ML20003E508
| ML20003E508 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/08/1977 |
| From: | Minogue R NRC OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20003E503 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8104030805 | |
| Download: ML20003E508 (32) | |
Text
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Apper. dix 3 to Er.eleme "sa Doci et no. PR-71, 73 (40FR23768)
TO RECIPIENTS OF THE TRMSPORTATION j
FINAL ENVIRONiiENT/L STATEIENT (NUREG-0170)
Enclosed for your information is a final environ =cntal statcment dealing with the transportation of radioactive material by air and other modes.
The document has bee.n prepared in support of the Nuclear Regulatory Comission's advanced notice of rule making proceeding published in the Federal Register on June 2,1975 (40FR23768), a copy of which is enclosed for your use.,
Pursuant to the' National Environmental Policy Act of 1959 and the Ccemission's regulations in 10 CFR Part 51 " Licensing and Regulatory Policy and Procedures for Environmental Protection," the Comission's Office of Standards Development issued a draft envirnnmental statement on Transportation in March,1976. After considt-ation of the 28 letters of coment received from the public and from Federal, State and local l
agencies, a final environmental statement on the Transportation of Radioactive ifatarial by Air and Other f*. odes has been issued and designated NUREG-0170.
Taking into account the conclusions of the final environmental stata-ment, public coments received on the proceeding, and other information, the Nuclear Regulatory Comission will consider the disposition of the i
rule making proceeding announced on June 2,1975. Persens with views on the content or conclusions of the final environmental statement
[
which may be helpful to the Comission in its deliberation should file i
such co=cnts by March 15, 1973 uith the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Washington, D. C.
20555, Atte'ntion:
Director, Office of
, Standards-Development.
If sufficient ner.d for clarification of the
. ' final environmental statement becomes apparent, the Office of Str.
Development will consider holding one or more public meetings for this purpose.
fC i
u l
Robert B'. !!!nogue, Director Office of Standards Development
Enclosures:
1.
Advanced Notice of Rule Making
' ' Proceeding
' 2.
Final Environmental Statement 59
~
Am"di* 3 to I"olo= "5" 810 40 3 0305t
Appendix 4 to Enclosure "B" PUBLIC COMMENTS AFTER ISSUANCE OF FES-STAFF RESPONSES Number Commenter Page 101 Louisiana Dept. of Urban & Community Affairs 61 102 New Jersey Dept. of Community Affairs 61 103 South Dakota State Planning Bureau 61 104 Virginia Electric and Power Company 61 105 Vermont Agency of Environmental Conservation 63 106 Utah State Planning Coordinator 64 107 Indiana State Board of Health 64 108 Alaska State Policy Development & Planning 65 109 Delaware Office of Management, Budget, and Planning 65 110 General Electric Nuclear Energy Business Group 65 111 Leboeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae 69 112 Connecticut Power Facility Evaluation Council 69 113 Transnuclear, Inc.
71 114.
Pennsylvania State Clearinghouse 71 115 Nevada Department of Human Resources 72 116 Virginia Council on the Environment 72 117 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 73 118 New York Department of Law 76 119
.New York. Department of Law 79 60 Enclosure "B"
SUMMARY
OF PUBLIC COMMENTS AFTER ISSUANCE OF FES Comment No. 101:
Louisiana Dept. of Urban & Community Affairs Have reviewed the document with respect to agency responsibility and impact, and notified others of its availability.
Staff Response:
None necessary.
Comment No. 102:
New Jersey Dept. of Community Affairs Document has met the State of New Jersey clearinghouse requirements.
Have circulated to appropriate State agencies, none of which voiced any objections.
Staff Resoonse:
Nona necessary.
Comment No. 103:
South Dakota State Planning Bureau No resources at this time (presumably with which to review the document).
Staff Response:
None necessary.
Comment No. 104: Virginia Electric and Power Company General support for the conclusions developed by NRC staff.
In particular, agree that the environmental impacts are sufficiently small to' allow continued 61 Enclosure "B"
shipments by all modes and that no immediate changes to the present transporta-tion regulations are needed at this time.
1 Also agree that successful theft or sabotage constitute no major adverse impact on the environment.
Shipments of spent fuel do not constitute a threat to the public health and safety because of the protection afforded by the various safety provisions (e.g. shipping containers).
Staff Response:
These are conclusions staff specified in the Final Environmental Statement (FES).
After completion of the FES a number of follow-on studies were initiated.
One of these studies deals with the transport of radioactive material through urban environs (TRUE).
A draft technical assessment of the environmental impacts of the TRUE was conducted by Sandia Laboratories.
The assessment suggests that the sabotage of spent fuel shipments has the potential for producing serious radiological consequences in areas of high population density. The conclusions of the technical assessment led, in part, to the
' establishment of rules for the physical protection of irradiated reactor fuel in transit.
Comment: No.need for further clarification of FES.
Document is adequate basis for determining final disposition of rulemaking proceeding.
Staff Response:
Staff believes that FES'in combination with public comments and sa'aty record is adequate basis for closing rulemaking proceeding without further' action at this time.
~
62 Enclosure "B"-
1
Comment No. 105:
Vermont Agency of Environmental Conservation Comment 105a: Any radiation exposure to the general public in excess of natural background is unacceptable and indicates a flaw in the system.
Staf f Response:
It is not physically possible to shield all radiation from radioactive material in transit, and hence there must be some exposure to members of the general public if the benefits of the uses of radiation are to be maintained.
Since general population exposures are now at a very low level (Items 3a and 8b of Summary and Conclusions, NUREG-0170), staff believes that further reductions should be required only on a cost effective basis as a ALARA consideration.
Comment 105b:
Shipment of high level waste and spent fuel by air should be discontinued and eliminated as an alternative.
Staff Response:
The shipment survey on which the analysis in NUREG-0170 is based disclosed no air shipments of high level wastes or spent fuel by air, nor any inclination to do so.
The heavy shielding required for the packaging of such materials makes air shipment impractical.
Comment 105c: -Benefits should be expressed, "in a format of lives saved vs.
lives lost'rather than the traditional cost benefit ' money oriented' method.
If lives are lost due to accident, etc.,-then the cost to correct the situation
-always escalates way beyond any predictions that were made in order to correct the problem..."
63 Enclosure "B"
Staff Resoonse:
The impact analysis in NUREG-0170 expresses impacts in terms of latent cancer fatalities and early deaths. The analysis of the cost-effectiveness of alternatives specifies changes in these fatalities, but also includes other factors of importance such as the cost of implementing the alternative.
The value of $1000 per person-rem used by the staff in balancing costs and benefits is thought to be a very conservative equivalency, corre-sponding in_most cases to many millions of dollars per fatality.
Staff would not expect this value to be exceeded ir any real accident.
Comment No. 106:
Utah State Planning Coordinator Have reviewed the document and offer no comment.
Staff Response:
None necessary.
Comment No. 107:
Indiana State Board of Health Have reviewed and have no adverse comment.
Suggest adding requirement that package recipient be identified prior to transfer f' rom carriage.
-Staff Response: A letter has been sent to the commenter indicating that a) 00T has established, in Part 101 of 49 CFR, hazardous materials accounta-bility standards, which if.used by carriers, will prevent the unauthorized transfer of radioactive material, and b) requirements placed on carriers fall under the jurisdiction of the 00T.
64 Enclosure "B"
Comment No. 108:
Alaska Office of the Governor Have reviewed the project and have no comment.
Staff Response: None necessary.
Comment No. 109: - Delaware Office of Management, Budget and Planning Thanks for opportunity to review FEIS.
Have no comments at this time.
Staff Response:
None necessary.
Comment No. 110:
General Electric Co. - Nuclear Energy Business Group Comment 110a:
No major quarrel with the broad aspects of NUREG-0170.
The information it presents shows-that the environmental impact of the transporta-tion of radioactive material is small.
The scope of the study was expanded beyond the original intent.
It should have been restricted to consider radio-active material for which air transportation is at least an alternative.
Instead the report covers all shipments of all types of radioactive material.
Staff Response: The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 requires that the relative cost and benefit of alternatives to certain proposed federal actions be fully considered.
ThusLit is necessary to examine the shipment of material by transport modes that offer an alternative to air shipment.
In determining the risks associated with various transport modes, it is useful to determine the transportation risk for all types of shipments and modes so that 65 Enclosure "B" '
a- -.
g-
~
a basis can be established for determining the relative risk of one set of transport parameters to another.
Comment 110b:
Release model I is unduly conservative and unrealistic.
Why is it used in the calculations?
Staff Response: Model I release fractions are based on no releases occuring up to the regulatory test limit and complete failure of the packaging in environments that exceed this limit.
Although it is recognized that Model I release fractions are very conservative, accident risk calculations based on this model provide an indication of the maximum impacts that can be expected regardless of how much real packages normally exceed the regulatory requirements.
Comment 110c:
In analyzing the cost-effectiveness of transporting packages containing radioactive material (RAM) by truck instead of by air, the amount of additional Mo-99 needed has been underestimated.
A cross-country truck shipment would require two times the activity as an air shipment, rather than the 10% estimated.
Such a transport mode shift would also affect shipments of Xe-133.
In addition,_the value of a more rapid delivery by air compared to truck should be included in any cost-effectiver.ess analysis.
Staff Response:
In NUREG-0170, it is estimated that on the average about 10%
more Mo-99 would be needed in a shipment transported by truck instead of by air...This is based on an average shipment distance.
It is true that for a cross-country shipment more Mo-99 wculd be needed than for an averace shipment.
'6 Enclosure "B" 6
In NUREG-0170, the conclusion is reached that shifting the transport of RAM packages from air to truck may be cost-effective.
This conclusion is based on the fact that the savings in shipping charges exceed the cost of the additional radiation exposure that would result from the transport mode shift.
Although there may be some cases where the value of rapid delivery should be included in the cost-effectiveness analysis, it is not clear that this is always the case.
For routine, periodic shipments it would appear that increasing the initial activity to compensate for the increased transit time and shipping by truck instead of by air is cost-effective.
For these cases it is not rapid delivery, but timely reliable delivery that is important.
It should be noted that shipment by air may result in more reliable delivery than shipment by truck and this may alter the cost-benefit ratio.
It is recogni::ed that for special cases, such as an emergency, rapid delivery is of paramount importance and for these cases the value of rapid delivery should be included in any cost-effective analysis.
On page vi of NUREG-0170 it is stated that cost-effective alternatives dealing with changes in mode of transport did not significantly reduce the radiologi-cal impact. As a result no regulatory action is required in this area, no further NRC study of this matter is planned and an examination of the affect on Xe-133 shipments will not be undertaken. The decision on which'made is most cost-effective is being left to the shipper.
i Comment 110d:
Agree with the conclusions reached in NUREG-0170 with regard to transportation of spent fuel. However, urge that the final statement include the complete industry rebuttal testimony presented before the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in order to balance the ICC testimony provided to 67 Enclosure "B"
the NRC by the American Association of Railroads, some of which was included in Section J of NUREG-0170.
Staff Resoonse:
NUREG-0170 is a Final Environmental Statement.
Immediate revision of this document is not planned and therefore the commenter's request can not be accommodated.
Placement of the complete industry rebuttal testimony in the NRC's Public Document Room (POR) could be done to satisfy the commenter's request. However, although the public would have the coraplete industry rebuttal testimony available, only a portion of the railroads' testimony would be available in the NRC's POR.
In fairness to all parties, a statement will be placed in the NRC's POR concerning the availability of the ICC hearing record.
The statement.will direct members of the public, who wish to investigate further the issue of special train service, to the ICC's Public Docket Rocm where the complete ICC hearing record can be found.
Comment 110e:
Commenter's position on-the rulemaking proceeding consists of the following four basic points.
There is no practical alternative to passenger aircraft shipments of radiophannacueticals.
Existing packaging regulations afford a high degree of protection.
A strong enforcement program, coupled with. certification of shipper, would increase effectiveness of existing egula-tions.
Special train service is not required for the transportation of spent fuel by-rail.
Staff Response:
These four points will be taken into consideration in the disposition of the rulemaking. proceeding.
68 Enclosure "B" e
m.-r-
Comment No. 111:
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby, & MacRae Apolaud Commission's effort.
Believe NUREG-0170 should eliminate doubt that current regulations are adequate.
Pleased that their comments on special train service are reflected in NUREG-0170 and that the conclusion is made that special train service is not a cost-effective alternative.
Believe that accident risk assessment is excessively conservative, but agree with conclusion that total accident risk is small compared to normal transportation risk and that further reduction in risk would not be cost-effective.
Urge that NUREG-0170 serve as a basis for decision making and that no further refinement is necessary.
Staff Response:
None necessary.
Comment No. 112:
Connecticut Power Facility Evaluation Council Comment 112a:
Express hope that the NRC, in reviewing its regulations, will censider carrier-transport aspects, factors unique to the urban environment and the additive effects of military shipments.
Staff Response:
NUREG-0170 included some carrier-transport aspects that are related to environmental impacts.
For example, the radiation exposure of the transport crew and cargo handlers are included in determining the impact of accident free transport.
Carrier accident probabilities are used in the section where the risks associated with accidents involving radioactive material are determined.
Some of the alternatives examined in Chapter 6 deal with carrier-transport aspects. Alternatives that appear to be cost-effective and result in a reduction in the radiological risk are being further reviewed.
69 Enclosure "B"
v As noted in the comment, factors unique to the urban environment are the subject of an on going study which will result in a generic environmental impact statement on this subject.
The relation of benefits to impacts for military shipments is evaluated on a different basis than that for transporting other radioactive material.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, exempts nuclear weapons from licensing and other regulatory controls. Military shipments are therefore outside the jurisdiction of the NRC.
Comment 112b:
Four factors have been identified that will reduce the transpor-tation risk. They are:
shift in transportation mode, operational constraints on transportation vehicles, packaging requirements, and change > in physical properties.
More atte,ntion should be given these factors and efforts should be made to provide NRC with cost / benefit information in order to reduce the radiological impact to a level as low as reasonably achievable.
Staff Response:
The NRC is conducting a modal. study that will examine estab-lishing packaging standards and regulations for specific modes of transporta-tion which may result in shifting some packages from one mode to another.
In the area of operational constraints on transport vehicles, the NRC is partici-pating with the DOT in analyzing the value of establishing routing restrictions for various categories of radioactyve material packages.
The NRC is in the process of establishing'a policy on maintaining radiation exposures as low as is reasonably achievable regarding licensee shipping practices.
This will include an examination of packaging requirements.
In the area of changes in 70 Enclosure "B"
phyrical properties, the NRC will conduct research in this area and if neces-sary, will prepare an Environmental Impact Statement to support a rule to establish chemical physical forms for radioactive material transport.
Comment 112c: The effectiveness of the NRC regulations and the resulting decrease in risk is dependent upon the enforcement and implementation of these regulations.
Staff Response:
Agree that adequate enforcement of regulations is necessary to achieve decrease in risk.
Comment No. 113: Transnuclear, Inc.
Agrees with and supports the determination that current regulations provide adequate safety to the public under normal and accident conditions.
-Staff Response:.None necessary.
Comment No. 114:
Pennsylvania State Clearinghouse l
Appropriate state agencies have reviewed the document and no comments are 1
offered.
?
Staff Response:
None necessary.
71 Enclosure "B"-
L
Comment No. 115:
Nevada Department of Human Resources Have noted on many occasions that airport workers and freight truck drivers lean or rest on packages containing radioactive material.
Recommend educating workers on the nature of radiation.
Staff Response:
Upon receipt of this comment, a letter was sent to the Nevada Governor's Office of Planning Coordination (who forwarded the Department of Human Resources' comment) outlining some actions that have already been taken to educate transport workers.
These actions consist of the preparation and distribution of booklets and wall posters designed to provide cargo workers with simple ir.ctructions to avoid unnecessary radiation exposures when handling shipments of radioactive materials.
The booklets also provide basic information on radiation, radioactive material packages, and emergency procedures during an accident involving these packages.
Comment No. 116: Virginia Council on the Environment-Several state agencies participated in the review of the Final Environmental
-Impact Statement.
No objections to the statement are made and no substantive comments are offered.
Staff Response:
None necessary.
-72 Enclosure "B"
Comment No. 117:
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Comn. ant 117a:
The discussion of dose to aircraft passengers explains the assumptions used to arrive at the dose values presented.
Houver, there is no explanation as to how the doses calculated in the draft EIS are related to those given in the final EIS.
Staff Response:
In terms of Integrated population exposure, the difference between 866 person-rem (Table IV-8, NUREG-0034) and 2330 person-rem (Table 4-15, NUREG 0170) results from the modification of the standard shipments model and the-increased number of persons per flight.
The TI/ year by passenger aircraft 5
5 went from 2.1 x 10 to 4.33 x 10 and passengers per flight went from 60 to 78
.(Table IV-3, NUREG-0034; Table 4-1, NUREG-0170).
Comment 117b: 'In speaking of the most exposed group, the draft EIS gave an average value of 60 mrem per year, while in the final EIS it is stated that members of what we assume to be the same group "would each receive, on the average,108 mrem per year".
Since there is no mention of the maximum individual dose, it would appear necessary to assume that the maximum individual dose has also increased by a factor of 1.8, which increases that dose beyond the 500 mrem per year limit established by the Federal Radiation Council and reflected in the NRC regulation 10 CFR Part 20.
Staff Response:
The values _ reported in the draft EIS were based on calcula-tions that used assumptions.that are different than those used to obtain the values reported in the final EIS.
It is, therafore, net correct to simply scale the values in the draft EIS to obtain a value for the maximum individual 73 Enclosure "B"
dose.
In any case, whatever assumptions are used to cbtain specific dose estimates, 'he conclusion remains valid that it is unlikely that any one airline passenger would receive an exposure in excccs of 500 mr in a year due to air transport of radioactive material.
Coment 117c: The EPA recomendation to FAA that radiation dose rate at seat level be limited to 0.5 mr/hi by the use of additional shielding is a cost effective method of reducing exposure to a level that is as low as reasonably achievable.
This alternative should have received detailed analysis in the EIS.
Staff Response:
This alternative is addressed in Section 6.3.7 of NUREG-0170.
However, as stated in Section 6.5 of NUREG-0170, the analysis of alternatives in Chapter 6 was performed in order' to identify alternatives which may be cost effective and therefore merit further study.
Although it is recognized that additional shielding will reduce radiation exposure, an analysis of the EPA recomendation performed by Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories (Refer-ence 6-19 in NUREG-0170) indicates that implementation of the recommendation would not be cost effective.
Coment 117d:
NUREG-0170 used the health effects model Geveloped in the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400).
This choice is inappropriate for several reasons.
WASH-1400 uses a dose reduction factor (ORF) which reduces risk estimates.
Use of a DRF_ for low dose / low dose rates is incorrect.
Upper risk estimates in WASH-1400 correspond to lowest risk estimates in 1972 SEIR report.
The "best estimate" of risk in the BEIR report is twice the upper
- isk in WASH-1400.'. EPA has concluded that for acute high dose exposure, WASH-la00 under estimates health risk by a factor of 2 and for enconic low dose exposure
- 74 Enclosure "B"
by a factor of 10.
EPA recommends using the BEIR report in its unmodified form.
Staff Resoonse:
The health effects model used in NUREG-0170 is not identical to that used in WASH-1400 although the NUREG-0170 analysis does use LCF risk coefficients derived in WASH-1400. The risk coefficients used were not based on a dose reduction factor. This is indicated in the last sentence to the second paragraph of page 3-13 of NUREG-0170 where it is stated that the LCF coefficients used do not reflect possible mitigation due to low dose rates.
Some changes were made in the EEIR risk estimates in the WASH-1400 analysis.
These changes are based on data accumulatad since the BEIR report was published and are discussed in Section 9.3.2.2 of Appendix VI to WASH-1400.
Comment 117e:
From the draft EIS to the final EIS, the estimated total popula-tion dose to the package handlers in airports was increased from 581 person-rem per year to 1740 person-rem per year; the 1985 projection increased from 1640 person-rem per year to 4480 person-rem per year.
However, the maximum individual ' dose is given in Table 4-19 as 500 mrem per year, which is lower than the estimate given in the draft EIS even though the population dose has increased by a. factor of 3.
Using the draft EIS method to calculate this individual dose yields an annual dose of 1.4 rem per year.
EPA would hope this i
is an oversight on NRC's part; however, since the entire discussion on handlers was omitted in the final. EIS, there.is no way EPA can verify NRC's numbers.
Staff Resoonse:
EPA is incorrectly reading Table IV-8 of NUREG-0034 and Table 4-15 of NUREG-0170.
Dose to airport package handlers increased from 302 person-rem (205 + 97) in NUREG-0034 to 449 person-rem (433 + 16) in 75 Enclosure "B"
This change is entirely due to changes in the standard shipments rodel:
slightly more than twice the TI/ year by passenger aircraft and about 1/10 the TI/ year by cargo aircraft in NUREG-0170.
The large change from 581 to 1740 person-rem per year is total handler dosa, including all modes of shipment.
This, too, is due to changes in the standard shipments model, 6
principally in the TI/ year shipped by secondary modes (1.18 x 10 in NUREG-0170
%s e 5
versus 4.0 x 10 in NUREG-0034) and the number of handlings per shipment (1 in NUREG-0034 versus 2 in NUREG-0170).
The 500 mrem / year upper limit is based on a 1977 airport survey, as noted.
EPA apparently overlooked Section 4.4 of Chapter 4 on page 4-29, entitled
" Exposure to Handlers," where this information is discussed.
Comment 118:
New York State Department of Law Comment 118a:
Comments previously submitted on trie Draft Environmental State-ments, NUREG-0034, are equally valid with respect to the Final Environmental 1 atement, NUREG-0170.
Many of the comments were evaded by the NRC staff and others were rejected without any justification.
Staff Response:
No attempt was made to evade or reject without justification comments submitted by the New York State Department of Law.
Appropriate
~
comments are addressed in Section 8.4 of NUREG-0170 and included the staff response to specific comments outlining the NRC staff position on the issues raised.
76 Enclosure "8"
Comment 118b:
NRC staff arguments against the use of military transport are at best insubstantial, e.g., the Posse Commitatus Act has no relevance to the comments of the NY State Attorney General.
The Attorney General disagrees with the NRC Staff assertion that commercial transport systems are, or can be made, adequate to protect SNM.
Staff Response:
There is apparently disagreement between the NRC legal staff and that of New York State concerning the applicability of the Posse Cem-mitatus Act to the situation under consideration.
Such legal disagreements can only be settled by judicial decision.
In any case the primary basis for the NRC staff position, that the use of military transport for movement of SNM is unnecessary, is that protection provided by the private sector is adequate to defeat the current threat. Additional safeguard measures can be imposed should the threat level increase.
Comment 118c:
Attached to the comments of the Attorney General is an analysis by three U.S. Naval Reserve Officers that outlines the current political environ-ment concerning terrorist activities, presents assumptions used in developing scenarios leading to diversion of SNM, identifies personnel and equipment required to implement the scenarios and finally, provides details of two scenarios resulting in the diversion of SNM.
Staff Response: The analysis postulates a maximum credible threat and shows that this threat could be successfu! in unauthorized diversion of SNM.
The Commission's position regarding the necessity of employing safeguards measures designed to combat the maximum credible threat is contained in a Memorandum and Order published in the FEDERAL REGISTER on January 27, 1977 (42 FR 5150).
77 Enclosure "B"
It is stated here that the maximum credible threat concept is not now part of NRC safeguards policy. " The reason for this policy is, in part, due to the fact that there does not now appear to be sufficient sophistication in safeguards analysis to establish conclusively the precise nature and level of threats.
Current safeguards policy therefore relies on extrapolation from historical evidence and communication with law enforcement authorities and with other Federal agencies having experience and expertise in this or related areas.
Maximum credible threats which specify the number of participants are essen-tially matters of judgments.
Such judgments, together with the other available information, have been taken into account by the Commission in arriving at its safeguards decisions.
The NRC has upgraded the physical protection requirements in Part 73 of 10 CFR.
The revised regulations were published in the FEDERAL REGISTER (44 FR 68184), on November 28, 1979. As part of this rulemaking action, the Commission directed that a reevaluation of the threat studies be conducted by the staff. The results of this reevaluation do not impact the level of threat to be considered in safeguards system design.
Comment 118d:
Another attachment to the comments of the Attorney General is an affidavit by Theodore T. Mason and Robert R. Leamer dated November 30, 1975.
The affidavit supports the position that there is a substantial likelihood that a motivated, trained, and equipped group of terrorists could be suc-cessful in destroying or seizing SNM in the course of its transportation by commercial air and related connecting ground services.
Staff Response:
This affidavit has been previously submitted to the NRC by the New York-State Department of Law.in connection with comments on the Draft Environmental Statement, NUREG-0034.
The NRC Staff response to points raised 78 Enclosure "B"
in the affidavit can be found in Section 8.4 of the Final Environmental State-ment, NUREG-0170.
The NRC staff position continues to be that the physical protection affordable through the private sector is adequate to protect against the postulated threat level and the use of military force is neither legal nor necessary.
Comment 119:
New York Department of Law Comment 119a: With respect to accident stress, staff lacks sufficient data to support its conclusions.
Staff Resconse:
At the time NUREG-0170 was issued, the best available " accident stress" information was used.
Data from subsequent experiments provided increased confidence that the accident model overpredicts accident consequences and risks. Thus, the public is correctly advised that accident risks and consequences are smaller than those indicated in NUREG-0170.
Comment 119bi Staff criticizes the comments of the Attorney General and Karl Z.
Morgan regarding resuspension of plutonium after dispersal, without providing any basis.
More critically, staff does not follow the plutonium pathway after dispersal.
Even accepting staff's rejection of resuspension, staff leaves unanswered a crucial question:
i~
If it is not resuspended, where does the plutonium, toxic for 250,000 years, go?
79 Enclosure "B"
The impact of this statement is not addressed at all for its full life thereby invalidating staff's conclusions as to insignificant impact.
Staff Resoonse:
The comments of the Attorney General and Karl Z. Morgan, among others, were not criticized and in fact, they resulted in additional consideration being given to resuspension.
Resuspension factors are given in Table A-7 of NUREG-0170.
For plutonium, resuspension increases the initial dose. received during cloud passage by a factor of up to 1.6.
The comments by Dr. Morgan and others on the significance of the ingestion pathway in plutonium dose calculations were criticized.
Current dosimetric models indicate that the ingestion of resuspended plutonium will add negligibly to the inhalation dose for resuspended plutonium.
The discussion in Appendix C of NUREG-0170, that addresses the ingestion pathway for plutonium, was expanded and additional references ware provided.
P-lutonium deposits from accidents which are not resuspended or cleaned up because surface concentrations are below hazard levels are left in place.
This is similar to the situation for other hazardous materials such as lead I
from auto exhaust or asbestos which are left in place because they exist as very dilute deposits.
Comment'119c: At pp. 8-39 to 8-41, staff's dose calculations and model are wrong; they are in obvious and serious conflict with Karl Z. Morgan's work and comments.
Staff Response:
On pages 8-39 and 8-40 of NUREG-0170, it is stated that the
' plutonium dose calculations in NUREG-0170 differ'from those of Dr. Morgan
-because.different assumptions concerning particle size and time of exposur 80 Enclosure "B"
were chosen.
The assumptions used in NUREG-0170 were chosen to fit trans-portation accident situations and are believed to be c'orrect for the scenarios analyzed.
Comment 119d: With respect to crush and puncture accidents (pp. 8-53, 56, 57,
- 58) staff fails to respond meaningfully to the Attorney General's comments.
One paper by Clark, et al, is cited.
(Consultants for the Attorney General have not been able to procure a copy of this paper upon which staff relies so heavily. Apparently it is an unpublished internal staff document.) Otherwise staff has no data to justify these conclusions.
~
Staff Response:
The basis for excluding crush, puncture, and shrapnel is justified in the referenced report. This report is not an " unpublished internal staff document". -The report was prepared by Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, and is document number SLA-74-0001, " Severities of Transportation Accidents-Volumes I through IV" by R. K. Clarxa, J. T. Foley, W. F. Hartman, and D. W. Larson.
The report is av'ailable, on request, from Sandia Laboratories.
l Comment 119e: In its analysis, staff improperly uses plutonium particles much l
larger than those actually found in shipments by the commercial sector, for-i example, in the shipments through J.F. Kennedy International Airport in 1974.
i
- The use of a different distribution of particle sizes invalidates staff's' conclusions (p. 8-67).
Staff Response:
The reference material which-served as a basis for the plu-tonium particle size distribution is cited in Section A.4.2.of Appendix'A.
An 81 Enclosure "B" L
additional reference (" Plutonium Aerosol Size Characteristics", Elder, et al, HPJ, 27, pp. 45-53, 1974) confirms that actual industrial plutonium aerosols would be expected to have diameters between 1 and 5 micrometres AMAD.
In any case the respirable fraction of 1974 plutonium shipments through JFK Airport is about twice as large as that used in NUREG-0170.
Even if this higher respirable fraction had been used, the staff's conclusion concerning the relative risk of plutonium shipments would not be substantially changed.
Comment 119f:
Staff admits integrating over wind speed, turbulence factors, etc. to find an " average" condition.
Staff has thereby failed to address the worst case situation.
Staff Response:
As discussed on p. 5-28, the meteorological information, as presented in Figure 5-7 (p. 5-29), does not represent average conditions, but 95th percentile information.
This means that the areas within the concentra-tion isopleths are exceeded in only 5% of all possible meteorological condi-tions.
Thus, this is a worst-case condition.
Comment 119g: ' Staff totally ignores the real economic impacts of a dispersal of plutonium in a metropolitan region.
Staff Response:
In Section 5.5 of NUREG-0170, the consequences of contamination from accidents is determined.
Included in this determination are the economic costs associated with decontamination, interdiction, evacuation and ir 'me loss.
In Table 5-14, some of the economic costs of a severe accidt
'<i ng place in a very high density urban area involving a shipment of plutonium are presented.
Note that.as mentioned on page 5-38, cost estimates in this analysis represent only order of magnitude accuracy.
82 Enclosure "B"
Comment 119h:
NUREG-0170 fails to address transport of radioactive materials in particular kinds of areas and circumstances such as metropolitan regions, including New York City.
It does not address the site-specific hazards and potential impacts of such transport.
Staff Response: NUREG-0170 is a generic study of certain aspects of the transportation of radioactive materials.
As a generic study it did not address any site-specific hazards that might be associated with the transport of radioactive material in metropolitan regions such as New York City., Note that in Section 5.6, the risks associated with severe accidents in very high population density urban areas are examined.
In addition, in Section 6.3.1, the results of restricting radioactive material transport to avoid high-population zones are briefly described..
As a follow-on study to NUREG-0170, an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on the transportation of radioactive material,in an urban environment is currently being prepared.
This EIS will provide more detail on this subje'ct.
Comment 1191:
The scope of the statement has been improperly limited to the shipper packaging aspects of the transportation of radioactive materials and does not adequately deal with the important carrier-transport issues.
See NUREG-0170, at p. iii.
/
Staff Response:_ NUREG-0170 was developed as part of the NRC's effort to reevaluate its regulations concerning the transportation of radioactive mate-rials.
The purpose of NUREG-0170 was to determine the environmental impact of-this transportation.
Carrier-transport aspects were included where they were related to an environmental impact.
For example, the radiation exposure of 83 Enclosure "B"
the transport crew and cargo handlers are included in determining the impact of accident free transport.
Carrier accident probabilities are used in the section where the risks associated with accidents involving radioactive mate-rial are determined.
Finally, in the section that deals with alternatives, some of the alternatives that are examined deal with carrier-transport aspects.
These alternatives involve transport mode shifts, route restrictions, and other operational constraints.
Comment 119f:
NUREG-0170 does not purport to be an EIS with respect to the NRC's individual actions in licensing the transportation of radioactive materials.
Such actions must be the subject of EIS's.
The " final environmental state-ment" does not purport to be an EIS with respect to the actions of the Depart-ment of Energy, Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration or State Department with respect to transport of radioactive materials.
Such actions must be the subject of EIS's.
Staff Resoonse:
NUREG-0170 is a generic environmental statement and is not intended to serve as the environmental impact statement (EIS) for individual licensing actions.
Specific licensing actions.will be supported with EIS's that address the particular situation involved.
Specific actions taken by other federal agencies that involve the transportation of radicactive material that does not involve an NRC licensee would be supported by an EIS prepared by the responsible federal agency if the preparation of an EIS is required by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.
- 84*
Enclosure "B"
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ENCLOSURE C h,
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ENCLOSURE "C" - RELATED ACTIVITIES This enclosure includes a discussion of various transportation activities related to the rulemaking proceeding.
They include rule amendments to Parts 70, 71, and 73 of 10 CFR, implanentation of Congressional mandates, studies involv-ing packaging standards and emergency response, and other activities.
Table of Contents Related Activity Page 1.
Quality Assurance 2
2.
New York State Lawsuit 2
3.
Plutonium Package Certification to Congress 3
4.
Study of Yellowcake Packaging and Emergency Response to Transportation Accidents -
5 5.
Transportation Safeguards Amendments 7
6.
General Accounting Office Transportation Report 10 7.
Proposed Revision of 10 CFR 71 16 8.
Low Specific Activity Study 17 9.
Incorporation of 00T Regulations into.10 CFR 71 18 10.
00T Rulemaking on Highway Routing 19 11.
FY 80 NRC Authorization Bill 20 1
l i
1 Enclosure "C" i
1.
Quality Assurance On December 12, 1973, the AEC had published in the Federal Register (38 FR 35490) a proposed amendment to Part 71 of 10 CFR. The amendment upgraded the requirements for quality assurance in the design, fabrication, assembly, testing, use, and maintenance of packagings for shipping and transporting licensed radioactive material.
The proposed amendment required a licensee to assess the adequacy of its quality assurance program against the upgraded standards, and to make whatever changes are required to comply with those standards. An applicant for a license under 10 CFR Part 71 would be required to describe his quality assurance program to be applied to the pro-posed packaging and to follow the detailed written procedures of the program in the licensee's operation.
After some minor modifications to the proposed amendments were made in response to public comments, the effective rule was published in the' Federal Register (42 FR 39364) on August 4, 1977.
Action on the proposed rule had been delayed while acceptable methods of implementation were developed.
Regulatory guides for these quality assurance requirements are currently being prepared. The NRC staff is also working to encourage the 00T to adopt quality assurance requirements for D0T specification packaging.
2.
New York State Lawsuit In 1975, New York State filed suit in U.S. District Court in the Southern
' District of New York against the NRC and other Federal agencies.
The lawsuit charges the defendants with violating the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) of 1969 by transporting or allowing the transportatica by air of plutonium and other special nuclear material (SNM) without having issued an environmental impact statec2ent as required by NEPA.
New York State also 2
Enclosure "C"
moved to have the court issue a preliminary injunction to halt the transport of plutonium and other SNM pending resolution of the lawsuit.
In addition to the legal arguments involving NEPA, affidavits filed by New York State con-tended that air shipment of SNM endangers the lives of New York citizens in two ways:
(1) the possibility of an aircraft accident resulting in the release of SNM and (2) the possibility of terrorist activities directed toward these materiais in the course of air transport or related connecting transport resulting in deliberate dispersal of radioactive materials, manufacture of nuclear weapons or accidental release of radioactive material.
New York State's request for a prel'iminary injunction was denied both in the lower court and in a court of appeals.
In its amended complaint dated August 31, 1978, New York State changed its emphasis from transportation accident consid-erations to those of transportation safeguards.
The final disposition of the suit has yet to be decided and the case is still pending.
During t,he time these legal proceedings were being conducted, the NRC staff prepared a " Final Environmental Statement (FES) on the Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other Modes," NUREG-0170.
One of the conclusions of the FES is that the air transport of SNM does not pose an unacceptable risk to public health and safety.
3.
Plutonium Package Certification to Congress The NRC authorization bill enacted into law (Public Law 94-79) on August 9, 1975, included an amendment by Congressman Scheuer that required the NRC to refrain from licensing any shipments by air of plutonium (except for plutonium contained in a medical device designed for individual medical application) until the NRC had certified to Congress that'a safe container had been developed and 3
Enclosure "C" 9
tested which would not rupture under crash and blast-testing equivalent to the crash and explosion of a high-flying aircraft.
In response to this Congressional mandate, the NRC issued an order to licensees prohibiting the air transport of plutonium, except that contained in a medical device for individual use.
The NRC also established a certification program to evaluate the conditions which could be produced in severe aircraft accidents, develop qualification criteria prescribing appropriate performance requirements and acceptance standards for packaging used to transport plutonium by air, and perform a series of physical tests and engineering studies of plutonium packages to demonstrate their ability to meet the qualification criteria.
As a result of the program, a report was issued in January 1978, " Qualification Criteria to Certify a Package for Air Transport of Plutonium," NUREG-0360. As part of the program, the NRC contracted with Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, to design, fabricate, and test a package capable of qualifying for certification under the criteria.
The National Academy of Science (NAS) and the ACRS reviewed both the qualification criteria and the package that had been developed to satisfy the criteria.
The NAS issued a report in 1978, " Review of Criteria for Packaging Plutonium for Transport by Air, "NUREG/CR-0428.
The program culminated on August 4,1978, when the NRC certified to Congress that a package (Model PAT-1) that would fulfill the requirements of Public Law 94-79 had been l
designed and tested.
A certificate of compliance (#0361) was issued by the NRC on September 5, 1978 based on a " Safety Analysis Report - Plutonium Air Transportable Package, Model PAT-1," NUREG-0361 issued in June 1978.
A rule-making proceeding is currently underway to amend 10 CFR Part 71 to codify the plutonium air transport requirements.
4 Enclosure "C"
4.
Study of Yellowcake Packaging and Emergency Resoonse to Transoortation Accidents On September 27, 1977, an accident involving a truck shipment of uranium ore concentrate (yellowcake) occurred near Springfield, Colorado.
Several tons of yellowcake were spilled on the ground.
Although the effects of this spill on the public health and safety were very small, the unusually large amount of material spilled combined witle uncertainties concerning the responsibility for overall management of the incident focused public and Congressional attention on the transportation of yellowcake in particular and of all radioactive mate-rials in general.
In response the NRC and the 00T undertook to review and assess the regulations and practices related to package integrity and to emer-gency response to transportation accidents involving radioactive material.
A study group was formed and a draft report, " Review and Assessment of Package Requirements (Yellowcake) and Emergency Response to Transportation Accidents,"
NUREG-0535, was issued in March 1979.
Eight recommendations were made by the study group and are contained in the report.
The recommendatians are, (1) State and local emergency response agencies should develop plans for advising and l
assisting the carrier in responding to the accident and to take appropriate action to protect public health and safety, (2) carriers should prepare, main-tain, and execute an emergency response plan for promptly notifying the shipper and government authorities, controlling the spread of and cleaning up released radioactive material, (3) shippers shculd be required to prepare and maintain an emergency plan for promptly' conveying hazard information about the shipment to the carrier and government authorities, (4) shippers snould be required to i
show an emergency telephone number on shipping papers and should ba encouraged to include emergency instructions with shipping papers, (5) carriars should be 5
Enclosure "C" L
~
prepared to assume initial costs for their responsibilities and State and local agencies should be prepared to assume initial costs for any protective actions implemented in response te the accident, (6) appropriate Federal and State agencies should initiate discussions on the merits of advance notice requirements for shipments of radioactive material, (7) the NRC/ COT State Surveillance Program, in whicn states monitor the packaging and shipment of radioactive materials within their jurisdiction, should be expanded, and (8) surveys that have as their goal the determination of shipment character-istics should be periodically updated and coordinated among applicable Federal agencies.
A notice of availability of the draft report for public comment was published in the Federal Register (44 FR 23391) on April 19, 1979.
After reviewing the comments received, a final report was issued in July 1980 contain-i ing the same recommendations as the draft report and updating portions of the discussion.
Several_ programs are underway at the NRC that respond to these recommendations.
Regulations are being developed that will require licensees / shippers to prepare plans to convey hazard information to assist in the emergency response to trans-portation accidents.
A regulatory guide will also be developed in this area.
In cooperation with the 00E, a shipment survey is being conducted that will identify the characteristics of nuclear material shipments.
Finally, the joint NRC/ DOT / State Transportation Surveillance Program is being expanded to include the use of State resources to supplement Federal inspection and enforce-ment activities.
6 Enclosure "C"
5.
Transportation Safeguards Amendments Since issuance of the FES in December, 1977, a number of amendments to Parts 70 and 73 of 10 CFR were made or have been proposed.
The following discussion out-lines those amendments to Parts 70 and 73 involving transportation and des-cribes the basis for the amendments.
a.
Security Personnel Qualification Training and Equipment Requirements:
On August 23, 1978, amendments to Part 73 were published in the Federal Register (43 FR 37421) that require individuals who are members of a licensee's transportation security organization to be trained, equipped, and qualified according to certain criteria.
This action was prompted by a Security Agency Study published in 1975, and an ERDA-NRC task force rerort issued in 1976.
b.
Safeguard Requirements for Special Nuclear Material (SNM) of Moderate and Low Strategic Significance:
On July 24, 1979, amendments to Part 73 were published in the Federal Register (44 'FR'43280) establishing in transit requirements for the physical' protection of SNM of moderate and low strat-egic significance. These requirements are designed to minimize the
. possibility of the unauthorized accumulation of a formula quantity of strategic SNM by multiple thefts of SNM of moderate or low strategic significance.
They provide a level of protection equivalent to that recommended by the IAEA.
7-Enclosure "C"
c.
Physical Protection Upgrade Rule:
On November 28, 1979, amendments to Part 73 were published in the Federal Register (44 FR 68184) that upgraded the regulations governing physical protection of formula quantities of SNM.
As part of these amendments, the appropriate transportation safe-guards standards were upgraded so that the transport standards would be consistent with those applied to fixed sites.
The amendments identify elements and components that, if included in a physical protection pro-gram, would achieve the specified performance objectives.
The amendment would increase the level of protection required by increasing the postu-lated threat including emphasis on internal conspiracies.
d.
Physical Protection of Irradiated Reactor Fuel In Transit:
Analyses per-formed in connection with the separate urban transportation study suggest that thi sabotage of spent fuel shipments has the potential for producing
' serious radiological consequences in areas of high population density.
.As a result, on June 15, 1979, amendments to Part 73 were published in the Federal Register (44 FR 34466) that require certain interim safeguard mea-sures for these shipments.
These measures included a requirement that these shipments avoid, where possible, highly populated urbanized areas, and that the -licensee obtain prior approval from the NRC for the proposed route.
Public. comments were requested at the time the interim rule was
. i s s u ad.
On June 3, 1980,.a revised rule amendment was published in the Federal Register (45 FR 37399) to reflect public comments and other staff considerations.
The-revised rule allows transit through heavily populated areas if additional protective measures are employed.
8 Enclosure "C" v
e.
Physical Protection of In Transit SNM of Moderate Strategic Significance:
On January 14, 1980 and February 21, 1980, proposed amendments to Part 73 were published in the Federal Register (45 FR 2657 and 45 FR 11503) that would allow the NRC to delay the shipment of certain quantities of SNM of moderate strategic significance.
The intent of the amendment is to pre-vent the concurrent shipment of two or more quantities of SNM of moderate strategic significance that, in total, would exceed a formula amount so that loss or theft of a formula quantity of strategic SNM would be avoided.
The physical protection upgrade rule already prohibits the coincident transport by a single licensee of two or more shipments of SNM of moderate strategic significance if the total quantity in all the shipments amounts to a formula quantity of strategic SNM.
The proposed amendment would allow the NRC to delay the dispatching of one or more of these shipments by two or more licensees to prevent simultanects shipments adding up to a formula qua'ntity of strategic SNM.
f.
Proposed Licensing of Spent Fuel Carriers: On March 12, 1980, proposed amendments to Part 70 of 10 CFR were published in the Federal Register (45 FR 15937).
These amendments would issue a general license to any person who possesses irradiated reactor fuel in transit.
Part 70 already contains provisions for general licensing of carriers of formula quan-tities of strategic special nuclear material.
This provides the NRC with a legal basis-for inspecting these shipments while in transit.
Prior to adoption of this rule amendment, carriers voluntarily submitted to inspec-tions.
Since the. adoption of physical protection requirements in Part 73 for certain irradiated reactor fuel shipments (sec item 5d of this enclosure) it.is necessary to adopt licensing requirements for' irradiated reactor fuel 9
Enclosure "C"-
l carriers.
This would provide a legal basis for NRC inspection of these carriers to verify compliance with the applicable safeguard requirements of Part 73.
6.
General Accountina Office (GAO) Transportation Report In May 1979 tho GAO issued a report entitled, " Federal Activities are Needed to Improve Safety and Security of Nuclear Materials Transportation," EMD-79-18.
The report contains several recommendations for NRC action.
This section will briefly describe these recommendations and the NRC response.
The detailed response can be found in SECY-79-421.
It should be noted that none of these recommendations concern safety-related items involving revision of Part 71, but rather concern safeguards regulations contained in Part 73, inspection procedures or advice and assistance to other Federal agencies such as the 00T or the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
a.
GAO Recommendation:
The NRC and the DOE should perform periodic, independ-ent physical inspection and testing of nuclear materials packages on a random basis during fabrication and after repeated use.
NRC Response: - The NRC conducts periodic, unannounced inspections of licensees who ship packages containing Type 8 quantities of radioactive material. 'Although independent tests are not made by NRC inspectors, inspectors observe such tests if they occur during the course of the unannounced inspection.
Because the record of package use has been very favorable, the NRC' staff has not deemed it necessary to conduct independ-ent. tests.
NRC inspectors also conduct periodic inspections during the 10 Enclosure "C" g
.-m n
r
^-
fabrication of casks used to transport irradiated reactor fuel.
These inspections are necessary because of the complexity in the design of these casks. The inspections include an examination of implementation of the quality assurance program, the materials of construction, fabrication processes, and design verification testing.
b.
GAO Recommendation: The NRC and the DOE should develop a graduated scale of security measures for the transportation of special nuclear materials (SNM), rather than the present all-or-nothing strategic cut-off level.
In establishing these levels, the dispersal hazard of plutonium and the enrichment level of uranium should be taken into account.
NRC Response: A program was already in progress to amend NRC regulations to extend graduated security measures to shipments of less-than-strategic quantities of licensed,' weapons grade material. The cmendments were published as a final rule in the Federal Register (44 FR 43280) on July 24, 1979 (see item Sb of this enclosure).
In connection with the development i
of this rule amendment, a risk study on the deliberate dispersal of l
plutonium was conducted.
Based on this study, it was determined that l
additional protection measures beyond those contained in the rule amend-ment were not needed.
In addition, both the quantity and enrichment of uranium shipments were taken into account in specifying security measures.
c.
GAO Recommendation: The NRC and the DOE should take immediate action to l
preclude enroute consolidation of.two or more SNM shipments that together exceed the strategic levels.
11 Enclosure "C"
~=
4 NRC Response:
The risk of this consolidation taking place is small because of license conditions imposed on licensees.
However, this small risk would be reduced even further by the adoption of proposed amendments to Part 73 that were published for public comment in the Federal Register on January 14, 1980 and February 21, 1980 (45 FR 2657 and 45 FR 11503).
See item Se of this enclosure for a brief description of the objectives of this rule amendment.
d.
GAO Recommendation: The NRC and the DOE should determine if there is a s
need to safeguard spent fuel shipments from sabotage by developing experi-mental data on the amount of radioactive material that could be released i
in a sabotage attack on spent fuel casks using high explosives.
NRC Response: A program is underway to develop the necessary data to
-determine more quantitatively the radiological consequences of sabotaging spent fuel casks; While this program is being carried out, amendments to
'Part 73'were published in the Federal Register on June 15, 1979 (44 FR
- 34465). and on June'3,1980 (45 FR 37399) that ' established interim safe-guard measures for spent fuel shipments.
See item 5d of this enclosure
.for.a-brief discussion of these rule amendments.
~ irectly.related to releases from sabotage events are releases associated 0
.with transportation' accidents involving spent-fuel casks.
In June 1979, "A Scoping Study of Spent Fuel Cask Transportation Accidents," NUREG/
CR-0811'was issued.'.The. study assesses-the extent of-existing infor-nation.and makes recommen'dations for th'e development of~ additional 1in'for-E
~
mation-to allow specification of realistic source terms for these acci-g dents.
The NRC also participated in a 00E workshop held on May.6-8, 112
-Enclosure "C"
1980, at the Transportation Technology Center, Sandia Laboratories.
The objectivesoftheworkshopweretodevelopaconsensustransportation accident scenario involving spent fuel and to provide recommendations for experimental needs.
In response to these recommendations, the NRC is considering the development of a research program to identify failure modes of spent fuel casks and to characterize potential releases from casks involved in transportation accidents.
4 e.
GAO Recommendation:
The NRC and the DOE should, if experimental data shows safeguards are warranted, develop a security system considering communication requirements, armed escort personnel, the least vulnerable transportation mode, and vehicle disabling features.
NRC Response:
If the results of the research program indicate that permanent physical protection measures are needed, the necessary rule amendment would be developed. As pointed out in item 8d, interim mea-sures are currently in effect.
f.
GAO Recommendstion: The NRC should amend its regulations to require receivers of radioactive materials to also monitor Type A packages, in addition to Type B packages, for radiation levels to make sure they comply with Federal regulations, to provide additional radiation protec-tion for workers and the public, and to report any violations to the Commission.
NRC Resconse: At the time the regulations governing procedures for picking up, receiving, and opening packages (10 CFR 20.205) were being 13 Enclosure "C" t.
3
developed, consideration was given to extending certain monitoring requirements to Type A packages and such an extension was proposed for public comment.
Public comments received ca the burden of such a require-ment, when considered with the limited benefits of extending the rule to Type A packages, resulted in a judgment that the requirement should be applied only to Type B packages.
Consideration will be given to extend-ing certain monitoring requirements to Type A packages that contain enough radioactive material to present a significant hazard.
Another reason for reexamining the rule is for the protection of persons receiving the packages.
It has been thought that the general survey provisions of 10 CFR 20.201 would provide this protection for packages where the monitoring requirements of 10 CFR 20.205 do not apply.
- However, it is the judgement of the NRC legal staff that this is not the case. 'It is, therefore, planned to add a general monitoring requirement to 20.205.
The GAO recommendation states that one purpose for monitoring packages on receipt is to assure that shippers are complying with regulatory require-ments.
The additional radiation exposure to the recipient in monitoring packages solely for the purpose of assuring regulatory compliance probably cannot be justified.
This type of exposure is justifiable only if it results in an improvement in worker or public health and safety.
g.
GAO Recommerdation:
The NPC and the 00T should reduce permissible con-tamination levels for packages and vehicles to levels compatible with what industry can reasonably achieve.
14 Enclosure "C"
NRC Resoonse:
Allowable contamination levels will be reconsidered.
Although almost all radioactive materials packages have no detectable external contamination, spent fuel casks and those few other packages which are loaded under contaminated water or in contaminated hot cells sometimes have levels of contamination that approach allowable levels.
This occurs because of the difficulty in decontaminating the outer sur-faces of these packages.
A balance must be drawn between additional decontamination of these packages and the additional radiation exposure to the persons involved in that decontamination.
A study is currently underway to examine current contamination levels and establish a technical basis for applying the ALARA principle in the area of external package contamination.
h.
GA0 Recommendation:
The NRC and the DOT should expand the NRC/ DOT / State Transportation Surveillance Program where existing State recources'are used to assure that shippers and carriers comply with Federal radioactive l
materials transportation regulations.
l l
NRC Response: Additional funding for this program will be sought and if granted, the program will be expanded.
In July 1980 the NRC and the DOT I
jointly issued a report reviewing the history of the program and assess-ing the direction it should take in the future.
The report recommends that the principal objective of the program should be shifted to include enforcement of transportation regulations by the States. On September 18, 1980, letters were sent to several Governors requesting their considera-tion of initiating a joint NRC/ DOT / State inspection and enforcement u
program.
15 Enclosure "C"
1.
GAO Recommendation:
The NRC and the 00T should continue their efforts to develop consistent regulations for packaging low specific activity (LSA) radioactive materials.
NRC Resconse:
Regulatory requirements for LSA material will be consoli-dated in the DOT regulations.
In addition a study is currently underway to examine regulatory packaging standards for LSA material.
See item 8 of this enclosure for a brief discussion of this study.
7.
Proposed Revision of 10 CFR Part 71 On August 17, 1979, the NRC published in the Federal Register (44 FR 48234) for comment a proposed revision of 10 CFR Part 71.
The revision would make the NRC's transportation regulations compatible with those of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and thus with those of most major nuclear nations of the world.
Although several substantive changes are proposed to provide a more uniform degree of safety for Various types of shipments, the basic stand-ards for radioactive material _ packaging would remain unchanged.
The DOT on January 8,1979, also proposed a corresponding rule change (44 FR 1852) to its hazardous materials transport regulations.
Coordination between the NRC and the DOT staffs has been conducted to ensure compatibility of the final regu-
-lations.
Two major changes to the NRC's regulations are being proposed.
One change will eliminate the system currently used to specify the quantities of radioactive materials permitteo'to be shipped in certain types of packages.
Under the present system, all radioactive materials are divided into seven transport groups that are used as the basis'for determining the amount of 16
-Enclosure "C"
those materials that can be shipped in Type A packages and the amounts that must.be shipped in the more stringently designed, accident-resistant Type B pat.kages.
This system has proved to be unduly restrictive because less haz-ardous radioactive materials included in one transport group are required to be packaged in the same manner as other, more hazardous radioactive materials belonging to the same transport group.
Under the proposed revision, the use of a Type A or Type B package would depend on the degree of radioactivity for each material being shipped.
The other change will establish two classifica-tions of Type 8 packages.
This change would facilitate foreign acceptance of U.S. export shipments by conforming package types to international standards.
Comments have been received from 26 persons that included support for the proposal, technical comments urging changes to the proposal, or a plea for uniformity among NRC, IAEA, and 00T regulations.
Effective regulations will be finalized in FY81.
8.
Low Specific Activity (LSA) Study Current regulations permit the transportation of radioactive materials tnat have a low specific activity using packaging that is less stringent than would otherwise be allowed.
This 'is based on the fact that the maximum dose to any l
individual, resulting from the inhalation of LSA material dispersed in a transportation accident, is limited and thus, the radiological consequences of a transnortation accident involving LSA material are assumed to be small.
l A study is currently underway to examine several aspects of transporting LSA material.
The study will determine the doses to individuals and to the popu-lation in the vicinity of an accident site from several different pathways.
I 17 Enclosure "C" l
Since there is no limit on the amount of LSA radioactive material that can be placed in a package, the external radiation field resulting from unshielded material released because of an tecident can be appreciable.
In addition, the population dose resulting from the inhalation of dispersed LSA material will be determined.
The study will identify any new standards for LSA shipments that should be developed based on the examination of the LSA concept.
The cost implications of implementing these new standards will also be determined.
This is especially important considering the large number of LSA shipments that are made since most low-level radioactive waste is shipped as LSA. A survey of current LSA shipping practices will also be conducted.
The survey will determine the quantities and types of materials shipped as LSA, the origins and destinations of these shipments, the characteristics of the pack-aging used to ship LSA material, and the operational procedures used in trans-porting LSA material.
9.
Incorporation of 00T Regulations into 10 CFR Part 71 In the summer of 1979, several packages of low-level waste that were not in compliance with Federal requirements arrived at one or more of the three commercial burial facilities in the country. While none of these items of noncompliance by itself represented a significant health concern, collectively they showed a lack of proper ' attention to Federal requirements for packaging and shipping of radioactive waste materials.
The Governors of the Agreement States of South Carolina, Washington, and Nevada, in which the commercial burial facilities are located, notified the NRC of the repeated disregard for the Federal transportation rules and at 18 Enclosure "C"
j 1
1 various times closed or limited these facilities to certain shippers.
The
]
NRC, in conjunction with the 00T, determined that the Federal government should improve its assurance that Federal regulations governing such shipments i
are met.
As part of the measures taken to provide this assurance, the NRC, on November 11, 1979 published in the Federal Register (44 FR 63083) an effective rule requiring all radioactive material shipments made by NRC licensees to be made in accordance with 00T regulations.
Shipments subject to the regulations of the U.S. Postal Service were excluded.
The effective rule permits the NRC to inspect the activities of its licensees in this area and to take enforcement action if warranted.
These inspection and enforcement actions will augment those of the DOT thus assuring that applicable Federal regulations are observed. On December 3, 1979, the NRC published in the Federal Register (44 FR 77135) guidelines to be used for enforcement of the effective rule.
Since the rule became effective, several enforcement actions have been taken, some resulting in the imposition of civil penalties.
~
10, 00T Rulemaking on Highway Routing On January 31,.1980, the DOT published in the Federal Register (45 FR 7140) a notice of proposed rulemaking on the highway routing of radioactive material.
The proposed rule would apply general routing requirements, aimed at reducing l
total impacts, to all carriers of radioactive material required to placard their vehicles.
The rule would apply r. ore specific requirements, concerning use of interstate highways and driver training, to carriers of large quantity packages.
The proposed rule recognizes and defers to the NRC requirements for prutection against sabotage of spent fuel and extends those requirements to all shippers of spent fuel although the rule requires 00T, not NRC, approval 19 Enclosure "C" s
for these non-NRC shipments.
Seven public hearings have been held at various cities across the country on the proposed rule.
Except for the hearing held in Boston where there were very few members of the public in attendance, NRC personnel attended all hearings as an observer. The NRC comments to 00T on the proposed rule are contained in SECY-80-305.
The comments generally sup-port the 00T proposal, and emphasize in particular NRC support for the "minimi-zation of total impact" principle and the importance of limiting opportunity for. deviations from that principle.
The NRC comments are based on an " Environ-mental Appraisal of Routing Alternatives" developed by the NRC staff.
The appraisal is included in the comments and is offered as a standard model by which States could substitute their more specific knowledge about their area to determine whether a routing alternative increases or decreases total impacts.
It was these routing considerations that delayed closure of the transportation reevaluation rulemaking proceeding.
11.
FY 80 NRC Authorization Bill The NRC Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1980 (enacted as Public Law 96-295 on June 20, 1980) contains two items relating to transportation.
One item requires the NRC to issue regulations providing for timely notification to the Governor of any State prior to the transport of nuclear waste including spent fuel in the State.
The Act also states that the notification requirement shall not apply to nuclear waste that the NRC determines does not pose a potentially significant hazard to the health and safety of the public.
The NRC response to these requirements.is described in SECY-80-456.
On December 9, 1980,-the NRC published in the Federal Recister (45JFR 81058) proposed rules to11mplement the Congressional requirement.
The proposed rules would require 20 Enclosure "C" e
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notification for nuclear waste transported in a Type B package.
The pr1 posed rules would also require notification for shipments of spent fuel of less than 100 grams.
For spent fuel shipments greater than 100 grams, advance notification is already provided to the NRC by requirements in 10 CFR Part 73,
" Physical Protection of Plants and and Materials." A part of the proposed rules would require direct notification to the Governors.
The other item relating to transportation in the FY80 Authorization Bill requires the NRC to issue regula-tions to prohibit unauthorized disclosure of sensitive safeguards information..
In the transportaton area, this would prohibit unauthorized disclosure of scheduling information concerning spent fuel shipments.
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