ML18158A528

EPRI Presentation_Heavy Loads

ML18158A528
Person / Time
Issue date:	06/07/2018
From:	Steve Jones NRC/NRR/DSS/SCPB
To:
Jones S, NRR/DSS/SCPB, 415-2712
References
Download: ML18158A528 (24)

Text

1 EPRI Hoisting, Rigging and Crane User Group Presentation:

Control of Heavy Loads Steve Jones, Senior Reactor Systems Engineer Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission June 13, 2018

2 Purpose

• Communicate background information regarding existing licensing basis for control of heavy loads

• Communicate operating experience important to NRC regulation and interface with industry initiative activities

• Discuss relationship with ASME Cranes for Nuclear Facilities Committee

3 Task A-36 NUREG 0612 GL 80-113 GL81-07 GL 85-11 Bulletin 96-02 GSI-186 Opened NUREG-1774 (Operating Experience)

RIS 2005-25 Closure of GSI-186 Stator Drop and Temp Rig Collapse ASME Issues NOG-1 Comparison Matrix Heavy Load Issue Timeline NUREG-0554 First Dry Fuel Storage Installation Licensed Reactor Vessel Head Lift Issues Industry Initiative RIS 2008-28 ASME Issues Crane O&M Standard?

Two Yellow Violations for Stator Drop

4 Analysis of Issue

• Task A-36:

- Analyze current licensing criteria

- Analyze measures that ensure safe handling of heavy loads.

- Recommend changes

• NUREG-0612 (July 1980)

- Overview of potential consequences of a load drop

- Summary of current licensee programs

- Review of Historical Data

- Guidelines and Recommendations

• Procedures and safe load paths

• Consistency with industry standards

• Assurance that critical SSCs adequately protected

5 Heavy Load Handling Program

• Licensees review heavy load programs against NUREG-0612 guidelines

• Requested responses in two phases to determine how NUREG-0612 guidelines would be met

6 Phase I and II Guidelines:

• Phase I [prevention]:

- Safe load paths

- Load handling procedures

- Periodic inspection and testing

- Operator qualification

- Lifting device standard

- Sling standard

- Crane design standard

- Interim Technical Specifications

• Phase II [protection or consequence analysis]:

- Stops or interlocks prevent movement of load over critical SSCs, OR;

- Overhead crane and lifting devices designed to be single failure proof, OR;

- Load drop analyses demonstrate acceptable consequences.

7 Review of Phase I and II

• All licensees submitted Phase I and II information

• Resource intensive reviews confirmed conformance with Phase I guidelines

• Phase II responses sampled

• Phase II responses generally enhanced Phase I implementation through limited load drop analyses and administrative controls (where single-failure-proof cranes were not installed)

8 Resolution of Phase II (GL 85-11)

• Greatest risk - heavy loads over irradiated fuel

• Risk to safe-shutdown systems considered small

• Full implementation of Phase II unjustified

• Phase II responses did not identify additional concerns; no need for further generic action

• However, Phase II responses captured in licensing basis

9 Bulletin 96-02

• Handling of dry storage casks began after establishment of heavy load programs

• Bulletin initiated because of proposed movement of dry storage casks at power in a BWR

• Potential for cask drop to initiate transient and damage key equipment

• Reinforced requirement to evaluate changes in operations through safety analysis report change process (10 CFR 50.59)

10 Heavy Load Generic Issue

• Generic Issue 186 was opened in 1999 to determine the need for more regulatory action

• Operating experience review published as NUREG-1774

• RIS 2005-025 in October 2005 and Supplement in May 2007 reemphasized expectations regarding heavy load handling

• Identified focus areas based on operating experience

11 Operating Experience Findings

• Most heavy lift accidents due to below the hook issues (human errors, rigging failures, etc.) vice crane deficiencies

• Industry standard provides clear single failure proof criteria for cranes

• Consequence and load drop analysis methodologies vary between licensees

• Three >30 ton load drops between 1980 and 2002, all due to rigging failures (not crane failures)

12 Key Insights

• Three recurring causes of load drops at nuclear power plants:

- Two-blocking

- Intermediate hoists

- Inadequate sling protection

• Human performance important to prevention

• Additional measures can reduce risk

- Limit height of lift

- Redundant equipment available

- Use specially designed lift rigs

13 Two Blocking

• Three drops due to cutting of wire rope

- 1970-Palisades (Polar Crane Aux Hoist; Prior to Operation; Limit Switch Bypassed)

- 1985-Browns Ferry (Unloaded Turbine Aux Hoist)

- 1993-Calvert Cliffs (Unloaded Turbine Aux Hoist)

• Relationship to nuclear safety

- Aux hoist faster than main hoist; less time for operator action

- Main hoists carry heaviest loads

- Two Blocking is a credible cause of load drops

14 Intermediate Hoists Hoist failure - Comanche Peak - 1999

- 20 foot drop of 45 ton motor

- Snag avoided RCS impact

- Plant was defueled Chain failure - Peach Bottom - 2002

- 10 inch drop of 24 ton motor

- No damage to RCS; fuel in vessel Load path issue - South Texas - 2003

- 50 ton motor moved over operating RHR heat exchanger (in containment)

- Double-capacity lift rig specified in heavy load program not used

15 Intermediate Hoists (Continued)

• Relationship to nuclear safety

- Intermediate hoist increases failure probability

- Failures could threaten decay heat removal

• Regulatory Insights

- Not addressed in heavy load guidelines

- Redundant capabilities unaffected by potential load drop should be available to manage risk pursuant to 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)

16 Slings

• Three drops of very heavy loads

- 2001 at San Onofre (mobile crane dropped from turbine bldg crane)

- 2001 at Turkey Point (mobile crane dropped form turbine bldg crane)

- 2005 at Browns Ferry (old trolley dropped from reactor building crane temp hoist)

• All outside scope of heavy load program

17 Slings (Continued)

• Nuclear safety insights

- Failed slings used in basket configuration

- Slings used as part of cask lifting device with special fittings

- Operating experience suggests synthetics more susceptible to cutting than steel

- Training and procedures may improve identification of incorrect sling usage

- Steel slings may allow more time to correct inadequate corner softening

18 Continued Heavy Load Issues

• Mid-2000s: refueling delays

• Regulatory Issue: unclear licensing bases (particularly reactor head lifts)

• Safety Issue: potential damage that precludes adequate cooling of irradiated fuel

• Desired Resolution: improved practices aligned with licensing basis

19 Industry Initiative

• NEI proposed industry initiative related to heavy load handling:

- Safety basis for key heavy lifts

- Safety basis incorporated in FSAR

- Develop industry guidance for reactor head lifts (load drop analyses and single-failure-proof crane equivalence)

• Enforcement discretion during implementation

• NRC held public meetings with NEI to speed guideline development

20 Industry Guidelines (NEI 08-05)

• Realistic reactor head drop analysis methodology

• Single-failure-proof handling system equivalence for head lifts

• Maintenance rule risk management

• NRC staff endorsed the NEI guidelines, with some exceptions

21 Safety Significance

• PWR Head Lifts

- Significant portion of lift at height/location where drop could severely damage vessel

- High lift - increased potential for two-blocking, an important cause of drops

- Crane inspection/maintenance on or near critical path

- Vulnerable to single failures/operator error

• BWR Cask Movements

- Potential for drops from high elevations over sensitive structures (e.g., spent fuel pool floor and torus)

- Often performed with reactor operating at power

22 Load Drop Probabilities

• NUREG-0612, 1980 (Navy Data):

6.3 E-05 Drops/Lift

• NUREG-1774, 2003 (>30 Ton Lifts):

5.6 E-05 Drops/Lift

• DOE WIPP Study

- Crane Failure (Navy Data):

2.5 E-06 Failures/Lift

- Human Error Probability (Failure of Lifting Device):

8 E-07 Failures/Lift

• Estimates uncertain due to limited data

ANO Stator Drop 23

• Collapse due to buckling of unstable column assembly

- New configuration

- Not load tested

• Adverse impacts

- Loss of electric power

- Trip of adjacent unit

- Flooding

• Safety Significance

- Mechanical damage and flooding impacted all sources of AC power except EDGs

- Unit 1 EDG work not coordinated with stator move

24 Ongoing Activities

• Policy is to endorse consensus standards where appropriate

• Participation with ASME for standards development

- ASME NOG-1, 2010 and later include matrix to NUREG-0554 guidelines for single failure proof cranes

- ASME HRT-1 addressed heavy component replacement activities following ANO stator drop

- ASME developing operation and maintenance standard addressing scope of NUREG-0612

• Inspection and licensing

- Consolidated interim fuel storage license application

- At-reactor independent fuel storage facilities

- Reactor refueling activities