ML20002B168

Forwards Application by GE for License to Export Replacement Parts to India

ML20002B168
Person / Time
Site:	05000226
Issue date:	11/14/1980
From:	Wilson B GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To:	James Shea NRC OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS (OIP)
Shared Package
ML20002B169	List: ML20002B168 ML20002B173
References
80125, NUDOCS 8012110008
Download: ML20002B168 (3)

Text

-,w GEN ER AL h ELECTRIC uuctsin powen SYSTEMS DIVISION GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,175 CURTNER AVE., SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA 95125 BDW 80125 November 14, 1980 m8 0

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Mr. James R. Shea, Director 5g S

_n Office of International Programs E n 93 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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Dear Mr. Shea:

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s Enclosed is General Electric's application for a new license to export specified replacement parts for use in components of the Tarapur Atomic Power Station.

All of the parts covered by this application are necessary for the maintenance of station safety.

They are all specially designed or prepared for place-ment in nuclear reactors and, accordingly, are subject to NRC export licensing authority as specified in 10 CFR Part 110, Appendix A, paragraph (a)(10).

The parts covered by the enclosed export license application do not begin to approach in significance the facilities or materials which are subject to the export criteria set forth in Section 127 of the Atomic Energy Act.

(Cf., for example, the

" major components" listed in 10 CFR Part 110.2(ss) as con-stituting a utilization facility for export licensing purposes.)

Rather, these parts are but a few out of a large number of identical items that make up components or subcomponents of the existing power reactors at Tarapur.

They are of essentially the same relative proliferation significance (which is to say, none) as those components previously licensed by NRC under XCOM-20 and XCOM-84 and those applied for under XCOM-240 and XCOM-250 -- all exported to the Tarapur facility.

As a preliminary matter, it is worthy of note that the components for which an export license is now sought are expected to be installed in the Tarapur reactors, expend their useful lives, and themselves require replacement.

In fact, before the fuel most recently released for Tarapur's use becomes spent, further replacements would be required for these or identical items.

Thus, the export of these components would do no more than permit the Tarapur reactors to operate safely using U.S.-origin fuel already provided.

Clearly, U.S. non-prolifera-tion policy does not require that exports central to the safe 80121$00CT?'

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4Mr. James.R; Shea -

November 14, 1980 operation'ofja power' reactor be denied after export of the

nuclear: fuel:for the operation of that reactor during the very

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.same, period.has already been approved.

In=lightcof the safety importance.of these_ parts, and their-

unquestionable; insignificance.from a proliferation standpoint, it would be most unfert'unate, as.well as unreasonable, if this export license application were considered by NRC-or the Executive Branch in conjunction with the-pending application for the export of fuel for"the Tarapur reactors recently sub-

.mitted by anotherl applicant (i.e., XSNM-1740).

Such joint consideration. unduly risksisubmerging the component license _

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. application inLthe foreseeable controversy and delay involved q

in a determination. of'whether a further fuel shipment to India i

meets the' criteria set-forth in Section 127.and 128 of the

Atomic Energy-Act. _ What needs to be done (and what aoe believe

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'the Commission failed to do in connection with XCOM-240 or t

.XCOM-250) isLto focus its attention solely on whether the three criteria: set forth in Section 109b. of the' Atomic Energy Act are met,by the proposed component export.

As you are aware,L the generic asurances'provided to the U.S.

l 1

-_ Department of State by the Embassy of India, by letter dated 1

March 23, 1979, meet the:Section.109b. criteria.

Specifically,

.that--letter confirms that.the following conditions apply to the export of;U.S.-origin reactor' components to India:

.(1) IAEA safeguards will lur applied-to the special nuclear material pro-duced--through the.use of supplied equipment. or material for the

'Tarapur Atomic Power Station.(TAPS); (2) the special nuclear material or equipment supplied for use in TAPS or produced through

.the use of such material or equipment will be devoted' exclusively to the1needs of TAPS (and.therefore not utilized for the production or research and development of any nuclear explosive device); and (3) no equipment, material-or device _ supplied by the U.S. 'foi use at-the TAPS will be~ transferred to unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction of the Government of India.

ItLis useful to consider the application NNPA criteria one-by-one.

As noted above, Sections _127 and 128 of the.AEA are incpplicable to component exports. 'Section 109b., which is applicable, establishes three exclusive criteria, in sum (i) application of IAEA' safeguards in' accordance with Article III(a) of the NPT,

.(ii)uno use of.the export in or for research on or development of a nuclear _ explosive device; and (iii) no retransfer of the export'outside the jurisdiction of the recipient country.

At present,Hof course, all three criteria are net by existing under-t'akings of-the-Indianigovernment.

The question which seems'to

G EN E R A L ([) E LECTRIC Mr. James R. Shea November 14, 1980 have bothered the Commission in the past i- "what happens in the future, if the U.S. should cut off fuel sh pments?"

Taking the criteria in reverse order, it has never been suggested by the Commission in its decisions that India had threatened, or was a threat, to violate its non-retransfer obligations.

To our knowl-edge, there is no evidence to support the view that India might retransfer the components subject to the enclosed export license application absent U.S. consent.

Turning to the second criterion, it is clearly met, even without regard to the undertakings of the Indian Government, because the subject components plainly have no use in a nuclear explosive device, nor would they be useful for research or development of such a device.

In short, the second criterion is met by virtue of the nature of the components involved, and their specific design for use in nuclear power reactors.

The final applicable criterion, that concerning safeguards, is also net -- again, by virtue of the nature of the components even with-out regard to the assurances of the Indian Government.

Article III (2) of the NPT requires the U.S. and other signatory nations to refrain from providing to non-nuclear-weapons states either source or special fissionable material or " equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use, or production of special fissionable material" unless such material shall be subject to IAEA safeguards.

The subject components are obviously not themselves source or special fissionable materials.

Neither are they "especially designed or prepared for the processing, use, or production of special fissionable material."

They are designed solely to maintain plant safety.

We trust that when the Commission has measured these exports against the applicable licensing criteria, it will determine that there exists no reason to defer export licensing approval.

However, in view of the safety importance of the exports covered by this application and General Electric's commitment to maintain the enviable record of BWR safety worldwide, please advise us, to the extent and at the earliest date feasible, whether further informa-tion (from General Electric or others) will be required for the Commission's needs, and if so, the nature of that information, how it relates to the Section 109b. criteria, and a statement of what actions are currently in progress (and by whom) to acquire that information.

General Electric is, of course, prepared to provide j

whatever information we can to facilitate the processing of the attached application.

Ver,y truly yours, 9%

/B.' D. Wilson, Manager

/ Government Relations 4

/hp Export Licensing Attach.

cc:

J. A. Griffin, DOE; L. V. Nosenzo, Dept. of State