ML18096B026

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Proposed Deleted Tech Specs 3/4.7.10, Fire Suppression Sys & 3/4.7.11, Penetration Fire Barriers
ML18096B026
Person / Time
Site: Salem  PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 09/30/1992
From:
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
Shared Package
ML18096B025 List:
References
GL-86-10, NUDOCS 9210080174
Download: ML18096B026 (21)
v • d • e


Text

... '

).

Ref:

LCR 90-15 ATTACHMENT 2 INSERTS AND MARKED-UP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGES

/.

9210080174 920930 PDR ADOCK 05000272 p

PDR

m:T!ON 3/4.7 314.7.1 3/4.-7.%

3/4.7.3 3/4.7.4 3/4.7.5 3/4.7.*

3/4.7.7 3/4.7.I.

3/4.7.J INDEX PA61 lVRlld CTCl.I * * * * * * ** * * * ******* * * * *

  • I 3/4 7*1'*

CCll'OllDT CDOl.%111 WATD !TSTIM *

  • mvta WATD sYSTIN * * * * ***

'1.am !'la ra:na1 * * * * * * * *

  • I 3/4 7-4 I 3/4 7-~

I 3/4 7.5 AUX11.IMY IUILDUtl EXHAUST All '11.TIATIOll STSTIM

. I 3/4 ~-5 I 3/4 7.5 SW ID SMlCI CCKTMlMTIOI * * * * * * * * * * * * *

  • 1.3/4 7.5 SZIJUIRS ** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

, * * * * * * *

  • I l/4 7-a 3/4.I

!UC'ntICAL l1CMll srSIEl4S 3/4.1.1 1114 3/4.. a.. z 3/4.a.J A. C:. SQUICIS oam PO!G DIST!I!!JTIOJI STST!MS SAUM

  • UPltT Z XIV

! 3/1;. 1=1 I 3/4 l*l

TABLE 3.3-10 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS Minimum Total Type "A" Ty:r;>e "B" Detectors Description No. of Detectors Detectors Operable Zone Area Breakdown Detectors (Note 1)

(Note 2)

(Note 3) 91 Relay Room 9

9 17 (ZIU 91, odd numbered detectors)

(Note 5) 91 Relay Room 9

9 (ZIU 96, even numbered detectors) 92 Aux Feed Pumps El. 84' Detection Only No Discharge 5

5 4

97 Switchgear Room El. 84' 14 14 13 98 Electrical Penetration Area El. 78' 6

6 5

101 No. 12 Fuel Hdlg Area Exhaust El 100 1

1 1

102 Containment Pressure Relief El 100 1

1 1

103 No. 11 Iodine Removal El 78 1

1 1

104 No. 12 Iodine Removal El 78 1

1 1

105 Control Room Air Cond'g El 100 1

1 1

106 Aux Bldg Air Cond'g El 100 1

1 1

121 South Penetration El. 92 1 -6 11 & 100' 6

6 5

122 Elect Penetration El. 100' 6

6 4

123 Mech Penet. East El. 100' 6

6 4

124 Mech Penet. West El. 100' 5

5 4

125 Aux Bldg Elev 100 Col 11. 8-14 FF-NN 21 21 Corridor Det's 125-1 to 125-5. & 125-15 6

5 e

Boric Acid Evap Rm, Det's 125-6 to 125-8 3

2 Misc Areas, Det's 125-9 to 125-14 6

6 Lab El 100' & llO', Det's 125-16 to 125-21 6

6 126 Aux Bldg Boric Acid Trans Pumps El. 100' 3

3 2

127 Containment Fan Coil Unit 11 & 12 El. 130' 12 12 Ring Duct by 11 FCU 2

2 Ring Duct by 12 FCU 2

2 Above 11 FCU 4

3 Above 12 FCU 4

3 128 Containment Fan Coil Unit 13 & 14 El. 130' 12 12 Ring Duct by 13 FCU 2

2 Ring Duct by 14 FCU 2

2 Above 13 FCU 4

3 Above 14 FCU 4

3 SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 3-52b Amendment No.

,c_ *.

Ref: I.CR 90-15 INSERIS FOR LICENSE CllIDITIOOS AND TEXlINICAL SP.EX:IFICATION - 6. 9. 3 INSERl' 1 LICENSE CllIDITION 2.C. (5) FOR UNIT 1 AND 2.C. (10) FOR UNIT 2 PSE&G shall implement am maintain in effect all p:rovisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, am as approved in the NRC Safety Evaluation Report dated November 20, 1979, am in its supplenent:s, subject to the followl.Ig provision:

PSE&G may make charges to the aQ?:ruve.el fire p:r:utection program without prior app:roval of the Cbmmission only if those cbanJes "WCUld not adversely affect the ability to adrleve am maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.

INSERl' 2 - TS 6.9.3

6. 9. 3 Violations of the :requirene1t:s of the fire protection PrtXJl'.'alll described in the Final Safety Analysis Report which "WCUld have adversely affected the ability to achieve am maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire shall be submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulato:ry Chmnission, IlXllIDent Control Desk, Washington, OC 20555, with a copy to the Regional Administrator of the Regional Office of the NRC via the Licensee Event Report System within 30 days.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIBEMENTS 4.7.11.1 At least once per 18 months the above required fire rated assemblies and penetration sealing devices shall be verified OPERABLE by:

a.

Performing a visual inspection ot the exposed surfaces ot each fire rated assemblies.

b.

Performing a visual inspection of each fire window, fir~ damper and associated hardware.

c.

Performing a visual inspection of at least 10 percent of each type of sealed penetration. It apparent changes in appearance or abnormal degradations are found, a visual inspection of an additional 10 percent of each type of sealed penetration shall be made.

This inspection process shall continue until a 10 percent sample with no

  • apparent change in appearance or abnormal de9radation is found.

Samples shall be selected such that each penetration seal will ))e*. inspected at least once per 15 years.

4.7.11.2 Each of th* above required fire doors shall b*

verified OPERABLE by inspecting the automatic hold-open, release and closing mechanisms and latch** at least once per 6 months, and by verifying:

a.

The po*ition of each closed tire door at least once per 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

b.

That door* with automatic hold-open and release mechanism* are free of obstructions at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

c.

The position of each. locked closed fire door at least once per 7 days.

d.

Tb* OPBRABILITY of the fire door supervision system by performing a TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TIST at least once per 31 days.

Unit l

4;_

Ref:

LCR 90-15 ATTACHMENT 3 PROPOSED CHANGES TO FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS PRIOR TO REMOVAL FROM THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR SALEM GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2

(

1 1 AND 2

-1*::... 1*.. HI e

~

Stan:md Tedmical Spacificatiaw (SIS) for ~

~

water Rsactars, :AllVisial 4 waa used as a baaia. far tlw c::harlJ89.

Specific systan parameters currently ccntained in tha ex:istinq Balm 'lW:tJnical Bp9cificatiais

('IS) ware ex:b:ca:::ted and iutz* dred into thl S'IS 1llCl:tlin;r.

'Iba rec;piranents for Balm Generatin;J statial CClltainad in thia attadme1t refiect CXl'JSistmcy with tha Fire Protectial PtUjtaa nq.dranents ot PSE&G 1 s Hep creak.Genaratin;J statiat ~

possible.. 'Iha ci(:p:ca:h WU taken reccgniz:i.n:J that aw 0 11""1 organizat:im a mapc:n1ibl.e far fire protact.iQ1 system sm:veillanca tastin; an::l o "ler&ltar:y wsurm far beth statimm.

By*

havinJ a ocndstent set of 9ddeli.nes for sal* ani a:pa Ctaek, tlllll pcssibility far ez:1uta a rectred. 'lharetare, m.m significant diffaresxw.

exist between tha S'IS and tm recpirEIDEl'lta ~Y

~

far Hep creek (as ccntained in RJR!Xi-1186), tha Hep Creek req.d.raDera WE"e adcpt.ed.

In adclitiai, othm:' than asaigninJ tha mjar Sectian nmt:ma,

  • cxmt:ained in the existinJ TS, to tb9 apprcpriat.a sectiaw in thia.mi.ttal, no atteapt was made to carralate sutJsectim l'llllblrln:J ar Tabla dll!lsignatic.m.

S&Decti.al ri.mmrs ware assigned in tm arder caitained in tm S'IS and Tabla designations reflect the designatiaw ot tha SIS unless othe1'wim spacifically noted in the SUllmlly of Cllangea below.

  • lliere entire sect.iaw er par-4ap* have been dalet:sd, *JtiseqllEl1t pu&Jlcqhl have been I'B'UltJered aeqlBltially. Specific o 1111ents are included in tm follawinq 9111111ftry of ~.

Sectia>

3.3.3.6 Plrdnt1m

  • srs Table 3.3-10 has been rumteud to be a:ndstent with am:a& 'IS to avoid disnJpt.im ot athar tabl* in the Sectioo *

. 'Dda tabla has been cxzpletaly Nfamrt:t:.a:l to maz:a clearly

  • WeHty dstactia1 zaa1 and datactar tuncti.aw *** either as
  • mrl~

al.am auy or

  • a agr ian syataa

~.

Di ccntrast to th9 llDil tm::Mt 1libic::h inclmea a gwwd.c st:atanent far detem:in:lD).UU.. dlltectar

  • cparability bum en datactar tUnct:.:l.al, tm actual miniJua nmtier of d8t8ct:ara req.iirad to be q>erabl* baa ~

includad oawistent with tlatb ex:istinq 'IS am sm. '1bia fcmmt-. selected. to avoid rwiain;J tacbnical. intm:mticn ccntain.s in tb9 ex::istirg TS uni-t:bE9 wu a SI'~

llXlificatian to a zme or tm nw.r or type of detectara 11118 claarly in crcr based oo a fial.d 1lilal.lcdcMl.

Since the ~

ot datactam at salem a primrily localized or spot CCJYararJll rath8r than area CCJYararJ11 u provided at HC:XaS, tm ga*dc &tatma1t for dlltaDlininJ miniJlua cparable dstactcn.ia mt cq:;p:q:a iate.

4.3.3.6.1 4.3.3.6.2 eescription

'Ihe testirg requirement contained in Section 4.3.3.6.l for testirg restorable spot-type thermal detectors alla¥S for testirg "sudl that at least cne detector at each signal-initiatirg circuit will be tested at least once per 6 llalths, sucn that all detectors are tested in s years. " 'lhis testin;J requirement represents a ~

fran STS arx:l existin;J SGS 'IS both of which require testin;J all fire detectiai instruments at least cn:llB per 6 ~o 'lhis testirg requirement, however I is consistent with the awrcved Hope creek Generatirg station (HO:;S) requirement.

'Iha basis for the d'lan;;Je to the requirement cxmes fran National Fi.re PJ:ctection Associatiai {NFPA) stan::latd 72E, "starnard on Autanatic Fire Detectors". '!his stan:1ard is a naticmally recognized stan:1ard which aa:b:esses the :miJWlun req.ti.rements for the perfo:cman:::e of autanatic fire detectors to ensure timely wamirq for the protectiai ot lite am prq>erty.

MaintenarD! requirements of autanatic fire detectors are inclu:ied aJDCnJ the topics considered. Specifically, NFPA 72E, 1990 &:litiat, Section 8-3-.3.1 states, "For restorable heat detectors (except pneumatic line-type), aie or more detectors ai*eacn signal-initiatin;J circuit shall be tested at least semianmally arx:l different detectors sball be selected for each test. Within five years, each detector shall*have been tested." '!here are no pneumatic line type detectors installed in SGS.

'lherefore, the exceptiai noted in NFPA 72E, Section 8-3.3.1 was not in::lu::led in TS 4.3.3.6.1.

A :review of past revisioos of NFPA 72E t:hraqi the 1974 editiai, in:lica:tes that the specified duratiai of s years, over

'Which all detectors sbruld be tested, was inb:* dncm in the 1982 editim. Prior to that time, there was no specified duratiai for testi.rg all detectors. secticn 7-3.1.2 of the 1974 edition an::i Sectiat 8-3.1.3 of the 1978 editiat bJth state, "For :restorable spat-type heat detectors, at least cne detector en eac:h signal initiatin} circuit shall be tested semi-anrually arx:l different detectors shall be selected for ea.ch test." 'Iherefare, PSF.&G's pu p:ead. revisim to the t:estinJ requirement far :rest:orable spot thennal detectors is justified by NFPA 72E.

'Iba J.nt.1t ot t:hiJI sectiai, u a::intain.:l in SIS s.:tiat 4.3.3.3.8.2 an:l the ll:m ~

t. to.-.ire that the supcvisary functiai ot NFPA 72D supervised circuits is OmwuJ!:o As prasentai in tn. a:1atinJ 'IS sect.ial 4 o 3 o 3 o 6
  • 2 I tha cirali.t itsalt ia te&tad fifley 92 days. 'lhi.9, in effect, dupl.icat.. sectiai 4. 3. 3. 6.1. 'lb£9tare, SIS and tn. 6 IIO'lth

~are ilm:poratad in thia mtmittal.

secticn 4.3.3.8.3 Description

'1his section of SIS deals with deoonstra~ that nonsupervised circuits associated with detector alanns, between the instrument an::l the Control Roan are q>erable at least once per 31 days. 'Ihis requirement is not currently in::luded in either SGS Unit 1 or Unit 2 TS an::l has been anitted f:ran this subnittal.

A review of the Sanple TS provided with the NRC's original request for subnittal of TS in 1977 in:licates that, at that time, there were two requirements associated with fire detection instrumentation.

TS Section 4. J. 3. a.1 required the dem:lnstration of eadl fire detectiai instrument to be ~le at least cn:::e per 6 nart:hs by perfOZ11BJD! of a ClfANNEI, FUNC!'I~ TES!': arxi section 4. 3. 3. s. 2 required dem:lnstratirg that the circuitry associated with detector a1anns for NFPA Code 720 Class A supenrised circuits q>erable ame per 62 days.

Referrin;J to the NFPA 720, 1975 editicm, a "Cl.ass A system provides emergency operation for fire al.am, waterflCM alam

.an:l guard's twr signals durirg a sin;Jle break or a sin;Jle grami fault of the signalin:J line circuit" (NFPA 720, 1975 editiai, Article 110, Section 1111, Page 0-13). 'lhe signalin:J line circuit is "A circuit camectinJ transmitters or control tmits to the central supervisin:J staticm over Which fire alam, waterflCM, guard tair, or supervismy signals are transmitted, whether entirely within a buildinq or ext:eminJ to other build..i.nJs" (NFPA 720, 1975 editie11, Article* 100, Page 0-12).

In the case of the system installed at SGS, the OJntro1 F!x::xn is considered to be the central supervisin;J staticm. 'lhe cxmtrol tmits for the fire detection zones identified on Table 3. 3-10, with one exception for two* zones in eadl Urtit, are located in the Relay Roan, the roan directly belCM the o:introl Roan.

'!he circuits between the Control Roan ard the caitrol tmits are not arran;ed in a Class A configuratie11.

'lS Sectie11 4. 3. 3. a. 2, as originally provided by the NRC, was anitted in PSE&G's response dated 7 /28/77 because SGS is not provided with NFPA Code 72D Class A supervised circuits. In subsequent NRC <Xl.ll'esµJtrlence, dated ll/23/77, the requirement which had been anitted by PSE&G was reYi.sed arxi reintroduced to require that the circuits between the above required detection instruments am the Control Reem shall be deioonstrated OPERABLE at least once :i;:>er 31 days per awrcved procedures." In response, a PSE&G letter, dated 4/12/78, contained a prqx>sed. c:banJe to the frequency of this requirement frc:an 31 days to 12 nart:hs.

'lhe Reason for Chan:Je.p:rcvided with the request in:licated that "SGS is not equi~ with automatic circuit d'lec::kiJ'g devices or manual switches to check the 148 circuits involved on a 31 day basis.

Disoounectirg leads on this frequerx:y 'Wall.d cause un:iue equipnent -wear: actual sroke tests 'Wall.d be tapractical on a m::mthly basis. 11

'!he NRC response, dated 2/12/79, allowed for a f:requex:y of 92 days with the requirement focusin;J on deroonstratin;J the.circuits between the detection instruments ani the control Room OPERABIE.

I 4.3.3.8.3 (Ccnt'd)

Pescription

~

the requirement contained in the original SaJli>le TS to the req.tlrement in SIS Rev. 4, there is a noted difference.

STS 1'XJW in:::l.me Section 4

  • 3
  • 3
  • 8. 2, which requires 1"llle NFPA stan:!ard 720 supezvised circuits supezvision associated with the detector alarms of eadl of the above required fire detectioo instruments shall be clemcn;trated OPmABIE at least once per 6 months. " an:i Section 4. 3. 3
  • 8. 3 which requires "'Ihe ncnsupetVised circuits, associated with detector alann,.between the instrument an:i the Control Reem shall be demonstrated OPERABIE at least orx:e per 31 days."

At SGS, the entire circuit fran initiatin;J device to Cootrol Reem can be broken into two parts, 1) the circuits between the initiatin;J devices an:i the CCl'ltrol units, and 2) the circuits between the control units an:i the cattrol Rcc:m.

Coosiderirg first the circuits bebJeen the initiatirq devices and the COl'Itrol units, t.hsse circuits are marl.tared for circuit integrity. With only a few excepticms, the relays which maiitar the circuits can be actuated without liftin;J leads to deaastrate that if circuit integrity bebieen the initiatirg device and the control unit has been CXllpl'.u11Jsed, a "trooble" in:licatiai ~d be transmitted to the 0::11trol Reem.

Perfcmmnce of this test also CCl'lfinl& circuit integrity itself by dalastratirq that the relays which maiitar ciJ:cuit integrity are function.in:;.

In other words, if the alann initiatirq circuit had been cx:atptunised, a "tralble" in:lication wculd have been previrusly received. Also, the tralble" in:licatiai bein:J transmitted to the ca1trol Reem can be CCl'lfinned in the Control Roan denra1stratizg the circuits between the control unit an:i the O:o11trol Rcc:m are q>erable.

As noted, t:ha'e are a few circuits which require liftirg leads to dema'lStzate that the relays llihich :natl.tar for cirarl.t integrity are fum::timirg.

Hcwever, due to the limited nmt>er of cin::ui:ts.involved, perfOJ:mal'De of this :furd:i.a'l a1 a freq.len::y of six DDnths is l'XJt cxnsidend to subject the system to uni1e

-wear. It shalld also be noted that meet:inJ the :requirement as origimlly written could be acxx:mplisbed by* actuatil'q the m::ist ramta initiatirq device on the circuit and caifi.J:m:in;1 that 0*11Uol Reem in:lication is received. '1his methcx:l, l'lavever, dces net exercise the relays which DDU.tor circuit integrity.

'lberefore, perfo:nnance of Sectioo 4.3.3.8.2, as currently px s 1ted in S'IS Rev. 4, offers the added benefit of ensuring that the relays which nonitor circuit inteqrity between the initiatirq devices an:i the control units are cprational arx:l, at the same time, of confinnirg that the "trouble" circuit to the Control Roan is operable.

Unlike the circuits.between the initiatin:;J devices an:i the ccntrol units, the circuits.between the ccutcol units arx:l the cart:rol Reem are not ronitored for circuit integrity. However, the P1ysical configuration of the caip::nents, thetselves,

Section 4.3.3.8.3 (Cont'd) 3.7.10.1 Cescriotion min.:iJnizes the potential that detection alanns will not be received in the Control Roan due to loss of circuit integrity.

As inilcated previously, the control units, with one exception, are located in the Relay Roan, whidl is inmediately below the Control Roan.

'Iherefore, the len;tb of cable involved is minimal, thus reducin:] the potential for damage.

For the exception noted, one control unit in eadl Unit is located in a corridor at the elevation inmediately below the Relay Roam an:i the circuits are routed in can:luit to the Relay Roan.

'Ihis arrargement differs fran arrangements often installed in large facilities in that the control units may be located in areas which are remote fran the central alann station requirin:J an extensive signalirg line circuit. In addition, the circuits between the oontrol units an:l the 0:111ltol Rocm are oot of the type whidl transmit nultiple signals. Eadl zooe at a control unit represents a sirgle circuit to the OJntrol Roan.

Consequently, loss of a sirgle circuit does oot result in total loss of cxmrunication with the plant.

Finally, in order to perfcmn testinJ associated with the requi.n!ments of Sectim 4.3.3.6.1, it is necessary to actuate detectors m each initiatirg device circuit. 'lhe anzeuL design of the SGS syst:an is sudl that, shJrt of lift.:in;J leads far circuits between the <x11Ltol units an:l the Q:al'l:t:ol Roan, actuatim of a detector will transmit an alann to the Q:a1Ltol Roan.

Omf.im.Ug receipt of this alann denalstrates that the circuits between the a::ultol mrl.t and the o:a1Ltol Reem are cperable.

'Iherefore, the testirg associated STS Rev. 4, Section 4.3.3.8.1 for perfonnin:J a test of the detectors an:l Section 4.3.3.8.2 for dem:Jl'lstratirg that the supervised circuit supervision is cperable, in CCl!i:>ination with the ~ical ~of the control units relative to the Control Roan, ensures that circuits whidl are oot rronitored for integrity are q>erable.

Qnissim of Section 4.3.3.8.3 is oot oonsidered to reduce the level of system reliability.

'Ibis sectia1 has been repirasm. to refiect STS and establishes 0CZ1Sistency with }kpl Q:eek ~.

It sbail.d be noted that sect.iai 3. 7.10.1. c, as incl\\.dad in ax:i.stinJ unit l 'IS as "Autanatic initiatiai loqic tar tba tire punp" has been significantly repirasm. 'Ibis. dcm net a.J;hiESt, hcwever, that autanatic loqic is no lcn;Jer rapirad, SllrYaill.an::.

RFqd*w1t 4.1.10.1.1.e, as c:x:mtaina::l in thia sutmittal,

~

tunctiaW. testin:J to dancr*lzata tba system ~le lilhich includes " **. sillUl.ata:i autanatic actuatial of the

~-***

c:~

t.

Section cescription 4.7.10.1.1 S'IS Secticn 4.7.11.1.1.b has beat deleted as net afPlicable and sul:sequent paragraphs ~lettered. It sball.d be noted that this paragraPt is cxl'ltained in the existin;J TS.

'!be p.mp run t.ilua retlec:te.1 in sm, hc:lwavar, su.:JgeSts that the.

requirement was nct :interned to ag:ply to beth electric and diesel drivan pmp. salm dcm net use electric driven punps.

'Iha requiranents far IUl1l'l:irq diesel driven pmp; are amtainad in S'1S Sectiai 4.7.11.1.2.

4.7.10.1.1.b 'Ibis section corresporxls to existin:;J TS SectiCX'l 4.7.10.1.1.c.

Olrrentl.y, unit 1 requires valve positiai verification for valves in the flowpath which are not locked, sealed, or othe?:wise secured.

Both SGS unit 2 TS arxl SIS irolude previsions for corxiuctin:J valve position verificatiCX'l for valves in the flowpath: however, valves which are locked, sealed, or othel:wise secured are not identified as exclu:led.

A review of other sections of SIS was con::hlcted to determine if the cq:proad1 used for establishirg the requirement for valve*

position verification for the fire water system was consistent with safety system requirements.

Usin:;J SIS, Revisioo 4, it was identified that valve J;X>Sitiai verificaticn is typically excluded for valves in flcwpaths that are locked, sealed, or othawise secured in J;X>Sition, regardless of their location.

'lhis is consistent with the requirement originally ~roved for SGS unit 1. Several exanples include TS Section 4.1.2.1.b for Boratiai Systems, section 4.1.2.2.b for Reactivity Control Systems, Section. 4. 7.1. 2. a. 3 for Auxiliai:y Feedwater Systems, Section 4 o 7 *Jo a for ~

Coolin:;J water Systems I arxl Section 4. 7. 4. a for Service water Systems. COnsiderin:;J the significance of the fire water system relative to other safety systems addressed by TS, the requirement currently inclu:led in SGS unit 1 TS which requires valve position verification for valves in the flowpath which are not locked, sealed, or otheiwise secured is consistent. It shall.d also be noted that this ~ch is in agreement with the basis provided by PSE&G in a letter, dated 12/19/77, SlJR)Ortin;J the current SGS Unit 1 TS which was subsequently ~ed in an NRC letter dated 2/14/78.

It is nJt PSE&G 1s intent, however, to eliminate the requi.rem=nt for perfcmn:iig valve positicn verificatiai. for all f~ water valves mi.ch are locked, sealed, or ot:hezwise secured in pcsitiai. 'llle exceptim mi.ch has been inlt* dncm is ally for valves which are inaccessible. we have inteJ:preted the tenn "inacx:essi.ble" as CClt'pOl'l9l'lt in areas of high radiatioo arri the cont:ainment.

'llle contairnnent was included because the irr::lustrial safety risks of elevated tevratures (ccmp:mxied by protective clothi.nj requirements), high ooise levels (with atterrlant diminished communications capability) arxi excessive

Sec::tion Description

4. 7.10.1.1.b manpower resources experxied by a containment entry are not (Cont'd} justified for checking valves that, by virtue of beinJ in the containment, are in an area of infrequent personnel activity, are not rcutinely operated or haniled, are locked in position an::i verified as such prior to closure of the contairnnent durin;J plant start up.

At this time, there are fire water valves at SGS installed in Contairnnent, but none are in high radiation ai::eas.

'!here are currently ten valves in the fire water system flowpath inside each Containment (iooludin;J valves.addressed by Section 4. 7.10. 2. a) * 'Ihese valves are provided with padlocks an::i dlains to secure them in the nonnally open position.

Keys for the padlocks are administratively controlled by both SGS Operations an::i the site Fire Protection Groop.

'!he limited general aC:cess to Contairnnent an::i the piysical

. padlocks arrl c.hains provides reasonable assurance that the valves will remain in their required p:isition. While the proposed revision reflects a C'harge fran the requirements of S'IS for the fire water system, it is m::>re cxn;ervative than the requirements for safety system;. 'lherefore, PSE&G believes that oor pZ"CpJSE!d revision whidl excludes fire water valves that are both "inaccessible" an::i locked, sealed, or ot:h.erNise secured in p:isition fran the requirement for perfonning valve position verifications does not reduce the overall effectiveness of the fire protection program.

4. 7.10.1.1. c

'!he frequency contained in S'IS for perfo~ a fire water system flush is 6 ironths.

'!he requirement currently contained in SGS 'IS an::i the HCX3S prtXJ?:am is to perfonn a syStem flush every 12 IOOnths.

'Ihe frequency of 12 lOOllths also correspo:rrls with an annual :reccmnenjation for test:in:J fire hydrants as contained in National Fire Protection Association starxlard 24, "starxlard for the Installation of Private Fire Service Mains am '!heir~," section 4-3.6. Alt:halgh the frequency of 12 ironths contained in I.CR 90-15 does not reflect that of sm, it is consistent with the consideration of establishing program consistency between SGS am Hope Creek.

In addition, the 12 montl1 frequency was previously awroved for use at SGS.

Since the basic design of the fire water system has not chan:Jed since the requirement was awrovecI, PSE&G' s proposed retention of a 12 IIDllth frequency.for perfonning a flush of the fire water system is not considered to inl>act the effectiveness of the fire protection program.

4.7.10.1.2 Existinq unit 1 'IS incl\\.lles seCt:icn 4.7.10.1.2.c.2.

~er, since it is nipetitive of secticm 4.7.10.1.2.a.2 am is not cxl'1tained in S'IS, this requirement has not been incl med in this subnittal.

I 4.7.10.1.2.a.2 3.7.10.2 4.7.10.2.a 4.1.10.2.c.1.1>

4.7.10.2.c.3 3.7.10.3 4.7.10.3.1 4.7.10.3.2.a 3/4.7.10.4 4.7.10.4.a Descriptial

'llle ~

run time cart:ained in ax:lstinq Unit l 'IS Section 4.7.10.1.2.a.2 is 20 mimtes. 'Ihis recpirement is exterrled in thia sut:Dittal to 30 min.rt:es to :be cxnsistent with exi.stin3' thi.t 2 'IS, ffq)e creek statiat 'IS, and SIS recpirements.

'Iha listin;J of Haz.ard AreaS has been updated to clearly reflect all safety-related amas protected by "Water SllAl%' 2 Fiat systems.

Refer to the djscussion associated with Section 4.7.10.1.1.b.

'DUii sectial, nat CCl'1tained in ex:lst.irl) 'IS, np: seuts relief far cyclirl) inao: aihle valwa f1N8r:Y 18 llCl1tlw rather than eveey u mcnths.

'Iba a m121t11 ~

CC111&ElpCkm to the refual.irl) cycle. '!his nq.1i.ranent retlect:a bJth SI'S and the li:p! Ct-eek recpirements.

'DUii nqiiraDent is airrentl.y nwtiere:1 4. 7.10. 2.b. 3 in ax:lstinq unit l 1S and 4.7.10.2.c.J in Qdt 2 'IS. In aa:litiat to nn.miJerin;J thll ~

to pamit intrcxlx:tial of a na.7

  • sectiai 4. 7.10.2.a for unit 1 (d1.,,sseci alxNa), the
nqiiransnt, as stated, reflects srs. '1119 tunct.im of l'X>Zzle

~

impecticn is cD:h:

eel by Sectim 4. 7.10. 2.d.

'Iba listirl) of Hazard Areas bu bean ~

to clearly reflect all safety related aram pratacted by a:>2 sq:pressioo systal&.

(:1

'1hUI sectial, cart:ained in stamard Tech Specs as 4. 7.11. 3.1, is nat incl\\Ded in ax:lstinq tl'dt 1 'IS *. 'DUii req.iiraDent is cxn1i&tmt with ax:lstinq unit 2 TS and ll:GS nq.iirements ani is, tmrefore, incl\\Ded in thia.mittal.

tn. ax:lstinq 'IS inclme co starag9 tank lflV9l. am pressure recplraamt8 in the Limi~ ocnlitiaw far q>eratial. 'lllis

~

sectiat TOtl cxntaim these specific nq.iirements.

1Ma w:tia'l is a new sectial *incl\\Dd to ad:h requirements fer tba bal.cm systems installed for pratactiat of the Relay

........ Bacmwa system q:ieraticn aeeociated eith thG halai ll)!ltFR Jjll."CNided for the Hep! Ctaak Q:a1Ltol Real QDsole Pit is

~ic:antly different than tba ha.lat.systam far the Salem RaJ.ay Rl:x:lllB, the requi:tements cxmtainecl in srs ware incll.Ded in tbl sutmittal with no c::bar9!S far st*Uarity to ffq)e creek.

'1hia sectial, cart:ained in S'1S u 4. 7.11. 4.a, a nat incll.Ded in ax:lstinq salaa TS. 'Ihis ~

is CD18istent with ffq)a creek rec;r.iirements and is, thm'afore, incl\\Ded in this sutmittal.

Section 3.7.10.5 3.7.10.S.a 4.7.10.5.a 4.7.10~5.c.2 3/4.7.10.6 Description

'Ihis sectioo c:onespc:rds to existinq Sectiai 3.7.10.4 for fire hcse statiC'llS.

In oaitrast to the fire hose statiai listing provided in the exist.in; 'IS, this list:i.BJ inclmes all fire hose statiC11S required to protect safety-related areas regardless of the fire hcse statiai unit designatiai.

Where aie fire nose statiai is required for protectiai of areas CXl1i:ained in both units, it is included in the sutmittal for each unit.

'llti.s section, contained in existinq SGS TS as 3.7.10.4.a an:i STS, requires that with one or more of the listed fire hose stations in:lperable, acklitional fire hose is to be rcuted to the unprotected area from an OPERABIE hose station.

'!he corresporrling HCGS requirement permits hoses to be stored in a roll, ready for use, at the outlet of the OPERABI.E hose station where the routing would result in a recogJdzed hazard.

Routing hoses between hose stations introduces poteritial triwin;J hazards an:i subjects the hose to possible damage thereby

reducing the reliability of the system.

In addition, prior to usirg the hose, it would be necessary for a fire brigade memher to confinn that the hose has not been twisted, damaged, or othel:wise obstructed - slc:JWi.nJ fire response. 'lherefore, PSE&G' s proposed allowance to store fire hoses at the outlet of an c:perable hose station in lieu of :routin;J the fire hose considers potential safety inpacts an:i assures that the effectiveness of fire fighting activities is not :inpacted.

'1his sectiai, as o:::ntained in existinq Unit 1 TS 4. 7.10. 4 *.a, dee& not irx::lu:ie relief fraD 31 day inspectiam of

.inamess ible fire hcse statiats. Because this relief is o:::ntained in S'IS, existirq Unit 2 TS, ani lD:aS ~'

it is.in:luded in this" sutmittal.

'Ibis sectiai, in existinq Unit 2 TS as 4. 7.1~4.c.2, requires hydJ:ostatic testirq of fire b:lses at 50 paiq greater than the maxh*n fire main pressure or 300 psiq, YU.ch ever is greater.

Existin;J Unit 1 'IS call for a pr r.u:e of at least 50 :psig greater than the maximnn pressure available at the hose statiai. S'1S stip.llate l.50 psiq or 50 psiq abaYa maxtnum fire main pressure, 'Whichever is greater.

Becmwe the JOO :?;ig CXl1i:ained in existing unit 2 'lS is both greater than the maximnn cprati.rg pressure plus 50 psiq ani in CXl'lflict with the nmdnnn pressures required by NFPA 1962 for service pressure tests, the requirement has been revised to agree with the S'IB.

'1his sactiat is new an:i not.included in existinq 'lS.

Because there are two fire hydrants called cut in the Salem Fire P:cotsctial Qeport as tein;J required for CXNerage of safety-ralatad areas incll.¥iin;J the Service water Intake sttu:ture an:i tbl J\\J8l Hamling alll.din;s, this sectia1 is included.

'Ibere a no cm:1esp::niin:J Hem requirement.

Section 3.7.11 Description Section 3.7.11 addresses fire rated asserrt>lies such as walls, floor/ceilirgs, cable tray enclosures, ani other fire barriers alcn;J with fire doors, fire winiows, fire danprrs, cable ani pipirg penetration seals, ani ventilation seals.

ACl'ION a. l allows for establishin;J a compensato:cy daily fire watch patrol in conjunction with verification of OPERABIE fire detectors on both sides of the affected penetration.

'lhe ~

of this fire watch patrol represents a c.:ban;Je fran STS ani existinq SGS TS both of which establish the least frequent fire watch patrol to be hourly with available detection on at least one side of the affected penetration. 'lhe daily fire watch patrol with detectiai available on both sides of the affected penetration, however, is consistent with the awroved Hope Creek Generatinq station requirement.

'!he current requirement for carpensato:cy actions has two levels, either establishi.rg a conti.nuoos fil:e watch on at least one side of the affected assenhly or verifyin; the OPERABILITY of fire detectors on at least one side of the inc:parable assE"i?ly am establ:ishin;J'. an hourly fil:e watch patrol. 'lhese actions are aiJDed at providin;J reasaiable assurarDe that if a fire were to occur on either side of the barrier oant:ainirg the inc:parable assembly it wruld be detected to allow for fire brigade actions before the fil:e threatens the barrier.

In the case of an hourly fire watch patrol, the role of the fil:e watch patrol is to provide oversight of general roan cornitians to ensure that an envirorment is not created which ccW.d threaten the barrier. 'lhe eq;hasis, however, is placed on the availability of operable detectors to detect a fire before it threatens the barrier c:ontainiIXJ the affected penetration since an hourly patrol would mt necessarily be present if a postulated fire were to occur.

With detectors available on both sides of the affected fire barrier, the detectors are expected to actuate for a fire in the in:ipient stages to allow for fire brigade actions, thus, minimizil'liJ potential ilrpact to the barrier. 'lhe role of the daily fil:e watch patrol is to establish a level of oversight consistent with the inherent protection available am assure that areas of the plant which may be unattemed for exterxied dUratioos are inspected. 'lhe actions associated with traCking and assignin;J a daily fire watch patrol also assure a heighten awarenesS that a corrlition exists which is "off nonnal".

'Iherefore, although the use of a compensato:cy daily fire watch patrol in conjunction with verification of OPERABIE fire detectors on both sides of the affected penetration represents a charge fran STS, PSE&G believes that this dlan;e does not reduce the overall effectiveness of the fire protection program.

1*

section 4.7.11 Cescriotion e

'Ibese surveillance requirements have been signi£icantly revised frcm their CXAllrt:el:part in existin:J 'IS.

'Ibese cmn;es are OCl'lSistent with both S'lS an::l HCGS requirements.

'lllese dlan;Jes result in relief frcn scme requirements, tut add surveillances as a result of other requirements.

PSE&G has been ilrplanentirq the Fire Protectiai I:qlroYanent Ptop:am for Salem Generatin;J statiai as cxmnitted to NRC.

As part of that pro;iam, it was realized that, in sane cases, Tedmical Specificatia1S airrently in effect for saleiii units l and 2 do not reflect acblal plant OCl'lditia'l&.

In additiai, the llmisisterx:ies between both unita' 'IS for 9jmi Jar eqdpnent bas the potential for causin;J errors in i:aplementin;J requirecl surveillances and actia..

By updatin;J, with these charqes, the Fire Prat8ctia1 Ptop:am - with the S'lS as a guide, and incxnporatinq clarificatia1S of specific Fire Protectiai Prog1am requirements ~

for HqJe creek Generatinq statiai, the organizatiai respcnd.ble for.inpl.ementin;J the Fire Prctecticn Plograms at Artificial Islam can aR>lY unifcmn PJ:'X'Sd'rres at all three units.

In additici'l, Generic I.etters 86-10 an::l 88-12 provide guidan::a to utilities seekinq license amaxme:tt:s to :reccgnize ~

Fire Prctecticn Plop:ams an:l rem:JVe surveill.ance/Limitin;J onlitiais for q>eratiai fraa thl Technical.

Specificatia1S.

HcWleYer 1 the assnnptiai made by NR:: far that type of amemment request is that tha cperability rec;piranents i"P"'M"' by.existinq 'IS are accurate.

PSF.&G has detezmined that, due to reca1t tim prot:ectiat system enhancements and due to the above mentia'lSd 'IS inccmisten:ies, salem unit Nos. 1 and 2 presently do net meet that Criteria.

'Iha pn:pose of this amendment request is to sutmit a CU&tJLEtslsiva an::l up-to-date Fire Protectiai Ptop:am that, up::n NA:: review an:i ~'

will satisfy the criteria of the Generic Letters an::l ult:illlately pemit the :ranoval. of the Fire Protectiai Plo;JXam frail the salem Technical. Specificatiaw as requested in At:t:adJinent 1.

As previcusly :inlicated, the pt* p:sed revisia1S pemit cxnsistency of requirementa to be inpaed ai Fire Protectiai systaa far bath salem uni ts.

ClarificatialS to recJ1iranents previaJSly ~far HqJe creek Gerleratirq statiai haw bllm irm:parated. as well. ~

of these cbarges allow tmifom progzwtic r=quiremants to ba GR?lied to all three units en Artificial Islancl by_ a o 1111* n arganizatiai.

'lhere are cases.invol.virq either relief frail ex:istinq sunail.l.ama requirements and a **1ensatozy measures or oc:riversely, 1110m :castrictive surveillance re:pirements.

Hcwever, no a~

waa made to tailer this sul::mittal to gain relief frail st:armrd surveillanca requirements ar cc **1eusatoey measures.

PSE&G is makirg this ~

request to i.nprcYe. the averall Fire Protecticn Ptop:am at Artificial Island.

.., "" \\,:

~

. SlCJOZICMl' WW9NNms CIJ§tm1Clf e

'Iba p:* I~ c:bmJaa to tba tsdnica1. sper::it:1cat:l do JXJt inYOJ.ve a sic;Jd f1mnt inct 1 in tba p:* hah11 ity er m s ~-x:es at any acx:ident pardcualy..imtal.

'Iha ~

JBte to Tedmical Speciticatiaw ~

this Attad'iment ratl.ect actuil plant cxn:Ut.i.CDI.

'1ha il'm:pw.-atial of stamard Tedu'rl.cal Speciticatim ~

and ~

Hq>e creek vari.atiaw allow a ocndstent fire pmtectia1 ptogxdli to be cq:pl.ied at Artificial Isl.ani.

By raaavin;J inccllsistent rec;piranents, tha prci>abi 1 ity of enma in &Ur/eillance req.iirements is recbred.

'Iha NRC ravi8w and ~

of the pt* p:&ed dlan;;es will thm satisfy tha criteria of. Generic I.att:ers 86-10 and 88-12 and pennit tha raDCYal. of tha sal.* Fin Protectic:n P.togxaa (u ~

by NAC) frcm the Tedmical specificatiaw tcllc:Min; tha 91ddelinea p:ovided by the Generic Isttars. 'Iba ranaYal. of the Fin Prctectiai PlUjt* traa tha 'IS has been reviewed by tba NRC staff u part ot the issuanc9 of the Gmeric Letters and beat fan:l acceptable provided that tha critllria establ.ilb8d in tha Generic Iatters U9 mt.

Upc::n NRC ~

of the ~

cban;ies hm8in, tba Fl'P ~

a.m:'El'1tl.y defined in tha 'IS, in cxnjuncticn with tbaae aalitimll. pt* p:isecl c:ban:1f3S to thcaa 'IS and to the SGS Updated Facility sataty Anal.yai.9 Rep:at (UFSAR) in AttaJma1t 4, wcW.d be artxdied within a par:iailc: teat!n:;J am surwill.anca p&:Qjtaa deacribed in the SGS U1SAR and wmld mtail. shift:irq of tha t.-tirq ~

traa 'IS millance pt*... iair. to paricdic ta&t pt* anvm. * 'Iba Att.aciJma'1t 1-pt* p:aai Licaw9 o:nilticn am ackli.ticl1al SC-Cial Rapa&:t ~in

'IS sectiai 6.9.3 'WCUld pr:c:wim adacp!ta administrativ. msb:ul of Fl'P elmant8 ta..ire that staticn cap!lbilitiea to adU.av9 and miaint:ain sate llbJtdcflll in the -..nt of a fire raaain at an

&Jlivalmt lAMd of fire protectiai u aJrraltly provided with tha Fl'P in the

'19.

Since st:atiai fire protact.icn capabilitJM will raaain at an &Jlivalent level with the Fl'P :ram::N81 tzm tha 'IS, it can be cm:lu:tad that tha prcp:isecl dlan;e dcea not.:lnvol.w a significant increase in tha prc:mbility ar m111£qlel'lCeS of an accident pravi.aJal.y aval.uataci.

'Iba pt* ipcse5 dm.gaa to u. tsdnica1. ~

m nat czmta the P"9'1M1 tty at a w er di '"*'a&> JdJd at amidfrlt frm my amidfrlt praria81.y 8Vlllmt:md.

'Iha pz:* p.m chmJea 1ept s it: emmm11:s to Ml<<.blJ tec!mical specificat:laB. 'lbe mjarity of signifiamt dmllJIEi am to tlhit 1 tsdnica1.

speci ficat:laB to provide cxnrlst:en:y with md.t 2. 'Iba chmJea to beth units' tec!mical specificat:l.cns are in accm:danca with IJ(p!OWd ga:eric West.injDlse stardard '1'edmical. fPCificat:laB aid variaticnl agn:tMd far Hepa Q:aek GeneratinJ stat.ial. No P¥lical plant :mdifimt:iaB ar q>erat.irq amf:igurat:.iaB result fral tbeea chmJBS.

'Iha po pomd dlanJes do *not affect the design ar q>erat.icn of any systaa ar 0"1aail iaplttaril to safety.

Upc::n NA: ~

of tbe Pin Protectial P.tUjtM, -

.:xlifim hllrain, tha ram:M1l at tba eJ.mmta at tbat pttglU trca ~

Specificatiaw and incmparatiai in tba UFSAR in accmdance with tba prariaiam ani ~ddelines of Genaric Iattam 86-10 ant 88-12 will mt* creata af¥ new ar diffarmt accident fraa af¥ pmvicusly waluated.

'*)~

. 'lh8 p&:*p::aed cmi9a to~ tecbtlcal Fp?Cificat.i.41t do mt :inYol.ve a a:lgnifiamt rectrt1m in a im:gin of safety.

'1b9 pc* ipmaj c:bmJe9 affect the CXl1trol of periodic testirq and surveillances far f;im prat.m:ticn systsmB and C* 11(<1Wlts.

'Iba charges do net affect aey anal.yaia of 3 19" b!lse9 accidents or ant ~

R Hazards o:nrl.deratiai.

'Iha pt* p _., c:lsqM provide a ccndstent ~

to assurin;J q>erability an:i availability t1 ex:lstinJ -fire protectic:l1 systsma far safety-related areas at salaia GeneratinJ statiat.

  • 'iha proposed IJ.oense Ccniltim and recpiraDent:s placed in '1S Sectim 6. 9. 3 will ensure that the statim fire protecti.cm capabilit.iee, foll~ rem:JYal of the FPP frclll the Tec:tmical Specificatials, rana.i.n at an level equivalent to that level OJrrently in place with the FPP in the Tec:tmical Specific:aticns.

'lherefare, rE!llDYal. of tm fire protecticm p&:o:Ji'am el.anent.a fraa the Technical Sgecificatiaw will net invalva a significant reductim in a nmgin of safety.

  • -* \\... 1_..:j l_* \\

Based al tba infcmnaticm provided alxNa, PSEr.G bu ccncl.udad that tm pee posed chanaB& satisfy tha criteria for a no significant bazm19 c:x:nddllratiat.

L'

Ref:

LCR 90-15 ATTACHMENT 4 HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL CONTROL FUNCTIONS DISCUSSION

~

ATTACHMENT 4 Control Functions from the Hot Shutdown Panel During the June 30, 1992 review, additional information was requested as to how Salem assures op_erabil i ty of control functions (i.e., transfer switches) on the Hot Shutdown Panel for post fire safe shutdown.

The control functions (transfer switches), to which the concern refers, are those associated with various pumps and valves utilized to achieve Hot Shutdown from outside the Control Room as part of PSE&G's method of meeting 10CFR50, Appendix A Criterion 19 - Control Room (GDC-19) requirements.

These control functions are not associated with Appendix R Alternate Shutdown.

The Salem Alternate Shutdown methodology related to Appendix R,Section III.G.3 and III.L for post fire safe shutdown employs local operation of equipment.

This methodology was approved via NRC Safety Evaluation Report dated, May 31, 1983.

The Hot Shutdown Panel has a limited role in Salem's alternate shutdown capability.

Only a portion of the panel contains post fire safe shutdown equipment.

This equipment is limited to process monitoring indication as follows:

Steam Generator Level Steam Generator Pressure Pressurizer Level Pressurizer Pressure Source Range Flux Reactor Coolant Hot Leg and Cold Leg Temperature Operability of the above indication is verified by a surveillance procedure which is equivalent to controls invoked by Technical Specifications.

Also, administrative controls exist such that design changes are reviewed against any potential impact to the above noted indication.

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