ML19274D293
| ML19274D293 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant  |
| Issue date: | 01/12/1979 |
| From: | Malsch M, Sohinki S NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7901230044 | |
| Download: ML19274D293 (63) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE COMMISSION In the Matter of OFFSHORE POWER SYSTEMS
)
Docket No. STN 50-437
)
(Floating Nt. clear Power Plants)
)
NRC STAFF'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF AFFIRMATIVE FINDING ON CERTIFIED QUESTION January 12, 1979 Stephen M. Schinki Martin G. Malsch Counsel for NRC Staff 7e3?2306Vf
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page.
TABLE OF CITATIONS..................
iii I.
QUESTION PRESENTED................
1 II. PROCEEDINGS BELOW 1
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS....
2 IV. ARGUMENT.....................
14 A.
THE COMMISSION'S REGULATIONS DO NOT LIMIT OR OTHERWISE PRESCRIBE THE TYPE OF NEPA ACCIDENT EVALUATION TO BE PERFORMED FOR FNPs AND THE SCOPE OF THE ANALYSIS THAT HAS BEEN PERFORMED BY THE STAFF IS IN ACCORD WITH NEPA AND CON-SISTENT WITH THE UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE..................... 14 (1) THE ONLY COMMISSION " REGULATION" ARGUABLY IN F0 INT--PROPOSED ANNEX A TO 10 CFR PART 50, APPENDIX D--D0ES NOT APPLY TO FNPs 14 (2) SINCE THE COMMISSION'S REGULATIONS DO NOT ADDRESS THE MATTER, THE COMMISSION MUST DEVELOP AN APPR0ACH TO ACCIDENT EVALUATION FOR FNPs THAT COMPLIES WITH NEPA 21 (3) THE SCOPE OF ACCIDENT RISK EVALUATION PERFORMED BY THE STAFF IS A REASONABLE RESPONSE TO THE UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OPS PROCEEDING.......... 28 B.
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE FR0 POSED ANNEX APPLIES GENERALLY TO LIGHT WATER POWER REACTORS, THE ANNEX AND COMMISSION REGULATIONS PERMIT THE REVIEW 0F CLASS 9 RISKS IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THIS PARTICULAR,OPLICATION............
32
- ii -
TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT'D)
PJ1e B.
(1) THE FOCUS OF THE ANNEX IS ON RISK -
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY AND CONSEQUENCES -
AND THERE MdST BE A POINT BEYOND WHICH ACCIDENT CONSEQUENCES BECOME SUSCEPTIBLE TO CANDID EVALUATION IN AN ENVIRON-MtNTAL IMPACT STATEMENT...........
32 (2) THERE IS SUFF'.IENT FLEXIBILITY IN THE LANGUAGE OF THE ANNEX AND COMMISSION REGULATIONS TO ALLOW THE STAFF TO EVALUATE CLASS 9 ACCIDENT RISKS - PROBABILITY AND CONSEQUENCES - IN SPECIAL CASES OF UNUSUAL 38 RISK....................
C.
THE DISCUSSION OF CLASS 9 ACCIDENT RISKS IN THE STAFF'S ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A CHALLENGE TO ANY COMMISSION 42 REGULATION D.
THE EVALUATION OF CLASS 9 ACCIDENTS IN THIS CASE IS IN ACCORD WITH CURRENT STAFF INFORMAL LICENSING REVIEW PRACTICE AND DOES NOT SUBJECT APPLICANT TO UNEQUAL AND UNLAWFUL TREATMENT....
44 52 V.
CONCLUSION e
4 I
- iii -
TABLE OF CITATIONS Page COURT DECISIONS N.L.R.B. v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975)..
48 S.E.C. v. Chenery Corporation, 332 U.S.194 (1947) 21 Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comnittee v. A.E.C.,
449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir.1971) 14,26 Carolina Environmental Study Group v. U.S., 510 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1975)..............
22,23 Citizens for Safe Power v. N.R.C., 524 F.2d 1291 (D.C. Cir.1975) 41,43 Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaburg, 463 F. 2d 783 (D.C. Ci r. 1971 )............
26 Morningside Renewal Council v. A.E.C., 482 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1973) 21 N.R.D.C. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir.1972)..
26 Porter County Chapter of Isaak Walton League v.
A.E.C., 533 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir.1976) cert. denied, 429 U. S. 858 (1976).................
23.44 Public Interest Research Group v.
F.C._C_., 522 F.2d 1060 (1st Cir. 1975) 48 Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282 (1st Cir.1973) 26
~ States Marine International, Inc. v. Peterson, 518 F.2d 1070 (D.C. Cir.1975) 48 Union of Concerned Scientists v. A.E.C., 499 F.2d 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1974)................
26
- iv -
Page COURT DECISIONS (Cont'd)
United States v. Carrol Towing Co.,159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947)...................
32 Branks v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 269 (W.D. Wash. 1972),
aff'd, 487 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir.1973)........
26 Environmental Defense Fund v. T.V.A., 339 F. Supp 806 (E.D. Tenn.1971), aff'd, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972) 26 E.D.F. v. Corp of Engineers, 348 F. Supp 916 (N.D. Miss. 1972) 26 NRC (AEC) DECISIONS Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company (Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station) CLI-74-2, 7 AEC 2 (1974)...
43 VermontYankeeNuclearPowerCorp.(Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station) CLI-74-40, 8 AEC 309 (1974).......................
42 1..g Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station) ALAB-156, 6 AEC 831 (1973) 15 Northern Indiana Public Service Company (Bailly Generatin9 Station, Nuclear 1) ALAB-224, 9 AEC 224 (1974).......................
4; Offshore Power Systems (Floating Nuclear Power
~
Plants) ALAB-489, 8 NRC 194 (1978).........
2, 16,17,28 31,35,49 Offshore Power Systems (Floating Nuclear Power Plants) ALAB-500, 8 NRC
, Slip Op. (September 29, 2
1978)
-v-Page STniUTE5 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended........
1 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 529, 42 U.S.C.
2039 5182(b), 42 U.S.C. 2232(b)...........
4 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) 1,15,20,21,22 23.24,27,28,32, 40,43,47,51 REGULATIONS 10 CFR Part 2, 52.758................ 39,40,42 10 CFR Part 50, 550.46 42,43 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix D 20 42 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix K 19,20,21 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix M 10 CFR Part 51 21 PROPOSED REGULATIONS 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix D, Annex A (proposed),
36 F.R. 22851 (December 1,1971) 6,14,15,16,17, 18,19,20,21,24, 30,32,34,35,36, 37,38,39,40,41, 50,51,52,53 MISCELLANE0US Davis, " Administrative Law of the Seventies," 1976 51 Draft Environmental Statement, Part III, related to the manufacture of Floatino Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG-0127) 1,2,7,8
- v1 -
Page MISCELLANE0US (Cont'd)
Draft Liquid Pathway Generic Study (FUREG-0140)..
7,8
" Final Environmental Statement, Construction and Oper'. tion of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant" (NUREG-0139)................
45 Final Environmental Statement, Part III, related to the manufacture of Floating Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG-0502)....................
4,6,9,10,12, 13,14,30 Final Liquid Pathway General Study (NUREG-0440)..
5,9,40,41 Interim General Statement of Policy, 39 F.R.
30964 (August 27, 1974)..............
36 "Mett e,olitan Siting--A Historical Perspectile."
44,46 (Nti..EG-0478)
NRC Staff Brief in Response to Brief of Applicant in Support of Requested Order on Class 9 Accidents,"
37 May 12,1978 OPS Topical Reports TME 0001 and 0002.......
5 Prosser, " Law of Torts," ath Ed.,1971 33 Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) 29,30,36 Regulatory Guide 4.2, " Preparation of Environmental Reports for Nuclear Power Stations" (NUREG-0099),
Revision 2, July 1976...............
6 Regulatorf Guide 4.7, Revision 1, " General Site Suitability Criterio Tur Nuclear Power Stations" 45,46,47 Report of Risk Assessment Review Group (NUREG/CR-0400)..................
29 Revised Draft Environmental Statement, Part III, related to the manufacture of Floating Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG-0127, Revision 1).......
6, 10 eP
- vii -
Page.
MISCELLANE0US (Cont'c)
" Standard Review Plan" (NUREG-75-107)........ 45,46,47 Statement of Considerations, proposed 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix D, Annex A, 36 F.R. 22851 (December 1, 1 9 71 )........................
35 Statement of Considerations,10 CFR Part 51, 39 F.R.
26279 (July 18, 1974)................
14 Transcript, Hearings before the House Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment.
7 Transcript of Oral Argument Before the Appeal, Offshore Power Systems (Floating Nuclear Power Plants),
May 25, 1978 34 r
- s
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE COMMISSION In the Matter of 0FFSH0RE POWER SYSTEMS
)
Docket No. STN 50-437
)
-)
(Floating Nuclear Power Plants)
)
}
NRC STAFF'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF AFFIRMATIVE FINDING ON CERTIFIED QUESTION I.
QUESTION PRESENTED Are Class 9 accidents a proper subject for consideration in the Staff's environmental statement on the floating nuclear E
power plant manufacturing license application?
II.
PROCEEDIf!GS BELOW On February 23, 1978, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board denied a " Motion for Relief" by the Applicant filed on February 2,1978, in the captioned proceeding. The Applicant had requested, in its Motion, that the Licensing Board direct the NRC Staff (Staff) to exclude any discussion of
!-(
the consequences of a " Class 9" accident at a floating i
nuclear plant from the Final Environmental Statement, Part III (FES III).
On March 17, 1978, the Applicant filed a motion for reconsideration of the February 23 Order in 1/ The question presented deals only wich NRC's duties and authorities under NEPA; the question does not deal with NRC's duties or authorities to consider Class 9 accidents under the Atomic Energy Act.
which it once again requested a direction to the Staff to exclude analyses of Class 9 co'1 sequences from the FES III.
The Licensing Board denied this motion in an Order dated March 30,1978, and the Applicant thereupon filed a petition for directed certification with the Appeal Board, seeking consideration of whether the Licensing Board had acted properly in denying the requested order.
In its Order dated April 19, 1978, the Appeal Board granted the petition.
Briefs were submitted by several parties to the proceedina and oral argument on the certified question was held on May 23, 1978. On August 21, 1978, the Appeal Board determined, in ALAB-489 that the Licensing Board had indeed acted correctly in refusing to order the Staff to exclude consideration of Class 9 accidents in the environmental statement for this application.
In a motion dated September 1,1978, the Applicant requested reconsideration of that decision or, in the alternative,
~
cert ification of the question to the Commission. The Appeal Bnard denied the motion to reconsider but granted the request to certify the " Class 9 question" to the Commis-sion in ALAB-500, dated Scotember 29,197 On December 8, 1978, the Commission agreed to review the above question.
2/ 8 NRC 194 (1978).
{/ 8 NRC (1978).
. The Staff submits this brief in support of an affirmative answer to the certified question.b III. STATEMENT OF FACTS The application for a manufacturing license to assemble
~
the world's first commercial floating nuclear power plants (FNPs) was docketed by the NRC Staff in July,1973. These plants would be mounted on barges in contrast to all other commercial light water nuclear power plants which are founded on land.
Because of this unique barge design there will be no soil structure to retard the release and dis-persal of activity beneath the plant following a core melt accident as would i e tne case for land base plants (LBPs).
As a result of studies conducted in the proceeding, it now appears that as a consequence of this unique construction J In view of the precise question which the Comiission has agreed to review, the Staff will not reiterate its argument that the Licensing Board lacks the authority to order the Staff to exclude Class 9 analyses from the environmental statement (See "NRC
~
Staff's Brief in Response to Brief of Applicant in Support of Requested Order on Class 9 Accider.ts,"
dated May 12,1978, p.13). Whether tne Licensing Board has such au;hority or not is no longer a material question now that the Class 9 issue is before the Commission, since the Comission clearly has the authority to issue the order reo,ested by the Appli-cant.
a core-melt accident would release radioactivity to the open surface water bodies in a relatively short time as compared to the release time for a plant located on a soil or rock foundation. 5_f In keeping with its statutory duty to advise the Commission on the hazards of the proposed reactor facilities, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) had written to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission on November 15, 1972, concerning its pre-application review of the concept of platform mounted nuclear plants. I The ACRS the e suggested that OPS '*give further consideration to possible means for assuring maintenance of containment integrity in the highly unlikely event of core-melt through."
Almost one year later, the same scientific body, in a letter of October 18, 1973 regarding its pre-application review of the Atlantic Generatino Station facility,l! stated:
5/ Final Environmental Statement, Part III (NUREG-0502),
Para. 3.4.1.2, p. 3 r.,
6 / See Atomic Eneray Act of 1954, as amended, 55 29 and 182(L), 42 U.S.C. 2039, 2232(b).
~
7 / This was the first application for a oermit to place an FNP at a specific offshore location (Docket Nos.
50-477 and 50-478). On December 20, 1978, the appli-cant in that proceeding filed a " Notice to Atomic Safety and Licensing Board of Withdrawal of Apoli-cation," requesting that the proceedino be dismissed.
The Committee also recomends that the possible advantages to safety of a closed breakwater (possibly employing locks) be analyzed and receive careful consideration. Of particular interest would be the effectiveness of a closed breakwater in mitigating the possible consequences of a very low probability uncontained fuel melting accidont.
further work was needed The Committee went en to state i
on the dispersal characteristi s v/ fission products and plutcnium which m;ght be re.. wad in a core-melt accident from a barge mounted plant.
Because of the NRC Sta N's own concerns and in response to these recommendations of the ACRS, the Staff contacted the RAND Corporation and Sandia Laboratories requesting a generic evaluation of the consequences of a core-meltdown accident at an FNP.
On November 17, 1974, the Applicant in this proceeding submitted two topical reports (OPS Topical Reports TME 0001 and 0002) in response to the November 15, 1972, ACRS letter. These reports contained preliminary analyses related to both the probability and consequences of a core-melt accident at an FNP.
The final decision to undertake the Liquid Pathway Generic Study (LPGS) (NUREG-0440) was made by the Staff in mid-1975.
As indicated, the decision was made in response to ACRS
. concerns and because the OPS application presented a unique siting and design option never before evaluated by the Staff.
Because the floating barge mounted reactor was such a significant departure from land based siting, it was important to detennine whether the risk associated with the core-melt event (Class 9 accident) through the liquid pathway was comparable to that of land-based plants (LBP's) (i.e., low enough so that no detailed assessment be made in a cost-benefit context). E This analysis of core-melt consequences through the liquid pathny for 8_f Regulatory Guide 4.2 on " Preparation of Environmental Reports for Nuclear Power Stations" (NUREG-0099, Revision 2, July 1976), indicates that Section 7.1 of the Guide " Station Accidents Involving Radioactivity" would not necessarily be a limitation on tae review of offshore power systems.
It provides (Introductior.,
Para. 7.b, p. x):
Some of the text of this guide (e.g., Section 7.1) has been written with specific reference to light-water-cooled reactors.
For applicant-proposing to construct and operate other types of reactors, guidelines on the reconinended content of these sections will be provided on a case-by-case basis.
Similarly, offshore power systems will, in general, require special cuidelines for each individual case.
Section 7.1 of the Regulatory Guide incorporated the proposed annex to Appendix D of 10 CFR Part 50 (36 F.R.
22851) which deals with the evaluation of risks of accidents in nuclear power plants. The qualifica-tion regarding applicability of the Guide to FNPs was added in response to a comment on the draft Guide by Ebasco Services which questioned the applicability of the Guide to FNPs.
The evaluation presented in the Revised DES III
_9_/
and FES III presents a comparison of the overall risk (air and liquid pathway) for the FNP and LBP.
both FNP's and LBP's was the major purpose of the LPGS.
Regarding the use to which the results of the study would be put in the Staff's review of the OPS application, the Staff's Director of Site Safety and Environmental Analysis, Harold R. Denton, in testimony before the House Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment on July 27, 1976, explained to the Subcommittee that "... this [LPGS] evaluation will be reflected in our balancing of safety, environmental and economic factors of proposed offshore stations against alternative stations on land."
(Tr. 118-119).
The Draft LPGS (NUREG-0140) was published in September, 1976, and circulated for comment as the conpanion document and principal reference of the Draft Environmental Statement, Part III (NUREG 0127) (DES III), which was published one month later.
The dei III contained an entire section devoted to a presen-tation of the results of the Draft LPGS, which results, in-cludine those related to core-melt events, were included in the overall cost-benefit balancing.
Specifically, Section 2.4 (Significance of Consequences and Conclusions) of the DES III stated:
The floating nuclear plant, by virtue of close proximity to water, appeared to have the potential for significantly different consequences than land based plants in the event of very severe accidents involving core-melt.
However, review of the events leading to core-melt and ultimate contain-ment penatration indicate that the expected con-sequences are generally comparable.
Similarly, the cost-benefit section of the DES III (Section 3.3) concluded:
A core melt accident and ultimate containment penetration in both the land based and floating nuclear plants are very improbable events and lead to consequences that are generally comparable.
The Staff concludes that the overall risks associated with a float,' g nuclear plant are low, and comparable to the risks associated with land based plants.
Finally, the overall cost-benefit conclusions specifically con-sidered the LPGS and, in particular, core melt analyses (Section 3.4):
The conclusionary results summarized above relative to radiological accidents and the consequences through the liquid pathway do not affect the cost-benefit balances previously stated in the Final Environmental Statement -
Parts I and II. The added parameter of radio-logical impact due to FNP liquid pathway accidents, both within design basis and the large core melt event, to the cost-benefit equation continues to reflect a favorable balance.
(Emphasis supplied).
The Draf t LPGS met with substantial adverse comment from sister agencies, the general public and from the ACRS as well. Those comments necessitated substantial additional analysis of core-melt events for both floating nuclear plants and land-based plants. As a result of that additional analysis, the conclusion that the liquid pathway conse-quences of core-melt accidents are comparable for FNPs and LBPs has, in the Staff's view, no remaining validity. Thus, the Staff concluded, in the final version of the LPGS, pub-lished on February 23, 1978:
For representative sites, there are differences in the impacts of accidental radioactive releases for the hydrosphere between floating nuclear plants (FNPs) and land based plants (LPBs) of the ice-condenser type. The consequences of releases from design bases accidents, are found to be lower for an FNP than for an LBP. For core-melt events which we consider to be of very low probability, the staff results indicate that the expected liquid pathway consequences are higher at an FNP than at an LPB, and that interdiction at the site is not likely for an FNP.
The Staff further concluded that, when one factored in the expected benefits of interdiction at the source of the radioactive release, the difference in calculated popu-lation exposures (from core-melt events through the liquid pathway) between the two types of plants was several orders of magnitude.3U Given this finding tl'at one aspect of the overall accident risk was significantly greater for an FNP than for an LBP, the Staff could no longer conclude in summary fashion in the environmental statement that the cost-benefit balance was favorable to the FNP.
A. detailed analysis was s
10 /
- See FES III, p. 2-5.
therefore performed to determine whether the overall risk from accidents (design basis and beyond, air pathway and liquid) on an FNP was comparable to that of an LBP and whether, as a result of that determination, the cost-benefit balance continued to reflect a favorable result in terms of the Staff's licensing recommendation.
9 In light of the considerable changes in the Staff's con-clusions in the final version of the LPGS and the subsequent expansion of the cost-benefit analysis in the environmental statement, the Staff issued a Revised Draft Environmental Statement, Part III (NUREG-0127, Revision 1) on May 1, 1978.
The Final Environmental Statement, Part III (NUREG-0502)
(FES III) was issued on December 29, 1978.
It was concluded by the Staff that:
... the results of our analysis indicate that:
1.
The most likely radioactive releases through the liquid pathway to the environment are much larger for an FNP than for an LBP.
2.
The most likely population exposure from the liquid pathway for an FNP is significantly greater than for an LBP because of the inability to isolate initial releases in thevicinityoftheFNP.))/
These conclusions were based on studies which indicated to the Staff the following environmental releases from core-melt accidents.dSI 33/FES III, Para. 3.4.1.2, p. 3-13.
3 M., Table 3.4-3, 3-13.
I_d
SUMMARY
OF LIQUID PATHWAY RELEASES AND CONSEQUENC_ES (MOST LIKELY CASE)
I RELEASES INTERDICTED TO LIQUID PATHWAY POPULATION CASE
(% CORE INVENTORY)
(MAN-REM) 78% I 6
78% Cs 10 F oating Nuclear 54% Sr Plant]
.1% I 2
LBP 10 -4 3
[ Land-
.1 Cs Based Plant]
.1% Sr I Assumes effective source interdiction at an LBP and sourca interdiction beginning after one week at an FNP. Pathway interdiction to 5 rem maximum individual dose.
2 Liquid pachway results for ice condenser and non-ice condenser LBP are expected to be similar.
In view of these significant differences in the liquid path-way core-melt risks between FNP's and LBP's, the Staff has concluded that only "with suitable modifications" will FNPs be comparable to current generation LBPs; thus, only with such modifications will there be reasonable assurance that eight FNPs can be sited in offshore and shore-zone waters of the Atlantic Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico (p. xiv).
Concerning estuarine-riverine siting, the change in the overall conclusion (between the DES III and the FES III) when the results of the final LPGS are factored into the assessment is even more dramatic:
With respect to FNP siting in estuaries and rivers, the Staff recognized in the FES, Part II, and in the iddendum to Part II, that dredging and disposal of dredged material related to the construction of access channels and the protective basin or lagoon for an FNP and the maintenance of those areas, can have significant potential for adverse environ-mental impact.
Furthermore, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has expressed the view (Appendix B(1)) that "...it will be extremely difficult to find environmentally acceptable sites in any of the estuarine or barrier island areas along the East and Gulf coasts."
In addition, the staff finds that the unlikely but possible occurrence of a core-melt accident at estuarine and riverine areas could result in a direct release of radioactive material, cuch that the consequences to the environment would be unacceptable. The staff, therefore, concludes that finding acceptable FNP sites in estuarines, rivers or near barrier islands will most likely be extremely difficult, but cannot conclude that there are no acceptable estuarine, riverine or barrier islands locations for FNP emplacement when appropriate mitigative actions are taken.
Applicants applying to the NRC for
~
a license to locate and operate an FNP at such ites would have to demonstrate appropriate litigative actions that would provide both an acceptable level of environmental impact as well as an acceptable level of core-melt accident risk.l3/
On the basis of the above findings, the Staff found it necessary to reconinend the issuance of a manufacturing license for barge moJnted plants only with the following
- FES III, p. xiv.
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WEBSTER, NEW. ORK 14580 (716) 2ob 1600-condition designed to mitigate the consequences of Class 9 core-melt accidents:
The applicant shall replace the concrete pad beneath the reactor vessel with a pad con-structed of magnesium oxide (See Appendix E) or other equivalent refractory material, that will provide increased resistance to nelt-through by the molten reactor core in the event of a highly unlikely core-melt accident and which will not react with core-debris to form a large volume of gases.
The pad should be as thick as practical, taking into account space availability and applicable design and operating considerations, but not thinner than the concrete pad currently proposed.
The proposed refractory material and pad design should not compromise safety requirements and the applicant shall obtain NRC approval of the selected material and pad design prior to the start of construction of major elements of the FNP hull s'wucture.14 /
In addition, while not recommended as conditions to the manufacturing license, the Staff has recommended that the following siting requirements be applied to applicants who may file applications with NRC for construction permits to site und operate FNP's at specific locations:
A.
Provide an assessment of actions that will be taken by the owner / operator of an FNP-including source and pathway interdiction methods, that would provide further pra-tection to the public, and operating staff and the environment, in the event of a highly unlikely core-melt accident by taking ddVantage of the delay in core melt-through provided by the nagnesium oxide (or equivalent) pad beneath the reactor vessel.
i Id., p. xv.
B.
Proposed FNP sites in estuaries, rivers or near be.rrier islands must be appropriately modified in an environmentally acceptable manner such that in the event of a core-melt accident, the release of radioactive material into the surrounding water body shall be limited to levels that will not result in undue impact to man or the ecosystem. l_5/
IV. ARGUMENT i
A.
THE COMMISSION'S REGULATIONS DO NOT LIMIT OR OTHERWISE PRESCRIBE THE TYPE OF NEPA ACCIDENT EVALUATION TO BE
~
PERFORMED FOR FNPs AND THE SCOPE OF THE ANALYSIS THAT HAS BEEN PERFORMED BY THE STAFF IS IN ACCORD WITH NEPA AND CONSISTENT WITH THE UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE (1) THE ONLY COMMISSION " REGULATION" ARGUABLY IN POINT - PROPOSED ANNEX A 10 CFR PART 50, APPENDIX D - DOES NOT APPLY TO FNPs At the heart of the certified question is an issue regarding an old AEC proposed regulation - the proposed Annex A to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix D.U5 / This proposed regulation was issued for public comment some seven years ago as part of AEC's set of regulations developed in response to the now famous Calvert Cliffs' decision.bb/ No final Annex was ever prepared, so technicall'y this old AEC rulemaking proceeding is still pending before the NRC and the Annex has never been codified into the Commission's regulations.
Further, the status of 'the proposed Annex was not affected by the revoca-tion of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix D and promulgation of 10 CFR Part 51 by the AEC back in 1974.bb/ While the Annex has never lE/_I d.
LE/ 36 F.R. 22851 (December 1,1971).
LZ/ Calvert Cliffs' v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir.1971) 18/ Statement of Considerations, 39 F.R. 26279 (July 18,1974).
The AEC there stressed that the Annex was "still under consideration."
been formally adopted by the Commission, it has been authorized for use as guidance. The Annex itself stated that its provisions "will be useful as interim guidance until such 19 time as the Commission takes further action on them," " and the Annex has been used as guidance by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards and Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Boards. E The old proposed Annex divided all radiological accidents into nine classes for NEPA evaluation purposes. With respect to the ninth class (so-called " Class 9 Accidents"), the Annex provided the following:
The occurrences in Class 9 involve sequences of postulated successive failures more severe than those postulated for the design basis for pro-tective systems and engineered safety features.
Their consequ.ences could be severe. However, the probability of their occurrence is so small that their environmental risk is extremely low.
Defense in depth (multiple physical barriers),
quality assurance for design, manufacture, and operation, continued surveillance and testing, and conservative design are all applied to provide and maintain the required high degree of assurance that potential accidents in this class are, and will remain, sufficiently remote in probability that the environmental risk is extremely low. For these reasons, it is not necessary to discuss such events in applicants' Environmental Reports.
It is this language which is at the heart of the certified question. The old Annex contains the only language in the i
,19/ 36 F.R. at 22851 2q/ E.g., Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station),ALAB-156, 6 AEC 831 (1973).
Commission's regulations that is arguably in point on the certified question. The Staff will show later that the old proposed Annex does not forbid discussion of Class 9 accident consequences in all cases, and that Class 9 accident consequences may be discussed even for some land based plants without running afoul of the Annex.21/
However, there is a critical threshold question - does the Annex apply to FNPs at all? The Staff submits that the answer to this question is "no."
The Appeal Board below put the matter quite succinctly:
It is one thing to hold the staff to clearly articulated, reiterated policy guidance that the Coninission has chosen to let stand.
It is quite another to extend that policy to situations not considered at its adoption. And doing so is particularly inappropriate where that " guidance" is a proposed Atomic Energy Commission regu-lation -- proffered but not adopted in 1971 --
and allowed to languish ever since. We there-fore cannot share our dissenting colleague's faith in the annex's vitality for seasons and circumstances never contemplated.
In sum, we agree with the staff that the annex should not be read as extending to floating nuclear plants -- a concept unknown when the annex was put out as interim guidance.- We have been given no reason to disbelieve the staff's assertion that, until it studied the matter, it did not know how the consequences of serious accents at floating plants would stack up against the consequences of similar accidents on land.
It follows that the staff had to inform itself of the consequences of using this novel siting con-cept. 2_2/
2_1/ Brief, infra, at pp. 32-41.
22/ ALAB 489, 8 NRC at 220.
The public rulemaking record on the old Annex is scant at best, consisting only of the short preamble to the proposed rule and the rule itself us published in the Federal Register.
There is nothing whatsoever in the rulemaking record that would suggest that the AEC even thought about the FNP concept when it decided to issue the Annex. The comments
~
received on the Annex have gone unanswered for some seven years, so we do not have the benefit of a comment analysis in fles ing out the rulemaking record.
It is plainly correct that, as the Appeal Board stated below, the Annex was " adopted without any focus on the floating nuclear plan plantorthediscreteproblemitpresents."E Clearly the old Annex does not apply to FNPs.
The AEC might have applied the old Annex to FNPs, but it never addressed the question. Moreover, as the Appeal Board stated below:
[0]ur reluctance to extend the coverage of an annex proposed in 1971 is consistent with our understanding of this Commission's policy of frankness and full disclosure.
In saying this, we do not mean to disparage Our-our colleague's carefully articulated dissent.
point is rather,. that in this area it is a mistake to assume too readily that the NRC would automatically extend, sub silentio, policies formulated by the Atomic Energy Commission in a different era. 24/
2_3_/ Id., at 219.
24/ Id., at 220, note 92.
In its " Motion for Reconsideration and in the Alternative, Certification to the Commission," filed with the Appeal Board on September 1,1978, Applicant argued that the Appeal Board was factually incorrect in holding that AEC was unaware of FNPs when the Annex was issued in 1971.
OPS argued that since certain sub-offices or contractors of the AEC knew about FNPs when the Annex was issued, the AEC itself must have intended that the Annex apply fully to them. OPS cited in this regard a 1968 report by Oak Ridge National Laboratory, a 1971 in-house meeting between AEC Division of Reactor Licensing Staff and electric utilities, and a 1971 letter from AEC Division of Reactor Licensing to an electric utility. This argument is without merit.
To be sure, some AEC contractor personnel and AEC staff members were aware of the floating nuclear power concept back in 1971, but that is not the critical question.
The critical question is whether there is anything in the rulemaking record associated with the Annex that indicates that the AEC had FNPs in mind when it con-sidered and issued the Annex. The materials cited by OPS indicate nothing whatsoever regarding AEC intent i
in considering and issuing the Annex. As indicated, the publ1c rulemaking record here is scant, consisting only of the preamble of the old rule and the old rule itself.
The documents and meeting cited by OPS are nowhere mentioned in either the Annex or the preamble and, as discussed above, there is nothing whatsoever in the rulemaking record that would suggest that the AEC even thought about the floating nuclear power plant concept when it decided to issur the Annex.
OPS argued in the same Motion that Appendix M of 10 CFR Part 50 somehow makes it clear that the Annex has to apply to floating nuclear power plants. Appendix M provides that applicants under that appendix:
... shall submit an environmental report as re-quired by applicants for construction pennits in accordance with Appendix D, provided, however, that such report shall be directed..., in general terms, at the construction and operation of the reactors at... hypothetical... sites having characteristics which fall within the postulated site parameters.
Appendix M thus, by its terms, neither extends nor restricts the scope of activities to which the Annex applies. Where, as here, it has been determined that the Annex to Appendix D did not apply to FNPs, Appendix M gains applicant nothing.
Moreover, the language of Appendix M cited by OPS below is ambiguous.
It is not clear at all that in referring to "10 CFR Part 50, Appendix D" ir. Appendix M the AEC intended to refer also to the Annex. The Annex was not then, nor has it ever been, a part of the Commission's NEPA regulations in either 10 CFR Part 50, Apoendix D or 10 CFR Part 51. There is nothing whatsoever in the public rulemaking record of Appendix M to indicate that the AEC gave any consideration to the scope of the applicant's environmental report or Staff's impact state-ment as they pertain to accidents at FNPs. Accordingly, the more reasonable interpretation is clearly that the AEC was merely referring here to existing Comission regulations, and did not mean to refer to the Annex.
OPS also argued in the same Motion that AEC somehow ratified the scope of NEPA review set forth in OPS's environmental report when it issued Appendix M without any criticism of the report. Again, there is not the slightest indication in the language of Appendix M or the public ru;emaking record of Appendix M that the AEC reviewed and considered any of the arguments advanced by OPS in its environmental report. Besides, the argument goes too far.
If OPS is correct in this argument, then why stop at accidents? Carried to its
(
logical extension, OPS's argument leads to the conclu-sion that everything in OPS's environmental report must have been adopted as true and correct by the AEC. Yet this result, which would render all of the NEPA hearings in this matter a useless exercise, is clearly absurd.b (2) SINCE THE COMMISSION'S REGULATIONS DO NOT ADDRESS THE MATTER, THE COMMISSION MUST DEVELOP AN APPROACH TO ACCIDENT EVALUA-TION FOR FNPs THAT COMPLIES WITH NEPA We have established above that the only Commission
" regulation" in point -- AEC's old proposed Annex to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix D -- does not apply to FNPs.
However, the absence of a Commission regulation in point need not trouble us. The law is quite clear that the Commission has the discretion to define its policy in this area by either rulemaking or adjudication.2_6/
But the policy adopted must, of course, be in accord with NEPA.
25/ As a slight variation of these arguments regarding Appendix fi, OPS also argued in its Motion that the AEC knew about FNPs when 10 CFR Part 51 was issued with the Annex left standing, so it must have intended that the Annex be fully applied to FNPs. The short answer to this is that there is no indication in the public rulemaking record associated with Part 51 that the AEC gave any consideration to accidents at FNPs.
~26/ SEC v. Chenery Corporation, 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947);
Morningside Renewal Council v. AEC, 482 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1973).
The Staff does not quarrel with the general proposition that a " rule of reason" governs agencies' NEPA duties.
There are scores of judicial decisions upholding agencies' decisions not to address in depth (or at all) certain topics in environmental impact statements on the ground that the agencies efforts were consistent with a
" reasonable" approach to " EPA compliance. However we have not uncovered a single case standing for the proposition that the NEPA " rule of reason" forbids an agency from including a discussion of some topic in an impact statement. Yet that is the issue here.
The issue presented in this case is not whether the Commission must include an analysis of Class 9 acci-dents in its environmental impact statement, but whether it may, as a matter of sound discretion.
include such an analysis in its statement.
An examination of some cases cited in the proceedings below by the applicant, OPS, is instructive. Carolina Environmental Study Group v. U.S.27/ upheld the AEC's
~
determination in the McGuire licensing case that the general conclusion of the Annex concerning Class 9 accidents was appropriate and applicable to 27/ 510 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
the reactor in question. The plaintiff in this case had argued that the impact statement was inadequate because it failed to corsider Class 9 accidents in detail. Far from concluding that the Commission was prohibited from considering Class 9 accidents in detail, the Court went only so far as to state that:
Viewing the record as a whole, we cannot say that the AEC's general consideration [in this case] of the probability and severity of a Class 9 accident amounts to a failure to provide the required detailed statement of its environmental impact.28f The Court also stated that it could find nothing in the record which "would indicate that the AEC findings re-garding Class 9 accidents are clearly erroneous or that the AEC's complia ce with NEPA Section 102(2)(C)(i) in this case was inadequate."
There is no indication in the opinion that, had a detailed Class 9 review been undertaken by the Commission, its inclusion in the impact statement would have been proscribed by the Court.
l k
In Porter County Chapter of Izaak Walton League v. AEC l
the Court stated that:
The AEC Staff's extensive analysis of accident probabilities and effects, which was uncontro-verted, provides sufficient record support for the ASLB's conclusion.3_0/
28/ Id. at 799.
29/ Id. The very recent decision in Hodder v. NRC, F.2d
, Nos. 76-1709 and 78-1149 (D.C. Cir., December 26, 1978) merely follows the rationale of Carolina Environmental Study Group in holding that discussion of effects of Class 9 accidents is not required by NEPA. There is no indication in Hodder that such a discussion would violate NEPA.
30/ 533 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir.1976), cert denied, 429 0
U.S. 858 (1976).
Again here the Court concluded only that the agency was not required to consider Class 9 events in its cost benefit analysis. Further, the Court here emphasized the deference to be paid to agencies on matters within the agencies expertise.
It is fairly implicit in the Court's decision that had the agency determined that it was appropriate to consider Class 9 events, that determina-tion would not have been disturbed.
Thus, there is nothing in the case law construing NEPA that would forbid the Commision from including a dis-cussion of Class 9 accidents in its impact statement in the OPS proceeding. To be sure there are numerous Appeal Board decisions which can be read as proscribing this sort of discussion, b ut these decisions all have as b
their basis the old proposed Annex. Since the old Annex does not apply to FNFs, these decisions are not on-trolling on the certified question.
In addition, numerous Court decisions have upheld and amplified the view that NEPA requires that the pertinent impact statemant contain a full disclosure of all envi-ronmental matters examined, including responsible opposing or controversial views, in order that the decisionmaker and the public be fully informed.
31 / See decisions cited in the Appeal Board's opinion below, ALAB 469, 8 NRC at 210, note 52.
A good explication of the " full disclosure" requirement is set forth in Silva v. Lynn:
The " detailed statement" required by 9 4332(2)(C) serves at least three purposes.
First, it permits the court to ascertain whether the agency has made a good faith effort to take into account the values NEPA seeks to safeguard. To that end it must " explicate fully its course of inquiry, its analysis and its reasoning." Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130,1139 (4th Cir.1971); Appalachiaa Power Co., 477 F.2d at 507.
St: also Natural Resources Defence Council v. E.P.A. 478 F.2d 873 (1st Cir.1973); Environmental Defense Fund v.
Ruckelshaus, 142 U.S. App. D.C. 74, 439 F.2d 584 (1971). Second, it serves as an environmental full disclosure law, providing infonnation which Congress thought the public should have con-cerning the particular environmental costs involved in a project. To that end, it "must be written in language that is understandable to nontechnical minds and yet contain enough scientific reasoning to alert specialists to particular problems within the field of their expertise." Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps.
of Engineers, 348 F. Supp. 916, 933 (W.D. Miss.
1972).
It cannot be composed of statements "too vague, too general and too conclusory." Envi-ronmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1972). Finally, and perhaps most substantively, the requirement of a detail-ed statement helps insure the integrity of the process of decision by precluding stubborn problems or serious criticism from being swept under the rug.
(emphasis added)3_2]
The Court in Silva v. Lynn found the statement in question in-sufficient on its face, when measured by applicable review standards, for failing to comply with the statutory mandate for a " detailed staterhent." The Court noted that the detail-ed studies and background of deliberations which formed the
_3_2/ 482 F.2d 1282,1284-85 (1st Cir.1973).
basis of the statement were not put forward and thus the statement was inadequate. Hence, it is manifest that federal agencies are under a duty to include and present in suffi-cient detail in the statement the pertinent information gathered in conjunction with a particular project so that an assessment can be made of the environmental risks
~
associated with it.b This full disclosure requirement imposes an obligation on Federal agencies to gather for and include in the impact statement enough information to show that compliance has beengenuineratherthanperfunctory.b Moreover, opposing views, critical comments and problem areas which come to the agency's attention during the environmental review are required to be included in the EIS.b This certified question deals with precisely one of those
" problem areas." The subject of Class 9 accidents conse-3_3_/ See, Calvert Cliffs' v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C.
Cir.1971); NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C.
Cir. 1972).
39 Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 339 F. Supp.
806 (E.D. Tenn.1971), affd., 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir.1972); Brooks v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 269, 276 (W.D. Wash. 1972), aff'd., 487 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir.1973).
35/ Silva v. Lynn, supra note 29; Union of Concerned Scientists v. AEC, 499 F.2d 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1971); EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 348 F. Supp. 916 (N.D. Miss.1972).
quences via the liquid pathway commanded the attention of Staff almost from the inception of its licensing review, and attracted numerous " critical comments" from responsible scientific bodies as well as sister federal agencies and the general public.
It would be ludicrous for the Staff to gather information or do research on a given matter in the context of a specific application, arrive at a conclusion which indicated the significance of some items, and not present such information to the decisionmaker in its impact statement. The impact statement must fully disclose all the relevant information developed and considered by the Staff.
It must bring together the results of research and analyses on pertinent environmental matters.
It must be designed to adequately ir'orm the public and decisionmakers.
To now amputate a vital ortion of the impact statement and exclude a discussion of Class 9 accident consequences would leave a partial document which would be not only incomplete but actually misleading. Clearly a detailed discussion of Class 9 accidents is in accord with the NEPA " full disclosure requirement." As the Appeal Board below put it:
NEPA demands -- rather than forbids -- that the staff publish the results of its study.
It is too late in the day to argue that NEPA is not an environmental full disclosure law.36/
(3) THE SCOPE OF ACCIDENT RISK EVALUATION PERFORMED BY THE STAFF IS A REASONABLE RESPONSE TO THE UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OPS PROCEEDING.
We have shown above that the Commision's regulations do not spell out the type of NEPA accident risk evaluation to be conducted for FNPs and that therefore the type of evaluation must be determined by adjudication in this particular case. We have also shown above that a detailed discussion of Class 9 accident risks does not violate NEPA but is rather in accord with NEPA's " full disclosure" require-ment. The remaining question is whether, given the unique circumstances of this case, a detailed evaluation of Class 9 accidents was a reasonable course of action for the Staff to undertake.
Prior to the filing of the OPS application to manufacture FNPs, the Staff had only evaluated the risk of accidents for land based nuclear power plants, and the conclusions in the proposed Annex could only apply to the plants previously 36/ ALAB 480, 8 NRC at 225.
evaluated. With specific regard to Class 9 events, the Staff had examined, prior to the development of the proposed Annex, the probabilities and consequences of such an event for land based reactors. These factors were subsequently evaluated in more detail in the AEC-funded Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400).E However, upon an examination of the OPS application, the FNP concept was perceived, by both the ACRS and the Staff, to incorporate unique and unusual features related to both the design and siting mode which could have a significant bearing on the probability and/or consequences of accidental release of radioactive effluents into surface water bodies.
From an accident viewpoint, this uniqueness stemed froin the intimate contact of free flowing surface water with the FNP barge structure. Thus, in the event of a core-melt accident, it was considered possible that there would be no inherent retention capability for core debris and radioactivity which was released beneath the plant, whereas for a land-based plant the soil and ground water characteristics were seen to offer substantial restrictions to releases to the liquid pathway.
37/ The Reactor Safety Study has been the subject of considerable criticism and debate. A report of the review of that study by an independent group, the Risk Assessment Review Group, has recently been published as NUREG/CR-0400.
Further while the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) had evaluated the liquid pathway impacts for a land-based plant and suggested that they were not significant contributors to risk, this had been based primarily upon (1) assumptions of relatively slow release of radio-activity from core debris, (2) a substantial radioactive decay that occurs during the long transport time of activity through the ground water, and (3) the oer-ception that effective mitigative actions could be taken to isolate releases at the source and to prevent exposures from contaminated pathways. These effects were seen to be potentially significantly differerit for the FNP.
In fact the Reactor Safety Study included a statement (pg.139 of the Main Report) that a risk assessment of FNPs would be useful.
A study was therefore undertaken by the Staff to determine whether the prior assumptions of the Annex were applicable to this previously unevaluated concept; that is, whether the risks of a core-melt accident were comparable to previously licensed reactors, or whether they were outside the parameters of the original analysis which was the underpinning of the Proposed Annex. As the final version of the LPGS and FES III conclude, the liquid pathway core-melt risks do indeed place an ocean sited FNP in the upper range of the risks associated with typical land-based nuclear power reactors. Also, while the Staff was unable to quantify the extent of core-melt accident impacts in an estuary or river and was forced to use highly conservative assumptions so as to bound the risk, the study showed that the risk of a core-melt at a estuarine or riverine sited FNP in an open breakwater lies well beyond the range for all existing land-based plants. Clearly the results of the study have been worth the time and resources devoted to it.38/ The facts noted above shew that the study undertaken by the Staff was a reasonable response to the circumstances of the OPS application. The Appeal Board below put the matter quite well when it stated that:
The first question likely to be asked by anyone confrorted with the concept of an offshore nuclear power plant is "what will happen in the ocean in the event of a serious accidenti?" The staff is to be commended, not criticized, for doing precisely what is reasonable -- attempting to find out the answer to that question.39/
38/ The Staff resources required to date to conduct the LPGS and related studies for the OPS application have been substantial, amounting to about 15 man-years.
39/ ALAB 489, 8 NRC at 220.
B.
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE PROPOSED ANNEX APPLIES GENERALLY TO LIGHT WATER POWER REACTORS, THE ANNEX AND COMMISSION REGULATIONS NEVERTHELESS PERMIT THE REVIEW 0F CLASS 9 RISKS IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THIS PARTICULAR APPLICATION (1) THE FOCUS OF THE ANNEX IS ON RISK - ACCIDENT PROBABILITY AND CONSEQUENCES - AND THERE MUST BE A POINT BEYOND WHICH ACCIDENT CONSEQUENCES BECOME SUSCEPTIBLE TO CANDID EVALUATION IN AN ENVIRON-MENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT The analysis of potential accidents at nuclear generating facilities is performed by the Staff as an integral part of every environmental assessment to fulfill the mandate of NEPA that this agency use all practicable means to:
attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other un-desirable and unintended consequences.40}
It is now settled jurisprudence that the term " risk" is ordinarily understood to involve a relationship between the probability of the occurrence of an event, and the severity 41/
of the consequences of that event should it occur.~ The balancing of probability against consequences has tradition-ally been the foundation for the determination of the types of
~
risks against which society is entitled to be protected. The courts have uniformly performed such a balancing in determin-40/ 42 USC 54331(b)(3).
- 41) The now famous enunciation of this principle first appeared in the opinion of Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Carrol Towing Co.,159 F.2d 169 (2nd Cir. 1947).
ing whether society should hold an actor accountable for exer-cising due care to insure that a given damage is not inflicted on its members, or whether the risk associated with that damage is so low that society will not deem the actor responsible if it occurs.
It has always been the case, in the develop-ment of American law, that the more serious the consequences of an action, the more readily is the actor held accountable despite the low probability of the initiating event.12/
42/ Prosser, Law of Torts, 4th Ed.,1971, pp.147-146.
Thus, as Prosser has said:
[I]f the risk is an appreciable one, and the possible consequences are serious, the question is not one of mathematical probability alone. The odds may be a thousand to one that no train will arrive at the very moment that an automobile is crossing a railway track, but the risk of death is nevertheless sufficiently serious tc require the driver to look for the train.
It may be highly improbable that lightening may strike at any given place or time, but the possibility is there, and it requires precautions for the protection of inflam-mables. As the gravity of the possible harm increases, the apparent likelihood of its occurrence need be less. Against this probability, and gravity, of the risk, must be balanced in every case the utility of the conduct in question.
(Emphasis supplied.)
There is a close relationship between the tort law discussed above, and the public law involved in the case at bar. Critical to both is a balancing of costs and benefits--in negligence law to determine whether an actor must guard against a given occurrence, and pursuant to NEPA to determine whether a proposal for major federal action should be permitted to proceed.
Further, both have, as their major purpose, the protection of society from high risk activity which might impact on health or safety.
' Despite this consistent development of the concept of risk as a balancing of the two components of probability and conseauence, it has been argued that under the cid Annex, no matter how catastrophic the consequences of a Class 9 accident may be, these consequences should not be taken into account in the cost-benefit analysis performed by the Staff as part of its environmental review.E As indicated above, the old proposed Annex was issued by AEC to provide guidance with regard to analyses of accidents in environmental reports concerning light water reactors. The Proposed Annex divides all radio-logical accidents into nine classes. As discussed, supra, with respect to the ninth class, the Annex provides:
The occurrences in Class 9 involve sequences of postulated successive failures more severe than tho u postulated for the design basis for protective systems and engineered safety features.
Their consequences could be severe.
However, the probability of their occurrence is so small that their environmental risk is
~
extremely low.
Defense in depth (multiple physical barriers), quality assurance for
^
design, manufacture, and operation, continued surveillance and testing, and conservative design are all applied to provide and maintain the required high degree of assurance that potential accidents in this class are, and will remain, sufficiently remote in probability that the environmental risk is extremely low.
For these reasons, it is not necessary to discuss such events in applicants' Environmental Reports.
43/ Appeal Board Tr. 23.
35 -
While the guidance of the Annex indicates that no dota11od discussion of Class o events was necessary in cm ii onnent al reports, the Applicant, and for that matter the Appeal Board in ALAB-489, take the position that the exclusion of discussinn of these accidents is founded upon a consideration by the Commission of the low probability of the accident alone. However, the Commission specifically emphasized in the Statement of Considerations accompanying the proposed Annex that the assess-ment of accident risk necessitates a consideration of both pro-babilities and consequences:
In consideration of the environmental risks associated with the postulated accidents, the probabilities of their occurrence and their consequences must both be taken into account.
'he Appeal Board concluded that the above language was merely
" prefatory, a part of the introductory discussion..."
Presumably, then, according to the Applicant and Appeal Board, the language only applied to accident classes one through eight. However, a Commission intent to exclude Class 9 acci-dents from that statement certainly cannot be divined from the public rulemaking record with regard to the proposed Annex; to call that record scant would be charitable. The aoove statement concerning risk, and the provision to relieve Applicants of the 41/ ALAB 489, 8 NRC at 213.
s requirement to discuss Class 5 accidents could just as consistently be read as reflecting a judgment that the consequences of these accidents at then existing plants were within the same general envelope, and that there-fore, the accidents could be dismissed on the basis of their low probability.
But the essential point is that consideration of both probability and consequences of the accidents must have been inherent in the judgment regard-ingrisk.b The premise for the Annex's limitations on discussion of Class 9 accident risks must be that the risks for the reactor in question fall within the envelope of the risks for typical licensed power reactors.
It just doesn't make sense to presume that the Commission was forever foreclosing any attempt to evaluate Class 9 consequences even if it could be shown that those consequences, and therefore risks, for a particular appli-cation, were quantitatively and qualitatively different from practically all plants within the general envelope previously considered.
In its brief to the Appeal Board, the Staff argued that
~
eductio ad absurdum, such a presumption would lead to the result that even if the consequences of such an accident were the destruction of the planet, the Staff would still be foreclosed from looking at those consequences by virtue 41 Indeed, even when Class 9 accidents were evaluated in far greater detail in WASH-1400, the Atomic Energy Commission, in its Interim General Statement of Policy published with that document, reiterated that "neither consequences nor probabilities should 'be considered alone."
39 FR 30964 (August 27, 1974).
4D of the language of the Proposeu Annex.
Of course this circumstance is far fetched in the real world; however, it was suggested to illustrate a point. Common sense dictates that there must be a point beyond which the consequences of a Class 9 accident become susceptible to candid evaluation in an environmental impact statement. And it should not matter whether the reactor in question is a land-based plant or an FNP.
We cannot state with mathematical precision what the divid-ing line is, but we can and de argue that where a first of a kind application is received for which the liquid pathway risks of a Class 9 accident are potentially both quali-tatively and quantitatively more severe (by several orders of magnitude assuming interdiction) than any previously licensed power reactor, the Staff is not violating any Commission intention which we can discern from the old AEC Annex by conducting and publishing the results of that evaluation and factoring those results into the cost-benefit balance for this application.
- @7 "NRC Staff's Brief in Response to Brief of Applicant in Support of Requested Order on Class 9 Accidents,"
dated May 12,1978, p. 33.
(2) THERE IS SUFFICIENT FLEXIBILITY IN THE LANGUAGE OF THE ANNEX AND COMMISSION REGULATIONS TO ALLOW THE STAFF TO EVALUATE CLASS 9 ACCIDENT RISKS - PROBABILITY AND CONSEQUENCES - IN SPECIAL CASES OF UNUSUAL RISK We have shown above that the Annex does not apply to FNP's (pp.13-30, supra), but that in any event it should be construed as focusing on accident risks and not just accident probabilities and as permitting evaluation of accident risks in special cases (pp. 31-36). We will show below that the language of the Annex itself and the Commission's regulations specifically permit an evaluation of Class 9 accident risks (probabilities and consaquences) in special cases of unusual
'sk.
The starting point is the language of the Annex itself.
While establishing a general approach to Class 9 accidents, the proposed Annex makes clear that:
[0]ther accident assumptions may be more suitable for individual cases. Where assumptions are not speci-fied, or where those specified are deemed unsui'able, assumptions as realistic as the state of knowledge permits shall be used, taking into account the specific design and operational characteristics of the plant under consideration.
Thus the Annex itself permits the Staff in this case to conduct an evaluation to determine whether or not the assumptions in the Annex are suitable and " realistic" for this unique case.42/
This is consistent with the Commission's other regulations.
Under 10 CFR 6 2.758 any party to an initial licensing proceeding may request the Commission to make an exception to a rule on the ground that "special circumstances with respect to the subject matter of the particular proceeding are such that application of the rule... would not serve the purposes for which the rule... was adopted." While the old Annex was never made effective or codified as part of the Commission's regulations, clearly if a party may properly request an exception from an effective regulation, a_ fortiori a party (including the Staff) may request an exception from some document promulgated only as " interim guidance." However the Staff did not believe that the certification procedure in 10 CFR S 2.758 was applicable both because, as noted above, the Annex itself contained its own " exceptions" clause, and because the Annex itself is not, strictly speaking, a regulation.
, / Of course, the Staf f itself does not have final decision 47 authority regarding whether the assumptions in the Annex are " suitable" or " realistic." The final decision rests with the Commission.
Nevertheless, whether one relies on the " exceptions" clause in the Annex itself, or 10 CFR 9 2.758, the result is the same -- there are special circumstances in this case that warrant an exception from the general rule that Class 9 accident risks (probability and consequences) need not be considered in detail in an environme7tal impact statement.
~
The results of the Staff's evaluations (see pp. 3-12, 29-30, supra) show both that there are special circumstances in this pro-ceeding, and that these special circumstances could give rise to such substantial environmental impacts that failurs to include these impacts in detail would not serve the purposes of NEPA as a full disclosure law. Specifically, we have shown above that the unique FNP barge design permits intimate contact of free tiowing surface water with the FNP barge structure.
In the event of a core-melt accident, there could be no inherent retention capability for core debris and radioactivity which was released beneath the plant, whereas for a land-based plant the soil and ground water characteristics would offer substantial restrictions to releases to the liquid pathway. Clearly this constitutes a special circumstance.
The final results of the liquid pathway study show that for ocean sites the liquid pathway core-melt risks place the FNP outside the risk envelope for typical existing land-based reactors.
Furthermore, the study results indicate that the core-melt risks at an estuarine or riverine sited FNP on an open breakwater lie well beyond the range of risk for all existing land-based plants.
Clearly failure to disclose these con-clusions, and the underlying analysis, in the environmental impact statement would fail to serve the " full disclosure" purposes of NEPA.
S Finally, the Court in Citizens for Safe Power v. NRC confirmed the propriety of a more detailed treatment of Class 9 events should previously unevaluated risks be beyond those assessed or contemplated in formulating the original guidance of the Proposed Annex:
Apart from the requirements of NEPA or similar ones already implicit under [the Atomic Energy Act], it would be pointless, and a waste of agency resources, to require the AEC to reapply efforts that hrte already gone into its basic health and safety regulations, in individual licensing proceedings, in the absence of some evidence that a particular facility presents risks outside the parameterr of the original rulemaking. 49 /
(Emphasis s pplied) 48 / 524 F.2d 1291 (D.C$ Cir.1975).
49 / Id. at 1299.
C.
THE DISCUSSION OF CLASS 9 ACCIDENT RISKS IN THE STAFF'S ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A CHALLENGE TO ANY COMMISSION REGULATION The Applicant argued below that the Staff is precluded from including an analysis of the consequences of a Class 9 accident in the FES because to do so would be a challenge to Commission safety regulations. Specifically, the Applicant argued that consideration of a Class 9 accident postulates a failure of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), an assumption not permitted under Commission regulations.EI However, as the Appeal Board noted below in rejecting this argument, the Commission in the Vermont Yankee proceeding, b specifically held that the ECCS couid be assumed not to function properly because different accident assumptions may be postulateu for different design purposes. b Thus, the Commission rejected an argument in Vermont Yankee that a Staff Safety. Guide (now called a Regulatory Guide) challenged the regulations because the Guide assumed that the ECCS would not function as intended.S/
" Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Systems 50f for Light Water Nuclear Power Reactors," 10 CFR s 50.46 and Appendix K to 10 CFR Part 50. See "Brief of Applicant in Support of Requested Order on Class 9 Accidents," dated April 28, 1978, p. 40.
51/ Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station) CLI-74-40, 8 AEC 809 52/
M. at 811-814 Of course even assuming, arguendo, that the Staff's 53/
Class 9 accident evaluation did constitute a challenge to the Commission's safety regulations, under 10 CFR 5 2.758, such a challenge may be entertained by the Commission itself in special circumstances.
. In any case, the license conditions recommended by the Staff in this proceeding were not recommended because the Staff thought the facility unacceptable as a safety matter (the Emergency Core Cooling System of the Applicant is reviewed against the criteria in 10 CFR 9 50.46 as part of the safety review of the facility).
Rather, the Class 9 analysis in the Staff's environmental statement was per-
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formed as part of the cost-benefit balancing required under NEPA; as the Commission has made clear, even residual risks -- those risks which remain despite compliance with all applicable regulations - "are appropriate for weighing in the NEPA context." b The Commission emphasized that NEPA " compels" such a balancing of residual risks against benefits."El This approach to residual risks under NEPA has been upheld by the courts.5_6_/ The required weighing of residual risk against benefits is precisely the subject of Part III of the Staff's Final Environmental Statement.
54/ Main _e_Ya_nkee _A_ tom _i_c Powe_r_ComJta_nj (Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station) CLI-74-2, 7 AEC 2, 4 (1974).
55/ M. at 4.
It should be emphasized again that the matter of whether the balancing was correctly done in this case is not before the Commission at this time. That is a matter to be determined by the factual record adduced before the Licensing Board in the first instance.
We argue here only that it is appropriate for the Staff to perfom the balancing and have the results thereof tonsidered by the Licensing Board.
Sy Citizens for Safe Power v. NRC, supra note 44.
Taken to its logical conclusion, Applicant's assertion that the Staff has violated Conmission regulations in dis-cussing Class 9 accidents runs contrary to Maine Yankee, since under that theory no evaluation of residual risk would ever be possible without challenging a regulation.
D.
THE EVALUATION OF CLASS 9 ACCIDENTS IN THIS CASE IS IN ACCORD WITH CURRENT STAFF INFORMAL LICENSING REVIEW PRACTICE AND DOES NOT SUBJECT APPLICANT TO UNEQUAL AND UNLAWFUL TREATMENT.
It is true that, as the Appeal Board noted in its opinion below, the Appeal Board decisions construing the old Annex as focusing on accident probability as the determining factor were in accord with the Staff's positions in those cases.
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The Class 9 accident evaluation that has been conducted in this case js a departure from the infomal Staff licensing review ;'ractice of several years ago. However, past Staff licensing practice has not always been entirely consistent.
For example, in the Bailly case the Staff's position was that no significant weight should be given to Class 9 accidents in the NEPA cost-benefit analysis of alternative sites because of the low probability of Class 9 accidents.
Yet a few years before Ballly the Staff had taken the opposite position in the Newbold Island case that the site was unacceptable because of concerns regarding impacts 57 of Class 9 accidents on nearby high population areas.
/
See NUREG-0473, October 1978, " Metropolitan Siting - A 5 '
Historical Perspective", at 12-13. The position of the Staff in Bailly was upheld by the Appeal Board. Northern Indiana Public Service Company (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear 1), ALAB-224, 9 AEC 244 (1974), affirming, LBP-74-19, 7 AEC 557 (1974), and on judicial review, Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League of America v.
AEC_, supra note 27. Newbold Island never reached the formal hearing stage, so there was no express adjudica-tory or judicial approval for the position taken by the Staff in that case.
Also, the Staff's NEPA review of the Clinch River Breeder _
Reactor included specific consideration of Class 9 accident risks (bothprobabilityandconsequences).b For land based light water nuclear power reactors, the concerns about Class 9 accidents have historically focused on the special problens considered to be posed by high popu-lation density sites. Beginning in November 1975, w'th the issuance of Regulatory Guide 4.7, Revision 1, " General Site Suitability Criteria for hoclear Power Stations", the Stcff infonnal licensing review practices with respect to the high population density question for land-based light water reactors crystallized and became uniform and more explicit.
Regulatory Guide 4.7, Revision 1 provided in Section C.3.
that:
If the population density, including weighted transient population, projected at the time of initial operation of a nuclear power station exceeds 500 persons per square mile averaged over any radial distance out to 30 miles (cumu-lative population at a distance divided by the area at that distance), or the projected popu-lation density over the lifetime of the facility exceeds 1,000 persons per square mile avernged over any radial distance out to 30 miles, special attention should be given to the con-sideration of alternative sites with lower population densities.
The provisions of the " Standard Review Plan", NUREG-75-107, are to the same effect:
58/ See NUREG-0139, February 1977, at 7-8 to 7-11.
If, at the CP stage, the population density, including weighted transient population, pro-jected at the time of initial plant operation exceeds 500 persons per square mile averaged over any radial distance out to 30 miles (cumu-lative population at a distance divided by the area at the distance), or the projected popula-tion density over the lifetime of the facility exceeds 1,000 persons per square mile averaged over any radial distance out to 30 miles, special attention should be given by the staff to the consideration of alternative sites in the environmental review.
It has consistently been the Staff's position that the "special consideration" called for by the Guide and Review Plan in the case of sites exceeding the population level
" trip points" entails a consideration of population exposures for Class 9 accidents at the proposed site and alternative This was the practice followed by the Staff in sites.
the recent Perryman early site review. S/
The positions expressed by the Staff in Regulatory Guide 4-7, Revision 1, and the Standard Review Plan are not part of the Commission's regulations. However, in partial response to a petition for rulenaking filed by Public Interest Research (Docket No. PRM-lC3-2), the Staff is recommer -
Group, et al.
ing to the Cocinission that a rulemaking proceeding be com-menced to incorporate the informal " criteria" of the Guide and Standard Review Plan into the Commission's NEPA regulations.
Sj/ NUREG -0478, supra note 52 at 13-14.
The Guide and Standard Review Plan cited above were developed with land-based light water power reactors in mind. The infonaal Staff review practice for nuclear plants with unusual designs or siting features has developed on an ad-hoc basis.
As indicated above, Class 9 accidents received explicit Naff consideration in the NEPA review for the proposed Clinch River Breeder Reactor, and, of course, there has been explicit Staff consideration of Class 9 accidents in this case.
In summary, the current infonnal Staff review practice may be expressed as follows:
there is no need for a detailed NEPA discussion of Class 9 accident risks in nuclear power reactor licensing proceedings unless the special circumstances of a particular case indicate that Class 9 accident risks may be unusually higher or of a different character than for the typical land based nuclear power reactor. To date only three types of special circumstances have been identified that would trigger a detailed Class 9 accident evaluation:
a high population density for the proposed site (above the
" trip points" in the Standard Review Plan and Regulatory Guide), a novel reactor design (a type of power reactor other than a light water power reactor), or a combination of a 4
unique design and a unique siting mode (an FNP).
\\
The evolutionary refining of review practices to look at Class 9 accidents in this situation is not inequitable.
An agency may and should develop new review practices as it gains in knowledge and experience. As stated in NLRB
- v. Weingarten, Inc.
... The use by an administrative agency of the evolutional approach is particularly fitting. To hold that the Board's earlier decisions froze the development of this important aspect of the...
law would misconceive the nature of administrative decisionmaking.
"' Cumulative experience' begets understanding and insight by which judgments...
are validated or qualified or invalidated. The constant process of trial and error, on a wider and fuller scale than a single adversary litiga-tion pennits, differentiates perhaps more than anything else the administrative from the judicial process.
NLRB v. Seven-up Co., 344 U.S. 344, 349 (1953).60/
The applicant in this proceeding is not being subjected to regulatory standards that are different from those that apply to other applicants. Every applicant knows, when it applies for a license or permit, that there will be no need for a detailed discussion of a core-melt event absent s_ome special circumstances. But the very purp sse of the Staff accident study here was to detennine if the OPS license application presented some special circumstances regarding the risks of core-melt accidents through the 1iquid pathway. Under the current Staff review practice, 60/ 420 U.S. 251, 265-266 (1975). See also, Public Interest
~
Research Group v. FCC, 522 F.2d lIi60,1065-lii6'6' (lH
~
~
~
Cir.1975); States Marine International, Inc. v. peierson, 518 F.2d 1070,1081 (EC Cir.1975).
this same treatment will be accorded any applicant whose facility prevents some special circumstances that may result in Class 9 accident risks which are substantially greater or different in character than the risks associated with typical previously licensed reactors,
- ether the applicant proposes to build a land-based plant or FNP.
The Appeal Board summarized the law on the matter of unequal treatment quite well:
OPS's second objection invokes the principle that it is arbitrary to treat similarly situated parties inconsistently. Applicant contends that to discuss the consequences of Class 9 accidents in connection with its application when the Staff has never done so in impact statements prepared on other proposals to build power reactors lacks " fundamental fairness" and is, therefore, impermissible.
We have no disagreement with the principle stated and we are in accord with the judicial and admin-istrative decisions (including our own) applying it that the applicant calls to our attention. But this does not advance applicant's cause. For reasons we previously discussed, the situation of a nuclear plant afloat is not the same as that of one on terra firma. The Staff is consequently correct in relying upon the principle that the law does not require consistency in treatment of two parties in different circumstances; what is required is a reasoned and reasor.able explanation why the differ-ences justify a departure from past agency practice.
The Staff has provided here an adequate explana-tion for conducting its study and discussing the results.61/
However one note of qualification must be added. The Staff in its brief below urged the Appeal Board to render a broadly 61/ ALAB-489 at 221-222 (footnotes omitted).
s applicable ruling that would have addressed the scopt of NEPA review of Class 9 accidents for both land-based plants and floating plants. Under the principal theory there advanced by the Staff, the Annex must be read as based upon both accident probabilities and consequences, and considera-tion should be given to Class 9 accident consequences for both land-based and floating plants wherever, because of some special design or siting circumstance, the Class 9 accident risks may be outside the envelope associated with typical individual plant risks. We make this same argument in this brief before the Commission (Section IV B., pages 32-41).
On the other hand, the Appeal Board in its decision below adopted the argument advanced in this brief regarding inapplicability of the Annex to FNP's (Section IVA., pages 14-31 supra).
It is possible that adoption of this argument may result in some theoretical inconsistency between FNP's and some hypothetical future land-based plants presenting similar accident risks. This is because construction of the Annex as inapplicable to FNP's will leave the Annex fully applicable to high population density land-based plants presenting higher risks, and will leave in effect a prior interpretation of the Annex that generally precludes a ly NEPA discussion of Class 9 accident risks for light water land-based reactors.
Given the highly controversial nature of the subject matter, it is entirely understandable that the Appeal Board chose to adopt a rationale that in effect, con-fined the holding to the facts of the OPS case, and left the matter of Class 9 accident consequences for land-based plants to rulemaking by the Commission.
As we have indicated, there is ample support for the Appeal Board's construction of the Annex as applying only to land-based plants. As we have said, this my result in some theoretical inconsistency. But, as Professor Davis, one of the foremost exponents of the use of general standards in the adminstrative process, has pointed out:
Even the Supreme Court is often inconsistent as every lawyer knows. Any judge or administrator who tries to build a body of case law on a complex subject is almost sure to be inconsistent to some extent.62/
Besides, as the Staff 'idicated in Section IV B. of this brief (pp. 32-41, supra), the Annex itself and the Commission regulations (10 CFR S2.758) will still permit evaluation of Class 9 accidents in some special cases of unusual risk.
It may very well be that the flexibility already inherent in the language of the Annex and Commission regulations will allow the Staff to perform Class 9 accident evaluations in all cases where the specific plant / site combination presents Class 9 accident risks comparable to the risks for FNP's.
D avis, " Administrative Law of the Seventies," 1976, D
617.07-1, p. 410.
Here we think that the possible future inconsistency is overshadowed by the benefits that broader publi. and industry participation can play in the resolution of tne Class 9 accident question for land-based plants. As indicated, the Staff is recommending to the Commission that it begin rule-making proceedings on the matter of consideration of Class 9 accidents for high population density land-based plants.
V. CONCLUSION We have shown above that the only Commission regulation (or proposed regulation used for " interim guidance")
arguably in point on the certified question -- proposed Annex A to 10 CFR Part SG, F jendix D -- does not apply to FNPs, and that therefore the Commission is free to adopt a position regarding Class 9 accidents in this case that comports with NEPA and that represents a reasonable response to the OPS application. We have established that consideration of Class 9 accidents in this case does in-deed comply with NEPA and does indeed represent a reason-able response to the unique nature of FNPs.
(Brief,Section IV A.)
We have established, alternatively, that even if the proposed Annex does apply to FNP's, the Annex and Commission regulations must be read so as to permit an evaluation of Class 9 accidents in the special circumstances of this case. This is because the focus of the whole proposed Annex is on risk (the product of probability and consequences), and the premise for the Annex's limitation on discussion of Class 9 accident risks -- that the
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Class 9 accident risks for the reactor in question fall within the envelope of typical licensed power reactors -- is inapplicable to FNP's (Brief,Section IV B.).
Finally, we have shown that consideration of Class 9 accidents in this case does not challenge any Commission regulations, (Brief,Section IV C.), is in accord with current Staff licensing review practices and does not subject OPS to unequal treatment compared to other applicants for pending applications (Brief,Section IV D. ).
h Accordingly, the Staff believes that Class 9 accidents are_
a acoper subject for consideration in the Staff's environmental statement on the FNP manufacturing license application, and that the answer to the certified question is a clear "yes".
Respectfully submitted, v
tepherf M. Sohinki Counsel for NRC Staff
/
/;.;
in r%'
N
't.
Martin G. Malsch Counsel for NRC Staff Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 12th day of January,1979.
p
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE COMMISSION In the Matter of 0FFSHORE POWER SYSTEMS 1
Docket No. STN 50-437
)
(Floating Nuclear Power Plants)
)
.?
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of "NRC STAFF'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF AFFIRMATIVE FINDING ON CERTIFIED QUESTION" in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class, or, as indicated by an asterisk by deposit in the Nuclear Regulatory Comission internal mail system, this 12th day of January,1979:
Richard S. Salzman, Esq., Chairman
- Mr. Lester Kornblith, Jr.*
Atomic Safety and Licensina Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 Vincent W Camobell, Esq.
Dr. John H. Buck
- Vice Pres, 'ent and General Counsel Atomic Safety and Licensing Offshore Pvver Systems Appeal Coard P.O. Box 8000 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 8000 Arlir.gton Expressway Washington, D.C.
20555 Jacksonville, Florida 32211 Michael C. Farrar, Esq.*
Dr. David L. Hetrick Atomic Safety and Licensing Professor of Nuclear Engineerinq Appeal Board The University of Nuclear Engineering U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commssion Tucson, Arizona 35721 Washington, D.C.
20555 Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary
- Office of the Secretary Sheldon J. Wolfe, Esq., Chairman
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Washington, D.C.
20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Richard M. Hluchan, E q.
Dr. David R. Schink Deputy Attorney General Departrent of Oceanoaraphy State of New Jersey Texas A & M University 36 West State Street College Sta tic.1, Texas 77840 Trenton, New Jersey 08625 Dr. Glenn L. Paulson Anthony Z. Roisman, Esq.
Assistant Commissioner of the Natural Resources Defense Council State of New Jersey 917 15th Street, N.W.
Department of Environmental Washington, D.C.
20005 Protection Labor & Industry Building
' Mary M. Chen, Esq.
John Fitch Plaza Suite 1000 Trenton, New Jersey 08625 600 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20037 Mr. Mitchell Attalla 4028 Ponce De Leon Avenue Barton Z. Cowan, Esq.
Jacksonville, Florida 32217 Eckert, Seamans, Cherin & Me!Iot Forty-Second Floor William Potter, Esq.
600 Grant Street Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219 Department of Public Advocate Division of Public Interest Advocate P.O. Box 141 Thomas M. Daugherty, Esq.
520 East State Street Offshore Power Systems Trenton, New Jersey 08625 8000 Arlington Expressway P.O. Box 8000 Atomic Safety and Licensing Jacksonville, Floriaa 32211 Board Panel
- U.S. Nuclear Renulatory Commission Mr. John H. Williamson Washing ton, D.C.
20555 211 Forest Drive Linwood, New Jersey 08221 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Panel
- City of Brigantine U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn:
Mr. George B. Ward Brigantine, New Jersey 08203 Washington, D.C.
20555 Docketing and Service Section*
Harold P. Green, Esq.
600 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Office of tne Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20037 Washington, D.C.
205d5 Carl Valore, Esq.
53b Tilton Road P.O. Box 152 Northfield, New Jersey 08225 Dr. Willard W. Rosenberg apq 8 N. Rumson Avenue Stephen [i.Sohinki I
Margate, New Jersey 08221 Counsel for NRC Staff Mr. Harold P. Abrams 9100 Amherst Avenue Margate, New Jersey 08402
- -