ML19325E898
| ML19325E898 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River, Comanche Peak, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 11/01/1989 |
| From: | Haughney C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19325E899 | List: |
| References | |
| OREM-89-038, OREM-89-38, NUDOCS 8911130001 | |
| Download: ML19325E898 (13) | |
Text
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i.EMORANDUll FOR:
Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational Events Assessment i
FROM:
Charles J. Haughney, chitf I
Events Assessment Branch l
Livision of Operational Events Assessment nl SUCJECT:
THE OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS HEETING hovenber 1,1989 - HEETING 89-38 ei i
r On Hovenber 1,1989, we conducted an Operating Reactors Events weeting (09-38) to brief senior tanagers froni NRR, AEOD, RES, Consnission staff, and regional offices on selected events that occurred since our last meeting on October 18, 1909. Inclosure 1 lists the attendees.
[j presents the significant elements of the discussed events, h' contains a status report of longterm followups assigned and a 4l sumery of reactor scrams for the weeks ending 10/22/89 and 10/E9/89. We
,l identified one significant event for input into the HRC performance indicator program.
Oracar.e W.n,
2.t rics J. 1. r '
Charles J. Haughney, Chief Events Assesswent Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment
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Enclosures:
As stated I
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'i nassiwoTow.o.c.rn u November 1,1989 i
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I:EMORANDUM FCR:
Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational Events Assessaent P
FROM:
Charles J. Haughney, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessinent j
SUBJECT:
THE OFERATING REACTORS EVENTS HEET!hG hovember 1,1989 - MEETING 89-38 i
i On November 1,1989, we conducted an Operating Reactors Events meeting (89 38) to britt senior n.anagers from hRR, AE00, RES, Connission staff, and regional offices on selected events that occurred since our last meeting on October 18, 1909.
Inclosure 1 lists the attendees.
l presents the significant elements of the discussed events.
I contains a status report of longterm followups assigned and e
sunnary of reactor scrams for the weeks ending 10/EC/89 and 10/19/89. We
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identified one significant event for input into the NRC performance indicator program.
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7v-Charles J. Hau y, Chief g
Events Assessment Branch v
Division of Operational Events Assessment l
Enclosures:
As stated i
cc w/ Encl.:
I See Next Page i
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1.
ENCLOSURE 1 l
LIST Cr ATTENLEES OPERATING REACTOR $_ EVENTS _DRIEFING (E9-20_)
ioventer 1.1989 I;AME ORGANIZATION NA14E ORCANIZATION B. Clayton EDO E. Rossi I;RR/00EA M. Fields hRR/CP A. Almond hRR/PD-5 J. Hayes NRR/FDE-1 N. Trehan NRR/SELB W. Lyon tiRR/SRXB Y. Hsti NRR/SRXB B. Buckley NRR/F02-2 ll Reardon i:RR/00EA A. Serkir RES/DSIR E. Reeves t%R/PD2-1 F. Cherny RES/ElB G. Harmer NRR/EMEB
- 11. Wegner AEOD L. P11sco i;RR/DONRR W.11111er Ril S. Hoffran NRR/PDF-2 W. Jensen NRR/DOEA R. Kendall NRR/DOEA T. Reed I;RR/PD2-3 R. Ferfetti OE W. Troskoski OE E. Baker I;RR/DRIS R. Lobel NRR/00EA J. Richardson hF.R/DET R. Jones NRR/SRXB l
I I
l E.NCLOSURE 2 OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING 89-38 i
EVENTS ASSESSMENT BRANCH LOCATION:
16B-11, WHITE FLINT WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 1989, 11:00 A.M.
CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 H!GH PRESSURE INJECTION FLOW ACCURACY PROBLEM COMANCHE PEAK VNIT 1 DIESEL GENERATOR AIR START SYSTEM PROBLEMS GENERIC ISSUE (WESTINGHOUSE)
SAFETY YALVE TESTING PROBLEMS (UPDATE) h P
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89-38 CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 ll]SH PRESSURE INJECTION FLOW ACCURACY PROBLEM OCTOBER 26, 1989 PROBLEM LICENSEE DETERMINED THAT DESIGN BASIS FOR A HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION (llPI) LINE SMALL BREAK LOCA MAY NOT BE MET, 1
CAUSE HPl LINE FLOW INSTRUMENTATION DETERMINED NOT TO BE SUFFICIENTLY l
ACCURATE FOR OPERATORS TO CORRECTLY BALANCE LOOP INJECTION FLOWS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PLANT EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES, SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE FOLLOWING A POSTULATED HP! LINE BREAK, CORE DAMAGE LIMITS IN i
10 CFR 50,46 MIGHT BE EXCEEDED, DISCUSSION o
EACH HPI LINE IS EQUIPPED WITH A FLOW MEASURING VENTURI AND REDUNDANT SAFETY RELATED FLOW INSTRUMENTS IN THE CONTROL ROOM BY BAILEY, o
HPl FLOW INSTRUMENTS READ 0 TO 500 GPM, i
o THE DESIGN BASIS REQUIRES OPERATOR ACTION WITHIN 20 MINUTES FOLLOWING A SMALL BREAK LOCA TO BALANCE HPI LINE FLOWS, o
FOR ONE TRAIN OPERATION HPI LINE FLOWS WOULD BE 100 TO 120 GPM i
WHICH IS APPROXIMATELY THE SAME AS THE INSTRUMENT ACCURACY, o
LICENSEE DECLARED BOTH HPI TRAINS INOPERABLE DECLARED UNUSUAL EVENT, o
PLANT COOLED TO MODE 3 BASED UPON B8W ANALYSIS, o
HPl FLOW INSTRUMENTATION PROBLEM AT ANO-1 IN MARCH 1989 INVOLVED LOCATION OF FLOW INSTRUMENTS RATHER THAN ACCURACY, o
CAVITATING VENTURIES INSTALLED AT ANO-1 SO OPERATOR ACTION NO LONGER NECESSARY, o
TMl-1 ALSO HAS CAVITATING VENTURIES; OCONEE HAS HPI LINE ORIFICES S0 THAT OPERATOR ACTION IS NOT REQUIRED, CONTACT:
W. JENSEN S!GEVENT:
YES
REFERENCE:
10 CFR 50,72 # 16951
CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 89-38 o
THE HPI DESIGN AT DAVIS BESSE IS DIFFERENT WITH HIGHER FLOW RATES; MUST ALSO BALANCE FLOWS.
o TOLEDO EDIS0N INFORMED ABOUT CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 PROBLEM.
o LICENSEE SUBMITTED JC0 FOR INTERIM OPERATION OF CRYSTAL RIVER.
o FOUR TRAINS OF ROSEMOUNT TRANSMITTERS ARE INSTALLED 0-200 GPM FOR IMPROVED ACCURACY.
o LONG TERM SOLUTION TO BE INSTALLED NEXT REFUELING OUTAGE.
i FOLLOWUP NRR APPROVED LICENSEE'S RETURN TO POWER OPERATION.
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o COMANCHE PEAK UNIT 1 DJf,SIL GENERATOR AIR STAPT SYSTEM PROBLEMS i
JULY 2, 1989 PROBLEM LEAKING AIR BLOCK VALVES AND AIR START VALVES.
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o CAUSE FOR LEAKING AIR BLOCK VALVES IS UNKNOWN AND UNDER INVESTIGATION.
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CAUSES FOR AIR START VALVE LEAKAGE ARE:
I MISSING VENTS ON AIR START HEADERS, WEAKENED VALVE RETURN SPRINGS, AND INSUFFICIENT LOWER GUIDE RING TO GUIDE RING GROOVE CLEARANCE.
j SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE LEAKING AIR START VALVES CAN RESULT IN ADMISSION OF STARTING AIR l
PRESSURE TO DIESEL GENERATOR CYLINDERS OUT OF SEQUENCE, OPPOSING ENGINE ROLL AND PREVENTING DIESEL GENERATOR START.
DISCUSSION o
TRAIN "B" DIESEL GENERATOR FAILED TO START.
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INVESTIGATION BY LICENSEE AND DIESEL GENERATOR VENDOR (ENTERPRISE) l t
FOUND THAT STARTING AIR HEADERS WERE CONTINUALLY PRESSURIZED CONTRARY TO DESIGN BECAUSE:
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- 1. AIR BLOCK VALVES WERE LEAKING, AND
- 2. AIR HEADER VENTS WERE MISSING (SEE ATTACHED DIAGRAM).
o CONSTANT PRESSURE IN THE STARTING AIR HEADERS CAN CAUSE DAMAGE TO THE AIR DISTRIBUTORS (DISTRIBUTOR PINS REMAIN PUSHED AGAINST CAMS WHEN DIESEL GENERATOR IS RUNNING, RESULTING IN PIN AND CAM WEAR).
ALSO, AIR START VALVE RETURN SPRINGS BECOME WEAKENED DUE l
TO CONTINUAL CYCLING DURING DIESEL GENERATOR OPERATION (VALVE DESIGN REQUIRES A 40 PSIG PILOT SIGNAL TO OPENS SOME VALVES WERE FOUND TO OPEN AT 5 PSIG).
CONTACT:
R. KENDALL SIGEVENT:
--YES
REFERENCE:
MORNING REPORT 10/24/89
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. COMANCHE PEAK UNIT 1 89-38 i
DISCUSSION (CONTINUED) o INSPECTION OF AIR START VALVES REVEALED BINDING BETWEEN THE LOWER GUIDE RINGS AND THE GUIDE BECAUSE OF IMPROPER CLEARANCES BETWEEN THE GUIDE RINGS AND GUIDE RING GROOVES.
o AIR BLOCK VALVES ARE MODEL T3603, MANUFACTURED BY CAllFORNIA CONTROLS (CALCON),
o AIR START VALVES ARE MANUFACTURED BY ENTERPRISE (FORMERLY DELAVAL); OTHER PLANTS HAVE SIMILAR DESIGN, o
TRAIN "A" DIESEL GENERATOR AIR START HEADERS CONTAIN VENTS.
THE DIESEL GENERATOR HAS TESTED SATISFACTORILY, CORRECTIVE ACTIONS o
TRAIN "B" LEAKING AIR BLOCK VALVES HAVE BEEN REPLACED, o
TRAIN "B" AIR START VALVES HAVE BEEN REPLACED, o
AIR HEADER VENTS HAVE BEEN ADDED (WILL ALLOW DETECTION OF LEAKING AIR BLOCK VALVES),
o TRAIN "B" AIR DISTRIBUTORS WERE INSPECTED AND TESTED FOR PROPER FUNCTIONING, EQU.M EAB IS CONSIDERING THE NEED FOR AN INFORMATION NOTICE THAT ADDRESSES THE DIESEL GENERATOR AIR START SYSTEM PROBLEMS DISCUSSED
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89-38 i
(H ERIC ISSUE (WESTINGHOUSE)
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SAFETY VALVE TESTING PROBLEMS (UPDATE)
PROBLEM PRESSURIZER CODE SAFETY VALVES MAY NOT MEET TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENT FOR SE1 POINT.
THIS PROBLEM COULD AFFECT 40 U.S. PLANTS l
WHICH HAVE WATER-FILLED LOOP SEALS, f
CAUSE VALVE SETPOINT TESTING CONDITIONS NOT IDENTICAL TO PLANT CONDITIONS, SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE I
o PLANT OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION IS AFFECTED BY HIGH SETPOINT, o
PROBABILITY OF SMALL BREAK LOCA IS INCREASED BY LOW SETPOINT, l
r DISCUSSION o
SECTION 3,4,2,2 0F WESTINGHOUSE STANDARD SPECIFICATIONS REQUIRES l
THAT THE LIFT SETPOINT OF PRESSURIZER CODE SAFETY VALVES BE 2485 PSIG 1 1%,
o DIFFERENCES BETWEEN METHOD USED TO ESTABLISH VALVE OPENING i
PRESSURE AND AS-INSTALLED CONDITIONS MAY RESULT IN SET PRESSURE i
SHIFT OF 4% TO 8%,
o THE WESTINGHOUSE OWNERS GROUP MET WITH NRC STAFF OCTOBER 27, 1989 TO DISCUSS THIS GENERIC PROBLEM, i
o DEGREE OF SETPOINT SHIFT BETWEEN TESTING WITH WATER AND STEAM i
FUNCTION OF VALVE TYPE, l
0 LIMITED AMOUNT OF TEST DATA, l
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EFFECT ON PLANT SAFETY ANALYSIS EVALUATED, INADVERTENT OPENING FROM LOW SETPOINT IS AN ANALYZED EVENT, OVERPRESSURE EVENTS RESULT IN ACCEPTABLE RESULTS IF CREDIT IS GIVEN FOR PORV'S, PRZ SPRAY OR 120% OF DESIGN OVERPRESSURE, o
STAFF QUESTIONED RELATIONSHIP OF NEW LOOP SEAL DATA WITH PREVIOUS EPRI TEST DATA 0BTAINED FOR RESOLUTION OF TMI ACTION ITEM ll,D,1, o
STAFF QUESTIONED EFFECT ON SAFETY VALVE OPENING PROBABILITY
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EVALUATED IN TMI ACTION ITEM ll,K,3,7.
CONTACT:
W. JENSEN
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GENERIC 1SSUE (WESTINGHOUSE) 89-38 FOLLOWUP e
o WESTINGHOUSE OWNERS GROUP (WOG) TO DISCUSS ISSUE AT NEXT FULL MEETING 0F WOG IN FEBRUARY 1990, o
REACTOR SYSTEMS BRANCH HAS NRR LEAD TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE.
o NRR IS WORKING ON A SHORT TERM (BEFORE FEBRUARY 1990) APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM.
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