ML19322A848
| ML19322A848 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 12/21/1973 |
| From: | Gibson A, Jape F, Murphy C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19322A844 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-73-13, NUDOCS 7911270606 | |
| Download: ML19322A848 (22) | |
See also: IR 05000269/1973013
Text
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ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
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DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY CPERATIONS
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230 PE ACMT R E E ST RE ET. NORT HWEST
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RO Inspection Report No. 50-269/73-13
Licensee:
Duke Power Company
Power Building
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, North Carolina
28201
Facility:
Oconee Unit 1
Docket No.: 50-269
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License No.:
Category:
B2
Location: Seneca, South Carolina
Type Of License: B&W, PWR, 2568 Mw(t)
Type of Inspection: Routine, Unannounced
Dates of Inspection: November 27-30, 1973
December 3-7, 1973
Dates of Previous Inspection: October 22-26, 1973
Principal Inspector:
F. Jape, Reactor Inspector
Facilities Test and Startup Branch
Accompanying Personnel: A. F. Gibson, Radiation Sp,cialist
Radiation Environmental and Protection Branch
G. R. Jenkins, Radiation Specialist
Radiation Environmental and Protection Branch
A. L. Cunningham, Environmental Scientist
Radiation Environmental and Protection Branch
Other Accompanying Personnel:
C. E. Murphy, Chief
Facilities Test and Startup Branch
R. F. Sullivan, Reactor Inspector
Facilities Operations Branch
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Principal Inspector:
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F. Jape, Reactor 4nsp'ector
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Facilities Test and Startup Branch
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Reviewed by:
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C. E. Murphy, Chief c g/
Facilities Test and Startup Branch
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
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I.
Enforcement Action
A.
Violations
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1.
The following apparent violations are considered to be Category
II severity:
a.
Chemical Discharge Limits
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Concentration of boric acid in the Keowee River has exceeded
the allowable limit specified in Section Specification 1.2
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A of Appendix B Technical Specifications.
(Details III,
paragraph 5)
b.
Wastewater Collection Basin Effluent pH
The pH of the wastewater collection basin effluent has exceeded
the maximum allowable limit specified in Section Specification
1.2 B Appendix B Technical Specifications.
(Details III,
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paragraph 6)
c.
pH and Specific C)nductance Monitoring
Audit of monitoring records revealed a failure to conduct
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daily pH and specific conductance determinations as required
by Section Monitoring 1.2 A of Appe.ndix B technical Specifica-
tions.
(Details III, paragraph 7)
d.
Dissolved Oxygen Measurements
Audit of records revealed a failure to measure dissolved oxygen
during May 1973 and incomplete measurements during the period
June 1973 through August 1973, as required by Section Specifica-
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tion 1.3.1 A of Appendix B Technical Specifications.
(Details
III, paragraph 8)
e.
Fish Impingement Inspection
Audit of records revealed that fish impingement inspections
were not conducted during the period April 1 through June 2, 1973,
as required,by Section Specification 1.4 A of Appendix B
Technical Specifications.
(Details III, paragraph 9)
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2.
The following apparent violation,is considered to be Category
III severity:
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Reporting Requirements
Failure to operate the Oconee Nuclear Station within the Appendix
B Technical Specification 1.2, " Chemical Discharge Limits," is
considered a reportable unusual event as covered by Appendix A
Technical Specification 1.9 C and 6.6.2.1 B.
The occurrence
of exceeding the Keowee River boric acid concentration limit and
pH limits of the wastewater collection basin effluent were not
reported.
(Details III, paragraph 10)
B.
Safety Items
None
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II.
Licensing Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Matters
A.
Violations
All previously identified enforcement matters have been resolved.
B.
Safety Items
None
III. New Unresolved Items
73-13/1 Wastewater Collection Basin Modification
The enlargement of the basin to increase both its capacity.and
loading time has not yet been implemented.
(Detaila III, paragraph
9)
73-13/2 Control Rod Failures
Several types of rod failures have occurred. The licensee is
reviewing the situation to determine if a report should be issued.
(Details I, paragraph 9)
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IV.
Status of Previously Reported Unresolved Items
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73-12/1 Calibration or Effluent Monitors
No change in status. The analysis of data to determine the
correlation between monitor indication and sample analysis
is continuing.
(Details II, paragraph 2)
73-9/1 R0B 73-3, " Defective Hydraulic Shock Suppressors and Restraints"
The licensee's response, dated August 31, 1973, has been reviewed
and there are no further questions on this matter. A visual
inspection of hydraulic snubbers on safetyrelated systems is
required by Technical Specification 4.1.1.
This item is closed.
(See R0 Inspection Report No. 50-269/73-9, Details I, paragraph
2, for previous report on this item.)
73-7/1 Thin Walled Valves (R0 Report No. 50-269/7-5,Section II
paragraph 3)
The licensee has submitted two reports concerning the
acceptability of the Electromatic Relief Valve, 1-RV-67.
RO:II is currently reviewing these documents and will report
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our findings on a subsequent inspection.
V.
Unusual Occurrences
A.
UE-269/73-8, " Main Steam Relief Valve Operation"
Corrective actions described in DPC's. report, dated October 25, 1973,
and the followup letter, dated November 21, 1973, were verified
during this inspection. There are no further questions on this
matter.
(Details I, paragraph 4)
B.
UE-269/73-9, " Borated Water Storage Tank Outlet Valva LP-22"
Corrective actions described in DPC's report, dated October 31, 1973,
were verified during this inspection and the inspector has no
further questions on this item.
(Details I, paragraph 5)
C.
UE-269/73-10, " Engineered Safeguards Valve HP-27"
Corrective actions described in DPC's report, dated November 2, 1973,
were verified during this inspection and the inspetor has no further
questions on this item.
(Details I, paragraph 6)
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D.
Unusual Event on Radwaste Management.
The proposed permanent corrective actions described in DPC's letter,
dated October 26, 1973, are being reviewed by Licensing. Followup
on this item will be handled by Licensing.
(Details I, paragraph
7)
VI.
Other Significant Findings
None
VII. Management Interview
The management interview for this inspection was held in three parts as
follows:
Part 1 was held on November 30, 1973, with J. E. Smith, J. W. Hampton,
R. M. Koehler, and D. Smith in attendance. During this part of the
management interview, matters related to non-radiological environmental
technical specifications were discussed.
(Details III, paragraphs
3 through 10)
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Part 2 was held on December 4, 1973, with J. W. Hampton and C. L. Thames
in attendance. During this part of the management interview, matters
related to radwaste management, fuel performance, and an occupational
exposure incident were discussed.
(Details I, paragraphs 2 and 3, and
Details II, paragraphs 3 through 7)
The third part of the exit interview wcs held on December 7, 1973, with
J. W. Hampton, J. W. Cox, and T. L. Cotton in attendance. Items
discussed during this part of the exit interview included the status
of previously identified unresolved items, unusual events, and document
control implementation.
(Details I, paragraphs 4 through 8)
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DETAILS I
Prepared by:
F. Jape, Reacto( Inspector
Date
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Facilities Test and Startup Branch
Dates of Inspection: November 30, 1973
December 3-7, 1973
Reviewed by:
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^C. E. Murgby / Chi.ef'
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Facilities Test and Startup Branch
1.
Individuals Contacted
Duke Power Company (DPC)
J. E. Smith - Plant Superintendent
J. W. Hampton - Assistant Plant Superintendent
J. W. Cox - Assistant Plant Engineer
R. L. Wilson - Performance Engineer
G. W. Cage - Assistant Operating Engineer
E. E. Hite - Junior Engineer
D. L. Lanning - Assistant Maintenance Supervisor
J. Phillips - Electrician
D. Smith - Junior Chemist
2.
Tanker Incident
A Chem Nuclear System tanker arrived at ONS July 13, 1973, to receive
low specific activity radioactive waste for off-plant shipment.
The tanker was fully loaded (5000 gal.) at 0530 hours0.00613 days <br />0.147 hours <br />8.763227e-4 weeks <br />2.01665e-4 months <br /> on July 14, 1973. At
that time the driver was notified that the tanker was ready for shipment
and that the asphalt was starting to give way under the tanker landing gear,
and that the right side had settled three to four inches. About 0820 hours0.00949 days <br />0.228 hours <br />0.00136 weeks <br />3.1201e-4 months <br />
on July 14, 1973, the landing gear of the trailer collapsed allowing the
front end of the tanker to reach grade level.
A survey of the tanker for leakage was completed after the landing gear
failed. One weld on top of the tanker was found seeping. Radioactive
liquid release was controlled by using absorbent material to contain the
seepage. None of the liquid reached the ground.
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At about 1145 hours0.0133 days <br />0.318 hours <br />0.00189 weeks <br />4.356725e-4 months <br />, the tanker was restored to its normal position by
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DPC construction. The Chem Nuclear Tractor was then connected to the
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tanker. Repairs to the landing gear and tanker were then initiated.
Following repairs, a leak test at 2 psig revealed that the rear manway
was leaking around the flange. Correction was accomplished by tightening
the flange bolts, which were found to be only hand tight. A test at 5
psig and a soap bubble test of all handways and manways was successfully
completed. The 5 psig was held for approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> with no leaks on
external surfaces detected.
The brakes on the tanker were checked for operability and found Okay
prior to moving the tanker. The tanker left the station at 1930
hours an July 14, 1973. The inspector has no further questions
on this incident.
3.
Fuel Performance
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Data obtained during performance of TP 710/4-1, " Initial Radicactivity,"
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were reviewed by the inspector. These data provide information regarding
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fuel performance.
Since issuance of the operating license, samples of reactor
coolant have been obtained and analyzed for gross beta, gross gcmma, tritium,
gamma spectral analysis, and Sr 89 and 90 as required by the technical
specifications.
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The iodine activity and the iodine isotopic ratios observed during the
periods of power operation at 15% and 40% indicated that the primary
source of fission product activity to the reactor coolant was from
tramp uranium.
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On June 20, 1973, when reactor power was raised to 75%, indications of
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possible leaking fuel rods were observed. At 75% power, both xenon
and ;odine activities exceeded the maximum predicted values for tramp
uranism. Review of the 75% power steady state data for iodine activites
indiertes that approximately 0.05% of the fuel rods in the reactor may
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contait a pinhole leak.
These d.sta were discussed with the licensee's representative and it was
concluded that a report would be submitted regarding leaky fuel
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rods,
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4.
UE-269/73-8, " Main Steam Relief Valve Operation"
Section 7.2.3.3.4 of the.0conee Final Safety Analysis Report states that the
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combined actions of the control systen and turbine _ bypass valves permit
a 40 percent load reduction or a turbine trip from 40 percent load without
safety valve action.- During power ascention testing of unit 1, it was
determined that the system response was not as described in the FSAR.
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The main steam relief valves lifted following reactor trips from levels
less than 40 percent of full power.
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This problem was identified as an unusual event and reported to the
Directorate of Licensing in Unusual Event Report UE-269/73-8, dated
October 25, 1973.
After extensive testing, the licensee determined that the primary cause
of this situation was that the turbine bypass valves were not opening
fast enough to prevent lifting the main steam relief valves. As
corrective action, the pneumatic pressure to the turbine bypass valves
was increased from 100 psig to 150 psig. This reduced the valve opening
time from 49.5 seconds to 5.8 seconds.
On October 27, 1973, a turbine trip test from 40 percent of full power
was conducted. The turbine bypass system functioned as designed and the
main steam relief valves did not lift. The unusual event report, the
plant modification, the test procedures, and test results have been reviewed.
The inspector has no further questions on this item.
5.
UE 269/73-9. " Borated Water Storage Tank Outlet Valve, LP-22"
LP-22 failed to open during performance of IP 310/13D, "RB Spray Logic CH-8
on Line Test," a monthly test. The following corrective actions were
verified by the inspector:
a.
The valve was tested once-a-day for a week and it performed
properly on each test. The original failure apparently
could not be duplicated.
b.
The engineered safeguards logic circuity functioned properly
on each test.
Since the failure on October 1,1973, IP 310/13D has been performed twice
and LP-22 performed properly on each test. The Sta: ion Review Committee
reviewed the incident on October 22, 1973, and has recommended that if
the incident occurs again, the equipment status not be disturbed until
a full investigation into the cause of the failure is initiated. This
recommendation has been implemented. The inspector has no further
questions on this item.
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6.
UE-269/73-10, " Engineered Safeguards Valve HP-27"
On October 3, 1973, HP-27 failed to open following completion of PT 202/11,
"HPI System Performance Test."
HP-27 is a normally open valve and is
closed for performance of PT-202/ll. The valve failure was determined to
be caused by fouled contacts in the motor control center for the valve.
The contacts were cleaned and the valve operator properly.
The Station Review Committee has reviewed this incident on October 22, 1973,
and has suggested that the alarm circuit associated with this valve be
changed so that the alarm will actuate only when electrical continuity
lost. The present circuit alarms when the valve operates as well as when
electrical continuity is lost. Action on this suggestion is pending.
In
either case, the alarm circuit provides a monitoring function and would
be actuated if the valve becomes inoperable due to fouled contact or loss
of electrical continuity for any reason.
The inspector has no further questions on this item.
7.
Unusual Event Report on Radwaste Management
A meeting was held on Novesber 27, 1973, with Duke Power Company,
Licensing and RO:II representatives to discuss the events that led to the
situation currently being experienced with regard to radwaste management.
DPC indicated that the basic problem was a significant under-estimation
of the expected volume of liquid radwaste and this was compounded by the
installed equipment not performing at rated capacigr.
Duke's proposed interim waste handling facilities were discussed. These
include an additional 15 gpm evaporator and associated tanks and piping.
The target data for completion of the interim facilities is May 1, 1974.
The permanent modification to the waste management facility was also
discussed. Future meetings on the permanent facility with Licensing are
planned.
RO:II has no further questions on the unusual event report of October 26,
1973, but will follow up on this matter as the modifications are made.
8.
Document Control
Implementation of Criterion VI, " Document Control," of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 was reviewed by the inspector. Sections 2.1, " Document Control,"
and 4.4, " Administrations Instructions for Permanent Station Procedures"
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of Duke Power Company, Steam Production Department Administration Policy
Manual for Operational Quality Assurance of Nuclear Station (APM/NS),"
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were compared with current practice at the stations In particular,
the handling of changes to technical specifications was reviewed to
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determine if the correct-information is communicated to those responsible
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for the affected activity.
A recent waiver to Technical Specification 3.5.2.5, " Control Rod Position,"
issued by DOL on December 3, 1973, was used as an example to assess the
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effectiveness of the licensee's program for document control.
After the waiver was received, the Operating Engineer issued a memorandum
to the shift supervisors describing the authoriced change to the
Technical Specification. The affected operating procedure, OP 1102/04,
" Operation at Power," was revised by.using the " proposed procedure revision"
form as prescribed in the APM/NS. A new procedure was aise issued, PT
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200/30A, " Power Mapping," to implement the requirements of the waiver.
This procedure and the change to OP 1102/04 were reviewed and approved as
prescribed in the APM/NS. The inspector reviewed the changes and had
several comments which were discussed with the licensee's representative.
All comments were resolved and the inspector had no further questions
on this matter.
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The method for implementing changes to the Technical Specifications in
a timely manner appears to satisfy the requirements of Criterion VI,
" Document Control," of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50.
9.
Control Rod Failures
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The occurrence of control rod failures was discussed with the licensee's
representatives. The inspector indicated that the number of failures
experienced to date appear to be substantial. Control rod drive stators
have failed allowing rods to drop into the core. Position indication reed
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switches have failed causing a loss of relative position indication and other
functions provided by the reed switches. The inspector stated that an
unusual event report should be issued describing the cumulative failures
experienced to date and the corrective measures taket or planned. The
licensee's representative indicated that'this would be reviewed and a
decision would be reached at a later date. This matter will be carried
as an unresolved item pending further review and action by the licensee.
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10.
Audit of Log Books
The shif t supervisors log and the reactor operation log were reviewed for
the period of November.7, 1973, to December 5, 1973. The licensee's Stand-
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ing Order Nos. 8 and 9 and Section 3.1.6, " Operating Records," of the APM/NS
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were used as the base for the review.
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All entries in the log books were in agreement with the company's instruc-
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tions and appear to be in agreement with Criterion XVII. " Quality
Assurance Records," of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50.
The inspector had no questions on these records.
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DETAILS II
Prepared by:
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A. F. Gibson, Radiation Specialist
Date
Radiological and Environmental
tiofranch
Po
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G. R. Jenkins, Radiation Sp'pcialist
Date
Radiological and EnvironmeMtal
Protection Branch
Dates of Inspection: Decem r 3-4, 1973
Reviewed by:
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y . T. Sutherland, Thief
'Date
Radiological and Environmental
Protection Branch
1. Individuals Contacted
J. W. Hampton - Assistant Plant Superintendent
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C. L. Thames - Health Physics Supervisor
C. T. Yongue - Assistant Health Physics Supervisor
2. Calibration of Effluent Monitors (73-12/1)
During a previous inspection, discrepancies were noted between effluent
monitor concentration values and the values determined by laboratory
analysis. The status of action taken to resolve these discrepancies was
reviewed during this inspection. The licensee has developed a plan for
comparing laboratory samples with monitor (RIA) values. Only four
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measurements have been made as yet; however, a licensee representative
stated that a person was soon to be assigned full ~ time to this project.
3. Liquid Radwaste Management
a.
A licensee representative said that about six batches of radioactive
waste were being released per day into Lake Hartwell from the Oconee
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Nuclear Plant. He said that the volume of each batch ranged from
about 1800 to 2400 gallons and that this was diluted with a minimum
of 13,500 gallons per minute of water from the Keovce Hydroelectric
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Plant to reduce concentrations of radionuclides below technical
specification limits. Technical Specification 3.9.2 states, in part,
that, "The release rate of radioactive liquid effluents, excluding
tritium and dissolved noble gases, shall not exceed 10 curies during any
calendar quarter without specific approval of the Commission." Review
of licensee records revealed that less than three curies of radio-
activity, excluding tritium and dissolved noble gases, were released
from the time Unit 1 started up in April 1973 until December 1973.
Technical Specification 3.9.2 further states that, "Similarly, the
quarterly average concentration of tritium released from the
Restricted Area shall not exceed 1 x 10-5 uCi/ml." Review of
licensee records revealed that the average tritium concentrations
released in liquid effluents ach month, from start up until November
1973, varied from 9.99 x 10-1 to 3.80 x 10-7 microcurie per
milliliter. Technical Specification 3.9.3 states that, "The rate
of release of radioactive materials in liquid waste from the station
shall be controlled such that the instantaneous concentrations of
radioactivity in liquid waste upon release from the Restricted Area,
does not exceed the values listed in 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table II,
Colunn ?."
Review of licensee records and procedures revealed that
the radioactivity concentration and flow rate of liquid waste released
was controlled to limit instantaneous radioactivity concentrations at
the boundary of the restricted area to values less than 10 CFR 20,
Appendix B, Table II, Column 2.
b.
A11 liquid radwaste is released either from Condensate Test Tank A,
Condensate Test Tank B, or the Low Activity Waste Tank. A licensee
representative said that most liquid waste is processed through
demineralizers and/or evaporators prior to release, and that the
contents of each tank is sampled prior to release after being mixed
by recirculation for at least twenty minutes. He said that tests
at Oconee had proved the twenty minute mixing time to be adequate to
ensure samples are representative of tank contents. In addition to
samples collected prior to release, samples are collected continuously
of effluents being released from the Low Activity Waste Tank because
this tank cannot be physically isolated from auxillary building floor
drains during release. The amount of radioactivity released from
the Low Activity Waste Tank is based on this continous sample in lieu
of a sample collected prior to release. Each sample is analyzed
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for tritium, gross beta and gross gamma radioactivity. An alpha and
gamma isotopic analysis is performed on one batch of liquid waste per
week and the dissolved noble cas concentration determined by this gamma
analysis is assumed to remain constant until the next weekly analysis
is performed. Review of weekly noble gas concentrations determined
during October 1973 revealed that they varied from about 3 x 10-5
to 3 x 10-4 microcuries per milliliter. This variation indicates
that noble gas concentrations do not remain constant from one week
until the next as assumed by the licensee. A licensee representative
said that limited manpower made more frequent noble gas analysis
impracticable at that time but that more frequent analysis would be
considered when a new computerized multichannel analyser was received
in about forty-five days. Technical specifications require the
analysis to be done at least monthly.
c.
A licensee representative provided data which showed that about
117,000 gallons of liquid waste, containing less than four curies
total, had been shipped from Oconee by a contractor. He said that
the shipments were necessary because the rate of generation of
liquid waste at Oconee exceeded the rate at which it could be
effectively processed by facilities at the plant. He said that a waste
management task force was working on the problem and had made pro-
posals to reduce waste generation and increase processing capability.
He said that the rate of generation had been reduced significantly
in recent months and that no shipment off-site had been made since
September 1973.
d.
A licensee representative said that water samples were collected
continuously from Lake Hartvell at the boundary of the restricted
area and analyzed monthly for radioactivity. Records of these
analyses for March through October 1973, revealed typical concen-
tration values of about 3 x 10-9 microcuries per milliliter based
on gross beta analysis. A licensee representative said that the
nearest know drinking water supply downstream of the plant was at
Clemson University which was 8.4 air miles away. He said that
samples of the Clemson water supply had been analyzed monthly
since early 1969 and that no radioactivity above background had
been detected. Review of licensee records confirmed that gross
beta and alpha analyses had been performed monthly and that no
increase in radioactivity in Clemson University water had been
detected since the plant began operation.
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During review of licensee records of radioanalysis results of
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environmental and liquid waste samples, the inspectors noted that
the letters "MDA" were often the only results recorded when no
radioactivity was detected. The inspectors commented that, when
no radioactivity is detected, records would be more informative if
the actual value of the detection limit were recorded instead of
the letters "MDA".
A licensee representative agreed and stated
that actual values for minimum detectable activity would be recorded
in the future. The inspectors also noted that statistical un-
certainties were not specified in licensee records of radioanalysis
results. The importance of deternining and specifying statistical
uncertainties was discussed with licensee representatives and they
agreed to consider including this information in records of future
analysis results.
4. Airborne Radioactivity in Auxiliary Building
A discussion with a licensee representative revealed that, on several
occasions, airborne activity had been detected in the auxilary building
(including the control room), resulting from the unit vent discharge
being drawn into the auxiliary building ventilation intakes during
atmospheric inversion conditions. This was first detected on September 19,
,
1973, by clothing contamination on an operator. A licensee represent-
ative stated that subsequent surveys showed no surface contamination
above clean area limits, and showed airborne activity to be below
maximum permissible concentration (MPC) levels. The licensee represent-
ative stated that the clothing contam1. nation resulted from electrostatic
charge build-up collecting the contaminants from the air. He stated
that they are presently unable to control the timing of all releases
'
because of the ne 4 for continuous purge of the containment building
to maintain iodine concentrations below MFC levels, as well at to pre-
clude short-term releases at higher concentrations as permitted by
Technical Specification 3.10.3.
An inspector noted that the proper
action required is to identify and reduce the leakage of radioactivity
into the continuous purge stream. A management representative stated
that the waste managment task force, currently assessing liquid waste
problems, would also evaluate gaseous waste problems. In addition, he
stated that all identifiable leaks would be repaired during the shutdown
planned for mid-December. An inspector also recommended that all Waste
Gas Tank releases be coordinated such that they are not made during
periods of atmospheric inversion conditions. Management agreed to do this.
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5. Monitor Alarm Caused by Waste Truck
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An inspector questioned a licensee representative about a waste trans-
port truck setting off radiation monitor alarms inside the auxiliary
building. A licensee representative said that an RM-14 personnel
monitor, with an alarm setting 0.5 millirem per hour, alarmed in early
August 1973, due to radiation from an empty waste transport tank truck
parked within 30 feet of the monitor. . Licensee survey records dated
August 7, 1973, reported contact dose rates ranging from 60 to 80
mrem per hour on the empty truck. A licensee representative said that
the truck was moved after the alarm occurred and that personnel access
to the radiation area surrounding the truck was properly controlled.
6. Spill of Radioactive Liquid Waste
On September 11, 1973, a licensee representative notified the Directorate
of Regulatory Operations, Region II, by telephone that approximately 20
gallons of waste wa~er containing low concentrations of radioactive
material had been accidentally spilled onto a concrete pad at the plant
.
site on September 10.
The representative stated that the area had been
promptly decontaminated. Review of licensee survey records confirmed
that the radioactivity concentration of the spilled water was low (about
3 x 10-3 microcuires per milliter), and that the truck and pad were
decontaminated to less than 200 disintegrations per minute per 100 square
centimeters of loose surface contamint. tion and less than .05
millirem per hour measured at ore inch with a Gieger-Mueller survey
meter. The Health Physics Log stated that decontamination was successfully
completed on September lith after three attempts.
7. Interaal Contamination of Personnel
On August 23, 1973, a licensee representative notified the Directorate
of Regulatory Operations, Region II, by telephone that three employees
had been exposed to airborne radioactivity on the evening of August 22,
1973. The circumetances surrounding the incident and the licensee's
actions following the incident were examined by an inspector soon after
the occurrence. During the current inspection, this incident was again
discussed and the report of investigation prepared by the licensee was
revieved. This report confirmed that two employees had approximatley
4% and 67., respectively, of the maximum permissible thyroid burden (0.7
microcures) of iodine-131. These values were determined by independent
measurement (Helgeson Nuclear Service) using whole body counter techniques.
The inspector found no deficiencies in the handling of this incident,
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RO Rpt. No. 50-269/73-13
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DETAILS III
Prepared by:~A. L. Cunningha fm '" vlronmentalDate
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Scientist,.Rauiological and
Environmental Protection Branch
Dates of Inspection: November 27-30, 1973
Reviewed by:
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/[-#-7f
J.J..Sutnerland(Chie'f, Radiological
Date
and Environmental Protection Branch
1.
Individuals Contacted
J. E. Smith - Plant Superintendent
R. M. Koehler - Technical Support Engineer
R. F. Gray - System Environmental Engineer
D. Smith - Jr. Plant Chemist
T. B. Owen - Environmental Chemist
M. M. Majure - Assistant Environmental Engineer (Meteorology and
Instrumentation)
W. D. Adair - Staff Environmental Biologist
R. G. Rada - Environmental Biologist (Plankton)
T. W. Yocum - Biologist (Benthos)
L. L. Olmstead - Environmental Biologist (Fish)
L. F. Abernathy - Chemist / Biologist
Environmental Technicians (2)
2.
Organizational Changes
None
3.
Scope of Nonrad Environmental Inspection
The inspection consisted of a detailed review and audit of all require-
ments of the Technical Specifications defined in Appendix B to the
Operating Licc :es for Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1 & 2, and all
pertinent data, records and reports generated from these requirements.
An inspection of the Er.vironmental Laboratories (McGuire Plant Site)
was also included. This effort involved examination and review of
analytical chemical / biological equipment and respective procedures
used to conduct and evaluate the monitoring and surveillance programs
defined in the Technical Specifications.
1
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4.
Station Cooling Water Systems Thermal Limits
Audit of the station condenser cooling water intake and discharge thermal
records reve.aled that on November 20, 1973, between 4:00 and 5:00 pm, the
discharge temperature decreased at a rate of 10.4 F/hr. The recorded
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RO Rpt. No. 50-269/73-13
III-2
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rate exceeded the 10 F/hr limit stipulated in section 1.1C of the
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Technical Specifications. The licensee representative stated that
this incident was a direct consequence of an unscheduled plant trip;
hewever, it was not reported as a violation because of the under-
standing that such plant trips are not considered " normal plant
operation" as stated in the Technical Specifications.(It was later
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concluded that this interpretation was correct and that exceeding
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the subject thermal limit as a consequence of spurious plant trips
}
does not constitute a violation. Occurrence of such incidents how-
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ever should be routinely reperted in the Semi-Annual Report).
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1
5.
Chemical Discharge Limits
!
Inspection of chemical usage and inventory records revealed that the
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estimated release of boron (boric acid) ta the Keowee River exceeded
the maximum concentration limit given in Table 1.2-1 " Chemical Wastes
from Oconee Station," referred to in Section 1.2 - Chemical Discharge
Limits of the Technical Specifications. The licensee representative
,
stated that based on boric acid usage during the initial five to six
4
months of plant operation, releases resulted in an estimated boron
concentration in the Keowee River of 2.74 x 10-2 ppm - as opposed to
the maximum limit 8.8 x 10-4 ppm given in the referenced Table. He
further stated that on the basis of their calculations the estimate
could be considered very close to the actual concentration released.
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The licensee representative added that this was not formally reported:
however it was fully discussed with the AEC environmental project
manager, Directorate of Licensing. Management stated that the boron
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limit assigned was entirely too restrictive and that a considerably
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1arger concentration of boron could be released without adversely
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affecting the Keowee River environment. Management also stated that
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a proposed technical specification change has been submitted to Licensing
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requesting that a more realistic limit be approved. Management was ad-
vised that until such time that a new boron limit has been set and
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approved the current limit is binding and to exceed this limit constitutes
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a violation.
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6.
Wastewater Collection Basin Effluent pH
Inspection of the wastewater collection basin effluent pH and specific
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conductivity monitoring records revealed that the pH limit-stated in
Section 1.2B of the Technical Specifications was~ frequently exceeded
(the first such incident was reported on February 16, 1973, and is
referenced in RO Report No.- 50-269/73-3). The subject specification
!
requires that all water discharged from the basin shall have a pH
.between 6.0 and 8.5.
The'Oconee Nuclear Station Semi-Annual Report
- (period ending June 30, 1973) lists 31 incidents in which the effluent
pH limit was exceeded - none of which were reported as violations.
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Fourteen additional incidents, none of which were reported, were
recorded during the period' July' 11 through ' November 9.1973. Having
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examined both the Semi-Annual Report (period ending June 30., 1973)
and the wording of the Technical Specification and its monitoring
>
requirements, managerant agreed that pH. determinations were confined
to the wastewater collection basin effluent and that the incidents
mentioned above did, in fact, represent pH values outside of the
specified limit range. Management stated, however, that although
pH of the wastewater collection basin frequently exceeded specified
limits, the records also show that the combined effluent and normal
yard drainage generally show a pH well within the assigned limits
prior to discharging to the Keowee River. Management was advised
that the referenced Technical Specification applies only to the basin
effluent and until such time that the pH limits and scope of applica-
tion are changed, any incident in which the limit range is exceeded
constitutes a violation and should be reported.
7.
pH and Soecific Conductance Measurements
Inspection of wastewater collecti;n basin effluent pH and specific
conductance monitoring records also revealed frequent incidents
involving fai]
e to conduct required measurements. The monitoring
requirements of Section 1.2 of the Specifications state that the
above effluent parameters shall be determined and recorded daily.
For the period July 10, 1973, through November 14, 1973, 25 of the
above incidents were enumerated. Management was informed that
failure to execute the requirements of a technical specification
,
constitutes a violation. Management was also advised that in cases
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where required monitoring can not be conducted, e.g., where the basin
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has been drained and/or there is no discharge, appropriate notification
should be entered into the record. Management agreed that some degrec
of negligence has been involved and that attention would be given to
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the correction of this.
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8.
Dissolved Oxygen Measurements
Section 1.3.1 cf the Technical Specifications requires that dissolved
oxygen will be measured weekly from May through November at three
locations:
(1) Oconee discharge, (2) the lake surface (1 ft, deep)
at the Keowee intake structure, and (3) the Keowee tailrace during
hydroelectric. plant operation.
Inspection of dissolved oxygen moni-
toring records showed that no measurements were conducted during the
month of May. Monitoring was initiated on June 8, 1973. Further audit
4
of the records revealed failure to conduct such measurements for a
3
total of five weeks during the period June 15, 1973, through August 17,
!
1973. -A licensee representative stated that dissolved oxygen measure-
ments could not always be conducted as specified because of scheduled
operation of the hydroelectric plant as required in (3) above. The
inspector was informed by the system environmental engineer that arrange-
l
ments had been made to operate the hydroelectric plant- for three to five
minutes, when required, to accomodate specified weekly dissolved oxygen
s ,
measurements. Management was informed that failure to initiate these
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measurements when specified and failure to conduct such measurements
at the r,ssigned frequency constituted violations of the referenced
Technical Specification. ' Management was also informed that, in view
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of the large number of incidents involving failure to fully execute
. Technical Specification requirements,-it was apparent that an adminis-
i
trative or management procedure is required to assure that all plant
site environmental monitoring and surveillance procedures will be con-
ducted as specified.
9.
Fish Impingement Inspection
Examination of fish impingement inspection records revealed that the
required visual inspections were initiated on June 8,1973. No
inspections were conducted during the period April 1, 1973, through
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June 2,1973, when at least one condenser cooling water intake pump
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was operating. Failure to implement fish impingement inspection of
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the intake screens was discussed with management. Management agreed
that negligence was involved in implementation of Section 1.4 of the
Technical Specifientions and that corrective action had been taken.
Weekly visual inspections of the intake screens have been routinely
conducted as required since June 8,1973.
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10. Reportina Requirem. ats
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Incidents inwhich chemical discharge limits have been exceeded are
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repor.able as unusual events in accordance with the requirements of
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Sectit
6.6.2
"Non-Routine Reports," Appendix A Technical Specifi-
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cations. Management was informed of these reporting requirements
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and further advised that failure to report. violations of the chemical
discharge limits for boron and the wastewater collection basin
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effluent pH constituted violations of the specification referenced
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above. Following discussion of this , management indicated agreement
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and the need for corrective action.
11. Implementation of Reconmended Modification to Wastewater Collection Basin
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RO Report No. 50-269/73-3. describes the event of, February 16, 1973, which
involved violation of the wastewater collection basin effluent pH limit.
Additional comments concerning this event are found in R0 Report No.
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50-269/73-4, Details II.
The Oconee Station Review Committee reviewed
the violation (Technical Specification Section 1.2
" Chemical Discharge
,
Limits") and recommended that the wastewater collection basin be enlarged
'
to. provide for a longer holdup time and an increased volume of dilution
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water. The recommendation required that'three distinct volumes be made
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available for holdip. The Committee also recommended'a change in the
Technical Specific: tion requirements to make the existing pH limit apply
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to water being discharged directly to the Keowee River. Management
offered no reasons for delay in implementing the recommended changes in
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basin capacity; however, they did state that they were awaiting EPA
personnel to complete their revision of regulations before requesting
a change in Section 1.2 of the Specifications. The apparent necessity
to modify the wastewater basin to accomodate increased wastewater
discharges was discussed. Management stated that attention would be
given to this item.
12.
Aquatic Surveillance and Snecial Studies Program
Aquatic surveillance programs defined in Section 1.3 of the Technical
Specifications were discussed with licensee representatives. The
monitoring, surveillance and special studies programs detailed in
Table 1.0-1 of the Specifications are being conducted as required.
Raw and reduced data generated from special studies, namely, plankton
mortality, plu=e mapping for temperature and oxygen, and gas bubble
disease, were reviewed and examined. Management was infor=ed that, at
this point in time, these requirements were being conducted as specified.
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