ML19249D066
| ML19249D066 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Triso-X |
| Issue date: | 09/11/2019 |
| From: | Maurer R, Wheeler J Triso-X, X-Energy |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards |
| Tiktinsky D | |
| References | |
| Download: ML19249D066 (30) | |
Text
IntegratedSafetyAnalysis ISAMethodsOverview 11September2019 JenniferWheeler,PE RobertMaurer RegulatoryAffairs,FuelProduction Part1(Open)
ISARegulationsandGuidance 10CFR70SubpartH,Additional RequirementsforCertain LicenseesAuthorizedtoPossessa CriticalMassofSpecialNuclear Material(SNM)
NUREG1520,StandardReview PlanforFuelCycleFacilities LicenseApplications NUREG1513,IntegratedSafety AnalysisGuidanceDocument 2
DOESTD11892016,DOEStandard,IntegrationofSafetyintothe DesignProcess DOEHDBK11002004,DOEHandbook,ChemicalProcessHazards Analysis DOEHDBK11632003,DOEHandbook,IntegrationofMultiple HazardAnalysisRequirementsandActivities Crowl,D.A.,etal.,ChemicalProcessSafetyFundamentalswith Applications,FourthEdition CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteof ChemicalEngineers,InherentlySaferChemicalProcesses,ALife CycleApproach,SecondEdition 3
AdditionalGuidance
CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteof ChemicalEngineers,GuidelinesforEngineeringDesignforProcess Safety,SecondEdition CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteof ChemicalEngineers,GuidelinesforRiskBasedProcessSafety 4
AdditionalGuidance
Integratedmeansjointconsiderationof,andprotectionfrom,all relevanthazardsdirectlyassociatedwithNRClicensedradioactive material,including:
NuclearCriticality RadiologicalExposure ChemicalExposure 5
ISAApplicability 10CFR70.4 10CFR70.62(c)
ChemicalExposure FromchemicalscomingledwithSNMorwereproducedfrom reactionswithSNM Fromconcurrentreleasethatresultsincominglingofchemicals andlicensedmaterials(seismic,fire,explosion,etc.)
Workerimpairmentduetoachemicalexposurefromchemicals, evenifnotcomingledwithlicensedmaterials,isevaluatedto ensurethereisnotanintermediateorhighconsequenceduetoa singlefailureofanadministrativeaction(shutdownequipment, mishandlecontainer,etc.)
6 ISAApplicability 10CFR70.4 10CFR70.62(c)
SNMReceipt,
- Storage, Package,Ship Dissolution SolGel Process Conversion Coating Overcoating Pebbles Cylindrical Compacts QualityLab+
BufferStorage Recovery WasteOps Facilitywide+
Utilities 7
TRISOXFuelFabricationFacilityProcessAreas
BaselineDesignCriteriaaslistedin70.64(a)(110)mustbe addressedinthedesignofnewfacilities Facilityandsystemdesignandfacilitylayoutmustbebasedon defenseindepthpracticesper70.64(b) 8 RequirementsforNewFacilities 10CFR70.64 Usingthesedesignpracticesresultsinafacilitydesignthat includessuccessivelevelsofprotection theneteffectisaconservativelydesignedfacilityand system
Qualitystandardsandrecords
- Industryrecognizedcodesandstandardsarebeingusedfromthe beginningofthedesignactivitytoensuregoodengineeringpracticesand safetymarginareappliedtothedesignofthefacilityanditssafety features ANSI,ASCE,ASME,ASTM,IBC,NEC,NFPA,OSHA,andothers
- Designofthefacility,equipment,andIROFSisbeingpreparedundera qualityprogram
- Designdetailsarethoroughlydocumentedandtherecordsarecontrolled 9
BaselineDesignCriteria 10CFR70.64(a)(1)
10 InherentlySafeDesignConcepts StrategiesbeingconsideredduringPreliminaryDesign Limitquantitiesofhazardousmaterialsavailableforrelease
- Bulkstorageoutside
- Smallerstoragevesselsinsidebuilding
- Meteringcolumnswithsiphonbreaks Substitutelesshazardouschemicalswherepossible Secondarycontainmenttofurtherreduceexposures Keyedconnectionsforportablecontainerstopreventwrong materialinputs
Chemicalprotection
- Relevantcodesandstandardsandgoodengineeringpracticesforthe expectedhazardsarebeingusedtoensurechemicalprocesssafetyis provided
- Designconsidersmaterialsofconstruction,equipmentsizing,andsystem fabricationtechniquestopreventchemicalaccidentsfromoccurring
- Inherentlysafedesignconcepts(minimize,substitute,moderate,simplify)
- Physicalbarriers/secondarycontainment(dikes,venthoods,gloveboxes, splashshields)
- Siphonbreaks,overflows,chemicaltraps/filters
- Leakdetection,hazardoussourceisolation,pressurereliefdevices 11 BaselineDesignCriteria 10CFR70.64(a)(5)
FireProtection
- Relevantcodesandstandardsfortheexpectedhazardsarebeingusedto ensureprotectionisprovidedagainstfiresandexplosions
- Noncombustiblematerialsofconstruction,firedetection,firesuppression
- Inspection,testing,andmaintenanceprogramsforfireprotectionsystems Environmentalanddynamiceffects
- Designaccountsfornormaloperations,maintenance,testing,andevents thatcouldleadtolossofsafetyfunctions
- Designconsidersexpectedoperatingconditions(vibration,temperature, pressure,corrosion,weatherconditions,impact,etc.)
12 BaselineDesignCriteria 10CFR70.64(a)(34)
DesignBasisNaturalPhenomenaEvent-Anearthquake,highwind,tornado,orflood eventthathasbeendeterminedtobeHighlyUnlikelyusingappropriateconsideration ofthemostseveredocumentedhistoricaleventsforthesite (1)
DesignBasisEarthquake-AmericanSocietyofEngineers(ASCE)716, MinimumDesignLoadsforBuildingsandOtherStructures (2)
DesignBasisHighWind-AmericanSocietyofEngineers(ASCE)716, MinimumDesignLoadsforBuildingsandOtherStructures (3)
DesignBasisTornado-NUREG/CR4461,Revision2,TornadoClimatologyof theContiguousUnitedStates (4)
DesignBasisFlood-FederalEmergencyManagementAgency,Flood InsuranceRateMaps Notexpectinghurricanetobeaconcernduetoinlandsitelocationsbeingconsidered;snow/
localsiterunoffwillbeaddressedtothedegreenecessarythroughdesign 13 NaturalPhenomena 10CFR70.62(c)(iv) 10CFR70.64(a)(2)
Emergencycapability-Relevantcodesandstandardsandgood engineeringpracticesareusedtoensurethedesignprovides
- Methodstopreventormitigatereleasesduringanemergency
- Meanstodetectcriticality,radiologicalandchemicalreleases,andfires
- Unobstructedroutestoenable Timelyevacuationofonsitepersonnel Safeandtimelyresponsetoemergencies Transportofinjuredpersonneltoonsiteandoffsitemedicalfacilities
- Ameanstonotifyandcoordinatewithbothonsiteandoffsiteemergency responsepersonnel 14 BaselineDesignCriteria 10CFR70.64(a)(6)
Utilityservices
- Facilityisbeingdesignedsothatlossofutilitiescausescontroldevicestofail inasafestateorcontinuedoperationofessentialutilityserviceswillbe provided Inspection,testing,andmaintenance
- DesignofIROFSallowsforperiodicinspection,testing,andmaintenance CriticalitySafety
- Designincludesadherencetothedoublecontingencyprinciple Instrumentationandcontrols
- Designincludesthegoalofhavingsupervisorysystemstomonitorand providestatusofIROFSsothatappropriateactionscanbetaken 15 BaselineDesignCriteria 10CFR70.64(a)(710)
Adesignphilosophy,appliedfromtheoutsetandthrough completionofthedesign,thatisbasedonprovidingsuccessive levelsofprotectionsuchthathealthandsafetywillnotbewholly dependentuponanysingleelementofthedesign,construction, maintenance,oroperationofthefacility Theneteffectisaconservativelydesignedfacilityandsystemthat willexhibitgreatertolerancetofailuresandexternalchallenges RiskinsightsgainedthroughperformanceoftheISAcanthenbe usedtosupplementthefinaldesignbyfocusingattentiononthe preventionandmitigationofthehigherriskpotentialaccidents 16 DefenseinDepth 10CFR70.64(b)
Thedesignmustincorporate,totheextentpracticable:
- Preferencefortheselectionofengineeredcontrolsoveradministrative controlstoincreaseoverallsystemreliability
- FeaturesthatenhancesafetybyreducingchallengestoIROFS 17 DefenseinDepth 10CFR70.64(b)
PrimaryGuidanceDocuments AssembleISATeam DetermineProcessHazardAnalysis(PHA)
Scope AssembleProcessSafetyInformation IdentifyHazards ConductPHA ConsequenceAnalysis 18 PHAMethod/Process
NUREG1513,IntegratedSafetyAnalysisGuidanceDocument CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteof ChemicalEngineers,GuidelinesforHazardEvaluationProcedures, ThirdEdition CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteof ChemicalEngineers,GuidelinesforProcessSafetyDocumentation 19 PrimaryGuidanceDocuments-PHA
ManagerprovidesoveralldirectionfortheISAprocess ISATeamLeader
- TrainedandknowledgeableinthePHAmethodschosen
- Adequateunderstandingofallprocessoperationsandhazards
- Nottheresponsible,cognizantengineerorexpertfortheevaluatedprocess ISATeam
- Atleastonememberknowledgeableinthetypeofprocessdesignunder evaluation
- Includesoneormoremembersfamiliarwiththesafetydisciplinesrelevant tohazardsthatcouldcrediblybepresentintheprocess 20 AssembleISATeam 10CFR70.62(c)(2)
Consequencesofconcern-radiological,nuclearcriticality,and certainchemicalaccidentsthatcanaffectworkersorthepublic Physicalscope-sitecharacteristics,structuresonthesite, equipmentandmaterialsinuse,processoperations,and personneloperatingthefacility
- Credibleexternalmeteorologicalandseismiceventsthatcancause accidentsatthefacility
- Eventsfromfiresexternaltothefacility,transportationaccidents,and accidentsatnearbyindustrialfacilities Initialconditionsandboundingassumptions 21 DeterminePHAScope
Informationpertainingtothehazardsofthematerialsusedand producedintheprocess
- ChemicalandphysicalformsofSNMinprocess areas,includingproperties suchasinformationonSafetyDataSheets
- MaximumamountsofSNMinprocessareas
- Amountsanddischargepointsofwastestreamsandeffluents Informationregardingthetechnologyoftheprocess
- Blockorflowdiagrams
- Outlineofprocesschemistry
- Safeupperandlowerlimitsforcontrolledparameters(temperature, pressure,etc.)
22 ProcessSafetyInformation 10CFR70.62(b)
Informationpertainingtotheequipmentusedintheprocess
- Materialsofconstruction
- Pipingandinstrumentationdiagrams
- Buildingandequipmentlayouts
- Ventilation
- Designcodesandstandards
- Materialandenergybalances
- ElectricalClassification
- Designbasis 23 ProcessSafetyInformation 10CFR70.62(b)
Identifyallcredibleaccidentsequencesfromasingleupset event Unmitigatedconsequences Choiceofmethod
- BasedonguidelinesinNUREG1513
- Dependsoncomplexityoftheprocessbeinganalyzed,severityofthe hazards,andperceivedriskoftheprocess
- TypicalmethodsusedareWhatIf/ChecklistandHazardand OperabilityAnalysis(HAZOP) 24 ConductPHA 10CFR70.62(c)(iiv)
Credibleaccidentsequenceswiththepotentialofresultingina criticalityareassumedtobeHighconsequenceevents Doublecontingencyevaluationensuresthatnosinglecredible upsetcanresultinapossiblecriticality RiskAssessmentprovidesbasisforpreventivecontrolsdesignated asIROFS 25 NuclearCriticalitySafetyEvaluation 10CFR70.61(b) 10CFR70.61(d)
Evaluationofunmitigatedradiologicalandchemicalaccident sequencestodetermineconsequencelevel(low,intermediate,or high)for
- Workers
- Anyindividuallocatedoffsite
- Offsitereleasestotheenvironmentgreaterthan5000timestheeffluent limits Airborneandliquidreleases 26 AccidentConsequenceEvaluation(ACE)
Stressesarephysicalforcesthatcausematerialtobereleased Typesofstresses
- Mechanical
- Fires
- Explosions 27 AccidentConsequenceEvaluation(ACE)
28 ACEExposurePathways Inhalationisthedominantexposuremechanismforairborne releases
- Powderspills
- Liquidspills
- Gasreleases Ingestionisthedominantexposuremechanismforliquidreleases offsite
29 ACEConsequenceLevels 10CFR70.61RadiologicalandChemicalConsequenceExposureLevels Consequence Level Radiological Chemical Worker Public/Environment Worker Public/Environment High TEDE100rem TEDE25rem CHEM3 400mgsolubleU*
CHEM2 30mgsolubleU Intermediate 100rem>
TEDE 25rem 25rem>
TEDE 5rem 5000x10CFR20,
- Table2, App.Blimitsaveraged over24hourperiod CHEM2
<CHEM3 150mg*and<400 mgsolubleU CHEM1
<CHEM2 10mg**and<30 mgsolubleU Low TEDE<25rem
<IntermediateLevels
<IntermediateLevels
<IntermediateLevels CHEM=AEGL,ERPG,orTEEL
- ISG14,Revision0
- NUREG1391andDOESTD11362017 10CFR70.61
AcuteExposureGuidelinesLevels(AEGL)UsedifAvailable EmergencyResponsePlanningGuidelines(ERPG)ifnoAEGL TemporaryEmergencyExposureLevel(TEEL)ifnoERPG SolubleUraniumIntakeLimitsarebasedISG14,NUREG1391, DOESTD11362017,and10CFR70.61ratherthan AEGL/ERPG/TEELs Sources:
- EPAWebsite,AccessAcuteExposureGuidelineLevels(AEGLs)Values, https://www.epa.gov/aegl/accessacuteexposureguidelinelevelsaegls values#chemicals
- ProtectiveActionCriteriaPACDatabase,https://sp.eota.energy.gov/pac/
30 ChemicalExposureLimits