ML19289F092
| ML19289F092 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/04/1979 |
| From: | James Shea NRC OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS (OIP) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19289F093 | List: |
| References | |
| SECY-79-242, NUDOCS 7906020017 | |
| Download: ML19289F092 (6) | |
Text
.
5 April 4,1979 SECY-79-242 COMMISSIONER ACTION For:
The Comissioners From:
James R. Shea, Director Office of International Programs Thru:
Executive Director for Operations -
Subject:
PROPOSED LICENSE TO EXPORT SOURCE MATERIAL TO TliE UNITED KINGDOM (XUO8423)
Purcose:
Commission review of proposed issuance of subject license to the U.S. Department of the Army.
Discussion:
In June 1978, the U.S. Department of the Army applied for a license to export to the U.K. 250 kilograms of depleted uranium in the form of bar stock for use in research involving large caliber armor piercing penetrators.
Depleted uranium for a non-nuclear end use is not subject to the export licensing criteria contained in 10 CFR 110.42.
Further, such material falls withir) the categories of exports listed under 10 CFR 110.41 (d) which are not normally reviewed by the Executive Branch and, under 10 CFR 110.40(b), exports of source material in quantities less than 10,000 kilograms are not normally reviewed by the Commission.
However, as this is the first of a number of similar recuests expected to be received by NRC and because of the military end use_for the material, it was sent to State Department for. Executive Branch review and is being forwarded for Ccmmission review.
In response to our July 17, 1978 request for views, the Executive Branch provided its comments on January 3, 1979. These comments are attached at Accendix A.
In the opinion of the Executive Branch, this export:
o is consistent with the provision of the Atcmic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and with the NNPA of 1978, S
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' o may be made without being under the terms of an agreement for cooperation, and o will not be inimical to the common defense and security of the U.S.
The staff believes _that this export would be consistent with the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act and the NNPA and that it need not be covered by an agreement for cooperation. The Commission must determine, however, whether issuance of the license would be inimical to the common defense and security. The staff notes that the intended end use of this material is the development of military technology.
As a generic question, whether such an end use meets the test of non-inimicality involves complex military, technical, and political decisions in areas where the NRC has limited competence.
The staff is of the opinion that approval of XUO8423, because it involves only research, and because that research is to take place in a country closely allied to the U.S., would be favorable to the common defense and security.
In reaching this conclusion, the staff is relying heavily on the Executive Branch views and comments.
~
With respect to public health and safety factors, the conventional munitions-related end use presents unique considerations which are not normally present in non-nuclear source material exports. However, such military end uses present health and safety concerns which are no different in principle than those associated with the wide range of conventional munitions exports frcm the U.S. under the authority of the State Department's Office of Munitions Control.
It is also clear that the nuclear content of the material itself poses no signifi-cant health and safety concern. Ide staff has therefore concluded that the proposed export would not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety.
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. With respect to the NMSS technical review below, IP notes that the question of the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards in the UK, inasmuch as the material to be exported in this case is not subject to the licensing criteria of Section 127 of the NNPA, is relevant only to the Commission's determina-tion with regard to non-inimicality.
NMSS Technical Depleted uranium is subject to safeguards under the UK/
i<ev iew :
IAEA Agreement, but the export may possibly be exempted or terminated from IAEA control because of the quantity of material involved or the non-nuclear end use of the uranium. NMSS has no specific information on whether either type of exemption will be applied to this export.
A related consideration is whether the recipient facility is subject to IAEA safeguards. On the basis of information available to NMSS, it appears that the Fulmer Research Institute is not covered by IAEA safeguards.
NMSS has informed IP of its specific safeguards inforw -
tion needs, and IP has been following up with the Department of State and other agencies as appropriate to obtain information on these matters.
In addition, on February 28, 1979, the Chairman wrote to Mr. Pickering of the Department of State regarding NRC's information needs in the areas of state systems of accounting and control and IAEA safeguards implementation and problems, including as an enclosure a specific statement of these needs prepared by NMSS.
NMSS has received no information concerning the details of the UK state system of accounting and control and IAEA safeguards implementation. NMSS has in its possession only a public release on inventory difference (MUF) in the British civil nuclear program and the very limited informa-tion provided in the annual safeguards reports of the IAEA.
The staff is unable to associate any of the MUF data or IAEA information with the recipient laboratory. The principal conclusion of the NMSS examination is that the available information on IAEA implementation is not sufficient to permit NMSS to evaluate the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards in the UK.
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. Physical security criteria contained in 10 CFR Parts 110.42 and 110.43 are not applicable to this export.
As a related matter, at the request of the Department of Defense the staff has prepared ard circulated for interagency review and comments a draft paper amending Part 110 to exempt D00 from the requirements for a license to export depleted uranium contained in munitions.
The following documents are forwarded for Commission review of the subject application: (1) Executive Branch me,o of January 3, 1979 recommending issuance (Appendix A); (2) application of June 12, 1978 (Appendix B); and (3) copy of proposed license (Appendix C).
Recommendation:
That the proposed license be issuec to the Department of the Army.
Coordination:
OELD has no legal objection. NMSS views on the adequacy of the accounting and control system and the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards implementation are as stated above.
m
'l y
u ~. e
,.m James R. Shea, Director Office of International Programs
Enclosures:
Appendix A - Executive Branch memo dtd 1/3/79 Appendix B - Application dtd 6/'2/78 Appendix C - Proposed license DISTRIBUTION:
Cormissioners Ccmmission Staff Offices Exec. Director for Opers.
Secretariat NOTE:
Commissioner comments should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary, by c.o.b.
Tutn-saay. aeril 12, 1979 Ccamission staff office comments, if any, should ce suomitted to the Commissioners NLT Acril 10, 1979
, with ar information copy to the Office of tne Secretary, if tne caper is of such a nattre that it requires additional time for analytical review and comment, the Comm'ssioners and the Secretariat should be acorised of when comments may be expec~.ed.
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