ML19331C533
| ML19331C533 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas, Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 08/13/1980 |
| From: | Calhoun M, Dopsovic D, Fabrikant R, Mcmillen N, Parmenter F JUSTICE, DEPT. OF |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-A, NUDOCS 8008180676 | |
| Download: ML19331C533 (19) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 7-t NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION C0 A
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Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Boa 4 In the Matter of
)
HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER
)
Docket Nos. 50-498A COMPANY, et al. (South
)
50-499A Texas Project, Units 1
)
N and 2)
)
)
TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING
)
COMPANY, et al. (Comanche
)
Docket Nos. 50-445A Peak Steam Electric
)
50-446A Station, Units 1 and 2)
)
ANSWER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION OF THE TEXAS BORDER COOPERATIVES FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE OUT OF TIME On July 31, 1980, the Texas Border Cooperatives (" Border Coopera tives") filed a " Petition of the Texas Border Coopera-tives for Leave to Intervene Out of Time"
(" Petition") with the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
(" Licensing Board"). 1/
The Department of Justice
(" Department") hereby submits its answer in support of the Petition.
The Department contends that the Petition satisfies Section 2.714 (a) of the Rules of Practice of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2/ for nontimely intervention, and is in accord with Nuclear Regulatory Commission
("NRC" or " Commission") caso precedent concerning the granting of nontimely petitions to intervene, and, therefore, should be granted.
1/
The Texas Border Cooperatives filed by hand their Petition with the Department of Justice on August 1, 1980.
On August 8, 1980, at a Pre-hearing Conference in the captioned proceedings, the Licensing Board granted a request allowing the Department of Justice until August 14, 1980, to file an answer to the Petition.
2/
8008180676
I.
Factual Backcround Notices of the South. Texas Project and Comanche Peak anti-trust proceedings at the NRC were published in the Federal Register on April 14 and August 7, 1978, respectively. 3/
Various parties intervened in these proceedings, including Central and South West
("CSW"), seeking interconnections between the Electric Reliability Council of Texas ("ERCOT") and dhe Southwest Power Pool ("SWPP"),
to eliminate an alleged situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws arising _out of the proposed operating licenses in these proceedings.
CSW's public posture indicated their support for alternating current synchronous ("AC") interconnections between ERCOT and SWPP. 4/
On June 10, 1980, nearly three months af ter discovery closed in these proceedings, CSW, with the concurrence of Houston Lighting & Power Company ("HL&P"), Dallas Power and Light Company ("DP&L"), Texas Electric Service Co=pany ("TESCO")
and Texas Power and Light ("TP&L") submitted copies of a proposed settlement agreement to all parties in this proceeding.
The settlement agreement was subsequently filed in a related Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") proceeding.
In this settlement agreement CSW advocated publicly for the first time a proposal that ERCOT and SWPP be interconnected by asynchronous 3/
43 Fed. Reg. 15811 (1978) (South Texas Project) ; 43 Fed. Reg. 74850 (1978) (Comanche Peak).
4/ A study done on CSW's behalf indicated the benefits of a Hode 4 AC interconnection between ERCOT and SWPP ("PTI Study").
DC interconnections werc not advocated in Mode 4 in the PTI S tudy.
CSW supplied the PTI Study to the Border Cooperatives.
direct current ("DC"), rather than AC, line. 5/
The settlement e
agreement was offered in settlement of a number of pending cases in various forums, including the' instant proceedings before the NRC. 6/ Within eight weeks of that filing, the Border Cooperatives filed the instant petition to intervene.
II.
The Border Cooperatives' Nontimely Petition for Leave to Intervene Satisfies the Standards for Late Filings Set Forth in Section 2.714 of the Regulations In In the Matter of Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., and New York State Atomic and Space Development Authority, (West Valley Reprocessing Flant) (CLI-75-4, 1 NRC 273 (April 17, 1975)
(" West Valley") the Comm'ission confirmed that Section 2.714(a) governs l
the disposition of untimely petitions to intervene in a proceeding.
i Section 2.714(a) provides in part:
Nonetimely filings will not be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, presiding officer of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board designated to rule on the petition and/or request that the petiticn and/or request shou.d be granted based upon a balancing of the following factors in addition to those set out in paragraph (d) of this section:
(i)
Good cause, if any, for failure to file on time.
(ii)
The availability of other means whereby the petitioner's interest will be protected.
(iii)
The extent to which the petitioner's participation may reasonably be expected to assist in developing a sound record.
5/
Settlement Agreement, Central Power and Light Company, Public Service Company of Oklahoma, Southwestern Electric Power Company, West Texas Utilities Company, filed in Central Power & Light Co.,
FERC Docket No. EL-79-8.
6/
Settlement Agreement, Attachment I at 6-8.
/
O 1
(iv)
The extent to which the petitioner's interest will be represented by existing parties.
(v)
The extent to which the petitioner's partici-pation will broaden tre issues or delay the proceeding.
Section 2.714(d) provides:
(d)
The Commission, the presiding officer or the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board designated to rule on petitions to intervene and/or requests for hearing shall, in ruling on a petition for leave to intervene, consider the following factors, among other things:
(1)
The nature of the petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the proceeding.
(2)
The nature and extent of the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding.
(3)
The possible effect of any order which may be entered in the proceeding on the peti-tioner's interest.
The Department submits that a fair balancing of the factors contained in Section 2.714(a) and (d) supports granting the Border Cooperatives' petition for intervention.
A.
The Border Cooperatives Have Shown Good Cause for Their Late Filing The Border Cooperatives have alleged facts sufficient to support a showing of good cause for failure to file a timely intervention as that requirement has been interpreted by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeals Board (" Appeals Board").
The Border Cooperatives assert: (1) that the construction of the proposed DC lines would have a severely anticompetitive impact on the Border Cooperatives; (2) that the DC proposal injects significant, complex and novel issues into these -
proceedings that were not otherwise involved herein; (3) that the Border. Cooperatives could not have.' reasonably anticipated that these issues would be injected into these proceedings; (4) in the unlikely event these issues did become implicated in these proceedings, that Border Cooperatives had good reason to believe that another party to these proceedings, namely CSW, would protect the interest of the Border Cooperatives; and (5) that only af ter CSW tendered the sattlement agreement to the Licensing Board on June 10, 1980, did the Border Cooperatives realize that their reasonable and good faith reliance on CSW to protect the interest of the Border Cooperatives was misplaced.
It is undisputed that the DC proposal contained in the settlement agreement adds critical issues to the NRC proceedings that were not before the Licensing Board prior to the moment that the settlement agreement was tendered to the Licensing Board.
Prior to the submission of the settlement agreement to the Licensing Board, the instant proceedings did not implicate the question of whether DC lines were an appropriate manner to achieve an interconnection between ERCOT and SWPP.
Further, it is undisputed that, as alleged by the Border Cooperatives, the DC proposal raises important competitive issues that are specific to the DC lines that are the subject of that proposal.
- Finally, it is undisputed that the DC proposal may have a severely 4 -.
anticompetitive effect on the Border Cooperatives.
-7/
The Department submits that these factors are sufficient to demonstrate " good cause" to grant the untimely intervention petition of the Border Cooperatives.
The Border Cooperatives also assert that they could not have reasonably anticipated that the issues raised by the DC proposal wou3d eventually become injected into these proceedings.
This belief on the part of the Border Cooperatives was predicated on the widespread understanding throughout Texas and adjacent states that CSW would advocate only AC interconnections between ERCOT and SWPP.
This understanding was,
<r. turn, based upon CSW's consistent and repeated public statements that AC lines were the only_ appropriate device for interconnecting ERCOT and SWPP.
CSW's position on this issue was evidenced not only in its conspicuous and steadf ast advocacy of AC interconnections, but also in its repeated rejections of DC interconnections as a viable alternative to AC interconnections.
Against the background of CSW's long and uncompromising position on this issue, it cannot seriously be disputed that the Border Cooperatives' reliance on 7/
That each of these allegations by the Border Cooperatives is undisputed is underscored by the f act that in its lengthy answer to the Border Cooperatives ' petition to intervene, Houston Lighting
& Power Company ("HL&P") did not contradict, or even address, any of these issues. - HL&P sought to dispose of these allegations on the ground that the " concerns" of the Border Cooperatives will receive adequate consideration at FERC.
HL&P Answer at 8 et seq.
The-Department agrees that FERC is an appropriate forum to consider these issues but, as argued infra, the NRC has a broader antitrust responsibility than FERC.
In any event, the mere f act that FERC is a proper forum does not divest the NRC of jurisdiction to consider issues raised by the DC proposal. -
CSW was reasonable. 8/
Finally, the case law at the NRC provides ample precedent to allow untimely intervention where a party has reasonably and in good faith refrained from intervening because of representa-tions by an Applicant which are subsequently altered by that Applicant.
This is particularly true where the Applicant's changed position will, as here, create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws.
For example, in In the Matter of Florida Power & Light Company, (St. Lucie Nuclear Powcr Plant, Unit No. 2),
ALAB-420, 6 NRC 88 (July 12, 1977)
("St. Lucie"), aff'd, CLI-78-12, 7 NRC 939 (June 21, 1978) Florida Power & Light Company ("FP&L")
took actions which caused the City of Orlando, Florida ("Orlando")
to have the " impression" that Orlando could forego participation in St. Lucie Unit No. 2 and, at a future date, obtain participation in the South Dade nuclear unit that FP&L was planning to build.
6 NRC at 18.
More than a year later, FP&L advised Orlando that FP&L had decided not to build the South Dade nuclear 8/
HL&P's Answer states that the Border Cooperatives' claim of surprise is " wholly disingenuous" because the concept of DC interconnections was first introduced in March 1979 at the FERC proceeding, in which the Border Cooperatives have intervened.
HL&P has apparently misinterpreted the thrust of the claim advanced by the Border Cooperatives; the surprise they have suffered relates not to the injection of the DC concept at the FERC proceeding, but to the injection of that issue in the NRC proceeding and to CSW's unanticipated abandonment of AC inter-connections and its acquiescence in the DC concept.
As HL&P notes, in any event, the DC concept was introduced at the FERC proceeding by HL&P, not CSW.
HL&P Answer at 6-7.
It was not until CSW tendered the settle-ment agreement to the NRC that CSW formally and publicly dropped its opposition to the DC concept. -..
unit.
6 NRC at 17.
Four months af ter FP&L related to Orlando its decision not to build the South Dade nuclear unit, Orlando submitted its petition to intervene out of time in St. Lucie.
Id.
In finding that Orlando had good cause for submitting a nontimely petition to intervene, the Appeals Board stated:
In short, in light of the considerations described, we cannot say that the Licensing Board abused its discretion in excusing Orlando for failing to petition for intervention in 1973.
In reaching this result we do not imply that the company deliberately set about to mislead Orlando (or anyone else) into foregoing intervention.
The record does not compel a"~ such conclusion and we do not suggest it to be the case.
dut certainly as perceived by those on the outside, the company's actions anc' representations indicated a willingness to join with Florida municipal electric utili-ties in the development of nuclear power f acilities.
Had FP&L indicated in 1973 what it made clear in 1976--that it was going to develop its next nuclear power plant unilat-erally--we harbor little doubt that Orlando (if not the Attorney General) would have demanded an antitrust hearing on the St. Lucie 2 application at that earlier time.
6 NRC at 20.
Like the petitioner in St. Lucie, the Border Cooperatives saw no reason to intervene in a timely manner because the course being pursued by other parties, particularly CSW, would not be detrimental to their interests.
As in St. Lucie, the competitive problem faced by the petitioner did not arise until the previous position of a party was altered.
If anything, the Border Cooperatives' position is stronger than the petitioner in S t.
Lucie because the settlement agreement has placed in issue an entirely different potential competitive harm that could not have been anticipated by the Border Cooperatives in time to make -
/
a timely petition to intervene. 9/
On this basis, the Border Cooperatives have shown good cause for the granting of their nontimely intervention.
Even if good cause is not shown, a petition for late inter-vention can be granted on the basis of the other four f actors in Section 2.714(a).
Pacific Gas & Electric Company (Stanislaus Nuclear Project, Unit 1), 5 NRC 1017, 10245 (1977).
The Department believes that the Border Cooperatives have established not only good cause, but also that the petition should be granted on the basis of those other factors described below.
B.
The Border Cooperatives'Do Not Have Other Means to Protect Their Interests The Department contends that the Border Cooperatives have establisaed that their interests cannot adequately be protected except by intervention. 10/
9/
The Department further contends that the petition of the Border Cooperatives should be treated with even more liberality than that shown by the Commission in St. Lucie because, whereas the intervention petition in that case sought access to the sub-j ject nuclear plant, the petition submitted by the Border Coopera-tives does not seek an ownership interest in either the South Texas Project or Camanene Peak.
Where access is sought it is reasonable to impose a more stringent standard for untimely intervention petitions than where access is not sought because, presumably, construction of the plant is a widely publicized f act and substantial lead times are required for planning purposes.
Moreover, granting an untimely intervention petition that seeks access threatens an Applicant with loss of an ownership interest that he could reasonably expect he would not be deprived of once he had invested substanti al funds for construction.
10/
Section 2.174 (a) (ii). _
Although the CSW DC interconnection proposal is also before the FERC in a proceeding in which the Border Cooperatives are a party, this Commission will ultimately decide whether activities under a license containing the DC interconnection proposal will create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws.
In addi tion to, and apart from, any action taken by FERC, the above-described decision by the NRC will critically affect the ability of the Border Cooperatives to compete.
Tne FERC proceeding is being conducted under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act ("PURPA"), 16 U.S.C.
SS210, 211,
- 212, to approve the DC interconnection.
Even though the Border Cooperatives are a party to the FERC proceeding, partici-patton in that proceeding will not necessarily protect the Border Cooperative's interest in assuring that the license conditions adopted by the NRC are adequate to cure the alleged situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws because, unlike Section 105(c) of the Atomic Energy Act, PURPA does not explicitly contain an antitrust standard.
The PURPA standard is a "public interest" standard applicable under the Federal Power
- Act, 16 U.S.C. SS791 et seg. ("FPA") 11;/
While it has been held that PERC must consider antitrust f actors in determining whether its action is in the "public interest," the Appeal Board has recognized that the FPA "public interest" standard has a lower 11/ See Conway Corp. v. Federal Power Commission, 510 F.2d 1264 TD.C. Cir. 1975), af f'd, 426 U.S.
271 (1976); Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 402 U.S. 515 (1971).
antitrust component than the statutory standard applicable to the NRC under Section 105c of the Atomic Energy Act. 12/
There-fore, in order for the competitive concerns expressed by the Border Cooperatives to be fully ventilated, it is necessary that the Border Cooperatives have an opportunity to present their views to the NRC, as well as to FERC.
C.
The Border Cooperatives' Intervention Would Assist in the Development of a Sound Record Intervention by Border Cooperatives can also be expected to assist in developing a sound record.
The Border Cooperatives have identified as a witness Mr. Steven E. Collier, an expert on transmission systi79, including DC systems.
Since an issue in this proceeding will be whether ERCOT and SWPP should be interconnected by AC or DC lines, testimony on this irsue should be of considerable assistance to the Licensing Board.
Even though HL&P, Texas Utilities ("TU"), and CSW intend to call expert witnesses on transmission systems, such witnesses are likely to testify that the DC proposal should be adopted.
In addition, though Brownsville and the NRC Staff may also call engineering witnesses, for the reasons discussed in the next paragraph, such experts may not necessarily testify with respect to all of the concerns raised by the Border Cooperatives.
Consequently, the testimony of Mr. Collier can be expected to assist in the development of a sound record, thereby satisfying Section 2.714 (a) (iii).
12/
See In the Matter of The Toledo Edison Company and the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (Davis-Bessee Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2& 3), ALAB 560, slip. op. at 299 (September 6, 1979),
appeal docketed, No. 80-1295, 80-1307, (3rd Cir.,Feb. 29, 1980),
No. 80-1296, 80-1310 (3rd Cir., March 4, 1980) citing Otter Tail Power Company v. United States, 410 U.S.
366, 373 (1973). _,..
D.
The Interests of the Border Cooperatives Will Not Necessarily Be Represented By Existing Parties The Department understands that the Border Cooperatives is the only cooperative group in Texas situated in the area where the proposed northern DC line will cross.
As such, the Border Cooperatives are likely to be affected in a unique manner by that proposed interconnection which would not necessarily be addressed by existing parties.
While it is true that both the NRC Staff and the Department may address issues of concern to the Boarder Cooperatives, both the NRC Staff and the Department present arguments responsive to public, not private, interests.
Indeed, the Licensing Board has in the past recognized that government parties, even if taking essentially the same position as a petitioner, may not fully cover all items the intervenor feels necessary to protect its interests.
Pacific Gas & Electric Company (Stanislaus Nuclear Project, Unit 1), 5 Nhc 1017, 1036 (1977).
In any event it is clear from the pef.ition, the Border Cooperatives' stake in the outcome of this proceeding is immense.
Their future competitive viability, indeed, their very existence may hinge on the Commission decision. 13/
E.
The Border Cooperatives Will Not Broaden the Issues or Delay the Proceedings The representations of the Border Cooperatives made in the Petition confirm that the granting of the Petition will not delay the proceeding or broaden the issues.
14 /
All but one Border 13/
Petition at 5.
14/
Section 2.174 (a) (v).
Cooperatives witness has already been 4dentified and the Border Cooperatives have represented that they will accept the record as they find it. 15/
Consequently, the only conceivably necessary discovery that could not have been undertaken long ago is dis-covery with regard to the testimony of Mr. Collier.
Nor will intervention by the Border Cooperatives broaden the issues in this case.
It is the Applicants themselves, not the Border Cooperatives, who have introduced into this proceeding the issue of the effect on competition of DC interconnections between ERCOT and SWPP.
The Petition reveals that the Border Cooperatives wish only to bring to the attention of the Commission the anticompetitive ramification of Applicants' proposal.
More-over, the Border Cooperatives expressed concern with access to their electric power and energy requirements, either from West Texas Utilities ("WTU") or others, is already at issue insofar as the intrastate only policy restricts access to such power.
Consequently, granting the Petition will not broaden or unduly delay this proceeding.
III The Petition Satisfies All Requirements of Section 2.714 Concerning the Adequacy and Specificity of the Petition The Appeals Board has ruled that a petition to intervene raising antitrust concerns must:
(1) describe the situation allegedly inconsistent with the antitrust laws which is the basis for the intervention; (2) describe how the situation conflicts with the policies underlying the antitrust laws; 15/
Petition at 9-10. -m,,-
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-mw
(3) describe how the situation allegedly inconsistent with the antitrust laws would be created or maintained by activities under the license; and (4) identify the specific relief sought.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Stanislaus Nuclear Project, Unit 1), 5 NRC 1017, 1022 (1977).
Clearly, the Border Ccoperatives have set forth the specific relief sought. 36 /
They have also clearly described the situation alleged to be inconsistent with the antitrust laws and how the situation conflicts with the policies underlying the antitrust laws.
The Border Cooperatives allege that the DC interconnection may pre-clude AC interconnections to interstate power. 17/
This, they allege, will preclude them (or others) from constructing AC interconnect'ons and from obtaining power supplies from anyone other than utilities in exas, 18/
They further allege that this m
would result in a maintenance of the "stranglehold" on transmis-sion within and without the State of Texas presently held by the large systems in Texas, 19/ thereby locking them into obtaining power only from utilities in Texas 20/ which already possess a monopoly position. 21/
The Petition, therefore, alleges, in effect, that implementation of the DC proposal would perpetuate and enhance the monopoly power of the utilities in Texas over 16/
Petition at 9.
1/
Petition at 7, 8.
18/
Petition at 7.
19 /
Petition at 8.
20/
Petition at 7.
21/
Petition at 4.
sales of power to utilities such as the Border Cooperatives (wholesale power) by precluding their ability to either purchase that power from outside Texas or to transmit such power into Texas.
Moreover, if, as is alleged by the Border Cooperatives, the construction of the DC interconnections will further under-mine the ability of the Border Cooperatives to gain access to power and energy outside of Texas, the monopoly power of the utilities within Texas will be enhanced.
Although not specifically framed in terms of how the activities under the license will create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws, the Petitio.'. and the settle-ment agreement made clear that the proposed DC lines are to be owned and operated by certain Applicants as part of their trans-mission grid within and without Texas.
The Petition alleges that the proposed DC lines will" perpetuate the stranglehold on trans-mission both within and without the State of Texas which is now mrintained by the large systems." 22f Applicants are the largest electric utilities in Texas, and if they possess a "stranglehold" over transmission this would be inconsisten t with the antitrust laws.
Moreover, one of the proposed DC lines (the Southern Inter-connection), will be directly linked to the bus at the South Texas Project.
Thus, to the extent that the subject nuclear plants will create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws, the proposed DC lines will have a similar effect.
The licenses sought in these proceedings will give the Applicants access to additional power which they can sell at 22/
Petition at 8.
/
l wholesale in Texas.
Since the alleged situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws described in the Petition is a 'aonopoly in the transmission market and the market for wholesale power in Texas, the requisiste nexus is alleged in the Petition since it is clearly alleging that granting the license against the back-ground of the DC proposal will exacerbate the anticompetitive situation by giving access to additional wholesale power to a monopolist in that market through the issuance of the license. 23/
For the reasons enumerated above, the Deparoment believes that the Texas Border Cooperatives have met the requirements of Section 2.714(a) that are necessary to obtain intervention in these proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the Department respectfully submits that the Texas Border Cooperatives be granted leave to intervene in these proceedings and participate as a full party.
Respectfully submitted, Robert Fabrikant," Acting Chie'f Energy ection i
H.
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M,4N w
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Pa menter 3-3027 W
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W David A.
DopbC0ic/
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. Mildred C.
Calhoun Wa.shington, D.C.
Attorneys, Energy Section August 13, 1980 Antitrust Division U.S.
Department of Justice (Telephone: (202) 724-6624) l l
23/
The appropriate test of nexus is whether "anticompetitive situations [are) intertwined with or exacerbated by the award of
[the] license to construct or operate a nuclear facility.
In the Matter of Consumer Power Company (Midland Plant Units 1 and 2),
ALAB-452, 6 NRC 892, 917 (1977).
, 1
/
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION e
Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of
)
HOUSTON LIGHTING 4 POWER
)
COMPANY, et al. (South
)
Docket Nos. 50-498A Texas Project, Units 1 and
)
50-499A 2)
)
)
TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING
)
COMPANY, et al. (Comanche
)
Docket Nos. 50-445A Peak Steam Electric
)
50-446A Station, Units 1 and 2)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1 hereby certify that service of the foregoing Answer of the Department of Justice Supporting The Petition of the Texas Border Cooperatives for Leave to Intervene Out of Time j
has been made on the following parties listed hereto this 13th day of August, 1980, by depositing copies thereof in the United States mail, first class, postage prepaid.
Marshall E. Miller, Esquire Alan S. Rosenthal, Esquire Chairman Chairman Atomic Safety 6 Licensing Michael C. Farrar, Esquire Board Panel Thomas S. Moore, Esquire U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Atomic Safety and Licensing Commission Appeal Board Panel Washington, D. C.
20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Michael L. Glaser, Esquire Washington, D. C.
20555 1150 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.
Jerome E. Sharfman, Esquire U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Sheldon J. Wolfe, Esquire Commission Atomic Safety G Licensing Washington, D. C.
20555 Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Chase R. Stephens, Secretary Commission Docketing and Service Branch Washington, D. C.
20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary Washington, D. C.
20555 Office of the Secretary of the Commission Stephen H. Lewis, Esquire Washington, D. C.
20555 Ann P. Hodgdon U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the Executive Legal Director Washington, D. C.
20555
Jerome Saltzman Michael I. Miller, Esquire Chief, Antitrust and James A. Carney, Esquire Indemnity Group Sarah N. Welling, Esquire U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Isham, Lincoln G Beale Commission 4200 One First National Plaza Washington, D. C.
20555 Chicago, Illinois 60603 Mr. William C. Price Michael Blume, Esquire Central Power 6 Light Co.
Frederic D. Chanania, Esq.
P. O. Box 2121 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Corpus Christi, Texas 78403 Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 J. K. Spruce, General Manager City Public Service Board Jerry L. Harris, Esquire P. O. Box 1771 City Attorney, San Antonio, Texas 78203 Richard C. Balough, Esquire Assistant City Attorney Perry G. Brittain City of Austin President P. O. Box 1088 Texas Utilities Generating Austin, Texas 78767 Company 2001 Bryan Tower Robert C. McDiarmid, Esquire Dallas, Texas 75201 Robert A. Jablon, Esquire Spiegel and McDiarmid R. L. Hancock, Director 2600 Virginia Avenue, N.W.
City of Austin Electric Utility Department Dan H. Davidson P. O. Box 1088 City Manager Austin, Texas 78767 City of Austin P. O. Box 1088
.G.
W. Oprea, Jr.
Austin, Texas 78767 Executive Vice President Houston Lighting 6 Power Don R. Butler, Esquire Company 1225 Southwest Tower P. O. Box 1700 Austin, Texas 78701 Houston, Texas 77001 Joseph Irion Worsham, Esq.
Jon C. Wood, Esquire Merlyn D. Sampels, Esq.
W. Roger Wilson, Esquire Spencer C. Relyea, Esq.
Matthews, Nowlin, Macfarlane Robert A. Wooldridge 6 Barrett Worsham, Forsythe 5 Sampels 1500 Alamo National Building 2001 Bryan Tower, Suite 2500 San Antonio, Texas 78205 Dallas, Texas 75201 David M. Stahl, Esquire Joseph Knotts, Esquire
' sham, Lincoln 6 Beale Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esq.
Suite 325 Leonard W. Belter 1120 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Debevoise 4 Liberman Washington, D. C.
20036 1200 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.
20036 1
i Douglas F. John, Esquire Robert Lowenstein, Esquire McDermott, Will and Emery J. A. Bouknight, Esquire 1101 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
William J. Franklin, Esquire Suite 1201 Lowenstein, Newman, Reis, Washington, D. C.
20036 Axelrad 4 Toll 1025 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Morgan Hunter, Esquire Washington, D. C.
20036 McGinnis, Lochridge 4 Kilgore 5th Floor, Texas State Bank E. W. Barnett, Esquire Building Charles G. Thrash, Jr., Esq.
900 Congress Avenue J. Gregory Copeland, Esq.
Austin, Texas 78701 Theodore F. Weiss, Jr., Esq.
Baker 6 Botts Jay M. Galt, Esquire 3000 One Shell Plaza Looney, Nichols, Johnson Houston, Texas 77002 6 Hayes 219 Couch Drive Kevin B. Pratt, Esquire Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73101 Assistant Attorney General P. O. Box 12548 Knoland J. Plucknett Capital Station Executive Director Austin, Texas 78711 Committee on Power for the Southwest, Inc.
Frederick H. Ritts, Esquire 5541 East Skelly Drive Law Offices of Northcutt Ely Tulsa, Oklahoma 74135 Watergate 600 Building Washington, D. C.
20037 John W. Davidson, Esquire Sawtelle, Goode, Davidson Donald M. Clements, Esq.
6 Tioilo Gulf States Utilities Company 1100 San Antonio Savings P. O. Box 2951 Building Beaumont, Texas 77704 San Antonio, Texas 78205 Mr. G. Holman King W. S. Robson West Texas Utilities Co.
General Manager P. O. Box 841 South Texas Electric Abilene, Texas 79604 Cooperative, Inc.
Route 6, Building 102 W. N. Woolsey, Esquire Victoria Regional Airport Kleberg, Dyer, Redford 6 Weil Victoria, Texas 77901 1030 Petroleum Tower Corpus Christi, Texas 78474 Robert M. Rader, Esquire Conner, Moore 6 Corber Robert A. O'Neil 1747 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Miller, Balis 6 0'Neil, P.C.
Washington, D. C.
20006 776 Executive Building 1030 Fifteenth Street, N.W.
R. Gordon Gooch, Esquire Washington, D. C.
20005 John P. Mathis, Esquire Steven R. Hunsicker Baker 6 Botts 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
or Washington, D. C.
20006 Frederick H. Parmenter, "
Attorney Energy Section, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice