ML19319C047

Forwards Response to NRC 761021 Request for Addl Info Re Containment Sys

ML19319C047
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	11/03/1976
From:	Roe L TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:	Stolz J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML19319C048	List: ML19319C047 ML19319C051 ML19319C052
References
141, NUDOCS 8001300786
Download: ML19319C047 (12)

Text

U.S. NUCLE A R RE GULAToR Y ** *MMISSloN ooCKE T NUMIE R NRC Fom 195 f-.

[Q ]gg (2 7G) blRC DISTRIBUTly'J AoR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIA 1.

TO:

Mr Stolz Toledo Edison Co "51-3 76 Toledo, Ohi o4TE RECEIVE o L E Roe 11-8-76 E ETTER ONoToRIZEo PROP INPUT FORM NUMBER oF CoPtES RECE4VEo XoRiciN AL WU NC LASS s FIE o one Signed CCoPY DE SC RIP TIC N ENCLOSURE Ltr trans the following:

Responses to our request for addl info re Containment systems dtd 10-21-76.........

(1 cy enci rec'd) l PL\\NT NAME:

Davis Besse 41 SAFETY FOR ACTION!!NFOR.".1 ATION ENVIRO 11-9-76 ehf i

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m TOLEDO EDISON LCWELL E. RCE Docket No. 50-346 u,,,,,,,,,

Seco.t es Cevetcoment November 3, 1976

S' 8 5 8*3'8 Serial No. 141 to e

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y Director of Nuclear Regulation y,

(

Attn:

Mr. John F. Stolz, Chief

-N Light Water Reactors Branc.h No. 1

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Division of Project Management

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United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

'N' Washington, D. C.

20555 NC __ l '

Dear Mr. Stolz:

Enclosed are the responses to the requests for additional information regarding containment systems concerns requested in Enclosure 1 of your letter dated October 21, 1976. These responses are being provided by November 5, 1976, as requested to support the licensing schedule.

Yours very truly,

~

,1 bt b/2 Enclosures b$.bd1.

THE TCLECO EDISON COMPANY ECISCN PLAZA 300 MACISCN AVENUE TCLECO CHIO 43652

900 l

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3.

Identify the systems or portiona of systems which will be vented and drained during a Type A test as required by Ap-pendix J to 10 CFR 50, and include this information in the proposed Technical Specifications. Systems that will not be vented or drained should be identified and the reasons for not doing so should be provided.

RESPONSE

The valve lineup during the Type A test corresponds to post-LOCA condi-i tions. Svstems which will remain filled during a LOCA are filled during the Type A test.

Systems which are expected to be drained as a result of a LOCA are drained and vented for the Type A test.

The only excep-l tions are systems which are required for decay heat removal. These systems will remain filled during testing. These systems are grouped as j

follows:

A.

The following lines are water filled:

LINES DRAWING +

PENETRATION Containment air cooling service M-041 5,6,7,9,10,11 water inlet & outlet lines (service water)

High pressure injection lines M-033 19,20,22,50 (demineralized or borated water)

Containment spray lines M-034 25,26 (demineralized or borated water)

Low pressure injection lines M-033 27,28 (demineralized or borated water)

Decay heat removal line M-033 29 (demineralized or borated water)

B.

The following normally water filled lines are (1) vented to the containment atmosphere and drained sufficiently to expose the inside containment isolation valve; and are (2) vented to the outside atmosphere and drained suffi-ciently to expose the outside containment isolation valve:

LINES DRAWING +

PENETRATION Pressurizer sample line M-030 1

j Component cooling water M-036 3,4 i

inlet and outlet Component cooling water M-036 12 to control rod drives

..m

~

m B.

cont'd...

LINES DRAWING +

PENETRATION Containment vessel normal M-046 13 sump drain Letdown line to purification M-031 14 demineralizers Demineralized water M-010B 21 Reactor coolant system drain M-040A 32 to RC drain tank Pressurizer quench tank M-040A 41 circulating inlet line Core flooding tank sample M-034 47A line Pressurizer quench tank M-040A 48 circulating outlet line Refueling canal fill line M-033 49 Reactor coolant pump seal M-031 52,53,54 water supply & return lines 55,56 Pressurizer quench tank M-040A 68A sample line I

C.

The following lines are air or other gas lines and are vented inside and outside the containment to expose the inside containment isolation valve to containment air and the outside containment isolation valve to outside are:

LINES DRAWING +

PENETRATION Containment vessel vacuum M-029B 8A-J braakers Containment vessel equipment M-040A 16 vent header Containment vessel purge M-029A 33,34 4

inlet & outlet Service air supply line*

M-015 42A Containment vessel air sample M-029B 42B,43B i

return i

Instrument air supply line*

M-015 43A 1

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C.

cont'd...

l LINES DRAWING +

PENETRATION i

Core flooding tank fill and M-034 44A,71C N supply lines

• 2 Pressurizer quench tank M-019 44B N supply line*

2 Core flood tank vent line M-034 47B Hydrogen purge system exhaust M-029A 51 l

Hydrogen dilution system supply M-029A 67,69 lines I

Containment air sample lines M-029B 71B,68B

{

73B,74B D.

The following lines are associated with the secondary systems of the steam generators, shall not be vented to 3

the containment vessel in any mar.aer, and may be water i

f illed. All valves and connections on the secondary side of the steam generators must be checked to assure that they are positioned to isolate the entire system from the containment. Penetrations and systems involved are as i

follows:

LINES DRAWING +

PENETRATION Main steam line M-003, 39,40 M-007 Main feedwater line M-007 37,38 l

Auxiliary feedwater line M-007 35,36 Steam generator drain line M-007 57,58 Secondary sampling line M-007 2,18 i

The preceeding will be reflected in the ILRT report, titled " Containment Vessel Integrated Leak Rate Test", which is expected to be submitted for docket in December, 1976. This information will be included in revised Technical Specification 4.6.1.2.

1

• Lined up to ensure in-leakage of pressurized gases.

l

+FSAR figures associated with these drawing numbers can be found on FSAR figures 6-12 and 9-17, i

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4.

The proposed Technical Specifications specify an overall air lock leakage rate limitation of 0.05 La at Pa (38 psig).

Since the air lock is included as a potential bypass leak path, this limit conflicts with the maximum allowable bypass leakage rate of 0.015 La.

Provide an acceptance criterion for the overall air lock leakage rate that does not conflict with the maximum allowable bypass leakage rate.

In addition, the proposed Technical Specifications specify that periodic leak testing of the air lock door seals should demonstrate no detectable seal leakage when pressurized to Pa without the use of "strongbacks", and that leakage has been detected between the door seals when pressurized at a reduced Therefore, propose a method of leak testing the pressure.

volume between the door seals at a reduced pressure and justify the test pressure. Provide the equations that will be used to extrapolate the leakage rate to Pa, and justify that it is a conservative method. In addition, specify and justify the maximum allowable, extrapolated leakage rate at Pa.

4

RESPONSE

Technical Specification 3.6.1.3b (attached) has been revised to specify an overall air lock leakage rate limitation of 0.002 La at Pa (?3 psig).

This overall air lock leakage rate limit was established in the same i

manner as the potential bypass leak path limit was established as dis-cussed in the response to FSAR Request for Additional Information Num-ber 6.2.23.

The estimated leakage from the personnel air lock is more The than one eighth of the total estimated filtration bypass leakage.

overall air lock leakage rate limit of 0.002 La is therefore in agreement with the maximum allowable bypass leakage rate of 0.015 La.

Technical Specification 4.6.1.3a and its Bases have been revised as shown on the attached draft technical specifications to specify the l

technical specifications proposed by the Applicant.

The selection of the reduced pressure of 10 psig is based on the manufac-turer's recommendation that the " hold-downs" (rather than "strongbacks")

be installed whenever pressurizing greater than 10 psig between the The attached draft technical specification does commit to "no seals.

detectable leakage" when the test pressure is 10 psig. The Bases for the draft technical specification specifies the minimum leak race detec-tion capability of the testing method and instrumentation to make the technical specification clear and inspectable.

If there is detectable leakage when the seals are pressurized to 10 psig, the " hold-downs" will be installed and the seals will be pressurized to Pa, 38 psig, and the leak rate must be less than 0.002 La.

j.

There is no equation which can be used to extrapolate the leakage rate i

from 10 psig to 38 psig in a conservative way since the air lock seals present a variable orifice problem. However the proposed technical specifications do present a conservative method for assuring that the containment personnel air lock leak rate will not exceed the leak rate limit in the postulated event of a LOCA for the following reasons:

1.

Pressurizing between the seals tends to lift the air lock door 0

f rom the seals whereas a postulated LOCA would tend to compress the seals.

2.

Any leakage measured represents the total leakage past both seals whereas a postulated LOCA would act on both seals in the same direction.

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C0?iTAIfmE?iT AIR LOCXS LIMITI!iG C0tIDITIO!1 FCR OPEFATIC!1

3. 6. '.3 Each containment air lock shall be OPERASLE with:

Both doors closed except when the air lock is being used for a.

normal transit entry and exit thrcugh tne centainment, then at least one air lcck dcor shall be closed, and An overall air lock leakage rate of Ma at P, 38 psig.

b.

a

' * ' O~p APPLICA3ILITT: MOCES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTIOil:

'Jith an air leck inoperable, restore the air lock tc CPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STA:iCSY within the next 6 hcurs and in CCLD SHUTCC'4:1 within the folicwing 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLA?'CE DEOUIREFE:ITS 4.6.1.3 Each containment air lack shall be demonstrated CPERA3LE:

• After each opening except when the air lock is being used for a.

multiple entries, then at least cnce per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, by verifying ino detectableh seal leakage by-;remre d: cay wnen the volume between the door seals is pressurized to.10 psig, f:c n irt verify ng a seal itaksce rar M. 02 La i

when the volume' between +he. decr 14 prkGr>wY := Q35pa 1:. T e7 or by At least once per 6 months by conducting an everall air le

,,,gg' b.

• , 7 f,c air lock leakage fate is within its limit, and Jocr-h C'd'E At least once per 6 mcnths by verifying that only cne door in c.

cue each air lock can be opened at a time.

i ns-a !ks l Exemption to Appendix "J" of 10 CFR' 50.

DAVIS-BESSE, UtlIT 1 3/4.6-6 SEp ; ;.3,.

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5.

The proposed Technical Specifications require some testing of the emergency ventilation system. However, it is not clear that the testing will verify the acceptability of the system performance.

Identify the parameters to be monitored and specify their limiting values, for the purpose of justifying the calculated 740-second depressurization time for the shield building. Propose a technical specification which identifies the criteria for the acceptable performance of the emergency ventilation system.

RESPONSE

The mathematical model used to predict shield building pressure response following a LOCA has also been used to predict response when the EVS is initiated at ambient conditions for periodic testing. Parametric inputs present only after a LOCA (heat loads E1? containment vessel expansion) were set equal to zero and parametric inputs present at all times (fan start time, annulus temperature, fan capacity and in-leakage) were postulated as follows:

1.

The EVS was assumed to be given a manual start signal for the test, hence no diesel sequencing delay and no instrument delay were assumed. Fan start time was assumed to be 5 seconds based on fan acceleration time, only (see the response to question 1 above).

Tot 3 shield building leakage area was assumed to equal a 2.4 2.

1 ft.

opening. The basis for this number is that the revised analysis (see the response to ques 31on 2, above) shows that for openings between 0 and 2.4 f t.

the annulus drawdown time to negative 0.25 in w.g. is less than the 13 minutes assumed in the LOCA does calculationg in FSAR Chapter 15, and that for openings larger than 2.4 ft.', the drawdown time soon exceeds 13 minutes.

3.

The model was found to be essentially insensitive to initial annulus air temperature and humidity for the ambient analysis, hence an initial air temperature of 85 F and humidity of 75 percent were ssumed. These values are consistent with the initial temperatura assumed in the post-LOCA analysis.

4.

EVS fan capacity was assumed to be 8000 cfm consistent with the capacity assumed in the post-LOCA analysis.

The results of the revised analysis have been incorporated into the attached proposed surveillance test for Technical Specification 4.6.5.1.

Surveillance test 4 verifies EVS and shield building performance as a whole.

u.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PROC ? 1 ~;.J 'L' CG'(

SURVEILLA? ICE RECUIREMENTS (Continued) 1 2.

Verifying that the system satisfies the in-place testing acceptance criteria and uses the test procedures of Regulatory Positions C.5.a C.5.c and C.5.d of Regula-tory Guide 1.52, Revision 1, July 1976, and the system 1

flow rate is 8,000 cfm 10"..

3.

Verifying within 31 days after rer. oval that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52 Revision 1, July 1975, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regula-tory Guide 1.52, Revision 1, July 1976.

4.

Verifying a system flow rate of 8,000 cfm 10", during 1

system operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975.

t c.

Aft:r every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of charcoal adsorber operatien by verify-ing within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon samole obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 1, July 1976, meets the laboratory tes. ting criteria of Regula-tory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 1, July 1976.

d.

At least once per 18 months bye 1.

Verifying that the pressure drop across the cc=bined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is < 6 inches Water Gauge while operating the system at a ficw rate of 8,0C0 cfm 1.

10",.

2.

Verifying that the system starts automatically on any containment isc;ation test signal.

3.

Verifying that the filter cooling bypass valves can be manually opened.

4.

Verifying that each system produces a negative pressure of > 0.25 inches W.G. in the annulus withingseconds after a start signal.

fg DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 6-23 SE? 2 41975

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