ML19274G078
| ML19274G078 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/21/1979 |
| From: | Faust C METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908290476 | |
| Download: ML19274G078 (90) | |
Text
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,-l UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
1!
In the Matter of:
2!
IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW f
3l of Mr. Craig Faust I
Control Room Operator 4
l Si Si 7
81 Trailer #203 91 NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10!
Middletown, Pennsylvania 11!
April 21,1979 12!
(Date of Interview) i 13!
July 2, 1979 (Date Transcript Typec) 1M 35, 36, 37 15l (Tape Numoer(s))
16l 17'
'Si l
19l l
20j 21l j
NRC PERSONNEL:
Mr. Robert Marsh, Investigator 23 Mr. Dorsin Hunter, Investigator Mr. Larry Jackson, Radiation Specialist i
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1:
MARSH:
The date is April 21st and the time is now 3:29 p.m.
We are i
2 located in Trailer 203, which is the NRC interview trailer, just 3{
outside the gates of Three Mile Island.
This is Bob Marsh speaking.
4j I am an Investigator FROM Region III, the U.S. Nucle;r Regulatory 5
C6mmission.
I would like at this time to have the other people in the 6
room identify themselves and state their postions.
The purpose we are 7
here today is to.onduct an interview with Mr. Craig Faust, who is a 8
Control Room Operator at TMI, and Craig, you were on duty the night of gl March 28 when...?
i 10l l
11j FAUST:
Yes.
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MARSH:
the problem came about.
So at this time I am going to ask 13 each of the other NRC members here to state their name and their p sition.
15 16i HUNTER:
My name is Dorwin Hunter.
I am an IE Investigator.
I'm from
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18l 19l JACXSON:
My name is Larry Jackson.
I am a Radiation Specia'ist from 20' Region II.
22l1 MARSH:
Okay Craig, before we began here I gave you a document to 23l l
read, and when this is transcribed, rather than read th;c one and one-24l half page document into the record now I am just going to ask you if 25j I
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you had time to read it and then in the actual transcript of this tape l
2t at this point we will have that statement of that letter typed into i
I 3j this.
Did you read it?
I 4l 5l FAUST:
Yes I read it.
i 61 7
(Letter reads as follows:
The purpose of this investigation by the 8
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is to determine exactly what occurred gj regarding the incident at Three Mile Island, Unit 2, which began on 10f March 28, 1979, and the responding actions taken by Metropolitan lli Edison Company.
The investigation will include a review of tha condition i
12l f the plant prior to the incident and the period investigated will extend to 12:01 a.m. March 31, 1979.
13 14!
15l You are asked to provide information in as much cetail as you can recall concerning your site-related activities during this period, 16 incluaing your recommendations.
IS!
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission was given the responsibility i
and authority by the Congress of the United States in the Atomic 20!
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, to license nuclear power plants and to see they are operated safely to protect the health and safety of the American i
Public.
It is from this Act and Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, 246 that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Office of Inspection and 25i i
Enforcement is conducting this official investigation.
2001 158
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You have the right to refuse to be interviewed.
If you consaat to an i
2!
interview, you may have someone of your choice present.
To assist in 3
obtaining every comment, exactly as it is given, and to expedite the 4j interview, your permission to tape record this interview is requested.
t gj You have the right to refuse to have the interview tape recorded.
As 1
61 an alternative, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission investigators may t
7 prepare a written record of your statements and request you to sign i t.
You have the right to refuse to give a signed statement.
In the 8
g absence of a tape recording or a signed statement, the U.s. Nuclear 10l Regulatory Commission investigators will, to the best of their abilities, i
11f write your comments for inclusion in the investigative report.
Upon 12f your request you will be given a copy of your tape recording or signed statement.
13 14!
You have the right to request that your identity be protected and not 15 1gj used in the u.s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission investigation report.
However, because of the deep concern over this incident by the American 17l
""b i' *"d 9 "*'"**"t ffici s, tne u.s. nuclear aegulatory Commission lei cannot assure yo9 that we will not release your name and interview i
contents if we receive official requests and requerts by the public 20r through the Freedom of Information Act.
If specifically requested, all attempts will be made by the investigators to keep from disclosing to Metrcpolitan Edison or other parties specific information.
You must recognize that this is not an absolute guarantee.
Federal law 25l prohibits ycur employ.
Tom discharging you or discriminating against
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2001 159 l
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1; you because of your interview with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
I 2!
l 31 Your help and cooperation in providing information to the Nuclear i
4j Regulatory Commission will be appreciated.)
t 5
6 MARSH:
I have a couple of questions at the end which I would like you 7'
to respond to.
Question 1 is listed as: Did you underrtand what was in the letter?
8l 9l i
10l FAUST:
Yes.
I 11L i
MARSH:
Do we have your permission to tape the interview?
12l I
13l 1g FAUST:
Yes.
15:
MARSH:
And, would you like a copy of the tape or transcript?
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17I i
FAUST:
Yes, I would like that.
181 l
19i MARSH:
Fine, that will be provided to you.
And the 4th question, which wasn't typed on the end of the letter there but is covered in 21' the body of the letter, is that as it indicated you can have someone from the company present or from your union.
Do you have a -
23l 24 FAUST:
I have no preference to that, right now.
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2001 160 i
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MARSH:
Okay, so are you telling me you do not want someone present?
2 i
3 FAUST:
Not unless they want to be present.
4j 5
MARSH:
Okay.
Si I
FAUST:
I'm saying it doesn't really matter to me.
7l 8
i MARSH:
Okay, more than them wanted to be present, it would have to be g
10 that you want them here.
They obviously have a very strong feeling to 11!
be here, but it is up to you to make a decision.
I 12l FAUST:
I didn't talk about it with anybody, so right now I say no.
13 t
14!j MARSH:
0.K., fine.
All right, at that point then I am going to ask
.y Larry Jackson and Darwin Hunter to proceed.
And I would like, for the 6,
j ease of transcription, that each time yot do make a statement to l
proceed it with just your last name and it will make it easier on the ISI transcription.
20!
HUNTER:
Okay Craig, how about go through your background again for me, and your experience and how long you nave been with the company and have been an operator.
24 FAUST:
My background is from the Navy.
I served as a Machinist Mate 25j aboard the George Washington Carver.
I spent two years of pre-schooling l
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1l prior going to the boat, and reported aboard and was aboard the George 2
Washington Carver for about five years, and after that working, like I 3
said, in the capacity of Machinist Mate, Nuclear type.
From there I 4{
was hired by Met Ed and spent the next 5 1/2 years up tu now working Si as a A operator first, then training programs, and..ien the CR0.
I i
61 guess it's been two years now on Unit 2.
I had previously at one time 7l went up for a CR0 in Unit 1 and more or less for just disagreements g
that occurred at that time just between, well who I was training gl under, who I was training, the shift I was on, I dropped back and was 10 an A0 for awhile and then I bid up again for Unit 2 when tne opening 11; came up.
12l 13j HUNTER:
Okay and you indicated that you are an A operator on Unit 1 now.
15j
- " * # #" ^
P*"#
16i Unit 2 at times when needed, whenever we -- like we did the initial systems, the descriptions and lecture plans on.
I was involved in 18!
some of that, and just plain tracing out the plant for initial startup.
i 19l 20 HUNTER:
And then you bid, you said, CR0 for Unit 1 and due to 21(
22l FAUST:
It was more or less just a disagreement between me and my 23 shift supervisor at the time, that I just felt I didn't want to pursue 24 the program right at that point.
I dropped back and I just bid up 25 later on for Unit 2.
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.h li HUNTER:
Okay, and when did you get your license cr. Unit 2, do you l
2!
recall?
31 i
4 FAUST:
It was March of... I'll tell you when it was.
Let me dig it Si out of here.
I 61 7
MARSH:
Craig, what is it you are checking? Do you have a...
8 gj FAUST:
I have a copy of my license.. somewhere.
This is something 10; I imagine you can look up too, just as easily.
I thought I had one in l
11l my w llet.
I used to carry one.
Apparently, I don' t.
l 12!
HUNTER:
Okay, is that '78 or '77?
13 l
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AU :
w uld be in ' 8.
15 16!
HUNTER:
Okay.
17l t
181 FAUST:
Earlv '78 is when I got the license.
19!
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20I HUNTER: All right.
And as soon as you're licensed at the plant, then you are a CR0 in training, or a A CRO?
23 FAUST:
Well actually, we're a CR0 in training up until the time we are licensed.
In other words, we worked on the panel but at this time 25l l
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8 11 we did not have fuel in the reactor.
It wasn't refueled so we could l
2!
stand watches without being licensed 6at the time, and we were in our 3!
program - our training program - at this time.
41 5l HUNTER:
Then, did you load fuel in Unit - you were a CR0 when they l
6l loaded fuel in Unit 2?
I 7l 8
FAUST:
Yes.
When we received our license prior to loading fuel.
9' 10 HUNTER:
All right.
I didn't want to pursue the bidding for the job 11-in Unit 1.
But just one issue, 0.K.
And I wanted to ask if it was a 12l personality conflict, or what was, you know, was the - if you would 13l care to comment?
141 FAUST:
15 It was a personality conflict more than anything.
'Cause I didn't -- the forman there, the supervisor that I was dealing wfth, we 16 just didn't hit it off too well.
You just run up against people that you don't get along with and that's about all it amounted to.
g 19l HUNTER:
Oc'es tnat persor still work with Met Ed?
20j 21f FAUST:
Oh yeah.
23 HUNTER:
He -- is he still a Unit i supervisor or..
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1l FAUST:
Well, he covers both units.
I've worked under him but there l
2:
is - it's a little different, I guess, when you're training and when I
3t you're licensed and working for somebody because - I don't know how 4j you want to put it - it sort of a reminds me of the Navy career.
5 There were just some people I didn't want to go to for qualification 6j because I just thought they were wrong -
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g HUNTER:
Yeah.
i 9l 10f FAUST:
About the way they went about training.
I 11!
HUNTER:
Is there any problem there now?
I 13l gj FAUST:
No.
15l HUNTER:
After you got your license, was there any problem?
16 17 FAUST:
No, there wasn't.
As soon as I dropped back, there wasn't any g
gf problem.
I 20l HUNTER:
What about when you came back and bid for co-license in Unit 21l 2 or CR0 in 2?
22 23l l
FAUST:
There wasn't any problem with that.
24l 25 i
2001 165 e
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1 HUNTER:
- 0. K.
The night of the 28th, or the night if the 27th, you 2,
came on the 11:00-7:00 and as I understand and recall in our previous l
3i tapes, you were the CR0 taking readings in the Control Room.
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5l FAUST:
Yes.
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HUNTER:
And Ed Frederick was the panel CR0 trat night.
- 0. K.
And go 8{
through again what your duties are, in that position, as a CR0.
S!
10l FAUST:
As a - well we call it switching and tagging CRO.
We take i
lli care of writing up safety tags, when there are safety tags to write 12 up, whenever an application form is put in for it.
On the back-shift i
13j like this, and also when you are operating, you don't normally have 74{
tc,3 many tags to write up because there is not a great deal of maintenance g ing n.
And nce this night, I didn't even have any to write up, so 15 6l all I w s doing, for the most part, was our normal data acquisition, where you just go around and get a set of certain readings you take
'Y
' ' '# "U 18 which amount to when their computer schedules bring them up, provided 19l there is no other cover sheet for it and you just schedule to do it 1
20j that night.
And I was - I didn't have any of ther,, but I had the regular shift and dailys, which are called " Shift and Daily" readings, to take that I was working on at that time or that I was finishing up.
24 HUNTER:
- 0. K.
And where were you located? What was your position l
when you saw the Unit trip? What led you to note the Unit trip?
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f 11 llj FAUST:
I just faced the panel from where the switching and tagging l
2!
desk is.
I had been walking over and turning around facing the panel I
3 when the alarms came in that I first noticed on the trip, which were 4
located on the ICS alarm panel and also on the electrical board.
And Sj like I said, not before now, I'm almost sure, I had to have seen 6
alarms on the - when I say "I had to" - it was more natural for me to 7
actually be facing the one panel that I'm thinking about, which is the 8
one that's on the secondary plant, which is Panel 17.
The alarms had gj come on at that spot are very -- when you're looking at the panel 10l that's what you'd see out of the corner of your eye first.
So I'm 11l actually saying now that one of the first alarms I saw was the ICS, which was about 4 or 5 alarms on there initially.
And the ones on the 12 y3f turbine plant panel, which was probably a generator tripping - generator trip panel, mayce even a condensate pump.
p 15i HUNTER:
Have you been through trips before?
6; 17!
FAUST:
Yes.
g 19j HUNTER:
Hrw many have you been through?
c.G ;
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FAUST:
I guess I've seen -- I've been in three trips before and I've 22l f
I don't know whether you count run-backs, too.
I've been in a 23l i
couple of run backs.
I guess about 6.
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I lj M/.kSH:
Craig, have any of those trips been here? Can you give me an 2{
idea of how many trips have been here?
3!
4l FAUST:
All of the trips that I have associated with have been here.
5 Now, if you're talking about my Navy experience, I've been on aboard 6j the boat, but I wasn't in the Control Room.
My job was as a - was known as SCR, Control Room supervisor.
1 9
gj MARSH:
The trios out here were all referring to Unit 2?
10l 11l; FAUST:
Yes.
I was going to go on to say that I have seen trips in g
Unit 1, where I've been in the mom, but I was only under trainee and 13 therefore, I did not get involved directly into it.
But I stood more 14; r less, out of the operator's way so that they could perform what they needed to do.
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15 16i HUNTER:
The two run-back - what were they associated with?
g 18{
FAUST:
The two that I'm thinking about, were just where we had lost the faed pump.
And it turned out, later on we found out that it was due the FWV 16 valves -- I got the right designation there, 16.
I think it was the B pump that we lost, 168 that spiked open on us.
It went open just enough and shut, and we didn't see the valve travel, I
but it was enough to drop suction pressure on the pump, so we nad to 24l drop the pump off.
Ar:d I guess we ran about 97% power and we had to 25t run back to 50% about.
We had that twice.
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HUNTER:
Sams problem, again?
2l 3l
. FAUST:
But that was within t% same shift, that one.
4l 5
HUNTER:
- 0. K.
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FAUST:
We've had other run backs.
I'm trying to place them.
There 7l I
gj has been run backs when I've been in the Control Room, but not CR0 and I
g not even switching and tagging, but I was on, like, surveillance.
10l During the day, we had extra CRO's on and they usually run the surveil-I l.y lance procedures that we need to go through.
i 12!
HUNTER:
What about the trips?
13 14l FAUST: Well, one of the bigest ones we had was a trip during initial 15 startup where we were testing the steam safeties.
And we had to trip 6
at approximately... it was right around 22*. power.
And the bao' thing about that was that we had a relief valve.
One of the main safeties, ISI steam safeties, stick open on us.
It didn't re seat.
19l i
20' HUNTER:
Excuse me.
Safety on the secondary system or the primary?
22 FAUST:
It was on the secondary.
24 HUNTER:
The secondary.
0.K.
And it stuck oper and tk m.
.ppened?
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FAUST:
It was more than one.
I think it was three all together.
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They stuck at some point, where they didn't fully re-seat when they 3l were supposed to at about - they should have re-seated like around 900 l
4j pounds.
And they brought us down to a 600 pcunds range or more, which 5
gives you a pretty nasty cool down rate.
And I think it's pretty much 6i record, where you can read about it.
It shrank the pressurizer, we 7
lost the level out of the pressurizer, picked up high pressure injection l
8l but regained pressurizer level right away.
It was a rather sharp g
spike, where it went straight down.
In fact, I didn't even see the 10 pen drop, it went so fast.
And I carried out the procedures, once 11!
again.
And we managed the recovery fairly fast.
12!
HUNTER:
- 0. K.
Another trip?
13 14!
15l FAUST:
- 0. K.
There are two significant ones that are hitting me right 6
The otner one's hard for me to picture when it was, but I know n w.
ig we had it though.
I don't think I can picture or present it to you right now.
I'd have to look it up my; elf.
19l HUNTER:
- 0. K.
We'll look at it in Trailer soon.
We'll pick it up, 20t too.
And if we have any further questions, I'll come back and we'll talk about it, if it's significant.
- 0. K.
And when the unit in tripped a.id you saw the alarms, then you, if I recall properly, you went to the. makeup panel first?
2L
_FAU_ST: Yes.
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l 1l HUNTER:
- 0. K.
And what did you do at the makeup panel?
2!
l FAUST:
3l I shut it down, shut our letdown isolation valve - MUV 376 -
4f and attempted to start the makeup pump.
First try, I kr.cw I didn't 5l hold the switch long enough.
Like I said before, it's a one second l
61 time delay for the lube oil pump on it... and to pickup and apparently 7
let the switch go too fast.
I was back on it, and just about, just as 8l I sort of let the switch go, I was back on it again, and held it over g'
on again.
The pump indicated it picked up, in other words, I got the 10 red (stuttering), which would be really an indication that the breaker closed.
Started, I even got amps on it.
When I backed off and I let 11l go of the switch, the light went off but the pump tripped back off.
13l It was at that time that Ed Fredrick, whatever his movements were on it, reached over and started it and I just kept going across the panel y
13j to the feed station.
16i HUNTER:
- 0. K.
Looking at the makeup station, when you got there, what was the normal charge ng in lineup, the normal makeup lineup at the
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time?
19l 2.Di FAUST:
- 0. K.
"1B" makeup pump was running at this time and it was 211
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just supplying normal makeup to the system, as needed, through the 17 22 valve - MUV 17 - and also seal injections through the RC reactor cooling pumps.
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HUNTER:
What does that normally run - those two numbers, those two i
2:
values?
I 3:
4j FAUST:
Seal injections are usually about 40 gpm total, and it's hard 5
to tell what 17's because it varies.
At this time it was -- I can't 6l even guess
'cause the valve feeds, you know, automatically.
So you 7
don't really know which posit wn it's making up.
8 g
HUNTER:
What about the letdown that you isolate? What was the letdown 10 lineup at that time?
lli 12{
FAUST:
0.K., that would of been around, I'd say probably about total i
13j f 50, 50 GPM, probably.
14!
HUNTER:
Is that like one orifice?
or, 15 16i FAUST:
Well, it's a very -- it's an orifice.
18i HUNTER:
Okay.
19l 20' FAUST:
I guess there around 40 while we're making up that (phoenetic).
22,l All right, let's try to remember -- I'm getting them backwards here a minute.
23 24l HUNTER:
0.K. would I find that recorded anywhere, the makeup flow and,
}QQj }[2 the letdown flow?
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FAUST:
You'll find the... no.
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3i HUNTER:
0.K., would you have trended that on your analog recorders on i
4j the computer?
i 5
6 FAUST:
Not unless we had a eason, and at the time we didn't.
7 8
HUNTER:
- 0. K.
What about makeup tank level?
9 10 FAUST:
Well, you see that is trended on the -- there is a chart 11 recorder for that.
12j HUNTER:
13 0.K., and when you shut the letdown valve there, the ietdown 14 g es to, obviously goes to zero, and then you start the A, in this 15l
. case you started the A pump.
The sunction for the A pump is from where?
16 17!
Im[
FAUST:
Initially at this point, it's from the makeup tank.
19l 20l HUNTER:
Would the pump just come on, on recirc?
4 21!
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FAUST:
The pump would come on on recirc.
Actually, it would be --
the header for the A pump is lined up the same as the B pump.
That's why this one was selected initially.
25l 2001 H3 I
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HUNTER:
- 0. K.
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FAUST:
To start the "C", I would have had to go around the panel, run 4
around that back panel and open up CHV SA, or B rather, to p t suction 5
to the C pump before I could start it, 'cause the pumps will burn up 6
in about 3 seconds without any kind of suction flow going to them.
7 g
HUNTER:
Elaborate on that a little bit for me, all right? The B pump gj is lined up to the makeup tank.
It's normally charging flow and 10 letdown so it's stabilized and balanced.
i lli FAUST:
Right.
12:
13l l
HUNTER:
14!
And you start the A pump, and its suction is from where?
15i FAUST:
It's coming off the same flow pack that the 8 pump is, the 16 makeup pump, and its discharge path will then be the same too, through 77 seal injection and recire.
g 19f HUNTER:
- 0. K.
Parallel path, the.
At that time, the pressurizer c0!
level would have dropped, or going down.
i 21{
22l i
FAUST:
The procedures call, on a reactor trip like that, it doesn't hurt to start the A pump in this manner.
Because unless you open the 16A, you're not feeding anything else.
You can have the pump if you
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need it.
That's the big point getting it on.
Next step, is you i
2 monitor, you see what the pressurizer is doing and where your level's 3l going.
That's when you'd crack open your 16A valve.
And if you I
4 really have a problem and are not recovering it right away, the operator 5l would go behind and open the 16, or CHV SA, CHV SA, and that would put 6
you on on the BWST.
7 8
HUNTER:
And through the 16A valve, or whatever the--
Now what's the gl lineup of C?
101 1
11l FAUST:
C is isolated from A, at this time -- or this configuration at I
12j this time was, the cross connect (unintelligible mumbling) were isolated.
You have to provide a suction as well as - you would be 0.K. once you 13 have a suction path from the BWST for initial light off of it, but you wouldn't want to run like that, because you would fill you makeup tank I
up from the BWST through the recirc pumps.
When you use the C pump 16i you won't have another place to go.
181 HUNTER:
- 0. K.
And as far as moving the 16 valve on the A pump, you just passed the station and that was left up to Ed Frederick?
In i
.other words, all you did is start the pump?
21(
22!
l FAUST:
If Ed hadn't been right there at that point and reached over, 23 I would have still been there.
In other words, I might have even 24l never got over to the feed station.
I might have been on pressurizer.
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HUNTER:
Right.
He picked it up at that point? He didn't open the H I
2!
dome or anything?
3 4l FAUST:
He picked it up at that point, so I just left.
i 5'
6{
HUNTER:
- 0. K.
And then, Ed was there and you proceded to the secondary 7
area, the emergency feedwater station.
- 0. K.
You talked a little bit 8
before about --
t 9l t
10j FAUST:
Maybe I should -- what I was proceding for wasn't the --
i 11l HUNTER:
Go ahead.
12 13 FAUST:
14!
When I'm saying emergency or if we' re starting to say emergency, 15f what I was looking for was a normal feed path, when I was going over there.
I was going to the feed station.
16; 17' l
HUNTER:
Right.
I understand.
18!
19f FAUST:
It's all located in the same place, but --
20!
i 21l HUNTER:
But you were going to ti acondary system, looking for--
23 FAUST:
What I wanted to see was if steam generator was going towards low level limits.
2Sl 2001 176 I
i
21 1,
HUNTER:
- 0. K.
21 3
FAUST:
And that's what I was looking for, mainly.
4f 5l HUNTER:
Give the items that you checked as you go to the secondary I
6j panel.
7 g
FAUST:
The things I was looking for first were the -- and I missed it gl in the first part of it, but I said I saw the rod bottom lights when I 10 was heading over, at least I feel I did.
And all green lights caused 11f the (unintelligible) onto that.
To me that's rod bottom lights, nry.
12l That's telling me the reactor has tripped.
No question to me.
The 13 next thing I was looking for was feed station, oming from the makeup station, was to check that for going over low level limits and first g
thing I looked at was the startup range.
And I had indications that 15 it was Coming down.
It was somewhere in mid-scale on the startup range at this time, right.
It didn't take any time to look to see, I
all I wanted to see was the turn in trend down, that it was coming 13{
down.
I looked over.. all I can say is that i looked over and I saw 19f feed pumps were off, I don't know why I did.
I just looked over and 20l the feed pumps were off.
The next thing I checked was all the emergency feed pumps on, which they were.
So I proceeded, and I figured, in my own mind, I figured, well, coming down to the low level limits.
And I proceeded over to the turbine plant, secondary panel...
I'm missing 25l something...
Something else that was strange to me at that time.
It i
l 2001 177
22 l'
wasn't strange to me but it sort of is now, because the 11 valves were i
2!
traveling open.
And to me it shouldn't.
And when I think about it l
3j now, they shouldn't have been traveling open at that time because I 4
was still high in the operating range.
I don' t think there is anything, 5
you know -- as levels dropping down it has to actually has to go below 6
low level limits a little bit before the valves start fully traveling.
7 Or be right within the range of it.
So, that could just be something g
I don't know.
Maybe it does travel sooner, but I think it's a device 9
that you're actually below the low level limits and then it starts 10 feeding -
t lli l
12l HUNTER:
You were coming to the startup limits - is that what you i
said?
13 14i FAUST:
Well, I was on mid range of the scale, which is about 150 15 inches in the startup range.
16 17l HUNTER:
- 0. K.
1Sl 19f FAUST:
So.
20(
We were actually down to about 30 inches, before the I
"alve should have actually opened.
It didn't hit me at the time.
I 21!
just noticed that I was getting a dual indication on the 11 valves -
the emergency feed valves.
I'll pick it up later on then, on that.
I went over to the secondary plant, the turbine plant, and one of the first things I looked at was the turbine generator, main generator 2001 178 r
I t
.j f
l 23 1
startup and... looked at the governor valves and trottle valves 2
indicators, to make sure that they were shut.
One was hanging up, so 3
one thing I did do was hit the turbine trip button, to see if for some 4j reason this was the quick reaction, to see if something would - it 5
would release it.
The indication at that time was still open on the 6
one throttle valve.
I don't remember. I'd have to look at the panel 7
right now to tell you which one it was.
Anyway, it didn't drop down, 8
so I continued on to the... I believe I went from there to the generator g
breakers, put them in pull-to-lock and the field breakers in pull-to-1 ck.
And I was looking on the back panel, coming back now from here, 10 11; king over the back panel at the extraction valve.
The indicators 1
12 back there, there's a whole list of them, and they were traveling.
So I 1 oked at that, and also saw that caw the turbine drain valves were 13 ig going open, was getting dual indication on them.
I came back across nd had sor.
f paused.
I was going to do another part of our EP, 15 16l which is starting our lube oil pumps on the main turbine.
Then it was just like -- it was a pause.
I can get that later.
I don't have to r
I worry about that now.
I went back to the feed station.
First thing I 18!,
saw was 10 inches indication on both generators, which is, again, to 19!
me is a dry generator because it's also stated to treat them as if 20i they are dry when you get below about 10 inches.
The first thing that I more or less looked at was the 11 valves, and they were shot.
I jumped on them, and when I say " jumped", in other words, I took the daily station for the 11 valves in hand, to manual and then drove open l
on them on their demands.
That time I got indication of traveling 25i I
2001 179 i
f
i l
{
24 l
1 1;
valves.
And once again, it seemed faster, but I waited.
I must have i
2; been waiting for a couple of minutes because the next thing I'm looking I
3 for is to verify flow into the generator, which we do by looking at 4{
level.
I realize somewhere in there that we weren't getting flow yet 3l and announced it again, I had announced the first time that the generators I
6l are dry, and then I announced we still aren't feeding the generators.
7 That's when I looked down over the panel, and I'm sure I looked twice.
8 The first time I didn't see anything abnormal, but I realized that gl after a second scan the one indicator light for the one valve is right i
10f n the edge of the panel, and I was actually pretty well leaning over 11l the panel looking back under me like, And I was looking for this.
12l MARSH:
13 Craig, can I ask you to break for just a second.
Let me interrupt and change tapes here.
I'm breaking at this time.
The time 7
is 3:59 and I'm reading 472 on the meter.
It's still 3:59.
We'll 15 continue.
16 17!
FAUST:
I was making the second scan on the channel below me, when I 8
saw that, it would have been the EFB 12A, indicating light was indicating g
20jl shut.
I voiced, I starting voicing, I voiced actually both of to them shut.
I know I yelled that out.
And I was reaching for the 12, and there was this tag that we had on the EFV 16 it's FWV 168, which had problems with it due to -- it's an automatic recirc valve for the feed pump.
The tag from that was covering the uppper valve lights, indicating lights.
It was like - I can't remember the motions, but I pushed the i
i 2001 180
l
'l 25 11 tag aside and at the same time just about was opening both valves, and i
2!
somewhere in there at the same time saying to everybod'y else that I i
I 3!
knew what was going and what I found that EFV 12A and B were shut.
4l Bill Zewe the supervisor, voiced his opinion of it, you know, suprised t
5l at it more than anything.
He said get them open.
As soon as those 1
6l valves started traveling -- I'm not sure he;...och further along it was 7
when I found a new indication of feeding, and that was sound of the noise monitor.
We were just imagining 50 to 60 degree water going 8l g
- nto a hot -- down an ice cold pipe into a hot generator.
And we were 101 hearing it on the gen-- I'm pretty sure it was selected to the number 11 5 point, which was the A generator, tube sheet for the A generator.
I I'd ~
12 13 MARSH:
14 May I ask a question, before we get away from it? Those two switches.
15 You talked about the tag hanging down, covering the l_ights f the upper valve indicator lights.
16 17!
FAUST:
Yes.
18l 191 MARSH:
What about the lower?
2 01 21, FAUST:
No, that was --
23 MARSH:
That was also in a closed position?
i 251 a
l 2001 181' i
(
26 l!
FAUST:
That was in a closed position.
I 2
MARSH:
Had you noted that one or?
3j 4l 5l FAUST:
Pardon?
I 6
MARSH:
Had you noted that that one had been closed?
7l 8
FAUST:
I yelled - when I yelled to the operator, you mean..
gj i
10 MARSH:
That's the one you cre addressing, is the lower one?
11!
12l FAUST:
That was the A valve, 16A... or I'm mixing them -- the 12A.
13 j
I'm giving 16s and As here.
That's EFV 12A was the first one I saw at e
me, a
yel e.
actually yelled.
I tMnk I put ne tag on 15 16l the upper one while I was going to the A valve and opening that one.
Flipped that, and I was reaching down and opening the B, 'cause it makes more sense to me now, and then saying 16's, or I mean the 12's
- gI l
are shut.
191 20t MARSH:
So, if I t.nderstand it right, when you initially noticed the 21 I
lower indicator lights as being closed and as you went to open that 22!
I valve and flipped tag across and noticed that the upper one was also closed.
24l i
25i l
2001 182 l
l i
I l
27 1
FAUST:
When, I was reaching for it, I reached for it with one hand 2!
and flipped the tag with the other one.
And I guess it was in that 3
sequence, I started voicing what I found.
It's hard to straighten 4f that one out to me.
I Sj I
6l MARSH:
I just wanted to try and clear it in my own mind to.
I had i
7 looked at the valve positions and just want to clear it in my own 8
mind.
Thank you.
9 10l HUNTER:
Let's step back to the 11 valves.
There's a couple of points 11 there that are intriguing, to say the least.
As you passed them, you 12 n ted initally that the 11 valves were, they did have dual indication i
13l n them or that they were moving.
I 14!
FAUST:
Yes.
15 16i Ig HUNTE9.
So that would indicate to you that, even though the level was i
up, they were opening.
g 19f i
FAUST:
Yes.
20l 21l HUNTER:
Then when you came back, they were closed.
23 FAUST:
Yes.
Somebody was behind me, that can also pick that one up i
for me, too.
Because they noted that the initial, when they saw me 25j t
l 2001 183 I
i i
r I
r l
28 11 grab the station, noted the initial travel on the 11 valves, too, due 2!
to the change in the lights.
l l
4 HUNTER:
Now, who was behind you?
Si l
6i FAUST:
I thought it was Ed, but now I'm not sure.
7 8l HUNTER:
Cause Ed was over --
t FAUST:
Yeah.
It must have been Bill.
10 11l HUNTER:
Bill who?
12 13 FAUST:
Zewe.
15i HUN'. DA We'll find him. -- 0.K.
16i 17i FAUST:
I can picture.. when I said that I can picture him coming 8
over there then, too.
Because the first thing I said was we weren't i
19!
feeding.
And of course, he took an immediate concern in that.
And 21jl I'm sure I wasn't alone over in that corner, though.
I just didn't i
look around to see who was there.
22i 23 MARSH:
Do you recall him saying anything in response to that? Do you j
have any recollection at all?
2si 2001 184 i
k
i l
29 l
t li FAUST:
You mean initial - what I said initially -- I was taking the l
2!
action.
There wasn't any need to say anything.
For one thing, he 31 could see what I was doing.
I, 4l 5
MARSH:
Well, what you're saying is he would have been concerned.
Do 6i you recall then anything specifically that he did to show concern?
7 Did he start talking to you as he walt.ed forward towards you, or do a
you have any recollections at all?
9 FAUST:
10l I can't remember, now, to tell you the truth...
I think 11l somebody could be talking to me right at that point and I was so busy 12 trying to get feedback in my own mind, that I wouldn't have heard him.
13 And I imagine that's what it would have been.
He could have been i
14j saying something to me and it didn't register on me.
15i 16l HUNTER:
- 0. K.
The fact that the 11 valves were not opening when you 17 came back, or had not opened, and you were 10 inches, that shows, that appears to show a problem.
18 19i 20:
21, HUNTER:
Those valves should have fully stroked open.
23 I
FAUST:
Yes, they should have.
24l 25j l
2001 185 i
.1 30 1
HUNTER:
Realizing that the 12 valves were also closed.
They weren't 2!
in automatic? There was nothing, you didn't do it?
3 4
FAUST:
The 11 valves are automatic.
l Si
(
61 HUNTER:
Right.
There was nothing wrong with them, that you are aware 7
of?
8 g
FAUST:
No.
As far as I know, we had no problems with them.
But a ---
10 1 11 1
HUNTER:
What about steam generator level at that time, steam generator 12!
level?
13 t
14!
FAUST:
Steam generator level was at -- when I first came back over, 15 it was at 10 inches indication on both generators.
When I say 10 16!
inches, you could lock at the gauge on this end of it, and it's really g
hard to read it.
It wasn't pegged out on the bottom.
And I'm pretty g
sure that I got the 10 inches about right, because I was looking 191 pretty hard at this.
But like I say. Once again -- in fact, I'm not i
20l even sure if it's in the procedure right now.
But we, in the past,
{
when we had problems with the generator, it was put out that if you go below 10 inches, you assume the generator's dry.
So, that's where I was going from that point.
Somebody was behind me when I jumped on i
24l l
the lis.
That's about all I can say on that.
So, if it was Bill, 25i 2001 186
l 31 1!
that would be a good reason why he didn't say anything.
Another thing 2!
that you might be thinking about is, when I'm on the ll's there, I'm j
3j actually leaning over the panel and over these 12 valves, so that he i
4i couldn' t see them.
5' 61 HUNTER:
There is no way you could hit them... in other words, that 7j ought to have been (mumble) at that time.
8{
g FAUST:
As we were saying, I can't picture my body rubbing up against 10 the switch - that type of switch.
11!
HUNTER:
It's not a handle switch or a 12 13l i
74l FAUST:
You would have to be at a 30 degree angle there or less.
15i 16!
17!
FAUST:
And plus, one switch is even that much further up on the panel 19I tSan the other one, and you'd just really have a hard time hitting them.
2Cl t
21i HUNTER:
- 0. K.
I gtess the question is, what channels feed -- the level channels feed those 11 valves.
And then the question would be, was the actual level that the control system supply with valves indicating high, and closing the valves back?
I don't know.
l 2001 187
l 32 1
1!
FAUST:
That would have been - that comes off our startup range indication.
i 2l l
31 HUNTER:
You were looking at startup range and it was 10 inches.
l 4;
5 FAUST:
That then feeds into our ICS system where - that's logic, i
6l whatever the logic is --
7 8
HUNTER:
How did you open the 11 valves? What did you do to open them gj then?
10 FAUST:
What you do is you have to take the daily stations to manual, lli i
12j which are two - it's sort of like a - it's not a toggle switch, it's like a slide switch.
You just pull it down, in other words, what you 13 g
ended up doing..
Not down - I'm sorry.
What you're doing is, you're pushing buttons on this.
I'm thinking about the - just buttons, on 15 that part of it.
And you just hit the right side of it.
You push or 16j press on them and it transfers the station into a manual state where g';
r you can control it.
Then a toggle switch is onto control it.
19l HUNTER:
Did you ever see those valves fail to open before?
20 j, l
21; FAUST:
We had problems with those valves during one of these trips I
that we had.
That it was the result of getting indicating lights up 23l on the panel, so that we could tell that the 11 valves were actually 24l j
moving.
Because the only indication they had of it was on the daily 25t 2001 188 i
i
.l 33 i
I 11 station itself, which is ju-t an indication of the signal going to it.
2 Which really doesn't tell you anything.
So we had a problem with i
3 feeding the generators, one time before.
And it stemmed - you wasted 4;
a lot of time trying to tell if the valve was moving by the daily 5
station or change in generator level, you had to wait.
There wasn't 6
any real, immediate indication that the valve was moving.
So that 7f what your lights came in for.
8 gl HUNTER:
0.K. So now, after you've started feeding the generators, you ea e A genera r, apparently the feed water, the crackling and 10 g
the hammer, noise, because of the water.
And then you were feeding to recover A water level, or what was your ---
i 13 FAUST:
I was shooting for a water level - 30 inches in the generator.
14;:
I 15i HUNTER:
- 0. K.
16i l
17!
FAUST:
I think it was the B.
I can't remember which one it was now.
18!
It's getting too far away.
191 20 HUNTER:
It's all right.
Go ahead.
22 FAUST:
I think I said, I believe the B level, I guess was leading.
23 One of them was leading the other one, and when I started to get an 24l indication on it, I started backing off on the 11 valve.
On the 25\\
i 2001 189
j t
{
34 li generator an indication was coming up, because I know at the time I 2
was already feeding pretty heavily on it, but I also felt that -- I 3
didn't really have a feel, myself, to tell you how long we could go 4{
without feed on those generators.
I figured, the primary was getting g
pretty hot and I just wanted to get water in there and start cooling 6j it down, to get some heat out of there.
I'm not sure how much of this 7
reasoning was in my mind at the time.
My main concern was that I i
gl didn't have water in the generator.
And I wanted some in there.
9f HUNTER:
- 0. K.
There was a point in this event also that you shifted 101 the steam dumps to manual.
11 I
12!
l FAUST:
This - when I was waiting - when I initially - when I first 131 ig hit the 11 valve, one of the things I was looking at and expecting to see for a dry generator was a fairly sharp decrease in steam pressure.
., 5 i 1
I wasn't sure at the time, while I was waiting in there, I thought 16,t maybe I am feeding it and I'm just not seeing it.
I reasoned something 17,!
out to myself that I looked over, I realized that the header pressure 18t was less than what the atmospherics was supposed to lift at.
- 0. K.
Not the atmospherics, but what the bypass valves were supposed to lift 20[
i at.
They're set to go at 1010 and maintain air pressure at that.
And it was right around 1000, it was just about on the borderline, I'd 22' say, at the time.
I figured I'd get a little cooling rate on it that 23 way, and I put the valves manual over there and cracked them. When I 24 say cracked them, I just hit the toggle switches until I just got the 2001 190 i
l I
35 1,
first indication that the light went from red to green and stopped it 2
there.
I got a drop in pressure from that, which like I say now, I 3
know I was actually just bleeding the pressure off that was in there 4
from the dry generator.
I recovered it, and it only went down about 5
300 pounds, I guess.
And I recovered it when I first starting getting I
6f steam in tere, feed in there.
7 8
t!UNTER:
- 0. K.
There was a point also then that you, if I recall g
right, that you went from the - you were having trouble and you went i
fr m the bypass valves later, to the atmospheric dumps.
10j 11l i
FAUST:
That was actually, I had already re-established levels, and this was probably 20 minutes into it, I guess.
Because our next 3
y concern then was the secondary plant.
We wanted to try and re-1s; establish normal feed.
In fact, I think it was sooner than that.
I got involved and I directed Dale Laudermilch it turned out to be, to 16,;
go down and get on the reject valve, which at this time our COV 59 valves are automatic ones, and what we were worried about is if that 18l thing, -- if we lost let the valve go wide open, it would take away 19l suction from the feed pump and cause a trip on us.
So what we ended up doing was throttling the downstream discharge valve on COV 60, so 21(
that when it did open there would be a more controlled reject out to the storage tanks, which for the most part, under normal operating i
conditions, there's no real problem with that.
Just a slower rate 24 that you're rejecting at.
We had a hot well level --
In fact, I saw 25l l
2001 191 i
t
36 1.
the tail end of go on high on the indicator up there.
And I was I
2!
worried about flooding out the condensor.
I sent him down there to i
3 open up the reject valve.
And we were also getting involved with 4
getting the bypass around the polishers open, which is COV 12.
That's 5
on the back panel.
We tried to open that up from the in Control Room 6l there, and Bill Zewe went around the panel to get it, so I could stay 7'
in the front there.
He pushed it and tried to get the thing to open 8
and it wouldn't electrically open.
So, we had an operator... and I g
think at that time - this has got to be a little bit after the initial 10l reject, getting the reject going up, or right during it.
We had, I 11l think Don Miller also went down with Bill Zewe and tried to open COV 12, f which (Name?), I think he can tell you.
I just heard words, 12 something about the hand wheel wasn't on it.
So that was another 13 problem.
It was laying over in the corner, or something like that.
ey g n anpay, n
ey g e va e cracked open to where h 15 c uld pen it then.
It was frozen on its seat apparently.
16; 17)
HUNTER:
So once vou cracked it, then the motor was running on.
.?
18{
~
19i i
FAUST:
Right.
By the time I got over to the secondary plant there, 20' too, something you might want to realize is, I at this time hadn't realized we lost not only just the feed pumps but everything over there.
23 24i HUNTER:
Right.
25i i
2001 192 I
r
i 37 1!
FAUST:
The only thing that was running were the heater drain pumps, i
2t which were recircing the tank at low level.
In fact, I think it was 3
getting to the point where I think they should have tripped.
But by 4
the time I got over to the secondary panel there, Bill had already i
Si attempted to start the condensate pumps, apparently.
And he got one I
6j running, COV-28, or -1B was running when I got over there.
It was 7j running on recirc back to the hot well.
We still had a high hot well 8
level.
I had one - I had Dale Althouse going down to open the reject g
valve, isolation valve downstream with it, so that we could get rid of 10 the water faster.
Another thing I attempted to do at this point was g
ver n the atmospherics; in theory just to stop dumping steam back 11{
y there, to try to minimize the amount of water we were putting i."o the h t well.
So I figured we could go onto the atmospherics for a period 13 y
of time, till we got control of our hot well back.
We did this by taking off circ water pumps, which if we down below the three circ 15r water pumps, it automatically shifts control over to our normal daily y!
stations that are controlling the turbine bypass valves.
Then you can control your atmospheric dumps then.
It wasn't what I did at that point.
It wasn't too long after this that we got the - I'm having a hard time placing one thing.
We received an outside call, and it 40 couldn't have been at this time because ive didn't have any problems g
that we would have somebody telling us to shut those valves --
Somebody from the public.
They wouldn't even know anything about it.
Apparently came in, "I don't want to see that," or something like that
" steam coming out, anything out of there at this. time".
So it 25i must have been later.
It had to be later.
I 2001 193 l
t
{
38 i
1!
HUNTER:
Again, who would call?
i 2!
l 3!
FAUST:
I don't know.
4l 5'
HUNTER:
Then who answered the phone?
6 7
FAUST:
I can't answer that one either.
I think it was ---
8 HUNTER:
It wasn't you who answered the phone.
g 10j FAUST:
I can't remember who told me - which one of the - I think it y
was one of the supervisors that was there at the time.
So it had to be later on.
And told me to shift back over - to get back over to the turbine bypass valves and stop putting it through the atmospherics.
p, 15!
16i i
17!
FAUST: We had hot well level back, though.
That's what I'm getting.
18f We got it back and we shifted it back and it was the second time we 19!
attempted to do that and I'm not sure why.
And_I don't know if it was I
me now.
That's what so bad about this.
I can't remember doing it the 21l second time, but I can remember it struck me so funny..
I hate to 22l use that term right now during this, but that somebody was calling us from outside telling us not to dump anything like that.
So, anyway, i
24l that's how fast it went over.
25 j
2001 194 l
I
l 39 11 HUNTER:
- 0. K.
But basically, that stabilized the hot well and got i
2!
that system set up normal and you were damping ---
3l 4f FAUST:
No.
We never got it set up normal.
I think I said he had a 5l crack.
He r.ever got the bypass around the polishers open.
I 61 HUNTER:
Oh, 0. K.
7 I
8{
FAUST:
Like I said, you would h ve to ask him, because we ended up, g
10l we c uldn't get on feed..
Oh, that's.right.
We did get it open and i
then we couldn't get the pumps started.
We could only get a condensate pump, we couldn't get any of the booster pumps to start.
Something I
happened to it.
13l t
14!
HUNTER:
- a. K.
All right.
But you got the hot well back to normal.
16i FAUST:
Right.
17l l
18f HUNTER:
Sc there wasn't any problem dumping steam througn the bypasses?
20 FAUST:
We moved back to normal lineup on that, as far as the bypasses 21l i
go.
Now, it was right around - we were sort of holding here, fighting 22 the problem on the primary side then.
23 2 41 I
HUNTER:
Were you actually aware of the problem on the primary?
25!
i 2001 195
i 40 1
FAUST:
I was aware of the high hot well.
I was aware of the high 2
level in the pressurizer.
And I was aware initiali,y of a pressure 3
drop in the primary, but then, I believe I remember cne of us saying, 4
"it's holding, the pressure's holding.
W can' t get the damn. " He 5
said something like, "we can't get the hot well down".
1 don't know 6l what his exact words were.
I know they were busy thrott7ing back on 7
injection, high pressure injection, and except for that high level, it 8
seemed like we stabalized out.
And we did this before Bill Zewe left gj to go dcwn to work on it, to help out or try to get that COV valve 10 pen because we wanted to stop feeding from the storage tanks.
11!
HUNTER:
- 0. K.
12 13 FAUST:
Sc we were actually just holding where we w.re.
151 HUNTER:
Do you remember when Bill came back?
16!
i 17!
FAUST:
Time wise, I can't say a time, but I remember him coming back.
181 19l HUNTER:
Like an event or something that would tie a tire when he came 20t l
back up?
21l I
22 FAUST:
Yeah.
We got the fact shifting back from the atmospherics.
u He came back up and I think it -as from him that I learned that COV 12 24; was open.
They either got it c acked or it was open.
I was stili 25!
l I
l l
2001 196 e
i I
41 l
l 1:
keeping a pretty good eye, sort of off and on.
I sent an operator i
2l also out to the main turbine because we were
.. this was later too...
2 Because I was watchi1g the turbine roll down and coast down and I 4f wanted to make sure it got on the jack.
5!
t 6j HUNTER:
0.K. sir.
i 7l g
MARSH:
Do you recall who the operator was you sent out to the turbine?
9I FAUST:
I think it was Steve Mull.
10f 1 11 MARSH:
Steve Mull?
12 13l FAUST:
Yes.
15j MARSH:
Thank you.
g.
I 17l HUNTER:
How did you shift from the atmospherics back to the bypasses?
Do you do that by switching or restarting the ciic pump or -
201 21l
-FAUST:
Starting the circ pump remakes the interlock that's between it and shifts the control back over.
22l 23 HUNTER:
How many did you start?
Restart? One?
25 i
200\\
197.
I 42 I
l{
FAUST:
Two, I believe.
I calieve we got back on with four pumps i
2l running.
I 31 4
HUNTER:
In the chronology, we can key to that because we can see on 5
the computer when the pumps were restarted, so we --
6i 7
FAUST:
I see wnat you are trying to say.
I'm pretty sure we put two back on.
g 91 HUNTER:
But that will let us key to that.
But it was at that time, 10 11!
though, that you saw Bill back, that you recall seeing Bill Zewe back?
I 12 FAUST:
Right.
3 14!
HUNTER:
- 0. K.
Now, basically the secondary was - you had the primary 15 16l problem. 0.K.
And the secondary was there, and you had trouble with 1
17; the B steam generator, or apparent trouble?
1 18!
FAUST:
Well, OK.
When I initially -- right off when I got the flow 19l l
back, 8 seemed to be coming up, and I was throttling back was before I 20!
even got up to low level limits there.
As soon as I started seeing an 21l indication on the generator, I started throttling back on it.
And I 22l got to the point where I shut 11.
Levels kept coming up.
Drifted up above 30, so I got up to about 35 and I said -- well, at first I 24j thought maybe this thing is really expanding or something, in there 25' 2001 198 t
i
i
[
43 1
and it's just pushing it up.
And I shut 12, it would have been 128 2
isolation, EFV 128.
Then the level still came up.
I ended up, got up 3l to about - I guess it got up around 45 inches.
And I was then worried I
4l about really sub-cooling possibly - and giving them a harder problem 5
on the primary with pressure.
So I* isolated a third valve.
And it 6
helped.
Well, it sort of drifted it really turned the rate at which 7
it was increasing till where I was paying attention to the A coming up 8
and that one pretty well, I was acle to hold the 11.
Throttling back on the 11.
I want to say socething.
g i
10 HUNTER: When did you notice -- st this time did you notice the reactor 11 building pressure changing?
12 13}
FAUST:
Not during this period.
What I was looking at - some many other things that I was looking at - like, I was looking over the 151 NI(s) to make sure they were down, where I thought they should be, 16!
which in other words, it's like two to three decade drop right off.
And just trav' ting down - it came down, which at that time was looking 18 pretty good.
I got it into the EP at that time.
Somewhere in here I 191 got under the EP, because I remember looking over the EP for the 201 l
initial parts of our sequence that we wanted to cover on our reactor 21; trip.
Then I never got fully through followup actions on it when I 22 got involved back on the panel again.
And I also -- now this was 23l later, this was another one even later on.
24 2si i
i 2001 199
44
!lj MARSH:
Craig, can you define EP?
25, 3{
FAUST:
It's Emergency Procedure.
This would have been for the reactor 4
trip at the time.
i 5l 6
MARSH:
0.K., thank you.
7 8
FAUST:
I guess it was.-
I'm losing out my train of thought where I gl want to go right now.
It just seemed to hold there for a long period f time.
They got level indications back on the generator, the pressurizer.
10 11{
I think that sort of made us feel like maybe we never lost it.
That j
there was still some sort of a bubble in there.
At least, that's what I was thinking.
'Cause although we had a hard time holding it - I don't know whether everybodys' suspicions were at the time - but I 15' knew we were having a problem with high level in the pressurizer, which was abnormal for what we were going through, for what we should 17; have been going through.
It seemed like we should have recovered it.
And I think this was getting pretty well onto where we started noticing flow in the RQ pumps more and it was dropping off and it also, the fact that we had all the alarms on the RC pumps up there vibration 201 wise.
I 22 HUNTER:
When did you feel like you really had a problem, from your 23!
standpoint?
24 251 2001 200 1
45 1,
FAUST:
Well, I can't say that we - I don't think anybody really 6
2l didn't think that we did have a problem.
We were having a problem F
3 with - we just couldn't reason out for ourselves what would be giving 4
us this problem, the way we were seeing.
It turned out that - it 5
seemed like we could hold pressure, but we couldn't drop off too far 6
in the makeup to get pressurizer level to come down any further.
It 7
was dancing high on the range, the indicating range there.
And you 8
know, that's telling you, you've got a problem.
The thing of it is, gl trying to figure out what it is, at that time, and get other things -
10 that about all I can say about it - and get other things done that you f
knew you wanted to get done and get out of the way.
12l 13j HUNTER: Well, during our last interview, we made it down to a point j
where you had, basically the generator levels were recovered and 98 ** *
"9 Y*
- "Y" Y"
15 had moved across then to the makeup panel.
16i 17!
FAUST:
Before I went over there, - before I got over to the makeup 18{
panel, we had already had our indications first of a steam generator 19 e, leak in the B.
20l 21j i
HUNTER:
- 0. K.
22l 23 FAUST:
All right.
And plus, now after this, we had secured the RC 24 pumps.
I'm talking like, now it's like 70 minutes, 80 minutes in to 25,j i
i 2001 201
?
l f
i 46 11 it, in that range.
We res--, we attempted to restart one because I i
2l was having indications of restart accident.
I 31 i
4f HUNTER:
- 0. K.
Hold it.
5 61 MARSH:
At this point here, I would like to break for just a minute 7
and replace tapes.
The time is now 4:28 and I'm 26 feet on the meter 8
and I'll be ending at this time.
The time is 4:40.
The date is April 9
21, 1979.
We are continuing with a second reel on the interview of 10 Mr. Craig Faust.
I have zerced out the meter, and we are, once again, 11, g ing with a new tape.
People present are still Dorwin Hunter, Larry 12 Jackson, Mr. Craig Faust, and myself, Bob Marsh.
Darwin, I think you 13 had finished up with a question, and I'll let you pick up again at this time.
i 15; 16l HUNTER:
You were going to expound on a restart problem or an indicated problem.
i 18i FAUST:
- 0. K.
Like I said, like I was saying, indications I was getting i
19l on NIs 1 and 2, mainly... the thing that I was watching pretty well, 20j was also the strip chart recorder on this was giving us trends of it, 2 11 22I which would be NI 1 and intermediate range NI 4, which was showing up there.
NI 1 started trending up.
We had stopped the RC pumps, trying 23 to establish natural circulation, and it was becoming pretty obvious that we weren't getting.
But, one of the main things I was noticing 2001 202 l
i i
l 47 l
l 11 was increases on the counts on NI 1, which would go up a little bit, 2
settle back down.
It would almost be like a bouncing -- well, not 3
bouncing, but it'd be a trend, and then back down.
I noted this to 4j the supervisor and everybody else that was there at the time, which we 5
had quite a few people around then.
I 6l 7
HUNTER:
Excuse me, would the supervisor be Bill
...?
8 FAUST:
Yes, it would be Bill Zewe.
Well, there was a lot of people g
10l there.
There was Kuhn, Kunder was in, I think Joe Logan was there at this time, I believe.
Somewhere in there, I can't be sure if it was 11 12j Mike Ross was in here now or not - I think he came later.
Anyway, I started seeing the trends go up.
I pointed it out, went on monitoring 13 p;
this, as well as just trying to watch the generators.
I was also 15l feeding the generators up during this, to 50% indication on the operating "9
16; 17!
MARSH:
You say you pointed it out - do you recall to whom or do you
,8l 1
mean you just called it out in general?
19f 20l FAUST:
Well, I noted it -- I pointed it out to Fred Scheimann, our 21l foreman, because he was right along.
He was watching pressurizer level and pressure at the time, trying to help control that.
I'm pretty sure Ed heard me because he was over around the panel there.
I know I got Bill Zewe, I can't remember, when we first started to get
}
l 200i 203 6
.l f
48 l
1!
first indications, if I got the word to him right then, but when I i
2' started getting a good solid increase and I actually picked up on the 3j intermediate range on it, and I was getting a little concerned about i
4 getting -- I wanted to try to start an RC pump.
I don't know what 5
their reasons where, but that alone, I felt that we weren't getting water or baron in there.
Earlier -- I shouldn't even bring that in 6{
7l n w -- but I just felt we weren't getting water in there.
8!
gj MARSH:
Feel free to bring in anything you want to discuss, but at 10l this time, was there any discussion of courses of action, or do you 11f recall any response to your calling this out?
12l FAUST:
The discussion was being carried on, more or less.
We were 13 g
talking about it, but the main discussion I - you know, it is hard for me to say -- seemed like -- it wasn't with me anyway, for the most part.
I was relaying information, more or less reacting to what I saw 16 the best I could.
The decisions were -- I'm using the term like coming from behind me, which would have been Bill, and Kunder, and I 181 believe Joe Logan at this time.
I'm really not sure of all these people right then.
But we were talking about starting it.
I said 21l something about I just wanted to jog it just to get water in, jog the 4
thing, shcot water in, just move it in instead of trying to run it, because at this time everybody was pretty well assured, assured that 23l we were drawing a... producing a lot of steam in the core.
Something 24l else I would like to just emphasize is that just prior to stopping 25i 2001 204
l l
{
49 1,
those pumps, we did reinitiate, we nit high pressure injection just 2!
prior to stopping the pumps.
I don't know if that was brought up 3
before, it should be though.
We got the decision, in other words, we 4l made the decision and I'm not sure how you can look at that.
We 5
decided, anyway I'd look at it at all of this to get one of those i
Si pumps back on.
I made the initial attempt myself 'o starting the 7
pumps and I started with the A pumps, and my reasoning there, once 8
again, was get spray back at first, if we could, so we would have g
spray control and pressure.
We needed it.
I worked my way across, 79; and I believe it was, I ended up getting the two B going.
Neither of llt the A pumps would start.
The B pump picked up and ran, but it ran with little or no indication of flow.
But there was enough amps to 12 13 have the initial peg out on the amps, peak out on the amps, and they 14; came back and they went to near next to nothing, they were down around 100 or something like that.
Definitely they were reading the meter 15 16l closely, but it was darn low that it was wrong.
17!
HUNTER:
When you normally start a pump at the current pegs, how long did it take for the current to come back?
20l 21;!
FAUST:
It's under, it's right about 9 seconds, in that range.
It I
came back pretty quick.
It just bounced up and then came right back.
22!
23 HUNTER:
So, and then it stayed at 100 amps.
24l 25l i
2001 205 i
i
50 r
I 1!
FAUST:
Right, which sort of tells you...
I don't even think that i
2l registered right then, but I just remember that the amps went up and l
31 came off right away.
0.K.,
I can remember that now, but I at the time i
4l I can' t.
I can't honestly say I said, "Oh my gosh.
Look at this."
i 51 i
61 MARSH:
I'm not a technical type, cut what would that tell me, that 1
7' it's not catching, it's just spinning free?
8 FAUST:
What we would relate that to, would be like no impeller hooked g
i 10j up.
It's just spinning the motor.
l 11l HUNTER:
Okay.
And one point you pointed out and I understand.
and we'll still talk about, I want to go back before you stopped the 13 pump.
You indicated that you had manually initiated ESF safety injection, 14!
and at that time that would put the two high pressure injection pumps 15 16i 17f FAUST:
Right.
IS'I 19i HUNTER:
At maximum flow?
l 21!
FAUST:
Right.
Well, at sixteens would travel open till a preset at 240, actual a total 250 gpm in each loop.
In other words, I'm saying it would be putting actually a 1,000 gpm.
That'ss what they're set up to do, 250 per loop off the pumps.
25 I
2001 206
l
.-l 4
i 51 1!
HUNTER:
And what was the reasnning behind initiating SI?
2' l
3l FAUST:
You're taking off your main coolant flow path, now, so our 4j trend of thought was, at least mine was, you want water going in 5l there.
You're trying to establish natural circulation, but to me we i
6i were also under situations that didn't really indicate that, to me, 7
that we were gonna make it because we started to cavitate our pumps.
81 Its a lot of - the indication to me was a lot of voids, whatever you i
gj want to call it, voiding out in the loops.
So we -- I'm not sure 10 which -- it seemed like, try.
We were trying to establish circulation.
11 We had flow before we stopped it, so to us it wasn't inconceivable, 12{
anyway.
13 HUNTER:
Who initiated the ESF?
y I
15i FAUST:
Ed Fredrick.
16 17l HUNTER:
Okay, were you in that area then, near the pumps, or you were 8
near the pumps but g
20l 21j FAUST:
I was at the RC pumps.
'Cause I was the one that - I did initial start attempts on them and started the first one.
22 23 HUNTER:
All right, and when the B pump kicked off low, starting current up, back down immediately almost, very quickly, and running 100, what was the first thing that happened then?
f i
l 1
~f
}
52 l
i 1!
FAUST:
The first thing I was looking at was the NI(s), they went down i
2f and stayed down.
That's wF + I was observing, that's what I was 3
really -- I'm sure everybody else was too -- but I was really concerned 4
about that because I was starting to wonder exactly what I was seeing 5
there.
To me I assumed right off it was the indication of restart 6l accident.
It's an indication that we don't have boron in there.
We 7
were already coming, you know -- Zenon should be doing everything for g
us, as far as building up and peaking out at this time, but for some i
g reason we were still getting indications on this NIs going up, which 10' ever way it you analyze that out now, I don't know.
But I think it 11 was considerations of starting the pump were not only that helping in 12 there, they were talking about restarting them just for flow, just to 13 try to get flow back into it because, by this time, it didn't look like we were establishing natural circulation.
So,..
74; 15i MARSH:
Again, you said "they" were talking about it.
Are we still 16i talking about who, Zewe and who else?
glj 18l 19l I'm being a little, I'm being actually vague about this because FAUST:
20{
we were putting input in, but ultimately the decision to really do g
something would be stated by the supervisor.
21;!
22l I
HUNTER:
In your case that would be...
24 FAUST:
Bill Zewe.
25l I
i 2001 208 l
l
'a
53 l!
HUNTER:
Were you getting orders from more than Bill Zewe?
i 2!
31 FAUST:
At this point the orders were coming from, at least on this 4
particular thing, we took -- maybe I should redefine something.
The 5l R0 takes immediate actions, right.
We get back up then, we all work.
I gj together to'put the information together and recommend the best way we 7l can see to go on something, and that's the best way I say it, I guess.
8 We were making recommendations and we all come up with the same reasoning gj that we wanted that cump going anyway.
T-v to get it back on the line.
10 I
11; i
12f HUNTER:
You saw the NI, the nuclear instrumentation Intermediate 13 r nge and the source range?
t 14i FAUST:
The source range first, then the intermediate range.
15:
16i HUNTER:
You saw it dip? What was next, what was "a next thing that you saw or that you recall at that time?
ISI 19!
FAUST:
That's where I can't remember what I did exactly...
Oh, 20!
okay.
We just started a pump.
There's a hard part here on time, but 21' I
the next thing we really started, like I said before this, we had 22' noticed or indicated that intermediate let down coolers had alarms on 23 the rad monitors back there, as far as the secondary closed side of 24i it, which we pointed out and reasoned that due to probably the location 25l 2001 209 i
l
l 54 f
1!
of the... just due to the location of those detectors, which are down i
2' by the let down coolers, were outside the room from it but they're 3j down in that area of the let down coolers - the sensors are - that 4
just high background was probably setting it off at this time, down 5
there.
There's things I'm missing right now because I can't remember 6l when we started seeing building pressure come up, because at the time 7
the answer that I got back, I said, "why the heck are we getting 8
that?"
It would indicate a leak in the heat exchanger to me, going g
possible leak. And we really didn't have any problems with the level 10 n the intermediate closed surge tank to indicate a primary secondary leak on the let down coolers.
So, it was just reasoned out, it's down 11l 12 near the sump down there and it's high, probably high background right 13 n w because we were dumping water in the sump.
14; HUNTER:
Being high background, would that mean that it was primary 15 coolant to you, a radioactive coolant of some type?
,6 2
17l l
FAUST:
Yeah.
It would have to be.
To tell you the truth, I figured 181 1
it was... at the time I thought this, but I was thinking that was 191 sort of -- I hate to say this too -- but that was sort of an intermed-iate problem to me, to what we were having out front.
So, it was said' 22j high background, and for some reason, I visualized a lot of crud coming out of the system because of the thermal shock we had just put it through, and probably coming down in through the let down coolers.
You really have to get into it.
I don't have a real feel for what 25i i
I i
I 2001 210
55 11 kind of curie content, microcuries, you'd be seeing in this crud of i
21 such a crud burst.
I pictured that it would be a big one and I just 3l figured that possibly it would be coming from there.
l 4l 5
HUNTER:
But that was your reasoning at the time then?
6l 7
FAUST:
That was mine.
I just let that go then, to that point because 8
the way it looked, we didn't have a leak from the surge tank level, 9
indications in the surge tank might be increasing.
So, that's the 10 nly orders we had too.
This was before we stopped the RC, or I mean 111 restarted the RC pumps.
12 HUNTER:
13 Now you restarted the RC pumps, and source range dipped and 14 Intermediate range dipped, and then do you recall anything after that?
15; FAUST:
The next thing I seem to recall is there were an awful lot of 16i monitors up there on panel 12, all started alarming on the high alarms.
g 18!
HUNTER:
They all went high?
g 20j FAUST:
Yes.
21l r
22 HUNTER:
That's, if I recall right, that's alert alarm and a high alarm.
24l 25!
2001 211 i
l
l i
i l
56 I
l li FAUST:
Yes.
I 2!
l 3t HUNTER:
They all went high.
4l Sj FAUST:
This was on immediate.
I mean, What we saw was an immediate, i
6j a site emergency, you know, followed by a general emergency.
This is 7
what I have a hard time placing is, I don't remember if it was starting g
the first time - we started the pump twice.
I can't remember taking gl it off, and I probably was the one who turned it off.
Because of the 10 indications we were having, we shut it off again for fear of damage, 11 p ssibly rupturing piping somehow from vibrations on it or something.
12 It would be nice to have a tape recorder in this of this right now, in there.
13 14!
HUNTER:
We have radiation alarms, many radiation alarms, on all 15; recorders, all the Channels alarm.
g I
17 FAUST:
Bill'was then pulled, more or less, away from our initial 81 problem there.
He was back making the announcements needed and getting g
into the emergency procedures associated with site and general emergency.
He announced general emergency, he announced evacuation of the Auxiliary Building, and then he went to the paper work.
He announced it several times and then got the books out to start following up on the procedures.
There's people he had to call, he had to get more people out.
We had Ken Bryan was there.
We had -- I'm almost sure at this time -- Logan l
2001 212
1 57 l
1l was there, and Kunder was definitely there.
So they were taking care i
2!
of that.
31 4'
MARSH:
Craig, can you spell those names you mentioned, Ken Bryant is 5l that B R Y A N T? B R I A N?
(Bryan) 61 7j FAUST:
I'm just pronouncing it wrong.
l 8!
9l MARSH:
And you mentioned Kunder?
Is that George Kunder?
10l 11' FAUST:
George Kunder.
i 12' 13 MARSH:
What is the third name?
141 FAUST:
And, Logan.
Jim Logan.
15 16i HUNTER:
Okay.
They're handling the site emergency, general emergency 17 and.
18 191 FAUST:
This is hard to say now.
It's not as if we were abandonned up 20j I
there or anything but, in other words, we were still trying to sort g
out the problem up front.
23 HUNTER:
Right.
You were there doing that.
And I'm, at this particular time, interested in that you were.
But I want to go back, make sure 25,t 2001 213-i l
.-l 58 i
i 1{
that we go back through what you're doing at that time.
Are you still 2{
at the panel?
l 31 4j FAUST:
I'm at the panel.
I ended up -- I was monitoring the.. we 5l were just trying to hold where we were at now, is what it amounted to.
I 61 Trying to still get pressurizer level to go down and just remove 7
whatever heat we could, because this is the time period now that I saw gl we were cooling the TC down and we couldn't get T hot to come down.
T gj hot, when we stopped the pumps initially, went offscale high.
They i
10l claimed that, at least up in the panel.
They said they could still i
11!
see it on the -- we hate a trend recorder over on panel... it's over i
igj by panel 8, to the left of panel 8, whatever the panel number is on 13 It is used to, it monitors some of our primary components, that.
p; radwaste and turbine supervisory things.
I don't know who was over there looking at it, but he said he could just barely see it, which 15 w uld indicate temperatures up around 790 degrees, somewhere in there 6,
on T hot.
We couldn't get that to come down.
i ISi HUNTER:
TC was coming down, TH was not coming down - it had gone 191 offsCale.
It goes off about 620 or... and so it's off, but it's at 790 or 800, somewhere in that range.
22 FAUST:
Right around the side panel...
24 l
HUNTER:
... Side panel.
That has each TH on it?
25j l
2001 214
59 1.
FAUST:
Right.
2 3
HUNTER:
Any cold legs on that?
4 5
FAUST:
Yes, there's cold legs on it.
It's a trend recorder, so it 6
should have them, I imagine they do.
7 HUNTER:
You're still at the panel, okay?
8 9
FAUST:
10 We spent time now - time is very bad right now.
We spent time monitoring an:f still trying to..
I'm not even sure how, what configura-tion Ed had on makeup system right at that time.
I know Ed ended up, when we were sort of stable, ended up going behind and, I think this was before even, looking at the RC drain tank.
He was doing some other things at that time, too.
So, one of the problems we were starting to have was with building pressure, now.
It was gradually coming up.
We still haven't had a 4 pound actuation yet on the isolation.
We had other pecple in because I was - I turned over the feed station and I think I turned it over to Len Wright - I believe he is the operator that showed in.
Hugh McGovern was in there, too.
These are 20 the people that are on shift, coming on shift now.
Hugh was sort of, he was monitoring the back panel monitoring the charts, reading charts while I was writing them down and doing whatever else we were asked to 23 get done back there at that time.
Somebody else was back there too 24 it was one of the supervisors.
25 2001 215
60 1
HUNTER:
Did that bring you up then, to go where?
2 3
FAUST:
In this time period, I shifted to the makeup panel, and I was 4
there about the rest of the day.
Because this is where I got involved.
5 We started trying -- of course, the ultimate thing was to try to get 6
pressurizer level, get pressure up and temperature up in the pressurizer.
7 Just get control of the plant, is what it amounted to.
I was taking, 8
receiving orders from -- I hate to say it because I can't even say the g
supervisor -- it must have been, it must have been Bill.
Because they 10 were sort of in a conference behind us...
For the life of me, I know 11 I was on the make up panel.
I can answer some questions about that, 12 but I can't answer what was going on behind.
I know I asked questions.
13 I think I asked why we were doing it, but it was like one of those things.
People were too involved in trying to come up with answers to 14 take the time to explain some of this.
This is not the time to start 15 explaining things.
16 17 HUNTER:
When you were on the makeup and it was -- the makeup and you g
assumed that station, what was the makeup flow and the system status g
20 21 FAUST:
We were throttled on four of the sixteen A and B.. it had to 22 C too, because C pump was running.
We had two makeup pumps running.
24 25 200i 216-
61 1
HUNTER:
When you throttle those makeup valves to try to maintain 2
pressurizer level, what would you be throttling to, like flows and 3
that type of thing?
4 5
FAUST:
250 gpm per loop at this time, but...
6 7
HUNTER:
Do you go below that?
8 FAUST:
We were below this because of pressurizer level.
We couldn't g
10 g too low because we were trying to maintain pressure too in the system.
It almost ended up, you know, in a balance.
You still have n
an indication of pressurizer level, and you're low, you're down on pressure where you don't want to be.
You're down right around at 13 saturation, or whatever that.
15 HUNTER:
Under that type balance condition, what was the flow? Do you recall?
18 FAUST:
In the RC or the makeup?
20 HUNTER:
In the makeup.
22 FAUST:
At this point, it was, the flow was about 300 gpm.
Because I 23 got the word to throttle on two odd valves.
' got the orders to shut 24 C, no 8 and D, and throttle on C and A.
I think I got them right 25 2001 217 9
62 1
there.
They were like opposites in the system.
That was one of the 2
questions I couldn't figure out - I wasn't sure what they were trying 3
to.
They can probably explain the reasoning behind that.
They - if 4
somebody cart figure out who they are behind there.
I know they were 5
supervisors but what I'm trying to say is that I don't know how many 6
were involved in it at this time.
7 HUNTER:
And with A and C open, or throttled.
..?
8 9
FAUST:
Because, like... I'm drawing a blank on this guy's name.
I 10 know him.
It will come to me...
Anyway, he seemed to be behind me 11 quite a bit, at this time, in the corner.
He was overseeing what was 12 g ing n in there.
3 14 MARSH:
Here is a list of people that were in and around the control 15 room, if that helps.
6 17 18 19 MARSH':
That's not all of them.
20 21 FAUST:
Okay, Mike Ross.
I believe that it was him that indicated to throttle the valves in the position I had.
I had taken one of the makeup pumps off, purely because of getting down to a lower flow rate that I was throttling, I only needed one pump on.
It was then that I 2001 218
53 1
was actually shifting pumps.
I took one off and I got down to one 2
pump supplying 300 gallons, at one point.
I had taken "C" pump off, 3
before -- this is what I mean, this is when I have a hard time remember-4 ing -- I ended up somewhere in there I had the A makeup pump on, 5
supplying, and that would just be through the A and B valves.
I 6
restarted C and ended up throttling on throttling configuration cf 7
supplying 150 gpm, approximately.
They told me to try to shoot for g
100 on the loops, and I c.ouldn't get it down.
I couldn't fine -
g throttle it that low, and I ended up, I was always putting in at least 300-400 ga'lons per minute because it was too. hard to get down.
I 10 11 just couldn't get it down that low.
12 HN R:
- 0. K.
13 14 5;
FAUST:
Fluctuations in let down was erratic.
It was oscillating a un, a m s remem er r g s lhe a 20 gpm nuctuadon 16 around a normal 40 gpm, or 45, around.
It's not 40, it's g
18 19 HUNTER:
What would that indicate to you? Do you have any....
21 FAUST:
I thought it was, at the time I thought it was probably steam, but then it didn't seem to reason out to me because we had both let 23 down coolers on and temperature in the intermediate was low, so there 24 is no reason for that.
And then I started thinking, maybe we were t
2001 219 4
1 64 1
getting a lot of solid partic-- no, what I was starting to think was a 2
crud buildup possibly in the let down lines, to where it was actually 3
starting to block it up for us.
Along those lines, I even started 4
thinking, well maybe somehow it's solidifying out, boron was starting 5
to solidify because we had such a high concentration possibly in 6
there, at this time.
7 8
HUNTER:
Questionable.
9 MARSH:
Okay.
I'm going to break at this time for just a moment to 10 11 change tapes.
The time is now 5:11, and I read 475 feet on the meter, stopping at this time.
Okay, we are 1esuming at this time.
The time 12 has just turned 5:12.
We've restarted the second side of the second 13 cassette in this interview.
The date is still April 21st, and the g
same pe ple are still present.
Dorwin, you still had questions when 15 we broke.
I'll t'Jrn it back to you.
17 HUNTER:
Okay.
We were talking about the let down flows fluctuating g
20 gallons per minute, around 40 gallons and you were indicating that g
it might be due to high boron concentration.
What did you do then?
21 FAUST:
Well, I didn't d,o anything really.
We were just monitoring really.
I was sort of taking reference from Fred and just listening to him calling out what, you know.
Pressure seemed to be holding around, it was around 1200 -- I can't even say that because he was 25 2001 220 t
65 1
sort of glued in that corner.
The main thing I was trying to see is 2
if we were getting lead way at all in pressurizer level and T(av), if 3
the thing was starting to cool down at all.
There was debate on what 4
to do, of course.
Ideas were coming up, trying to, with the possibilities 5
of going on and trying to get the core flood tanks to flood into it.
6 I actually can't tell you everything that was going on, as far as the 7
reasoning going on, right now.
8 HUNTER:
During that period of time, you're sitting.
g 10 FAUST:
I actually ended up being just a. monitor, because all I was 11 12 d ing, at that point in the game, was controlling the makeup pump 13 because we needed it for the flow they were asking for.
14 HUNTER:
Okay, and the flows that they were asking for were, like you 5
mentioned, the odds throttling, trying to get down to the 100 per 6
loop, but you couldn't get down that low on 2 valve, so you were...
g 18 19 FAUST:
I was calling back, I think it was Brian Mehler was back there.
He was trying to pinpoint the - you can't see the gauges too well from over the panel there.
He was just trying to tell me when I was hitting it.
Usually, just tweeking on those valves when you get down that low, you either go all the way one way or back up to 500 in one loop.
It varies.
25 2001 221
66 1
HUNTER:
Let me ask one question -- cover one area and I'll let Mr.
2 Jackson have a little while with you, if you don't mind.
Two flow 3
paths for makeup, the normal makeup valve, okay - what would be the 4
maximum and minimum flows you would normally ever see through that 5
flow path?
In other words, if the pressurizer level is low, then that 6
valve could come open and you could have one or two pumps pulling the 7
water and then charging into that flow path.
8 FAUST:
Let's put it this way.
If that's 17 -- and we've experienced g
10 this in the past, it is the only was we can reference it to you --
11 right now, the 17 is shut, 'cause it's seeing a high level.
12 HUNTER:
Right.
I understand.
13 14 FAUST:
If that valve were to open wide, you :ould put in six, seven 15 hundred gallons going in through there.
The way I can reason this out 6
is because we've had, we had a trip once.
We actuated Er and we weren't getting any flow in the one loop indication bac4 there, and it turned out that 17 went wide open and just robbed the flow from that path and put it in through B high pressure injection loop but just took it away from that side from seeing a lot of it in through the A.
22 HUNTER:
Okay.
And on the normal.... the ESF valves, the 16 valves - A, B, C, and D you indicated that you couldn't get down much below 4 -- er,100 gallons an a valve.
Can you --
25 2001 222 i,
l 67 1
FAUST:
I was shooting for 100-2 3
HUNTER:
Did you shut them off?
4' 5
FAUST:
150.
6 7
HUNTER:
You said you shut two off and you had two throttled.
8 g
FAUST:
Right, that was this odd combination for what the reason they had in mind.
I guess it was just try to hold long enough so we could 10 11 see, I guess so they could have more time to think about what was 12 9 I"9 "-
13 HUNTER:
Okay.
I'll drop it at that point and, again, I need to come g
g.
back to those details and we'll come back and discuss that 7.'ea, to try to establish the actual flows, to the best of your recollection.
6 One point, you're receiving instructions from someone at that time, g
either a grcup or Fred Scheimann?
I mean...
8 19 FAUST:
Fred was pretty well tied up on the pressurizer level controller.
This was coming from Bill and Logan, I would say, and probably Kunder, back in the back discussing this.
23 HUNTER:
0.K., good.
No problem.
25 2001 223 9
68 1
FAUST:
There was other people -- in fact, there was a big meeting 2
back in that room back there.
3 4
MARSH:
What I would like to do is switch over to Larry Jackson at 5
this time, and when Larry's finished, if depending on how you feel 6
Craig, if you would like to re. urn and discuss the loops some more, we 7
could continue.
But if you begin to feel fatiqued we will rap up with a
Larry.
So I'll let Larry take over from here, now.
The time is now g
5:17 and I'm reading 600 on the meter.
10 JACKSON:
Craig, I've got some questions that relate to emergency 11 12 planning, effluent control, and a couple questions related to health 13 physics; and I know that you had some pretty specific duties in there, 14 and some of these may call for subjective answers instead of hard data.
So if I ask you a question and you don't know the answer to it, 15 that's fine.
If you've got an opinion or you've got an idea of what 16 was going on, I would appreciate you putting that down, okay? The 17 first question is - when in the sequence did you start getting radiation yg monitor indications that some type of release of radioactive material g
from the reactor coolant system was occurring?
I know you mentioned 0
the intermediate cooler monitors.
22 FAUST:
Letdown coolers.
That was before we even took the pumps off -- I believe it was.
It's in question -- that's a hard one for me to answer.
Those two, I just remember them being there, and they were 2001 224 f
69 1
there, that we were at a point where we could say, we could rt least 2
say, like, "we got these alarms - what could they be from, er what 3
kind of problem are we involved in here?" We made some checks on them 4
to at least say that "it's not getting out into the system.
It's 5
still in the primary" to us.
That was my indication anyway, if it was 6
staying in the makeup systcm, as far as I was concerned.
7 8
JACKSON:
One question on those let down monitors, or the intermediate g
cooler monitors - had those things gone off because of high background 10 bef re, or is this something that --
11 FAUST:
No.
It never happened before.
12 13 JACKSON:
This was the first time so you were having to make a judgment 14 call on had 15 16 FAUST:
Yes.
18 JACKSON:
Was there anyone, in particular, monitoring the radiological conditions?
Is that an assigned function of one of the operators?
21 FAUST:
It's not an assigned function from the fact that, if we think we have a problem and the problems are initiated by alarms, really on the back panel.
The first one we got didn't really show us that we were having problems radiological wise, but I can't tell you when.
2001 225 i
70 1
I can't really say when - I think it was when we got the alarms initially 2
that we shut our ASV-53 or -23, which is out steam supply to Unit 1, 3
which get on their boilers pretty quick over there, because we just 4
cut them off. We called them, they knew that we had a problem now, 5
nd they had to go on their own from there.
We were supplying our own g
steam from what we were pulling off the generators.
7 JACKSON:
Did you ever -- was there a point somewhere where you saw a g
g radiological condition developing in the plant that was abnormal or, I 10 know that you mentioned earlier that a lot of the alarms just - bang, they were there.
Did anybody, to your knowledge, notice any trends 11 before this all h6ppened?
12 13 FAUST; No.
We -- the first indication to get our eyes back there w uld been an alarm.
We didn't receive any except, like I said, I 15 can't place how exactly when it was, the intermediate?
I know it was beforethe rest of them and it was in for -- I can remember it being in for a while.
That's really about all I can say to that.
19 JACKSON:
Did you at any time get a notification from Unit 1 that their releases were going up, if they were seeing anything on the monitors?
22 23 FAUST:
No.
24 25 2001 226
71 1
JACKSON:
What considerations were given, during this time, to such 2
things as reactor coolant drain tank pressure, or level increa es, or 3
to the reactor building sump levels - did somebody look at those or 4
see?
5 6
FAUST:
This is what "m saying...
This is even later than Ed Fredricks 7
was looking, looked at one thing he was at was the RC drain tank.
I g
don'.t know what time period this was really, but that was one thing he g
was looking at.
10 JACKSON:
I'm kind of covering more..
Don't restrict yourself to 11 12 just this immediate time frame here, when everything was going haywire, 13 because I'm really looking at a longer time period than dorwin, okay?
I'm trying just to following things up to the 31st, where they are p
restricting themselves to looking at a pretty narrow time frame now.
15 S if y u think of anything that falls out of that time frame, that's 6
fine too.
g 18(
l FAUST: Something you might -- as far as monitoring meters, I can't 191 remember when Hugh McGovern came n, but he was one of tht persons that.
I just have it on my mind -- we got the alarms and Hugh was there.
That seems to be the way I remember it, because he was monitoring the back panels then, as far as c cdiation monitoring alarms, marking the charts, and then trying to keep... tre!.ds were all pretty high at that time... it wasn't a trend, I think it was a step change.
So' there wa:;n:t much for him to monitor.
There never is.
2001 227
72 JACKSON:
What position is McGovern, for my benefit.
2 FAUST:
He is a CRO.
He was to be our relief coming in at that time.
4 MARSH:
In Unit 2?
5 6
FAUST:
Yes.
I could be wrong on that?
I was relieved by another shift, really, so I could be wrong in that.
But, he was there, that's all I can say.
9 10 JACKSON:
To your knowledge, do you know when anyone started looking 11 at the indications with the ideas of classifying the situation as an 12 emergency? What keyed them to start doing this?
13 14 FAUST:
It was pretty instantaneous.
15 16 JACKSON:
Are you talking about radiation, instantaneous with relation 17 to --
18 19 FAUST:
Radiation alarms.
It was obvious.
20 21 l
JACKSON:
Tha radiation alarms all..
22 l 23 FAUST:
There wasn't any cuestion.
24 25 '
l 2001 228 t
4
73 JACKSON:
Okay, did anybody, -- I know, one of the criteria in the 1,
2 emergency plan is reactor building pressure verses reactor coolant 3
system pressure.
Do you know if anybody...?
4 5
FAUST:
Well, the thing of it is, we were maintaining really reactor 6
coolant pressure.
It was low, but we were maintaining it.
That's one 7
of the problems of the baffling us.
What we're trying to do is get 8
ahold of the system here.
And it seemed like we had hold of it, it g
was just that we couldn't get it to go where we wanted it to go. We 10 just didn't want to run off the bat and do something and maybe -- this 11 is hard for me to say now -- but at the time we thought we were doing 12 the right thing.
13 JACKSON:
14 That's the type of thing I'm looking for, okay.
I'm not trying to pin something down here.
I'm just collecting data for 15 future reference on emergency planning and this type of stuff -- What 16 kind of thinking goes on in this type of situation do any of your E0P's -- I've noticed a number of times that you referenced pulling 8
out, you called them EP's, maybe that's the correct terminology.
Do g
any of thos-cie you into an emergency plan action at any time?
21 FAUST:
We have a certain limit set, or stated, that gets you in general emergency, or site emergency -- that's in the reverse order --
or just a local emergency.
And it would be easy to just tear the page out and show it to you, but there is a list of everything you're a
2001 229 a
74 l'
looking:for.
They get you into this and up until that point we didn't 2
have them.
3 4
JACKSON:
You hadn't met those conditions, is that what you're saying?
5 6
FAUST:
No.
7 8
JACKSON:
OK.
9 FAUST:
At least, to my knowledge, let's put it that way.
10 11 JACKSON:
Do you recall a point when the decision was made -- well, 12 y u've already answered that, I think -- when the monitors when off, 13 what was the declared first, a site emergency?
14 15 FAUST:
It was a site emergency, and it seemed like it was very --
6 alm st right after that it was declared a general emergency.
7 18 JACKSON:
Okay so very little time was between the site and general.
g 20 FAUST:
Yes.
21 22 JACKSON:
One question in relation to this, going into the emergency plan organization here - there's been some question about the supervisor's role in contacting people - did you have enough supervisior at this 2001 230
f 75 1
time or, maybe I should have said, did you have too much supervision 2
at this time?
I know you had a lot of people in the control room.
3 4
FAUST:
I'm not sure what kind of answer I should give there.
5 6
JACKSON:
Well, I'm asking for an opinion, really, OK?
7 8
FAUST:
I really don't like to say one, because.
9 10 JACKSON:
Okay, that's fine.
Let me ask you another question then.
11 At this point, what is your opinion about the number of people in the control room? Was the crowd managable, or was it causing, giving the 12 13 perators problems?
14 15 It's the first time I've ever hit it from this side of it, so FAUST:
I'm n t sure how to answer it.
I wasn't in any.. I had all the room 16 I needed.
I didn't seem to.. if I wanted to say something, it 7
wasn't ignored; as far as saying it, they were going to listen.
The g
l only thing I remember saying is that before we turned the RC pumps g
n e ny ng san h I don't mally lhe shudng 20 those pumps off, and nobody else did either, I'm sure.
But, the direction was to try to go on to natural circclation.
We had indications we were going to lose the pump, maybe A pump, or maybe all of them.
l 24 25 2001 231 a
l t
l 76 1
MARSH:
To maybe put you a little more at your ease in answering 2
these, remember, the purpose we're asking these is not to focus the 3
blame on an individual, but to draw from this as much constructive 4
information as possible for the future.
So we are not after you to 5
say well, so and so didn't do this or so and so didn't do that.
We're 6
trying to get a feeling, a flavor over all that we can draw from your 7
experiences, to make things better, should we have another occurrence.
8 And that's why we' re looking for your feelings.
So don't feel we're 9
trying to place blame at this point, but more to draw on your experience.
10 And only you went through it at this time.
So that is why we're 11 asking it in the manner we're asking it.
12 FAUST:
13 Well, I guess I'd say, it seemed like we had a lot of input that.
p
. what bugged me is that I didn't like them going back in the room and discussing it.
I know what their reasoning was, and maybe 15 it's better reasoning, I don't know.
But it is to try to -- they were holding the plant out there, try to get here and think over what's g
going on out there to get a good answer.
I'm sure that's the reasoning g
behind it, probably.
So we were just standing out there, trying to g
hold on to it, so to speak.
The idea is I can see what they were i
doing now - they wanted us to hold it, try to hold it to give them 21 enough time to try to reason something out.
We were the first line.
We were right there on top of it, looking at the thing, and somebody's got to back off and try to see it from the overall view point.
25 i
2001 232 s
77 1
MARSH:
Has there been any discussion among the operators since then?
2 In other words, separate from that of the supervisors, rave you discussed 3
this among yourselves? Doing this and that?
4 5
FAUST:
We talked about the accident among ourselves, I mean as far as 6
trying to reason out what's happened.
7 8
MARSH:
I'm wondering, was there any feeling that -- do you feel that g
the operators have more of a hands on experience and definite knowledge 10 of what was going on at the plant and the supervision may be a little 11 m re divorced from that, and that maybe your input should have been 12 solicited more?
13 FAUST:
I don't know if I really feel that way or not.
14 15 MARSH:
I was just curious to see.
16 17 FAUST:
That's been something bugging me.
If I were -- I think what 18 you're after, if I were there alone, w-
.ld I have done something g
di ferent.
I would probably say yes.
But..
20 21 MARSH:
Do you have any feelings specifically for what you would have done differently?
24 25 2001 233
78 1
FAUST:
I would have went on high pressure injection, I don't think I 2
would have shut it off.
Because it just seemed like way to go to me, 3
but I felt maybe I wasn't seeing something and these people are.
4 That's about all I can say.
i shouldn't say even "these people".
I 5
just felt maybe I wasn't seeing something that everybody else was 6
seeing.
7 8
JACKSON:
What are the normal lineups for the reactor coolant drain 9
tank and the reactor building sump? Where do they pump from, no wait, 10 not from but where they pump to?
11 12 FAUST:
They're usually lined up to go to the miscellaneous waste --
this is
- e miscellaneous waste holdup tank, I think it's called.
13 14 They're the same tanks, they do the same thing.
It's just different names are used.
15 16 JACKSON:
17 Both the sump and the reactor coolant drain tank go to the miscellaneous..
18 19 20 FAUST:
The reactor coolant drain tank goes to the RC bleed tanks.
That would be...
in fact, it goes to the vent header on it.
The sump pumps to the miscellaneous hold up tank and the drain tank goes to the bleed tank, which I believe was isolated because of high pressure in the tank.
I don't believe it does - it isolates itself on high pressure in the tank.
I think it's only like 5 pounds in the tank or something, and it will shut and isolates it.
2001 234
79 1
JACKSON:
What actions were taken to try to contain the radioactive 2
materials, now? The question is what pumps were shut off? Were there 3
any valve lineups changed to divert water to different places?
4, 5
FAUST:
At the time there wasn't... at the time when initially no 6
alarms were in the Auxiliary Building...
I think it was, I can't 7
really answer this, I can just tell you what I know.
We shut off the 8
RC sump pumps.
They were shut off before we had radiation alarms and g
I believe before we shut the RC pumps off.
I can't, I can just locate 10-it that way right now.
This is purely later on.. this is something that Ed had have done when he was over there.
He had been, like I 11 said, he went back and looked at it, and I don't know if it was then g
r if it was even before then, that he had this done and was referenced, 13 and when he went back around and took a look at the RC drain tank to 14 see what the conditions on it were.
g 16 JACKSON:
Once you had the alarms, I guess, what actions were taken to try to limit releases -- ventilation system, isolation, and this type?
8 19 FAUST:
Ventilation system - did as much as you could do on it.
The fans shut down and your. suction and discharge dampers on the ventilation unit trip off when the upstream monitor alarms high.
It just shuts the whole thing down, and it did that.
And so you're sitting dead over there, basically.
24 25 I
l 2001 235
80 1
JACKSON:
Do you have any knowledge of radioactive materials, liquid 2
or gases, how they might have been transferred from the teactor building 3
to the auxiliary building?
... I'm thinking li ke, you know...
- Well, 4
go ahead 5
6 FAUST:
The only thing I can think of is that initially the RC pump, 7
before we shut it down in the early stages of it, did pump to the 8
miscellaneous waste tank.
The only other thing I can think of would g
be that we -- that's manual, that would have been done manually.
10 Nobody pumped it down.
It would be the pump down in the RC drain 11 tank, at least at this time, there wasn't any pumping now like that.
S 12 the sump pump did pump automatically and it did put it into the 13 miscellaneous waste hold up tank.
And a thing that I can't figure 14 ut, once again, we were sitting down just discussing what happened nd tryin-to figure it out ourselves.
We couldn't figure it up to 15 the tank level indication prior to and after, never indicated it never 16 overflowed.
So, whatever came out should still have still been in g
that tank.
g 19f JACKSON-You mean "in that tank", you're talking about the miscellaneous waste tank?
21 22 FAUST:
The only other thing I can think of is a relief lifting in the makeup, the letdown line in the makeup system, possibly.
Like I said, we were getting surging.
And that goes to the vent header of bleed l
2001 236
81 l'
tanks.
And it's a loop seal on chat -- it's very possible that seal 2
was loose somehow, and we started putting water... maybe water got 3
out on the floor or into the system that way, I don't know.
I don't 4
think they can get in there yet to determine that.
The thing would 5
have resealed itself anyway, just from operations that we're doing 6
now, we still, we can hold the pressure on that vent header.
You 7
know, we proved that later on, so that's telling me we did put a lot 8
of water in through that header, through another problem we had earlier.
9 It's really a mystery to us, too, how the water got out there.
We 10 can't figure it out ourselves, for the most part.
11 MARSH:
You say you had a problem earlier - are you talking during 12 13 this event, or are you talking of a date previous to this.
When you 14 said about the seal repressurizing itself now, you had had a problem.
15 FAUST:
This was, I was on the panel that day till about 3:30-4:00, so 16 I went home.
When I came back on at the 11:00 shift that night, and 17 earlier that morning then, just before I got off shift again, we ran 18 into, that's when we started making the initial releases.
Because of g
the problem we had.
To me, it got pretty serious, and I didn't want 20 to loose what we had.
22 JACKSON:
Do you know of any liquids being pumped from Unit 2, say from turbine building sumps, or any other sumps, to the industrial waste treatment system, or Unit I anywhere else?
(
2001 237
82 1
FAUST:
The only thing we had going to Unit 1, and was terminated 2
right away, was -- in fact, it was coming to us from them, was condensate 3
returned.
We were sending them steam and getting it back, and it was 4
isolated.
The condensate return went right away because of problems 5
with the hot well.
Steam went, as soon as we had problems with 6
well, we had the trip and Unit 1 was getting their boilers up, bringing 7
their boilers up, which is normal in something like this, on just a 8
regular trip, let's put it that way.
So we could be supplied.
I O
don't think we actually isolated it until we got the radiation alarms, o
4 10f then we secured the steam from Unit 1 and we made a brief announcement 11, telling them, with a phone, I'm not sure how quick it was done.
12 That's one of the things we've got to get off the line if we have a problem with radiation.
And the liquid release was terminated right 13 away into the river that Unit 1 was making.
That's another thing that y
g t done pretty quick.
15 16 JACKSON:
One question regarding reactor coolant drain tank.
If that g
tank - I mean, not - well yeah, the tank or posribly even the sump 8
too - is it feasible that if those pumps are turned off manually and the lines are not isolated, that the pressure in containment could keep the flow going to the aux building?
22 FAUST:
I don't think it got high enough at that time to do it.
It was only 4 pounds.
The only other thing we had was this spike in the 24 building,whichIbelievenowweareinterpretingpossiblytbahydrogen 25 2001 238
l 83 1
explosion.
That was beyond, we had this problem in the aux building 2
before that.
I would say no, because its got to -- the line's got to 3
pump up to the.
4 5
Jo. L ON:
Possible, maybe due to siphon effect?
6 7
FAUST:
Well, maybe... I don't know.
8 JACKSON:
Does the pumping go about the same level?
g 10 FAUST:
It might have.
I guess it's feasible.
11 12 JACKSON:
Okay.
13 14 FAUST:
I think Terry Daugherty shut, isolated some valves associated 15 with turning the pumps off.
You can verify that with him.
16 17 MARSH:
Okay.
We're at a breakpoint, I would like to terminate this 8
tape at this time.
The time is 5:41 and I am reading 934 on the g
meter. I am going to shut this tape off and replace it with a new tape.
The time is 5:42.
It's April 21, and we are continuing.
This will be the third tape on cn interview with Craig Faust, being conducted at the interview trailer NRC is using at the Three Mile Island site.
This is Bob Marsh.
I'm accompanied by Larry Jackson of NRC and Dorwin Hunter, and the fourth person in the room is Craig Faust.
Larry 2001 239
84 1
Jackson was raising questions when we terminated the last tape, and I 2
will turn it back over to him at this time.
3 4
JACKSON:
I'm switching the questions ncy to a couple of HP type 5
questions.
Did you enter the Auxiliary Build m g anytime, from the 6
morning that the incident occurred to 3:31, which would have been 7
Saturday, I guess?
8 g
FAUST:
On Saturday.
No, I don't believe
. I went in but I think it 10 was, like five days later, four or five days later.
11 JACKSON:
Okay.
Do you know other individuals sent into the auxiliary 12 building n y ur shift?
13 14 FAUST:
I believe..
You mean after the accident?
15 16 JACKSON:
Yean? The morning or up to, say, the 31st.
7 18 FAUST:
To tell you the truth, no.
I said, I'm pretty sure people g
went in, but I can't say who, or when t!'ey went in.
21 JACKSON:
Okay.
23 FAUST:
And I wasn't really thinking much wrong with entering into the auxiliary building, for a while there.
Other people were taking care of that.
2001 240
85 1
JACKSON:
Okay, fine.
2 3
HUNTER:
You indicated that you worked from 11 to 7, then you went in 4
and worked from 7 to 3, so you completed a 16 hour1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> day oa the 28th?
5 6
FAUST:
On the 28th I worked my normal shift, 11 to 7.
The accident 7
held me over till 3:30.
8 g
HUNTER:
Okay.
10 FAUST:
It just, you know, the reason is, you don't turnover on something 11 12 like that till you are somewhat in a stable condition, if you can.
13 Otherwise it gets extremely ridiculous.
1 14)
HN Okay.
15 16 FAUST:
That's my feelings on it, anyway.
g 18j HUNTER:
Okay.
At the time that you were relieved at 3:30 that day, i
19 w re you still on makeup panel?
20 21 FAUST:
Yes, I think.
I must have been on that makeup panel there I can't believe it, I must have been in there for four or five hours, I guess, four hours, where we just folded.
I'm having a hard time seeing it being that long, but that's when I got relieved, I was there, and it was around 3:30, more like 4, when I left, around there.
2001 241
86 1
HUNTER:
Okay? Do you recall turning the pumps off during that time?
2 3
FAUST:
During that time I was on it? Oh yeah.
4 5
HUNTER:
A number of times?
6 7
FAUST:
I started and stopped the pumps as, like I said, when flow 8
conditions that I was required to maintain provided for it.
It was g
either backed off on it to where one pump was easily within the range 10 f what I was supposed to be holding or you know, when they gave the 11 w rd to go higher and especially when we split, I was on -- I went 77 down to one pump initially when I was told just to hold.
When we shifted, I started the C pump...
There is a problem with me that I'm 13 trying to clear up now.
We ended up on the B pump. I keep getting the p
feeling I never stopped the C pump, that the one I took off was tha A, 15 because I ended up trying to start the A, and it never started, and I
~
6 went right to the B.
And as far as I know, the A pump may not start g
18 19 HUNTER:
Was there any time where you secured all the pumps or had them all off?
21 22 FAUST:
No, I always had one pump on at all times, that I can remember.
I can't remember securing all the pumps.
I throttled back heavily when we tried to go on the core flood tanks.
2001 24.
87 1
HUNTER:
When you ended up on the makeup, were you keeping your own 2
log or was somebody writing the pump starts and stops down for you?
3 4
FAUST:
I don't think anybody was keeping a log at this point.
If 5
they were, I didn't know about it.
It's something, I think we should 6
have been, but...
7 8
HUNTER:
Okay.
9 FAUST:
Nobody was logging anything that I know of, in relation to the 10 11 pump starts.
One thing is, you sort of rely on the computer for 12 something like th'.t.
You can go back and pick it out, you know, start 13 and stop times on the pumps, what's on and off.
14 HUNTER:
Okay, I would like to leave it at that point and indicate 15 that I want to get back with you, and at that time it will be at some 6
specific points, and it would be to include your continuing the make-g up station, apparently from early morning until way late in the afternoon, 8
and see if we can't work our way through that okay?
g 20 FAUST:
Yeah, we have a lot of people who are in this.
I'm sure you can tell that they will be able to help and correlate this.
I cc.n't remember stopping all the pumps, and for some reason, maybe I'm just blocking it out, but I can't remember doing it.
I remember, and like I said, I'm getting the feeling I had, I went down to the C pump, not 2001 20 a
88 1
like I remember saying I had ' t before because of what I did, trying 2
to get the A back, and I ended to. nutting the B on.
I don't think --
3 I know I talked to people or mentioneo '+ to somebody, and it's something 4
that I'm going to mention agai'1, that that pump might not start, that 5
A pump.
I don't know if we know if it is going to start t : not, yet.
6 7
HUNTER:
When it tripped, is it damaged?
8 FAUST:
This is what I mean.
All I know is, when I tripped it, it g
10 went off properly and I had the lube oil the pumps on.
It's when I 11 went to restart it, l.ater on, it didn't pick back up.
12 HUNTER:
So it's sitting down there the way it was when you turned it 13 off?
3 15 A
As ar as I know, yes.
I don't know if anybody attempted to 16 start it since it's a good point, I'm going to bring it up.
18 HUNTER:
Okay, keep the makeup system in mind a little bit, and be g
aware that we need to go through that, because you are the flow recorder on the makeup system from this time to this time.
Okay? You know, I'm just trying to, we need to know the makeup flow, as best as we can recall.
So we'll specifically get at that, not a pressure point at all, but just something that, you must realize that we need to sit down and go through it and reconstruct it as best we can.
And I'll 25 2001 244
?
89 11 have the chronology, and we'll go through it and spend an hour or what 2
ever, going through that and try to recover all the data that we can.
3 4
FAUST:
Well, it might help, definitely.
I know what prints I have '
5 been able to look at, did help relate to me, once again, time periods 6
that passed.
I can't believe it went that way.
7 8
HUNTER:
I have no further questions.
Larry, do you have anything 9
else?
10 11 JACKSON:
No, No further questions.
12 MARSH:
Okay, before we finish up, I don't want to cut you off, either.
13 14 It's been long for you and we appreciate your coming in, but is there 15 anything else you want bring up or talk about before we finish up today? You've indicated your concern over this A pump? We'll take a 16 77 look at that, but is there anything you want to talk about or bring up.
In other words, I don't want it all on our side, if there's g
something you want to make, a statement on that, feel free to talk g
about?
0 21 HUNTER:
If there's an area you want*, that you think we should cover?
23 MARSH:
Either now, or if you're fatigued and you want us to cover it next time, feel free to bring it out.
2001 245 1
i i
i
90 1
FAUST:
Well, it seems like we've covered it all.
I don't seem to be 2
missing anything here.
3 4
MARSH:
Okay, well the time is getting to be 5:51.
I show 185 on this 5
third cassette of this series with this interview.
Just again, I 6
would like to say thank you.
It's a lot of your time, and we appreciate 7
it.
We recognize you're just coming off a work shift where you've put 8
in 10, 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, in there, and then come spend another 2 or 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> g
with us, so it is appreciated.
So at this time, if you have anything 10 else, I'll go ahead and terminate this tape...
Nothing? OK.
Then 11 we' re ending at this time, at 5:51 on April 21... terminate.
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 2001 246
)