, the operation of equipment on lower levels of the FHB would not be impaired.
l.
This means that no area restrictions, except for lift height and the new fuel handling area restrictions as describad above, apply l
to the FHB. operating deck.
(See section 6.2 response to NRC L
Question 7C for-additional information on the-fire tankers and4 other equipment).
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l OPT 0328.4-7 2/90 4.7-16A Revision 6 l
c' 4.7. 4. 5' Use of' Cask Pool and Cask Pool Cover
,).
The cask handling pool will be used to store fuel assemblies during the construction phase of the reracking effort This will j
l enhance the overall safety margins and ALARA program as discussed in' paragraph 4.7.4.1.
The existing 4-inch cooling line supplies 325 gal / min to the cask pool.
Analysis shows that this flow rate is capable of removing 6.1 MBTU/h from the cask pool by discharging the water to the SFP via the gate' opening.
Under these' conditions,-the cask pool temperature will be less than 140F, and the SFP temperature will be approximately 107F, j
assuming the CCW design temperature of 95F.
A maximum decay heat
_j production of 6.1 MBTU/h will be allowed; hence, any combination of fuel assemblies may be used provided it results in a heat load of less-than 6.1 MBTU/h.
This is the heat load that would be j
generated by storing 102 2-year-old spent fuel assemblies-and a e~
maximum of 108 fuel assemblies which have decayed a minimum of-75 days (Technical Specification 3.9.12 limit is 88 days minimum).
To provide further assurance of adequate mixing, a temporary cooling line will be added to discharge cooling water at the cask i
pool. bottom.
i The E seismic analysis bounds the use of the Region II storage
' rack in the cask pool area (figure 4.7-14).
1 The cask handling pool, which is located adjacent to the SFP (see
)-l figure 4.7-2) for each unit at SONGS 2&3, will be covered during the reracking program.
The cover is required to perform two basic functions, protect the spent fuel being stored in the cask
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OPT 0328.4-7 2/90 4.7-20 Revision 6 s
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s added protection ~are designed to-the requirements of ANSI jT N14.6-1978, Section-6, as amended by NUREG-0612 Sub-section (ms/-
$.1.1(4) -(see section 6.2, Response to NRC Question 2).
The cask pool cover will be designed to provide a suitable working surface (laydown area) for the transfer of loads between 4
the CHC and the TGC.
Impact loads resulting from postulated i
construction load drops will be designed / analyzed in accordance with the-requirements of Appendix A of NUREG-0612 (except that" administrative controls rather than mechanical stops or electrical interlocks are used to establish the postulated load drop locations).
This exception is discussed further in paragraph 4.7.4.6.2E.
f 4.7.4.6 Control Of Heavy Loads Evaluation
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The hoisting of all heavy loads within the FHBs will be accomplished by the existing CHC (125-ton rated capacity main -
hook and 10-ton rated capacity auxiliary hook), or the existing 6
NFHC (5-ton rated capacity), or the TGC-[35-ton rated capacity L
main hook and 2-ton rated capacity (limited to 1500 pounds-by l-load cell) auxiliary hook).
Figure 4.7-13 shows the rel'ationships between the CHC, the TGC, and the spent fuel-f handling machine.. Figure 4.7-13 also shows a temporary work platform.
The " draw-bridge" platform on the TGC has been 1
replaced by another independent temporary work platform.
The independent temporary work platforms have non-powered, non-braked trucks that also ride on the existing spent fuel handling machine (SFHM) rails.
The platforms are capable of being l
OPT 0328.4-7 2/90 4.7-22 Revision 6 l
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attached'to the TGC at the trucks to move integrally with the r"'
.TGC.
A 500-pound capacity electric powered chain hoist is i,)
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provided on the cantilevered portion of the 4 foot *5 inch wide
. platform for tool handling.
The platforms have been designed for a 150-pound per square foot uniform live load or a maximum concentrated load of 2000 pounds applied over a 1 square' foot area, anywhere on the platforms.
The platforms will meet OSHA requirements and will have signs posted which display the maximum allowed platform loads.
They have been designed to meet Seismic Interaction II/I criteria.
Heavy loads will be excluded from the platforms.
The provisions of the heavy loads program for raracking SONGS 2&3 are presented below in relation to the guidelines given in NUREG-061209:
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l A.
Subsections 5.1.1; general guidelines applicable to both the TGC and CHC.
-B.
Subsection 5.1.2 (4) and 5.1.2 (2) ; guidelines applicable to the CHC.
C.
- Subsection 5.1.2 (1) ; specific guidelines applicable to the TGC.
The guidelines of NUREG-0612 are not applicable for NI'HC lifts in
)
the new fuel handling area for reracking as heavy loads are not 6
carried in proximity to or over unprotected safe shutdown equipment or irradiated fuel in the SFP.
In addition, the
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OPT 0328.4-7 2/90 4.7-23 Revision 6 A
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-consequences'ofJpotential dropslassociated with the NFHC-are-gi:'i
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- - j-<y evaluated with respect to structural-damage-(see section 6.2,-
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- Response'to NRC Question 7a).
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~2/90 4.7-23A Revision 6 OPT 0328.4-7 t
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perimeter,m will be marked to show the location of I
boundaries between safe handling zones and exclusion areas N
within the SFP.-
Refer to.section 6.2, Response:to NRC Question 7c, for additional information concerning safe shutdown equipment effects on safe load paths.
- n
.B.
Procedures Procedures exist or will be developed for the handling of all heavy loads within the FHB for the raracking program.
The procedures, identified in table 6.2-3, section 6.2, 6
will comply with the guidelines of NUREG-0612 Subsection
'I 5.1.1(2 ).
For additional information on procedures, refer to section 6.2, Response to NRC Question 7d.
4 l
C.
Crane Operators All crane operators for the CHC and the TGC will be L
trained, qualified, and conduct themselves in accordance k
with existing station procedure S0123-I-7.15 which I
complies with the requirements of Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976.
Existing station procedure SO123-I-7.15 will be revised to extend its applicability to the TGC as l-I described in the Response to NRC Question 7d in section 6.2.
[
The requirements of ANSI Sections 2-3.1.7(o) and l
2-3.2.4(a) state that certain tests shall be performed at the beginning of each new work shift.
An exception to OPT 0328.4-7 2/90 4.7-25 Revision 6 1'
i e
The in-place' inspection and maintenance.of the single-
' \\_)(j failure-proof TGC.during the'reracking program will comply 5/
y with the guidelines of NUREG-0612 Subsection 5.1.1(6).
Station procedures.on inspection and maintenance-are-discussed further in section 6.2, Response:to.NRC Question 7d.
The testing'of the TGC will be accomplished in the o
i following manner:
I 1
1.
Operational-tests per ANSI B30.2-1976 Section 2-2.2.1 will be performed'at the factory prior to shipment, at the site prior to final installation, and in-place-(over pools) prior to initial use; J
Er~h 2.
Rated load. test per ANSI B30.2 1976,' Paragraph 2.2.2.2
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(at 1.25 x 35 tons) will be performed at the site 6:
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. prior to final installation.
3.
Affull performance test at the rated maximum critical load (MCL) (29.75 tons) will be performed at the site k
prior to final installation in sccordance with NUREG-0554, Section 8.2.
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4.
Also, a modified load test of the hoist and trolley (at 1.25 times the MCL of 29.75 tons) will be
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performed in-place (over the covered cask pool only)
L prior to initial use.
For additional information on OPT 0328.4-7 2/90 4.7-28 Revision 6 J.-
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NEW FUEL ACCESS HATCH l 1..
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NG M SPENT FUEL CASK S HA F#f#,20 x
"NEW FUEL RACKS
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L TRANSFER 1-POOL 1
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Administratively controlled NFHC Service Area for Construction Heavy Load Lifts in the New Fuel Handling Area i
l SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Units 2 & 3 f
HEAVY LOAD LIFTS IN THE NEW
,i FUEL HANDLING AREA (UNIT'2)
FIGURE 4.7-15 1
2/90 Revision 6 1
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22.
R. W. Lambert ef. Electric Power Research Institute, May 26, 1
1987 memorandum to Attendees of Boraflex Review Meeting at the EPRI Workshop of May 20, 1987, EPRI-3P-2813-4.
1
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23.
Electric Power Research Institute, EPRI NP-6159, "An Assessment of Boraflex Performance in Spent-Nuclear-Fuel i
Storage Racks", December 1988.
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24.
December 27, 1978 Proprietary submittal to the NRC, J. G.
Haynes (SCE) to R. L. Baer (NRC) letter Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362.
q 25.
Bechtel Structural Analysis Program (BSAP), CE800, Ver: ion F1-54.
i 26.
Generic Licensing Topical Report EDR-1(P)-A, Ederer's O
Nuclear Safety Related Extra-Safety and Monitoring (X-SAM)
Cranes, Revision 3, dated October 8, 1982 (including NRC approval letter dated August 26, 1983),.
27.
Letter from Mr. K. P. Baskin (SCE) to Mr. F. Miraglia (NRC)r 6
Subject:
NUREG 0612, Control of Heavy Icads, July 7, 1981.
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i OPT 0328.4-9 O
2/90 4.9-4 Revision 6
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i The identified heavy loads are evaluated as postulated
)
heavy load drops occurring during one or more of the following activities:
r i
1.
During Construction Phase i
a.
Lifts over the main SFP involving the TGC only.
The CHC is prevented by design from traveling over f
the main SFP, howeverf it is capable of, and is l
used for, lifting the spani, fuel pool gate (SFPG) f from the SFP as discussed in paragraph 2 herein.
i b.
Lifts over the cask pool without the cask pool t
cover or fuel in the cask pool involving either-the TGC or the CHC.
The cask pool is considered
(
)
either dry, as in the case when the Region II rack i
is installed, or flooded, as could be the case when the Region II rack is removed.
c.
Lifts over the cask pool cover involving either
[
the TGC or the CHC.
s F
d.
Lifts over structural concrete involving the TGC, CHC, or the NFHC.
This includes the cask pool cover extension area and the new fuel handling 6
)
area.
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e.
Lifts over the cask pool (with fuel) before the i
cover is installed.
The only heavy load is the
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OPT 0328.6-2 2/90 6.2-42 Revision 6 l
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l cover itself; however, the cask pool cover special j
/')
lifting device has been designed to prevent the
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cover from falling onto the fuel (see section 6.2, l
Response to NRC Question 2).
The strongbacks and crossbeams extend 2 feet beyond the pool edges on all four sides-and were designed to absorb the energy of the potential drop and prevent the cover from falling into the pool.
l Drops involving the TGC are not postulated to occur because this crane is a part of a single-failure-proof handling system (see Response to NRC Questions 2 and 8a).
i However, the consequences of these potential drops are considered in the design evaluation of the FHB and therefore they are included in the enclosed table of heavy
}
load drops.
l The consequences of potential drops associated with the TGC, CHC, and the NFHC are evaluated with respect to l6 structural damage.
The results are summarized in table l
6.2-2.
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l All potential heavy load drops listed in table 6.2-2 (Attachment A of table 6.2-2 lists the weight of components involved in each postulated drop) have been evaluated and the structural consequences found to be Y
acceptable.
Additionally, to further mitigate the potential for these drops to occur, administrative O
OPT 0328.6-2 2/90 6.2-43 Revision 6 I
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i controls will be implemented to control lift height and j
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exclusion zones.
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OPT 0328.6-2
'2/90 6.2-43A Revision 6 I
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TCblo 6.2-2
SUMMARY
OF POTENTIAL HEAVY LOAD DROPS (8)
(EVALUATION RESULTS) (Sheet 1 of 13) l fm CONSTRUCTION PHASE:
$PECIAL TOTAL DROP LIFilNG
$1RUCTURAL WEIGNT LOCAfl0N CRANE NEAVT LOAD kips (b)
NtigNT DEVICE CouttauthCES ft 83 kt0UIRED (Note No.)(c) agmangg I
LIFil 0Vit TCC EXIlflNG RACKS 34.0 47.5 Ytt (1) l6 SPENT FUEL POOL NEW RACKS
- e. El 59.9 22(')
til (1)
- b. all 43.2 47.5 fts (1) 6 LIFT tlG FOR NEW 6.9 47.5 No (1)
RACKS LIFT tlG FOR 6.9 47.5 NO (1) l6 ExilflNG RACKS (KitflNG RACK 5.3 47.5 No (1) l6
$UPPOR1 StAns NYDROLA2tt 7.2 47.5 No (1)
FILTRAfl0N UNIT 7.2 47.5 NO (1) 6 LIFTS OVER CAtt TGC NEW Ril RAct 43.2 20/29(f)
Yts (1)
ANilCIPAf tD FOR UNif 3 DNtt.
p POOL (2 sfAGE
(
LIFT)
LIFT RIG FOR NEW 6.9 20(h)
Yt$
(1)
ANilCIPATED FOR UNIT 3 ChtY. l6 RACKS CNC NEW Ril RACK 47.7 20/29(f)
Yt$
(5)
A P0$fULAft0 CROP INTO A CRV (2 $1 AGE CASK POOL (DURlWG INSTALLA*
LIFT) fl0N). DRY GOVERN $ OvtR Wtf CONDifl0N.
LIFT t!G FOR NEW 11.4 20(h) fis (5) i RACKS CHC LOAD BLOCK 6.0 WO PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH (W/0 LOAD)
Exilf!NG 51Atl0N PROCEDURis.1 TGC 91.5 20(h)
Yts (5)
A P051ULAftD DROP INTO A bit l CASE POOL.
CASK POOL COVER 44.2 TES PRICLUDED FROM FAtt.th0 th10 CASK POOL BY Cf51CN.
Liffs DVER CASK TGC EK!811NG RACKS 34.0 1
Yts (2 & 10) l6 POOL COVER NEW RACKS
- e. El 59.9 1
Ytl (2 & 10) 6
- b. Ril 43.2 1
Ytt (3 8 10)
OPT 0328.6-2 2/90 6.2-47 Revision 6 j
Tcblo 6.2-2
SUMMARY
OF POTENTIAL HEAVY ICAD DROPS (a)
)
(EVALUATION RESULTS) (Sheet 2 of 13) j CONSTRUCTION PHASE:
$PECIAL TOTAL DROP LIFTING STRUCTURAL WEIGNT NEl$NT DEVICE CONSEQUENCES LOCAfl0N CRANE NEAVY LOAD kips (b) ftLC)
REQUIRED (Note No.)(d) ggggggg LIFTS OVER TGC TGC TEST hEIGNT 76.6 1
NO (2 & 10)
THE MOR;20NTAL DIMEks!0hl 0F l6 CASE POOL COVER (CONT.)
THE TEST WEIGHT $ HALL BE 4 6
(CONT.)
FEET (MIN) BY $ FEET (MIN).
LIFT klG FOR NEW 5.5 1/19 NO (1 & 2) 1 700T FOR tlG W/ LIFT ROCS.
l6 i
RAr.K$
(SEE 19 FEET FOR tlG W/0 LIFT
+
REMARKS)
RODS.
i LIFT RIG FOR 5.5 1/19 WO (1 & 2) 1 FOOT FOR tlG W/ LIFT RODS.
l6 EXISTING RACKS (SEE 19 FEET FOR tlG W/0 LIFT REMARKS)
RODS.
EMllTING RACK 5.3 1
No (2 8 10) l6
$UPPORT BEAM 8 i
NYDROLAZER 7.2 1
NO (2410)
THE MORl20NTAL DlMEN$10N$
l6
$ HALL SE 2 FE' f (MI;:) BY 2 i
FEET (MIN).
FILTRAfl0N UNIT 7.2 1
NO (2 4 10)
THE NORIZONTAL DIMEN$10NS l6
$ HALL BE 2 FEET (MIN) $Y 2 FEET (MIN).
CNC EXISTING RACKS 38.5 1
YES (2)
NEW RACKS
- a. RI 64.4 1
VES (2)
- b. til 47.7 1
YES (3)
TGC 91.5 1
YES (289) l6 TGC TEST WElGMT 80.4 1
NO (2)
THE MOR120NIAL DIMEN$10NS CF THE TEST WElCHT $NALL SE 4 FEET (MIN) BY 8 FEET (MIN).
LIFT RIG FOR NEW 10.0 1/19 YES (2, 12 & 14)
SEE NOTE 12 FOR THE 1 FOOT /
RACKS
($EE 19 FOOT LIMIT FOR RlG W/0 REMARK $)
LIFT R00$. SEE NOTE 14 FOR THE 1.F001 LIMIT FOR t!G W/
LIFT RODS.
LIFT RlG FOR 10.0 1/19 YES (2, 12 4 14)
SEE NOTE 12 FOR THE 1 FOOT /
EKISTING RACKS
($tt 19 FOOT LIMif FOR tlG W/0 REMA.RKS)
LIFT RODS. $EE NOTE 14 FOR THE 1 F001 LIMIT FOR Rio W/
)
LIFT R00$.
t OPT 0328.6-2 2/90 6.2-48 Revision 6 w
w w
Tcblo 6.2-2
SUMMARY
OF POTENTIAL HEAVY I4AD DROPS (a)
(EVALUATION RESULTS) (Sheet 3 of 13)
CONSTRUCTION PHASE:
SPECIAL TOTAL DROP LIFilNG STRUCTURAL WEIGNT M
DEVICE C(klE0VENCES LOCAfl0N CRANE NEAVY LQ40 kipe(b)
NElg8 ft REQUltED (Note No.)(d)
RENAngs LIFil OVER CNC TEMPotARY Wott CAtt POOL COVER (CONT.)
PLATF0tus (CONT.)
- e. 3 FT 0 IN. WIDfN 11.8 1
NO (2)
- b. 4 FT*6 IN. WIDTM 17,0 1
18 0 (2) l6 Exilf!NG RACK 9.1 1
NO (2)
SUPP(af BEAMS TGC LIFilNG DEVICE 12.5 1
No (2 4 12)
CAtt Pool COVER SPECIAL LIFilNG DEV!CE
- s. $1RONGSACK 8.3 i
NO (4)
- b. CAOS$4EAM 7.7 2
NO (4) 1 FOOT AWOVE $1tDNCBACK$.
- c. ASSEMBLED LIFT 16.6 i
NO (4) klG CAtt CRANE LOAD 6.0 7.75 No (2 & 11)
EXCEPT FOR txCLU$10N t0NE.
BLOCK (W/0 LOAD)
NYDt0LA2ER 11.0 1
No (2)
INE Notl20kfAL DIMikSIONS SMALL DE 2 FEET (Mik) BY 2 FEET (MIN).
FILTRAfl0N UNif 11.0 1
NO (2)
THE Hotl20NTAL DIMENSIONS SMALL BE 2 FEET (MIN) 81 2 FEET (Mik).
FLOOR PLATE B.1 1
NO (2) thE NORl20NTAL DIMEkSIONS CONTAINEtt SHALL BE 151NCHES (MIN) BY 15 INCHES (MIN).
SFHM ft0LLEY 10.0 1
No (2)
LIFTS OVER TGC EXI$flNG RACKS 34.0 1
YES (6 & 10) h CONCRETE NEW RACKS
- s. Il 59.9 1
YES (6 4 10)
- b. All 43.2 1
YES (6810) 6 TGC TEST WtlGMT 76.6 i
NO (6 & 10)
THE NORIZONTAL DlMEh$10NS Of THE TEST WEIGHT $NALL BE 4 FEET (MIN) CY 8 FEET (MIN).
LIFT tlG Fat NEW 5.5 1/21 No (6 & 10) 1 FOOT FOR tic W/Liff Rocs.
l6 RACK $
(SEE 21 FEET FOR tlG W/0 LIFT REMARKS)
RODS.
OPT 0328.6-2 2/90 6.2-49 Revision 6
__ __~
i i
Table 6.2-2
SUMMARY
OF POTENTIAL HEAVY LOAD DROPS (a)
(EVALUATION RESULTS) (Sheet 4 of 13)
CONSTRUCTION PHASE:
SPECIAL TOTAL DROP LIFTING STRUCTURAL WEIGHT MEl N DEVICE CONSEQUENCis LOCATION CRANE NEAVY LOAD kips (b) ft 8 kt0UIRED (Note No.)(d) ggmaggg L!FTS WER TDC LIFT Alt FOR 5.5 1/21 N0 (6 & 10) i Foof FOR RIG W/ LIFT Roos.
l6 CONCRETE (CONT.)
(KISTING RACKS (SEF-21 FEET FOR tlG W/0 LIFT (CONT.)
REMAdtKS)
RODS.
(Kl8 TING RACK 5.3 1
N0 to 810) l6 BUPPORT BEAMS NYDROLAZER 7.2 1
WO (6810)
THE NORI2ONTAL DIMthSIONS l6
$ HALL DE 2 Ftti (MIN) BY 2 Ftti (NIN).
FILTRATION UNIT 7.2 1
WO (6 & 10)
THE NOR120NTAL DINik$10W5 l6
$ HALL BE 2 FEET (MIN) BY 2 FEff (NIN).
CNC EKISTING RACKS 38.5 1
YES (6)
NEW RACKS
- s. At 64.4 1
Yts (6)
- b. RI!
47.7 1
fts (6)
TGC 91.5 1
Ytt (6) l6 TGC TEST WEIGNT
$0.4 1
WO (6)
LIFT RIC FOR WEW 10.0 1/21 Ytt (6) 17007 FOR RIG W/ LIFT R005.
RACKS
($tt 21 FEET FOR RIG W/0 LIFT REMARK $)
R X)$.
LIFT RIG FOR 10.0 1/21 Ytt (6) 1 FOOT FOR RIG W/ LIFT R005.
EKISTING RACKS (SEE 21 Ftti FOR RIG W/0 LIFT RENARK$)
R(X)$.
TEMPORARY WORK PLATFORMS
- s. 3 FT 0 IN. WIDTM 11.8 i
NO (6)
- b. 4 FT 6 IN. WIOTH 17.0 1
ko (6) l6 CASK POOL C WER 44.2 1/3(I)
Ytt (6)
EK!$ TING RACK 9.1 1
MO (6)
SUPPORT BEAMS TGC LIFTING DEVICE 12.5 30 WO (6)
TGC TROLLEY 34.0 25 No (7)
TGC TRUCKS 11.0 1
WO (6)
SFNN TROLLEY 10.0 8(8)
No (6)
OPT 0328.6-2 s
2/90 6.2-50 Revision 6
T0blo 6.2-2
SUMMARY
OF PO7ENTIAL HEAVY ICAD DROPS (a)
(EVALUATION RESULTS) (Sheet 5 of 13)
CONSTRUCTION PHASE:
SPECIAL TOTAL DROP LIFilNG
$TRUCTURAL WElGMT NEIGN DEVICE CON $ttuthC B LOCATION CRANE HEAVY LOAD kips (b) ft(C REQUIRED (Note No.) d)
REMARKS LIFTS OVER CNC CAtt POOL COVER CONCREft (CONT.)
SPECIAL LIFTING (CONT.)
Dtvict
- e. STRONGtACK 8.3 1
No (6)
- b. CROS$8EAM 7.7 2
NO (6)
- c. ASSEM8 LED klG 16.6 1
NO (6)
CASK CRAmt LQAD 6.0 32 NO (6)
BLOCK NYDROLAZER 11.0 1
No (6)
THE NOR120NTAL DIMENSIONS SNALL DE 2 FEET (MIN) BY 2 FEET (MIN).
FILTRAtl0N UNIT 11.0 1
No (6)
THE MOR120NTAL DIMEN$10N$
ShALL BE 2 FEET (MIN) BY 2 FEET (MlW).
FLOOR PLATE B.1 1
NO (6)
THE Notl20NTAL DIMENSIOkt CONTAINER $
$NALL BE T5 INCHES (MIN) BY 15 lWCHES (MlN).
HATCM COVtt$
8.5 PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WlTH N0 tritTING STAfl0N PROCEDURE $.
l EXISTING RACK WHEN A2.5 2 FT *
- 0 (F 6 13) l_
BEING DOWN ENDED 10 IN.
MOVING PLATFORM 8.9 4
N0 (6)
EXISTING RACK DOWN ENDlWG DEVICE 10.0 21 No (6)
NFHC HYDROLAZER 6.0 5
No (6)
THE NmIZONTAL DIMEN$10NS (j)
$ MALL ct 2 FEET (MIN) BY 2 6
l-FEET (MSN).
1 FILTRATION UNIT 6.0 5
No (6)
THE HOR 120NTAL DIMEN$10h5
$NALL BE 2 FEET (MIN) BY 2 FEET (Mik).
FLOOR PLAft 3.1 5
NO (6)
THE NOR120GTAL DIMENSIONS CONTAINERS SMALL BE 15 INCHit (MIN) BY 15 lNCHt$ (MIN).
OPT 0328.6-2 2/90 6.2-51 Revision 6
Tcblo 6.2-2
SUMMARY
OF POTENTIAL HEAVY LOAD DROPS (a)
(EVALUATION RESULTS) (Sheet 7 of 13)
FOOTNOTES TO "
SUMMARY
OF POTENTIAL MEAVY LOAD DROPS" TABIE a.
The following legend is used in the table:
.TGC:
Temporary Gantry Crane SFHM:
Spent Fuel Handling Machine CHC:
Cask Handling Crane NFM:
New Fuel Monorail RI:
Region I Rack (12 X 13)
RII:
Region II Rack (14 X 15 or 13 X 15)
SFPG:
Spent Fuel Pool Gate TBD:
To be determined NFHC:
New Fuel Handling Crane l6 b.
See attachment A for a breakdown of the weight of components which compose the total weight listed in the table, c.
The drop height is defined as the vertical distance between-the bottom of the heavy load and the top surface of the.
postulated impactee.
Cribbing is permitted (if the load remains secured by a crane or other appropriate means) to j
keep the drop height within the value shown.
d.
See attachment B for the applicable notes which clarify the-structural consequences of the postulated heavy load drops.
e.
The evaluation is based on a conservative value of 22 feet.
l The actual value will be approximately 3 feet above a Region II rack which results in 19.5 feet.
i I
l f.
The cask pool has two levels as shown in figure 4.7-14.
The l
heavy load will be lowered to within 1 foot of the upper shelf, moved horizontally, then lowered to the bottom of the cask pool.
This sequence is the same as that used for the spent fuel cask as shown in SONGS UFSAR Figure 9.1-25.
g.
The SFHM trolley is not a governing drop for the concrete.
Therefore, a conservative upper bound value of 8 feet was used.
h.
This drop is postulated to the upper shelf of the cask pool.
The lower cask pool floor is protected by the Region II rack.
()
OPT 0328.6-2 2/90 6.2-53 Revision 6 s
TCblo 6.2-2
SUMMARY
OF POTENTIAL HEAVY IDAD DROPS (a)
(EVALUATION RESULTS) (Sheet 7A of 13)
.,_)
'w)
- i.. The cask pool cover is lifted through the equipment hatch at an angle due to its size.
The low point of the cover will not be lifted higher than 3 feet above the concrete in the equipment hatch area during up-righting.
All other areas of the operating deck have a 1-foot limit.
j.
These construction loads are handled only in the new fuel 6
handling area (when no new fuel is stored in this area).
l t
0 V
l O
OPT 0328.6-2 2/90 6.2-53A Revision 6
Table 6.2-2 j
n
- ( f-
SUMMARY
OF POTENTIAL HEAVY LOAD DROPS (a)
(EVALUATION RESULTS) (Sheet 8 of 13)
~-
Attachment A WEIGHTS USED IN LOAD DROP EVALUATIONS (kips)
(Sheet 1 of 3)
L040 BLOCK WEIGNT CRANE MEAVY LOAD LIFT SPECIAL LIFTING total Utt0 DESCRIPfl0N WIGNT DEVICE WlGNT CNC TGC(*)
WIGNT l6 TCC EXISTING RACKS 27.1(b) 4,7(c) 2.2 34.0 t
NEW RACKS
- e. Rt 53.0 4.7 2.2 59.9
- b. All 36.3(d) 4,7 2.2 43.2 TCC ftST WIGNT 74.4 2.2 76.6 LIFT tlG FOR NEW 3.3(*)
2.2 5.5 RACK 8 7
2.2 5.5 l6 LIFT klG FOR 3.3(***)
EMISTING kACKS 2.2
'5. 3 l6 ExtSTING RACK 3.1(f)
SUPPORT BEAMS NYDROLA2tt 5.0(*)
2.2 7.2 i
6 l'
FILTRATION UNIT 5.0(*)
2.2 7.2 1
CNC (Kl$flNG RACKS 27.1(b) 4,7(c) 6.7(8) 38.5 NEW RACKS
- e. Rt 53.0 4.7 6.7(8) 64.4
- b. Ril 36.3(d) 4.7 6.7(8) 47.7 TGC 79.0 6.5(c) 6.0 91.5 l6 TGC ftST WIGHT 74.4 6.0 80.4 LIFT tl0 FOR NEW 3.3(*)
6.7(0) 10,0 RACKS LIFT RIC FOR 3.3(8s')
6.7(0) 10.0 EXISTING RACKS TEMPORARY WORK PLATFORMS
- e. 3 FT 0 IN. WIDTM 5.8 6.0 11.8 17.0 l6
- b. 4 FT*6 IN. W10TN 11.0 6.0 CASK P0OL COVER 27.6 10.6 6.0 44.2
>O
(,)
OPT 0328.6-2 2/90 6.2-54 Revision 6 l
..m.
.t
Table 6.2-2 L
O
SUMMARY
OF POTENTIAL HEAVY ICAD DROPS (a)
V (EVALUATION RESULTS) (Sheet 9 of 13)
Attachment A WEIGHTS USED IN IDAD DROP EVALUATIONS (kips)
(Sheet 2 of 3) 1 LOAD SLOCK WEIGHT CRANE NEAVY LORD LIFT SPECIAL LIFTING TOTAL USED DESCRIPTION WElGMT DEVICE WEl4NT CNC TBC(e)
WEIGNT CMC EXISTING khCK 3.1(f) 6.0 9.1 (CONT.)
SUPPORT BEAMS TGC LIFTING DEVICE 6.5(C) 6.0 12.5 TGC TROLLEY 28.0 6.0 34.0 11.0 l
TGC TRUCK 3 5.0 6.0 SFNM TROLLEY 4.0(C) 6.0 10.0 SFPC 4.5 4.5 TEST EQUIPMENT 4.5 4.5 CASK POOL COVER SPECIAL LlfilNG l
DEVICE
- a. 8TROWotACK 2.3 6.0 8.3
(
- b. CROS$8EAN 1.7 6.0 7.7
- c. ASSEMBLED RIG 10.6 6.0 16.6 CASK CRANE LOAD 6.0 6.0 SLOCK NYDROLA2ER 5.0(C) 6.0 11.0 I-FILTRATION UNIT 5.0(C) 6.0 11.0 FLOOR PLATE 2.1(C) 6.0 8.1 i
CONTAINERS NATCN COVERS 2.5 6.0 8.5 L
EXISTING RACK WHEN 27.1IDI 9.4(C) 6.0 42.5 SEING DOWW ENDED MOVING PLATFORN 2.9(C) 6.0 8.9
~
EXISTING AACK 3.3 6.7(8)
DOWN ENDING DEVICE 10.0 i.
6.0 b
NTHC NYDROLA2ER 5.0(C) 1.0(h) 1 FILTRATION UNIT 5.0(C) 1.0(h) 6.0 1.0(h)
/
FLOOR PLATE CONTAINERS 2.1 8) 3.1 i
OPT 0328.6-2 2/90 6.2-55 Revision 6
f7 i
4 Table 6.2-2
(
')
SUMMARY
OF POTENTIAL HEAVY LOAD DROPS (a) i
(_,/
(EVALUATION RESULTS) (Sheet 10 of 13)
J Attachment A WEIGHTS USED IN LOAD DROP EVALUATIONS (kips) j (Sheet 3 of 3) i L
l a.
The weight of the new single-failure-proof load block is assumed to be 2.2 kips.
l6
)
b.
The existing racks are of two sizes (4 x 8 and 8 x 8).
The heavier 8 x 8 rack governs and was used in the evaluation.
i c.
The exact weight has not been determined.
A conservative upper-bound value was used.
d.
The Region II racks are of two sizes (13 x 15 and 14 x 15).
The 14 x 15 rack governs over the 13 x 15 rack and was used in the load drop evaluation.
r e.
The postulated load drop of a rack lift rig (without rods) from 19 feet (over cask pool cover) or 21 feet (over concrete) governs over a rack lift rig drop (with rods) from 1 foot.
Add 1400 pounds to account for lifting rod weight where required.
(n) f.
There are three sizes of existing rack support beams with the heaviest weighing 3.1 kips (which was used in the evaluation).
g.
The CHC load block weighs 6.0 kips.
There is a 0.7 kip CHC adapter used in conjunction with the CHC when it is used to lift the new or existing (old) racks.
h.
The NFHC has a capacity of 5 tons.
A conservative load block 6
weight of 1 kip was used in the evaluation.
t h'
k_,)
OPT 0328.6-2 2/90 6.2-56 Revision 6
Question No. 7c o
' Paragraph 4.7.4.6 " Control of Heavy Loads Evaluation" does not provide sufficient detail for the NRC to evaluate compliance with NUREG-0612.
Submit the following detailst A clear statement that no heavy loads are carried over safe shutdown equipment and/or evaluation of lifts over safe shutdown equipment is needed (pages 4.7-21 and 25), i e.,
specify water tanker locations.
Question No. 7c Response No heavy loads will be carried over unprotected safe shutdown equipment.
Specifically, the fire water tankers will be removed
(-
to outside tiedowns (by the diesel generator building), into the other unit's FHB truck bay, or to other locations when heavy loads are being lifted in the FHB by the CHC.
The fire water pumper will be relocated to the other unit's FHB truck bay, or to other locations outside the truck bay when heavy loads are being lifted in the FHB by the NFHC.
Therefore, no safe shutdown 6
equipment will be located below or in the proximity of the NFHC l
heavy load lifts in the new fuel handling area.
I Evaluations of postulated heavy load drops show that the FHB operating deck concrete does not spall; therefore, the operation of equipment on lower levels of the FHB would not be impaired.
This means that no area restrictions, except for lift height and OPT 0328.6-2 2/90 6.2-67 Revision 6 I-
--'-- s A-
-,,,y
,_ae<-
-y
>-,-p,
.p_,.,
%._r-g9
..7 p
y.a
,,w
,7
.,w
the new fuel handling area restrictions described in paragraph
'[
4.7.4.2 app 1'y to the FHB operating deck.
'I h
e i
I i
i b
i h
I 9
E l
1 k
OPT 0328.6-2 2/90
- 6. 2-6M Revision 6 i
anticipated that the TGC and/or the CHC will have to remain c-attached to. loads for durations that exceed a shift when performing operations such as old rack removal (where radiological conditions may not permit a fast removal from the pool), new rack installation (where the TGC remains attached during rack leveling operations), TGC installation (where the CHC f
should remain connected until the restraints have been installed), and work under cribbed load (where the crane may have f
to remain attached for safety reasons).
Procedure No. S023-I-3.21, Crane, New Fuel Crane Checkout and i
Operation:
This procedure provides preoperational checkout and operating I
t instructions for the NFHC.
This procedure will be revised to
.5 include the restrictions to the operation of the NFHC for the-construction heavy load lifts which are described in paragraph 4.7.4.2.
These restrictions are as follows:
I 6
t e
Hehvy load lift height and area.
e No new fuel stored in the new fuel handling area during these heavy load lifts by the NTHC.
e Fire water pumper must be relocated from the FHB truck bay during these heavy load lifts.
OPT 0328.6-2 2/90 6.2-72 Revision 6
I Procedure No. S0123-I-7.15, Crane Operator certification This procedure provides the requirements for crane operator qualification to ensure that operators are familiar with applicable equipment, and meet the knowledge level, proficiency, and physical requirements necessary for safe crane operation.
The requirements of the procedure apply to operator qualification of all cranes at SONGS.
As such, the procedure needs to be revised to extend its applicability to operators of the rarack TGC and include the TGC operators in the list of NUREG-0612 crane operators.
Procedure No. Sol 23-I-7.17, Maintenance and Inspection of Special Lifting Devices:
I r
This procedure provides the details for performing the required maintenance and inspection of special lifting devices at SONGS.
t Revision of this procedure is necessary to expand its range of applicability to the new special lifting devices, described in l
OPT 0328.6-2
\\
2/90 6.2-72A Revision 6 w------
n -
-r-,-
i l
Table 6.2-3 O\\
KFFECTED STATION PROCEDURES FOR HEAVY LOADS (Sheet 1 of 2) l l
Procedure No.
Type Description / Comment j
i SO123-I-7.10 Existing Maintenance / Inspection of Rigging
]
Accessories SO123-I-7.14 Existing Maintenance / Inspection of Cranes SO123-I-7.23 Existing Qualification / Certification of Riggers SO123-I-7.24 Existing Rigging Standards / Guidelines SO123-I-1.13 Revise Cranes, Rigging / Lifting Controls.
i Revise to include new licensing commitments, include TGC, NUREG-0612 crane, update list of procedures, and revise safe load paths.
l SO23-I-3.32 Revise Cask Crane Checkout / Operation.
l Revise to include administrative r
controls over cask pool.
t i
SO23-I-3.21 Revise New Fuel Crane checkout / Operation.
i Revise to include administrative 6
controls for the construction heavy load lifts.
$$423-I-7.15 Revise Crane Operator Certification.
Include TGC operators in list of
[
NUREG-0612 crane operators.
SO123-I-7.17 Revise Maintenance / Inspection of Special Lifting Devices.
Revise to include rarack special lifting devices.
SO23-I-7.102 Revise Inspection / Testing of Special Lifting Devices.
Revise to include rarack special lifting devices.
SO23-I-6.157 Revise SFP Gate Removal / Installation.
Revise to reflect 30-inch height I
L limitation for lift over racks.
l OPT 0328.6-2 2/90 6.2-76 Revision 6 o
Table 6.2-3 O
AFFECTED STATION PROCEDURES FOR HEAVY LOADS l
(Sheet 2 of 2) i Procedure l
No.
Type Description / Comment Station New Gantry Crane Checkout / Operation Contractor New Installation / Test / Removal of Gantry Crane in FHB Contractor New Installation / Removal of Cask Pool Cover Contractor New New Rack Installation Procedure Contractor New Old Rack Removal Procedure NOTE:
New procedures will be prepared, reviewed, and approved in accordance with existing project and station procedures.
' O
(
l l
l l
I
\\
OPT 0328.6-2 2/90-6.2-77 Revision 6 I
. m i~.
6.3 NRC TELEPHONE CONVERSATION DECEM3ER 20, 1989 S U ILT E C T't SPENT FUEL POOL RERACKING. SONGS UNITS 2 AND 3 Question No. 1 Provide a detailed description of the design modifications in the fuel racks, including the addition to stiffener plates and j
changes in number of welds and weld sizes.
Were the changes due to increased loads, errors in analysis, or changes in analysis method?
Explain the correction to the call and support pad stress calculation referred to in footnote "d" of table 4.6-4.
Question No. 1 Response Several design modifications to the SONGS 2 and 3 spent fuel storage racks have been made and accounted for in the 6
confirmatory analysis.
The first was the addition of stiffener plates to the Region II racks.
Stiffener plates were added on l
the periphery of the rack at each storage location as shown in
[
figure 4.1-3.
The stiffener plates are 0.110 inches thick, 7.25 inches wide, and 24 incher high.
They are located on the top of the rack base plate and against the cells, essentially doubling the thickness of the cells in those areas.
The stiffener plates are welded to the rack base plate and to the cells.
The purpose of the stiffeners is to provide additional load carrying capability for the cells on the rack periphery.
In addition j
there were several minor weld changes to the racks.
These are shown in the table below.
l (' '
OPT 0328.6-3 2/90 6.3-1 Revision 6 l-
.-~..nw..
.a a
i i
Previous Present
/
Value value (inches)
(inches)
Region II Cell seam weld length (no change in weld location) f f
Lower half of rack Adjacent to cell to cell weld 4.5 5.12 j
Upper half of rack Adjacent to cell to cell weld 4.5 4.88 Not adjacent to cell to cell weld 1.375 1.5 Cell to wrapper weld spacing (no change in veld size) l Upper half of rack 3.5 3.12 f,
6
\\~-
Region I cell seam weld length (no change in weld location)
Not adjacent to call to clip weld 1.0 1.09 All the modifications mentioned above were made solely to address
'the changes in loads resulting from the revision to the pool layout as analyzed in the confirmatory seismic analysis.
An additional hardware change was made on the cell to cell
+
)
stiffener clips on the Region I racks described in paragraph 4.1.2.1.1.5 and shown in figure 3.1-1.
In the original design, the clip connecting the corner of one call to the two adjacent 9
(
OPT 0328.6-3 2/90 6.3-2 Revision 6
cells was a single angle-shaped piece.
This was changed to two separate flat pieces placed between cells to give the same load path as the single piece clip.
The lengths of the clip and clip to cell welds did not change and the welds were sized to give a slightly greater margin than the original design.
This change was made to facilitate the manufacturing process and was not j
required because of the confirmatory analysis.
The margins to allowable reported in table 4.6-4 reflect the revised clip design.
i The explanation of the correction to the cell stress calculation referred to in footnote "d" of table 4.6-4 is as follows:
There was a modification from the primary analysis to the l
confirmatory analysis in some of the analysis details for the i
Region I cells.
In the primary analysis, the call calculations only took credit for one cell wall between adjacent storage 6
locations even though there are actually two cell walls between adjacent storage locations.
This was a known conservatism in the
( -
primary analysis.
In the confirmatory analysis, credit was taken for both cell walls between adjacent storage locations.
This more accurately portrays the structural capabilities of the cells.
The methodology used to evaluate the cells in the confirnatory analysis was the same as that used in the primary analysis other than the modification described above.
)
The explanation of the correction to the support pad stress calculation referred to in footnote "d" of table 4.6-4 is as follows:
OPT 0328.6-3 2/90 6.3-3 Revision 6
F The analysis of the support pads uses loads and margins to allowable from the cell analysis.
Thus, for the Region I racks, i
the changes in loads and margins from the cell analysis i
modifications described in the previous paragraph affected the results of the support pad analysis.
However, the methodology of the support pad analysis did not change.
i i
1 l
l O
e l
i L
OPT 0328.4-3 2/90 6.3-4 Revision 6 k
e.,
- e.,--(,
-7 h
Question No. 2 Provide a detailed description of the methodology used to extrapolate seismic loads in racks that were not analyzed in the confirmatory analysis.
Provide an example to demonstrate how the changes in stress for each rack component listed in tables 4.6-4 and 4.6-5 and the changes in fuel to rack impact loads were determined.
Provide further justification for decreasing the 13 x 15 rack loads as noted in paragraph 4.6.2.3 in light of the potential for increased rocking response.
{
Question No. 2 Response Retrion I Racks i
l The confirmatory analysis consisted of time history runs for the 6
Region II racks.
The loads for the Region I racks were determined by using the Region I loads from the primary analysis and multiplying by the ratio of the Region II confirmatory analysis loads to the Region II primary analysis loads.
The basis for this approach is discussed in paragraph 4.6.2.3.
The fonula for the Region I confirmatory analysis loads is shown below:
R1C = RIP * (R2C / R2P)
Where:
R1C - loads for the Region I confirmatory analysis (Standard fuel)
OPT 0328.6-3 2/90 6.3-5 Revision 6 j
I RIP - limiting loads from the Region I primary analysis
(
(Standard fuel)
R2C - loads from the Region II confirmatory analysis (Standard fuel, 0.8 friction coefficient, Eupty/ Full case)
R2P - loads from the Region II primary analysis (Standard fuel, 0.8 friction coefficient, Empty / Full case)
Note that limiting loads on the racks always occur with the 0.8-friction coefficient condition.
r Separate ratios of (R2C / R2P) were calculated for each component in the Region II rack.
Then the Region I loads for each component were determined by using the (R2C / R2P) ratio from the corresponding Region II component and applying the equation f
listed above.
The table below lists corresponding components for 6
i Region I and Region II.
t Region I Component Corresponding Region II component i
l Support Pads Support Pads Calls cells Grids Cell to Cell Welds Clips Cell to Cell Welds cell to Clip Welds cell to Cell Welds Grid to Grid Welds Cell to Cell Welds Grid to Base Plate Welds Cell to Base Plate Welds cell Seam Welds cell Seam Welds cell to Wrapper Welds cell to Wrapper Welds OPT 0328.6-3 l
2/90 6.3-6 Revision 6 3
A
[}
The cell to grid welds are an exception to the above procedure.
1 In both the confirmatory and the primary analyses, the load used in the evaluation of the cell to grid velds is the maximum load the cell can transmit (i.e., the cell limit load).
This did not l
change from the primary analysis to the confirmatory analysis.
An example of the method used to evaluate the Region I racks is shown here.
This example is for the limiting cell seam weld in the Region I rack.
REE DDE Region I primary analysis stress (psi)
R1P 9,263 20,275 Ratio (R2C / R2P)
(R2C / R2P) 1.079 1.076 Region I confirmatory analysis stress (psi)
R1C 9,994 21,813 R1C = RIP * (R2C / R2P)
Allowable stress (psi)
Fv.
24,000 30,660 Margin to Allowable MA 1.40 0.41 MA = (PV / RIC)
-1 other components on the rack were done in a similar fashion.
The ratio (R2C / R2P) for all the other components was between 1.06 and 1.10 with the exception of the cells, which had a ratio of 0.98, and the cell to wrapper welds, which had a ratio of 0.902.
In terns of loads, this means that the load changes were minor and ranged from a load increase of 10% to a load decrease of 10%.
OPT 0328.6-3 2/90 6.3-7 Revision 6 I
^
Reaion II Racks (13 x 15) i The loads for the 13 x 15 racks were determined by using the same loads per storage location as for the 14 x 15 racks.
The use of 4
the same loads per storage location for both rack sizes is justified in that the racks vary in size in only one direction and the difference is small.
The racks have the same dimensions
)
in the east-west direction and only vary by the width of one row of cells in the north-south direction.
It is noted that at the time during the time history of highest loads, the rack is rocking toward one corner of the rack due to horizontal loading on the rack in both directions rather that rocking about one axis.
Since the difference (between the 14 x 15 rack and the 13 x 15 rack) in span across the diagonal of the rack is even less than the difference in span of the racks in the north-south' l
direction, this further tends to minimize any variation in loads.
6 It is also noted that even though the 13 x 15 rack has fewer cells than the 14 x 15 rack, it has the same number of support pads.
Thus, the racks will respond in a similar fashion and produce comparable loads for the most limiting condition.
Any variation in loads between rack sizes will be minimal and is adequately covered by the existing margins.
Methodoloav for Fuel Imnact Loads i.
The fuel impact loads (load at each fuel spacer grid location) for the Region II racks were obtained directly from the time history evaluation performed in the confirmatory analysis.
In addition, the percentage change of the maximum Region II fuel OPT 0328.6-3 l
2/90 6.3-8 Revision 6 l.
impact load atLeach grid location for the confirmatory analysis
'versus the primary analysis results was determined.
The L
percentage change was obtained by ratioing the loads from the-2 confirmatory analysis case for standard fuel and a_ friction coefficient of 0.8 to the loads from the same case evaluated in the primary analysis.
It should be noted that the limiting fuel impact loads always occur for the 0.8 friction coefficient condition.
Using the percent' age change data from the Region II results, the maximum Region I fuel impact load at each spacer grid location'for the confirmatory analysis was calculated.
The basis for this approach is presented in paragraph 4.6.2.3.
The calculation was performed by-applying the percentage change factor at each grid obtained from the Region II results to the Region I primary analysis maximum load at each grid.
l The following provides an example of the calculation performed:
6 o
Maximum Region I primary analysis load at grid No. 10 =
2142 pounds e
Percentage change factor at grid No. 10 from Region II
- 2ults'(ratio of confirmatory analysis load versus primary
[
ane. lysis load) = 1.04 7
e Maximum Region I confirmatory analysis load at grid No. 10
= (2142) (1.04) = 2228 pounds In a similar manner, fuel impact loads were calculated at each spacer grid location.
The maximum confirmatory analysis fuel impact load was determined to occur at grid No. 11 (top grid) and resulted.in a load of 2522 pounds.
O' OPT 0328.6-3 2/90 6.3-9 Revision 6
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' Question No. : 3
-a.
f~T (f-Was the north-south rack-to-rack hydrodynamic mass term used in a
the dynamic' analysis based on the east side gap of 5.63 inches or
.the west' side gap of 48 inches?'
Question No.-3 Response The confirmatory analysis and the primary analysis were performed t
.using the same methods.
Thus, in the confirmatory analysis the' north-southLrack-to-rack hydrodynamic mass term used was. based on.
l-the-east side gap of 5.63 inches.
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&p OPT 0328.6-3 2/90 6.3-10 Revision-6
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' Question No..4 1
g Was the SFP reanalyzed to account'for the increased rack loads?
l t
Summarize the~ methodology and update the results given in tables
]
4.6-1 and 4.6-2.
i Question No. 4: Response i
The SFP was reevaluated
.r the revised. rack loads resulting from t
. the deletion of one row of fuel storage locations.- The deletion of one row of fuel storage locations for the SONGS 2&3 SFP raracking effort resulted in the following load revisions (compared to~the. loads which were based on the preliminary rack arrangement shown in figure 4.5-21):
l A.
Decreased hydrodynamic loads on the SFP walls lp p.
l l..V 6-3.
Decreased rack dead loads on the SFP basemat 3
.q C.
Increased rack seismic loads on the SFP basemat.
[
These revised loads were evaluated for the following FHB i
components:
A.-
SFP concrete walls B.
SFP basemat liner plate i
C.
SFP concrete basemat.
OPT 0328.6-3 2/90 6.3-11 Revision 6 w
u
h summarv of Methodoloey The rack induced hydrodynamic loads applied to the SFP concrete i
walls decreased by a minimum of 21%.
This decreased load results P
in reduced concrete wall section moments and membrane forces.
The local effects of the revised rack vertical loads on the basemat liner plate were determined as discussed in the Response to Question No. 5 herein.
The overall effects of the revised rack horizontal loads (due to friction) on the basemat liner plate system were determined and compared against the liner plate i
system capacities determined originally.
The effects of the revised loads on the basemat concrete were p7s determined by initially calculating the incremental change in the Lk-loads discussed above.
The incremental change for each 6
individual loading is obtained by-subtracting the loads for the-preliminary rack layout (figure 4.5-21) from the loads for the final rack layout (figure 2.2-1).
The total' combined incremental change-(summation ~of the-incremental change for'each individual i
L loading) was an increase of 432 kips vertically for the governing i
DBE load combination.
The apparently large increase actually is D
equivalent to only 18% of the rack dead load.
This 18% value is used as a sc le factor for the rack dead load finite element model primary load case to obtain a loading which closely represents the 432 kips total combined incremental load change.
The finite element model results for this scaled loading were l
l then combined (using superposition techniques) with the O'
OPT 0328.6-3 I
2/90 6.3-12 Revision 6 9
l j
,'R preliminary: rack layout (figure 4.5-21) finite element model I/#
results to obtain the modified concrete section moments and 1
membrane forces.- These were then compared;to the original design moments and membrane forces.
Summary of Results The evaluation for the SFP' concrete walls showed that the resulting loads decreased; therefore, the results in tables 4.6-1 and 4.6-2 of LAR Revision 4 (which were based on the preliminary rack. layout) conservatively envelop the final results and changes were not deemed necessary as stated in footnotes "c" and "a" of these tables respectively.
The evaluation for the SFP basemat liner plate showed that-thez
.resulting loads increased, but were still less than the liner.
6 plate capacity.
The revised loads are shown in paragraph 4.6.1.3B.
The evaluation for the SFP concrete basemat showed that the
~
resulting loads increased, which resulted in ths following increases in the finite element membrane forces.and moments:
North-South Reinforcement:
l' Membrane force:
0.1% increase Moment:'
O.1% increase 1
OPT 0328.6-3 2/90 6.3-13 Revision 6
I?
i East-West Reinforcement:
- , ~y Membrane force
0.5% increase
~-
Moment:_
0.3% increase Therefore, the increased loads on the concrete basemat have negligible effect on the resulting membrane forces and moments, and the resulting concrete utilization factors would have a similar insignificant change.
Thus, the values in tables 4.6-11 and 4.6-2 were not revised.
In summary, the revised loads due to the deletion of one row of fuel storage locations were evaluated, but did not necessitate a change in tables 4.6-1 and 4.6-2 (which are based on the preliminary rack layout shown in figure 4.5-21).
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OPT 0328.6-3 2/90 6.3-14 Revision 6
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LQuestion.No. 5 i
.,, 1. j l Provide ~a summary of the pool floor concrete bearing stress-5
. evaluation methodology presented in last June's meeting.
Provide j
,.I y'c p
. final.results and design margins.
)
L Question: No. 5 Response 9,
1 h
1.0 POOL FIDOR BEARING STRESS ANALY M o
p l'.1 IntroductiQD-i i
.The SFP floor includes the presence of leak chases, piping supports and embedment plates, as wc11 as liner seam welds. LIn
[
many cases, allowable bearing pressures on the concrete are-1
. restricted, particularly in the vicinity of the leak chases.
~
'OV Additionally, near weld locations, no bearing load.is permitted-6 l' -
to be applied to'the relinar, consequently, it'is necessary in many; rack-support pad locations that bearing plates-(called floor
~
l:
L
-plates,;herein) be=used underneath the pad in order to adequately distribute the bearing load such that all limitations of concrete
~)
bearing stress are satisfied.
.The components of loading which are imparted to the floor plate n
l.
through the support pad consist of a vertical force and a p
(
horizontal. shear force.
The horizoatal shear force is loccted-at the midpoint of the length of the leveling screw, 4.37 inches above the liner surface, and produces an overturning moment which Ll;c l
I O :/N OPT 0328.6-3 L nd 2/90 6.3-15 Revision 6
- n
i must be reacted at the pool floor.
The loading on the support pad is schematically shown in figure 6.3-1.
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The 4.37-inch dimension is derived from the 2-inch maximum floor plate thickness plus the thickness of the leveling pad and half o
the free length of the leveling pad screw.
The assumption made in the analysis of the leveling screw is that the screw behaves as a guided cantilever beam; hence,.the horizontal shear force acts at the mid-length of the beam.
That assumption is confirmed 3
by the results from the finite element structural model of the fuel rack and its-supports.
i As-a result of seismic motion of the fuel rack, the pad may slide across the upper surface of the floor plate.
This produces an g
eccentricity between the line of action of the vertical load and-
-the centroidal axis of the floor plate which results in a moment 6
to be reacted by the concrete.
As discussed above, the horizontal shear force located a distance above the concrete also contributes a moment which must be reacted in:the concrete.
Since anchor bolts are not used with the floor plate, the plate has no capability of transmitting a tensile load to the concrete.
Consequently, all applied vertical force and moment loads must be reacted in the concrete through appropriate compressive bearing stress distributions.
A bearing stress distribution which reacts both-force and moment.is illustrated in figure 6.3-1.
h
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OPT 0328.6-3 2/90 6.3-16 Revision 6 9
i i
1.2 Criteria and' Allowable Stresses
-f_
.h The criteria governing the bearing strength of the concrete are taken-from ACI-349, Paragraph 10.15.
The limit is based on a maximum' bearing stress-of ' PHI x.85f' times a factor not greater than 2 which represents the square root of an area ratio.
For the bearing stress analysis, PHI = 0.7 and the concrete bearing
- strength, f'e, is 5100 psi (based on concrete placement tests, as stated in paragraph 4.6.1.2).
The maximum bearing stress allowable is then multiplied by the entire load bearing area-cf the concreto to obtain the allowable' bearing load.
Consequently, the following allowable stresses are used to compute the bearing strength of the concrete:
Within 4-inches of a leak chase:
Max stress =.7 (.85) (5100)
=
3034 psi.
for area ratio = 1.0 6
More than 4-inches from leak chase:
Max stress = 2(3034) =
6068 psi for area ratio = 2.0 j.
The allowable bearing strength will be the above stress values l
multiplied by the load bearing area of the concrete.
It should be noted that in cases where any part of the load bearing area of the floor plate produces load on the concrete within the 4-inch zone near'a leak chase, the entire load bearing area of the L
concrete has been limited to the 3034 psi value for computation I
of the bearing strength.
OPT 0328.6-3 L
2/90 6.3-17 Revision 6
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1;3: Aeolication of the Stranath Method of ACI-349
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~ The geometric configuration of the load bearing area under the floor plate is used to determine combinations of force and moment which can be reacted without exceeding the allowable bearing.
stress.
This produces a number of combinations, all of which represent limiting loads for the concrete.
A plot of these combinations, with vertical force on the vertical axis and moment on the horizontal axis is called an interaction diagram.
The analysis represents the plate as an eccentrically loaded-7 column without tension capability.
The interaction diagram does not have the shape typical of reinforced concrete columns, but.
I-rather returns to the origin.
This is necessitated by the fact that there is no capability of carrying tension between the floor 6
. plate and the concrete.
Consequently, there cannot be tension.
and. compression loads on opposite sides of the centroidal axis l
which produce a moment with no not axial force.
The limiting floor plate locations are those under which leak chases and/or reliner welds intersect, causing a reduced load bearing area beneath the plate.
In the case of the leak chases, a reduced allowable stress also must be used.
Observation of the f
geometry under the plate indicates that the interaction diagrams about the major axes of the plate may not be the limiting interaction diagrams.
Rotation about the diagonal of the plate can, for these floor conditions, result in a more limiting load carrying capability.
For floor plates at the intersection of OPT 0328.6-3 2/90 6.3-18 Revision 6 9
i leak chases and/or reliner welds, interaction diagrams were l
_. generated'for rotation about both major axes and diagonals of the
. plate to determine limiting' interaction diagrams.
The data points on the interaction diagram are combinations of (M,F),
where M is the moment and F is the force reacted by the compressive stress distribution.
s For rotation about the diagonal of the plate, the plate was initially assumed to be fully in contact with the floor with a-uniform bearing stress equal to the allowable stress determined i
[
previously.
This produces a value of reaction force and values L
of MX and MY about the major axes of the plate.
The plate was l-then assumed to begin to lift off at one. corner of the plate,.and a series of lines through the plate was evaluated to determine.
the reacted force and values of MX and MY for successively greater amounts of' separation from floor contact (i.e., greater overturning moments on the plate about the plate diagonal).
6 Figure 6.3-2 illustrates the concept of the method of calculating the interaction diagram about the diagonal axis of the rectangular plate.
The example represents the calculation of interaction diagrams consisting of (MX,F) and (MY,F).
These-combinations define the ability of the concrete to react moments about the axis drawn from corner C to corner-I of the plate.
This moment is referred to as moment toward the first quadrant.
Combinations of moment and force were ca.lculated based on a
=
uniform reaction distribution of PHI x 85f' carried over the surface of the plate in-contact with the floor above and toward I
OPT 0328.6-3 l-2/90 6.3-19 Revision 6 l
a
.i the right of sections 1 through 711n the figure.
No load was assumed reacted below and-to the left of the sections.
This
{
. represents a moment loading occurring about the diagonal axis of the plate with the plate lifting off the-floor below and to the left of the section being evaluated.
For the plate shown, seven data points on the interaction diagram were obtained.
From these seven data points, the shape of the interaction diagram can be approximated.
A more precise interLucion diagram curve could be determined by examining more sections.
However,_the interaction diagrams calculated using a small number of sections are inscribed within the more precise interaction diagrams and represent a conservative approximation of the load carrying capability of the concrete.
The interaction diagrams for each quadrant of the plate are very different from each other.
In the example shown in figure 6.3-2,-
6 the fourth quadrant is clearly more able to resist moment than.is the second quadrant, and the interaction diagrams reflect this capability.
Consequently, interaction diagrams for MX and MY for each of the four quadrants are developed, giving a total of eight interaction diagrams-for each floor plate.
Interaction diagrams typifying the results of the above methodology are shown in figures 6.3-3 through 6.3-6.
t.
Having determined the capability of the concrete to react forces and moments, it was then necessary to determine the forces and moments which were actually applied to the concrete.
The following sections describe the manner in which this was accomplished.
OPT 0328.6-3 2/90 6.3-20 Revision 6 l
1.4' Determination of Reaction Forces Unit load cases of two orthogonal horizontal shocks and a vertical deadweight case are evaluated using the linear structural models for both Region I and Region II racks in order to determine reaction force distribution to the various support pads.- This distribution is governed by the response of the rack to the seismic excitation at the given point in time and by the, relative stiffness of the rack components in the vicinity of the-support pada.
In figure 6.3-7, a typical Region II rack pad location pattern is shown.
The pads are generally referred to as
" interior," " side," and " corner" pads as shown in the figure.
The finite element reaction force distributions demonstrate that
.the maximum vertical and horizontal force reactions occur at the interior pads, with the side pads being 70%-95%-as large, and the 6
)
corner pads being about 40%-50% as large as the interior pad reactions.
This agrees with intuitive expectation of reaction.
force distribution resulting from the relative stiffness of the various locations.
The non-linear seismic model (subsection 4.5.2, and figures 4.5-11 and 4.5-12) provides time histories of the force and moment reactions at the interface between the rack and the concrete.
These time histories are then used to determine the actual magnitudes of the various pad reaction forces by scaling the unit load case results to the magnitudes determined by the non-linear seismic model results.
Although coefficients of friction of 0.2 and 0.8 were both evaluated in the non-linear OPT 0328.6-3 2/90 6.3-21 Revision 6 1
?
model, clearly the higher coefficient of friction produces the j
1 sj larger reaction forces on the floor.
Therefore,.all loads sA evaluated in the floor plate analysis are for the coefficient of friction of 0.8.
.I The reaction forces as determined by the preceding method are unfactored service loads.
Appendix D of Standard Review Plan Section 3.8.4 requires that when the strength method of ACI-349 is used, the following load factors be applied to.the unfactored service loads, and the design must be sized to the limiting set of loads:
1.4 DW + 1.9 OBE 1.0 DW + 1.25 DBE l
6 After review of all combinations of loads, coefficients of friction, Region I and Region II racks, standard and two times.
4 standard fuels, and load factors, the limiting case for evaluation of the bearing stress in the concrete is' determined to be the reaction forces resulting from Region II' racks for a coefficient of friction of 0.8 with two times standard fuel and for the factor 1.0 DW + 1.25 DBE. -This provides substantial conservatism in load magnitude over the standard fuel loads for which the plant is to be licensed.
i.
f OPT 0328.6-3 L
2/90 6.3-22 Revision 6 e
l' 1~.5.'
Pad Disolacement Calculations
- V
~
As discussed previously, the moment reacted by the concrete is a function of the height of the horizontal shear force from the liner surface and the eccentricity of the vertical force from the centroid of the floor plate.
The horizontal shear force height remains constant during the seismic event, but the eccentricity changes as the rack slides.
The results of the non-linear seismic analysis of the Region II I
racks provide a time history of the cornar pad displacements of l
the fuel rack.
Given these displacements, displacements of all-other pads can be obtained by interpolation.
To the seismic-L motions were added installation tolerances and thermal l
l displacements.- The tolerance and thermal motion was multiplied by the square root of 2 to represent a maximum eccentricity inn each component direction, and then added to the seismic 6
displacement vector.
This was done by algebraic addition, rather than vector addition, so a slight conservatism is introduced in the value of eccentricity computed.
1.6 Anelled Loads As in any time history analysis, a very large number (approximately 80,000) of load combinations is produced by the finite element analysis.
In order to avoid the necessity of I
reviewing thousands of load cases, conservative combinations of
. parameters were made to simplify the effort.
In general, five parameters govern the magnitude of the force and moment OPT 0328.6-3 2/90 6.3-23 Revision 6 i
m
_ - - -_ -~
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1 transmitted to the concrete.
They are:
(1) the magnitude of the f's vertical force,- (2) the magnitude of the horizontal' force, (3) 1 the direction of the horizontal force, (4) the magnitude of the eccentricity of: the pad on top of the support plate, and (5) the j
direction of the eccentricity of the pad on top of the support plate.. The eccentricity is defined as the vector sum of the'X and Y' displacement components of.the pad motion during the seismic event plus all installation tolerances and thermal motions.
Each of these parameters can vary independently with.
time.
Among the conservatisms employed to simplify the effort are:
A.
The vector sum of the horizontal shear force components FX and FY is used and is assumed to lie along the line of i
action of the displacement vector of the pad.
This directly combines the moments.due to the vertical and 6
horizontal forces.
This is conservative because it~
produces an algebraic sum of the moments'rather than the vector sum and treats both moments as having the same r
algebraic sign, when at times they may oppose each other.
t This results in larger total moments than would actually occur.
B.. Tolerance stackups and thermal growths are assumed to accumulate in the most conservative fashion and in the
{
same direction as the seismic motion of the pad.
This produces conservative total eccentricity magnitudes and
()
OPT 0328.6-3 2/90 6.3-24 Revision 6 r
e
I I
i conservatively large moments.resulting from the applied vertical force.
As-mentioned earlier, interaction diagrams were developed for each of the four quadrants of a floor plate.. Actual displacement components were reviewed at several limiting points-in time to determine into which quadrant of the floor plate the pad is displacinq at a given time, and as a result, toward which R
quadrant of~the floor plate the moment is acting.
Regardless of.
the actual direction of motion into the quadrant, the resulting components of moment were plotted against the interaction diagram for motion normal to the diagonal axis of the plate.
This is conservative, since the interaction diagram about the diagonal _of the plate is the limiting interaction diagram for any section l
through the centroid of the plate.
l 6
L.
The factored force and moment components were plotted against interaction diagrams for the limiting floor plates in the vicinity of intersections of leak chases and/or welds.
The limiting margins occurred for a pad designated as Pad 8-23.
Results for that pad are shown in figures 6.3-3 through 6.3-6 for
- the limiting evaluation case (2 timei standard fuel) which is described in the last paragraph of section 1.4, Determination of Reaction Forces.
All force and moment combinations evaluated fall within the
[
respective interaction diagram curves.
The quantified margin to the allowable is calculated based on force and moment remaining in the same proportion as they increase toward the boundaries of
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OPT 0328.6-3 2/90 6.3-25 Revision 6
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e.the envelope.
Assillustrated'in figure 6.3-5,-the minimum margin i
to'.tho' allowable is found to be'O.06.
Therefore,-the criteria ~of
- ACI-349-havelbeen' satisfied.
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6.3-26 Revision 6
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LOADING ON SUPPORT PAD Figure 6.3-1 a:
l: M OPT 0328.6-3
' I M-2/90 6.3-27 Revision 6
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1 QUADRANT DEFINITION
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1 CORRESPONDING TO A POINT ON THE BOUNDARY 3
4 0F THE INTERACTION DIACRAM SECTION AND QUADRANT IDENTIFICATION FOR INTERACTION DIAGRAM Figure 6.3-2 OPT 0328.6-3 2/90 6.3-28 Revision 6 s
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MK FOR PAD 8 23, MRST QUADRANT ALLthd4BLE STRESS e 3034 Psi j
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t MY FOR PAD 8 23, MRST QUADRANT ALLOWABLE STRESS e 3034 PSI O
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INTERACTION DIAGRAMS FOR FIRST QUADRANT l
Figure 6.3-3 OPT 0328.6-3 2/90 6.3-29 Revisi6n 6
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~ h' 1[f MX FOR PAD 8-23, SECOND QUADRANT l
ALLOWastt sistst e 30M Psi
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Attawasta stats:. 30u pal-as 6
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MOMENT (IN Las)
INTERACTION DIAGRAMS FOR SECOND QUADRANT Figure 6.3-4 OPT 0328.6-3 2/90 6.3-30 Revision 6
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MOMENT (IN'Les)
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NOMENT (IN Les)
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INTERACTION DIAGRAMS FOR FOURTH QUADRANT Figure 6.3-6 OPT 0328.6-3 2/90 6.3-32 Revision 6 f
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