ML18361A535
| ML18361A535 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Watts Bar  |
| Issue date: | 11/01/2018 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | Tennessee Valley Authority |
| References | |
| Download: ML18361A535 (59) | |
Text
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Watts Bar Date of Examination: September 2018 Examination Level:
RO SRO Operating Test Number: 2018-301 Administrative Topic (see Note)
Type Code*
Describe activity to be performed Conduct of Operations R, N Cooldown Rate Evaluation SI-68-44, RCS Temperature / Pressure Limits and Pressure Temperature Limits K/A Conduct of Ops: 2.1.7 (4.4): Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.
Conduct of Operations R, N 1-AOI-6, Small RCS Leak, App. B RCS Leak Rate Determination K/A Conduct of Ops: 2.1.7 (4.4): Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.
Equipment Control R, N Perform 1-SI-63-901-A, Safety Injection Pump 1A-A Quarterly Performance Test K/A Equipment Control 2. 2.12 (3.7) Knowledge of surveillance procedures.
Radiation Control R, N Calculate the expected dose for a task provided dose rate and task duration estimates.
Determine if Radiation Protection Manager authorization required for exceeding TVA Administrative Dose Limits.
K/A Radiation Control 2.3.4 (3.2): Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions.
Emergency Plan N/A N/A NOTE: All items (five total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only four items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics (which would require all five items).
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1
- Type Codes & Criteria:
(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)
(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)
Conduct of Operations 1. (3-OT-J8A-0-1AR-SI6844) Examinees will perform a cooldown rate calculation IAW 1-SI-68-44, RCS Temperature/Pressure Limits and Pressurizer Temperature Limits, Section 6.3, Manual Calculation of Cooldown. Appendix A, RCS Temperature and Pressures Limits Data Sheet, and Appendix B, PZR Temperature and Pressures Limits Data Sheet, will be completed for the previous 45 minutes (data intervals are 15 minutes). Images of instrumentation used for the calculations showing values at current time will be provided to the examinees, and the examinees will complete the next row in Appendix A and Appendix B including checking for acceptance criteria.
Conduct of Operations 2. (3-OT-J8A-0-1AR-A6B) Examinees will perform an RCS leak rate estimate IAW 1-AOI-6, Small RCS Leak, Appendix B, Estimation of RCS Leakage Using VCT and PZR Level. First row in Appendix B will be completed (t0). Images of instrumentation used for the estimation showing values at a current time will be provided to the examinees, and the examinees will perform the specified calculation.
Equipment Control. (3-OT-J8A-0-1AR-SI6391) Examinees will be provided with a 1-SI-63-901-A, Safety Injection Pump 1A-A Quarterly Performance Test, package from the field (AUOs recorded information, completed calculations and signed off field steps). Examinees will review flow calculation IAW Section 6.0, Performance, step [11] and differential pressure calculation IAW Section 6.0 step [14]. Examinees will determine if calculations were performed correctly and if flow, differential pressure and pump and motor vibration are within acceptable ranges IAW Section 6.0 steps [15], [18] and [19].
Radiation Control. (3-OT-J8A-0-1AR-R15) Using dose rate and task duration estimate information provided, examinees will determine the Total Effective Dose Equivalent (no internal radiation concerns) for a specified task during a radiological emergency. Examinees will also determine if Radiation Protection Manager authorization required for exceeding TVA Administrative Dose Limits..
Emergency Plan. Not evaluated for RO examinees.
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Watts Bar Date of Examination: September 2018 Examination Level:
RO SRO Operating Test Number: 2018-301 Administrative Topic (see Note)
Type Code*
Describe activity to be performed Conduct of Operations R, N Cooldown Rate Evaluation SI-68-44, RCS Temperature / Pressure Limits and Pressure Temperature Limits (SRO to also evaluate appropriate LCOs)
K/A Conduct of Ops: 2.1.7 (4.7): Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.
Conduct of Operations R, N 1-AOI-6, Small RCS Leak, App. B RCS Leak Rate Determination (SRO to also evaluate appropriate LCOs)
K/A Conduct of Ops: 2.1.7 (4.7): Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.
Equipment Control R, N Perform 1-SI-63-901-A, Safety Injection Pump 1A-A Quarterly Performance Test (SRO to also evaluate appropriate LCOs)
K/A Equipment Control 2. 2.12 (4.1) Knowledge of surveillance procedures.
Radiation Control R, N Calculate the expected dose for a task provided dose rate and task duration estimates.
Determine if Site Emergency Director (SED) can authorize task performance.
K/A Radiation Control 2.3.4 (3.7): Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions.
Emergency Plan R, N REP Classification and State Notification (SAE based on Failure of Reactor Protection)
K/A Emergency Procedures 2.4.29 (4.4):
Knowledge of the emergency plan.
NOTE: All items (five total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only four items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics (which would require all five items).
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1
- Type Codes & Criteria:
(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)
(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)
Conduct of Operations 1. (3-OT-J8A-0-1AS-SI6844) Examinees will perform a cooldown rate calculation IAW 1-SI-68-44, RCS Temperature/Pressure Limits and Pressurizer Temperature Limits, Section 6.3, Manual Calculation of Cooldown. Appendix A, RCS Temperature and Pressures Limits Data Sheet, and Appendix B, PZR Temperature and Pressures Limits Data Sheet, will be completed for the previous 45 minutes (data intervals are 15 minutes). Images of instrumentation used for the calculations showing values at current time will be provided to the examinees, and the examinees will complete the next row in Appendix A and Appendix B including checking for acceptance criteria. SRO examinees will evaluate results to determine Technical Specifications Required Actions Technical Requirements Manual Required Actions.
Conduct of Operations 2. (3-OT-J8A-0-1AS-A6B) Examinees will perform an RCS leak rate estimate IAW 1-AOI-6, Small RCS Leak, Appendix B, Estimation of RCS Leakage Using VCT and PZR Level. First row in Appendix B will be completed (t0). Images of instrumentation used for the estimation showing values at a current time will be provided to the examinees, and the examinees will perform the specified calculation. SRO examinees will evaluate Technical Specifications Required Actions.
Equipment Control. (3-OT-J8A-0-1AS-SI6391) Examinees will be provided with a 1-SI-63-901-A, Safety Injection Pump 1A-A Quarterly Performance Test, package from the field (AUOs recorded information, completed calculations and signed off field steps). Examinees will review flow calculation IAW Section 6.0, Performance, step [11] and differential pressure calculation IAW Section 6.0 step [14]. Examinees will determine if calculations were performed correctly and if flow, differential pressure and pump and motor vibration are within acceptable ranges IAW Section 6.0 steps [15], [18] and [19].
SRO examinees will evaluate Technical Specifications Required Actions.
Radiation Control. (3-OT-J8A-0-1AS-R15) Using dose rate and task duration estimate information provided, examinees will determine the Total Effective Dose Equivalent (no internal radiation concerns) for a specified task during a radiological emergency. Examinees will determine if the Site Emergency Director can authorize the task performance.
Emergency Plan. (3-OT-J8A-0-1AS-R1) SRO examinees will assume the role of Site Emergency Director and classify an ATWS event IAW EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Logic, Emergency Action Limit (EAL) 2.3, Failure of Rx Protection. SRO examinees will declare a SITE AREA EMERGENCY within 15 minutes of being provided the data. (Time Critical)
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Watts Bar Date of Examination: September 2018 Exam Level:
RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test No.: 2018-301 Control Room Systems:* 8 for RO; 7 for SRO-I; 2 or 3 for SRO-U System / JPM Title Type Code*
Safety Function
- a. Shutdown Bank Withdrawal 001 A2.11 (4.4/4.7)
Withdraw Shutdown Banks IAW 1-SOI-85.01, Control Rod Drive and Indication System (Shutdown Bank B begins continuous withdrawal)
A, L, N, S 1
- b. CLA Isolation 006 A4.02 (4.0/3.8)
Isolate CLAs IAW 1-E-1 (2 CLAs Required to be Vented)
A, EN, M, S 3
- c. Transfer Steam Dump Mode 041 A4.08 (3.0/3.1)
Transfer Steam Dumps to Tavg mode IAW 1-GO-3 Section 5.5 (Steam Dumps Fail Open)
A, N, S 4S
- d. RCP Transfer 002 A2.03 (4.1/4.3)
RCP 2 Board Transfer (Alternate to Normal) (Subsequent RCP Trip)
A, N, S 4P
- e. PORV Failure 010 A2.03 (4.1/4.2)
Vent the PRT IAW 1-ARI-88-94, Reactor Coolant System (Pressurizer PORV failing OPEN and associate block valve failing to CLOSE)
A, M, S 5
- f. Establish Charging and Letdown 011 A4.01 (3.5/3.2)
Establish Charging and Letdown IAW 1-AOI-20, Attachment 1 N, S 2
- g. Restore PRNI 015 A2.01 (3.5/3.9)
Return PRNI N-42 to service IAW 1-AOI-4 Attachment 2 Section 2.0 M, S 7
- h. Alternate Thermal Barrier Booster Pumps 008 A4.01 (3.3/3.1)
Alternate Unit 1 Thermal Barrier Booster Pumps IAW 0-SOI-70.01, Section 8.7 (RO ONLY)
N, S 8
In-Plant Systems* (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)
System / JPM Title Type Code*
Safety Function
- i. ATWS 001 A2.13 (4.4/4.6)
Trip the Unit 2 Reactor from the 480V Unit Boards IAW 2-FR-S.1 E, M 1
- j. Containment Integrity during LOCA 028 A2.02 (3.5/3.9)
Open Ice Condenser AHU Breakers IAW 2-E-0 Attachment 5 E, M 5
Isolate the Unit 2 RCP Seal Injection, Seal Return IAW 2-ECA-0.0 E, M, R 2
All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all five SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant (EN)gineered safety feature (L)ow-Power / Shutdown (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A)
(P)revious 2 exams (R)CA (S)imulator 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 9 / 8 / 4 1 / 1 / 1 1 / 1 / 1 (control room system) 1 / 1 / 1 2 / 2 / 1 3 / 3 / 2 (randomly selected) 1 / 1 / 1
Shutdown Bank Withdrawal. (3-OT-J8A-1-1SI-A2) Examinees will assume the shift with Unit 1 in MODE 3. 1-GO-2, Reactor Startup, has been completed through Section 5.2, Actions Performed Before Reactor Startup, step [11.9].
Step [11.10] has the examinees withdraw Shutdown Banks IAW 1-SOI-85.01, Control Rod Drive and Indication System, Section 5.4, Shutdown Banks Withdrawal. 1-SOI-85.01 Section 5.4 has been completed through step [7].
Step [8] will have the examinees place 1-RBSS, ROD BANK SELECTOR SWITCH, to the Shutdown Bank A position and withdraw SBA to 225 steps (full out position provided on cue sheet). When examinees select Shutdown Bank B position with 1-RBSS, all SBB rods will begin to withdraw at 64 steps per minute. Examinees will be required to Trip the Reactor IAW the Immediate Action of 1-AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System, Section 3.2, Uncontrolled Rod Bank Movement or Instrument Failure.
CLA Isolation. (3-OT-J8A-1-1SI-E1 modified from 3-OT-J1E-1-1SI-E1). Examinees will assume the shift with the Reactor Tripped and Safety Injection initiated due to a Loss of Coolant Accident. 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, step [25] is being performed to determine if Cold Leg Accumulators should be isolated. 1-E-1 Appendix A, CLA Breaker Operation, (step [25.a]) is complete. Examinees will verify RCS pressure is less than 300 psig, and then perform the remainder of step [25]. Reactor MOV Board 1A1-A has lost power. 1-FCV-63-118, CLA 1 OUTLET ISOLATION, and 1-FCV-63-80, CLA 3 OUTLET ISOLATION, can NOT be CLOSED from 1-M-6. Examinees will exercise the RNO of step [25.c] to vent CLAs 1 and 3. Examinees will CLOSE 1-FCV-63-98, CLA 2 OUTLET ISOLATION, and 1-FCV-63-67, CLA 4 OUTLET ISOLATION, from 1-M-6.
Transfer Steam Dump Mode. (3-OT-J8A-1-1SI-S102) Examinees will assume the shift with Unit 1 in MODE 1 at 15% power and the previous crew having just synchronized the Main Generator IAW 1-GO-3, Unit Startup from Less Than 4% Reactor Power to 30% Reactor Power, Section 5.4, Roll Turbine and Synchronize Generator. 1-GO-3 Section 5.5, Raise Reactor Power to Between 20% and 24%, is complete through step [4]. Examinees will perform step [5] to transfer Steam Dump system to Tavg mode of operation. When 1-HS-1-103B, STEAM DUMP FSV B, is place to ON, Steam Dumps will OPEN requiring examinees to return either 1-HS-1-103A or 1-HS-1-103B to OFF to stop the inadvertent cooldown IAW 1-AOI-38, Main Steam or Feedwater Line Break, step [3].
RCP Transfer. (3-OT-J8A-1-1SI-S202) Examinees will assume the shift with Unit 1 in MODE 1 at 15% power and the previous crew having just synchronized the Main Generator IAW 1-GO-3, Unit Startup from Less Than 4% Reactor Power to 30% Reactor Power, Section 5.4, Roll Turbine and Synchronize Generator. 1-GO-3 Section 5.4 step [19.3]
is in progress. All 6.9kV Unit Boards have been transferred to NORMAL. Examinees will transfer 6.9kV RCP Boards IAW 1-SOI-202, 6.9kV RCP Board, series of instructions. RCP Board 1A will transfer successfully. RCP Board 1B NORMAL breaker will fail to CLOSE causing a loss of Unit 1 RCP 2. Examinees will Trip the Unit 1 Reactor IAW 1-AOI-24, RCP Malfunctions During Pump Operation, Section 3.2, RCP Tripped or Shutdown Required, step [3]. 1-RT-1 (typically used and closest to the RCP handswitches) on 1-M-4 will fail to trip the reactor. Examinee will use 1-RT-2 on 1-M-6 to successfully trip the reactor. WBN UNIT 1 OPERATING EXPERIENCE.
PORV Failure. (3-OT-J8A-1-1SI-S68 modified from 3-OT-J2D-1-1SI-S68-1) Examinees will assume the shift with Unit 1 in MODE 1 at 100% power. Pressurizer Relief Tank alarm 88-C, PRT PRESS HI, is LIT, and ARI actions are complete through step [7]. Examinees will reduce PRT pressure IAW ARI 88-C step [8]. When 1-HS-68-301A [1-M-5]
is taken to OPEN, PZR PORV 340A will OPEN, and examinees will be unable to CLOSE the PORV with the associated handswitch as required by 1-AOI-18, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control System, Section 3.2, PZR Pressure Drop Due to Failed PORV/Safety or Spray Valve, Immediate Action step [2]. Examinees will NOT be able to CLOSE the associate PORV Block valve IAW Immediate Action step [2]. Automatic Reactor Trip on Low Pressurizer Pressure has failed. Examinees must manually Trip the Reactor IAW 1-AOI-18 step [3].
Establish Charging and Letdown. (3-OT-J8A-0-1SI-A20) Examinees will assume the shift with Unit 1 in MODE 1 at 100% power. CCP 1A-A previously tripped, and the operating crew isolated Letdown (1-FCV-62-69 and 1-FCV-62-70 CLOSED) IAW 1-AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System, Section 3.3, Loss of Charging or Abnormal Charging Flow, step [3]. 1-AOI-20 Section 3.3 is completed through step [9] with CCP 1B-B in service.
Examinees will establish Charging and Letdown IAW 1-AOI-20 Section 3.3 step [10] RNO and 1-AOI-20 Attachment 1, Alignment of Charging and Letdown. All PZR level inputs to DCS remained valid.
Return PRNI. (3-OT-J8A-0-1SI-A4 modified from 3-OT-J1D-1-1SI-A40) Examinees will assume the shift with Unit 1 in MODE 1 at 100% power. Power Range Nuclear Instrument Channel II, N-42, failed on previous shift, and 1-AOI-4, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunctions, Section 3.4 Power Range Monitor Failure, was entered, and Attachment 2, N-42 PRM Function at NIS Rack, Section 1.0 was used to defeat N-42. MIG has repaired N-42, and 1-AOI-4 Section 3.4 is complete through step [15]. Examinees will restore N-42 IAW 1-AOI-4 Attachment 2 Section 2.0 which involves placing 1-RBSS, ROD BANK SELECTOR SWITCH, to MANUAL; restoring N-42 to the Upper and Lower comparators for QPTR; restoring N-42 input to the Rod Stop; restoring N-42 to the overall comparator; and restoring the N-42 signal to DCS.
Alternate Thermal Barrier Booster Pumps (RO ONLY). (3-OT-J8A-0-1SI-S70) Examinees will assume the shift with Unit 1 in MODE 1 at 100% power. To support maintenance, examinees will start TBBP 1B-B and stop TBBP 1A-A IAW 0-SOI-70.01, CCS, Section 8.7, Alternating Unit 1 Thermal Barrier Booster Pumps. Examinees must ensure both handswitches are returned to A-P AUTO and that flow is within normal range.
ATWS. (3-OT-J8A-0-2TB-FS1 modified from 3-OT-J1G-0-1TB-FS1) Examinees will assume the shift as Support AUO with Unit 2 in MODE 1 and 2-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS, entered due to a failure of the Unit 2 Reactor to Trip from the MCR. The examinees will be required to locate and simulate OPENING the Rod Control MG Set supply breakers on 480V Unit Boards 2A and 2B IAW 2-FR-S.1 step [9.a] RNO.
Containment Integrity During LOCA. (3-OT-J8A-0-2AB-E0 modified from 3-OT-J1G-0-2CB-E0) Examinees will assume the shift at the Control Building AUO on Unit 2. Unit 2 has experienced a Reactor Trip and Safety Injection.
Examinees will perform Attachment 5, Ice Condenser AHU Breaker Operation, directed by 2-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendix A, Equipment Verification, step [11]. Examinees will be required to locate and simulate OPENING the Ice Condenser Air Handling Unit breakers on both Trains of Unit 2 Reactor Vent Boards. All (4) breakers must be located and simulated OPEN.
CVCS and CCS Isolations on Station Blackout. (3-OT-J8A-0-2AB-EC0 modified from 3-OT-J1E-0-1AB-EC0)
Examinees will assume the shift as Support AUO with Unit 2 in MODE 3 following a Unit 2 Reactor Trip due to the loss of BOTH Unit 2 6.9kV Shutdown Boards. Crew is performing 2-ECA-0.0, Loss of Shutdown Power. Examinees are directed to complete 2-ECA-0.0 Appendix A, RCP Seals and Thermal Barrier Isolation, Section 2.0, Local Actions
- Performed by AUO. Examinees will be required to locate and simulate CLOSED the in-service Seal Water Injection Filter Outlet Isolation Valve, and simulate verifying the out-of-service filter isolation valve and bypass valve CLOSED.
The examinees will then be required to locate the Seal Water Return Filter Inlet Isolation Valve and simulate it CLOSED.
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Site name: L/4-jLç-
Exam Date:
c? C OPERATING TEST TOTALS Total Total Total Total Explanation Unsat.
Edits Sat.
Unsat.
C Admin.
JPMs 0
Sim./ln-Plant JPMs II 0
Scenarios 0
0 Op. Test Totals:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
ic Instructions for Completing This Table:
Update data for this table from quality reviews and totals in the previous tables and then calculate the percentage of total items that are unsatisfactory and give an explanation in the space provided.
Enter the total number of items submitted for the operating test in the Total column.
For example, if nine administrative JPMs were submitted, enter 9 in the Total items column for administrative JPMs.
For scenarios, enter the total number of simulator scenarios.
Enter the total number of (U)nsatisfactory JPMs and scenarios from the two JPMs column 5 and simulator scenarios column 8 in the previous tables.
Provide an explanation in the space provided.
Enter totals for (E)nhancements needed and (S)atisfactory JPM5 and scenarios from the previous tables.
This task is for tracking only.
Total each column and enter the amounts in the Op. Test Totals row.
Calculate the percentage of the operating test that is fU)nsatisfactory (Op. Test Total Unsat.)/(Op. Test Total) and place this value in the bolded % Unsat. cell.
Refer to ES-501, E.3.a, to rate the overall operating test as follows:
satisfactory, if the Op. Test Total % Unsat. is 20%
unsatisfactory, if Op. Test Total % Unsat. is > 20%
Update this table and the tables above with post-exam changes if the as-administered operating test required content changes, including the following:
The JPM performance standards were incorrect.
The administrative JPM tasks/keys were incorrect.
CTs were incorrect in the scenarios (not including postscenario critical tasks defined in Appendix D).
The EOP strategy was incorrect in a scenario(s).
TS entries/actions were determined to be incorrect in a scenario(s).
ES-301, Page 33 of 33
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301 -7 Facility: \\jf4-1 Exam Date:
1 2
3 4
5 6
ADMIN Attributes Job Content Admin JPMs Topic COD U/EIS Explanation and K/A (1-5)
I/C Critical Scope Pen.
Job Cues Overlap Key Minutia Focus Steps (NIB)
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ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301 -7 Facihty:
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Exam Date:
1 2
3 4
5 6
7 8
11 Scenario Event Events TS TS CT CT k Unsat.
Explanation Scenario UfEIS Totals Unsat.
Total Unsat.
Total Unsat.
Elements I
0 OO 5
17 0
0 0
5 3
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5 4
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1 Instructions for Completing This Table:
Check or mark any item(s) requiring comment and explain the issue in the space provided.
1, 3, 5 For each simulator scenario, enter the total number of events (column 1), TS entries/actions (column 3), and CTs (column 5).
This number should match the respective scenario from the event-based scenario tables (the sum from columns 1, 6, and 7, respectively).
2, 4, 6 For each simulator scenario, evaluate each event, TS, and CT as (S)atisfactory, fE)nhance, or (U)nsatisfactory based on the following criteria:
a.
Events.
Each event is described on a Form ES-D-2, including all switch manipulations, pertinent alarms, and verifiable actions.
Event actions are balanced between at-the-controls and balance-of-plant applicants during the scenario.
All event-related attributes on Form ES-301-4 are met.
Enter the total number of unsatisfactory events in column 2.
b.
TS.
A scenario includes at least two IS entries/actions across at least two different events.
IS entries and actions are detailed on Form ES-D-2.
Enter the total number of unsatisfactory IS entries/actions in column 4.
(ES-301, D.5d) c.
CT.
Check that a scenario includes at least two preidentified CTs.
This criterion is a target quantitative attribute, not an absolute minimum requirement.
Check that each CT is explicitly bounded on Form ES-D-2 with measurable performance standards (see Appendix D).
Enter the total number of unsatisfactory CTs in column 6.
2+4+6 7
In column 7, calculate the percentage of unsatisfactory scenano elements:
(1 + 3 +) 100%
8 If the value in column 7 is > 20%, mark the scenario as (U)nsatisfactory in column 8.
If column 7 is 20%, annotate with (E)nhancement or (S)atisfactory.
9 In column 9, explain each unsatisfactory event, IS, and CT.
Editorial comments can also be added here.
Save initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound scenario is marked by a (S)atisfactory resolution on this form.
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Facility: \\1.JArr6 GAR Scenario:.1-Exam Date: 2018 1
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ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-30f-7 Facility:
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ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Facility:
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Comments discussed/resolved.
Simulator Scenario Comments
- 1. General: This is just a reminder for everyone to track opportunities for Manual Control of Auto Function during prep week in case that needs to be incorporated into schedule development.
- 2. General: Any component or instrument malfunction that occurs prior to the reactor trip should be evaluated for potential RPS actuation if the operators were to take no actions to address the malfunction. If an RPS actuation would occur due to lack of operator response, then the event likely contains a pre-identified critical task (CT). The RPS actuation must occur within the time the scenario will allow for it (I.E. within a couple of hours).
- 3. Scenario 2 / Event 3: If the dilution is never terminated, will the RPS actuate? If so, then this would likely be a pre-identified CT.
- 4. Scenario 2 / Event 4: If CCS Pump 1B-B is not manually started, will any equipment, such as RCPs, be impacted such that RPS will eventually actuate within the timeframe of the scenario?
- 5. Scenario 3 / CT 1: What if crew establishes FW to SG prior to bleed and feed criteria being met, yet SG level is less than 5%? Do they fail CT 1? Discuss the criteria for CT 1.
- 6. Scenario 3 / Event 3: If an operator takes no action, will the RPS actuate? If so, then this would likely be a pre-identified CT.
- 7. Scenario 4 / Event 4: An auto divert will result from the failure. If the operator does nothing will the charging suction roll over to the RWST? If this occurs, and the operator does nothing, will the RPS eventually actuate? If so, then this would likely be a pre-identified CT.
- 8. Scenario 4 / Event 5: What happens if the redundant ERCW pump is not started? Will the RPS eventually actuate? If so, then this would likely be a pre-identified CT.
- 9. Scenario 5 / Event 4: When the PT fails low, will the RPS actuate if operators do nothing? If so, then this would likely be a pre-identified CT.
- 10. Scenario 6 only contains on Tech Spec evaluation. This is just a reminder to incorporate this limitation into the schedule.
- 11. Scenario 6 / Event 3: Does the operator have to take manual control? What happens if the operator does not take manual control?
Systems JPM Comments
- 1. JPM A: The Task Standard does not bound when the reactor must be tripped. At what point does the applicant fail if the reactor remains untripped?
- 2. JPM A / JPM Step 10: It appears that the applicant would accomplish the intent of the procedure step by going to AUTO. Discuss modifying the JPM to ensure that going to AUTO does not stop rod motion.
- 3. JPM C: The Task Standard does not bound when the cooldown must be stopped. A bounding criteria should be established.
- 4. JPM D: The Safety Function designation was not changed on the Outline. It looks like it was changed within the JPM itself, but the Outline was not updated.
- 5. JPM E: What is the significance of the 1500 psig criteria? This comments is not requesting change, but just to educate on the chosen criteria.
- 6. JPM E / JPM Step 8: The actions within this step (closing PORV and BV) appear to be necessary actions to accomplish the presented task. I believe it is critical to manipulate the switches even though they will not be successful. Look at it this way - If an operator does not attempt to manipulate these switches and goes directly to performing the actions of the alternate path, without knowing whether those switches would work, did that operator show adequate knowledge and ability to pass the task? If by happenstance, the JPM was not faulted, the operator that performs in such a manner would have taken drastic action unnecessarily. [A helpful way for me to analyze the critical nature of a step is to ask whether doing the step correctly would impact either the task as presented or the alternate path. If the answer to either of these is yes, then there is a good chance that it should be a critical step.]
- 7. JPM I: The Outline description still states time critical. It appears that the JPM itself was updated, but the outline was not.
Also the KA may still need to be updated to reflect the proper Safety Function.
Admin JPM Comments
- 1. JPM 1R/1S: Some JPM steps are marked as not being critical steps when a determination that acceptance criteria is met needs to be made. It may be appropriate to have those steps marked as critical because if an applicant is incorrectly determining that acceptance criteria is not met, when they actually are met, then that applicant should not satisfactorily complete the task.
- 2. JPM 1S: How is the SRO being tested at the SRO level on this task? LCO Entry Conditions and cooldown limits appear that they would be RO required knowledge. If LCO greater than one hour actions are required, then the task would be elevated to the SRO level.
- 3. JPM 2R: Notes indicate that more accuracy is obtained by using longer time periods. I agree when at steady state with low operational leakage. In times of elevated leakage, if the leak worsens, the accuracy may go down by using a longer time period.
- 4. JPM 2S: Is enough information provided to ensure that the leakage is UNIDENTIFIED? In other words, is sufficient information provided to eliminate other types of leakage?
- 5. JPM 2R/2S: The Initiating Cue does not instruct the applicants on how to do the calculation.
Only certain indications are being provided - only the necessary indications. By only providing relevant information, is a cue being given to the applicant? Why are charging flow, letdown flow, and seal flows not being provided? Some of these indications could potentially be misapplied. Discuss options.
- 6. JPM 3R/3S: Placing a NOTE on the cue sheet to have them do something that is not procedurally directed is not operationally valid. The note will need to be deleted. Acceptance Bands will need to be added to accommodate answers where rounding or truncation are likely.
- 7. JPM 4R: The survey map indicates that the location of work will have a dose of 30 mrem/hour at 30 cm. The instructions to the applicant are to stand 1 foot from the work location. Will applicants attempt to calculate what the dose rate will be at 1 foot, or will they use the 30 cm rate? Which is correct?
- 8. JPM 4R: Whenever an answer depends on truncation or rounding, an acceptance band should be used to accommodate the answer. In reality does it really matter if someone calculates 5.33 mrem? What if they truncate to 5 mrem or conservatively round up to 6 mrem?
- 9. JPM 4R: Is the performance of a dose calc something that an RO will ever be faced with during normal operations or even in an emergency? If the answer is no, it might be acceptable to simply tell them that RP has predicted that they will receive a certain dose. This would likely be OK if the total accumulated dose placed at least one of the operators above a limit and the JPM then requires them to identify the approval authority to doing the task.
- 10. JPM 4R: Initial Conditions 4 and 5 would be a better fit to be placed under the Initiating Cue.
- 11. Consider making the approval authority part of the JPM. This would allow the JPM to be more operationally valid because every rad worker is responsible for their own dose. This would also allow some of the less operationally valid items like the dose calc to be simplified.
- 12. If some of the above comments are incorporated, the Task Standard would also need to be updated.
- 14. JPM 4S: The approval part does not appear to be at the SRO level. Every rad worker is responsible for their own dose. Is it possible to make the dose accumulation higher and test an SED approval of the emergency 10 rem limit for equipment protection, or something similar?
- 15. JPM 5S: The Cue Sheet needs to indicate to the applicants that the task is Time Critical.
- 16. JPM 5S: The JPM needs to clearly state that there are two time critical aspects. 15 minutes to classify then 15 minutes to complete the notification form.
- 17. JPM 5S: The Task Standard needs to be enhanced to capture the two time critical aspects to successful completion.
- 18. JPM 5S: The references that are available to the applicants need to be exactly the same as the applicants would have in the control room. This is important because the task is time critical and valid arguments exist for meeting that time if they do not have the references in the same form.
FINAL WRITTEN EXAM SAMPLE PLAN IS COMBINATION OF ES-401-4 and ORIGINAL APPROVED SAMPLE PLAN.
ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier /
Group Randomly Selected K/A Reason for Rejection RO T1/G1 Replace original K/A 026AG2.2.39 with 026AG2.2.44 No one hour or less Tech Specs are associated with CCW.
RO T1/G2 Replace original K/A 059AK1.05 with 059AK1.01 No job link for RO license level.
RO T2/G2 Change 022G2.4.1 to 022G2.1.20 Could not write a discriminating question to meet the KA.
SRO T1/G2 Change 033AG2.4.4 to 033AG2.2.25 Could not write discriminating SRO level question that met the KA.
SRO T2/G1 Change 003A2.04 to 005A2.02 Could not write discriminating SRO level question that met the KA.
1 Watts Bar 2018-301
2 Q
- 1.
- 2.
- 3. Psychomeric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
B, M, N
- 7.
U, E,
S
- 8. Explanation LOK (F/H)
LOD (1-5)
Stem Focus Cues T
/
F Cred.
Dist Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
Units Back ward Q -
K/A SRO Only General Comment: Keep track of the (+)/(-) count on the binary question format. For purposes of communication, the questions that use the (IS)/(IS NOT) or (DOES)/(DOES NOT), etc, are sometimes referred to as questions with a binary choice. It is important to track how many of these questions are written in the affirmative and how many in the negative. The exam should be balanced. Some questions can usually be modified to make the other choice correct, if needed. This will help reduce the ability of a test taker to predict the answer by choosing the affirmative if the test favors affirmative choices. I will try to keep an approximate count by using (+)/(-) notation under the question number.
General Comment: Please Refer to the ADAMS Accession number ML18150A469 to help with meeting the intent of Tier 1 written questions. This information will not be used for this in-progress exam; however, Region II Chief Examiners will likely refer to this to ensure proper balance of coverage for future exams. FAQ 401.55 may or may not be adequately revised in the future, but the information found at the stated ML number may be useful.
1
(-)
H 2
B S
008AA2.23 2
H 1
2 X
B U
S 011AG2.4.20 K/A requires testing knowledge of EOP Warnings/Cautions/Notes. This question can be answered by only applying system design knowledge, which circumvents testing knowledge required by the K/A.
Fixed.
There appears to be other EOP Warnings/Cautions/Notes that could be used to write a question that cannot be answered with systems knowledge.
Incorporated.
3
(-)
(+)
H 2
N S
015/017AK1.02 Typo in K/A Match Analysis: 20% vs 45% RTP in stem.
Fixed.
4
(-)
H 2
N S
022AK3.01
3 5*
H?
F 1-2 1
2 X
X X
N N
U U
S 025AA1.09 (Tier 1 / Group 1)
- Pre-submitted LOK designated as H may be questionable. I used memory level knowledge to answer the question.
Stem Focus: Providing the meters may not be useful in this question. The only pertinent info provided in these graphics is the designation of Stable and Oscillating.
Cred. Dist: A(1) and B(1) do not appear to be credible choices with a cavitating pump. This also impacts the LOD of the question.
LOD: Described as 1-2 because there are really only two reasonable choices once the Stable amps choice is discarded.
The second part of the question appears to test knowledge required by the K/A statement. With this being the case, it may be possible to discard the first part and then create a new second part.
Draft Submittal A(1) and B(1) do not appear to be plausible. A cavitation issue is occurring, therefore stable amps is not credible.
Fixed.
The second part of the question appears to test knowledge required by the K/A statement. With this being the case, it should be possible to discard the first part and then create a new second part.
Incorporated.
Question most likely will be answered with a lower cognitive thought process. In other words, from memory an applicant is most likely to know that a cavitaing pump will have oscillating amps. Also, from memory, an operator will know that the procedure either first directs throttling flow or stopping the pump.
Incorporated.
6
(-)
H 2
B S
026AG2.2.24
4 7
(-)
H 2
N E
S 027AK1.01 Are the indicators that read 2.47and 2.61 needed to answer the question? If the question can be answered by using the pressures and temperatures, then extra information should be deleted.
Modified.
5 8
H 2
X X
X N
U S
029EK1.03 Answers to the following questions may help the reviewers understand if cues are being provided that lower the LOD to below 2.
Cue: What does the designator H on the control switch mean?
Cue: What does the half dark shaded square on the control switch mean?
Cue: Is there any indication on the control switch that would be indicative of a throttle valve or a seal-in contact?
Pictures deleted.
Stem Focus: The correct answer should not rely on the distractors in order to select the correct choice. The exam taker should be able to read the question and the correct answer and be able to determine that it is correct without looking at the distractors. For the second part of this question cover up the distractors and read the answer - the question cannot be answered because the correctness is relative to the information in the distractor. The fix should be fairly easy by putting a few more words in the question statement.
Modified.
What is the purpose for stating in accordance with the background documents? The question, as any question, will always be asked in accordance with how the plant is designed. Not sure what value is being added by stating in accordance with the background documents.
No purpose - but no need to change.
Stem Focus/Plausibility: The question statement asks what the operator will do. I just finished administering an operating test earlier this year where most operators did not know if a particular valve was a throttle valve. Therefore, they held the switch until they got the required response, even though the valve switch did not need to be held. I understand that B is the correct answer, but IF MOMENTARILY was actually correct, then HOLD would also be correct - creating a subset issue. Therefore C(1) and D(1) are not plausible. The fix should be fairly easy.
Consider: 1-HS-62-138A (DOES / DOES NOT) have a seal-in contact which allows the valve to deliver adequate emergency boron flow when the switch is momentarily taken
6 to the OPEN position and released. (this just illustrates the idea - you may have a little better way of scripting it.)
Incorporated.
9
(-)
F 2
X X
X B
E S
038EK3.08 Stem Focus/Partial: C(2) could be argued as correct because a trip criteria has not been reached because a cooldown is in progress.
Fixed.
Plausibility: Loss of cooling to RCPs during a SGTR does not appear to be credible. It is an advantage to keep RCPs running during a tube rupture because they provide better plant control. With no energy going into containment, this choice is not credible.
Fixed.
7 10*
(+)
H H
1 2
X
?
N N
U S
055EA2.01 (Tier 1 / Group 1)
- Pre-submitted LOD: If letdown has been isolated [as indicated by the picture] then pressurizer high level is an obvious concern.
This acts to reduce the LOD fairly readily.
Stem Focus: Is all the required info provided in the stem?
Does 1-FCV-62-77 close on low Pzr Level? If so, then even if an applicant does not know how the loss of power and control air impacts the question, the applicant would need to know other info such as pressurizer level, in order to assess whether the valve is in the proper position. Following this assumption further, an applicant can deduce that the valve must be in the expected position for the given malfunctions because other relevant info is not stated for them to assess whether the is NOT could be a possibility.
Suggestions: Consider making the second part: With the above plant conditions, CCP suction Auto Swap to the RWST (IS) / (IS NOT) available. This suggestion avoids the issue of Pzr Level being a concern with no letdown.
Tier 1: Current published guidance in FAQ 401.55 may be revised in the near future. This question can be answered without any procedure knowledge. In order to better meet the intent of a Tier 1 question, it may be appropriate to test abnormal/emergency procedure knowledge.
Draft Submittal Q provided in draft submittal is acceptable.
11 H
2 N
S 056AG2.1.28
8 12*
(+)
H H
1 2
X X
N N
U E
S 058AA1.03 (Tier 1 / Group 1)
- Pre-submitted Are any of the alarms that are listed on the left required to answer the question? If not, they should be deleted.
All four boards indicate zero amps. What does zero amps indicate for boards II, III, and IV? Would these three boards be energized and show zero amps?
What is the purpose for displaying the information from the other boards, when the question only asks about board I?
Cred. Dist.: The information in the stem makes it readily obvious that board I has zero volts (off scale low for a 125 volt supply). Therefore C(1) and D(1) do not appear to be credible choices.
The question statement indicates that the answers will depend on the content of the ARIs. The question looks like it can be answered by applying plant systems knowledge without any reliance on procedure knowledge.
Cred. Dist.: Interplay between the first and second parts of C - If the board is energized, then why would a reactor trip be expected?
Minor detail: Are the equipment ID tags for the four ammeters written as they are in the plant? For Board I, the BD I appears on the second row of the tag, but for the other three it appears in the first row. BD I actually takes less room than BD II, etc. yet it is the one that was written on the second line. No follow-up needed, it just seemed a little strange.
Draft Submittal Q appears to be acceptable. Currently the question is rated as E to facilitate a discussion to ensure that all the information in the stem is necessary to ensure one and only one correct answer as well as plausibility of distractors. If any of the info is not needed for these purposes, we should discuss impacts of deleting it.
OK
9 13 F
2 B
S 062AA2.03 14
(-)
F 2
N S
065AA1.03 15
(-)
H 2
N S
077AK3.01 16 L
2 B
VG10 1106 S
E04EK2.2 17 H
2 x
X B
E S
E05EK2.2 Plausibility of time 0810 is questionable. All SG levels are above even the adverse value, Pzr pressure is below value, and containment pressure is below meaningful value. To address the plausibility issue, consider making the pressures read:
0800 2234 (pressure that is < 2335 psig and makes sense) 0810 2340 0820 2345 0830 2350 OK - modified SG levels.
Stem Focus: the earliest time that bleed and feed would be required is not listed as one of the choices. In other words, the criteria would be reached sometime between 0820 and 0830. A slight modification to the question statement is all that is needed to guard against a no correct answer argument. Suggest something like: Of the times listed above, what is the earliest set of criteria that requires initiation of bleed and feed in accordance with 1-FR-H.1 (if any)?
Fixed.
18
(+)
H 2
B S
E11EK2.1 The Question Source indicates that it is a Bank question, but the Question History indicates that it is a New question. One of these is likely incorrect.
Fixed.
19
(+)
H 2
N S
001AK3.02 20
(-)
H 2
N S
036AG2.2.44
10 21*
(+)
H H
1 2
X X
N N
U S
037AA1.08 (Tier 1 / Group 2)
- Pre-submitted Cred. Dist.: B(2) and D(2) do not appear to be credible.
Letdown is isolated and both pzr and VCT level are decreasing. Related to this is a situation where letdown is isolated and charging is maximized - a trip and SI appears to be obvious.
Stem focus: The question statement has the applicant answer both parts iaw one of the procedures. Would it be cleaner to first ask if [108-A] is expected to alarm, then ask for required actions iaw 1-AOI-33?
Suggestion: would it be possible to give them indications of only one charging pump operating. Then test in one part of the question whether [108-A] is expected and then in the second part of the question whether which should be done first - isolate letdown or start an additional CCP?
Draft Submittal Draft submittal is sat.
11 22 H
2 X
N E
S 051AA2.02 Why is Low Pressure Inlet Pressure of 60 psig provided in the stem? If it is necessary to be in the stem, the actual instrument number should be provided along with it.
OK - only on ICS.
Why would the CRS direct the lowering of power to 35%.
The procedure directs lowering power to maintain backpressure, not to lower to 35%.
OK.
Credible Distractor: Both C and D discuss backpressure (not vacuum) and relate that to whether they cannot remain below a Lo Lo alarm. The relationship between backpressure and not being able to remain below the Lo Lo alarm appears to be contradictory as it applies to plausiblility. The alarms being discussed are for low vacuum, not low backpressure.
To say it another way - high backpressure is BAD.
Therefore, one would think that you want that BAD backpressure to remain below a HIGH backpressure critical valve, not remain below a LO alarm because LO backpressure is good. Comparing high backpressure with LO vacuum alarms is confusing.
These two distractors need to be written very precisely to preserve credibility. Consider:
C. Continue in 1-AOI-11, if condenser backpressure cannot be maintained such that Condenser Vacuum Lo [46-C]
reflashes due to backpressure continuing to rise, the trip the reactor.
D. likewise.
Modified.
23 H
2 M
S 059AK1.01
12 24 H
2 N
E S
074EK3.06 Is it necessary to have deenergized and energized in the answer choices? If only the positions are listed in the answer choices, then there still would be four unique answer choices.
If there is no need for the extra info in the answers, then the extra info should be deleted.
Fixed.
What do the square symbols on the switches mean? Is there any other information on the switches, as displayed in the question that would provide cues to how to answer?
Picture deleted.
25 H
1 2
X B
U S
E03EK2.2 Credible Distractor: A(1) and B(1) do not appear to be plausible. It would not be reasonable to think that reducing the amount of pressurized cool water going into the RCS would cause sub-cooling to rise.
Modified.
26
(-)
(-)
H 2
B E
E14EK2.1 LOK: Answering the question does not appear to require much analysis or higher cog thought process.
Unchanged, but OK.
27
(+)
H 2
N S
E15EK1.2
13 28 H
2 X
N E
S 003K5.03 Credible Distractor: backflow is not plausible for the second part of the answers because there is a LOOP in progress with no RCPs running. The question construction comments below will likely provide an easy resolution to the credible distractor concern.
Incorporated.
Answer Choice Construction: It appears that extra information is provided in the answer choices. Discuss deleting all of the due to statements in the answer choices.
This may help to address the plausibility comment above.
Incorporated.
General Question Construction Comment: Including extra items in the answer choices that is above what is needed to create four unique answer choices with one and only one correct answer is typically not beneficial to the quality of the question. It may be beneficial to the test taker because it may give them additional ways to eliminate answer choices, but it does not usually help make a good question.
Discussed.
What purpose does stating In accordance with the background document serve?
Deleted.
29 H
1 2
X N
U S
004A3.09 Credible Distractor: from the first part an applicant can see that auto divert will occur prior to the red band. It would not make much sense for an applicant to then believe that an auto makeup would not even start until the red band (7%).
Fixed.
The values stated in the question analysis do not match up exactly with the picture of the meter. Is the picture correct?
Does the picture exactly match the plant? Are the values in the analysis correct?
Fixed.
14 30 F
2 x
X N
U S
004K5.29 Credible Distractor: A(2) and C(2) do not appear to be plausible. A filter to collect particulate is not credible for chemical control.
Fixed.
K/A: The question appears to be testing only GFE knowledge. If the K/A allows testing site-specific knowledge for the site-specific exam, then the question should be written to test site-specific knowledge.
Fixed.
31 F
2 x
x B
E S
005K4.01 Stem Focus/Partial: Subset issues need to be addressed.
A is the designated correct answer; however, all the other answers are also technically correct. Using D as an example to explain - It is true that in order to open these valves that temp must be less than 370F and press must be less than 450 psig. If temperature and pressure was higher then, the valves would not open. The fix should not be too difficult. The fill-in-the blank question statement just needs to be tightened up to correct the subset issue, maybe by using the word MAXIMUM: To OPEN 1-FCV-74-1 and 1-FCV 2, RCS temperature must be less than a MAXIMUM of
___(1)___ and RCS pressure must be less than a MAXIMUM of ___(2)___.
Fixed.
32 F
2 N
S 006K2.02
15 33 H
2 x
N E
S 007A1.02 Credible Distractor: It is not plausible that BOTH spraying and venting be done as stated in D(2). If an operator hypothetically sprays and obtains the desired result, it would be reasonable that venting would then not be needed.
Stating that BOTH methods are required degrades the plausibility.
Fixed.
Use of the word ONLY has the ability to create situations where the correct answer is not technically correct. For this question the author intends to test that PRT pressure is high and that it is required to be lowered by venting. A much more precise way to write this is to test the differences between the answer choices so that the possibility unintended consequences reduced. Consider the following:
Discussed.
PRT temperature (IS / IS NOT) required to be lowered.
PRT pressure (IS / IS NOT) required to be lowered by spraying the PRT with primary water.
Incorporated.
The previous format had high PRT pressure in every answer choice. The above format reduces the question down to the only the material needed to create four unique answer choices.
Discussed.
34 F
2 X
N E
S 007A3.01 Answer Choice D contains extra information that is not needed to create a unique distractor., all RCPs must be secured should be deleted.
Incorporated.
Partial: (Distractor D) What will seal leakoff flow be during a LBLOCA? Could it be approximately zero? Purpose of asking is just to ensure that this answer is not correct.
Modified.
35
(-)
(+)
H 2
N S
008A4.04
16 36
(-)
(+)
F
?
2 x
X?
N E
S 008K4.01 Consider deleting the end of the question statement (in accordance with System Electrical Logic Diagrams) unless it is required for technical integrity of the question.
Incorporated.
Stem Focus: Are applicants forced to make an assumption as to the initial status of the 1B-B and 2B-B pumps. I think the author was intending for them to be off, but the stem does not state that.
Incorporated.
Credible distractor: It may not be all that plausible for a unit 1 designated pump to start on a Unit 2 SI. Would it be possible to slightly modify the question to have the C-S pump off and test whether it starts on the unit 2 SI? Discuss.
Incorporated.
37 H
1 S
X X
N U
S 010K1.06 Stem Focus: Does merely placing the HIC in MANUAL cause level to rise? If not, then how could an applicant rule out a steam space leak? A steam space leak would cause pzr pressure to go down.
Modified.
Credible Distractor: C(1) and D(1) do not appear to contain much plausibility with the master in MANUAL.
Modified Stem Focus: pressurizer level and VCT level are not rising in accordance with a System Operating Instruction. They are rising because with the in-progress event the plant is designed to respond that way. Consider deleting in accordance with System Operating Instructions.
Incorporated.
17 38 F
2 N
E 2
012G2.1.30 Similar comment with use of the word ONLY. If the test taker knows of any additional action that is required, they can rule out the choices using the ONLY qualifier. Additionally, the second part of the question has reactor trip breakers appearing in all four choices, so it serves little purpose to have them in the choices because they do not help make the choices unique. Consider the following for the second half of the question: The MCR is required to dispatch operators to the _______ Buidling to locally trip the reactor. The Rod Control MG Set Output Breakers (ARE / ARE NOT) required to be opened.
Modified.
39 F
1 x
N U
S 013K2.01 Credible Distractor: A and C do not appear to be plausible because it does not seem reasonable for a Unit 1 power supply to provide power to unit 2 SI pumps.
Fixed.
40 H
2 M
2015 S
013K6.01 What value does in accordance with System Electrical Diagrams add to the question?
Deleted.
LOD is minimally acceptable.
Noted.
41
(+)
F 2
x N
U S
022G2.1.20 Credible Distractor: B(2) and D(2) are not credible because no actions are taken in E-0 as stated. If the next actions are to close the MSIVs, it would not be very smart to take the time to officially enter the procedure prior to shutting MSIVs.
A possible fix may be to state that after E-0 immediate operator actions are completed, then close MSIVs.
Incorporated.
A(1) and C(1): need to change and to then.
Changed.
18 42 H
2 x
N E
S 025K6.01 Stem Focus: Even though the A(1) and B(1) answer choices try to give the illusion that knowledge of the LCO conditions are being tested - the only thing that is really being tested in the Applicability statement of the LCO. The question is not incorrect as written, but it may be more straightforward to simply ask whether the LCO is applicable in the current mode because that is the only piece of info needed to answer the first part.
Incorporated.
43
(-)
(+)
H 1
N U
S 026A4.05 Scenario overlap: If containment spray is reset during the operating test, then knowledge from the operating test could be applied to answer this question.
Discussed. OK.
LOD=1: When the stem states that there is a standing CS signal on the B train and the CS signal on the A train has been reset, then it becomes very intuitive that the B pump will run when placed back to AUTO.
Modified.
What value does in accordance with the electric logic diagrams add?
Deleted.
44 F
2 B
S 026K1.01 45 H
2 B
S 039A2.01
19 46 H
1 X
N U
S 059A4.03 Scenario Overlap? Scenarios will need to be checked to see if there is overlap.
Different than Op Test. OK.
Credible Distractor: B(2) and D(2) do not contain a reasonable amount of plausibility. From the gauges it is easily seen that feed flow is less than steam flow. Lowering feed pump speed can be easily eliminated because lowering pump speed obviously will not help raise feed flow.
Fixed.
Should the question state that the runback has been completed? If the runback is still occurring, could it impact the integrity of the answer?
OK.
47 F
2 N
E S
061K6.02 Scenario overlap. This seems to be a likely candidate for scenario overlap. They can likely observe that the TDAFW pump feeds all SGs during the scenarios. Adding some complicating conditions to the stem may be a way to fix this.
Modified.
What is the purpose of stating in accordance with the System Description? The design of the plant is always going to factor into the questions. Stating in accordance with a specific procedure has a purpose, which is to bound the question to the referenced procedure. Im not sure I understand the purpose of stating in accordance with a system description or in accordance with an electrical diagram.
Deleted.
48 H
2 B
E S
062K3.03 What is the purpose for the second part of the question. It appears that the first part of the question contains four unique answer choices, thereby eliminating the need to have a second half of the question.
Incorporated.
20 49
(+)
H 2?
X N
U S
063A2.01 Credible Distactor: The stem states that a ground is located on the board. The question then presents a choice between an alarm for the board or the charger/battery. Consider the following for the first part:
A ground on the 125 DC Vital Battery Board III (WILL / WILL NOT) cause 125 DC VITAL CHARGER/BATTERY III ABNORMAL [19-A] to alarm.
The above is an idea, but if incorporated, ensure that enough info is in the stem to ensure one and only one correct answer.
Incorporated.
At what point in time is each part of the question being asked? Are they both being asked following the subsequent conditions?
Fixed.
50
(-)
(+)
F 2
B S
063K3.02 51*
H?
F 2
B (2015-301 NRC Exam)
S 064K1.02 (Tier 2 / Group 1)
- Pre-submitted LOK: Higher Cog thought processes do not appear to be needed to answer this question. Would the test taker not just know that this button starts only one EDG and would they not just know that ERCW is not normally flowing to the EDGs?
Draft Submittal Pre-submittal was already sat.
52
(+)
H 2
X N
S 073A2.02 53 H
2 N
S 076A1.02 Be specific to which instrument is being tested in the first part by stating the equipment ID.
54
(-)
(-)
H 2
N S
078A3.01
21 55 H
1 2
M NRC1 106 RSB E
S 103A1.01 With the reference provided, there is not much knowledge being tested. If the question is asked closed book, then the LOD would be acceptable. I have not been trained at WB at all, but when the procedure is provided, all I need to do is read what is given and apply it to the conditions in the stem.
Replaced.
Supporting Ref states should.
Discussed - OK.
56
(-)
H 2
x N
E S
001K5.72 Stem focus: The second half asks about reactivity ADDITION. Both negative and positive reactivity can be added. Does the question need to clarify positive or negative reactivity addition?
Fixed.
57
(-)
(-)
H 1
x X
N U
S 015K6.01 Stem Focus: Why is the second bullet of information provided under Subsequently? Absent this bullet, would there already be enough information provided to know that IR NIs would lower below P-6?
OK Credible Distractor: B and C do not appear to be plausible.
The information in the stem does not appear to support one SR NI reinstating and the other one not. Consider salvaging half the question by testing whether SR NIs (WILL / WILL NOT) reinstate, then test something else for the second part.
Incorporated.
58 H
2 N
S 016K3.02 59 F
2 B
NRC 1106 S
027K2.01
22 60 F
2 N
E S
028A1.01 What purpose does stating, in accordance with the Combustible Gas Control System Description.?
Deleted.
Is the fact that the Upper Containment Cooler fans are not part of the Combustible Gas Control System the only reason that C is wrong? If so, is that a meaningful difference to be tested?
Slightly modified.
61 F
1 X
N U
S 041G2.4.34 Credible Distractor: Nothing has occurred to cause the test taker to doubt whether steam dumps could be operated from the control room, where they are typically operated.
Therefore, locally closing steam dumps does not contain much plausibility.
Modified.
62
(+)
H 2
x x
N E
S 045A3.05 Stem Focus: Second bullet under Subsequent: Will a turbine runback occur as a result of the main feed pump trip? If so, then the second bullet is unnecessary and should be deleted.
No impact on Q. OK.
Cue: Providing the entire EHC Display provides a cue that the governor valves, not the throttle valves are controlling because the throttle valves are shown as full open and the governor valves are mid position. Suggest not providing the EHC display.
OK following discussion.
23 63 H
2 x
B NRC 12/09 E
S 071K4.06 The use of the word ONLY reduces the plausibility of A(2) and C(2) because the switch and others things also likely need to be manipulated, so the RESET is not the ONLY thing that needs to be done. It is usually better to limit the answer choices to the information that shows the difference between those answer choices. Placing Instrument Malfunction must be RESET in every answer choice does not distinguish the answer choices. Consider: To OPEN 0-FCV-77-119, 0-FCV-77-119, (IS / IS NOT) required to be placed in manual and its output signal reduced to manual.
Incorporated.
Cue: The second part of the answer choices indicate that something must be reset in order to open the valve. That indicates to the applicant that a valve automatically closes. If a test taker thought that the valve did not automatically close and that manual closure was required, then why would the test taker believe that something needed to be rest before the valve could be manually operated? Discuss.
Modified.
64
(+)
(+)
H 1
N U
S 072K1.04 If the question is going to provide the photos of the alarming instruments, then it would seem that the bullet that states MCR INTAKE 0-RM-125/126 RAD HI [186-A], alarms should be deleted.
Incorporated.
LOD: Much is said about exceeding certain setpoints in the distractor analysis, but the photo shows that the monitors are in alarm. I did not need to know anything about setpoints.
The only thing I needed to answer this question was to see that both monitors were in alarm and that it appeared to be common sense that if they were alarming that it would be prudent to have a CRI and to have a positive pressure to reduce in-leakage.
Modified.
Interplay issue with C between first and second half of answer. If an isolation has not occurred, then how will the pressurization fans have the ability to pressurize?
Modified.
24 65 H
1 X
N U
S 075A4.01 Credible Distractor: A(2) and C(2) do not appear to be plausible. If Pump B-A will start on a LOOP, then it is not reasonable to think that it would not start on an SI.
Modified.
A subset issue exists for the second part. If B(2) is correct, then A(2) is also correct. This creates a second correct answer in A. This also impact the credibility of distractors.
Modified.
66 F
1 2
X N
U S
G2.1.29 Credible Distractor: A(1) and B(1) are not plausible choices.
It would make no sense to only move a valve in the open direction when the lineup clearly states that it needs to be closed. If an operator did this, the valve would be left in a position where it was not closed. The distractor analysis does not match the actual distractors. The analysis mentions that it could be plausible because they might be tempted to open and then reclose the valve, but the distractors state that they will ONLY move it in the open direction. To help inform how the question is fixed, opening and reclosing a valve for a valve that is required to be closed does not sound like a good idea because a flow path could be established when the procedure want there not to be a flow path.
Consider testing radiation/contamination conditions that might impact whether independent verification is required.
Modified.
67
(+)
(+)
F 1
2 X
B NRC 2016 DL E
S G2.1.3 Credible Distractor: It does not appear to be plausible that the CRS is not required to know who has the responsibility for monitoring the reactor. Rated as Enhance due to being on previous NRC exam.
Modified.
68 F
2 B
S G2.1.40
25 69
(+)
H 1
X N
U S
G2.2.12 Credible Distractor: The information in the stem gives all the information to answer the first part of the question. C(1) and D(1) are not credible choices.
Modified.
70 F
2 X
N U
S G2.2.7 Credible Distractor: A nuanced subset issue exists. If the correct answer was that the Plant Manager approval was required, then the shift manager would still be required to approve the activity because he is the senior license on shift.
Therefore, even without knowing whether the Plant Manager approval is required, I know for sure that the shift manager approval is required. We see these types of questions frequently - to avoid the subset, it is possible to ask what the Highest level of approval is.
Modified.
The supporting material states that the approval shall be granted by Operations Supervisory Personnel. Is the CRS an Operation Supervisory Person? If so, then the Shift Manager is not required to approve it - the CRS could approve it.
OK Is there any ambiguity on the second part for whether or not the CRS is absolved of responsibility for control and performance of the test?
OK 71 F
2 B
NRC 1606 S
G2.3.14 72 F
2 B
NRC 1506 PC S
G2.3.4
26 73
(+)
(+)
F 1
X N
U S
G2.4.12 Credible Distractor: C(1) and D(1) do not contain an acceptable amount of plausibility. There is not a reasonable misconception that would lead someone to thinking that they are not permitted to manually start/align ECCS equipment that fails to auto start/align.
Modified.
74
(+)
F 2
N S
G2.4.26 75
(+)
(+)
F 2
N S
G2.4.28 SRO EXAM 76
(+)
H 2
N E
S 007EG2.4.30 It appears that the proposed reference to the applicants will have the 1-hour notification information redacted. I could not find page 22 of 94 in nonredacted form to see what exactly was being withheld. If the withheld information could be used to help answer the question, then the operational validity of redacting needs to be discussed. If the information is redacted to eliminate impacting another question, then it will likely be OK to redact.
Discussed - OK.
27 77 H
2 X
x N
U S
009EA2.11 Stem Focus: The event described in the stem is not the DBA event. Therefore, the second part of the question has no answer. The event in the stem will not result in the maximum pressure or temperature.
Modified.
K/A Match: The K/A requires testing small break LOCA, but the SRO portion seems to test a DBA LOCA.
Modified.
Consider: A steam space LOCA can be a small break.
Safety Injection Termination could be tested when sub-cooling is met and pressurizer level indication is met. The pressurizer level may not be an indicator of RCS inventory in this instance, but it produces a decision point for procedure selection for the SRO on SI termination. It may be possible to use adverse numbers due to containment pressure in order to meet the K/A.
Modified.
78
(+)
(+)
H 2
N E
S 027AA2.16 Typically facilities do not require greater than one hour Tech Spec info to be asked in a closed book format. Does your facility have a learning objective that requires operators to know the information required to answer this question from memory? If so, please provide. If not, would it be possible for a statement to be written into the question documentation that both operations and training management agree that this information is required memory level information at your facility.
OK Otherwise, the question is sat.
79 H
2 N
S 054G2.2.25 80*
F 2
N S
057AG2.2.40 (Tier 1 / Group 1)
- Pre-submitted
28 81*
F F
2 2
X X
N N
E
?
S WE12EA2.2 (Tier 1 / Group 1)
- Pre-submitted Cred. Dist.: If E-2, Att 1, has been completed, then the MSIVs and bypasses have been closed. The conditions for uncontrolled depress of all SGs would no longer exist, so why would the US then transition to 1-ECA-2.1 as indicated in the question statement?
I like the SRO-only aspect of testing the when a procedure transition is required to occur; however, in this case, given the wording of the question, not much credibility exists for the distractors C(1) and D(1).
Typo: period missing after COMPLETE.
Stem Focus: It is always better to test what is required by a procedure, rather than what a Unit Supervisor will or will not do. Depending on the US, they may do a lot of different things, but the relevant question in this case is whether procedures allow them to delay implementation of the ECA.
Is it possible to reword the question and essentially test the same thing without implying that a transition to the ECA will still be done even if the MSIVs and bypasses are closed?
Consider: The Unit Supervisor (IS) / (IS NOT) permitted to delay implementation of 1-E-2, Step 4, Check for at least one Intact S/G while initial attempts outside of the MCR are made to close MSIVs and MSIV Bypass Valves.
Draft Submittal is sat.
82
(+)
H 2
N S
033AG2.2.25 83
(-)
H 2
N E
S 060AG2.1.27 Add a specific WGDT relief valve that is lifting. This will help address any questions that could arise due to the ambiguity.
Added.
84 H
2 N
S 068AA2.06
29 85 H
2 X
N U
S WE09E2.1 Credible Distractor: It looks like the ES-0.3 does not have a unit designator prefix. The reference set indicates that this is not a typo. This comment is only intended to verify that.
OK Credible Distractor: C(1) and D(1) do not appear to be credible because there is no data in the stem to analyze for one to make a determination that there may be a steam void present.
Modified.
Consider placing conditions in the stem that are indicative of a steam void. Then modifying the first question to: The US is required to transition to (1-ES-0.2 / ES-0.3) from 1-ES-0.1.
Modified.
30 86*
H 1-2 X
X X
X N
U U
S 003A2.04 (Tier 2 / Group 1)
- Pre-submitted Stem Focus: For a legal exam, such as the NRC exam, testing what an operator should do does not provide an unequivocal right and wrong answer. The question must be written to test what an operator is required to do, or permitted to do, etc.
Partial: If VCT level is raised, would that have the effect of raising pressure also? If so, then C may also be argued as a correct answer. This appears to be similar to a high level in the PRT, which causes pressure to be high. It would not be wrong to vent the PRT and then drain, but you might have to then go back and raise pressure.
SRO-only: RCP start prerequisites may be the only knowledge being tested with the current question.
SRO-only: Systems knowledge can be used to answer the first part. The second part can be answered by knowing that hydrogen cover is used at power and nitrogen while shutdown (GFE). No procedure selection knowledge is required to arrive at the correct answer.
K/A changed.
Consider: I am having difficulty thinking of suggestions. If needed we can replace the K/A with no penalty for the unsat question.
K/A changed.
87
(+)
H 2
N E
S 006A2.02 Cue: Delete from the first fill-in-the blank, due to the LOSS of a suction flowpath.
Modified.
The question analysis states that the crew has completed the containment sump swapover process and reset SI. Does the question stem need to state which steps of the procedure have been completed, or which step is being performed. The third bullet in the stem may, to a degree, be doing that, but it is a little vague in that operators could proactively do things to prepare to do something in the future. Discuss.
OK.
31 88 H
1 X
X X
N U
S 010G2.4.45 Cue/Credible Distractor: When giving an operator a visual cue of choosing between a red bordered alarm and one that is not red, the choice is obvious.
Modified.
Credible Distractor: Quickly applying common sense to deciding between a discharging PORV/SV to high PRT pressure would lead one to immediately choose to address the PORV/SV alarm.
Modified.
SRO-only: Is an RO required to know that red bordered alarms take priority?
Modified.
SRO-only: Would an RO be able to diagnose whether an instrument failure was causing the PORV to open? Is enough information provided to diagnose an instrument failure?
Modified.
Credible Distractor: Is enough information provided in the stem to diagnose an instrument/controller failure? If not, then Section 3.1 is not credible. If an instrument/controller malfunction cannot even be diagnosed, then one can conclude that it is irrelevant to answering the question.
Modified.
Partial: The question analysis states which Section SHOULD be done first. There needs to be one unequivocally correct answer. The analysis also states that IF section 3.1 is used first, that it will then send the procedure reader to the correct section - so is it really wrong? The question needs to be written to test what is REQUIRED, rather than what SHOULD be done.
Modified.
Consider: Are there any alarms for pressurizer max level or heaters that would provide a bridge to ask a tech spec question. Pzr level and heater capacity are both related to pressure control, so there may be some related tech spec material that could be used to test the interpret part of the K/A.
Modified.
32 89
(-)
H 1
2 x
N U
S 012G2.2.22 Credible Distractor/LOD: B(2) and D(2) are not credible choices because high pressure will add margin to DNB, not reduce margin to DNB. Also, the question can really be reduced to asking if the high pressure trip functions is intended to guard against high pressure (LOD = 1).
Modified.
The first part appears to test RPS LCO knowledge at the SRO level, which opens up the second half of the question to test something that is related to the first part. I mention this because the second part does not need to be at the SRO-only level because SRO-only knowledge of the KA is already tested in part 1.
OK
33 90*
(+)
(+)
H H
2 2
X N
N E
S 025A2.03 (Tier 2 / Group 1)
- Pre-submitted Stem Focus: A crew member could determine, without leaving the control room, which ice condenser door was open by dispatching an operator. I think the question is trying to test whether there is adequate information inside the control room to make the diagnosis.
Suggest rewording the first fill-in-the blank: The MCR (DOES)/(DOES NOT) contain adequate indications/information that allow the determination of which ice condenser inlet doors are open.
Stem focus: Condition B does require 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> checks - the relevant question is whether the actions of Condition B are required to be performed. I think the second question is more accurately presented if stated something like:
Required Action B.1, Verify maximum ice bed temperature 27F once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> (IS)/(IS NOT) required based on the above indications.
This is a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Tech Spec and you are proposing that it be asked without a reference. Do you have a learning objective that supports asking greater than one hour Tech Spec application questions without references? If this question is to remain on the exam, it may be necessary to have an Operations Representative and Training Management representative make a statement in the exam submittal that this is an item that is required closed book knowledge at your facility.
Typo in second fill-in-the blank statement: required Draft submittal sat.
91 H
2 N
S 002G2.1.20
34 92
(-)
H 2
N E
S 034K5.02 I think the question is OK, but I rated it as enhance just to trigger a discussion on whether Shift Manager could be argued as an alternate correct answer. The Fuel Handling Supervisor is clearly spelled out in the supporting procedure, which is why I think it is OK. I just wanted to double check with you that the Shift Manager cannot assume the responsibilities of Fuel Handling Supervisor, which would create a subset issue that would need to be addressed.
Discuss.
OK 93
(-)
(-)
H 2
B S
086A2.01 94*
(+)
(-)
F 2
N S
G2.1.17
- Pre-submitted 95
(+)
(+)
F 2
x N
E S
G2.1.2 Credible Distractor: C does not appear to be plausible because of the inter-play between the two halves of the answer. I am assuming that the shift would be staffed with a SM, US, and STA. Therefore, once the SM is incapacitated, that would leave the obvious choices of STA and US to assume the two responsibilities of making and peer checking the classification. If the answer for the first part is that the US IS NOT the person responsible for classifying, then that means the STA, as the only one left, would have that responsibility. And IF the STA had that responsibility, the STA cannot peer check themselves.
Modified.
Consider asking the second part as: Peer checks (ARE/ARE NOT) required to be performed when the SM has been incapacitated.
Modified in another manner.
96 H
2 B
S G2.2.40 97 F
2 x
N U
G2.2.43 Credible Distractor: The use of the word ONLY hurts plausibility of part 2 because likely the corrective action program and maybe others logs would arguably track an inoperable annunciator. It is usually better to construct your
35 answer choices to highlight the differences between the choices. In doing so, you are more explicitly defining what is meant by ONLY. Disabled Annunciator Book appears in every answer choice, so it serves no purpose to have that as part of the question. The difference between the choices is whether the narrative log is required to track the inoperable alarm. Suggest: The disabled alarm (IS / IS NOT) required to be tracked in the narrative log.
Modified.
Credible Distrator: The supporting procedure indicates that stickers are not used at Watts Bar; therefore, something that is not used at your facility does not appear to contain a reasonable amount of plausibility.
Modified.
98
(+)
F 2
B S
G2.3.6 99 H
2 N
S G2.4.37 100
(-)
(-)
F 2
N S
G2.4.5
36