ML19308C211
| ML19308C211 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 03/28/1979 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001210544 | |
| Download: ML19308C211 (78) | |
Text
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APPCNDICES NRC INCIDENT RESPONSE A.
Incident Scenarios B.
Current NRC Office /Divisica Responsibilities C.
Current NRC Personnel Assigned to Incident Response Fu: cticns D.
Present Incident Management Center E.
Present Agency Authorities for Incident Planning and Preparedness F.
Current Infor: nation Exchange Agencies G.
Current Support Agencies Responsibilities H.
Draft NRC Headquarters Contingency Plan Outline 8 0 01210 Qg W
',9 o
APPENDIX A INCIDENT SCENARIOS TABLE OF CCNTENTS Radiolerical Ccnsecuences 1
1.
Large Lass of Coolant Accidents (16 scenarios)........
4 17
)
2.
Small LOCA's (5 scenarios)..................
)
22 3
Reactor Plant Transients (4 scenarios)............
26 4.
Refueling Accidents.....................
27 5.
Gaseous and Liquid Waste Releases (2 scenarios) 29 6.
Large Fire (Browns Ferry)..................
7.
Abandoned Control Recm, at a Nuclear Power Plant 31 (2 scenarios).................
8.
Crash of Spent Fuel Cask with Release of Radioactivity 34 (2 scenarios).......................
9.
Major Flooding or Other Natural Phencmena at a Nuclear 37 Power Plant (4 scenarios).................
j 41 10.
East Coast Blackout.....................
Radiological and Saferuards Consecuences 42 11.
Seizure of a Reactor with Threat of Sabota8e.........
Saferuards Censecuences with Potential Radiolerica* Censecuences 12.
Penetration of Physical Barrier at a Fuel Facility 43 with Theft of SNM.....................
j
i 1.
LARGE LOCA ALL ECCS FrNCTION (PWR AB)
Time Event 0
Large break in the reactor coolant system.
6 - 7 seca.
Accumulator discharge begins.
10 - 11 secs.
Primary system depressurization ecmplete.
Accumulator discharge complete; safety injection 30 secs.
pumps and containment spray injectier sistem start.
1 min.
Gap inventory released to centainment.
200 secs.
Start containment spray recirculation system.
~
30 mins.
End source leak from containment.
!!7 mins.
Containment spray injection ends (w/ minimum pump capacity).
63 mins.
Core injection ends (w/ minimum pump capacity).
Manual switching to emergency coolant recirculation which continues as long as sump water is available.
No evacuation of off-site people required.
t 2.
EB.
LARGE LOCA ECR + CSRS FAILURE M
Time C-ant 0
Large Break.
6 - 7 seca.
Accumulator discharge beings; multiple alarms begin.
10 - 11 secs.
Primary system depress.
30 secs.
Accumulator discharge complete; safety injection pumps and CSIS sta,.
r 60 secs.
Gap inventory released to containment--radiation alarm.
47 mins.
Conticsent spray injection ends.
50 mins.
Core injection ends. Attempt to manually switch to t'ecirculation and fail.
(Decision point:
Can recirculation be fixed within 30 mins.?
Should evacuation be initiated?)
60 mins.
Start boiloff.
100 mins.
Start core melting.
150 mins.
End core melting (80% molten), melt source has been released to containment.
150 mins.
Steam explosion and cire' dispersed through failed
~
containment.
175 mins.
Source plume from steam exp. crosses site boundary of 0.5 m1 w/1.2 mph wind speed.
210 mins.
End reactor vessel meltina;.
230 mins.
Decomposition of containment concrete base sat sat begins.
250 mins.
Source plume from steam explosion crosses LPZ boundary of 2 mi, @ wind speed of 1.2 mph.
330 ain.
Vaporization source has been released to centainment.
1290 :dns.
End containment melting.
a e
/
3.
PWR LARGE LOCA ECI + CSRS FAILURE
.AE Event Time 0
Large break.
Accumulator discharge begins; multiple signals 6 - 7 secs.
received.
10 - 11 secs.
Primary system depress.
30 secs.
Acc. discharge complete; CSIS start.
60 secs.
Boiloff, gap inventory released to containment;
~
core injection discovered inoperable.
(Decision point: Should evacuation be initiated?)
16 sins.
Start core melting.
End core melting (80%) melt source has been 60 mins.
released to containment.
~
94 mins.
CSI ends.
120 sins.
End reactor vessel melting.
140 mins.
Decomposition of cent. concrete base sat begins.
240 mins.
Vaporination source has been released to cent.
1200 mins.
End containment melting.
1
)
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4.
D.E LARGE LOCA CSIS ECR CSRS FAILURE 19.E.
Time Event 0
Large break.
6 - 7 secs.
Accumulator discharge begins.
10 - 11 seca.
Primary system depress.
30 secs.
Accumulator discharge ecmplete; safety injection pumps start.
60 secs.
Failure of CSIS discovered.
100 mins.
Core injection ends; operator attempts to switch recirculation; failure of recirculation system discovered.
120 mins.
Start boiloff.
O 170 sins.
Start core melting.
200 mins.
Containment overpressure failure; puff release.
220 mins.
End core melt (80%) melt source released to cent.
280 mins.
End reactor vessel melting.
300 mins.
Decomposition of cent. base mat begins.
1360 mins.
End containment melting.
t
5.
f.HB.
LARGE LOCA CSIS + ECI FAILUBE i
Time Event 0
Large break.
6 - 7 secs.
Accumulator discharge begins.
10 - 11 secs.
Primary system depress.
30 secs.
Accumulator discharge complete.
60 secs.
Discover no CSID + ECI.
60 secs.
Boiloff, gap inventory released to containment.
3 3 mins.
Start CSRS, try to start ECR and fail.
16 mins.
Start core melting.
60 mins.
End core melting (80%) melt source has been released to containment.
120 mins.
End reactor vessel melting.
140 mins.
Decomposition of cont. concrete base sat begins CO leakage.
2 240 mins.
Vaporization source has been released to cont.
1200 mins.'
End containment melting.
6.
.DB.
LARGE LOCA CSIS. ECI + CSRS FAILURE MDf.
Time Event 0
Large bretx.
6 - 7 sees.
Accumula',or discharge begins.
10 - 11 sees.
Primary system depress.
30 secs.
Accumulator discharge complete.
60 secs.
Operator discovers CSIS, ECI inoperable.
60 secs.
Boiloff.
5 mins.
Attempt to start CSRS + ECH and fail.
16 mins.
Start core melting..
60 mins.
End core melting (805) melt source released.
60 mins.
Containment over press. failure.
120 mins.
End vessel melting.
140 mins.
Decomposition of containment concrete base mat.
1200 mins.
End containment melting.
7 PWR LARGE LOCA NO ELFCTRIC PCWER (PWR - A33)
Time Event 0
Large break in the reactor coolant system; electric power fails.
6 - 7 secs.
Accumulator discharge initiated.
10 - 11 secs.
Primary system depressurisation complete.
30 secs.
Accumulator discharge complete.
1 sin.
Start boiloff - gap inventory released to containment. Release to atmosphere from nominal containment leakage.
16 mins.
Start core melting.
60 sins.
End core melting (%805) molten). Melt source has been released to containment.
9 60 sins.
Steam explosion; significant release to atmosphere due to containment failure; reacter vessel melting begins.
35 ains.
Soure e plume
-nm steam explosien crosses site boundary of 0.5 c. assuming wind speed of 1.2 mph.
120 mins.
End reactor vessi melting; decomposition of 1
containment concrete base sat begins.
i 160 mins.
Source plume fece steam explosion crosars LPZ boundary of 2 21. 9 wind speed of 1.2 mp't.
)
240 ains.
Vaporization source has beedn released to
)
containment.
Up to 1800 nins.
CO and E O generated from concrete.
2 2
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8.
E.9.
LARGE LOCA CL>1001/ day & HPSW FAILURE j
28uhL
)
4 Time Event 0
Large break.
0.5 secs.
MSIV closure.
1 sec.
SCRAM signal.
3 secs.
Primay containment isolated.
30 secs.
Primary system depress, core spray syst. start.
43 secs.
LPCI system start.
60 seca.
Gap inventory released to containment, ESW pumps at rated speed (high release outside cent.)
1.5 mins.
Core reflooded.
10 mins.
Manual actuation of RHRS.
30 mins.
Discover no HPSW (2ecision point:
Should evacuation be initiated?)
250 mins.
Pump cavitation due to saturated water.
270 mins.
Start core melting.
330 mins.
End core melting (805) melt source has been released to containment.
390 mins.
End reactor vessel melting.
410 mins.
Start decomposition of cent. concrete base mat.
490 mins.
Vaporization source has been released to cont.
767 mins.
Max suppression pool Temp reached.
2500 mins.
End containment melting.
9.
M LARGE LOCA CL>1005/dav. CSRS & LCRS FAILURE AGHI Time Event 0
Large break.
0.5 secs.
MSIV closure.
1 sec.
SCRAM signal.
30 sees.
Primary system depress; core spray start.
60 secs.
ESW pumps at rated speed.
1 5 mins.
Core reflooded.
10 mins.
Manual actuation of RHRS.
15 mins.
Operator discovers no recire. capabilitv.
(Decision point: Should evacuation be Laitiated.
20 mins.
Start core melting (release to atmosphare).
80 mins End core melting (805) melt source has been released to containment (radiation alarm).,.
140 mins.
End reactor vessel melting.
160 mins.
Start decomposition of cent. concrete.
250 mine.
Pump cavitation.
767 mins.
Max suppression pool Temp reached.
2000 mins.
End containment melting; molten core in ground water containment.
10.
1 19.
LARGE LOCA ECF & CL> LOOS / day l
Time Event 0
Large break.
0.5 sees.
MSIV closure.
l 1 sec.
SCRAM signal.
30 secs.
Primary system depress.
3 mins.
Operator discovers no ECF.
5 mins.
Start core melting; significant release detected. (Decision point: Should evacuation be initiated?)
150 mins.
End core melting (805) melt source has been released to containment.
210 mins.
End reactor vessel melting.
230 mins.
Start decomposition of containment.
330 mins.
Vaporization source has been released to containment.
2000 mins.
End containment melting; core in ground water containment.
A
11.
EB.
LARGE LOCA CL>1005/ day & ECI FAILURE AEG (dry)
Time Event 0
Large break.
0.5 secs.
MSIY closure.
1 sec.
SCRAM signal.
30 secs.
Primary system depress.
60 secs.
Oap inventory released to containment.
3 mins.
Reles _= a to atmosphere, operator discovers ECI tot w.rking.
20 mins, Start core melting.
150 mins.
End core melting (8r 5) melt source has been released to containment.
180 mins.
End reactor vessel melting.
200 mins.
Start decomposition of. containment concrete.
300 mins.
Vaporization source has been released to containment.
2000 mins.
End containment melting; core in ground water containment.
i
12.
E.
LARGE LOCA VS + HPSW FAILURE L
Time' Event 0
Large break.
0.5 secs.
MSIV closure.
I sec.
SCRAM signal.
30 sees.
Primary system depress; core spray start.
30 secs.
Containment overpress. failure; puff release.
High radiation alarm. (Decision point: Should evacuation be initiated?)
43 secs.
LPCI system start.
60 secs.
ESW pumps at rated speed.
1.5 nins.
Core reflooded.
2 mins.
Gap inventory released to containment.
10 mins.
Manual actuation of RERS.
25 mins.
Source plume from overpress. crosses site w/ wind
~
speed of 1.2 mph.
100 mins.
Source plume crosses LPZ boundary of 2 mi.
w/ wind speed of 1.2 mph.
400 mins.
Pump cavitation; Operator discovers loss of RER capability. (Decision point: Should evacuation be initiated?)
400 sins.
Max suppression pool Temp reached.
420 mins.
Start core melting; significant release to atmosphere.
510 mins.
End core melting (805) melt source has been released to containment.
600 mins.
End reactor vessel melting.
620 mins.
Start decomposition of cent. concrete.
720 sins.
Vaporization source has been released to cont.
3000 mins.
End containment melting; core underground in cont.
13.
REL LARGE LOCA VS. CSRS + LPCRS FAILURE EdG.
Time Event O
Large break.
0.5 secs.
MSIV closure.
I sec.
SCRAM signal.
30 secs.
Primary system depress; core spray start.
30 secs.
Containment overpress failure; puff release.
Radiation alarm.
(Decision point: Should evacuation be initiated?)
60 secs.
ESW pumps at rated speed.
1.5 mins.
Core reflooded.
~
10 mins.
Manual actuation of RHRS.
13 mins.
Operator discovers no recirculation capability.
20 mins.
Start core melting.
25 mins.
Source plume from overpress. crosses site boundary of 0.5 mi. w/ wind speed of 1.2 mph.
80 mins.
End core melting (80%) melt source has been released to containment.
100 mins.
Source plume crosses LPZ boundary of 2 mi.
w/ wind speed of 1.2 mph.
140 mios.
End reactor vessel melting.
160 = ins.
Start deccmposition of cent. concrete.
2000 mins.
End containment melting.
14.
11!1 LARGE LOCA VS & ECI FAILURE ADE Y ( d r*v)
Time Event 0
Large break.
0.5 secs.
MSIV closure.
1 sec.
SCRAM' signal.
30 secs.
Primary system depress.
30 secs.
containment over pressure failure; puff release.
30 secs.
Operator knows containment fails.
(Decision point: Should evacuation be initiated?)
2 mins.
Gap inventory released to containment and atmosphere.
20 mins.
Start core esiting.
25 mins.
Source plume from overpress. crosses site boundary of 0.5 mi. w/ wind speed of 1.2 mph.
100 mins.
Source plume crosse's LPZ boundary of 2 mi. w/ wind speed of 1.2 sph.
150 mins.
End core melting (805) melt source has been released to containment.
180 mins.
End reactor vessel melting.
200 mins.
Start deccapositin of containment concrete.
300 mins.
Vaporization source has been released to cent.
2000 mins.
End containment melting; core into ground.
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15.
M LARGE LOCA SCRAM & VS FAILURE dis 2.
Time Event 0
Large break.
0.5 secs.
MSI7 closure.
30 secs.
Primary system depress; core spray start.
30 secs.
Containment overpress failure; puff release.
Radiation alarm. (Decision point: Should evacuation be initiated?)
43 seca.
LicI system start.
(0 secs.
ESW pumps at rate speed.
60 secs.
Cperator discoters SCRAM fails.
1.5 mins.
Core reflooded.
5 mins.
Start core melting.
10 mins.
Manual actuation of RHRS.
25 mins.
Source plume from overpress. crosses site boundary of 0.5 31. w/ wind speed of 1.2 mph.
100 mins.
Source plume crosses LPZ boundary of 2 mi.
w/ wind speed of 1.2 mph.
150 mins.
End core melting (805) seit source has been released to containment.
~
210 sins.
End reactor vessel melting.
230 mins.
Start decomposition of cent. concrete.
l l
250 mins.
Pump cavitation.
767 sins.
Max suppression pool Temp reached.
2000 mins.
End containment melting.
l
=
16.
HB.
LARGE LOCA EP & V S FAILURE MD.
Time Event 0
Large break and EP failure.
0.5 secs.
MSIV closure.
1 sec.
SCRAM signal.
30 secs.
Primary system depress.
30 sees.
Containment overpress. failure; puff release.
20 mins.
Start core melting.
25 mins.
Source plume from over press. crosses site boundary of 0.5 mi.
w/ wind speed of 1.2 mph.
100 mins.
Source plume crosses LPZ boundary of 2 31.
w/ wind speed of 1.2 mph.
150 mins.
End core melting (805) melt source has been release to containment.
180 mins.
End reactor vessel melting.
200 mins.
Start decomposition of cent. concrete.
2000 mins.
End containment melting.
..\\
17.
.D@.
SMALL BREAK 2 - 6 in CASE I - ALL ESFs FAILURE
. Time Event Indications O
Pipe rupture occurs.
FCS Low pressure alars; cont. Hi. press, alarm.
6 - 7 mins.
Reactor SCRAMS.
SCRAM signal; power decline.
30 secs.
Flow indication 30 secs.
HPIS initiates.
Flow indication; P.S.
pressure *1700.
100 - 200 secs.
Accumulator injection Flow indication; P.S.
- starts, pressure <600 psi.
200 - 300 secs.
LPIS initiates.
Flow indication; P.S.
pressure <200 psi.
30 - 40 mins.
Operator initiates CSRS, Flow indications pump CHRS & ECR.
status and valve positions.
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9 18.
IlfB.
SMALL BREAK CASE 2 - LOSS OF LONG TERM COOLING (CSRS-CHRS. ECR)
STEPS 1 THROUGH 6 SAME AS CASE 1 Time Event Indications 30 - 40 mins.
Initiate CSRS, CHRS Flow indications
- indicate
& ECS, no long term cooling.
100 - 110 mins.
Water boils off from Containment pressure rising core. clad fails and radiation alarms.
gap activity released.
200 mins.
Core melts 4805 molten.
No core instrumentation; containmen pressure increasing.
300 mins.
Containment fails due Containment pressure to overpressur; M exceeds ultimate strength.
release.
2000 mins.
Core melts through containment; core in ground.
' Start Evacuation of public l
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19 FWR SMALL BREAK CAS? 1 - LOSS OF EP Time Event Indication 0
Pipe rupture occurs.
Loss of all power on station & instrumentation readout.
O Loss of all EP.
6 - 7 secs.
Reactor SCHAMS (Gravity drop).
100 - 200 secs.
Accumulator injection.
60 mins.
Core melts.
160 mins.
Containment fails due to overpressure; F.P. release; 800 mins.
Core melts through containment.
20.
BWR SMALL BREAK CASE 1 FAILURE OF LONG TERM CQ0 LING (CSRS. LPCRS and HPSW FAIL) 1
_._ _ _.. _ T Lme Event Action er Indiestion 0
Small rupture occurs.
5 secs.
MSIV closure.
Alarm in control room.
10 secs.
SCRAM reactor.
30 secs.
Diesel start.
45 secs.
ADS valves open 4 mins.
ECI working 20 mins.
Core reflooded 20 - 30 mins.
Manual switch to No long term heat removal recirculation capability.
(Decision point: Should evacuation be initiated?)
N12 hrs.
Containment fails; moderate release.
N12 hrs.
Suppression pool water - - - -
flashes pumps cavitate.
12 1/2 hrs.
Core dry out.
l 15 brs.
Core 805 melts; large release.
24 hrs.
Core melts through containment. Release into soil and ground-water.
l l
4.
21.
Ed@.
SMALL LOCA CASE 2 - FAIL TO SCRAM Time Event O
Small LOCA occurs.
5 secs.
MSIV closure.
60 secs.
Pressure increase in vessel and power increase.
5 mins.
Operator discovers failure to SCRAM.
20 mins.
Reactor vesssel failure; release to containment.
30 mins.
Core starts to melt.
4 hrs.
Core melts through vessel.
5 brs.
Containment ruptures 0.P.
Large release.
13 brs.
Core melts through containment; in ground.
h 4
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l 22.
LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER WITH TOTAL LOSS OF FEEDWATER Time Event 0
Loss.cf offsite power.
6 - 7 secs.
Reactor SCRAM.
10 secs.
Auxilliary Feedwater fails.
20 secs.
Secondary reliefs open.
3 sins.
Operator reacts; discovers fesdwater failure.
60 sins.
Steam geneator dry.
60 mins.
Pressuriser safety and reliefs open.
2 brs.
Top of core uncovers.
3 brs.
Start core ms:.t.
8 brs.
Core melts through vesse!.
16 brs.
Core melts through containment. Base sat (large release).
23 PWR ATWS (Loss of Feedwater. Westincheuse)
Time Event 0
Loss of FW.
30 secs.
31.5 secs.
Pressurizer relief valves open.
43 secs.
S. G. safety valves open.
43.5 sees.
Pressurizer pressure peaks at 2412 psia.
53 secs.
Pressurizer relief valves close.
60 secs.
Auxiliary FW pumps start.
73 secs.
Pressurizer relief valves open.
85 secs.
Pressurizer' fills with water.
87 secs.
Pressurizer safety valves cpen to relieve water.
113 secs.
Peak reacter ecolant system pressure.
10 sins.
Operator initiates safety injection.
20 mins.
Operator puts plant in hot shutdown.
2 - 3 hrs.
RWST depleted, operator switches to recirculation mode.
s 24.
BWR ATWS (MSIV Closure - BWR h,5.6) j Time Event 0
3 secs.
Reliefs valve lift.
4 secs.
Some fuel experiences transition boiling.
6 secs.
FW flow steps.
10 secs.
Vessel pressure peaks (1300 psig for BWR 6).
30 secs.
HPCI or HPCS and RCIC flow starts.
40 secs.
Liquid control ficw reaches core.
l 3 mins.
Water level reaches minimum and begins to rise.
7 1/2 mins.
Hot shutdown is achieved.
10 mins.
Operator initiates pool cooling mode of RER.
11 mins.
RHR flow begins (pool cooling).
2 1/2 hrs.
Containment temperature and pressure peak.
l
l 25.
CASE 1 FAILURE OF DECAY HEAT REMOVAL Time Event O
Transient event occurs.
6 - 7 secs.
Reactor SCRAMS.
5 mins.
Safety / relief valves open and dump to suppression pool.
20 mins.
(Decision coint: Should evacuation be initiated?)
27 hrs.
Containment pressure increases to S175 psia; containment bursts.
27 hrs.
Feedwater flow to reactor vessel terminated by continament burst.
27 hrs.
Water flashes in suppression pool and water cannot be pumped to vessel because of pump cavitation.
28 brs.
Core uncovers.
29 brs.
Core starts to melt.
33 hrs.
Core melts thrcugh vessel.
40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br />.
Core melts through containment.
4 l
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t 26.
4 REFUELING ACCIDENT SCENARIO Time Event
-100 hrs.
Reactor Shutdown.
0.0 One fuel assembly dropped while being moved in Spent Fuel Pool; all fuel rods in that assembly rupture on impact, releasing gap noble gas and iodine activity.
+0 Activity passes thru the Fuel Building iodine filter and passes out to environment; venti-lation vent radiation detector alarms La control room.
+8.4 minutes Plume crosses site boundary at 503 meters, 1 meter /second wind speed.
+80 minutes Plume crosses outer boundary of LPZ at 3 miles, 1 meter /second wind speed.
1 l
27.
5.a.
LIOUID WASTE RELEASE SCENARIOS Time Event 0
1.
High Level Waste Drain Tank ruptures, spilling contents onto floor of Auxiliary Building, thru cracks in floor to ground below.
OR 2.
Liquid waste accidentally discharged thru storm sewer.
Less than 1 day Activity discharged in Scenario (2) above enters local body of water and travels to nearest point of consumpti.:n.
0.3 to 3000 years Activity discharged in scenario (1) above travels thru ground, enters local body of water, and travels to nearest point of consumption.
(Variability in travel times due to difference in soil porosity from site to site.)
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28.
5.b.
GASEOUS WASTE RELEASE '2ENARIO Time Event 3
0 One 434 ft waste Gas Decay Tank, buried in the plant yard, ruptures, releasing noble gas activity equivalent to 95.400 curies Xe-133, and iodine activity equivalent to 0.26 66cE s I-131, directly to environment.
+8.4 minutes Plume crosses site boundary at 503 meters, 1 =eter/
second wind speed.
+80 minutes Plume crosses LPZ outer boundary at 3 miles, 1 meter /second wind speed.
29 6.
LARGE FIRE (BROWNS FERRY)
Plant Conditions at Time of Fire Units 1 and 2 were operating at power, cable penetration between Unit I reactor building and cable speading room, commen to Units 1 and 2, was being leak tested by observation of a lighted candle. Polyurethane insulation in penetration was ignited by the candle flame.
Time Event 0
Fire ignited cables in penetration, propogated through the penetration anc involved large numbers of cables in the building.
Unit 1 5 - 6 mics.
ECCS alarm panel alarmed. Subsequent alarm received indicating erratic control equipment behavior. RCS recirculation pumps began running back.
13 mins.
RCS Recirculation pumps tripped.
16 mins.
Reactor manually tripped, shutdown confirmed, turbine and two feedwater pumps tripped.
16 - 20 mins.
Low water level after trip started HPCI and RCIC, water level rose to +47 inches and HPCI & RCIC were tripped.
20 mins.
E Plan implemented.
25 mins.
Unit 2 tripped.
28 mins.
MSIV's closed. Power lost to several boards, RCIC inopeable RV*s opened automatically to control pressure.
Cooling established by one CRD pump.
Nuclear Instrumentation became inoperable, only 4 RV's effective in " remote manual."
CO dumped in spreading room.
65 mins.
Bicwdewn to 350 psig begun.
Minimum water height +48 inches above tcp of fuel.
Condensate ficw to reactor for cooling established and relief valves were kept open.
30,
- 6. Large Fire (Browns Ferrv) eent'd Time Event 5 1/2 hrs.
Power to 4 remaining relief valves lost.
7 hrs.
Fire pronounced out. (Fire burned intermittently throughout above sequence) 8 hrs.
Relief valve power restored.
9 hrs.
Reactor pressure rose to peak of 600 psig.
Cooling above 350 psig by one CRD pump.
Unit 2 15 mins.
Erroneous alarms received.
25 mins.
Numerous alarms received. Unit 2 tripped.
26 mins.
Shutdown confimed, turbine tripped.
28 mins.
HPCI and RCIC initiated and tripped by high water level, MSIV's closed.
35 mins.
HPCI and RCIC startd manually one CRD pump operating.
45 mins.
Relief valve =anual activation capability lost; automatic OK.
95 mins.
Reactor began to depressurize.
100 mins.
Air for manual operation of relief valve restored.
Depressuristien allcwed to continue.
115 mins.
RHR pump "D" placed in torus cooling mode.
HER drain pump initiated to control torus water level. Reactor pressure 200 psig.
3 1/2 brs.
Cooling via condensate booster pump establised; main steam line drain line opened to condenser.
6 hrs.
Conditions stabilized.
l 1
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31.
7.a.
ABANDONED CCNTROL ROOM (SITE EVACUATION AT A WESTINGHOUSE PWR)
Initial Conditions!
The station is operating at 1005 power with all control systems in auto-antic. All ESF systems are operable and the auxiliary feedwater system is aligned normally wita the feed supply valves to all steam generators closed. Containment is being purged in preparation for the weekly con-tainment entry. Chlorite is being supplied to the site by a truck con-taining liquid chlorine.
Assumptions:
1.
The truck operator is involved in an accident and a fitting ruptures releasing the chlorine gas. The plant ventilation system spreads the gas through the station forcing site evacuation.
2.
The plant operators trip the pir..t as they exit the control rocm.
All protective functions occur as designed (i.e., reactor trip, turbine trip, auxiliary power transfer to offsite, etc.).
3 The containment purge system will fail to isolate on high radiation due to a failure of the radiation monitor.so containment purge con-tinues for the duration of the accident.
Time Event 0
R'upture of tank fitting, chierine released.
5 mins.
Chierine is spread throughout the facility. The station emergency plan is initiated and site evacuation commences.
6 mins.
The operator trir.s the reactor as he exits control room. The turbite trips due to the reactor trip and steam dump to the condenser begins.
)
21 mins.
The police and " ire departments arrive on site.
45 ains.
The steam generaters boil dry due to no feedwater (auxiliary or 'sain) being supplied and RCS tempera-I ture and pressure begin to increase. Pressure will be limited by the action of the pressurizer spray and relief valves.
22IEL If re-entry has not occurred before the steam generators have boiled dry, it is unlikely that the following sequence of events can be avoided.
.g'.
l 32.
7.a. Abandoned Control Roem cont'd 1
Time Event 90 mins.
RCS temperature increases to the point where NPSH is lost to the reactor coolant pumps and extreme cavitation begins causing bearing and seal damage.
The seal damage allows a continuously increasing leak rate to the containment atmosphere with all contained activity released to the environment through the still operating containment purge I
system.
105 mins.
Safety injection is actuated on low pressurizer pressure and level due to the loss of primary inventory thre;tsh the RCP seals.
160 mins.
Safety injection terminates due to the emptying of the refueling water storage tank.
163 mins.
The accumulators discharge into the RCS.
170 mins.
' The reactor vessel is drained to the nozzle level due to leakage through the pumps seals.
190 mins Reactor temperature increases due to decay heat and boiling begins.
240 mins.
Vessel inventory is reduced to the point where the fuel begins to be uncovered.
245 nins.
Clad perforation occurs and the gap inventory is released to containment and through the purge system to the environment. Lccalized core melting begins and the melt source begins to be released to containment.
260 sins Gap activity reaches the site boundary of 0.5 miles.
(Assuming a wind speed of 1.2 mph.)
360 sins.
The core is completely uncovered; melting con-tinues with the melt source completely released to containment.
l i
33 7.b.
ABANDONED CONTROL RCCM - OPERATOR WALKOUT Time Event 0
Operators give noitice that in two hours all non-supervisory personnel will walk out because of a dispute over contract terms.
I hr.
Plant management, after consultation with utility headquarters, decides to keep the plant on line and run with supervisor personnel rather than shut down. NRC notified.
2 hrs.
Operators leave plant. Plant continues to run under supervisory staff (augmented by off-duty supervisors).
8 hrs.
Talks with operators not productive. NRC requested to grant emergency relief to allow oper-ation with less than normal station complement and with relaxed surveillance and maintenance schedules.
10 hrs.
System transient forces plant to hot shutdown condition. On-site staff prepares to increase power.
)
34 8.a.
CRASH OF SPENT FUEL CASK WITH RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVITY AT A PWR FACILITY Statement of Conditions
)
l Two unit site with one unit in refueling and one unit at 1005 power.
Preparation for spent fuel shipment in progress in the fuel services building. With two fuel assemblies loaded in the cask, difficulty was encountered securing the cask lid underwater due to a malfunctioning tool. It was decided to transfer the cask to the decontamination area, with the lid in place but loose, where it could be secured under dry i
conditions. Severity of this accident will be strictly dependent on the decay time associated with the fuel involved. An initial loading error would also be required as fuel is not normally transported for at least 90 days after irradiation.
Assumptions:
1.
Fuel decay time = 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br />.
~
2.
Initial release exceeds 10 CFR Part 100 limits at the site boundary by a factor of 30.
3 Fuel storage locations were misinterpreted and the assemblies loaded into the cask were just recently removed from the reactor.
4 1200 psig fuel-clad gap pressure.
Time Event 0
Shipping cask removed from pool, lid in place but not secured.
15 secs.
Fuel service building radiation alarm sounds, emergency gas treatment system activated.
20 secs.
Crane reversed to place cask back in pool.
21 secs.
Crane cable breaks, cask drops 60 feet to decon-tamination area floor. Cask lid comes off spilling both assemblies cut onto the ficer with +50% of the fuel pins ruptured. Two personnel injured and dis-abled on the operating floor due to whipping cable.
1 e '.
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35.
8.a.
Crash of Scent Fuel Cask with Release of Radicactivitv at a PWR Facility (cont'd)
Time Event 22 secs.
Airborne fission products starting to spread in fuel services building.
30 secs.
Fuel service building evacuation started.
2 mins.
Fuel service building evacuation complete with exception of injured men. Fission product release from plant vent starts.
5 mins.
Site emergency plan initiated. Radiation reaches site boundary.
10 mins.
Control area radiation levels increasing, operating unit shutdown initiated.
- 15. mins.
Rescue team enters fuel service building.
20 mins.
Police and fire department arrive.
21 mins.
Site boundary radiation levels measured to be in excess of part 100 by a factor of 30. Wind direc-tion southeast at 2 MPH toward a population center of 400 located 3 miles away.
22 mins.
Rescue team returns; effort unsuccessful, high radiation.
25 mins.
Decision made to evacuate all site personnel to the northwest perimeter.
30 mins.
Operating unit in hot standby; control room evacuated.
35 mins.
Site evacuation complete.
37 mins.
Roving environmental monitoring team reports radiation levels a factor of seven above part 100 limits one mile to the southeast fecm the site parimeter.
38 mins.
Decisien made to evacuate all population areas to the east and south within a radius of 10 miles.
36.
8.b.
TRA6:'PORTATION INCIDENT INVOLVING SPENT b' EL SHIPMENT J
Conditions A s pent fuel shipment is being transported by truck from a nuclear power plant via a main highway. On the outskirts of a major population center, still within a fairly heavily populated area, the driver loses control (brake failure, speeding) and the truck / trailer strikes an abutment with force sufficient to dislodge the cask. The cask also hits the abutment and tumbles onto the highway. The driver is killed / unconscious. Several persons in a car are also involved in the accident and are injured.
There is considerable liquid on the pavement, some encompassing the area of the cask.
Time Event 0
Accident occurs. Road is impassable in one direction and traffic which is heavy begins j
to back up.
2 - 3 hrs.
Other nearby drivers / passengers go to scene and attempt to aid victims.
3 - 10 hrs.
Possibility of fire and/or radioactive con-taminatien is mentioned and would-be rescuers retreat, not reaching truck driver. Police are called.
10 - 20 hrs.
Traffic tie up builds. Police respond. Fire Department and ambulance are called.
15 - 25 hrs.
Police observe radioactivity markings and liquid on pavement. Police stop all traffic, rope off area, and call State Health Department. Truck driver is not available for questioning and shipping papers cannot be located.
30 - 60 hrs.
State Radiological Health personnel initiate response to scene of accident. Federal agencies are notified by telephone (ERDA/ RAP, NRC, DOT or EPA).
l NRC receives report of a transportation accident probably involving a spent fuel shipment which may be leaking radioactive material to the en-viro ns. State people are believed to be on way to scene.
37.
9.a LOCAL INTENSE PRECIPITATION The Plant The plant is located at one of the Great Lakes and adjacent to a small stream that has been modified at the mouth to serve as a discharge structure. The access road to the plant crosses the small stream by a bridge on the bluffs near the lake.
The Event Heavy thunderstorms have occurred the previous evening and are forecast to continue all day with the possibility of tornadoes. At 2 p.m.,
after rain-ing of f and on all day a thunderstorm approaches from the SW.
Rain is very heavy and continues uninterrupted until near 4 p.m. when a call from the relief operator alerts the plant that trees and other debris have lodged in the bridge and water is going over the bridge impeding passage.
Upon investigation by plant personnel, they notice that the stream has left its bank and water is reaching the lake through the yard. Cars in the park-ing lot are in water above their hub caps. Rain continues to fall. At 4:30 the parking lot has 2 feet of water and the stream continues to rise cutting other channels through the yard and deposieng trees, etc. through-j out the plant site. At 6 p.m. the rain stops and the stream slowly recedes.
Time Event 0
Heavy rain.
2 hrs.
First alarm - bridge closed.
2-1/2 hrs.
Water in plant yard.
4 hrs.
Flood crests.
e' l
38.
9.b.
DAM FAILURE The Plant The plant is located along a river with numerous dams upstream. Plant grade is set to protect the plant from all but the most severe floods on the basin or from possible dam failures. The nearest dam is located about 10 miles upstream of the plant.
The Event Af ter a mild earthquake that :aused no apparent damage, excessive seepage is noted at the toe of the upstream dam. One hour later, a small s tream has developed and erosion is noticeable. Within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> the dam is breached.
The crest of the wave reaches the plant 1-1/2 hours later.
Time Event 0
Seepage noted at toe of dam.
I hr.
1st alarm probable dam failure.
3 hrs.
Das breached.
4-1/2 hrs.
Flood crest reaches plant.
39.
9.c.
MAJOR FLOOD EVENT The Plant The plant sits on the flood plain of a major river at elevation 200 MSL.
Normal river level is approximately 40 feet below plant grade. The plant is protected to the PMF level of 230 MSL but must shut down at elevation 197.
The Event After a rather wet and cold period a major storm is forecast for the The following is a sequence of dates and hydrologic events.
area.
January 8 - 10 Heavy rain is falling throughout the basin.
January 10 - 12 A flood is forecast for the river - rain continues.
January 14 The river has started to rise - still raining.
January 15 River forecasts call for a major flood.
January 17 River projected to rise to plant grade at river to top of bank.
January 20 River near plant grade forecast to rise 20 additional feet.
i January 21 River at plant grade January 26 River crests at 225 ft MSL.
February 7 River at plant grade and falling.
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40.
9.d.
TSUNAMI The Plant A coastal site with once-through cooling with the intake arut discharge on a bay sitting about 10 to 15 feet above sea level.
The Event An earthquake occurs somewhere offshore--at the plant the shock is felt as a major shock but it does no damage to the plant. Five minutes after the shock the intake is left essentially dry. Ten minutes after the shock water reaches plant grade and continues to rise for 3 additional feet. The cycle is repeated with the same period but with less severe fluctuations in water level.
Time Event 0
5 mins.
Water recedes.
10 mins.
Water 3 feet above plant grade.
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41.
10.
EAST COAST BLACKOUT Time Event 0
Electrical grid system disturbance initiated in a large power plant switchyard.
I min.
Faults in interconnecting transmission systems cause successive blackouts in New England, Pennsyl-vania, Maryland and Virginia. Region I and head-quarters power out. Telephone lines are operable but swamped with high volume of calls so that tele-phone concunication is not practical.
I hour Ten power plant sites are without outside power.
Some have presumably been able to restart facili-ties after system transient to carry hotel load; others are probably relying on on-site emergency power supplies. Telephone communication to the sites has not yet been established.
3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> Electrical service has bein restored in some areas.
Phone situation begins to alleviate but telephone enm=nnication with some sites not ye t established.
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Plugging of fuel lines to emergency diesel gene-rator causes loss of all AC power at one blacked-out site--no telephone contact available from site to Region I or headquarters.
l 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Power restored at headquarters but not at Region I j
or at 4 sites, one of which has had the AC power loss.
10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> Power restored to all areas.
42.
- 11. SEIZURE OF A REACTOR WITH THREAT OF SABOTAGE Problem A terrorist group seizes a single unic PWR power reactor and threatens to sabotage the facility to release radioactivity over the countryside if their demand for release of fellow members from jail is not met.
Time Event
)
0 Plant seized. 10 armed terrorists gain entry and are demanding release of Oriends from county jail. They threaten to blov up the facility if demands are not met in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
30 mins.
Utility Corporate Headquarters reports seiz-ure of plant to NRC.
7 LLEA reports receipt of information that there are 10 terrorists armed with hand guns and several automatic weapons. They claim to be part of the xxx group. Reports indicate they have about 20 boxes of dynamite.
?
FBI reports the xxx group had been identified in the area and the group has claimed responsi-bility for bombings of several buildings in the past 2 years.
?
Reports from the facility indicate the terrorists intend to dynamite major penetrations into the containment building, dynamite waste hold-up tanks in the radwaste building, and destroy the control room panels. 25 hostages are being held.
I l
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43, 12.
PENETRATION OF PHYSICAL BARRIER AT A FUEL FACILITY WITH THEFT OF SNM Time Event 0
& mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facility is penetrated and a quantity of SNK is stolen.
2 hrs.
NRC Regional Office receives a report from xy fuel fabrication facility that the facility was penetrated after hours and a quantity of SNM is missing. Two security guards were killed. The facility is within 50 miles of the Mexican bor-der. The facility possessed a significant in-ventory of both Pu and U oxides.
~
The faelity reports the material access area was breached by use of explosives and the ter-rorist group consisted of about 8 persons. The attack occurred just after midnigh,t. The group carried hand guns and automatic weapons and ap-parently used plastic explosives for penetrating the material access area. Appronmately 40 to 60 containers of pug 2 are missing. Esch container had about 2.5 kg of material. Escape was made
~
in a panel truck.
A material inventory confirms the loss of 50 containers of Pu0. Each of the shipping con-2 tainers had 2.5 kg of material. Radiological surveys indicate no spread of contamination.
The FBI and Regional Of fice personnel are at the sc ene.
Interviews with the guards present during the attack and thef t have failed to produce any leads concerning the identity of the individuals or the group.
1 l
1
1-APPENDII B Current NRC Office / Division Rasconsibilities l
Under the direction of the Director, Office of Inspection the Incident Response Action Coordination and Enforcement, Team (IRACT), the Regional Offica staff, and the Incidene Manage-t Center (IMC) provide the resources and capabilities Other
.co initiate and coordinata NRC's response to incidents.
Of'fices and Divisions of the NRC support the IRE'T and operation of the IMC.
IRACT and IMC procedures and response actions for daaling with threats,. thefts, and sabotage relating to special nuclear
- material, high-level radioactive wastes and licensed nuclear facilities are prepared under the direction of the Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
Specific responsibilities and authorities of the NRC Offices and Divisions are as.,follows:
TheExecutiveDihactorforcoerations deter nhos, with respect to incidents reported to his or otherwise brought to his attention, whether the incident' i
i should be reviewed by the Incident Investigation Review Conunittse (IIRC).
~~
Director, Office of Insoection and Enforcement:
provides direction for the Incident Response Action a.
Coordination Team (!3ACT) and the II Eeadquar.ers and m
. n'..
.....-e..
s NRC Regional Office response to incidents; operates the Incident Management Center (IMC) to support the response to incidents which require extensive coordination between NRC,and other agencies.
1 b.
develops procedures for use within NRC for receipt and dissemination of information relating to notifi-cations and reports of incidents; inforns the i
Commissioners, the Executive Director for Operations; other senior NRC management; and other appropriate agencias of incidents and NRC response actions.
I develops contingency plans for dealing with radiological c.
and safety-related incidents, other than threats to sabotage, in consultation and coordination with other Offices of the NRC.
d.
receives and evaluates reports of incidents and determines and initiateh* tihe initial required response actions l
including, where appropriate, requesting radiological assistance from the Energy Research and Development i
Administration (ERDA) or the Interagency Radiological Assistance Plan (IRAP).
e.
disseminates pertinent information about incidents to licensees.
.3-f.
adfises the Commissida, the Executive Director for Operations, and senior NRC management on questions connected with an incident relating to the operational i
l aspects of shutting down or placing licensed facilities l
in a safe condition.
g.
coordinates NRC response actions with other agencies on the Federal and State level.
The Technical Advisor to the Executive Director fer Operations as Chairman, directs the aca vities of the Incident Investigation Review Committee in its investigation of incidents.
Director, Office of Standards Develoement:
s.
reviews reports of investigation of incidents to determine whether changes and improvements are needed in regulations, guides, codes, and standards relating to the use of, materials and facilities.
a b.
issues regulations, standards, and guides for NRC licensees on the subjects of plans and preparedness to cope with incidents which may occur in licensed operations.
I provides technical staff to be members of the IRACT i
c.
Support Staff and the IIRC when needed.
1 1
~. -
j
. s I
l Director. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation:
reviews reports of investigation of incidents to:
s.
(1) identify eafety and safeguards related problems 1
associated with the construction and operation j
of nuclear reactors and the materials and i
O activities associated therewith; (2) determine if additional safety and safeguards evaluation may be needed; and (3) determine if changes and improvements are needed in regulatory requirements.
b.
establishes requirements in licenses and technical -
1 specifications for reactor licensees regarding the i
i reporting of incidents to the NRC.
~ evaluate's corr,ective actions p1Eoposed by reactor._
c.
~ iicensees as a result 'of incidents; performs safety evaluations of reactor facilities subsequent to an incident, during *. pair, test, and startup.
d.
provides technical staff to be members of the IRACT Support Staff and the IIRC when needed.
Director. Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards:
a.
reviews reports of investigation of incidents to: (1) identify problems associated with the processing, transport, and h=ad14ag of nuclear materials, including provision and maintenance of safeguards against threats, thefts, and sabotage of licensed materials and facilities; (2) determine if additional safety and safeguards
.nr
evab.uation may be neede ; and (3) determine if changes or improvements are needed in regulatory requirements.
b.
establishes requirements in licenses and technical specifications for materials and fuel cycle facility licensees regarding the reporting of incidents to the e
NRC.
c.
develops contingency plans for dealing with threats, thef ts, and sabotage relating to special nuclear material, high-level radioactive vastes, and licensed nuclear facilities, maintains awareness of threat posture through analyses and interagency coordination; and establishes and maintains pertinent interagency liaisons and procedures to ensure that NRC receives timely notifications of perceived threats.
d.
provides tech 4e=1 staff to be members of the IRACT Support Scaff'and the IIRC when needed.
e.
evaluates corrective actions proposed by materials and fuel cycle facility licensees as a result of incidents; performs safety and safeguards evaluations subsequent to an incident, during any repair, test, or startup of facilities or licensed operations.
f.
establishes appropriate interfaces with other Federal agencies concerning contingency planning for threats, 1
s theft, and sabotage.
Director. Office of Managenent Infornation and Program Control:
a.
amistains the computer-based Licensee Event Report File based on reports submitted by licensees and prepares periodic listings and special searches of the file.
b.
identifies " abnormal occurrences," defined in the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Section 208, and prepares the required Quarterly Reports to the Congress and reports to the public on these events. Reports, notifications of incidents and safety evaluations made pursuant to this Chapter are reviewed to assess whether or not an " abnormal occurrence" has occurred.
Director. Office of State Programs:
s.
carries out the lead agency responsibilities assigned to the NRC by*the Federal Preparedness Agency, GSA, relating to radiological incident emergency response pf==afas activities among Federal agencias, including the coordination of Fcderal radiological emergency response planning guidance for fixed facilities and transportation, and p1annfng assistance and traf nf ng programs for Federal, State, and local governments.
i
~
b.
establishes liaison with other nations, in cooperation with the Department of Sente, for the exchange of information relating to incidents having international implications.
c.
assists the Office of Public Affairs in public relations matters relating to incidents having international implications.
Director, Office of Administration:
provides advice and assistance on the Incident Management a.
Center security program, including its physical and technical security measures.
.b. provides central control and coordination through the Division of Security for receipt and diss==4 nation of reports of investigations which are made by the Federal Bureau of Investiga ion relating to NRC licensed activities.
reviews reports of investigation of incidents dealing c.
with classified information or material to determine:
(1) if there was any compromise of national security information or (2) action taken to prevent a recurrence.
d.
serves, through the Division of Security, as the central point of contact with other investigative agencies on matters relating to the NRC security and security D
e-e e.
e e op en e*umme p
classification program.
e.
provides the Dic with computer services, telephone and other communications services, access to emergency communications systems, information and data processing, and other capabilities that may be needed.
Director, Office of Public Affairs:
a.
follows established NRC public information policies for release of information relating to incidents.
b.
assists the Office of Inspection and Enforcement in
. information activities relating to incidents.
c.
reviews public statements and press releases regarding incidents at NRC-licensed facilities and clears those having international implications with the State Department.
d.
promotes the'NRC policy of encouraging licensees to take l
the lead in information activities related to incidents occurring at their facilities.
I Directors, Offices and Divisions,
~ ^
],'. "
notify the IRACT through II Division of Field Operations (or the IE Eq Duty Officer during non-working hours) of reports of incidents received from sources other than the NRC staff.
-Y-er
l APPENDIX C Current NRC Personnel assigned to Incident Response function Incident Investigation Review Committee (IIRC)
Technical Advisor to the Executive Director for Operations -
Chairman Representative, Office of Standards Development - member Representative, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation - member Representative, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards - member Incident Response Action Coordination Team (IRACT)
Director, Office of Inspection md Enforcement - Director Deputy Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement - member Director, Division of Field Operations - member Director, Division of Materials Inspection Programs - member Director, Division of Raactor Inspection Programs - member IRACT Support Staff Staff members, as neces,sary, from:-
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards 0ffice of Public Affairs Office of Standards Development l
Office of Ad=fnistration-Office of Nuclear 2egulatory Research O
l 1
m
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Incident Management Center (IMC) Overating Cadre Technical and clerical staff of Office of Inspection and Enforcement:
Ope [ations Officer M=inistrative Officer Co-=f e=tions Officer Regional Staffs io 5 Regional office Response Teams Information Assessment Team (IAT)
Chief, Contingency Planning Branch, NMSS - Chairman Representative, Program Support Branch, NRR - member Representative, Field Operations Support Branch, II - member I
L
)
APPENDII D Present Incident Management Center l
The present IMC is located in the EastWest Towers and consists of the rooms and equipment shown in Attachment 1.
In addition to the equipment shown in Attachment 1, a.he IMC uses the II File room and other connunicating equipment for incident response.
Two communicating mag-card typewriters, two facsimile machines, and a computer terminal coded for input and simultaneous access by all.
five Regions is available. The file roca contains a complace docket Each Part 50 power reactor licensee and~
file for Part SO; licensees.
Part 70 major fuel facility licensees have site descriptions, emergency
~
plans, and environmental statements (some Part 70 licensees are not complate - material is not yet available), in individual packets on separte shelves in the file room.
The functions of the IMC are shown in Attachment 2.
In order to perform the functions outlined, the IMC has cadre that proceeds to the DC when the IRACT directs the activation of the center.
~ M-The cadre consists of an Opertions, a Communications, and an u=h 4 rative
~
t 2 Officer. The procedures for activation and operation of the center have been written and tested.
I
~ In addition to the DC procedures, response procedures have been written by each region, teams have been predesignated, arrangements for chartered
- air service have been nade, portable radiation detection inser :=ents are
" "available for the team, and two Regions have vans that can be noved to i-the incident scene. Prearrangenents have been made with local and l
- t federal agencias for assistance. Call lists are included in the plans.
Portable radio equipment is being purchased.
The IMC is operational and may be activated within approximately one
~
hour from the time of notification. If Headquarters response to the scene is required to supplement a Region, emergency funds are stored and
- imediately available, and emergency transportation has been arranged, i
/
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T _..
, ATTACENDrr 1 INCIDErr MANAGEMETf CErrER
-..7--
LOCATION The following rooms, located on the 5th floor of East-West Towers, have o*
)een designated as the Incident Managenent cancer:
Room 503 - Initial IMC (See Fig.1)
Room 504 - Expanded IXC*
Boca ~506'- ED0/Comm. Office Roca 513 - Rast/ Sleeping Ar.ea INDICENOUS EQUIPMENT idcoms 503 and 504 have tables and chairs for approximately 20 people 2-anch. Each room also has a vu-Graoh orciector, illustration boards
- :(which also serve as screens)*, slide croiector, codium, celechone --
- d., -,
ihookups,'and eouisment locker. Room 503 contains tha IMC eouiement
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.o en e e.. e -.
44
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Fig. 1 Room 503 Screen
., Scraan
,h,, o r,. a i
' odium 1
1 Profector P d etor IRACT IRACT
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1 Public IRACT.
Af. fairs i.
l t
l Operations Officar NRR - 9155 4
r-
\\
w, Officar u
. s Visitors i---
Storace f
t
=
.,g
.m N*
I
,.us.
m
i DESCRIPTION:
IMC Equipment Cabinet (key-Ac.ked)
LOCATION:
Rn. 503, E/W.
RESPONSI3ILITY:
The Admin. Officer, IMC, is responsible for the contents and general maintenance of the cabinet except where noted below.
CONIE: TIS:
1.
Telephones (8) - Communications officer, IMC.
2.
Conference phone - C&=4 cations Officer, IMC 3.
Regional Emergency Response Plans - Operations Officer, IMC 4.
Directory of Key Personnel - to be developed - Operations Officer, IMC 5.
II Manual Chapter (5) - operations officer 6.
Writing tablets (2 dozen) 7.
P-41 = (2 dozen)
~
8.
Pens'(2 dozen)
~
)
I l
9.
Staplers (2)
~
- 10. Paper 8x10 1/2, Ieror (300)
~
- 11. Paper, 8x10 1/2, letterhead (100)
- 12. 3M Type 388 transparencies for thermo fax machine (1 box)
- 13. 3RC talephone directorv (8)
- 14. Dictionary (1)
I
- 15. Paperclips,scocc5 cape, clips, folders,etc.
..-........a..
m
~
[
i i DESCRIPTION:
Beds, blankats, sheets, pillows for use in the Rast/ Sleeping area.
_PRESENT LOCATION:
Warehouse.
. ;. TRANSITION RESPONSI3ILITY:
Admin. Officer, IMC works with Admin., NRC.
l
(
IMC LOCATION:
Em. 513 E/W.
l OPERATIONAL RES70NSI31LITY:
t
~
PROCUREMENT:
\\
. Three beds are stored over at the varahouse. Telephone the Security Force (P-100, x27227) at any Tine. Inform them to notify either Grovar Escap or Art Correira (WESZ) that the beds ' ara required. They will arrange to have the beds and accessorias transportad and set-up in 3m. 513.
e 8
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s
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ATTACHHEKr 2 RAM.E I -
FUNCTIONS OF Tile IMC.
l_ ICE.! SEES, FIELD OFFIf,ES) INSPECTORS ON THE SCENE COLLECT INFORMATION:
FEDERAL / STATE /LOCALORoiNIZTIONS EVALUATE INFORMATIONt SYNTilESIZEI CllECK FOR A6 CURACY, ASSESS MAGNITUDE l
OFINCIDENT)DE.TERMINEA5SISTANCER'EQUIREDANDPOSSIBLE CORRECTIVE ACTION, ETC.
DISSEMINATE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER 5 & 0 tiler P RTS OF NRCJ CONGRESSJ
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NEWS MEDIAJ WiiiTE l{0USEj ERDA, FBI a OrtiER FEDERAL AGENCIES RENDER ASSISTANCEt DISPATCHADDITIONALASSISTNCEIPR0VIDEADVICE..-
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OVERRIDEi IF REQUIRED i
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APPENDit E l
AUTHORITIES AND RESPON51RILITIES FOR EMERGEleCf (IleCIDENT) PLAIINIlli AND PREPAREDNE55-f
- l 0FFICE/DIVIsl0N RESPON-OfflCE/ DIVISION RESPON-NRC EMERGE E Y OTilER PRIKIPAL INTERAGEhr}
3 51btE FOR IMPLEMENilleG SIRLE IDR INTERNAL NRC PLAll$ AND AGEN*IES AGRE[HENT I
TYPES OF INCIDENTS REQUIREMENTS Def NRC A5
- )
(EMERGENCIES)
A REGULATORY AGE K V AGENCY REQUIREMLNTS PLANS AfsD PROCEDURES INVOLVED
- 8 i
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PREPAREDNESS
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NRCM 0502 Energy Reorg Act of 1374.
Responsedctions 5te h snd local for Incidents agencies as I
Exec Order 18490 applicabletoall generallyapplle s appropriate
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emergencies & Incidents to eli encapt aattonal emere I,
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- 1. OPERATIONAL l'
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- a. fires a.
a.
a.
a.
- i. Il0J 86//A i.
l M
b.' implosions b~.
b, b.
b.
- b. ful.20Sel4 l).
I c.
c.
- c. DOL!vSIA
- c. "
'c. Industrial accdt
- c. -
c.
- d. Ir/fe saa
- d. EPh..
- 1. 'hovY
- d. 1E, el 8 R, N
- d. Radioactive reis d.
st
- d. ##8, F/85's 86 usco.
nou utn - ess I.
1...,.i..s.
- e. crA
- e.,,,
3
- f. Injury, fatallt,y f.-
f.
f.
f.
- f. Dot tos# A
- f. -
If
,c t n..a s C*
- g. hTR, b g.
9 9
- g. Radiation esposri g.
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. s ML-ev-o 1
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- h. Transp accident h.
at h.
b.
h.
h.DJT
- h. Ao
- I?RDA fgnav+
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, AUiliORITIES ANO RESPON51BILITIES IM EkERGEEY (INCIDENT) PLANNING $ND PitEPAREDNE554 t'Prlss.I RR. IE, f b.S P i l
i, OfflCE/ DIVISION RESPON-OFFICE / DIVISION RESPON-NRC EMERGENCV OTHER PRINCIPAL INTERAGEEY TYPES OF INCIDENIS REQUIREMENTS ON NRC AS SIbtE FOR INPLEMENTING SIBLE FOR INTERNAL hRC PLANS AND AGENCIES AC'tEEHENT (EMERGENCIES)
A REGULATORf AGENCY AGENCY REQHIREMENTS PLANS AND PROCEDURES INVOLVED PREPAREDNESS l
MRCM 0502 '
i Energy Reors Act of 1974 Responsedctlons State and local Exec Order II490 for Incidents agencies as l
sppilcabletoaIl to all except '
6 appropriate generallyapplle emergencies & lacidents actional eaere
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- 2. SAFEGUARDS a
a., Pas 5 NN
- a. Ihreat to steal a.
le a.
PIC5 N j
s.,,
- a. N6/
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- c. Indication of c.
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c.
c.
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c.
Penetration facli
- d. Indication of d.
a.
4 d.
J. '. si d.
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- theft / sabotage e..
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8.'
l c. Facility penetra-e.
e.
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e.
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s.
tion in progrest a
- f. Assaalt--penetra-f.,
8e f.
- f.,
..se f.
,as-f.
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s.
j tion & escape
- g. Assault and g., -
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seizure Possible theft h..
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I TAUINORIJ1ES M RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ENERGENCY (INCIDENT) PLANNING AND PREPAREDHESS.
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- l 0FFICE/DIVISIONRESPON-l i.
1 0FFICE/OlVISION RESPON-NRC ENERGENCY 0 tiler PRINCIPAL INTERAGEllCY TYPE 5 0F INCIDENT 5 REQUIRDIENTS 011 hAC A5 SIRLE FOR IMPLEMENilNG SIBLE FOR INTERNAL NRC PLANS AND AGEleCIES AGRfDtENT (EMERGEleCIES)
A REGULATORY AGENCY AGENCY REQUIREMENTS PLANS AND PROCEDURES INVOLVED PREPAREDNESS l
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 NRCM 0502 i
Energy Reorg Act of 1974 Response $ctless State and local Exec Order 11490 for Incidents agencies as 1
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appilcabletoall s;,tgg gg, generallyappIle 5*PPropriate -
e. m ncl.a a faci *=ta
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- a. Edthquake a.
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- c.. -
se' c.
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d.-
d.
- d. '
d.
d.
- d. -
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- 4. NATIONAL
{. Oaeestic
- a. JiO ll*D Uf*
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APPENDII F Current Information Exchange Agencies Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)_
The FBI has a limited intelligence gathering role, but serves as a supplier of needed intelligence concerning a range of threats against the nuclear industry.
In addition the FBI prepares and dis-
~
seminates security alerts, bulletins and summaries to FBI field offices and other appropriate federal agencias regarding terrorist groups or activities.
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
The DIA is responsible for producing and disseminsting defense inteli:,gence to satisfy the intelligence requirements of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and major components of the,DOD.
It accomplishes this either by use of internal resources (Army, Navy, Air Force) ; through the management, control, and coordination of the intelligence functions of the DOL activities; or l
l through cooperation with other intelligence organi-l sations.
Information collected by DIA on terrorist and other threatening groups provide input for NRC's threat assessment and alert dissemination activities.
s Department of Army Military Operations (DAMO).
DAMO is the central point of contact for the utilization of D0D r esources (equipment and technical personnel).
In the event of a civil disturbance or when the FBI requests assistance e
to combat terrorism, the DAMO v111 provide the necessary resources.
Foreign Science and Technology Center The mission of this center is to provide all source world wide scientific and technical intelligence to meet the requirements of the U.S. Army and the Def ense Intelligence Agency.
This center provides NRC with studies, testing data and capabilities of foreign weapons.
Naval Investigative Service (NIS)
The Naval Inv eitigative Service is the primary acti-vity vichin the U.S. Navy responsible for investi-gative and counterintelligence support within assigned geographic areas, and upon request conducts investi-gations and operations in criminal,. counterintelligence i
and security matters.
Information gathered through l
1 NIS is used by NRC in threat ana3 7 sis and assess-ment.
An example of the infor=ation provided includes 1
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investigation of adversary activities near ports and harbours, (applicable to overseas shipment) and threat information relative to naval reactors, naval fuel facilities and associated transportation sys-tem all of which are per,tinent to NRC efforts in this area.
Central Inte111aeace Agency (CIA)
The CIA correlates and evaluates intelligence relating to the national security and provides for the appropriate dissemination of such intelli-gence withis our government, using where appropriate, existing agencies and facilities.
Information from the CIA serves to increase the probability and reliability of early adversary detec-tion as a means of reducing our safeguards problem.
DOS - Bureau of Intelligence and Research The Bureau of, Intelligence and Research coordinates programs of intelligence, research, and analysis for the Department of-State and for other Federal agencies, and produces intelligence studies and current intelligence anlayses essential to foreign i
policy determination and execution.
Information on I
adversary actions or plans against nuclear facilities 0
r-1 4
in foreign countries assists the NRC in accomplish-ing threat assessment.
DOS - Office of Security Within the Office of Security is the Command Intelligence Center which is responsible for e
the collection, evaluation and dissemination of domestic and international information on terrorism for the Department of State.
An au.comated data base and support system is being developed for use by the Center.
The Office of Security has agreed to provide NRC with any intelligence infor-mation affecting the nuclear industry.
FAA - Ooerations/ Liaison Staff The Operations Liaison Staff is the principal element of the Civil Aviation Security Service
~
responsible for,the collection, evalua:Lon and dissemination of Civil Aviation Security informa-tion to deter and prevent criminal acts.
Based upon our experience in countering terrorists in sky-jackings and bombings, the FAA has developed and implemented procedures f or the collection and assessment of threat inf ormation and for the dissemina-t tion of security alerts, bulletins, and summaries to the appropriate recipients.
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ERDA - Safeguards and Security A working arrangement has been agreed upon between the NRC and ERDA providing f or mutual support and assistance in the response to incidents occurring in or affecting facilities or activi, ties under the jurisdiction of either agency.
Information exchange' occurs between the Of fice of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards and ERDA's Division of Safeguards and Security on matters involving sabotage, terrorism and thef t of SNM.
Treasury - Customs S e rv ic e Of particular interest to NRC is the Terrorist Data Base (TDB) presently being developed and their Indicative Intelligence Center to carry out l
their assigned mission.
The TD3 includes information describing terrorist organizations, their capabili-l I
ties, size, op/rkting characteristics, and member-ship.
These systems can provide NRC information in a timely manner to support our threat assessment and alert dissemination.
2 I
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J U.S.
Secret Service
.Pr'otective Intelligence
~ ~ ~~~
operation The Protective Inte111genca Operation which con-ducts investigations relating to the protection of the President and others, maintains liaison with law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
Pertinent information is provided to NRC on individuals or groups who pose a threat to the commercial nuclear industry.
Department of State - Operations Center This operations center is responsible for coordinating the Federal Government's response to major non-military emergencies which htve international implications.
It is staff ed with operational personnel 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day, seven days a week.
Information received from this Operations Centar on threats or acts of terrorism against nuclear' facilities in other countries is included in our threat assessment and alare dissemina-tion program.
In addition close coordination would occur between NRC and the State Department's Operation l
Center in an incident originating in the U. S. whose I
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effects cross over into adjacent countries and thus have international implications.
National Security Council - Situation Room The situation room is used for advising the President and senior government officials of all information o
available on pending crisis situations.
Through this contact NRC could advise our executive.
branch of government of a theft or possible act j
~
of sabotage of significant quantities of SNM which could pose a threat to our national security.
I D epar tment of Health, Educatica and Welfare (DHEW) i i
DHEW is responsible for providing guidance for evaluation, control and use of radiological 17 con-taminated foods and animal feed.
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APPENDIX G Current Support Agencies Responsibilities
/
1.
Support / Action Agencies Federal Bureau of Investination (FBI)
The FBI is responsible for investigating all incidents, including nuclear thre,ats, which involve suspected or actual violations of Federal laws. Thus, tbs FBI will have the I
primary jurisdictica and overall responsibility for direction of operations whenever terrorist actions are directed against nuclear material and/or facilities. Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAI) teses are available to provide a response force and for adversary apprehension.
Energy Research and Develooment Agenev (ERDA)
ERDA will provide technical advice on the bomb design and assist in the disarming or disabling of the dispersal or improvised nuclear device.
This service is available ;o the civilian sector when requested through JNACC or ERDA channels.
Joint Nuclear Accident Coordination Center (JNACC)
JNACC is t. joint organization (ERDA/DOD) that acts as an information and coordination center for advice on radiological mishaps and can prwide data on the location and availability of nuclear accident response teams, equipment, and special capabilities. It also receives requests for assistance, and
in turn, requests the required assistance from the appropriate agency. The DOD element of JNACC is located at Field Command, DNA, Kirtland AF3, New Mexico.
Nuclear Emertency Search Team (NEST).
The Nuclear Emergency Search Team is made up of representatives from the ERDA labor,atories (Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL), Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (LLL), and Sandia Laboratories (SL) and an ERDA contractor, EG&G. NEST is responsible for searching, locating, and identifying ionizing i
radiation-producing materials; and for providing the logistics and communications support required for the ERDA team assisting in the disarming or disabling of dispersal or improvised i
nuclear devices.
ERDA Emertencv Operations Center (EOC)
The direction and coordination of ERDA's EACT emergency response operations are accomplished from the Emergency Operations Centar which is located at Germantown, Maryland.
j NRC requests for ERDA response forces assistance would be made through the EOC.
Radiation Assistance Plan OtAP) Team RAP teams will respond, upon request, to provide radiological advice and assistance at the scene of an incident.
Interatency Radiological Assistance Plan (IRAP) l IRAP is a plan designed to marshall Federal resources for radiological incidents.
ERDA is the Secretariat.
'---A..
-3 Department of Defense GOD) i i
Explosive Ordinance Discosal Teams (EOD) l The various military Explosive Ordinance Disposal teams are responsible for locating, identifying, rendering safe, l
l removing or destroying explosive ordinances, to include nuclear devices.
Department of Transportation (DOT)
U. S. Coast Guard (USCC)
The Coast Guard is a law enforcement agency with a significant military capability in terms of aircraft, helicopcors, patrol boats, cutters, weapons, and highly trained personnel shich can act as a response force for incidents occurring on waterways, at offshore nuclear plants and on the high seas. They also have a Command Center which serves as the command center for the Department of Transportation. As such, they have responsibility not 1
only for shipments by sea and inland waterways, but also for accidents and incidents involving the shiptnent
.sf :hamardous materials on land (Tail and cr.ack)..
Depart:nent of Treasury - Customs Service The Customs Service is responsible for the collection and protection of the revenue; the prevention of fraud and smuggling through the tactical interdiction program, and the processing and regulation of people, carriers, cargo and nail
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Into and out of the United States. 'In support of this program the Customs Operations Office utili:es the Treasury Enforcement Co-mications System (TECS). The TECS capability for message switching point-to-p t and broadcast from headquarters to the field levels might prove useful for alert messages to I
border posts, airfields, and ports in the case of a theft i
contingency in which adversaries are attemping to leave the country. We would coordinate with their Operations Center.
for assistance on adversaries attempiting to leave this country.
Environmental Protection Agencv'(EPA)
EPA can provide radiological monitoring assistance through its Pagional sffices.
Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (ECPA)
DCPA can provide radiological monitoring assistance through the civil defense resources.
Local Taw Enforcement Authorities (LLEA)
All NRC licensees are required to make arrangements with local law enforcement authorities - municipal, county, and State -
to provide assistance when requested. State and local law
!l enforcement agencies currently have a limitad capacity to i*'-
respond in a timely fashion to security a=argencias at f
nuclear facilities and transport.
i 1
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AFFENDIX H OUTLINE "0 RAFT NRC HEADQUARTERS SAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY PLAN" to be prepared by Contingency P1pnning Branch, SG I.
Introduction i
a.
Background
b.
Purpose c.
Scope d.
Content Sets the stage for the material to follow.
II.
Possibla Safeguards Contingencies a.
Threats b.
Thefts c.
Sabotage The objective of this section is to define what is meant by a safeguards contingency and to present examples of the three types.
III. NRC Response to Incidents a.
General Discussion b.
Events / Objectives c.
Decision - Action Sequences d.
Decision Criteria e.
Data Requirments for Decision Making t
This section consists of a delineation of (1) the criteria for the initiation and termination of extraordinary safeguards concern, and (2) the general requirements for adequate response to the cause of that concern.
It groups all indications or confirmations of threats, thefts, or sabotage for both the fixed site and transportation fuel cycle segments into several dozen categories of events according to how they are first perceived by any member of the safeguards system. Each event has an associated objective, a necessary level of awareness or desired final state of operations towards which all efforts are directed.
Each event / objective pair will be followed by a delineation I
of the preconceived sequence of decisions and actions to be taken to guide the NRC responses from the stimulus to the objective. Each discussion will also include criteria and data requirements necessary for decision making.
(
7'
-2 asponsibilities in Reacting to. Incidents j
a.
NRC Responsibilities b.
Federal Agencies Responsibilities c.
Local Government Responsibilities d.
Licensees Responsibilities e.
Responsibility Matrices--who does what and when The fourth section will delineate the responsibilities of the various federal and local agencies (with emphasis on NRC Headquarters). The Responsibility Matrix depicts the NRC organi-zational responsibilities for making decisions or taking actions.
The matrix is an expedient for presenting the actions and/or decisions required as a function of a particular event and responsible agency.
V.
Procedures Summary The Procedures Sumary is a convenient rearrangement of the Responsibility Matrix. For each member of the organization, it condenses the set of events into groups that initiate identical task sequences, or series of decisions and actions.
It then lists for each task sequence the procedures to be followed, the criteria for considering the task sequence accomplished, and all the data necessary to perform the tasks.
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