ML19308D173
| ML19308D173 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 06/20/1977 |
| From: | Stewart W FLORIDA POWER CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19308D157 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8002270643 | |
| Download: ML19308D173 (3) | |
Text
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(pLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFCi#. TAT:Ja j 1
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"'rvYt Nt cocast NuustR EVENT CATE AfpCAf CAtt cartcoAv O 1 CCN'T l _ l _l
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l Subsequent to introduction of NaOH into the RCS as reported in LER-77-17, B&W evaluation, J.
7 89 tio 03 l of this event indicated the possibility of an unreviewed safety question as defined by J
7 80 90 0
l 10 CFR50.59(O in that the unterminated injection of the NaOH tank contents into the l
7 89 EU 0t l RCS could result in core criticality with all rods inserted. Redundancy N/A.
This l
7 u9 eO event has not occurred to this date.
Administrative and chvsical centrols to ereclude 1
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%g (LER 77 _52) t 004 coupcNENT CC0f A
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A VCLATON 0
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l Xl Xl Xl q q Xl lAl l Z lZ lZ lZ l l Nl 7 89 10 11 12 17 43 44 47 48 CAUSE DESCRIPTION l*
a l The possibility of moderator dilution by the unterminated injection of the entire j
7 89 60 g j contents of the NaOH tank into the Reactor Coolant while in the decay heat removal l
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cycle.
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paCtrry MEfMCo CF status
% POW (A QTHER STAfuS OtSCOviny OtSCOVEAy CISCMTCN l 0l 0l 0l l NA l
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NA l
1 7 0 9
10 12 13 44 45 46 80 Att S C
AMCuNT CF ACfrvity LCCATCN OF SELEASE 12 l
l ASE l NA l
l NA l
7 8 9
10 11 44 45 60 PERSONNEL EXPCSunES NUMBEA fvPE QESCA@fCN Glil l 0l 0l 0l gl NA l
7 89 11 12 13 50 PERSCNNEL INJUAIES NUMGE A DESCMfCN E [ O! 0l O!
NA l
7 89 11 12 i-0 i
CFFSITE CONSECUENCES 15 l NA l
7 89 80 LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FAC.'UTY TvPt CISCRaicN 3bl NA l
7 00 10 Lu l
PUBUCITY NA l
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I ADDITIONAL FACTORS
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yl this occurrence have been provided.
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See attached Supplementary Information f
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g W. P. Stewart
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NAME; cro 44..s67 s
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION x
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, 1.
' Report No.:
50-302/77-52 2.
F cility:
Crystal River Unit #3 3.
Report Date:
20 June 1977 4.
Occurrence Date 14 June 1977 5.
Identifleation of Occurrence:
l'ossible unreviewed safety question as dofined by 10 CIR50.59(b) concerning unterminated sodlum hydroxide dilution of Reactor Coolant System.
6.
Conditions Prior to Occurrence:
NA as event has not occurred to this date.
7.
Description of Occurrence:
.As reported on 1 March 1977 (LER 77-1.') approximately 600 gallons of NaOH was introducted into the Reactor t'olant System via the Decay Heat Re-moval System. Subsequent to this event, an evaluation by Babcock and 4
Wilcox, concerning the unterminated injection of the' entire contents of the sodium hydroxide tank into the Reactor Coolant System, reveals that the possibility of thic occurrence may constitute 'an unreviewed safety question. The results of this evaluation indicate that a situation could exist where an unterminated moderator dilution accident could occur that-is not bounded by the CR-3 FSAR Chapter 14 analysis.
8.
_ Designation of Apparent Cause:
The injection of the entire NaOH cank contents into the RCS as described in the B&W evaluati'on could cause the core to go critical.
9.
Analysis of Occurrence:
Should this event ever occur, there is the possibility of the Reactor going critical with all rods inserted.
10.
Corrective Action:
Precluding an occurrence of this nature includes the following administratively imposed safeguards:
A.
Closing manual isolation valves in the NaOH supply lines and " racking out" the breakers to the motor operated isolation valves in the NaOH supply lines before starting a DH puro.
B.
Verifying manual isolation valves are closed before testing the motor operated valves in the NaOH supply lines.
C.
Only testing the motor operated valves at a refueling interval.
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Supplementary Information
, Page'2
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Corrective Action (Cont'd)
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Florida Power Corporation is presently evaluating the chemical additive system for CR #3 to determine what permanent modifications are required as a result of eliminating the sodium thiosulfate from the system. This evalua-tion is being performed in accordance with Condition 2.C(4y of Amendment No.1 to the CR #3 Operating License and will be submitted to the Commission for review and approval on or before September 3,1977.
It is our intent to in-clude this unreviewed safety question as part of our overall evaluation of
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the Chemical Additive System. Appropriate revisions to the CR #3 FSAR will be submitted to the Commission following the completion of our evaluation.
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