ML18095A209
| ML18095A209 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 05/16/1990 |
| From: | Miller L Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 90-2-1, NUDOCS 9005240012 | |
| Download: ML18095A209 (4) | |
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OPS~G Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Dear Sir:
SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 UNIT NO. 2 SPECIAL REPORT 90-2-1 May 16, 1990 This revision to Special Report 311/90-2 addresses additional fire barrier penetration seal impairments which have not been restored to functional status within seven (7) days.
These penetrations have been impaired in support of planned work.
This report has been prepared in accordance with the reporting requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2.
MJP:pc Distribution 9005240012 900516 PDR ADOCK 05000311 F'DC The Energy People Sincerely yours, L. K. Miller General Manager -
Salem Operations 95-2189 (SM) 12-88
UNIT 2 SPECIAL REPORT 90-2-1 PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:
/
Salem Generating Station - Unit 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:
Technical Specification 3.7.11; Fire Barriers Impaired For Greater Than Seven (7) Days in Support of Planned Work Event Dates:
03/27/90, 4/17/90, 4/19/90, and 4/23/90 Report Date: 05/16/90 This report was initiated by Incident Report Nos.90-184, 90-246,90-252, 90-262, and 90-263.
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:
3/20/90 4/10/90 4/12/90 4/16/90 Mode 1 Reactor Power 100% - Unit Load 1160 MWe Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown)
Mode 5 Mode 6 (Refueling)
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:
This report addresses the planned impairment of fire barrier penetration seals.
The impairments have lasted greater than seven (7) days in support of the associated design change work, therefore, a Special Report is required as per Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a.
The following fire barrier penetrations were impaired in support of design change work (i.e., DCP 2SC-2154):
On March 20, 1990, one (1) fire barrier penetration, on the east wall of the 84' Elevation Control Area Transformer Bus Room (Auxo Building)
- Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11 was complied with at that time.
The penetration is 25"x36" and contains cable trays and conduit.
On April 10, 1990, six (6) fire barrier penetrations were impaired.
Four (4) of the penetrations are located in the floor of the Unit 2 Control Room.
The other two (2) penetrations are located in the floor of the Unit 2 Control Equipment Room.
The Unit 2 Relay Room is located below both the Control Room and the Control Equipment Room.
The Control Room penetrations are 3.5" in diameter and are used as electrical cable passageways.
The Control Equipment Room penetrations are 150"x24" and 194"x25" and are also used as cable passages.
On April 12, 1990, five (5) fire barrier penetrations were impaired.
Two (2) of the penetrations are located in the floor of the Unit 2 Control Room.
The other three (3) penetrations are located in the floor of the Unit 2 Control Equipment Room.
The Control Room penetrations are -3.5" in diameter and are used as electrical cable passageways.
The Control Equipment Room
UNIT 2 SPECIAL REPORT 90-2-1
- DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:
(cont'd) penetrations are 210"x24.5", 129"x24.5" and 166.5"x24.5" and are also used as cable passages.
On April 16, 1990, thirteen (13) fire barrier penetrations, located in the floor of the Unit 2 Control Room, were impaired.
They are -3.5" in diameter and are used as electrical cable passageways.
An hourly roving fire watch had been established for the above identified areas previously due to other fire protection concerns.
Therefore, the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a, were met.
Technical Specification 3.7.11 states:
"All fire penetrations (including cable penetration barriers, fire doors and fire dampers), in fire zone boundaries, protecting safety related areas shall be OPERABLE."
Action Statement 3.7.11.a states:
"With one (1) or more of the above required fire barrier penetrations inoperable, within one hour either establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected penetration, or verify the OPERABILITY of fire detectors on at least one side of the inoperable fire barrier and establish an hourly fire watch patrol.
Restore the inoperable fire barrier penetration(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or, in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.1, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 30 days outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperable penetration and plans and schedule for restoring the fire barrier penetration(s) to OPERABLE status."
APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:
The root cause of the impairment of the fire barrier penetration was to support design change work.
ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:
The functional integrity of the penetration fire barriers ensures that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility.
This design feature minimizes the possibility of a single fire involving several areas of the facility.
The fire barrier penetration seals are a passive element in the facility fire protection program and are subject to periodic inspections.
This report satisfies the reporting requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2 (both Units) since the time between discovery and eventual repair of the fire barrier impairments is greater than seven (7) days.
Appropriate actions were already in place in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a (both Units) to establish an hourly roving fire watch patrol for the impaired fire barriers once the impairments were identified.
UNIT 2 SPECIAL REPORT 90-2-1
- ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:
(cont'd)
The subject fire areas contain detection in addition to the roving fire watch patrol.
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a fire in the areas would be detected before it could involve an adjacent area.
This occurrence therefore involved no undue risk to the health or safety of the public.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
The hourly roving fire watch patrol, as addressed in the Description of Occurrence section, will continue until all fire protection concerns associated with the subject areas is resolved.
The repair of the penetrations was not accomplished within seven (7) days due to the time required to support the associated design change work.
Upon completion of the design change work, the penetrations will be sealed.
The hourly fire watch, as addressed in the Description of Occurrence section, will continue until all fire protection concerns associated with these areas are resolved.
MJP:pc SORC Mtg.90-053 General Manager -
Salem Operations