ML19329B890
| ML19329B890 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 08/01/1977 |
| From: | Batch S, Lingenfelter J TOLEDO EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19329B831 | List: |
| References | |
| LER-RO-770801-01, LER-RO-770801-1, NUDOCS 8002060888 | |
| Download: ML19329B890 (2) | |
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
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Jacque Lingenfelter/Stan Batch (419)'259-5000, Ext. 251 tuoNE 80020600 M
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TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY DAVIS-BESSE UNIT ONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION O~
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-77-16 i
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DATE OF EVENT: July 6, 1977 FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1 IDENTIFICATI0N'OF~ OCCURRENCE: Primary containment internal pressure was not de-termined as required in Technical Specification 3.6.1.4.
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- Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The plant was in Mode 4 with-Power (MWT) = 0
. and Load.(MWE) = 0.
Description of Occurrence: The station entered Mode 4 at 2300 hours0.0266 days <br />0.639 hours <br />0.0038 weeks <br />8.7515e-4 months <br /> on July 2, 1977. On July 6, 1977, at 0630 hours0.00729 days <br />0.175 hours <br />0.00104 weeks <br />2.39715e-4 months <br />, it was discovered by the Shift Foreman.
on duty that Surveillance Test " Miscellaneous Instrument Shift Check",
ST 5099.01, did 'not conform to Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1., of Technical
. Specification 3.6.1.4.
The surveillance requirement states that primary con-tainment internal pressure is to ' c. maintained between the specified limits of
+25 and -14 inches of water, and monitored at least once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> while in Mode 4.
Containment internal pressure was not being monitored.
Designation of-Appa' rent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of this event can be i
- attributed to a deficiency in the surveillance test procedure which failed to include the' check for containment. internal pressure in Mode 4.
1 Analysis of Occurrence:
During the time period the pressure differential was not. monitored, there was frequent usage of airlocks for surveillance of equip-ment.
Pressure differentials of even one or two inches of water can be noticed by personnel using the airlocks.
Personnel who have frequently used the air-locks' indicate that the containment pressure continually increased over the period in question.
Since the containment pressure at the end of the period was significantly less than the limit,we believe the pressure in containment could not have exceeded 'the limit during the time the pressure differential was not being monitored. Therefore, there was no threat to the health'and safety.of the public or station personnel.
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-Corrective Action: A modification was made to the procedure and was in effect at 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> on July 6, 1977. The primary containment internal pressure has
- been monitored in accordance with Technical Specification 3.6.1.4 surveillance 4
- requirements since 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> on' July 6, 1977. The Davis-Besse Station was thus removed-from non-conformance with Surveillance Requirement 4.6.~1.4 and the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.6.1.4.
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- Failure Data: On May 13, 1977, there was a similar occurrence in which a deficiency-occurred in the channel check reading sheets required for Mode 6.
This occurrence, i
however, was in violation of the surveillance requirements of Technical Specifica--
\\s tion 4.3.2.1.1.
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