ML19345H529
| ML19345H529 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek, Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 05/18/1981 |
| From: | Petrick N STANDARDIZED NUCLEAR UNIT POWER PLANT SYSTEM |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| SLNRC-81-32, NUDOCS 8105210202 | |
| Download: ML19345H529 (7) | |
Text
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Standudiaed Niedow Unit
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Nicholas A.Petrick
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Executive Director nookvin uwvi.no aceso 9
taon seseoio kY A 19 May 18, 1981 SLNRC 81-32 FILE: 0541 SUBJ: SNUPPS FSAR - Request for AdditicM1 Information
- Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D. C.
20555 Docket Nos.: STN 50-482, STN 50-483, STN 50-486
References:
1.
NRC (Tedesco) letter to Union Electric (Bryan),
dated April 10, 1981, Request for Additional Information for the Review of the Callaway Plant, Unit 1 2.
NRC (Tedesco) letter to Kansas Gas and Electric (Koester), dated April 13, 1981, Request for Additional Information for the Review of the Wolf Creek Plant
Dear Mr. Denton:
The referenced letters requested identical infonnation in the area of fire protection. The enclosure to this letter provides the requested information and will be incorporated into the SNUPPS FSAR in a future revision.
Ver truly yours, i
\\EATR Nicholas A. Petrick A l
RLS/srz l
3007 Enclosure
.1 cc:
J. K. Bryan UE
/
G. L. Koestar KGE
// /
- 0. T. McPhee KCPL i
l T. Vandel NRC/WC W. Hansen NRC/ Cal
SNUPPS Q280.1 Provide a table that lists all equipment including instrumentation and vital support system equipment required to achieve and maintain hot and/or cold shutdown.
For each equipment listed:
a.
Differentiate between equipment required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown and equipment j
required to achieve and maintain cold shutdown, b.
Define each equipment's location by fire area, c.
Define each equipment's redundant counterpart, d.
Identify each equipment's essential cabling (instrumentation, control, and power).
For each cable identified:
(1) Describe the cable routing (by fire are) from source to termina-tion, and (2) Identify each fire area location where the cables are separated by less than a wall having a three-hour fire rating from cables for any redundant shutdown system, and e.
List any problem areas identified by item 1.d.(2) above that will be corrected in accor-dance with Section III.G.3 of Appendix R (i.e., alternate or dedicated shutdown capa-bility).
RESPONSE
The SNUPPS final fire hazards analysis, FSAR Appendix 9.5B, identifies all redundant safe shutdown components and circuits on a fire area-by-fire area basis, and demonstrates that either the required separation exists or that alternate means are available to perform the safe shutdown function.
This analysis will be submitted in June 1981.
FSAR Table 3.11(B)-3 identifies all the equipment required for safe shutdown, differentiates between hot and cold shutdown requirements, and identifies the location of each component.
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SNUPPS Q280.2 Provide a table that lists Class 1E and Non-Class 1E cables that are associated with the essential safe shutdown systems identified in item 1 above.
For each cable listed:
(* note) a.
Define the cables' association to the safe shutdown system (common power source, common raceway, separation less thah IEEE Standard-384 guidelines, cables for equipment whose spurious operation will adversely affect shutdown sysuems, etc.),
b.
Describe each associated cable routing (by fire area) from source to termination, and c.
Identify each location where the associated cables are separated by less than a wall having a three-hour fire rating from cables required for or associated with any redundant shutdown system.
- NOTE Option 3a is considered to be one method of meeting the re-quirements of Section II.G.3 Appendix R.
If option 3a is selected the information requested in items 2a and 2c above should be provided in general terms and the information re-quested by 2b need not be provided.
RESPONSE
As stated in FSAR Section 8.1.4.3, in complying with Regulatory Guide 1.75, associated circuits are separated and identified as if they were safety related Where non-Class lE circuits are associated by reason of their sharing of Class 1E sources, they are provided with a Class 1E isolation device, or else it has been determined that their failure will not cause an unacceptable influence on the Class lE system.
Up to the isolation device, these circuits are treated as Class 1E and are separated accordingly.
Nonsafety-related cables are not routed through safety-related raceways.
(
The final fire hazard analysis, FSAR Appendix 9.5B, which will be submitted in June 1981, demonstrates that adequate separation is provided for safe shutdown systems.
280.2 -1
SNUPPS o
Q280.3 Provide one of the following for each of the circuits identified in item 2.c above:
(a)
The results of an analysis that demonstrates that failure caused by open, ground, or hot short of cables will not affect it's associated shutdown system, (* Note)
(b)
Identify each circuit requiring a solution in accordance with section III.G.3 of Appendix R, or (c)
Identify each circuit meeting or that will be modified to meet the requirements of sec-tion III.G.2 of Appendix R (i.e., three-hour wall, 20 feet of clear space with automatic fire suppression, or one-hour barrier with automatic fire suppression).
- NOTE Option 3a is considered to be one method of meeting the re-quirements of Section II.G.3 Appendix R.
If option 3a is selected the information requested in items 2a and 2c above should be provided in general terms and the information re-quested by 2b need not be provided.
RESPONSE
As stated in the response to Question 280.2 there are no associated circuits whose failure would affect safe shutdown systems.
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SNUPPS Q280.4 To assure compliance with GDC 19, we require the following information be provided for the control room.
If credit is to be taken for an alternate or dedicated shutdown method for other fire areas (as identified by item 1.e or 3.b above) in accor-j dance with section III.G.3 of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50, the following information will also be i
required for each of these plant areas.
A table that lists all equipment including a.
instrumentation and vital support system equipment that are required by the primary method of achieving and maintaining hot and/or cold shutdown.
b.
A table that lists all equipment including instrumentation and vital support system equipment that are required by the alternate, dedicated, or remote method of achieving and maintaining hot and/or cold shutdown.
I Identify each alternate shutdown equipment c.
listed in item 4.b above with essential cables (instrumentation, control, and power) that are located in the fire area containing the primary 4
shutdown equipment.
For each equipment listed provide one of the following:
(1)
Detailed elec trical schematic drawings that show the essential cables that are duplicated elsewhere and are electrically isolated from the subject fire area.s, or (2)
The results of an analysis that d ^9n-strates that failure (open, ground, or hot short) of each cable identified will not affect the capability to achieve and maintain het or cold shutdown.
d.
Provide a table that lists Class lE and Nca-Class lE cables that are associated with tha alternate, dedicated, or remote method of shutdown.
For each item listed, identify eat:s associated cable located in the fire area containing the primary shutdown equipment.
For each cable so identified provide the results of an analysis that demonstrates that failure (open, ground, or hot short) of the associated cable will not adversely affect the alternate, dedicated, or remote method of t
shutdown.
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RESPONSE
FSAR Table 3.11(B)-3 pr3vides a list of all equipment required for both hot and cold safe shutdown.
This list includes equipment required by the primary method of shutdown and equipment that provides an alternate means of performing a safe shutdown function.
The list also identifies primary and local control and indication locations, and identifies the controls and indications available on the auxiliary shutdown panel.
FSAR Section 5.4A describes the safe shutdown systems and identifies the diverse or alternate systems and components that are provided to perform safe shutdown functions.
FSAR Section 7.4.3 describes the capability of the auxiliary shut-down panel for safe shutdown from outside the control room.
The final fire hazards analysis, FSAR Appendix 9.5B, which will be submitted in June 1981, considers primary, alternate, and associated circuits and demonstrates that any single fire will not p2 event the safe shutdown of the plant.
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SNUPPS Q280.5 The residual heat removal system is generally a low pressure system that interfaces with the high pressure primary coolant system.
To preclude a LOCA through this interface, we require compliance with the recommendations of Branch Technical ;
Position RSB 5-1.
Thus, this interface most (kely consists of two redundant and independent motor operated valves with diverse interlocks in accor-dance with Branch Technical Positis.- ICSB 3.
These two motor operated valves.an6 : heir associ-ated cable may be subject to a single fire hazard.
It is our concern that this single fire could cause the two valves to open resulting in a fire-initiated LOCA through the subject high-low pres-sure system interface.
To assure that this inter-face and other high-low pressure interfaces are adequately protected from the effects of a single fire, we require the following information:
a.
Identify each high-low pressure interface that uses redundant electrically controlled devices (such as two series motor operated valves) to isolate or preclude rupture of any primary coolant boundary.
b.
Identify each device's essential cabling (power and control) and describe the cable l
routing (by fire are) from source to termina-tion.
c.
Identify each location where the identified cables are separated by less than a wall having a three-hour fire rating from cables for the redundant devices.
d.
For the areas identified in item 5.c above (if l
any), provide the bases and justification as l
to the acceptability of the existing design or l
any proposed modifications.
RESPONSE
The reactor coolant system high-low pressure interfaces that rely on redundant electrically control devices for isolation include the RHR letdown isolation valves and the pressurizer power-operated relief valves and associated isolation valves.
The fire hazards analysis, FSAR Appendix 94 5B, which will be submitted in June 1981, demonstrates that no single credible fire could c:mse the spurious opening of these valves in a manner that would breach the primary coolant boundary.
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