Text

Proposed TS Re Chemical & Vol Control Sys & Safety Injection Sys
	ML18152A182
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	06/09/1994
From:	; VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML18152A183	List: ML18152A182; ML18153A965;
References
	NUDOCS 9406140278
	Download: ML18152A182 (32)
	v • d • e

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Technical Specifications Changes Surry Power Station

~

9406140278 940609 PDR ADDCK 05000280 P

PDR

TS 3.1-4

4.

Reactor Coolant Loops

a.

Loop stop valves shall not be closed in more than one loop unless,I the Reactor Coolant System is connected to the Residual Heat Removal System and the Residual Heat Removal System is OPERABLE.

b.

POWER OPERATION with less than three loops in service is prohibited.

The following loop isolation valves shall have AC power removed and their breakers locked, sealed or otherwise secured in the open position during POWER OPERATION:

Unit No. 1 Unit No. 2 MOV 1590 MOV 2590 MOV 1591 MOV 2591 MOV 1592 MOV 2592 MOV 1593 MOV 2593 MOV 1594 MOV 2594 MOV 1595 MOV 2595

5.

Pressurizer

a.

The reactor shall be maintained subcritical by at least 1 % until the steam bubble is established and the necessary sprays and at least 125 KW of heaters are OPERABLE.

b.

With the pressurizer inoperable due to inoperable pressurizer heaters, restore the inoperable h,eaters within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and the Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure less than 350 degrees F and 450 psig, respectively, within the following 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

Amendment Nos.

TS 3.2-1 3.2.

CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM Applicability Applies to the operational status of the Chemical and Volume Control System.

Objective To define those conditions of the Chemical and Volume Control System necessary to ensure safe reactor operation.

Specification A.

When fuel is in a reactor, there shall be at least one flow path to the core for boric acid injection. The minimum capability for boric acid injection shall be equivalent to that supplied from the refueling water storage tank.

B.

The reactor shall not be critical unless:

1.

At least two boron injection subsystems are OPERABLE consisting of:

a.

A Chemical and Volume Control subsystem consisting of:

1.

One OPERABLE flow path,

2.

One OPERABLE charging pump,

3.

One OPERABLE boric acid transfer pump,

4.

The common OPERABLE boric acid storage system with:

a.

A minimum contained borated water volume of 6000 gallons per unit,

b.

A boron concentration of at least 7.0 weight percent but not more than 8.5 weight percent boric acid solution, and

c.

A minimum solution temperature of 112°F.

d.

An OPERABLE boric acid transfer pump for recirculation.

Amendment Nos.

TS 3.2-2

b.

A subsystem supplying borated water from the refueling water storage tank via a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System consisting of:

1.

One OPERABLE flow path,

2.

One OPERABLE charging pump,

3.

The OPERABLE refueling water storage tank with:

a.

A minimum contained borated water volume of 387,100 gallons,

b.

A boron concentration of at least 2300 ppm but not more than 2500 ppm, and

c.

A maximum solution temperature of 45°F.

2.

One charging pump from the opposite unit is available with:

a.

the pump being OPERABLE except for automatic initiation instrumentation,

b.

offsite or emergency power may be inoperable when in COLD SHUTDOWN, and

c.

the pump capable of being used for alternate shutdown with the opening of the charging pump cross-connect valves.

C.

The requirements of Specification 3.2.B may be modified as follows:

1.

With only one of the boron injection subsystems OPERABLE, restore at least two boron injection subsystems to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

2.

With the refueling water storage tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within one hour or place the reactor in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

a.

For conditions where the RWST is inoperable due to boron concentration or solution temperature not being within the limits of Specification 3.3.A.1, restore the parameters to Amendment Nos.

3.

TS 3.2-3 within specified limits in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months or place the reactor in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

With no charging pump from the opposite unit available, return at least one of the opposite unit's charging pumps to available status in accordance with Specification 3.2.8.2 within 7 days or place the reactor in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

D.

If the requirements of Specification 3.2.8 are not satisfied as allowed by Specification 3.2.C, the reactor shall be placed in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

E.

During REFUELING SHUTDOWN and COLD SHUTDOWN the following valves in the affected unit shall be locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position except during planned dilution or makeup activities:

1.

During Unit 1 REFUELING SHUTDOWN and COLD SHUTDOWN:

Valve 1-CH-223, or

a.

b.

Valves 1-CH-212, 1-CH-215, and 1-CH-218.

2.

During Unit 2 REFUELING SHUTDOWN and COLD SHUTDOWN:

a.

Valve 2-CH-223, or

b.

Valves 2-CH-212, 2-CH-215, and 2-CH-218.

3.

Following a planned dilution or makeup activities, the valves listed in Specifications 3.2.E.1 and 3.2.E.2 above, for the affected unit, shall be locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position within 15 minutes.

Amendment Nos.

~--~~-

TS 3.2-4 Basis The Chemical and Volume Control System provides control of the Reactor Coolant System boron inventory. This is normally accomplished by using boric l acid transfer pumps which discharge to the suction of each unit's charging pumps. The Chemical and Volume Control System contains four boric acid transfer pumps. Two of these pumps are normally assigned to each unit but, valving and piping arrangements allow pumps to be shared such that three out of four pumps can service either unit. An alternate (not normally used) method of boration is to use the charging pumps taking suction directly from the refueling water storage tank. There are two sources of borated water available to the suction of the charging pumps through two different paths; one from the refueling water storage tank and one from the discharge of the boric acid transfer pumps.

A.

The boric acid transfer pumps can deliver the boric acid tank contents (7.0% solution of boric acid) to the charging pumps.

B.

The charging pumps can take suction from the volume control tank, the boric acid transfer pumps and the refueling water storage tank.

Reference is made to Technical Specification 3.3.

The quantity of boric acid in storage from either the boric acid tanks or the refueling water storage tank is sufficient to borate the reactor coolant in order to I reach COLD SHUTDOWN at any time during core life.

Approximately 6000 gallons of the 7.0% solution of boric acid are required to meet COLD SHUTDOWN conditions. Thus, a minimum of 6000 gallons in the]

boric acid tank is specified. An upper concentration limit of 8.5% boric acid in the tank is specified to maintain solution solubility at the specified low temperature limit of 112 degrees F.

The Boric Acid Tank(s) are supplied with level alarms which would annunciate if a leak in the system occurred.

I Amendment Nos.

TS 3.2-5 For one-unit operation, it is required to maintain available one charging pump with a source of borated water on the opposite unit, the associated piping and valving, and the associat~d instrumentation and controls in order to maintain the capability to cross-connect the two unit's charging pump discharge headers.

In the event the operating unit's charging pumps become inoperable, this permits the opposite unit's charging pump to be used to bring the disabled unit to COLD SHUTDOWN conditions. Initially, the need for the charging pump I cross-connect was identified during fire protection reviews.

The requirement that certain valves remain closed during REFUELING I SHUTDOWN and COLD SHUTDOWN conditions, except for planned boron dilution or makeup activities, provides assurance that an inadvertent boron dilution will not occur. This specification is not applicable at INTERMEDIATE SHUTDOWN, HOT SHUTDOWN, REACTOR CRITICAL, or POWER OPERATION.

References UFSAR Sections 9.1 Chemical and Volume Control System

_Amendment Nos.

3.3 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM Applicability Applies to the operating status of the Safety Injection System.

Objective TS 3.3-1 To define those limiting conditions for operation that are necessary to provide sufficient borated water to remove decay heat from the core in emergency situations.

Specifications A.

A reactor shall not be made critical unless:

1.

The refueling water storage tank (RWST) is OPERABLE with:

a.

b.

A contained borated water volume of at least 387,100 gallons.

A boron concentration of at least 2300 ppm but not greater than 2500 ppm.

c.

A maximum solution temperature of 45° F.

2.

Each safety injection accumulator is OPERABLE with:

a.

A borated water volume of at least 975 cubic feet but not greater than 1025 cubic feet.

b.

A boron concentration of at least 2250 ppm.

c.

A nitrogen cover-pressure of at least 600 psia.

d.

The safety injection accumulator discharge motor operated valve blocked open by de-energizing AC power and the valves's breaker locked, sealed or otherwise secured in the open position when the reactor coolant system pressure is greater than 1000 psig.

Amendment Nos.

3.

TS 3.3-2 Two safety injection subsystems are OPERABLE with subsystems comprised of:

a.

One OPERABLE high head charging pump.

b.

One OPERABLE low head safety injection pump.

c.

An OPERABLE flow path capable of transferring fluid to the Reactor Coolant System when taking suction from the refueling water storage tank on a safety injection signal or from the containment sump when suction is transferred during the recirculation phase of operation.

B.

The requirements of Specification 3.3.A may be modified as follows:

1.

With the refueling water storage tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within one hour or place the reactor in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

a.

For conditions where the RWST is inoperable due to boron concentration or solution temperature not being within the limits of Specification 3.3.A.1, restore the parameters to within specified limits in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months or place the reactor in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

2.

With one safety injection accumulator inoperable, restore the accumulator to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or place the reactor in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

a.

For conditions where one safety injection accumulator is inoperable due to boron concentration not being within the limits of Specification 3.3.A.2, restore the accumulator to within specified limits in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or place the reactor in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

b.

Power may be restored to any valve or breaker referenced in Specification 3.3.A.2.d for the purpose of testing or Amendment Nos.

TS 3.3-3 maintenance provided that not more than one valve has power restored, and th.e testing and maintenance is completed and power removed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

3.

With one safety injection subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or place the reactor in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

C.

If the requirements of Specification 3.3.A are not satisfied as allowed by Specification 3.3.B, the reactor shall be placed in COLD SHUTDOWN in the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

Basis The normal procedure for starting the reactor is, first, to heat the reactor coolant to near operating temperature by running the reactor coolant pumps.

The reactor is then made critical by withdrawing control rods and/or diluting boron in the coolant. With this mode of startup the Safety Injection System is required to be OPERABLE as specified. During LOW POWER PHYSICS TESTS there is a negligible amount of energy stored in the system. Therefore, an accident comparable in severity to the Design Basis Accident is not possible, and the full capacity of the Safety Injection System would not be necessary.

The OPERABLE status of the subsystems is to be demonstrated by periodic tests, detailed in TS Section 4.11. A large fraction of these tests are performed while the reactor is operating in the power range. If a subsystem is found to be I inoperable, it will be possible in most cases to effect repairs and restore the subsystem to full operability within a relatively short time. A subsystem being I inoperable does not negate the ability of the system to perform its function, but it reduces the redundancy provided in the reactor design and thereby limits the ability to tolerate additional subsystem failures.

In some cases, additional components (i.e., charging pumps) are installed to allow a component to be inoperable without affecting system redundancy.

Amendment Nos.

TS 3.3-4 If the inoperable subsystem is not repaired within the specified allowable time I period, the reactor will initially be placed in HOT SHUTDOWN to provide for reduction of the decay heat from the fuel, and consequent reduction of cooling requirements after a postulated loss-of-coolant accident. If the malfunction(s) is I not corrected the reactor will be placed in COLD SHUTDOWN following normal shutdown and cooldown procedures.

Assuming the reactor has been operating at full RATED POWER for at least 100 days, the magnitude of the decay heat production decreases as follows after a unit trip from full RATED POWER.

Time After Shutdown 1 min.

30 min.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months 8 hours 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months Decay Heat(% of RATED POWER) 3.7 1.6 1.3 0.75 0.48 Thus, the requirement for core cooling in case of a postulated loss-of-coolant accident, while in HOT SHUTDOWN, is reduced by orders of magnitude below the requirements for handling a postulated loss-of-coolant accident occurring during POWER OPERATION. Placing and maintaining the reactor in HOT SHUTDOWN significantly reduces the potential consequences of a loss-of-coolant accident, allows access to some of the Safety Injection System components in order to effect repairs, and minimizes the plant's exposure to thermal cycling.

Failure to complete repairs within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is considered indicative of I unforeseen problems (i.e., possibly the need of major maintenance). In such a case, the reactor is placed in COLD SHUTDOWN.

The accumulators are able to accept leakage from the Reactor Coolant System without any effect on their operability. Allowable inleakage is based on the volume of water that can be added to the initial amount without exceeding the volume given in Specification 3.3.A.2.

Amendment Nos.

TS 3.3-5 The accumulators (one for each loop) discharge into the cold leg of the reactor coolant piping when Reactor Coolant System pressure decreases below accumulator pressure, thus assuring rapid core cooling for large breaks. The line from each accumulator is provided with a motor-operated valve to isolate the accumulator during reactor start-up and shutdown to preclude the discharge of the contents of the accumulator when not required.

Accumulator Motor Operated Discharge Isolation Valves Unit No. 1 MOV 1865A MOV 18658 MOV 1865C Unit No. 2 MOV 2865A MOV 28658 MOV 2865C However, to assure that the accumulator valves satisfy the single failure criteria, they will be locked, sealed or otherwise secured open by de-energizing the valve motor operators when the reactor coolant pressure exceeds 1000 psig.

The operating pressure of the Reactor Coolant System is 2235* psig and accumulator injection is initiated when this pressure drops to 600 psia. De-energizing the motor operator when the pressure exceeds 1000 psig allows sufficient time during normal startup operation to perform the actions required to de-energize the valve. This procedure will assure that there is an OPERABLE flow path from each accumulator to the Reactor Coolant System during POWER OPERATION and that safety injection can be accomplished.

The removal of power from the valves listed above will assure that the systems of which they are a part satisfy the single failure criterion.

For Unit 2 Cycle 12, Reactor Coolant System nominal operating pressure may be reduced to 2135 psig.

Amendment Nos.

B.

TS 3.4-2 During POWER OPERATION the requirements of Specification 3.4.A may be modified to allow a subsystem or the following components to be inoperable. If the components are not restored to meet the requirements of Specification 3.4.A within the time period specified below, the reactor shall be placed in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

If the requirements of Specification 3.4.A are not satisfied within an additional 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months the reactor shall be placed in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

1.

One Containment Spray Subsystem may be inoperable, provided immediate attention is directed to making repairs and the subsystem can be restored to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

2.

3.

One outside Recirculation Spray Subsystem may be inoperable, provided immediate attention is directed to making repairs and the subsystem can be restored to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

One inside Recirculation Spray Subsystem may be inoperable provided immediate attention is directed to making repairs and the subsystem can be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

4.

Refueling Water Storage Tank volume may be outside the limits of Specification 3.4.A.3 provided it. is restored to within limits within one hour.

a.

For conditions where the RWST is inoperable due to boron concentration or solution temperature not being within the limits specified, restore the parameters to within specified limits in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

Amendment Nos.

TS 3.4-4 In addition to supplying water to the Containment Spray System, the refueling water storage tank is also a source of water for safety injection following an accident. This water is borated to a concentration which assures reactor shutdown by approximately 5 percent ~k/k when all control rods assemblies are inserted and when the reactor is cooled down for refueling.

References UFSAR Section 4 Reactor Coolant System UFSAR Section 6.3.1 Containment Spray Subsystem UFSAR Section 6.3.1 Recirculation Spray Pumps and Coolers UFSAR Section 6.3.1 Refueling Water Chemical Addition Tank UFSAR Section 6.3.1 Refueling Water Storage Tank UFSAR Section 14.5.2 Design Basis Accident UFSAR Section 14.5.5 Containment Transient Analysis Amendment Nos.

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10.4 10.2 10.0 ALLOWABLE AIR PARTIAL PRESSURE SURRY POWER STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 TC MINIMUM = 100 Of I

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TC = 120 IOF 9.0 TC MAXIMUM

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25 35 45 55 65 75 SERVICE WATER TEMPERATURE (°F)

FIGURE NOTATION TC - Containment average temperature FIGURE NOTES

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1. Refueling Water Storage Tank temperature s 45°F, with an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months AOT.

2. Allowable operating air partial pressure in the containment is a fundion of service water temperature.

3. Horizontal lines designate allowable air partial pressure per given containment average temperature.

4. Each containment temperature line is a maximum for the given air partial pressure~

Amendment Nos.

TS 3.13-1 3.13 COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM Applicability Applies to the operational status of all subsystems of the Component cooling System. The Component Cooling System consists of the Component Cooling Water Subsystem, Chilled Component Water Subsystem, Chilled Water Subsystem, and Neutron Shield Tank Cooling Water Subsystem.

Objective To define limiting conditions for each subsystem of the Component Cooling System necessary to assure safe operation of each reactor unit of the station during startup, POWER OPERATION, or cooldown.

Specifications A.

When a unit's Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure exceed 350°F and 450 psig, respectively, or when a unit's reactor is critical operating conditions for the Component Cooling Water Subsystem shall be as follows:

1.

For one unit operation, two component cooling water pumps and heat exchangers shall be OPERABLE.

I

2.

For two unit operation, three component cooling water pumps and heat exchangers shall be OPERABLE.

I

3.

The Component Cooling Water Subsystem shall be OPERABLE I for immediate supply of cooling water to the following components, if required:

a.

Two OPERABLE residual heat removal heat exchangers.

B.

During POWER OPERATION, Specification A-1, A-2, or A~3 above may I be modified to allow one of the required components to be inoperable provided immediate attention is directed to making repairs. If the system is not restored within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to the requirements of Specification A-1, Amendment Nos.

C.

Basis TS 3.13-2 A-2, or A-3, an operating reactor shall be placed in HOT SHUTDOWN I within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

If the repairs are not completed within an additional 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , the affected reactor shall be placed in COLD I SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

Whenever the component cooling water radiation monitor is inoperable, the surge tank vent valve shall remain closed.

The Component Cooling System is an intermediate cooling system which serves both reactor units. It transfers heat from heat exchangers containing reactor coolant, other radioactive liquids, and other fluids to the Service water System. The Component Cooling System is designed to (1) provide cooling water for the removal of residual and sensible heat from the Reactor Coolant System during shutdown, cooldown, and startup, (2) cool the containment recirculation air coolers and the reactor coolant pump motor coolers, (3) cool the letdown flow in the Chemical and Volume Control System during POWER,.

OPERATION, and during residual heat removal for continued purification, (4) cool the reactor coolant pump seal water return flow, (5) provide cooling water for the neutron shield tank and (6) provide cooling to dissipate heat from other reactor unit components.

The Component Cooling Water Subsystem has four component cooling water pumps and four component cooling water heat exchangers.

Each of the component cooling water heat exchangers is designed to remove during normal operation the entire heat load from one unit plus one half of the heat load common to both units. Thus, one component cooling water pump and one component cooling water heat exchanger are required for each unit which is at POWER OPERATION. Two pumps and two heat exchangers are normally.

operated during the removal of residual and sensible heat from one unit during cooldown. Failure of a single component may extend the time required for cooldown but does not effect the safe operation of the station.

References UFSAR Section 5.3, Containment Systems UFSAR Section 9.4, Component Cooling System UFSAR Section 15.5.1.2, Containment Design Criteria Amendment Nos.

TS 3.16-5 The diesel generators function as an on-site back-up system to supply the emergency buses.

Each emergency bus provides power to the following operating Engineered Safeguards equipment:

A.

One containment spray pump B.

One charging pump C.

One low head safety injection pump D.

One recirculation spray pump inside containment E.

One recirculation spray pump outside containment F.

One containment vacuum pump G.

One motor-driven auxiliary steam generator feedwater pump H.

One motor control center for valves, instruments, control air compressor, fuel oil pumps, etc.

I.

Control area air conditioning equipment - four two air handling units, two chiller, one service water pump, and one chilled water pump.

J.

One charging pump service water pump Amendment Nos.

TABLE 4.1-1 (Continued)

MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECK, CALIBRATIONS, AND TEST OF INSTRUMENT CHANNELS Channel Description

~ Calibrate

~

Remarks

10.

Rod Position Bank Counters S(1,2)

N.A.

1) Each six inches of rod motion 0(3).

when data logger is out of service

2) With analog rod position

3) For the control banks, the bench-board indicators shall be checked against the output of the bank overlap unit.

11.

Steam Generator Level s

R M

12.

Charging Flow N.A.

R N.A.

13.

Residual Heat Removal Pump Flow N.A.

R N.A.

14.

Boric Acid Tank Level

D R

N.A.

15.

Refueling Water Storage Tank Level s

R M

16.

Volume Control Tank Level N.A.

R N.A.

17.

Reactor Containment Pressure-CLS

D R

M(1)

1) Isolation valve signal and spray signal

18.

Boric Acid Control N.A.

R N.A.

c:,

19.

Containment Sump Level N.A.

R N.A.

-I

=

V, (I)

20.

Deleted

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3 1-l (I)

21.

Containment Pressure-Vacuum S.

R N.A.

I

-...J i:-1' Pump System

z 0.

22.

Steam Line Pressure s

R M

TABLE 4.1-2A MINIMUM FREQUENCY FOR EQUIPMENT TESTS FSAR SECTION DESCRIPTION IEfil FREQUENCY REFERENCE

1.

Control Rod Assemblies Rod drop times of all full Prior to reactor criticality:

7 length rods at hot conditions

a. For all rods following each removal of the reactor vessel head.

b. For specially affected individual rods following any maintenance on or modification to the control rod drive system which could affect the drop time of those specific rods, and

c. Each refueling shutdown.

2.

Control Rod Assemblies Partial movement of all rods Monrhly 7

3.

Refueling Water Chemical Functional Each refueling shutdown 6

Addition Tank

4.

Pressurizer Safety Valves Setpoint Per TS 4.0.3 4

5.

Main Steam Safety Valves Setpoint Per TS 4.0.3 10

6.

Containment Isolation Trip

Functional Each refueling shutdown 5

7.

Refueling System Interlocks

Functional Prior to refueling 9.12

8.

Service Water System

Functional Each refueling shutdown 9.9

9.

Fire Protection Pump and Functional Monthly 9.10

z:,,

Power Supply

-I

=

V, Cl)

10.

Primary System Leakage

Evaluate Daily 4

Q.

I-'

3

11.

Diesel Fuel Supply

Fuel Inventory 5 days/week 8.5 I

Cl)

I.O c::r c :z

12.

Deleted 0.

13.

Main Steam Line Trip Valves Functional Before each startup (TS 4. 7) 10 (Full Closure)

The provisions of Specification 4.04 are not applicable.

l_

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DESCRIPTION

18.

Primary Coolant System

19.

Containment Purge MOV Leakage

20.

Containment Hydrogen Analyzers

21.

RCS Flow

22.

Deleted TABLE 4.1-2 (CONTINUED)

MINIMUM FREQUENCY FOR EQUIPMENT TESTS FREQUENCY UFSAR SECTION REFERENCE Functional Functional

a.

Channel Functional Test

b. Channel Calibration Test

1. Sample gas used:

One volume percent

(+/-0.25%) hydrogen, balance nitrogen Four volume percent

(+/-0.25%) hydrogen, balance nitrogen

2. Channel Calibration test will include startup and operation of the Heat Tracing System Flow~ 273,000 gpm 1. Periodic leakage testing(a)(b) on each valve listed in Specification 3.1.C. 7a shall be accomplished prior to*

entering power operation condition after every time the plant is placed in the cold shutdown condition for refueling, after each time the plant is placed in cold shutdown condition for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months if testing has not been accomplished in the preceding 9 months, and prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed.

Semi-Annual (Unit at power or shutdown) if purge valves are operated during interva1(c)

Once per 31 days Once per 92 days on STAGGERED TEST BASIS Once per refueling cycle 14 (a)

To satisfy ALARA requirements, leakage may be measured indirectly (as from the performance of pressure indicators) if accomplished in accordance with approved procedures and supported by computations showing that the method is capable of demonstrating valve compliance with the leakage criteria.

(b)

(c)

Minimum differential test pressure shall not be below 150 psid.

Refer to Section 4.4 for acceptance criteria.

See Specification 4.1.D.

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TS 4.1-10 TABLE 4.1-28 MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR SAMPLING TESTS FSAR SECTION DESCRIPTION TEST FREQUENCY REFERENCE

1. Reactor Coolant Liquid Radio-Chemical Analysis(1)

Monthly(5)

Samples

Gross Activity(2) 5 days/week(5) 9.1 Tritium Activity Weekly(5) 9.1

Chemistry (CL, F & 02) 5 days/week 4

Boron Concentration Twice/week 9.1 E Determination Semiannually(3)

DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 Once/2 weeks(5)

Radio-iodine Once/4 hours(6)

Analysis (including 1-131, and (7) below 1-133 & 1-135)

2.

Refueling Water Storage Chemistry (Cl & F)

Weekly 6

3.

Boric Acid Tanks

Boron Concentration Twice/Week 9.1

4. Chemical Additive Tank NaOH Concentration Monthly 6

5. Spent Fuel Pit

Boron Concentration Monthly 9.5

6.

Secondary Coolant Fifteen minute degassed Once/72 hours 10.3 band q activity(4)

DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 Monthly(4)

Semiannually(B)

7. Stack Gas Iodine and

1-131 and particulate Weekly Particulate Samples radioactive releases

See Specification 4.1.D (1)

(2)

A radiochemical analysis will be made to evaluate the following corrosion products: Cr-51, Fe-59, Mn-54, Co-58, and Co-60.

A gross beta-gamma degassed activity analysis shall consist of the quantitative measurement of the total radioactivity of the primary coolant in units of µCi/cc.

Amendment Nos.

TS 4.5-2

2.

By verifying that each motor-operated valve in the recirculation spray flow paths performs satisfactorily when tested in accordance with Specification 4.0.5.

3.

At least once per 1 O years, coincident with the closest refueling outage, by performing an air or smoke flow test and verifying each spray nozzle is unobstructed.

C.

Each weight-loaded check valve in the containment spray and outside containment recirculation spray subsystems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once each refueling period, by cycling the valve one complete cycle of full travel and verifying that each valve opens when the discharge line of the pump is pressurized with air and seats when a vacuum is applied.

D.

A visual inspection of the containment sump and the inside containment recirculation spray pump wells and the engineered safeguards suction inlets shall be performed at least once each refueling period and/or after major maintenance activities in the containment. The inspection should verify that the containment sump and pump wells are free of debris that could degrade system operation and that the sump components (i.e.,

trash racks, screens) are properly installed and show no sign of structural distress or excessive corrosion.

Amendment Nos.

TS 4.11-1 4.11 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM TESTS Applicability Applies to the operational testing of the Safety Injection System.

Objective To verify that the Safety Injection System will respond promptly and perform its design functions, if required.

Specifications A.

The refueling water storage tank (RWST) shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

1.

At least once per day by verifying the RWST solution temperature.

2.

At least once per week by:

a.

Verifying the RWST contained borated water volume, and

b.

Verifying the RWST boron concentration.

B.

Each safety injection accumulator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

1.

At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months by:

a.

Verifying the contained borated water volume is within specified limits, and

b.

Verifying the nitrogen cover-pressure is within specified limits.

-Amendment Nos.

TS 4.11-2

2.

At least once per 31 days and within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months after each solution volume increase of greater than or equal to 1 % of tank volume by verifying the boron concentration of the accumulator solution.

a.

This surveillance is not required when the volume increase makeup source is the RWST.

C.

Each Safety Injection Subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

1.

By verifying, that on recirculation flow, each low head safety injection pump performs satisfactorily when tested in accordance with Specification 4.0.5.

2.

By verifying that each charging pump performs satisfactorily when tested in accordance with Specification 4.0.5.

3.

By verifying that each motor-operated valve in the safety injection flow path performs satisfactorily when tested in accordance with Specification 4.0.5.

4.

Prior to POWER OPERATION by:

a.

Verifying that the following motor operated valves* are blocked open by de-energizing AC power to the valves motor operator and tagging the breaker in the off position:

Unit 1 MOV-1890C Unit 2 MOV-2890C

b.

Verifying that the following motor operated valves are blocked closed by de-energizing AC power to the valves motor operator and the breaker is locked, sealed or otherwise secured in the off position:

Unit 1 Unit 2 MOV-1869A MOV-2869A MOV-1869B MOV-1890A MOV-1890B MOV-2869B MOV-2890A MOV-2890B Amendment Nos.

Basis

c.

TS 4.11-3 Power may be restored to any valve or breaker referenced in Specifications 4.11.C.4.a and 4.11.C.4.b for the purpose of testing or maintenance provided that not more than one valve has power restored at one time, and the testing and maintenance is completed and power removed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

5.

At least once per REFUELING SHUTDOWN by:

a.

Verifying that each automatic valve capable of receiving a safety injection signal, actuates to its correct position upon receipt of a safety injection test signal. The charging and low head safety injection pumps may be immobilized for this test.

b.

Verifying that each charging pump and safety injection pump circuit breaker actuates to its correct position upon receipt of a safety injection test signal.

The charging and low head safety injection pumps may be immobilized for this test.

c.

Verifying, by visual inspection, that each low head safety injection pump suction inlet from the containment sump is free of debris that could degrade system operation. Perform each refueling outage and/or after major maintenance activities in the containment.

Complete system tests cannot be performed when the reactor is operating because a safety injection signal causes containment isolation. The method of assuring operability of these systems is therefore to combine system tests to be performed during refueling shutdowns, with *more frequent component tests, which can be performed during reactor operation.

Amendment Nos.

TS 4.11-4 The system tests demonstrate proper automatic operation of the safety Injection System. A test signal is applied to initiate automatic operation action and verification is made that the components receive the safety injection signal in the proper sequence. The test may be performed with the pumps blocked from starting.

The test demonstrates the operation of the valves, pump circuit breakers, and automatic circuitry.

During reactor operation, the instrumentation which is depended on to initiate safety injection is checked periodically, and the initiating circuits are tested in accordance with Specification 4.1. In addition, the active components (pumps and valves) are to be periodically tested to check the operation of the starting circuits and to verify that the pumps are in satisfactory running order. The test interval is determined in accordance with ASME Section XI. The accumulators are a passive safeguard.

References UFSAR Section 6.2, Safety Injection System Amendment Nos.

. Attachment 3 Significant Hazards Consideration Determination Surry Power Station

Significant Hazards Consideration Virginia Electric and Power Company has reviewed the proposed changes against the criteria of 1 O CFR 50.92 and has concluded that the changes as proposed do not pose a significant hazards consideration. The changes include:

(1) modification of the high head charging pumps seal cooling subsystem, (2) restructuring of the Chemical and Volume Control System and Safety Injection System Specifications, (3) relocation of certain specification requirements within existing specifications, (4) specification of a minimum boric acid solution temperature in lieu of heat tracing channel operability, and (5) minor wording changes which are administrative in nature for consistency in terminology, capitalization of defined terms and clarification.

Specifically, operation of Surry Power Station in accordance with the proposed Technical Specifications changes will not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The modifications to the charging pumps and elimination of the charging pump component cooling subsystem do not increase the probability of occurrence of any accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the safety analysis report.

The charging pump modifications utilize a passively designed process flow cooling arrangement to reduce exposure, improve reliability, and improve operability. The charging pump modifications will not decrease the pumps ability or the associated subsystems ability to perform their design function.

The restructuring of the Chemical and Volume Control System and Safety Injection System specifications on a subsystem basis continues to ensure that the reactor can be made subcritical from any operating condition and provide sufficient shutdown margin to preclude inadvertent criticality when in the shutdown condition.

The Safety Injection System subsystems continue to maintain sufficient boration capability to mitigate reactivity transients within the design limits associated with postulated accident conditions. The Safety Injection System subsystems ensure that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will Page 1 of 4

4 be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration. Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the accumulators remains capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the

peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits in accordance with the loss-of-coolant accident analyses.

The Chemical and Volume Control System remains capable of achieving Cold Shutdown of both units during any operating conditions in accordance with the safety analysis with a minimum specified solution temperature of 112 degrees F.

Heat tracing is not required for operability of the Safety Injection System nor does it affect the ability of the Safety Injection System to mitigate the consequences of any postulated accident identified in the safety analysis.

The changes ensure that the refueling water storage tank remains capable of providing a sufficient supply of borated water for injection by the emergency core cooling system in the event of a LOCA. The limits specified for refueling water storage tank volume and boron concentration continue to ensure that sufficient solution is available within containment for recirculation cooling flow to the core, and that the reactor will remain subcritical in Cold Shutdown consistent with the LOCA analyses.

The specified allowed outage time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months for an inoperable Chemical and Volume Control System subsystem or Safety Injection System subsystem is reasonable for the repair of affected components and is consistent with NRC Memorandum, "Recommended Interim Revisions to LCO's for ECCS Components," dated December 1, 1975, and NUREG-1431, Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactors.

A reliability analysis (reference NRC memo above) has shown that the impact of having one subsystem inoperable is sufficiently small to justify continued operation for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . Engineering evaluation of the proposed changes determined that they are bounded by existing safety analyses. Furthermore, the proposed changes do not increase the allowed outage times to achieve Cold Shutdown presently specified in the Technical Specifications.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Page 2 of 4

The passively designed once-through process flow cooling arrangement for the charging pumps' seals are recommended by the pump manufacturer with the pump seal manufacturer's concurrence and result in no decrease in the pumps ability to perform their safety function.

Our Engineering evaluation has determined that the affected systems ability to mitigate the consequences of any accident as described in the safety analyses is not reduced. The restructuring and relocation of specifications has not reduced any limiting condition for operation or surveillance specification requirements. Changes in allowed outage times are consistent with NUREG-0452, NUREG-1431, or Generic Letter 93-05 and our accident analyses. Consequently, the possibility of a new or different kind of accident is not created.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The modifications to the charging pumps result in improved reliability and improved operability of the eves and SI subsystems.

Our Engineering evaluation of the manufacturer's proposed modification and the pump seal manufacturer's concurrence with the modification, have determined this modification to be acceptable with no reduction in the pump's safety-related function. The charging pump modification does not reduce the margin of safety in any part of Technical Specifications or the accident analyses.

The restructuring of the Chemical and Volume Control System specifications continue to ensure that the reactor can be made subcritical from any operating condition and provide sufficient shutdown margin to preclude inadvertent criticality when in the shutdown condition. The Chemical Volume and Control System remains capable of achieving Cold Shutdown of both units during any operating conditions in accordance with the safety analysis with a minimum specified solution temperature of 112 degrees F. The revised allowed outage times for the Safety Injection System subsystems do not impact the margin of safety of in the Technical Specifications bases or the accident analyses.

The Safety Injection System subsystems continue to maintain sufficient boration capability to mitigate reactivity transients within the design limits associated with postulated accident conditions described within the safety analysis report. The Page 3 of 4

Safety Injection System subsystems ensure that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration.

Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the accumulators remains capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits in accordance with the loss-of-coolant accident analyses.

The changes ensure that the refueling water storage tank remains capable of providing a sufficient supply of borated water for injection by the emergency core cooling system in the event of a LOCA. The limits specified for refueling water storage tank volume and boron concentration continue to ensure that sufficient solution is available within containment for recirculation cooling flow to the core, and that the reactor will remain subcritical in Cold Shutdown consistent with the LOCA analyses. Consequently, the proposed change to Technical Specifications does not involve a significant reduction is the margin of safety within the accident analyses.

Page 4 of 4 I

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ML18152A182

Text

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