ML18092B577

Dcrdr Emergency Operating Procedure Upgraded Task Analysis Rept

ML18092B577
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	04/16/1987
From:	GENERAL PHYSICS CORP.
To:
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ML18092B576	List: ML18092B575 ML18092B577
References
GP-R-212219, NUDOCS 8705180461
Download: ML18092B577 (160)

Text

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i DETAILED CXJNTK>L ~-DESIGN REV:IBW

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OPERATING PBOClmoRE Prepared for:

Public Serv:j.ee Electri,,a and ~~-~Y Salem N.iclear Generating Station*.. *,..

Units 1 & 2 GP-R-212219 April 16, 1987 Prepared.by:

General Physics Corpor~ti_on 10650 Hickory Ridge :Road.

Columbia, MD 21044

GP-R-212219 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION 1

• INTRODUCTION. * * * * * * * * * * * *. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

• 1-1 1.1 Purpose *.******......*..* o************************* 1-1 1.2 Description........................................ 1-1 SECTION 2.

DCRDR/EOP UPGRADED TASK ANALYSIS METHODOLOGIES ********** 2-1 2.1 Methodology for Operating Scenario Selection ******.* 2-1 2.2 Identification of Residual Tasks ******************* 2-2 2.3 Development of Task Analysis Worksheets and Identification of Information and Control Requirements..................................... 2-2 2.4 Database Management System ************************* 2-7 2.5 Data Entry and Modification of Data in IBM PC dBASE III Program ************************* 2-7 2.6 Verification of Task Performance Capabilities ****** 2-9 2.6.1 Purpose **.**.....*.*******..*********..***** 2-9

2. 6. 2 Approach. * * *. *. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

• 2-9 2.7 Validation of Control Room Functions ************** 2-10

2. 7.1 Purpose *......***..*..*********..********** 2-10 2.7.2 Slow Walkthroughs ************************** 2-11

2. 7. 3 Real-time Simulator Runs*. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

• 2-11 2.7.4 Link Analysis ****************************** 2-14 SECTION 3

• RESULTS * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *. * * * * *

• 3-1 APPENDIX A SALEM SCENARIO DESCRIPTIONS APPENDIX B LINK DIAGRAMS APPENDIX C HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES i

GP-R-212219 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY SECTION 1.

INTRODUCTION 1.1 Purpose To satisfy the requirements of NRC DCRDR Technical Evaluation Reports, the purpose of the upgraded Task Analysis was to (1) provide a complete set of plant-specific information and control characteristics required to support operator tasks during emergency operations and (2) to ensure that required systems can be efficiently and reliably operated under conditions of emergency operation using the upgraded EOPs and existing control room inventory by operations personnel.

The methodologies utilized during the upgraded Task Analysis were performed under the guidance of the Salem Integration Plan.

1.2 Description This report describes the methodologies utilized during and the results obtained from the performance of the Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) and the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) Upgraded Task Analysis for Public Services Electric and Gas (PSE&G) Salem Nuclear Generating Station Units 1 and 2.

The detailed EOP evaluation and resolution detailed results can be found in the Salem EOP Verification and Validation Report.

The activities which comprised the upgraded task analysis are shown in Figure 1-1.

Section 2 of this report describes the major activities and the methodology utilized for each activity which comprise the integrated task analysis for the DCRDR/EOP upgrade.

The results of the task analysis are described in Section 3.

General Physics Corporation wishes to acknowledge the assistance and cooperation of PSE&G personnel throughout the performance of this project and the development of this report

• 1-1

GP-R-212219 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY Define Representative Scenarios-and Related EOPs for Analysis 1 f Identify Residual Tasks 1'

Develop Task Analysis Worksheets Conduct Walkthroughs of Scenarios Verily Task Performance Capabilities 1 f Validate Control Room Functions Figure 1-1.

Upgraded Task Analysis Program Activities 1-2

1 GP-R-212219 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY SECTION 2.

DCRDR/EOP UPGRADED TASK ANALYSIS METHODOLOGIES 2.1 Methodology for Operating Scenario Selection The original DCRDR Task Analysis and the new Salem EOP flowcharts were used to define a preliminary set of 22 accident scenarios that adequately sampled various emergency conditions, and the plant systems used in those conditions.

The scenarios were selected so that all Salem safety-related systems controlled from the main control room were exercised during the Real-Time Simulator Runs (Section 2.7.3).

The scenario selection process also considered the Salem ATWS events and other ATWS events with simultaneous and consequential failures.

A brief narrative description of each scenario was prepared that established the limits and conditions of the events analyzed.

The descriptions included:

Procedures to be used Initial conditions Scenario sequence Expected response Termination criteria The 22 scenarios developed were:

Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Reactor Trip without SI Spurious Safety Injection Station Blackout followed by Natural Circulation Cooldown LBLOCA to Cold and Hot Leg Recirc Alignments LBLOCA to Recirc with One Vital Bus Supplied by its Emergency Diesel Generator SBLOCA with Cooldown and Depressurization Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators 2-1

GP-R-212219 PUBLIC SERVICE ELJECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY Scenario 8 Secondary Break Inside Containment Scenario 9 Secondary Break Inside Containment with Loss of Spray capability Scenario 10 Loss of Secondary Heat Sink Scenario 11 ATWS Scenario 12 Loss of all AC Power with SBLOCA Scenario 13 Mode 3 Heatup with Loss of All AC Power Scenario 14 LBLOCA to Recirc with One De-energized Vital Bus Scenario 15 SBLOCA outside Containment Scenario 16 Large Break LOCA without rum. Pumps Scenario 17 Rapid Natural Circulation Cooldown - With RVLIS Scenario 18 Rapid Natural Circulation Cooldown - Without RVLIS Scenario 19 SGTR with Cooldown via Backfill Scenario 20 SGTR with SBLOCA Scenario 21 SGTR with Failed Steamline Safety Valve Scenario 22 SGTR without Pressurizer Pressure Control The scenario descriptions are provided in Appendix A.

2.2 Identification of Residual Tasks Residual operator tasks (unique tasks) from the pl~nt-specific EOPs not covered in the scenarios were analyzed independently for information and control requirements.

The analysis of residual tasks was done to ensure that all operator interfaces had been examined even if those interfaces were not exercised in the sample of accident scenarios selected for validation.

Verification of equipment availability and suitability was performed for these residual tasks as well as for tasks embedded in the accident scenarios.

2.3 Development of Task Analysis Worksheets and Identification of Information and Control Requirements Task Analysis Worksheets (TAWs) were developed and used to collect task analysis data.

The worksheets (see Figures 2-1 and 2-2 as examples of completed TAWs) indicated the operational steps required in each scenario, 2-2

GP-R-212219 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY along with the appropriate information and control requirements, means of operation, and I&C present on the control boards.

The operator tasks were analyzed using the selected plant-specific EOPs as a starting basis and documented in the following manner.

(Refer to Figure 2-1 for items 1 through 3, refer to Figures 2-1 and 2-2 for items 4 through 8).

1.

Steps derived from the plant-specific flowchart EOPs in order of performance were recorded in the "PROCEDURE & STEP NO." column of the TAW.

The discrete steps from the plant specific flowcharts were recorded in the "FLOWCHART STEP NO."

column of the TAW for reference.

2.

A description of the operator's tasks (in order of procedural steps) was recorded in the "TASK/SUBTASK" column of the TAW.

All tasks, both explicit and implicit, were documented.

3.

The "TASK TYPE" column of the TAW identifies the operator performance function.

Each step in the procedural flowchart format is identified by a specific symbol which consequently determines the type of operator performance, (e.g., ACTION STEP, DECISION STEP) necessary to complete the task; therefore, each task has one implied function.

The task type correlates specifically with the Salem writers guide.

4.

Input and output requirements for successful task performance were recorded in the "SYSTEM COMPONENT PARAMETER" and "RELEVANT CHARACTERISTICS" columns.

These were system component and parameter, relevant characteristics, and procedural information necessary for operators to adequately assess plant conditions or system status (e.g., hot leg temperature, reactor coolant system flow, pressurizer pressure, etc.). Specific values for parameter readings or control characteristics (i.e., close-open, off-auto-on) were recorded.

It is important to note that Steps 1 through 4 were completed on the TAW using independent sources of data other than the actual I&C present in the control room.

2-3

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Page No. 3 PROCEDUflE AND STEP MO TRIP-2-02800 TRIP-2-02900 TRIP-2-02000 TRIP-2-03100 TRIP-2-03400 TRIP-2-04100 TRIP-2-04200 TRIP-2-05000 TRIP-2-05100 TRIP-2-05300 TRIP-2-05500 TRIP-2-05700 TRIP-2-05900 TRIP-2-06000 9

10 11 12 FLOW

-CHART STEP NO.

SCENARIO:

SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION TASK ANALYSIS WORKSHEET TASK/SUBTASK BORATE B MINUTES FOR EACH CONTROL ROD NOT FULLY INSERTED WHEN BORATION IS COMPLETE, THEN:

o CLOSE RAPID BORATION STOP VALVE 1CV175 AND o PLACE DORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMPS IN AUTO IS RAPID BORATION FLOW ESTABLISHED IS PZR LEVEL GREATER THAN 17%

IS CHARGING FLOW ESTABLISHED CONTROL CHARGING FLOW TO MAINTAIN 22X PZR LEVEL IS LETDOWN FLOW ESTABLISHED IS PZR PRESSUr(E GREATER THAN 1765 PSIG IS PZR PRESSURE STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG IS PZR PRESSURE GREATER THAN 2235 PSIG AND INCREASING CLOSE PZr( F'Or(Vs ARE PZR PORVs FULLY CLOSED CLOSE F'ZR SPRAY VALVES ARE PZR SPRAY VALVES FULLY CLOSED PAGE 1 TASK TYPE ACTION STEP RETAIMMENT STEP DECISION STEP DECISION STEP DECISION STEP ACTION STEP DECISION STEP DECISION STEP DECISION STEP DECISION STEP ACTION STEP DECISION STEP ACTHJN STEP DECISION STEP YES

YES, YES YES

YES, NO, NO, YES YES SCENARIO

RESPONSE

26X 2025 2025 2025 co co co co co co co co co co co co co co CREW MEMBER

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GP-R-212219 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY The remaining columns of the TAW were utilized during the Verification and Validation (V&V) phases which are described below:

5., Once the Tasks, Task Types, and Information and Control requirements have been specified, the existing Instrumentation and Controls (I&C) that the operator uses or can use for each procedural step was documented.

All I&C needed or available to either (1) initiate, maintain or remove a system from service, (2) confirm that an appropriate system response has or has not occurred, (i.e., feed-back), or (3) make a decision regarding plant or system status, were be listed in the "MEANS CHARACTERISTICS", "I&C NO.", and "PANEL" colunms.

The "MEANS CHARACTERISTICS" column refers to how the information and control requirements are presented on the Salem control boards (e.g., switch, meter, etc.).

The "I&C NO." column provides the specific identification number of the control or instrument.

The "PANEL" coluI!lll provides the specific panel the control or instrument is located on.

6.

The "SCENARIO RESPONSE" column briefly describes the feedback that was obtained from the I&C and the operator decisions during the scenarios.

The "CREW MEMBER" column identifies which crew member performed each task in the scenario.

7.

The verification process is documented in the "AVAIL." and "SUIT."

columns as described respectively below:

Availability of the necessary I&C required for successful operator task performance was noted by a "YES" or "NO" in this column.

Suitability of the existing I&C to meet the postulated information and control requirements for operator tasks was noted by a "YES" or "NO" in this column

• 2-5

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Page No. 9 SCENARIO:

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N SALEH NUCLEAR GENERATING N

STATION I-'

TASK ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

\\D PAGE 2 PROCEDUF~E SYSTEM f\\ELEVANT HEAMS/

H.C PANEL AV SU COMMENTS/

AND COMPONENT/PARAMETER CHARACTERISTICS CHARACTEI~ I ST I CS NO.

CANDIDATE HEDs STEP NO lQ TRIP-2-05502

[47JPZR PORV Hlr\\EE POSITION SWlTCH, TWO 3-PB CONTROL WITH.

2PR-1 CC-2 YES YES c::

COMTROL OPEN/AUTO/CLOSE BACKLIT INDICATION 2PR-2 l"1 CD MANUAL-BLUE/OPEN-RED/CL N

OSE-GREEN I

TRIP-2-05702

[161JPZR N

PORV INDICATING LIGHTS, INDICATING LIGHTS 2PR-1 CC-2 YES YES POSITION INDICATION OPEN-RED/CLOSE-GREEN AUTO-OPEN-WHITE/AUTO 2PR-2 BLOCK-RED/MANUAL-BLUE/O 1-3 PEN-RED/CLOSE-GREEN Ill

{11 TRIP-2-05902

[203JPZI~ NORMAL HJr(EE POSITION SWITCH, TWO 4-PB THROTTLE 2PS-1 CC-2 YES YES SPRAY VALVE CONTROL OPEN/AUTO/CLOSE CONTROL WITH BACKLIT 2PS-3

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INDICATION

l AUTO-WHITE/MANUAL-BLUE/

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INCREASE-RED/DECREASE-G

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[101JPZF\\ AUX SPr\\AY TWO POSITION SWITCH, 2-PB CONTROL WITH 2CV75 CC-2 YES YES t"

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VALVE CONTROL OPEM/CLOSE BACKLIT INDICATION

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Ul l"1 TRIP-2-06002

[46Jf'ZR NORMAL INDICATING LIGHTS, EIACKLIT INDICATION 2PS-1 CC-2 YES YES tIJ

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{11 SPf\\AY VALVE OPEN/CLOSE LIGHTS FROM PEI CONTROL 2PS-3

.r POSITION INDICATION AUTO-WHITE/MAMUAL-EILUE/

H CD INCREASE-ROD/DECREASE-G

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[435JPZR AUX Sf'f(AY INDICATING LIGHTS, BACKLIT INDICATION 2CV75 CC-2 YES YES t"

Ill VALVE POSIT ION RED<OPENl/GREENICLOSED>

FROM PB CONTROLS tIJ lQ

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CD HID I CATION RED-OPEN/CLOSED-GREEN 1-3

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N TRIP-2-06202 U 71 JF'ZR CONT. GROUP CC-2 YES YES H

HEATER VARIAEILE,MANUAL-AUTO HEATERS

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CONTfWL CONTROLLER, ON/OFF 2-P[I CONTROL WITH EIACKLIT INDICATION

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RED-ON/OFF-GREEN t1 TRIP-2-06302

[51JSTEAM METER, RECORDER, 12 VERTTICAL LINEAR 21,24 CC-2 YES YES

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GENERAT0f( Nf\\ LEVEL LINEAR, ANALOG, RANGE METERS CH II, Ul INDICATION 0-120%

RANGE 0-12Y. x 10, 2 II I, IV 20 MAJ, 10 INT, 2 MIN MAJ,.2 MIN 22,23

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RECORDERS, RANGE I II, IV

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0-120%, 20 MAJ, 10 INT, 21-24

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2 MIN, EILUE PEN

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GP-R-212219 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY Figure 2-2.

Task Analysis Worksheet Page 2 2-6

GP-R-212219 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY

8.

HEDs were noted in the "COMMENTS AND CANDIDATE HEDs" column during any step applicable of the Task Analysis.

Data for iIEDs were entered on a HED form (see Figure 2-3), for assessment and input into the computerized database.

The TAW thus serves as the complete record of operator tasks, decision, information and control requirements, and I&C availability and suitability.

This record was developed through the series of steps described above.

All data was entered into a computerized database management system (see Section 2.4 below).

2.4 Database Management System The Computerized Database Management System (DBMS) hardware was an IBM AT Computer.

The DBMS software was based on the dBASE III system by Ashton-Tate, as modified by General Physics for the Salem DCRDR project.

The DBMS allowed selective sorts and lists of data collected throughout the DCRDR.

The following data was input into the DBMS files:

HEDs and other findings from the review of Salem Verification and Validation.

A list of the tasks and subtasks from task analysis, including related information and control requirements, systems, controls and displays required to accomplish the task or subtask.

a list of all Salem EOPs.

2.5 Data Entry and Modification of Data in IBM PC dBASE III Program This was a continuous task performed throughout the project.

The task statements and information on the TAWs, including information and controls characteristics, were continually evaluated to reflect changes, additions, and deletions.

Any database changes initiated were reviewed by the Subject Matter 2-7

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GP-R-212219 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY S A L E M N U C L E A R G E N E R A T I N G S T A T I 0 N HUMAN ENGINEERING OBSERVATION/DISCREPANCY REVIEWEF~:

DATE:

NO:

PANEL IDENTIFIER COMPONENT IDENTIFIER

---

~

SECTION CODE:

WOF~KSPACE:

GUIDELINE NO:

---

~-----------

DESCRIPTION OF DISCREPANCY:

HED CATEGORY CODE:

LEVEL:

SCHEDULE:

RECOMMENDATIONS:

COMMENTS/JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-CONFORMANCE:

Figure 2-3.

HED Form 2-8

I

l.

GP-R-212219 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY Expert (SME) and the Human Factors Engineer before changes were made.

All changes were verified after entry into the database.

2.6 Verification of Task Performance Capabilities 2.6.1 Purpose In accordance with and under the guidance of the Salem Integrated Project Plan, the purpose of the Verification of Task Performance Capabilities was to systematically verify that the Instrumentation and Controls that were identified in the Task Analysis as being required by the operator are:

Present in the Control Room Effectively designed to support correct task performance

• Additionally, the EOPs were verified to be usable and compatible with the minimum number, qualifications, training, and experience of-the Salem control room operating staff.

2.6.2 Approach The Verification of Task Performance Capabilities utilized a two-phase approach to achieve the purpose stated above.

In the first phase, the presence or absence of the Instrumentation and Controls that were noted as being required by the Task Analysis were confirmed.

This was done by comparing the postulated requirements of the Task Analysis listed in the "SYSTEM COMP PARAM" and "RELEVANT CHARACTERISTICS" columns to the actual*control room I&C, listed in the "MEANS/CHARACTERISTICS" column of the TAW

• 2-9

GP-R-212219 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY Phase 1 -

I&C Availability The presence or absence of the required Instrumentation and Controls were noted by a "YES or "NO" in the "AVAIL" column of the TAW.

If it was discovered that required Instrumentation and Controls were not available to the operator, any such occurrence was identified as an HED and documented accordingly on an HED form.

Phase 2 -

I&C suitability The second phase addressed the human engineering suitability of the required Instrumentation and Controls by comparing them against the criteria shown on Figure 2-4.

For example, if a meter utilized in a particular procedure step exists in the control room, that meter was examined to determine whether or not it has the appropriate range and scaling to support the operator in the corresponding procedural step. If the range and scaling were found to be appropriate, it was so noted by placing "YES" in the "SUIT" column of the Task Analysis Form.

Conversely, if the meter range or scaling was found to be inappropriate for the parameter of interest to the operator, "NO" was recorded in the "SUIT" column of the TAW.

This type of occurrence was defined as an HED and documented accordingly on an HED form.

The suitability review of I&C was performed utilizing the decision process specified in Figure 2-4.

2.7 Validation of Control Room Functions 2

• 7

• 1 Purpose The purpose of the DCRDR/EOP Validation was to determine whether the functions allocated to the control room operating crew can be accomplished effectively within (1) the structure of the Salem EOPs and (2) the design of the control room as it exists.

Additionally, this step 2-10

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GP-R-212219 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY provided an opportunity to identify HEDs that may not have become evident in the static processes of the DCRDR, and the EOP development.

Under the guidance of NUREG-0700, NUREG-0899, and INPO 83-006, the DCRDR and EOP upgrade validation was integrated so as to comply with Technical Evaluation Report items 2 and 3 previously submitted by the NRC.

2.7.2 Slow Walkthroughs l

Utilizing the TAWs, walkthroughs were performed in the Salem

\\..

simulator for each scenario developed with a full complement of Salem control room operators.

The walkthroughs were first performed in slow-time.

During these s.low walkthroughs, operators were instructed to speak one-at-a-time and describe their actions.

Since this forced serial action, operations were not performed simultaneously.

Specifically; the operators identified the:

Component or parameter being controlled or monitored Purpose of the action Expected result of the action in terms of system response As the operators walked through each task within the EOP flowcharts, they pointed to each control or display they utilized and indicated which annunciators were involved.

2.7.3 Real-time Simulator Runs Following the slow-time walkthroughs, the operators performed the accident scenario walkthroughs in real-time on the Salem simulator.

The purpose of real-time walkthroughs was to evaluate the operational aspects 2-11

GP-R-212219 CRITERIA FOR DECISIONS HFE/OPS Information displayed to appropriate modality (visual vs. auditory I Appropriate parameter displayed Display of quantitative and/or qualita*

tive information appropriate for task Discrete/continous control functions appropriate Display of trend information available when appropriate I & C Actual system/equipment status infor*

mat1on is provided rather than indirect information (e.g., demand vs. valve pos1t1on for controllers, direct vs. in-direct measure of flow in system loop!

HFE/OPS/l&C Equipment provides appropriate pre*

cision and range of control Scale unm are consistent with the de*

gree of precision needed Scale range spans th* oxpected range of operational parameters Values disolayed are in a form immedi.

ately useable w/o conversion PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY For !'very task in the task analysis, ver*

ify that the eQuipment specified is suitable to meet the demands of emer*

gency contingencies.

Does the eQu1pment provide appropriate information/feedback for the task?

YES Does the equipment provide actual*

system status

, 1nformat1on?

• (direct)

YES equipment useablo?

YES Eou1pm,nt m'"s su1tab1litv r'Quir,menu for task pedormance NO NO NO eQu1pment available which provides appropriate information/

', feedback?

YES YES NO HED Identified Figure 2-4.

Flowchart of Decision Process for Verifiying Equipment Suitability 2-12

i..

GP-R-212219 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY of the control room design in terms of control/display grouping, control feedback, manning levels and traffic patterns.

During the real-time simulation runs, some originally prepared accident scenarios were modified or omitted so as to either eliminate identical EOP flowchart flowpaths previously taken by the operators or to deviate from simulator malfunctions.

To incorporate as many EOP flowchart steps as possible, additional scenarios were also developed, thereby reducing the number of residual tasks necessary for the independent analyses.

Each of. the original 22 scenarios not run and their rationale for non-performan.ce are listed below:

Scenario 8 -

Scenario 13 -

Scenario 15 -

Scenario 17 -

not performed because EOP-LOSC-1 was covered in Scenarios 7 and 9 adequately

• not performed because Scenario 12A covered EOP-LOPA-1 and EOP-LOPA-2 more effectively.

not performed because the simulator was incapable of modeling the sequence of events required to present the performance opportunities necessary to evaluate the procedure in a real-time environ-ment.

Any tasks not addressed because this scenario was deleted were analyzed as residual tasks.

not performed because RVLIS, a major indicator required for this scenario, is not modeled on the simulator.

Any tasks not addressed because this scenario was deleted were analyzed as residual tasks

• 2-13

i.

j.

I.

GP-R-212219 Scenario 21 -

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY not performed because Scenario 20 covered EOP-SGTR-4 adequately.

Additional scenarios that were developed and the basis for their development are included below:

Scenario 4B -

Scenario GB -

performed because Scenario 4A terminated early, due to an inexperienced control operator.

performed to verify resolution of procedure problem identified in Scenario GA.

Scenario 12A -

performed as a substitute to Scenario 13 using a loss of 2 vital busses without reactor trip instead of the original scenario description because this scenario covered EOP-LOPA-1 and-EOP-LOPA-2 more effectively.

Scenarios 22A - performed to incorporate more flowchart flowpaths and 22B from the SGTR-based EOPs.

Operators who performed the walkthroughs were debriefed after their performance.

The operators were asked to note any errors or problems that were encountered in the walkthroughs and to expound upon the source of the errors or problems.

The significant errors or problems were documented as HEDs on an HED form.

All EOP problems discovered during the DCRDR/EOP Validation phase were evaluated and resolutions were incorporated into the draft EOP flowcharts.

This feedback process better assured that the EOPs are usable and human factored as required

• 2-14

l G:t>-R-212219 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS. COMPANY A detailed EOP evaluation and resolution summary and all Debriefing and Observation forms for the scenarios are located in the Salem EOP Verification and Validation report.

2.7.4 Link Diagrams The real-time simulator walkthroughs were videotaped to fully document the tasks involved for all crew members.

Link diagr~ms, which trace the movement patterns of the operating crew in the control room, were prepared to assess whether the control room layout hinders operator movement while performing the events.

The link diagrams of the evaluation walkthroughs were developed by examining the videotapes of the actual walkthroughs.

The link diagrams, provided as Appendix B, show the sequencing, location, and paths of the operators as they walked through the scenarios.

The link diagrams were reviewed with regard to three aspects of control room operation:

Control Room Staffing Traffic Patterns Instrument and Control Distribution Control Room staffing addresses the adequacy of the number of personnel that are provided for operation in the control room.

Traffic patterns, the routes that each person traverses during the scenario, are examined to ascertain how far and how frequently each person must travel to complete their tasks.

Instrument and control distribution are assessed, in a general sense, in terms of the relative distance between them.*

The results of the analysis of the link diagrams are summarized by aspect below:

2-15

GP-R-212219 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY Control Room Staffing - the control room staffing appears to be adequate.

The location of control/display manipulation and monitoring was relatively evenly divided with the Control Operator manning CC-1, CC-2, and CC-3 the majority of the time.

The Shift supervisor and STA's activities took place randomly throughout all control room panels as necessary, while the second control operator read the procedures aloud.

Traffic Patterns - the link diagrams exhibited some repetititions of the traversal of long paths.

Path intersection or overlapping was not excessive.

Instrument and Control Distribution - the majority of the instrumentation and controls that were utilized during the scenario walkthroughs were distributed evenly among the vertical panels and consoles in the control room.

Larger separations were minimal in terms of the number of times the separated I&C was utilized.

In summary, the analysis of,the link diagrams indicated that there were no significant problems which hindered operating crew movement or control access while performing the scenarios.

Any dynamic performance problems that were uncovered during this phase of the upgraded Task Analysis process were documented as HEDs on HED forms

• 2-16

I.

GP-R-212219 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY SECTION 3.

RESULTS All findings from the DCRDR upgraded task analysis effort were documented on HED forms and entered into the DBMS.

The forms contain a description of each finding, the panel on which the finding occurred, and the components found discrepant (see Figure 2-3).

Once documented on HED forms, the HEDs were assessed by the DCRDR team in accordance with the Salem Integrated Project Plan.

Reconunended resolutions for each discrepancy were developed and documented are on the HED forms.

A total of 26 HEDs were identified during the Upgraded Task Analysis project.

All the HEDs are provided in Appendix C.

Completion of the project resulted in the achievement of the purpose stated in Section 1

• 1, specifically: (.1) provision of a complete set of plant-specific information and control characteristics required to support operator tasks suring emergency oper~tions, and (2) ensurance that required systems can be efficiently and reliably operated under conditions of emergency operation using the upgraded EOPs and existing control room inventory by operations personnel.

3-1

GP-R-212219 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY APPENDIX A SALEM SCENARIO DESCRIPTIONS

Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4A Scenario 4B Scenario 5 Scenario 6A Scenario 6B Scenario 7 Scenario 8 Scenario 9 Scenario 10 scenario 11 Scenario 12 Scenario 12A Scenario 13 Scenario 14A Scenario 14B Scenario 14C Scenario 15 Scenario 16 Scenario 17 Scenario 18 scenario 19 Scenario 20 Scenario 21 Reactor Trip without SI Spurious Safety Injection Station Blackout followed by Natural Circulation Cooldown LBLOCA to Cold and Hot Leg Recirc Alignments LBLOCA to Cold and Hot Leg Recirc Alignments LBLOCA to Recirc with One Vital Bus Supplied by its Emergency Diesel Generator SBLOCA with Cooldown and Depressurization SBLOCA with Cooldown and Depressurization Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators Secondary Break Inside Containment Secondary Break Inside Containment with loss of Spray Capability Loss of Secondary Heat Sink ATWS Loss of all AC Power With SBLOCA Loss of Two Vital Buses without Safety Injection Mode 3 Heatup with loss of All AC Power LBLOCA to Recirc with One De-energized Vital Bus LBLOCA to Recirc with One De-energized Vital Bus LBLOCA to Recirc with One De-energized Vital Bus SBLOCA Outside Containment Large Break LOCA without RHR Pumps Rapid Natural Circulation Cooldown - With RVLIS Rapid Natural Circulation Cooldown - Without RVLIS SGTR with Cooldown via Backfill SGTR with SBLOCA SGTR with Failed Steamline Safety Valve

Scenario 22 SGTR without Pressurizer Pressure Control Scenario 22A SGTR with Pressurizer Pressure Control Scenario 22B SGTR with Pressurizer Pressure Control

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Scenario 1 Reactor Trip Without SI

==

Description:==

Procedures Used:

Initial Conditions:

Sequence:

Expected Response:

Termination*criteria:

A reactor trip occurs from full power.

Two control rods fail to insert.

EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection EOP-TRIP-2 Reactor Trip Response Hot full power

1. Initialize at HFP

2.

Implement malfunctions to prevent two control rods from tripping into the core

3.

Inform crew of initial conditions

4.

Allow sufficient familiarization time

5.

Implement malfunction for spurious reactor trip Crew enters EOP-TRIP-1 at Step 1. After verifying the reactor trip and turbine trip, the crew transfers from EOP-TRIP-1 Step 7 to EOP-TRIP-2 Step 1. *crew initiates rapid boration at Step 8 and continues with TRIP-2 to verify proper plant response.

Discretion of Validation Coordinator.

Scenario 2 Spurious Safety Injection

==

Description:==

Procedures Used:

Initial Conditions:

Sequence:

Expected Response:

Termination Criteria:

A spurious actuation of both trains of safety injection occurs with the unit at hot full power, end-of-core-life.

EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection EOP-TRIP-3 Safety Injection Termination EOL, HFP

1.

Initialize at HFP, EOL

2.

Inform crew of initial conditions

3.

Allow sufficient familiarization time

4.

Implement malfunction for spurious SI, both trains The operating crew enters EOP-TRIP-1 when the spurious SI occurs.

They continue through the safeguards verification and event analysis sections of TRIP-1.

At Step 40, the SI termination criteria are met and the operators transfer to EOP-TRIP-3, Step 1 to terminate the SI and maintain the plant stable.

Discretion of Validation Coordinator.

Scenario 3 Station Blackout Followed By Natural Circulation Cooldown

==

Description:==

Procedures Used:

Initial Conditions:

Sequence:

Expected Response:

Termination Criteria:

A loss of off-site power occurs during a shutdown for refueling.

The reactor trips; all emergency diesel generators start and supply their respective buses.

After the unit is stabilized, a natural circulation cooldown commences.

EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection EOP-TRIP-2 Reactor Trip Response EOP-TRIP-4 Natural Circulation Cooldown EOP-APPX-5 RCS Degas HFP, EOL

1.

Initialize at HFP, EOL

2.

Inform crew of initial conditions

3.

Allow sufficient familiarization time

4.

Implement malfunction for station blackout The operating crew will enter EOP-TRIP-1 when the reactor trips. At Step 7, they will transition to TRIP-2 (SI neither actuated nor required).

At Step 30 of TRIP-2, a transition is made to EOP-TRIP-4 for the natural circulation cooldown.

The cooldown commences and continues with no further malfunctions.

Discretion of Validation Coordinator.

I Scenario 4 LBLOCA to Cold and Hot Leg Recirc Alignments Note:

This scenario was performed twice (Scenarios 4A and 4B) because the initial performance terminated early.

==

Description:==

Procedures Used:

Initial Conditions:

Sequence:

Expected Response:

During full power operations, a design break LOCA occurs.

The scenario continues through alignment for cold leg and then hot leg recirculation.

EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection EOP-LOCA-1 Loss of Reactor Coolant EOP-LOCA-3 Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation EOP-LOCA-4 Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation HFP, MOL

1.

Initialize to HFP, MOL

2.

Inform crew of initial conditions

3.

Allow sufficient familiarization time

4.

Implement malfunction for large break LOCA

5.

Approximately 5 minutes prior to RWST lo-lo level alarm, take simulator snapshot of plant status for later scenarios.

Note current procedure step in effect.

The operating crew enters EOP-TRIP-1 on indication of either the reactor trip or the safety injection.

They verify all automatic safeguards actions and at Step 37 transition to EOP-LOCA-1.

In EOP-LOCA-1, certain plant parameters are monitored and/or sampled.

When RWST level reaches the lo-lo level alarm setpoint, a transition is made' to EOP-LOCA-3 for alignment of safeguards to cold leg recirculation flow.

After the plant is stabilized on cold leg recirculation the crew returns to the procedure in effect (EOP-LOCA-1)

• Scenario 4 LBLOCA to Cold and Hot Leg Recirc Alignments Termination Criteria:

Validation Coordinator will direct the operating crew to proceed to EOP-LOCA-4 to place the plant safeguards flow on hot leg recirculation.

Discretion of Validation Coordinator.

e Scenario 5 LBLOCA to Recirc With One Vital Bus Supplied By Its Emergency Diesel Generator Description :

Procedures Used:

Initial Conditions:

Sequence:

Expected Response:

During full power operations, a design break LOCA occurs.

During the safeguards loading sequence, one vital bus loses.its normal supply and is energized by its diesel generator.

The scenario continues until the unit is stable on hot leg recirculation.

EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection EOP-LOCA-1 Loss of Reactor Coolant EOP-LOCA-3 Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculati.on EOP-LOCA-4 Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation HFP, EOL

1.

Initialize at HFP, EOL

2.

Inform crew of initial conditions

3.

Allow sufficient familiarization time

4.

Implement malfunctions for large break LOCA and loss of normal power supply to 2B vital bus The operating crew enters EOP-TRIP-1 on indication of either the reactor trip or the safety injection.

They verify all automatic safeguards actions and at Step 37 transition to EOP-LOCA-1.

In EOP-LOCA-1, certain plant parameters are monitored and/or sampled.

When RWST level reaches the lo-lo level alarm setpoint, a transition is made to EOP-LOCA-3 for alignment of safeguards to cold leg recirculation flow.

At Step 8 of EOP-LOeA-3, the operators are directed to Step 18 because 2B vital bus is energized by its EDG.

Some electrical realignment is performed, and safeguards flow is aligned for cold leg recirculation.

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Scenario 5 LBLOCA to Recirc With One Vital Bus Supplied By Its Emergency Diesel Generator After the plant is stable on cold leg recirculation, the Validation Coordinator will direct the operators to proceed to EOP-LOCA-4 for alignment of safeguards flow to hot leg recirculation.

Termination Criteria:

Discretion of Validation Coordinator.

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Scenario 6 SBLOCA With Cooldown and Depressurization Note:

This scenario was performed twice to verify a procedural problem resolved during the initial performance.

==

Description:==

Procedures Used:

Initial Conditions:

Sequence:

Expected Response:

At hot full power, end of core life, a generator fault causes a generator trip which results in a turbine and reactor trip. A pressurizer safety valve fails open during the RCS pressure transient, resulting in a small-break LOCA.

EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection EOP-LOCA-1 Loss of Reactor Coolant EOP-LOCA-2 Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization EOL, HFP

• l. Initialize at HFP, EOL

2.

Inform crew of initial conditions

3.

Allow sufficient familiarization time

4.

Implement malfunction for generator fault trip

5.

Implement malfunction for stuck open pressurizer safety valve Operating crew will enter EOP-TRIP-1 following reactor trip.

They continue with the *safeguards verification and event analysis sections of TRIP-1.

At Step 43, the operators will transfer to EOP-LOCA-1 based upon abnormal PRT parameter indications.

Operators perform the plant status evaluations outlined in LOCA-1.

In Step 13 they determine RHR cold leg injection flow to be less than 200 gpm and they stop 21 and 22 RHR pumps.

At Step 15 they transfer to EOP-LOCA-2 based on neither 21 or 22 RHR pump in operation.

LOCA-2 is performed in its entirety with no further malfunctions.

Scenario 6 SBLOCA With Cooldown and Depressurization Termination Criteria:

Discretion of Validation Coordinator.

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Scenario 7 Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators

==

Description:==

Procedures Used:

At 30% power conditions, a non-isolable main steamline rupture occurs outside containment.

All MSIVs fail in the open position, allowing all steam generators to blow down through the break.

EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection EOP-LOSC-1 Loss of Secondary Coolant EOP-LOSC-2 Multiple Steam Generator Depressurization EOP-FRTS-1 Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Conditions Initial Conditions:

Sequence:

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Expected Response:

EOP-FRTS-2 Response to Anticipated Pressurized Thermal Shock Conditions 30% reactor power

1. Initialize at 30% power

2.

Implement malfunction to fail all MSIVs in open position

3.

Inform crew of initial conditions

4.

Direct crew to begin up-power maneuver to 100%

reactor power

5.

Allow sufficient familiarization time

6.

Implement malfunction for main steamline rupture outside of containment The operators will be involved in the operating procedure for power increases when the steamline rupture occurs.

They will enter EOP-TRIP-1 on indication of either the ensuing reactor trip or safety injection.

Manual attempts to close the MSIVs are unsuccessful.

At Step 35, a transition is made to EOP-LOSC-1 on uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure

• Scenario 7 Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators Termination Criteria:

In EOP-LOSC-1, attempts to manually close the MSIVs are still unsuccessful.

In Step 6, a transition is made to EOP-LOSC-2 for all steam generator pressures decreasing in an uncontrolled manner or completely depressurized.

Manual attempts to close any MSIV remain unsuccessful.

The RCS is cooled and depressurized to cold shutdown conditions using EOP-LOSC-2.

At some time during the scenario, a transition to EOP-FRTS-1 and/or EOP-FRTS-2 is expected to occur to address PTS concerns resulting from the cooldown transient.

Discretion of Validation Coordinator.

1 i...

I Scenario 8 Secondary Break Inside Containment Note:

This scenario was not performed because EOP-LOSC-1 was adequately -

covered in Scenarios 7 and 9.

==

Description:==

Procedures Used:

Initial Conditions:

Sequence:

Expected Response:

Termination Criteria:

At full power conditions a steamline weld partially fails, resulting in the affected steam generator secondary shell blowing down to the containment atmosphere.

EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection EOP-LOSC-1 Loss of Secondary Coolant HFP, BOL

1. Initialize at HFP, BOL

2.

Inform crew of initial conditions

3.

Allow sufficient familiarization

4.

Implement malfunction for 30% break in one main steamline inside containment As steam pressure in the affected loop decreases, a safety injection signal may result from steamline delta-P.

This indication or a reactor trip followed by a SI will cause the operators to enter EOP-TRIP-1.

At Step 35 of EOP-TRIP-1, a transition is made to EOP-LOSC-1 based on uncontrolled SG pressure decrease.

The plant is stabilized, cooled down, and depressurized using EOP-LOSC-1.

Discretion of Validation Coordinator.

Scenario 9 Secondary Break Inside Containment With Loss of Spray Capability I"

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==

Description:==

Procedures Used:

... Initial Conditions:

Sequence:

Expected Response:

• ~--

At hot zero power, during startup from a refueling outage, a steamline ruptures inside the containment.

Containment pressure increas.es above the containment spray actuation setpoint but the spray pumps do not start.

EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection EOP-LOSC-1 Loss of Secondary Cooling EOP-FRCE-1 Response to Excessive Containment Pressure HZP, BOL, Critical

1. Initialize to HZP, BOL

2.

Implement malfunction to fail both containment spray pumps

3.

Inform crew of initial conditions

4.

Allow sufficient familiarization time

5.

Implement malfunction for steamline break inside containment (21 or 23 SG)

At hot zero power (critical), during startup following a refueling outage, a steamline ruptures inside containment.

The containment pressure exceeds the containment spray actuation setpoint but the spray pumps do not start.

In Step 10 of TRIP-1, a manual start attempt fails.

The crew continues through TRIP-1.

At Step 28, monitoring of the critical safety function status trees begins, and the crew will transitiqn to FRCE-1 to respond to the excessive containment pressure condition.

In FRCE-1, all CFC~s will be started, and the crew will return to TRIP-1.

I -

Scenario 9 Secondary Break Inside Containment With Loss of Spray Capability Termination Criteria:

At Step 35 of TRIP-1, a transition is made to LOSC-1 based on the uncontrolled pressure decrease in one SG.

The faulted SG is isolated and a plant cooldown is commenced.

Discretion of Validation Coordinator

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Scenario 10 Loss of Secondary Heat Sink

==

Description:==

Procedures Used:

Initial Conditions:

Sequence:

Expected Response:

A loss of offsite power results in a reactor trip from full power end-of-life conditions.

A failure of all auxiliary feedwater paths into the steam generators results in a loss of secondary heat sink.

EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection EOP-TRIP-2 Reactor Trip Response EOP-FRHS-1 Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink EOP-TRIP-3 Safety Injection Termination HFP, EOL

1. Initialize at HFP, EOL

2.

Tag out 2A EDG for maintainence

3.

Implement malflD'lction to prevent 22 AFW pump from automatically starting

4.

Inform crew of initial conditions

5.

Allow sufficient familiarization time

6.

Implement malfunction for station blackout

7.

When operators enter EOP-TRIP-2, then implement malfunction to trip 23 AFW pump The station blackout will result in a reactor trip, causing the operators to enter EOP-TRIP-1.

The 2A vital bus will remain de-energized because its EOG is tagged out for maintenance. Vital busses 2B and 2C will be energized by their respective EDGs, but the 22 AFW pump will not start.

In the absence of a safety injection the operators will transition to EOP-TRIP-2 at Step 7 of EOP-TRIP-1.

Scenario 10 Loss of Secondary Heat Sink Termination Criteria:

After the transition to EOP-TRIP-2, 23 AFW pump will trip. Attempts to locally start the pump are unsuccessful.

The total loss of feedwater will result in a transition to EOP-FRHS-1.

Attempts to restore AFW flow in EOP-FRHS-1 are unsuccessful.

At Step 13.1 a transition is made to Step 19 for a final check for heat sink before feed and bleed cooling is established.

Feed and bleed cooling is established.

After a return to Step 27 from Step 34.2, 23 AFW pump is started.

When the secondary heat sink is established, feed and bleed cooling is terminated in FRHS-1

• A transition is made from the end of FRHS-1 to EOP-TRIP-3 to terminate SI and restore the unit to the pre-transient condition.

Discretion of Validation Coordinator.

Scenario 11 ATWS

==

Description:==

Procedures Used:

Initial Conditions:

Sequence:

Expected Response:

Termination Criteria:

A generator trip occurs at full power BOL conditions.

It is followed by a turbine trip without a reactor trip. The reactor is tripped locally at the MG set breakers.

EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection EOP-FRSM-1 Response to Nuclear Power Generation EOP-TRIP-2 Reactor Trip Response HFP, BOL

1.

Initialize at HFP, BOL

2.

Implement malfunction to prevent automatic reactor trip

3.

Implement malfunction to prevent manual reactor trip

4.

Inform crew of initial conditions

5.

Allow sufficient familiarization time

6.

Implement generator trip

7.

Allow reactor trip after entry into FRSM-1 The reactor trip requirement causes an entry to EOP-TRIP-1.

When reactor trip is not confirmed, immediate manual actions are taken that are not successful.

After entry into EOP-FRSM-1, the reactor is locally tripped.

FRSM-1 is completed and the operators return to EOP-TRIP-1.

At Step 7 they transition to EOP-TRIP-2 to stabilize the plant Discretion of Validation Coordinator.

Scenario 12 Loss of All AC Power With SBLOCA

==

Description:==

Procedures Used:

Initial Conditions:

Sequence:

Expected Response:

During full power operations at EOL, a small break LOCA develops from a cold leg weld failure.

A sequential loss of all EDGs results in a loss of all AC power.

EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection EOP-LOPA-1 Loss of All AC Power EOP-LOPA-3 Loss of All AC Power Recovery/SI Required EOP-LOCA-1 Loss of Reactor Coolant EOP-LOCA-2 Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization EOP-FRCC-1 Response to Inadequate Core Cooling EOL, HFP

1. Initialize at HFP, EOL

2.

Tag out 2B EOG for maintenance

3.

Inform crew of initial conditions

4.

Allow sufficient familiarization time

5.

Implement malfunction for station blackout

6.

Implement malfunction for 2C EOG trip

7. After entry into EOP-LOPA-1, implement malfunction for 2A EDG trip

8. After STA recognizes inadequate core cooling on status tree, remove malfunctions for 2A and 2C EDG trips Entry into EOP-TRIP-1 will quickly be followed by a transition to Step 5 of EOP-LOPA-1 when the 2C EOG trips.

Progress will continue through LOPA-1 until a return loop is encountered at Step 81.

Scenario 12 Loss of All AC Power With SBLOCA Termination Criteria:

The LOCA conditions combined with lack of SI flow should present an opportunity for inadequate core cooling.

When ICC is recognized, the 2A and 2C EDGs are restored.

Recovery begins at Step 82 of LOPA-1, followed by a transition to LOPA-3.

In LOPA-3 a transition is made to FRCC-1 to respond to the inadequate core cooling condition. After returning to LOPA-3, a transition is made to LOCA-1 after electrical alignments are satisfactory.

Discretion of Validation Coordinator.

Scenario 13 Mode 3 Heatup With Loss of All AC Power Note:

Scenario 12A was performed as a substitute using a loss of 2 vital busses without a SI so as to cover LOPA-based EOPs more effectively.

==

Description:==

Procedures Used:

Initial Conditions:

Sequence:

Expected Response:

During a mode 3 heatup, a station blackout accompanied by a failure of two EDGs to start results in a partial loss of all AC power.

Recovery without SI follows after power is restored.

EOP-LOPA-1 Loss of All AC Power EOP-LOPA-2 Loss of All AC Power Recovery/SI Not Required Mode 3 heatup following maintenance outage

1.

Initialize at Mode 3, approximately 400-4S0°F

2.

Implement malfunctions to prevent automatic start of 2A and 2B EDGs

3.

Implement malfunction to prevent start of gas turbine

4.

Inform crew of initial conditions

5.

Direct crew to heatup to 500°F

6.

Allow sufficient familiarization time

7.

Implement malfunction for station blackout

8.

When crew gets to procedure loop at LOPA-1 Step 41, then restore 2A EDG.

The crew should enter EOP-LOPA-1 at the onset of the partial loss of all AC power.

They will continue in LOPA-1 with one energized vital bus until they get to the procedure loop at Step 41, when EDG 2A will be restored to service.

I-*

Scenario 13 Mode 3 Heatup With Loss of All AC Power Termination Criteria:

A transition to Step 82 occurs, followed by a transition to EOP-LOPA-2 for plant recovery without SI required.

Discretion of Validation Coordinator.

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Scenario 14 LBLOCA to Recirc With One De-energized Vital Bus Note:

This scenario was performed three times (Scenarios 14A, 14B, and 14C).

==

Description:==

Procedures Used:

Initial Conditions:

Sequence:

Expected Response:

Termination Criteria:

A LBLOCA has occurred.

Approximately five minutes prior to RWST depletion, one vital bus becomes de-energized.

Transfer to cold leg and then hot leg recirculation takes place without the equipment powered by the de-energized bus.

This scenario is performed three times (14A, 14B, 14C) -

once for each vital bus.

EOP-LOCA-1 Loss of Reactor Coolant EOP-LOCA-3 Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation EOP-LOCA-4 Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation LBLOCA snapshot from Scenario 4

1.

Initialize to snapshot from Scenario 4

2.

Implement malfunction to prevent vital bus energization by 2A (2B, 2C) EOG

3.

Inform crew of initial conditions

4.

Allow sufficient familiarization time

5.

Implement malfunction to de-energize vital bus 2A (2B, 2C)

The crew begins the scenario in LOCA-1 approximately five minutes prior to transfer to cold leg recirculation.

A vital bus becomes totally de-energized.

The crew will use the appropriate section of EOP-LOCA-3 to transfer to cold leg recirculation without the equipment powered by the de-energized bus.

After the plant is stable on cold leg recirc, the Validation Coordinator will direct the crew to proceed to EOP-LOCA-4 to transfer to hot leg recirc.

Discretion of Validation Coordinator.

Scenario 15 SBLOCA Outside Containment Note:

This scenario not performed because simulator sequence could not be programmed.

==

Description:==

Procedures Used:

Initial Conditions:

Sequence:

Expected Response:

Termination Criteria:

A small-break LOCA outside containment occurs.

The break is isolated by operator action and the plant is recovered.

EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection EOP-LOCA-6 LOCA Outside Containment EOP-LOCA-1 Loss of Reactor Coolant EOL, HFP

1.

Initialize at HFP, EOL

2.

Inform crew of initial conditions

3.

Allow sufficient familiarization time

4.

Implement malfunction for LOCA outside containment Operators will enter EOP-TRIP-1 on reactor trip or

~I. A transition to EOP-LOCA-6 will occur at Step 42.2 of TRIP-1 due to abnormally high auxiliary building radiation which is found to be due to a LOCA outside containment.

In EOP-LOCA-6 the break is isolated and the crew transitions to EOP-LOCA-1 when RCS pressure begins to increase.

Discretion of Validation Coordinator.

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Scenario 16 Large Break LOCA Without RHR Pumps

==

Description:==

Procedures Used:

A large break LOCA occurs from full power conditions.

Both RHR pumps fail to start automatically and manually.

Injection flows must be reduced to slow RWST depletion until recirc capability can be restored.

EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection EOP-LOCA-1 Loss of Reactor Coolant EOP-LOCA-5 Loss of Emergency Recirculation EOP-LOCA-3 Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation Initial Conditions:

HFP Sequence:

Expected Response:

1. Initialize to HFP

2.

Implement malfunctions to prevent automatic and manual start of 21 and 22 RHR pumps

3.

Inform crew of initial conditions

4.

Allow sufficient familiarization time

5.

Implement malfunction for LBLOCA

6.

When crew gets to procedure loop at Step 33 of EOP-LOCA-5, then restore one RHR pump to service The operators will enter EOP-TRIP-1 at indication of the reactor trip or safety injection.

They will verify automatic safeguards actuation, and will transition to EOP-LOCA-1 at Step 37 of TRIP-1.

Plant status is evaluated in LOCA-1 and a transition is made to EOP-LOCA-5 at Step 14 of LOCA 1 when it is determined that there are no RHR pumps operable.

Attempts to start an RHR pump are unsuccessful.

Containment spray flows and core injection flows are reduced to slow RWST depletion

• Scenario 16 Large Break LOCA Without RHR Pumps Termination* Criteria:

When the operators get to the procedure loop at Step 33 of LOCA-5, one RHR pump is returned to service.

At this point they should return to LOCA-1 and then transition to LOCA-3 to align for cold leg recirculation.

Discretion of Validation Coordinator.

Scenario 17 Rapid Natural Circulation Cooldown - With RVLIS Note:

This scenario was not performed because of the RVLIS malfunction on the simulator.

Description :

Procedures Used:

A loss of CCW flow to the RCPs require~ removing all RCPs from service.

A rapid natural circulation cooldown is required with RVLIS in service.

EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection EOP-TRIP-2 Reactor Trip Response EOP-TRIP-4 Natural Circulation Cool down EOP-TRIP-6 Natural Circulation Rapid Cooldown With RVLIS Initial Conditions:

HFP Sequence:

Expected Response:

1. Initialize to HFP

2.

Inform crew of initial conditions

3.

4.

s.

Allow sufficient familiarization time Implement malfunction for loss of CCW to RCPs At Step 19 of EOP-~RIP-4, take snapshot of plant conditions for later scenario The ope~ators enter EOP-TRIP-1 on the reactor trip indication. At Step 7, in the absence of a safety injection signal, they transition to EOP-TRIP-2 to stabilize the plant.

The operators will trip all RCPs to prevent damage from overheating.

At the end of performing TRIP-2, the crew will transition to EOP-TRIP-4 for a natural circulation cooldown.

At Step 19, it is determined that a rapid cooldown is required and that RVLIS is available, so the crew transitions to EOP-TRIP-6

• Scenario 17 Rapid Natural Circulation Cooldown - With RVLIS Termination Criteria:

EOP-TRIP-6 is used to cooldown the RCS under natural circulation conditions as rapidly as possible without exceeding tech. spec. cooldown limits.

Discretion of Validation Coordinator.

1-I Scenario 18 Rapid Natural Circulation Cooldown - Without RVLIS

==

Description:==

A loss of CCW flow to the RCPs requires removing all RCPs from service.

A rapid natural circulation cooldown is required without* RVLIS in service.

Procedures Used:

Initial Conditions:

Sequence:

Expected Response:

Termination Criteria:

EOP-TRIP-4 Natural Circulation Cooldown EOP-TRIP-5 Natural Circulation Rapid Cooldown Without RVLIS Snapshot from Scenario 17

1.

Initialize to snapshot from Scenario 17

2.

Remove RVLIS from service

3.

Inform crew of initial conditions

4.

Direct crew to cooldown as rapidly as possible without exceeding tech. spec. limits EOP-TRIP-5 is used to cooldown the RCS under natural circulation conditions as rapidly as possible without exceeding tech. spec. cooldown limits.

Discretion of Validation Coordinator.

Scenario 19 SGTR With Cooldown via Backfill

==

Description:==

Procedures Used:

Initial Conditions:

Sequence:

Expected Response:

Termination Criteria:

A steam generator tube rupture occurs while at full power.

The plant is stabilized and the ruptured steam generator is cooled via backfill to the RCS.

EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection EOP-SGTR-1 Steam Generator Tube Rupture EOP-SGTR-2 Post-SGTR Cooldown.

HFP, EOL

1.

Initialize to HFP, EOL

2.

Inform crew of initial conditions

3.

Allow sufficient familiarization time

4.

Implement malfunction for 450 gpm SGTR The SGTR will result in a safety injection before the unit can be ramped off line.

EOP-TRIP-1 will be entered.

A transition to EOP-SGTR-1 occurs at TRIP-1 Step 36.

The ruptured SG is identified, isolated, and the plant is stablized in SGTR-1 without further failures.

When SGTR-1 is completed, a transition to SGTR-2 occurs, and the ruptured SG is cooled using backfill to the RCS.

Discretion of Validation Coordinator.

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Scenario 20 SGTR With SBLOCA

==

Description:==

Procedures Used:

Initial Conditions:

Sequence:

Expected Response:

A steam generator tube rupture occurs while at full power, EOL.

When a safety injection occurs, the station auxiliary power transformer fails, causing a station blackout.

A PRZ PORV fails open and is not isolable during RCS depressurization, resulting in a tube rupture coincident with a small break LOCA.

EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection EOP-SGTR-1 Steam Generator Tube Rupture EOP-SGTR-3 SGTR With LOCA - Subcooled Recovery HFP, EOL

1.

Initialize at HFP, EOL

2.

Implement malfunction to prevent closure of both PRZ PORV block valves

3.

Inform crew of initial conditions

4.

Allow sufficient familiarization time

5.

Implement malfunction for SGTR

6.

When safety injection occurs, then implement malfunction for station blackout

7.

When operator uses PRZ PORV to depressurize RCS, then implement malfunction to fail open PRZ PORV The operating crew will enter EOP-TRIP-1 at the reactor trip or SI.

During the safeguards electrical loading sequence a station blackout occurs. All EDGs start and load on their busses.

The crew will transition from TRIP-1 Step 36 to EOP-SGTR-1 Step 1 on high secondary radiation levels

• Scenario 20 SGTR With SBLOCA Termination Criteria:

In SGTR-1 the ruptured SG is identified and isolated.

When an operator uses a PRZ PORV to depressurize the RCS, the PORV fails open and cannot be isolated using its block valve. This condition forces a transition to EOP-SGTR-3.

In EOP-SGTR-3, RCS subcooling is minimized and a rapid cooldown is commenced.

The plant is cooled to cold shutdown using SGTR-3.

'Discretion of Validation Coordinator.

Scenario 21 SGTR With Failed Steamline Safety Valve Note:

This scenario was not performed because scenario 20 covered EOP-SGTR-4 adequatly.

==

Description:==

Procedures Used:

Initial Conditions:

Sequence:

Expected Response:

A large SGTR occurs at full power.

The ruptured SG becomes overpressurized, popping a main steamline safety valve that fails open.

EOP-TRIP-1 EOP-SGTR-1 EOP-SGTR-3 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Steam Generator Tube Rupture SGTR With LOCA - Subcooled Recovery EOP-SGTR-4 SGTR With LOCA - Saturated Recovery HFP, EOL

1. Initialize at HFP, EOL

2.

Inform crew of initial conditions

3.

Allow sufficient familiarization time

4.

Implement malfunction for very1large SGTR

5.

At appropriate time in ruptured SG pressure/level transient, implement malfunction for failed open main steamline safety valve The operating crew will enter EOP-TRIP-1 at indication of either reactor trip or safety injection. Automatic safeguards actuation will be verified and, at Step 36, a transition will occur to EOP-SGTR-1.

In SGTR-1 the ruptured steam generator will be identified and isolated. Further isolation will occur at Step 8 when the ruptured SG is also found to be faulted

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Scenario 21 SGTR With failed Steamline Safety Valve Termination Criteria:

At Step 19 a transition occurs to EOP-SGTR-3 because the ruptured SG pressure is not 100 psig above other intact SG pressures.

At Step 18.2 of EOP-SGTR-3 a transition is made to EOP-SGTR-4 because of a direct uncontrolled steam release to atmosphere from the ruptured SG.

In SGTR-4, the RCS is cooled and depressurized keeping RCS subcooling at a minimum 2°F.

Discretion of Validation Coordinator

• l Scenario 22 SGTR Without Pressurizer Pressure Control Note:

Two additional similiar scenarios (Scenarios 22A and 22B) were also performed to incorporate more procedure steps from the SGTR-based EOPs.

These are discussed in the note at the end of this scenario description.

==

Description:==

Procedures Used:

Initial Conditions:

Sequence:

Expected Response:

A station blackout and failure of instrument air to containment after a steam generator tube rupture make normal pressurizer spray and pressurizer PORVs inoperable.

Additionally, the auxiliary spray valve is found to be inoperable, thus no pressurizer pressure control is available.

EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection EOP-SGTR-1 Steam Generator Tube Rupture EOP-SGTR-5 SGTR Without Pressurizer Pressure Control HFP, EOL

. 1.

Initialize to HFP, EOL 2 *. Implement malfunction for failure of auxiliary spray valve in closed position

3.

Inform crew of initial conditions

4.

Allow sufficient familiarization time S.

Implement malfunction for SGTR

6.

Implement malfunctions for station blackout and failure of instrument air header in containment A safety injection is initiated and EOP-TRIP-1 is entered by the operating crew.

Automatic safeguards actuations are verified, and at Step 36 a transition is made to EOP-SGTR-1 based on high secondary radiation levels

• Scenario 22 SGTR Without Pressurizer Pressure Control Termination Criteria:

pressure have failed.

EOP-SGTR-5 is used to depressurize the RCS via rapid secondary depressurization.

Discretion of Validation Coordinator NOTE:

Two additional scenarios, incorporating minor initiating condition changes, were performed to analyze additional tasks and flowchart path sequences not covered in the original scenarios.

These were designated Scenarios 22A and 22B.

Scenario 22A:

Scenario 22B:

This scenario consisted of a steam generator tl,lbe rupture with loss of all RCS forced flow.

This change was made only to capture operator performance of a natural circulation step sequence in EOP-SGTR-1.

This scenario consisted of a steam generator tube rupture without other major failures.

This allowed real-time analysis of step sequences to cool the RCS by dumping steam to the main condenser and to reduce SI flow via the SI reduction criteria.

These scenarios were run based on an evaluation of the procedure paths covered by the original scenario set.

The Validation team, assisted by the Salem Simulator instructor, identified minor changes to existing scenarios that would provide the performance opportunities necessary to analyze remaining step sequences

• GP-R-212219 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY APPENDIX C HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES

GP-R-212219 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY

e APPENDIX B LINK DIAGRAMS I

' J.

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GP-R-212219

?UBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY LINK DIAGRAMS Link diagrams are graphical depict.ions of the operator's movements that occurred during the walkthroughs of the scenarios.

The lines show the paths that the operators took when performing the procedures that were part of each scenario.

The link diagrams in this appendix show where, how far, and how frequently operators traversed particular paths.

The numbers in the circles on the paths indicate the times each path was traversed; arrows indicate the termination point of the path.

The link diagrams were reviewed with regard to three aspects of control room operation:

Control Room Staffing Traffic Patterns Instrument and Control Distribution A description of the Link Analysis is provided in Section 2.7.4 of this report.

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GP-R-212219 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY APPENDIX C HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES

~*

S A L [ M N U C L E A R G E N E R A T I N G S T A T I 0 N HUMAN ENGINEERING OBSERVATION/DISCREPANCY REVIEWER~

VENTERS Dr::iTE~

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PANEL IDENTIFIER COMPONENT IDENTIFIER r' ** vr--:-.F: I DUS SEE DESCRIPTION AND COMMENTS

,.-<:.ECT l DH CODE::

GU I DEL HIE l'iO ~

I *DESCRIPTION OF DISCREPANCY:

ALL METE~S LISTED BELOW AND CONTINUED IN COMMENTS SECTION ARE LABELED PSI" ON iviETEF.: F?'iCE H~STE(-'D OF "P~3IG" AS ETATED HI PROCEDUl\\ES:

PI-936A/B/C/D ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE INDICATIONS; PI937A/B/C/D ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE INDICAT~ONS; PA-148 23 AFW PUMP STEAM SUPPLY PRESSURE; PA-1676 AUX F PUMP SUCTION PR~SSURE; PA-3451 AUX F PUMP ALT SUCTION PRESSURE; PA-1039-21 AFW PUMP SUCTION PRLSSURL; PA-1040-22 AFW PUMP SUCTION PRESSURE; PA-1041-23 AFW PUMP SUCTlON 'PRESSUR~; PI-142A, PA-3372, PA-3394 STATION AIR HEADER PRESSURE~.* PI-948A/B/C/D CU~lAINMLNT PRESSURE:

Pl-135B~ PI-472 PRT PRESSURE

. ' ~

I

• 1 INDICATION; PI--435A, PI~456, PI-457, PI-474A PZR PRESSURE INDICATION; HED CATEGORY CODE: 3 1...E:VE:L.;:

~;;cHEDULE:

_RECOMMENDATIONS~

.**~I: I~~~~.... '.*~~-~ l:. :: :

'.~ ~~ ~'. -~ *-.... --........ **--*................ *-*-.... *--* *--**-*-**--*--**--*---*--*---* --*-* -* ****-.... --** **-*-............ -*.... ---------

i COMMENTS/JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-CONFORMANCt~

PI-185, PI-186, PI-187, PI-188 RCP DELTA PRESSURE INDICATION; PI-405, PI-403, PR-403 RCS PRESSURE INDICATIONS; PI-507A MAIN STEAM PRESSURE; PI-514A, PI-515A? PI-516A SG i21 PRESSURE INDICATION; PI-524A, PI-525A, PI-526A SG t22 PRESSURE INDICATION; PI-534A, PI-535A, PI-536A SG i23 PRESSURE INDICATION; PI-544A, PI-545A, PI-546A SG #24 PRESSURE INDICATION.

METER FACES WILL BE LABELED "PSIG".

i.

1

• S A L E M N U C L E A R G E N E R A T I N G S T A T I 0 N

~UMAN ENGIN~ERING OBSERVATION/DISCREPANCY REVIEWER~

VENTERS DATL::

~:):J./07/8?

PAI-IE L I :OE r~T IF I EF::

COMPONENT IDENTIFIER

'.**NA SECTIOl"-i CDDE~

GUIDE::LINE l*m~

_DESCRIPTION OF DISCREPANCY~

i.

VARIOUS EDP PROCCDURAL STEPS REQUIRE OPERATION OUTSIDE OF THE CONTROL ROOM WHICH IS NOT DESIGNATED IN THE PROCEDURES.

HED CATEGORY CODE~ 4 F..:EC OMi'"i["IDA TI C!l,1::3 ~

CHANGE RECOMMCNDED.

L.EVEL:

SCHEDULE:

COMMENTS/JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-CONFORMANCE~

PROCEDURAL STEPS IN COPs WILL SPECIFY LOCAL OPERATION WHEN REQUIRED.

S A L ~ M N U C L E A R G E N E R A T I N G S T A T I 0 N HUMAN LN~INLLRING OBSERVATION/DISCREPANCY REVIEWER:

VENT~RS

or~1TL ::

('.: L /Q)/' /D?

ND::

728 COMPONENT IDENTIFIER GUIDELHIE NO:

DESCRIPTION OF DISCREPANCY:

PROCEDURE STEPS REQUIRE TOTAL AUX FEED FLOW VALUES WHICH CAN ONLY BE OBTAINED THROUGH CALCULATiON USING INDIVIDUAL AUX FEED METERS L.EVEL. ::

SCHEDULE~

F~E CDMMLND(1 TI DI,~'.:;::

CHANGC RECOMMCN0CD.

COMMENTS/JUSTIFICATION

~DR NON-CONFORMANCC:

ZOI,![

i'\\r:~i::.:1c:l'if:: AT rU:,iIMUM i:~LGUir<:L:::o i::*i._01,_1 or~ U1CH OF FOUi*< CHAl-*INELS

<RECORDERS) WILL BE PROVlD:D

• S A L E M N U C L E A R G E N E R A T I N G S T A T I 0 N HUMAN ENGINEERING OBSERVATION/DISCREPANCY REVIEWER~

VENTERS

Oi*~1TE::

0110?/fl?

729 COMPONENT IDENTIFIER

_ C~C>.. *2 FI-113A, RAPID BORATE FLOW INDICATOR SECT I 01-1 CODE~

GU I DEL HIE l'ID:

DESCRIPTION OF DISCREPANCY:

MINOR INCREMENTS ON METER FACE ARE.3 GPM WHICH IS DIFFICULT TO INTERPRET r --*---------------------------------------------------------------------------

HED CATEGORY CODE

4 LEVEL:

SCHEDULE:

RECOMMENDATIONS:

CHANGE RECOMMENDED.

r COMMENTS/JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-CONFORMANCE~

MINOR INCREMENTS WILL BE CHANGED TO.5.

i i.

\\

S A L E M N Li C L E A R G E N E R A T I N G S T A T l 0 N HUMAN CNGINE=RING OBSERVATION/DISCREPANCY REVIEWER~

VENTERS DATE::

01 /9.)7 /B?

~-l 0 ::

COMPONENT IDENTIFIER CC>-*2 FI-128B~ C~G SYSTEM FLOW

.. S E:C T I 0 ~I C 0 D E ~

GU I DEL I NE 1'10 ~

DESCRIPTION OF DISCREPANCY:

.. METER FACE DOES NOT DESIGNATE GPM AS UNITS OF MEASUREMENT

. HED CATEGO~Y CODE:

LE\\lEL~

SCHEDULE~

*COMMENTS/JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-CONFORMANCE~

THIS HED HAG BEEN DEL:TCD.

UNITS OF MEASUREMENT CGPM>

ARE PROVIDED ON THE

~*:ETEF;: r*f*ICE l l'i Tl*iL CDl'-iTr~UL. F\\ClOM u THE:Y w I LL BE Pl\\OV I Dl::D DI'~ THE METER FACE IN THE SIMULAl"OR.

i.

S A L C M N LI C L E A R G L N E R A T I N G S T A T I 0 N HUMAN ENGINEERING OBSERVATION/DISCREPANCY REVIEWER:

VENTERS

~~O::

Pf'.iNEI... I DENT IF I EF~

COMPONENT IDENTIFIER DIGITAL CLOCK bLCT IDl'-l COD[~

GUIDELif'.IE ND:

• DESCRIPTION OF DISCREPANCY:

/'31 THE DIGITAL CLOCK IN THE CONTROL ROOM IS AC POWERED AND RENDERED INOPERABLE DURING LOSS OF AC POWER HED CATEGORY CODE~ 4 LEVEL:

SCHEDULE:

F\\:E:CDMi"iEHDF1 TI O!,I'.'.) ~

NO CHANGE RECOMMENDED.

COMMENTS/JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-CONFORMANCE~

TH= CLOCK IS POWER~D OFr AN INVCRTER AND IS CAPABLE OF TRANSFERRING r:*owc::r~

~3uu::~cE::::> DlHn 1-ic 1...0::::.s or:

~iC 1-:*owci:~.

S A L E M N U C L E A R G E N E R A T I N G S T A T I 0 N HUMAN ENGINLERING OBSERVATION/DISCREPANCY REVIEWER=

VENTERS

. CC****2

~3E~CT I DI'-! COD[::

DESCRIPTION OF DISCREPANCY:

COMPONENT IDENTIFIER PI-509C, STM DUMP VALVES DEMAND TI-500, STM DUMP VALVES DEMAND GUIDELHIE NQ:

METER FACE INDICATES "AMPS AS VALVE DEMAND UNITS INSTEAD OF X OPEN VALVE DEMAND.

HED CATEGORY CODE:

l...E::VEL.::

SCHEDULE=

COMMENTS/JUSTIF1CATION FOR NON-CONFORMANCE:

THIS HED HAS BEEN DELETED.

OPEN VALVE DEMAND AS PERCENT

<X> IS r:*F;:uv I :OED Oi'*t THE M['f'EF~ F,:.*,[;[ I l'-i Ti*!!:::

CDl'~TF~OI...

F~OOM" THI:: Sf.'1ME ti.I I L_L BE PROVIDED ON THE METER

~ACE IN THE SIMULATOR

• i.

S A L E M N U C l E A R G E N E R A T I N G S T A T I 0 N

~lUMAN ENGINEERING OBSERVATION/DISCREPANCY REVIEWER:

VENTERS DATE~

01/07/87 NO~

733 PANEL IDENTIFIER COMPONENT IDENTIFIER

.. ((-1 21CA330~ CONTROL AIR TO CONT. ISOL VALVE 22CA330, CONTROL AIR TO CONT. ISOL VALVE SECTION CODE:

WORKSPACE:

GUIDELINE NO:

DESCRIPTION OF DISCREPANCY~

PROCEDURE STEPS IDENTIFY CONTROL AIR TO CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES AS 21 AND 22 CCA330~S BUT NUMBER IDENTIFICATION IS NOT LABELED ON VALVE CONTROLS HED CATEGORY CODE~ 3 RECOMMENDATIONS; CHANGE RECOMMEND:D LEVEL:

SCHEDULE:

COMMENTS/JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-CONFORMANCE:

CONTROLS WILL BE LABELED

• S A L E M N U C L E A R G E N E R A T I N G S T A T I 0 N HUMAN ENGINEERING OBSCRVATION/DISCREPANCY REVIEWER~

VENTERS COMPONENT IDENTIFIER I CC*-2 2CV134, EXCESS LETDOWN TO VCT OR RCDT DIVERSION VALVE CONTROL s::cT l:Drl CODE::

1.i..1or~KSPACE ::

. GUIDELHIE l'ICl:

DESCRIPTION OF DISCREPANCY~

i.

Dl\\IE 2r*n COr-iTFWL. Sl.JITCH CD1'1TFWL.S TWU VALVES, r~EITHEF~

\\, t. POSITION INDICATION, ONLY TWO RED INDICATING LIGHTS LOCATION IS EXIST

• OF WHICH HAVE ACTUAL IDENTIFYING WHCRE FLOW HED CATEGORY CODE~ 4 LEVEL.~

~)CH[DUL.E:

F;:ECOMMi:::i*~Di:1T l (J!,I'.:; ::

NO CHANGE RECOMMENDED.

COMMENTS/JUSTIFICA.rION FUR NON* CONFORMANCE~

THIS !G AN AP~RDPRIATC INDICATION FOR A THREE-WAY DIVERT VALVE

,'..F'[F;:ATIOi,I.

t.

S A L E M N U C L E A R G E N E R A T I N G S T A T I 0 N

• HUMAI*~ E!,IGil,ICEF\\:Il,iG DBECF:VATION/DISCF<EPAl,ICY REVIEWER~

VENTERS DATE:

£11/07/8?

_,-1***

./~:.:..r Pf~NEL I DEl-.JT IF I Ef\\'.

COMPONENT IDENTIFIER CC',-,

)

FI-123~ EXCESS LETDOWN FLOW SECT I 01'1 CODE:

WOF<KSPACE:

GUIDELH~E ND~

, DESCRIPTION OF DISCREPANCY:

EXCESS LETDOWN FLOW INDICATION METER, FI-123, IS DEMAND INDICATION ONLY.

PROCEDURE STEPS IMPLY ACTUAL FLOW INDICATION IS NECESSARY.

. HED CATEGORY CQDE:

4 LEVE::L:

SCHEDULE:

f*~CCOMMEl,ll)r'.:J TI Di'l~3:

NO CHANGE RECOMMENDED.

COMMENTS/JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-CONFORMANCE~

THERE IS NO SPECIFIC FLOW REQUIREMENT IN THE EOPs, VALVE POSITION AND TEMPERATURE CHANGE WILL INDICATE FLOW

• S A L C M N U C L E A R G E N E R A T I N G S T A T I 0 N HUMAN ENGINECRING OBSERVATION/DISCREPANCY RCVI~WCR=

VENTERS Df'.iT::~::

G1/lj7./8?

COMPONENT IDENTIFIER 73t.

f - CC--.l TRAIN A, HIGH STM FLOW SI BLOCK CONTROL TRAIN B, HIGH STM FLOW SI BLOCK CONTROL

• . '.3ECT J: 01'-!

CODE~

GUIDELHIE l'-10:

DESCRIPTION OF DISCREPANCY~

F:*fWCEDUt~E ST~::f'b IDEi*iTIFY "HIGH STEAM i:=-LOW SI BLOCl-\\

11 AL THOUGH COl'HFWL LABELS DESIGNATE "HIGH STEAM PRESSURE SI BLOCK" HED CATEGORY CODE~

L.EVLL.~

!3CHE:DUL.E:

COMMENTS/JUSTIFICATION roR NON-CONFORMANCE~

THiS,HED HAS DEEN DELETED.

THE LABELS ARE CORRECT IN THE CONTROL ROOM.

THEY WILL BE CORRECTED IN THE SIMULATOR

• S A L L M N U C L E A R G E N E R A T I N G S T A T I 0 N HUMAN ENGINEERING OBSERVATION/DISCREPANCY REVIEWER:

VENTERS

• CC>-2 DESCRIPTION OF DISCREPANCY~

COMPONENT IDENTIFIER 2CV18, LETDOWN PRESSURE CONTROL P455E, PZR PRESSURE CONTROL 2CV71, RCP SEAL PRESSURE CONTROL GUIDELHIE ND~

/'37 THE "INCREASE PRESSURE" PUSHBUTTON IS ~ACKLIT RED IN COLOR.

VALVE IS ACTUALLY GOHIG CL.m:;[D Wl-IE::H "lHCF<LASC Pf-i.:E:SSLJr~E 11 PUSHBUTTOl'l IS DEPRESSED WHICH IS OPPOSITE

().~*

l'IDF~MAL II Gf<:E::EH****CL..Cl~:)E:D II F'Li~lHT COL OF(

CDHVEt~T I 01-1.

HED CATEGORY CODE~ 4 1._cv::::L..::

fr:CHEDULE~

• HO*-**-*_,. *OOO OHO''*-*-.. Ooo00-0 OOoO *-* "'*-*OHO 00*0"-00 0000 *-* 0000 *-* *-* 0*000-0 0000 0000.0.. 0 *-00*00.. 00-00 00.. 00*0 " 0000.... --

........ 0000 -* *- 00.. -

r::ECDMMEl-i:0(.:1TI01-.1::3 ~

NO CHANGE RCCOMMENDED.

COMMENTS/JUSTrrrCATION FOR NON-CONFORMANCE:

""'j-![

Pi~,F~Ai"iETE~F;: or:* CUi-.1C[F::i'*i

( r-:*r~EG~3LJF::i::)

IG Il-.!CF~Er:.if::; Ii,IG ti.JI-I I CH Is I r~D I CAT ED Y THE RED BUTTON

• G A L E M N U C L E A R G l N E R A T I N G S T A T I 0 N HUMAN ENGINEERING ODSERVATION/DISCREPANCY 738 COMPONENT IDENTIFIER r -

i CC*-2 2CV35, LETDOWN TO VCT/HUT VALVE I

~)ECTIOl\\i CDDE::

GUIDELINE 1'10~

DESCRIPTION OF DISCREPANCY:

ONE CONTROLLER CONTROLS TWO SEPARATE VALVES NEITHER OF WHICH HAVE OPEN/CLOSE J: 1-l:O I CAT I 01*4 HED CATEGORY CODE: 4 LEVEL:

SCHE::DULE:

Fo:ECIJMME:i*~Di4 TI Di--i;:; ~

NO CHANGE RECOMENDED.

COMMENTS/JUSTirICATION FOR NON-CONFORMANCE:

THIS IS AN APPROPRIATE INDICATION FOR A THREE-WAY DIVERT VALVE 0 F't::1:;:AT I 0 l'l

• S A L E M N U C L [ A R G E N C R A T I N G S T A T I 0 N HUMAN ENGINLERING OBSErVATION/DISCREPANCY

!**.iU::

COMPONENT IDENTIFIER i

CC>*2 MAIN TURBINE DRAIN VALVE CONTROL AND IND GUIDELHIE HO~

DESCRIPTION OF DISCREPANCY:

ONE CONTROL SWITCH CONTROLS VARIOUS VALVES, NONE OF WHICH HAVE SEPARATE OPEt-1/CLOGE I i'ID I CF1 TI Di'if:)

HED CATEGORY CODE~

LEVEL~

RECOMMENDATIONS~

COMMENTS/JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-CONFORMANCL~

THI~3 HED Htib BE:D*I DE::L.CTU)..

THEF:E IS l*W S~1FETY SIGIHFICAHCE: F::ELATI\\lE TO WHETHER THESL VARIOUS VALVES ARE OPEN OR CLOSED.

THERE IS NO BEARING ON THE EOPs WH~*:*HER THE VALVES ARE OPEN OR CLOSED

• S A L E M N U C L E A R G E N E R A T I N G S T A T I 0 N HUMAN ENGINEERING OBSERVATION/DISCREPANCY REVIEWER~

VENTERS NO~

F* C::)Ni:::L r nr:.1\\1 TI FIEF~

COMPONENT IDENTIFIER r.CC*-*1 FI-946, RHR COLD LEG INJ FLOW METERS FI-947, RHR COLD LEG INJ FLOW METERS

.SECTION CODE~

wcmKSPACE~

GUIDELINE 1-10~

DESCRIPTION OF DISCREPANCY~

RHR COLD LEG INJECTION FLOW METERS 21 AND 22 SJ49 CFI-946, FI-947) ARE DIFFICULT TO INTERPRET BECAUSE OF 12 MINOR INCREMENTS BETWEEN MAJOR UNITS.

21 AND 22 SJ49 ARE NOT IDENTIFIED ON CONTROLS EVEN THOUGH EDP STEPS.REFERENCE THE METEFW THI!3 Ii.Ir~)"(..

HED CATEGORY CODE~ 3 RECOMMENDATIONS~

CHANGE RECOMMENDED..

L..E:.\\/[~L. ~

'.3Cl*:EDUl...E ~

COMMENTS/JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-*CONFORMANCE~

THE SCALE WILL BE CHANGED APPROPRIATELY

• S A L L M N J C L E A R G l N E R A T I N G S T A T I 0 N HUMAN ENGINEERING OBSERVATION/DISCREPANCY REVICWER:

VENTCRS

. CC**2 r.::::::cT I O!'i CODE::

. DESCRIPTION OF DISCREPANCY:

DrYiT~

Y.l:J../Y.)8/8/'

"i--10~

COMPONENT IDENTIFIER PR-403, RCS PRESSURE RECORDER PI-405, RCS PRESSURE METER

\\.<.IOF~l<S:::*ACE:

GU IDEL HIE 1,10:

/'41 THE PR-403 RECORDE~ RANGC VARILS FROM 0-300 PSIG.

THERE IS NO " X 10" MULTIPLIER FOR ACCURATE PRESSURE INTERPRETATION.

THE PI-405 AND THE PR-403 DO NOT HAVE THE CAPABILi1*y OF SUPPLYING VALUES LESS THAN 50 PSIG WHICH THE HED CATCGU~Y COD~:

i... :::: \\/ E:: L. ::

SCi**iE:OULE ~

COMMENTS/JUSTiFiCATiON FUR NON-CONFORMANCE~

TH I u Ht::D HA'.3 r:i::c1***!

DE::~_ ETC:D.

1 HE::

DF'C::F<:(::-, ru::;~ C(.:1N USE OTHER APF'F.:OPF\\ I t-1 TE:L y

'..Cf.'1/...ED 1: i'it:Ti~UME !'~T [; TU F'l~iJV I DE: TH IS I i\\!i".-DF~MAT I Dl'I.

I

S A L E M N U C ~ E A R G E N E R A T I N G S T A T I 0 N HUMAN E~GINEERING OBSERVATION/DISCREPANCY COMPONENT IDENTIFIER

.i*

C:C****2 FI-128B, CHARGING FLOW INDICATION

\\.

GUI DEL. HIE i'ID:

. DESCRIPTION OF DISCREPANCY:

Fl-128B, CHARGING FLOW INDlCATION, DOES NOT HAVE "GPM" LABELED ON THE METER FACE.

ALSO~ CHARGING FLOW THROUGH REGCN Hx INDICATION IS INTERPRETED THROUGH Cr;L CUL.11TI01'1.

HED CATEGORY COD:~

L.E:~VEL::

SCHEDULE:

COMMENTS/JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-*CONFORMANCE~

THIS HED HAS BEEN DCLETLD.

UNITS or MLASUREMENT CGPM) ARE PROVIDED ON T:**l:~:

M;::Ti::;:;~ ;*:*?-.CC 11'1

'i'l*-i::~ CDHTiWL. !*;:C:!UM.

TH::::y WILL BE p1:wv1:01:::r:i m-1 THE METER FACE IN 1'HE SIMULATOR.

G E N E R A T I N G HUMAN ENGINEERING OBSERVATION/DISCREPANCY REVlEWER~

VENTERS PANEL IDENTIFIER COMPONENT IDENTIFIER PI-514A, PI-515A, PI-516A PI-524A? PI-525A, PI-526A PI-534A, PI-535A, PI-536A PI-544A, PI-545A~ PI-546A NO~

743 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE INDICATIONS

~3ECTION CODE~

WOf\\KSPACE ~

GUIDELHIE NO:

' DESCRIPTION OF DISCREPANCY:

STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE INDICATOR INCREMENTS ON METER FACES HAVE MINOR UNITS OF 20 PSI.

PROCEDURE STEPS REQUIRE ACCURATE VALUES OF 5 PSIG.

HED CATEGORY CODE~ 3 L.E\\/[i._ ~

SCHEDULE:

I F<:ECOMMENDAT I 01-IS ~

CHANGE RECOMMENDED.

COMMENTS/JUSTIFlCATION FOR NON-CONFORMANCE~

-~*IE F't~:C:CE:D!.ff\\:E WILL BE MODIFIED TD AVOID 1:~EFEF-:Et-ICHIG 5 PSIG.

S A L E M

~ U C L E A R G E N E R A T I N t S T A T I 0 N HUMAN lNGINEERING OBSERVATION/DISCREPANCY REVIEWER:

Vl~TERS DATE;

~H/~)8/8?

7A4 r *-*---------------------------------------------------------------------------

COMPONENT IDENTIFIER NA SECTIOl'-i CODE~

wm;:f<SPACE:

GUIDELINE NO~

i ~----------------------------------------------------------------------------

DESCRIPTION OF DISCREPANCY~

THE LARGE SIZE OF THE EDi) FLOW CHARTS WERE CUMBERSOME FOR THE OPERATORS TO HANULE.

THE CLEAR PLASTIC SURFACE FOR THE FLOWCHARTS WAS A NONGLARE MATERIAL THAT CAUSED READING PROBLEMS.

HED CATEGORY CODE~ 3 LEVEL:

SCHEDULE:

r~ECOMMl::N:OAT I Dl'-iS ~

CHANGE RECOMMEND=D.

COMMENTS/JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-CONFORMANCE~

THE FLOW CHARTS WILL BE SMALLER AND WILL HAVE A NONGLARE FINISH.

S A L E M N U C L E A R G E N E R A T I N G S T A T I 0 N HUi..,.i1'.:ii'*i E:.1-~(., I i'li::. Er~ 1:,,,c DB!:3i::. i::.:v f-'1 TI Oi'-1./D I SCF:EP~~l,iCY REVIEWER~

VCNTE~S Dr::-1TE:::

i!Jl/08/S?

/'45 I *-----------*-----------------------------------------------------------------

PANEL IDENTirIER COMPONENT IDENTIFIER GUIDELHIE t-10:

DESCRIPTION OF DISCREPANCY~

SCENARIO 12 AND 12A:

DURING THESE TWO SCENARIOS, PROCEDURAL STEPS IN LOPA EOPS

~CQUIRE NUMEROUS LOCAL OPCRATIONG, MORE THAN THE NUMBER OF EQUIPMENT OPERATORS

~"1VAILABl...E.

r HCD CATEGORY CODE~ 4 LEVE!...~

i-~ECCli'lrlF.::1--ID,-::i T ~.: D !'1~3 ::

NO CHANGE.RECOMMENDED.

COMMENTS/JUSTIFICATION roR NON-CONFORMANCE~

LEVELS ARL DICTATCD BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

S A L E M N U C L E A R G E N E R A T I N G S T A T I 0 N HUMAN

~NGINEERlNG OBSLRVATION/DISCREPANCY REV~EWER~

V~NT~RS PANEL IDENTIFIER COMPONENT IDENTIFIER

CC*-*i

'.:~ECTIDl'I CODL:~

GUIDELHIE I-ID:

1

"?46

' 1 DEsc1:nPTior-1 OF Disci~i:::PA1'1CY~

THERE IS NOT AN ACTUA~ rLOW INDICATION FOR COMPONENT COOLING WATER TO THE RCPs.

i THIS IS REQUESTED IN THE EDP STEPS.

I --------------------*---------------------------------------------------------

'* HED CATEGUffY CDDL::~ 4 L.EVEL~

SCHEDUU:::

1-i RECOMMENDATIONS~

l NO CHANGE RECOMMENDED.

i COMMENTS/JUSTIFICATION

~OR NON-CONFORMANCE~

THERE IS NO UUANTIFIED FLOW REQUIREMENT IN THE EOPs.

~;~

r :

S A ~ E M N U C l [ A R G E N [ R A T I N G S T A T I 0 N HUMAN

~~G:NEERING OBSERVATION/DISCREPANCY

Of'.:1 TE:.::

0:1.11\\al~:r.1 747

\\. *-................ *-*........ *-*.... *-*............ *-*.. -.... _

PANEL IDENTIFIER COMPONENT IDENTIFIER r. r****'... '1 j

-*\\.:

STEAM GENERATOR FEED FLOW INDICATIONS

• • SECT:LOl'-1 CDDE:

GUIDELINE ND:

DESCRIPTION OF DISCREPANCY:

ALL STEAM GENERATOR FEED FLOW INDICATIONS ARE DISPLAYED IN PERCENT FLOW.

ALL PROCEDURES REQUCST FLOW *IN LBS/MASS/HR.

HED CATEGORY CODE~

SCHEDULE:

r.;:ECDMME:l-.JDAT I Dl*~G ~

COMMENTS/JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-CONFORMANCL~

Tins HED HF1U f:Ei:::H DEU:::TCl).

THE T1~SI< A1'if'.:"1L.YGT MISHITEF..:F*F~ETED THE FEE::()

FLOW ACRONYM 10 MEAN AUX FEED AND MAIN FEED WHERE IT rs ACTUALLY ONLY i\\~1 J: i'i F:CED.

~.*.

~;:AL.CM l*lLJM1::1!'1 F:EV I Ei..JE::F< ::

SCCTIOl'I CO:OE~

N U C L E A R G E N E R A T I N G ENGINLERING OBSERVATION/DISCREPANCY Di~)TE~

~l:l/:1.2/8?

COMPONENT IDENTIFIER STATIOl'I ND~

PZR AUX SPRAY DIFFERENTIAL TEMP IND GUIDELINE l'-iO:

DESCRIPTION OF DISCREPANCY~

?4l3 THERE IS NOT A PRECALCULATED INDICATION FOR PZR AUX SPRAY DIFFERENTIAL TEMPERATURE.

MANUAL CALCULATION IS NECESSARY.

r *----------------------------------------------------------------------------

LEVEL:

SCHEDULE:

I RCCOMMENDATIDNS:

[

CHANGE RECOMMENDED.

CDMMEl-JTS/ JU~:iT Ir:* I Cr::*, TI ON FOi'.\\: NO:-*i*.. *CDl'ffOF~MANCE ~

JJE::LTA T WIU_ BE Dif:lF'L.AYCD Di"*I THE CDMPUTEJ~.

L

[.

I

~.

I

• ,;-**~.

S A l C M N U C l E A R G E N E R A T I N G S T A T I 0 N HUMAN E~GINEERING OBSE~VATIDN/DISCREPANCY REVIEWER~

VENTERS l'lO ::

/'49 COMPONENT IDENTIFIER CC*-*2 j

PZR/RCS PRESSURE INDICATIONS Pl-455A, PI-456, PI-457 PI-474~ PI:405, PI-403

r.

\\

~)ECTIDr*i CODE~

GU I DEL HlE NO:

DESCRIPTION OF DISCREPANCY~

ALL PRESSURE INDICATIONS CANNOT ACCURATELY DISPLAY VALUES AS REQUESTED IN EDP

~)TEPS.

HED CATEGORY CODE:

L.E:.Vi.~L::

i RECOMMENDATIONS~

r I

I i \\...

I I

CDr1MEl'1T~;/ JUST Ii:* I CA *r I Ui'l FOi:~,,f[il\\f.... CDl'iFDF~MAi'1CE ~

THIS HED HAS BEEN DELETED.

OPCRATORS HAVE NARROW RANGE INDICATIONS AVAILABLE TD THEM WHICH CAN ACCURATELY DISPLAY THE VALUES REQUESTED

G A L E M N U C l E A k G E N E R A T I N G S T A T I 0 N HUMAN ENGINEERING DBSE~VATION/DISCREPANCY RCVIEWER~

VENTERS DATE~

0:i./l5/87

~-10~

F'Al-iEL I DE!'-JT IF I EF~

COMPONENT IDENTIFIER

~

NA LETDOWN FLOW INDICATION i :

---

~--------------

SECT I 01-.J CODE~

wor~l<SF'ACE~

GUIDE:LHIE NO:

DESCRIPTION OF DISCREPANCY:

op STEPS REQUEST DETERMINATION OF LETDOWN FLOW.

THERE IS NO ACTUAL LETDOWN rLOW INDICATION AVAILABLE.

\\.

HED CATEGORY CODE~

LEVEL:

SCHEDULE~

F~i:COMMLNDAT I m~s ::

' COMMENTS/JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-CONFORMANCE:

!. THIS HED HAS BEEN DELETED.

OPERATORS USE A VARIETY OF OTHER INSTRUMENTS

~DR DEMAND INDICATION.

S A L E M G E N E R A T I N G STATIOr*f HUMAN ENGlNEERING ODGERVATION/DISCREPANCY REVIEWER:

VENTlRB DATE~

0:l./1!:i/87 i'ID::

PANEL IDl:~NTIFIER COMPONENT IDENTIFIER f:;:P-**4 21-24 BF22 FDWTR INLET STOP/CHECK VALVE SECTIOl'f CODE~

wm~KSPACE:

GUIDELHIE l*W~

DESCRIPTION OF DISCREPANCY:

THE LOCATION OF THE 21-24 BF22 FEEDWATER INLET STOP/CHECK VALVE CONTROLS ON RP~4 DEVIATES FROM NORMAL CONTROL GROUPING CONVENTION AS ALL OTHER RELATED I&C rs LOCATED ON CC-2.

HED CATEGORY CODE; 4 LEVEL.~

SCHEDULE:

RECOMMENDATIONS:

NO CHANGE RECOMMCNDED.

COMMENTS/ JUSTir*rcr~)TIDl\\i FOf~ r-101*~**-Cm-irmmr:)f'*ICC:

THE ST?-1 C1~1-~ EA~3H.Y F:E1~CH MfO UTJ:u:zr. THESC COMPOl,IEl'HS..