ML18152A145

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Forwards Summary of 880706 Enforcement Conference in Region II Ofc Re Insp Repts 50-280/88-16 & 50-281/88-16, 50-280/88-25,50-281/88-25,50-338/88-16 & 50-339/88-16
ML18152A145
Person / Time
Site: Surry, North Anna, 05000000
Issue date: 08/01/1988
From: Grace J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To: Cruden D
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
References
NUDOCS 8808150015
Download: ML18152A145 (43)
v • d • e


See also: IR 05000280/1988016

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:. -- ., ,: ;: --'l AUG O 1 i988 Docket Nos. 50-280, 50-281, 50-338 and 50-339 License Nos. DPR~32, DPR-37, NPF-4 and NPF-7 . Jirginia Electric and Power. Company \\jATTN: Mr. D.S. Cruden, Vice President, . Nuclear Operations P. 0. Box 26666 Richmond, VA 23261 Gentlemen: ~ SUBJECT: ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMMARY (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-280/88-16, 50-281/88-16, 50-280/88-25, ' 50-281/88-25, 50-338/88-16 AND 50-339/88-16) This letter refers to an Enforcement Conference held at our request on July 6, 1988. This meeting concerned activities authorized for your Surry and North Anna faci 1 iti es. The issues concerning the Surry Station discussed at this conference related to deficiencies in your radiation protection program identified during an inspection performed on May 2-6, 1988, and a review of the events surrounding a personnel overexposure on May 27, 1988, and the subsequent corrective actions in response to Inspection Report Nos. 50-280, 50-281/88-16 and 50-280, 50-281/88.:..25. The emergency diesel generator operability issue for North Anna Station discussed at this Conference was identified during an inspection conducted on May 14-June 10,. 1988, and was addressed in Inspection Report Nos. 50-338/88-16 and 50-339/88-16. Summaries, a list of attendees,.and copies of your hand-outs are enclosed. We are continuing our review of these issues to determine the appropriate enforcement action. In accord~nce with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Pu~lic Document Room. Should you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact us. Enclosures: 1. Enforcement Confere.nce Summary (Surry) 2. List of Attendees 3. Handout (Surry) 4. Enforcement Conference Summary ( North Anna.) 5. Handout (North Anna) ... cc w/encls: (See page 2) 8808150015 880801 PDR ADOC:K 050002E:O Q PDC Sincerely,

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J. Nelson Grace Regional Administrator . -**-------------* -~----------*---- ----****---~--- .~--. -... - -. -. ,---- - .. -.. ....--.-,.. . . . --..- . .**

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ENCLOSURE 1 ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMMARY SURRY Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company Facility: Surry Docket Nos: 50-280, 50-281 License Nos: DPR-32, DPR-37 - - - - - - - - - - - SUBJECT: CORRECTIVE ACTIONS REGARDING INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-280, 50-281/88-16 AND 50-280, 281/88-25 An Enforcement Conference was held at the Region II office on July 6, 1988, to discuss the findings identified in Inspection Report Nos. 50-280, 50-281/88-16 and 50~280, 50-281/88-25 and the results of the licensee's investigation of the incidents and review the corrective actions taken as a result * Licensee representatives discussed the sequence of events surrounding the personnel overexposure incident of May 27, 1988. A summary of the licensee's findings was presented including whole body doses received by each of the three individuals involved. Only one of the three individuals received a radiation dose in excess of 3 rems for the cal~ndar quarter (total quarterly dose was 3.279 rems). The licensee presented the basis for their determination of the root cause and contributing factors for the findings in both Inspection Report Nos. 50-280, 50-281/88-16 and 50-280,50-281/88-25 and their short and long term corrective actions. Inadequate Management Control of the Ra.diation Protection Program and support for the program were identified as the root cause. NRC representatives discussed the seriousness of these events and the breakdown of the licensee's system, including management review, which had been implemented to prevent such occurrences. Other items discussed included an apparent lack of proc~dural compliance on the part of plant workers and the inadequacy of the current procedures in the Radiation Protection Program. The licensee acknowledged weaknesses in the Radiation Protection Program and delineated their extensive corrective actions.

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.-- ENCLOSURE 2 ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE ATTENDEES Virginia Electric and Power Company D. Benson, Station Manager, Surry M. Bowling, Assistant Station Manager, North Anna D. Cruden, Vice President, Nuclear Operations G. Gordon, Supervisor, Electrical Maintenance, North Anna E. Grecheck, Assistant Station Manager, Surry N. Hardwick, Manager, Nuclear Licensing J. Hegner, Licensing, Surry G. Kane, Station Manager, North Anna G. Pannell, Corporate, Director SEC S. Sarver, Superintendent, Health Physics, Surry J. Smith, Supervisor, IOER B. Thornton, Corporate, Director of Health Physics and Chemistry Nuclear Regulatory Commission C. Bassett, Radiation Specialist, DRSS J. Caldwell, Senior Resiqent Inspector, North Anna B. Cline, Branch Chief, NMSS D. Collins, Branch Chief, DRSS T. Collins, Radiation Specialist, DRSS F. Cantrell, Section Chief, DRP M. Ernst, Deputy Regional Administrator L. Engle, NRR/PM, North Anna W. Hehl, Deputy Director, DRP C. Hinson, Health Physicist, DREP, NRR W. Holland, Senior Resident Inspector, Surry C. Hosey, Section Chief, DRSS F. Jape, Section Chief, DRS G. Jenkins, Director, EICS E. Merschoff, Deputy Director, DRS C. Patel, NRR/PM, Surry M. Scott, Project Engineer, DRP R. Shortridge, Radiation Specialist, DRSS B. Wilson, Branch Chief, DRP

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SURRY. POWER STATION UNIT 1 REACTOR VESSEL HEAD LIFT EXPOSURE EVENT NRC ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE JULY 6, 1988

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D. L. BENSON STATION MAN-AGER SURRY POWER STATION

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CAUSES & COMMON THREADS

EXPOSURE EVENT DESCRIPTION

SPECIFIC CAUSES

INSPECTION REPORT 88-16

CORRECT I VE ACTIONS

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WEAKNESSES IN MANAGEMENT CONTROLS PROCEDURES AND PROCEDURAL COMPLIANCE - ACTIVITIES PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT

WEAKNESSES .IN RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION PROGRAM INADEQUATE MANAGEMENT SUPPORT INADEQUATE TECHNICAL DEPTH - INADEQUATE CONTROLS AND PROCEDURES

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OBJECTIVE VERIFY REACTOR VESSEL FLANGE WAS CLEAN AND SET REACTOR HEAD PART IC I ~ANTS (FLANGE CLEAN I NG): Contractor Refueling Supervisor - Two Contractor Refueling Technicians V1 rgi ni a Power HP Techn1 ci an - Vi rgi ni a Power QC Inspector RADIATION WORK PERMIT: Based on 1 ev~l s measured at ti me of head 11 ft - Techn1 ci an to confirm reading after water 1 evel 1 owered, prior to f 1 ange cleaning DOSIMETRY: TLDs and High and Low Range SRDs on Head and Chest Extensions Granted in Anti ci pat ion of 300-500 * mrem


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... PRE-JOB MEET I NG: 9 am PRE-JOB BRIEF I NG: 5:30 pm Organizational Meeting Actual Participants Participants: Discussed: Not Covered: 3 Contractors - Crane Operator - 2 HP Technicians - Outage Coordinator HP supervisor QC Inspector Mechanics of Head Lift and Set Assignments of Coverage* Radiological Issues: 2-3 R field; expect 3 to 5 minute job; 300-400 mrem dose Dose Gradient inside Flange Passi bi 1 i ty that job could extend si gni fi cant 1 y beyond 5 minutes - Stey Times .

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Reactor Vessel Flange 6 R/hr 3 R/hr i .j

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SEQUENCE OF WORK (Mc1y 27, 1988,* c1pprox. 7 pm)

Water Level Lowered

Technician verifies 2-3 R/Hr dose rate and establishes a low dose waiting area

Delays encountered due to water level adjustments; 1 eve 1 stabi 1 i zed by operations

Work Party Enters Cavity

Initial Inspection of Flange Completed Minor .scratch noted and cleaning begins - Head lift *begins - QC inspector exits . ' ~

Contractor Supervisor proceeds with stoning flange; other contract personnel buffing sealing surface

  • HP Technician perio.dically surveys to confirm d-ose rates
  • * Stoning of scratch takes approximately 20-30 minutes

Work Party Exits Cavity

Dosimetry Read

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lnd1v1du6l Wl W2 W3 HP * QC

(M1111rem) Quarterly Total Event Event Quarterly Total (Prior to Event) (WB) (Heed) (After Event) ' 1340 2527 752 739 0 142 429 1247. 1650 3279 2389 1990 * 532 970 . 1073 350 392 1990 390 491

HP Technician Expected approximately 300 mrem total Did not believe stay time would become a constraint - 111 just lost track of time 11 Contractor Personnel - Felt that since technician was repeatedly surveying the work area and around their heads that they were protected

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  • RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION
  • MANAGEMENT CONTROLS

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CAUSES OVERALL

Fai 1 ure to Implement Radial ogi ca 1 Protection Pl an (RPP)

Inadequate support of HP by management and non-HP fore-men

Inadequate Technical Depth

Failure to Foll ow Procedure TH IS EVENT

Inadequate pre-job brief (minimal emphasis on HP)

Inadequate survey; dose gradient not quantified

Inadequate RWP; no def ense-i n~depth

HP technician failure to confirm RP consi derflt i ans and to cover the job properly

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understanding of RP coverage by all parties

c;:ontract personnel failure to accept responsibility for their own dose

' VIOLATIONS

  • Failure to re qui re radi at 1 O*n m oni tori ng devices for

entry into high radiation areas

Failure to perform adequate surveys to evaluate the extent of airborne radioactive material present

Failure to prop~rly post area where respiratory protection was re qui red

Failure to adequately label containers/items of radioactive materials THESE VIOLATIONS ILLUSTRATE ADDITIONAL EXAMPLES OF FAILURE TO FOLLOW PROCEDURES

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~~lg~ (Q)l(Q)~ ~ le~l [p ~ (Q)[J ~ lelJ ~ (Q) [M CORRECTIVE ACTIONS IMMEDIATE (Comp 1 eted)

Institute detai 1 ed pre-job briefing discussion guidelines to ensure proper review of radial ogi cal conditions and controls 100 mrem: 1000 mrem: guidelines detailed sign-off procedures

Management review of event with HP personnel

Management review of event with station personnel ~

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Retained consultant to evaluate RP Program

Complete RPP implementation: - I mp l em en t end T re i n Pe rs on n el i n Group 1 procedures by September 1988:

  • Respiratory Protection
  • Red i at i on Work Pe rm i t
  • Contemi net ion Control
  • Redioective Meteriel Control
  • I nstrumentet ion
  • Surveys

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CORRECT I VE ACTIONS (CON 1T) IN PROGRESS (CON BT)

Complete .RPP I mpl ementat ion (Con*t) - Implement end Train Personnel on Group 11 procedures by December 31, 1988:

  • External Dosimetry
  • . Sal i d Rad i a act i v e Waste C ant ro 1
  • Effluent Contra l
  • Red i o e ct i v e En vi ro nm en tel Mon i tori n g
  • Su rv e i 11 enc e & Eve l u et i on s
  • Rediologicel Incident Investigation end Anelysis

~ArD~(O)l(O)G~tAl [P~(O)lfEtl~(O)~ CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (CON 1T)

  • Organizational Cnanges (Prior to Unit 2 Outage)

- Establish radiological engineer function onsite; one in place; recruiting two addition al posit ions - Aggressively recruiting for a relief superintendent

- Aggressively recruiting for director of radiological assessment at corporate office - S~eking INPO reverse loanee

Additional Training Sessions with Station Employees (July 31, 1988) - Topics: recent events,.causes and corrective act ions; RP responsibilities; procedura 1 comp l i clnce - Department specific

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~~~~@l@~~t~l f~ijT~tT~@~ CORRECT I VE ACTIONS (CON 1T)

HP SUPERVISORS - Vi si tat ion to sites of superior RP performance

CONTRACTORS - TRAINING; ACCOUNTABILITY - He ell th Physics - General Contractors I;"

ASSESSMENT FUN CT I ON - Unit 2 0 uta ge Corporate or Contractor - Reporting to Station Mt:inager -

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PROCEDURES AND PROCEDURAL COMPLIANCE

ACTIVITIES PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT ! I i ;

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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS -* Formation of centralize*d procedure development staff at each site - Consoli dete procedure development to ensure consist ency end i ntegret ion of procedures Ensure proper procedurel erchi tecture end hum en f ectors - lmplementetion:

  • Nu c 1 e er Spec i el i st es s i g n e d - Jen u e ry 1 9 8 8
  • Consul tent support edded - Februery 1988
  • NOD Dreft Stenderd issued for comment - April 1988

. * Fi nel N_OD Stenderd issued (July 1988)

  • Wri ter*s Gui de issued (July 31, 1988)
  • Procedures revised by December 1991

~ (CORRECT I VE ACTIONS CON 1T)

Consul tnnt review of stnt ion net i vi ti es planning and manng~ment (August 1988) M.A.C. - Station Task Team

Unit 2 Outnge Reduced loading Levellze containment activities

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CORRECT I VE ACTIONS ( CON 1T)

Standards Reinforcement - Corporate Assist - Two full time.personnel; two part time - Personnel are trained in observation techniques and have participated in numerous INPO evaluations - Di rec t pa rt i c i pat i on in briefings and f i el d act i vi ti es to ensure standards are met - Will be conducted'for a four month period beginning July 6, 1 988 - Will report to Station Manager

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BREAKDOWN OCCURRED IN MANAGEMENT CONTROLS AND RADI-OLOGICAL PROTECTION* PROGRAM

EXTENSIVE AND AGGRESSIVE EFFORT BY MANAGEMENT *1s REQUIRED AND WILL BE * IMPLEMENTED TO CQR.RECT THE PROBLEM

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ENCLOSURE 4 ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMMARY NORTH ANNA Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company Facility:_ North Anna Docket Nos: 50-338, 50-339 License Nos: NPF-4, NPF-7 SUBJECT: EMERGENCY DIESEL OPERABILITY An Enforcement Conference was held at the Region II Office on July 6, 1988, to discuss the findings identified in Inspection Report 50-338, 50-339/88-16 regarding emergency diesel operability during the month of May 1988.

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1 i censee presented the contents of enclosure 5 on the issues. The NRC representatives discussed the safety aspects of the inoperable diesels, the inoperable- breaker associated with the 11 2H 11 diesel and the review depth on the breaker issue at the site.

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ENCLOSURE 5 ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE NORTH ANNA POWER STATION 4160 VOLT CIRCUIT BREAKERS JULY 6, 1988 AGENDA ilt'JTRODUCTION CIRCUIT BREAKER DESCRIPTION AND OPERATING EXPERIENCE EVENT CHRONOLOGY CORRECTIVE ACTIONS SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE CONCLUSIONS CLOSING REMARKS

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INPO SER 14-87 RIVER BEND EVENT

  • 4160 VOLT BROWN BOVERI, TYPE 5HK250 BREAKER
  • SHEARED/LOOSE BOLTS ON CLOSING SPRING CHARGING

MOTOR ALLOWED MOTOR TO BECOME MISALIGNED

  • 15 OF 19 LIKE BREAKERS WERE FOUND TO HAVE SIMILAR

PROBLEMS, HOWEVER BREAKERS WERE STILL OPERABLE

  • CAUSE ATTRIBUTED TO INSUFFICIENT TIGHTENING OF BOLTS

BY MANUFACTURER

  • CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

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  • INSPECTION AND REPAIR OF SIMILAR BREAKERS
  • INSTALLATION OF SPLIT LOCKWASHERS
  • DAILY INSPECTION OF CLOSING SPRING CHARGE INDICATOR

INPO- COMMENTS

  • PERFORM CHARGING MOTOR BOLT TIGHTNESS CHECKS

DURING PERIODIC MAINTENANCE

  • CONSULT MANUFACTURER FOR TORQUING AND THREAD

ADHESIVE RECOMMENDATIONS

  • PERFORM DAILY INSPECTION OF CHARGING MOTOR MECHANICAL

CHARGE INDICATORS

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 87-41

INADVERTENT BREAKER CLOSURE OR REPEAT BREAKER CLOSING AND OPENING FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF SPRING CHARGING. THESE PROBLEMS WERE ADDRESSED BY INSTALLATION OF A LIGHT SPRING TO THE CLOSE LATCH IN THE 1984 REFUELINGS

  • EOG OUTPUT BREAKER FAILURE TO CLOSE DUE TO LOOSE/MISSING

CLOSING SPRING CHARGING MOTOR MOUNTING BOLTS . **--*.**-- - "

INITIAL EVALUATION

  • CONCLUDED THAT BREAKER PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE WAS

ADEQUATE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING:

  • THERE WAS NO KNOWN HISTORY OF BROKEN OR LOOSE CHARGING

MOTOR BOLTS AT NORTH ANNA. (A LATER REVIEW OF BREAKER WORK ORDERS IDENTIFIED ONE PREVIOUS BREAKER WITH LOOSE BOLTS)

  • A SPOT CHECK OF APPROXIMATELY 14 BREAKERS DID NOT

INDICATE A SIMILAR PROBLEM

  • THE NORTH ANNA BREAKERS HAD BEEN MAINTAINED IN ACCORDANCE

WITH MANUFACTURER'S RECOMMENDATIONS

  • THE NORTH ANNA BREAKERS HAD SPLIT-RING LOCK WASHERS

INSTALLED - ONE OF RIVER BEND'S CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

  • THE INPO SER INDICATED THAT THE RIVER BEND FAILURE WAS DUE

TO A MANUFACTURING FLAW. BASED ON THIS FACT, AND LACKING A KNOWN FAILURE HISTORY FOR THE NORTH ANNA BREAKERS, IT WAS CONCLUDED THAT A SIMILAR PROBLEM DID NOT EXIST AT NORTH ANNA

  • ENGINEERING CONTACTED BROWN BOVERI AND WAS TOLD NO

POTENTIALLY DEFECTIVE BREAKERS HAD BEEN SUPPLIED TO NORTH ANNA

  • PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE ALREADY REQUIRED A

GENERAL TIGHTNESS CHECK '* :.*: -~- '****;*: . .. *-*~.- . ~--*::-*-~-:*~.-:: **.* ~:- . .. . '*" -~- *... , ... -

EVENT CHRONOLOGY MAY 5, 1988 0533 2H EDG REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR COOLANT CHANGE MAY 6, 1988 0435 2H EOG RETURNED TO SERVICE. OUTPUT BREAKER WAS CYCLED SATISFACTORILY 3 TIMES DURING POST-MAINTENANCE AND. OPERABILITY TESTING MAY 18, 1988 0603

2253 .. MAY 19, 1988 2J EOG REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR COOLANT CHANGE 2J EOG STARTED AND LOADED TO MIX COOLANT. ERRATIC LOAD INDICATION WAS NOTED. SMALL LEAK IN GOVERNOR SERVO BOOSTER WAS ALSO NOTED. 0010 2J EOG SHUTDOWN AND TAGGED FOR REPAIR OF SERVO BOOSTER LEAK 0355 2J EOG STARTED AND LOADED FOR POST-MAINTENANCE CHECK. SMALL LEAK IN LINE BETWEEN SERVO BOOSTER AND GOVERNOR NOTED. 0525 2J EOG SHUTDOWN AND TAGGED FOR REPAIR OF LEAK 1055 2J EOG STARTED FOR POST-MAINTENANCE CHECK 1230 2J EOG STARTED AND LOADED FOR OPERABILITY TEST 1236 EOG WAS SHUTDOWN WHEN LOAD DROPPED TO ZERO.

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INSULATION BINDING OF GOVERNOR LINKAGE WAS IDENTIFIED AND CORRECTED

1357 1652 1759 2034

2055 2116 2140 MAY 20, 1988 0400 0451 0705 1019

EVENT CHRONOLOGY (CONT'D) 2J EOG STARTED AND LOADED FOR POST-MAINTENANCE CHECK 2J EOG STARTED FOR OPERABILITY TEST. LOW LUBE OIL ALARM WAS RECEIVED. EDG WAS SHUTDOWN TO INVESTIGATE, AND ALARM WAS DETERMINED TO BE SPURIOUS 2J EOG STARTED AND LOADED FOR OPERABILITY TEST 2J EDG DECLARED OPERABLE

  • 2H EDG STARTED FOR OPERABILITY TEST PER SPEC 3.8.1.1

2H EDG SHUTDOWN BECAUSE OUTPUT BREAKER WOULD NOT CLOSE .. 2H EDG OUTPUT BREAKER INSPECTED. CHARGING MOTOR FOUND OFF ITS MOUNTING. ALL 3 MOUNTING BOLTS WERE MISSING 2H EOG OUTPUT BREAKER REPLACED WITH SPARE 2H EOG STARTED AND LOADED FOR OPERABILITY TEST 2H EOG DECLARED OPERABLE 4 HOUR REPORT PER 10 CFR 50.72(b}(2}(iii}

EVENT SUMMARY

  • THE 2J EDG WAS AVAILABLE WITHIN APPROXIMATELY 30 MINUTES

DURING THE COOLANT CHANGEOUT

  • THE 2J EDG COULD HAVE BEEN STARTED MANUALLY AT EITHER THE

LOCAL CONTROL PANEL ON THE DIESEL OR THE CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY PANEL IN THE DIESEL ROOM

  • THE 2J EDG WAS STARTED 7 TIMES (AND LOADED 5 TIMES} DURING

THE MAINTENANCE OUTAGE

  • THE MINOR OIL LEAK AND SPURIOUS LUBE OIL ALARM WOULD

NOT HAVE PRECLUDED RUNNING AND LOADING OF THE 2J EDG . . ' -

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REASONS FOR PROBLEM

  • WEAKNESSES IN THE OPERATING EXPERIENCE DOCUMENT

FOLLOWUP AND CLOSEOUT PROCESS

  • BREAKER PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE NOT REVISED TO

EXPLICITLY REQUIRE CHECK FOR BOLT TIGHTNESS

  • DAILY CHECK OF BREAKER MECHANICAL CHARGE NOT

IMPLEMENTED

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS COMPLETED CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

  • REPLACED 2H EDG OUTPUT BREAKER AND PERFORMED

OPERABILITY TEST

  • CHECKED ALL 4160 VOLT BREAKERS (SAFETY AND NON-SAFETY

RELATED) TO VERIFY CLOSING SPRINGS WERE CHARGED

  • . IMPLEMENTED STANDING ORDER REQUIRING VERIFICATION OF

MECHANICAL CHARGE FOLLOWING OPENING OF A 4160 BREAKER

  • IMPLEMENTED DAILY CHECK OF BREAKER MECHANICAL CHARGE

INDICATORS (SAFETY RELATED BREAKERS)

  • CONSULTED WITH MANUFACTURER ON CHARGING MOTOR BOLT

TORQUING REQUIREMENTS .

  • INSPECTED SAFETY RELATED 4160 BREAKERS (EXCEPT EMERGENCY

BUS FEEDER BREAKERS) FOR LOOSE BOLTS. ALSO VERIFIED CLOSE LATCH SPRING INSTALLED. .

  • REVISED BREAKER PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE TO INCLUDE

BOLT TIGHTNESS CHECK AND INCREASED PM FREQUENCY

  • EVALUATED 480 VOLT BREAKERS FOR SIMILAR CHARGING MOTOR

CONCERNS

  • ISSUED NUCLEAR NETWORK MESSAGE ON NORTH ANNA

EXPERIENCE

  • CONDUCTED QA PERFORMANCE-BASED SURVEILLANCE OF OPERATING

EXPERIENCE REVIEW PROGRAM

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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (CONT'D) ONGOING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

  • INSPECTING REMAINING SAFETY AND NON-SAFETY RELATED

BREAKERS AS PLANT OPERATIONS PERMIT

  • ENHANCING FOLLOWUP AND CLOSEOUT OF OPERATING EXPERIENCE

DOCUMENTS TO ASSURE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ARE ADEQUATE AND TRACKED - . --*

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... 4160 VOLT CIRCUIT BREAKER INSPECTION RES UL TS SAFETY RELATED BREAKERS TOTAL 53 NUMBER CHECKED FOR MECHANICAL CHARGE 53 NUMBER THAT CAN BE INSPECTED AT POWER 47 NUMBER INSPECTED NUMBER WITH LOOSE BOLTS NUMBER INOPERABLE NON-SAFETY RELATED BREAKERS TOTAL 47 9* 1 84 NUMBER CHECKED FOR MECHANICAL CHARGE 84 NUMBER THAT CAN BE INSPECTED AT POWER 13 NUMBER INSPECTED NUMBER WITH LOOSE BOLTS NUMBER INOPERABLE 13 0 0 --~- --*:*--*

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BREAKER LOOSE BOLT HISTORY BREAKER CYCLES LAST PM DESCRIPTION 15H2 783 11-14-85 2 BOLTS BACKED OUT HALF.WAY, 1 BOLT WITH 2 THREADS ENGAGED 15J12 438 05-23-84 1 BOLT MISSING, 2 SAT. 25H1 166

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ll2,-Q2 82 1 BOLT 1/4 TURN LOOSE, 2SAT 25J5 777 09-09-84 1 BOLT BACKED OUT APPROX. 1/4", 2 SAT 25J9 407 09-09-84 3 BOLTS BACKED OUT APPROX. 1/4" 15H12 371 11-25-85 1 BOLT 6 TURNS LOOSE, 1 BOLT 1/2 TURN LOOSE, 1 BOLT SAT . .. 15H14 499 10-29-85 1 BOLT 6 1/2 TURNS LOOSE, 1 BOLT 2 TURNS LOOSE, 1 BOLT 1 TURN LOOSE 25H2 638 03-18~86 CHARGING MOTOR FOUND LOOSE FROM BKR. FRAME, DISCOVERED WHEN BKR. WOULDN'T CLOSE 25J7 331 04-28-83 . ALL 3 BOLTS BACKED OUT HALFWAY

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'.r' P CA l.i* * SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS WERE TAKEN OR COULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO MINIMIZE THE POTENTIAL SAFETY CONSEQUENCES OF THIS EVENT:

  • TWO INDEPENDENT OFFSITE POWER CIRCUITS WERE DEMONSTRATED

TO BE OPERABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

  • THE FAILED CIRCUIT BREAKER WAS REPLACED WITH A SPARE BREAKER

WHICH WAS READILY AVAILABLE

  • THE FAILED CIRCUIT BREAKER WAS CAPABLE OF BEING MANUALLY

CHARGED AND CLOSED

  • THE START CAPABILITY OF THE 2H EDG WAS UNAFFECTED
  • EMERGENCY AND. ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR LOSS .

OF OFFSITE AND EMERGENCY AC POWER SOURCES ARE IN PLACE

  • CURRENT PROCEDURES ADDRESS POWERING THE UNIT 2 EMERGENCY

SUSSES FROM THE UNIT 1 EDGs

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CONCLUSIONS

  • EVENT WAS IDENTIFIED AND REPORTED BY VIRGINIA POWER
  • SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE WAS REDUCED BY PROMPT ACTIONS AND

EXISTING EMERGENCY PROCEDURES

  • FULL COMPLIANCE WITH TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS WAS

ACHIEVED AT ALL TIMES FOLLOWING DISCOVERY .J' LS-Z,'!Y) LrD

  • RESPONSE TO INPO SER lNA8 REASONABLE GIVEN PAST

EXPERIENCE AND ONGOING MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES

  • LAST SURVEILLANCE TEST OF 2H EOG GAVE NO INDICATION OF

A BREAKER PROBLEM

  • UNAVAILABILITY OF 2J EOG DURING MAINTENANCE WAS

SIGNIFICANTLY LESS THAN THE 39 HOURS IT WAS IN THE ACTION STATEMENT

  • CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE HAVE BEEN

IMPLEMENTED ..... *-.----*~- -- ' .. ..... ,-- }}

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