ML18065A942

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Forwards Addl Info Per 960531 Request Re Rept Entitled Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical & Electrical in Operating Reactors,Usi A-46, in Response to GL 87-02
ML18065A942
Person / Time
Site: Palisades Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 09/27/1996
From: Bordine T
CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
REF-GTECI-A-46, REF-GTECI-SC, TASK-A-46, TASK-OR GL-87-02, GL-87-2, NUDOCS 9610070125
Download: ML18065A942 (81)


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consumers Power l'OWUUN&

MIClll&All-S l'IUllillDS Palisades Nuclear Plant: 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway, Covert, Ml 49043 September 27, 1996

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U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 DOCKET 50-255 - LICENSE DPR;.20 - PALISADES PLANT Thomas C. Bordlne Manager, Licensing REPORT OF SQUG ASSESSMENT AT THE PALISADES PLANT FOR THE RESOLUTION OF USI A-46 SUBMITTAL.- REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION On May 23, 1995, Consumers Power Company (CPCo) submitted the summary report in response to Generic Letter 87-02, "Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46."

On May 31, 1996, a request for additional information was received. This letter provides the requested information. The original request for additional information required a response by 60 days from the date of the NRC letter; however, due to the complexity of the questions, an extension of the response due date to September 30, 1996 was granted by the NRC Project Manager, Robert G Schaaf, per telephone conve~sation with Dale Engle of Consumers Power Company on July 11, 1996.


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The attachment to this letter lists each individual request for information and provides the Consumers Power Company response.

960927 '.\\.]

9610070125 05000255 '

PDR ADOCK PDR l, __

8~J. C'lHTS.

A CMS' ENERGY COMPANY

SUMMARY

OF COMMITMENTS This letter contains one new commitment and that commitment is as follows:

CPCo will disposition all USI A-46 outliers at Palisades before the end of the second refueling outage following the receipt of a Palisades-specific Safety Evaluation Report (SER) that approves the use of GIP-2 methodology for resolution of USI A-46 at Palisades.

Thomas C. Berdine Manager, Licensing CC Administrator, Region Ill, USNRC Project Manager, NRR, USNRC NRC Resident Inspector - Palisades Attachment 2

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ATTACHMENT CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY PALISADES PLANT DOCKET 50-255 Response to Request for Additional Information

. (NRC Letter dated May 31, 1996)

  • on the Resolution of Unresolved Safety _Issue A-46.
  • PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT RESPONSE TO USI A-46

-REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NRC letter dated May 31, 1996, requested additional information in respect to the Consumers Power Company's May 23, 1995 response to Generic Letter 87-02. Below is each request for additional information ~nd the Consumers Power Company.

response.

Question

1.

In the proposed resolution for outliers provided in Table 9-1 of the summary report, the lengths of the cantilever impeller shafts of service water pumps P-7 A, P-78, and P-7C are indicated as 37 feet. The effects resulting frorr1 the exceedance of this impeller shaft length beyond the upper boun<::f"length of 20 feet was not addressed. Provide resolution for the potential misalignment and bearing damage due to excessive lateral loads, and damage to the impeller due

  • to excessive deflection of the impeller drive shaft.

Response

The pump casings are supported by two braces at elevation 583'. The shaft is also horizontally suppprted internally by rubber bearings approximately every 5 feet on center. An analysis fo check the casing and shaft stresses, and the bearing loads for seismic inertial effects will be performed to resolve the outlier.

  • A schedule for resolution of outliers is provided in response to Question 6 of this letter.

Question

2.

In the proposed resolution for outliers provided in Table 9-1, we agree that tightening of U-bolts on the wall brackets of jacket water surge tanks T-13A and T-138 might indeed enhance restraint on the tanks in the vertical and transverse directions: However, we don't believe that the proposed fix provides a positive longitudinal load path. Provide a discussion on the ad~quacy of the alternate approach for resolving the issue.

Response

The ~alculation for T-13A&B is provided as Enclosure 1, which is performed for outlier resolution based on frame action by allowing yielding of the brackets near the top bolt. The calculation is based on peak spectra acceleration of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.60 Floor Response Spectra (FRS) with Soils Structures Interaction (SSI). Two issues have not been addressed in the previous calculation. One issue is pipe flexibility of the attached piping due to

2 fixed-end elastic + plastic deformation and the second issue is "tightness" of the U-bolts. CPCo will to check the flexibility of the piping going to the diesel generator to determine if it can accommodate the displacement demand. An engineering evaluation will establish the tension in the U-bolts to demonstrate that the shear friction resistance is greater than the seismic demand.

The alternative is to provide a design modification which would add braces to the angle frame and longitudinal restraint between the tank and the angle frame.

Question

3.

Describe the extent to which the seismic margin methodology in the EPRI NP-6041 procedure was used in the Palisades A-46 program, including resolution of outliers. Since this methodology is generally not acceptable for the A-46 program, provide justification for deviation from the GIP-2 guidelines in situations whe~e the margin methodology is utilized.

Response

The seismic margin methodology in the EPRI NP-6041 procedure was not used in the A-46 program exclusive of outlier resolution, thus there was no deviation from the Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP-2) guidelines. The seismic margin methodology was only used in resolving two outliers, T-2 and T-58..

These two tanks are flat bottom vertical tanks. Justification is provided in Question 15 of this response.

. Question

4.

For plant structures containing equipment in the US/ A-46 scope:

a.

Identify structures which have licensing-basis floor response spectra (5%

critical damping) for elevations within 40-feet above effective grade which are higher in amplitude than 1.5 times the SQUG Bounding Spectrum.

B.

Provide response spectra, designated according to height above effective grade as identified in Item 4.a. above, and a comparison to 1.5 times the Boundi(lg_ Spectrum.

C.

  • With respect to the comparison of equipment seismic capacity to seismic demand, indicate which method (Method A or Method Bin Table 4-1 of GIP-2) was used to address the seismic adequacy of equipment installed on those floors as identified in Item 4.a. above.

3

Response

Question 4 relates to the use of 1.5 times the plant Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) ground response spectra as a realistic estimate of seismic demand under certain limited conditions as specified in the GIP. It is Consumers Power Company's understanding that the NRC Staff and representatives of the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) are jointly seeking resolution of this issue.

Accordingly, response to these questions are being deferred pending this resolution. It is Consumers Power Company's position that the GIP has been approved by the NRC Staff in Supplementary Safety Evaluation Report No. 2 (SSER #2) dated May 22, 1992, as an acceptable* method of demonstrating the

. seismic adequacy of equipment within its scope. This new methodology differs from that used in licensing the Palisades Plant. Accordingly, it is impossible to meaningfully compare isolated aspects of the two methodologies including their relative conservatisms; any such comparison must be made at the program level to evaluate compliance with appropriate NRC regulations concerning seismic adequacy.

Question

5.
  • Provide a comparison of demand and capacity response spectra at the top floor and ground elevations for the reactor and auxiliary buildings. This is to ensure a complete enveloping of the licensing:.basis response spectra by the GIP spectra.

Response

. See response to. question 4.

Question

6.

Provide resolution schedules for the outliers shown in Table 9-1 for which schedules were not provided. Provide an assessment of the impact on plant safety in consideration of the proposed schedules.

Response

The resolution of those outliers which have not yet been resolved will be scheduled after we receive a Pafisades.plan't.:.spedfic Safety Evaluation Report (SER) which approves the methodology described in the GIP-2 for resolution of USI A-46 at Palisades. That schedule will ensure those outliers will be resolved before the end of the second refueling outage following receipt of that SER

4 Per the GIP Part 1 S-ection 2.2.5, if a component fails to meet the GIP screening criteria, that component is considered an outlier. This, of itself, does not mean that the plant is not meeting its licensing basis. Each outlier was evaluated to determine if existing regulatory requirements applicable to Palisades are being met. Therefore, since our evaluation found that those outliers do not cause the licensing basis to be violated, they have no significant impact on plant safety.

Question

7.

Provide a copy of the Peer Review Letter, referred to as Reference 20 in the submittal; and provide the peer reviewer's bases for concluding that the licensee's walkdowns have beenperformed in accordance with the plant walkdown procedure and have revealed equipment as-built configurations.

Response

The peer review letter is provided as Enclosure 2 of this letter.. The basis for the peer reviewers' conclusion is contained in Part I, Section 2.2. 7 of the GIP and the corresponding section of SSER #2. The Peer Reviewers (Third Party Auditors) have attended.the SQUG developed training course ori seismic adequacy verification and, in general, have very broad experience within the industry. The Peer Review Team for Palisades has extensive industry experience, including the chairman of the Senior Seismic Review & Advisory Panel (SSRAP).

Question

8.

Provide an explanation for why the accelerations of the reactor_buildin_g shell at elevations 646.25' and 683. 75' are lower than that at elevation 608. 75' (figs. B-6, B-7 and B-8), and foi why the acceleration of the auxiliary building at elevation 601.0' is lower than that at elevation 590.0' (Figs. B-10 and B-11).*

Response

The floor response spectra (FRS) is verified to be the same as the original response spectra from Bechtel (the original ArchitecUEngineer for the Palisades

__ Plant) June 1969 for th_e,A.uxiliary" and Reactor Build_ing.

The following discussion is based on 5% damping for all Response Spectra (RS).

For the Reactor Shell, the FRS has higher peak spectral values at elevation 608. 75' than at elevation 646.25' and 683. 75' but they are in different modes (see table below). The FRS at elevations 646.25' and 683.75' peak in the first

mode (1.94Hz) and RS at 608.75' peaks in the second mode (5.52Hz).

Considering the higher demand in the ground response spectra in the second mode compared to the first mode spectral acceleration, the higher modal response at elevation 608.75' of the second mode compared to the first mode responses at elevation 646.25' and 683.75' is plausible.

Elevation 1st mode 2nd mode RS at 1st RS at 2nd shape shape mode mode 590' 0.098 1.000 608.75' 0.188 0.881 0.6g.

1.28g 646.25' 0.375 0.581 0.8g 0.68g 683.75' 0.571 0.225 1.14g 0.55g 721.25' 0.769

-0.165 765

1.000

-0.629 5

For the Auxiliary Building, the FRS at elevation 590' and 601' are essentially equal. The differences in amplitude are less than about 5%. Since the responses are based on soil springs and composite modal damping was used to account for differences in soil modes and structural *modes, small differences in amplitude response is attributed to this effect. These spectra represent the

. licensing basis for the Palisades Plant.

Question 9*.

Section 4.1.3, Anchorage Adequacy, states that all significantly sized equipment was analyzed using the ANCHOR software package developed by Stevenson Associates. Provide a. list of such equipment (if they are contained in the existing.

lists in the report, identify them) and a sample calculation indicating the input parameters, assumptions and other pertinent information together with the.

output.

Response

A total of 88 equipment anchorages were analyzed using the ANCHOR software package developed by Stevenson & Associates (S&A). They are listed in the following table.

6 Class ID Description 1

EB-01 480 VOLT MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 1

EB-02 480 VOLT MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 1

EB-07 480 VOLT MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 1

EB-08 480 VOLT MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 1

EB-21 480 VOLT MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 1

EB-22 480 VOLT MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 1

EB-23 480 VOLT MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 1

EB-24 480 VOLT MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 1.

EB-25 480 VOLT MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 1

EB-26 480 VOLT MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 2

EB-11 480 VOLT LOAD CENTER 2 '

EB-12 480 VOLT LOAD CENTER 2

EB-15 480 VOLT LOAD CENTER 2

EB-16 480 VOLT LOAD CENTER 2

EB-19 480 VOLT LOAD CENTER 2

EB-20 480VOLTLOADCENTER 3

EA-11 2400 VOLT BUS 1 C 3

  • EA-12 2400 VOLT BUS 1 D 4

EX-11 2400/480 VOLT TRANSFORMER 4

EX-12 2400/480 VOLT TRANSFORMER 4

EX-15 2400/480 VOLT TRANSFORMER 4

EX-16 2400/480 VOLT TRANSFORMER 4

EX-19 2400/480 VOLT TRANSFORMER 4

EX-20 2400/480 VOLT TRANSFORMER 4

EX-63 CONTROL ROD CLUTCH TRANSFORMER 4

EX-64 CONTROL ROD CLUTCH TRANSFORMER

.4 EX-66 DG-1/2 EXHAUSTER TRANSFORMER 4

EX-67 DG-1/1 EXHAUSTER TRANSFORMER 5

P-55B CHARGING PUMP "B" 5

P-55C CHARGING PUMP "C" 5

P-56B BORIC ACID PUMP.

9 V-24A DG 1-1 VENT FAN.

9 V-24B DG 1-1 VENT FAN 7

9 V-24C DG 1-2 VENT FAN 9

V-24D DG 1-2 VENT FAN 9

V-95 CONTROL ROOM VENT. FAN 9

V-96 CONTROL ROOM VENT. FAN 10 VHX-27A ESR COOLING COIL 10 VHX-27B ESR COOLING COIL 11 VC-10 CONTROL ROOM CONDENSING UNIT 14 ED-10 125 V DC BUS 14 ED-11 125 V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL 14 ED-11A 125 V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL 14 ED-20 125 V DC BUS 14 ED-21 125 V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL 14 ED-21A 125 V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL 14 EY-10 120 V AC PANEL #1 14 EY-20 120 V AC PANEL #2 14 EY-30 120 V AC PANEL #3 14 EY-40 120 V AC PANEL #4 15 ED-01 MAIN STATION BATIERIES 15 ED-02 MAIN STATION BATIERIES 16 ED-06 AC INVERTER #1 16 ED-07 AC INVERTER #2 16 ED-08 AC INVERTER #3 16 ED-09 AC INVERTER #4 16 ED-15 DC CHARGER #1 16 ED-16 DC CHARGER #2 16 ED-17 DC CHARGER #3 16 ED-18 DC CHARGER #4 17 K-6A DIESEL GENERATOR 1-1.

17 K-6B DIESEL GENERATOR 1-2 20 EC-04 RELAY & STATION AUXILIARY CONTROL 20 EC-06 REACTOR PROTECTIVE SYSTEM CONTROL

8 20 EC-11 RADIATION TURBINE CONTROL 20 EC-12 PRIMARY PROCESS &

INSTRUMENTATION 20 EC-126 CIRC. WATER & IODINE CONTROL 20 EC-13 OBA SHUTDOWN & MISC. CONTROL 20 EC-150 AUX. HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL 20 EC-168 POST ACCIDENT SAMPLE MONITORING 20 EC-17 P-55A SPEED CONTROL 20 EC-182 ATMOSPHERIC STEAM DUMP PA 20 EC-187 AUX FEEDWATER CONTROL 20 EC-188A DAMPER CONTROL 20 EC-22 DG-1/1 CONTROL PANEL 20 EC-26 DG-1/2 CONTROL PANEL 20 EC-33 REDUNDANT SAFETY INJECTION CONTROL 20 ED-13 METERING SECTION DC BUSS 20 ED-23 METERING SECTION DC BUS 20 EJ-1005 AUX FEEDWATER RELAY CONTROL 20 EJ-1006 AUX. FEEDWATER RELAY CONTROL 20 EJ-1051 AUX FEEDWATER CONTROLS 20 EJ-1052 AUX. FEEDWATER RELAY CONTROLS 20 EJ-541 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION RELAYS 20 EJ-9400 BUS 1-C UNDER VOLTAGE RELAYS 20 EJ-9401 BUS 1-D UNDERVOLTAGE RELAYS 20 EJL-258 ED-01 FUSE BOX 20 EJL-423 72-01 BREAKER BOX Screenin.g Evaluation Work Sheets (SEWS) for equipment EB-01, EB-26 and P-55C are provided as Enclosure 3, which include the input parameters, assum-ptions and other pertinent information together with the output. For a discussion regarding the validity of the ANCHOR software package methodology, please refer to the USN RC assessment of the software package discussed in SSER#2. 1 1 "Supplemental Safety Evaluation No.2 (SSER #2) on GIP-2," NRC Washington, D.C., May 22, 1992.

9 Question

10.

It appears from your discussion in Section 4. 1. 3 that on/y expansion anchors are used and all the anchors for safety related equipment have been inspected. If this is the case, indicate the number of anchors inspected. Otherwise, indicate your criteria for selective inspection.

Response

. Safety-related equipment is not only anchored by expansion anchors, it is also anchored by cast-in-place anchors, grouted-in-place anchors, J-bolts, and welds to embedded steel o.r exposed* steel. All anchors are inspected as part of the walkdown. Concrete expansion anchors require bolt tightness checking. All accessible expansion anchors were tightness checked, except:

1.

Those declared as outliers pending results of tightening checks

2.

Those qualified by "tug test"

3.

Those installed post-1980 under QA/QC verification procedures for which tightness documentation already exists Question

11.

In section 4. 1. 3 on page 4-~, at about the middle of the page, it is indicated that tightness checks and embedment checks will be documented in a separate report. Are these checks completed? If so, provide the report. Otherwise, indicate the planned dates for completion and submittal of the repo.rt.

Response

Bolt tightness checks have been completed with no anomalies identified. A report specific to the bolt tightness check has not been prepared, however,

.these outliers will be addressed in the final report documenting outlier resolution for the A-46 program.

10

-Question

12.

On page 4-6, the formulae for pullout capacity and shear capacity are given, with various reduction factors for each. Provide an example.for each case where the formulae are used: *

Response

See Enclosure *3, which provides SEWS for equipment EB-01, EB-26 and

. P-SSC. The SEWS provided examples where the formulae are used. The reduction factors are used in accordancewith the provisions of Appendix C of.

the GIP-2.

Question 13..

  • On page 4-7 of section 4.2, Outlier Resolutidn, a general discussion on how to resolve an outlier was presented. Provide a specific example of an outlier *.
  • resolution.

Response:.

LARGOS is provided as Enclosure 4 as a'n example of outlier resolution for a.

raceway.(equipment class 22).

Question

14. *. In sectio.n6.1 Evaluation Methqdology, most statements are verbatim repetitions of what is stated in Section 7.2 of the GIP It is indicated that 19 tanks and heat. *.

exchangers were evaluated (Table 6-1 shows only 13) and 12 tanks and heat exchangers were declared outliers. How many tanks and exchangers are:fhere in the safe-shutdowm path at Palisades? How many tanks are verticai?' How many are horizontal? Are any of the vertical tanks supported on skirts and structural legs?

Response

The naming convention of "A&B" means the A tank and the B tank are two

  • inaiviauananks*-or identical desi~fn-arid location.-* FofF-54A&B, E-60A&B,-

T-13A&B, T-25A&B and T-53A&B in Table 6.1, two tanks are each accounted for, and T-31A-D accounts for 4 tanks in Palisades Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL). A total of 19 items are listed in table 6.1 and *were evaluated.

11 No.

ID Description Type Results 1

E-54A&B CCW Heat Piggyback Outlier (2): Anchorage (J-bolts) do Exchanger Horizontal not have sufficient embedment Heat

(<16 diameters) per the GIP.

Exchanger 2

E-56 Regenerative Vertical Wall Meets Design Ba$iS in Accordance Heat mounted with GIP Section 7 Rules

  • Exchanger Heat Exchanoer 3

E-60A&B Shutdown Piggyback Outlier (2): Anchorage capacity is Cooling Heat Horizontal exceeded.

Exchanger Heat Exchanger 4

T-10 Diesel Fuel Horizontal Outlier (1) due to tank not covered Oil Storage Buried by the GIP but analysis shows that Tank Storage tank meets Design Basis.

Tank 5-T-13A&B Diesel Jacket Horizontal Outlier (2) due to anchorage and Water Storage strap restraints. Straps need to be Expansion Tank tightened to preclude longitudinal Tank travel of tank.

6 T-2 Condensate.

Vertical Flat.

  • outlier (1) due to ring type Storage Tank Bottom Tank foundation. Meets design basis with a CDFM HCLPF of 0.30g.

Analysis documented on CPCo Cale. EA-0007899-T2.

  • 7 T-25A&B Diesel Fuel Tank on Meets Design Basis in Accordance Oil Day Tanks Legs with GIP Section 7 Rules 8

T-31A-D Diesel Air Vertical Floor *Meets Design Basis in Accordance Start Tanks Mounted with GIP Section 7 Rules. T-31 D Tanks has gapped anchorage, but still has sufficient anchorage capacity.

T-31 D is still declared as an Outlier (1).

12 9

T-53A&B Boric Acid Tank on

  • Outlier (2): Anchorage capacity Tanks Legs exceeded using grouted-in-place tensile capacity of~ 0% of cast-in-place anchors 10 T-58 Safety Vertical Flat Anchorage details are not well Injection &

Bottom Tank documented. Declared Out!.ier (1 ).

Refueling Analyzed as an unanchoredLtank Water Tanks which resulted in a CDFM PGA HCLPF of 0.21 g with respect to RG 1.60 ground motion (0.20g PGA).

Analysis documented on CPCd Cale. EA-0007899-T58 11 T-73 quench tank Horizontal Meets Design Basis in Accordance Storage with GIP Section 7 Rules Tank As shown above, 12 tanks and heat exchangers were declared outliers.

type of Tank Number of ID Tanks Vertical Flat Bottom Tank 2

T-2 and T-58 Tank on Legs 4

T-25A&B and T-53A&B Vertical Floor or Wall Mounted 5

T-31A-D and E-56 Tank and Heat Exchanger Horizontal Tank and Heat 8

  • E-54A&B, E-60,A&B, T-13A&B, T-Exchanger 10 and T-73 Question
15.

Provide a sample evaluation for each type of vertical tank (flat bottom and supported on shirts and structural legs, if any) and horizontal tank, indicating the major simplying assumptions made in the analyses. Even though GIP-2 indicates thafbackling *is only to be evaluated for vertical tanks, was the - --

possibility of buckling in horizontal tanks.evaluated? The evaluation of anchors which restrain tank movement should also be provided.

It is noted that you have used the EPRI Report NP-6041-SL guidelines in evaluating the flat bottom vertical tanks, which is known to render results with

13 lower margins of safety than those obtained using the GIP-2 guidelines. Provide justification for deviation from the GIP-2 guidelines.

Response

Sample evaluations of the following tanks and heat exchangers are provided as :

Type of Tank and Heat ID Major Simplifying Assumption Exchanger Vertical Flat Bottom Tank T-58 The steel reinforcement exceeds the minimum required per ACI 318-71 per Grade 40 steel for a 1 O" slab (0.0020 reinforcement ratio)

Tank on Legs T-

1) Boundary conditions of the legs are 53A&B fixed at top and.simple supported at bottom.
2) Cross bracing has no compression
  • strenoth or stiffness.

Horizontal PiggybackHeat E-Boundary conditions of the saddles are Exchanger 60A&B fixed at interaction between heat exchanger and saddles and simple supported between the saddles and the floor which is the same simplifying assumption made by GIP-2.

Horizontal Tank T.:73 Boundary conditions of the saddles are fixed at top and simple supported at bottom which is the same simplifying assumption made by GIP-2.

No buckling in horizontal tanks was evaluated. Anchorage evaluations are performed on all tanks arid are included in the* sample evaluations. *-

Seismic margin methodology was used for two vertical, flat bottom tanks at Palisades: T-2 and T-58. The two tanks were already declared outliers by the GIP-2 method. The Conservative'Deterministic Failure Margin (CDFM) method in Appendix H of EPRI Report NP-6041 is similar to the GIP method. The

differences between the methods are listed below in approximate order of importance:

Appendix H relies on CDFM bolt and bolt chair capacities that may include credit for post elastic behavior, 14 Appendix H uses a 0.90 knockdown factor on elephant foot buckling while GIP-2 uses a 0. 72 factor, Appendix H credits fluid hold down effects, GIP-2 does not (this was not used for T-58 tank),

Appendix H uses 5% damping for impulsive mode response, GIP-2 uses 4% damping. (For the T-2 tank, 4% damping was used and for T-58 a 5%

damped floor spectrum based on RG 1.60 input was used.

The two methods (Conservativ(3 Deterministic Failure Margin v.s. the GIP method) have been compared to one another and are presented on*page X-9 of the EPRI Add-on Seismic* IPE Training Course. It is shown that the A-46 GIP-2 method yields approximately 75% of the CDFM Appendix H capacity~ It is reasonable, therefore, to use the Ap.pendix H methodology, understanding the differences between Appendix Hand the GIP-2 method.

Note that the safety factor of 1.5 for bolt pullout allowable based on ACI shear cone theory as used in the GIP-2 guidelines was not applied in the following tank and heat exchanger calculations:

1.

E-60A&B and T-2; however, there is no alteration of any conclusion of Palisades A-46 program because the pullout of bolt is not controlled by shear cone capacity.

2.

T-53A&B remains an outlier whether or not the 1.5 reduction factor is applied.

Question

16.

Indicate the criteria used in selecting.12 hanger supports for limited analytical

. revie_lll{ {LAR) _a§ lis_ted in Table 7-1.. _

Response

As stated in Section 8.2 of GIP-2, the walkdown is conducted to select representative, worst-case samples of supports for the limited analytical reviews

15 (LAR). This is based on the judgment of the Seismic Review Team (SRT) engineers to select the largest (heaviest) loaded hangers which encompass the diversity of the plant's support systems. This is performed after the entire plant is walked down so that the basis to categorize support types as representative, and then to choose the worst-case of that type can be accomplished: By reviewing the Plant Area Summary Sheets (PASS), it was determined that the 12 LARs chosen were in fact representative of the types observed throughout the plant.

Question

17.

Provide the sample analysis or resolution for the hangers listed as LARs No.

005, 007 and No. 012 in Table 7-1.

Response:.

The Stevenson & Associates Calculations of LARs No. 005, 007, and 012 are provided as Enclosure 6.

Question

18.

Provide an explanation of the critical interaction values, specifically how the various values in Table 7-2 are established and how they are used.

Response

The interaction ratio is the demand stress (or load) divided by the capacity, so a factor less than 1.0 is acceptable. The interaction ratios are calculated for each LAR check required; that is, dea_d load, vertical capacity, and lateral load.

  • Question
19.

Section 8. 2 indicates that because cinch anchors may have been used, a tightness check will be scheduled to determine the installation quality of these anchors. Please indicate whether the tightness check has been performed. If not, when will it be done?

Response

Bolt tightness checks have been completed with no anomalies identified.

I

ENCLOSURE 1 CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY PALISADES PLANT DOCKET 50-255 DOCKET 72-7 ANCHORAGE ANALYSIS OF T-13 A&B

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ENCLOSURE 2 CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY PALISADES PLANT DOCKET 50-255 DOCKET 72-7 PEER REVIEW LETTER

Stevenson & Associates A structural-mechanical consulting engineering firm June 22, 1995 Robert White Dale Engle Consumers Power Company Palisades Nuclear Power Plant 27750 Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert, Michigan 49043

Subject:

Palisades IPEEE and A-46 Peer Review Gentlemen:

JO State Srreer. Wohurn. Mus.wchmerrs 0180/

Tel 617 932 951!0 Fax 617 933 +428 BOSTON*CLLVELAND 92C2750-LSC-105 Please let this letter serve as a report on the peer review walkdown for the A-46 (SQUG) and IPEEE evaluation of the Palisades Nuclear Plant (PNP). The peer review plant walkdown was conducted by Ors. R.

  • P. Kennedy and J. D. Stevenson on March 3, 1995. Walkdowns were conducted before the Screening Evaluation Worksheets (SEWS) and othCI' evaluation documentation were reviewed. A sampling of SEWS were subsequently reviewed and generally found to be in good order. The SIR.wr tank analysis was explicitly reviewed and found to be acceptable. General and specific comments on the walkdowns and the SEWS reviewed are provided below.

Accessible areas of the plant were reviewed. Areas which were inaccessible due to radiological concerns were the Containment, and a few areas in the Auxiliary building in the radiologically controlled area. As such, the majority of the Auxiliary building, Twbine and Intake structure, and the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump room were visited.

The A46 (SQUG) and IPEEE walkdown bas been conducted in a competent manner and results are in accordance with the guidance of the Generic Implementation Plan (GIP) and NP-6041 documentation. The.

vast majority of the findings noted in this letter were already found and documented by the walkdo\\vn team, so the peer reviewers believe this walkdown to have been conducted in a thorough and professional manner.

The Palisacles plant bas been found to be in good condition with respect to seismic ruggedness owing to good

  • original design and modifications made to meet the requirements of the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP), information bulletins and notice5 during the past fifteen years.

During the peer review walkdowns a number of observations were made for the consideration of the A-46

_and ~EEE seismic capability engineers (SCE). Some general conditions were noted:

- Leaded Cinch anchors may ~

been used for some equipment anchorages including some of the rotating mechanical pumps. Some of the documentation is contradictory so it conservative to assume the unknown anchor types are leaded Cinch type anchorages. Although they are considered outliers by the GIP since the GIP does not include this anchorage type, they do have an established capacity based on a testing prog131D-conducted at the Savannah River Site1* The Table 1 data. in the 1 Lead Expansion Anchor Load Capacitv in Reactor Buildings at the Savannah River Site, E. L. Bryant, Westinghouse Savannah River Company, RTR-2661, August 15, 1989.

SA referenced document provides new recommended allowable loads from the testing results based on the mean divided by 4.0. Dr. Kennedy suggested using the 98th percentile non-exceedance probability value divided by 1.5. With the exception of 3/8" diameter bolts, which are not found at Palisades, the allowables recommended in Table 1 are less than factored 98th percentile non-excecdance value; therefore, the Table l.allowables were used at Palisades. The use of these data is predicated on tightness checking having been performed on all anchors to ensure they are still capable. If they are loose. they must be discounted completely. For purposes of an operability assessment only, if the bolts arc found loose they can still be used to resist shear load, but not tensile (pullout) load. The peer reviewer.; d~ recommend that loose anchors be replaced at the next reasonable opportunity such as a refueling outage.

- The Auxiliary and Turbirie buildings are in contact with one another at discrete column locations at Elevation 625' along the control room wall. The concern is not so much with change in overall structural response since the Turbine building mass at that elevation is significantly smaller than the Auxiliary building, but rather with the potential for localized impact loads that could be generated in the main control room immediately adjacent to this column line. In the judgment of the seismic review team, this is estimated to have a small effect based on similar studies performed previously for another plant. The peer reviewers adjudge the building impact potential as not posing a credible risk to operability of relays in the contrnl room panels at Palisades.

A-46 and fPEEE Related Comments Comments pertaining to specific equipmenfreviewed during the peer reviewers' plant walkdown are provided below:

Auxiliarv Feedwarer Pump Room No issues were noted with the motor dri\\'en fcedwatcr pump (P-8A). However. the steam turbine driven feedwater pump (P-8B) has anchors within about. only 1 diameter. of the edge (measured from the centerline of the bolt). The pumps have a low center of gravity so that the overturning moment, even with consideration of nozzle loads. does not overcome the restoring moment thus no tensile load is developed. For shear load, the anchor analysis discounts one side of the bolting to preclude the bolt forces directed toward the free edge from "breaking out". As such. the other side of the bolting is talcing all of the shear and the load is directed into the supporting pad. To accomplish this load trnnsfcr. the steel skid is in tension on this side. so the peer reviewers brought up the issue of"tearing" of the steel skid since the amount of steel (shear area) to take this tensile force is limited due to the small steel edge distance. The SRT will evaluate the steel skid for this local shear st~ess effect.

Intake Structure The service water pumps (P-7A.8.C) may be anchored with Cinch type anchors. The *puin.ps are -*

braced with tfilti-Kwik bolts which are capable of resisting the overturning moment. so that the base plate anchors need only take shear load. TI1c peer re,*iewers recommended that the bolts be tightness checked and if found loose be counted on only for shear capacity. Although. this is reasonable as an operability argument the peer reviewers recommend replacement of any anchors that are ultimately found loose for long term operation.

The diesel fire pump driver (K-10) was obser\\'ed to have one of its anchor bolts in an oversized hole with no washer. The anchorage analysis should completely discount this anchor in the anchorage evaluation.

The fire pump batteries (ED-36. & -38 AIB CID) were found to lack spacers between batteries and

  • the wooden battery rack cover is unrestrained making this equipment an outlier.

Auriliarv Building All accessible areas of the Auxiliary building were reviewed including the control room, cable spreading room, diesel generator-switchgear rooms and the roof where the SIR wr is located.

Diesel Generator-Switchgear Rooms No issues were found with any equipment in this area. Much of the equipment had been re-anchored in 1980 as part of the response to the SEP project effort. External evidence of added-on base anchorage and/or top braces could be seen on the 2.4 kV buses, diesel generator skids and day.tanks. Masonry block walls had been upgraded in response to the Inspection-Enforcement Bulletin (IEB) 80-11. The jacket water surge tanks (T-13 A&B)*

were identified by the SRT to be outliers becauJ)e there is potential for the tanks. to slip horizontally because they are horizontal tanks strapped in by U-bolts. The peer reviewers suggested that with some tightening of the U-bolts to assure they are not loose the tanks would be secure so that "slipping" longillldinally would be precluded.

Cable Spreading Room and Batteries No issues were found with any equipment. Much* of the equipment had been re-anchored in 1980.. as part of the response to the S~P project effort. External evidence of added-on base angles and top braces could be seen on the distribution panels and MCCs. The batteries were properly installed and the anchors did not appear to be Cinch type anchors as some documentation stated. Masonry block watts had been upgraded in response to the

  • IEB 80-11. The Instrun:ient AC Bu~ Transfer Switch Panel (EY-50) was.identified by the*

SRT as an* outlier because it is. in close p~oximity to ED-16 and there exists a potential for impact. The peer reviewers suggested that the approximate gap of 3/8" may suffice to preclude impact. The SRT agreed to calculate the actual displacement value.

SA S::ifetv Injection and Refueling W::iter T::ink (SIR WT)

The SIR WT is anchored by 52 cast-in-place J-bolts of 10" depth. The J-bolts' embcdment does not exceed the concrete pad thickness, and it is unclear b::ised on the documentation if the p::id has reinforcement or is doweled (or otherwise secured) to the roof of the Auxiliary building. Given this uncertainty, it was decided to analyze the tank as unanchored and rely on the water's hold-down force only, thus totally (and conservatively) discounting the anchorage's capacity. This analysis is being reviewed by the peer reviewers. Given that the tank is being evaluated as unanchored., the vertical uplift of the tank would be an issue for attached piping. In the case of the SIRWT, the drain line is more than 6' inset for the outside radius of the tank and the efTective length. l. of the b::ise plate that will lift is calculated to be XX which is less than 6 ', so this is not an issue. Near the top of the tank.

the flange of a duct support adjacent to the tank is within about l" of the tank shell. Even if the tank moves into the support fl::inge. the tank shell would most likely bulge inward and not be punctured. Even it punctured. the hole would be at the top of the tank where little loss of content inventory would take place. As a result, this interaction was adjudged

  • as acceptable.

The peer reviewers identified a vent stack adjacent to the Containment which is an interaction hazard for the SIRWT ifit were to collapse. The SRT agreed to evaluate the structural integrity pf the vent stack.

Main Control Room "Seismic housekeeping" was found to be an issue throughout the control room. Lack of restraint of carts, anchorage of tables and similar components were noted in the control room. This needs to be addressed in some fashion so that these items are not seismic interaction hazards to the control panels in the. room. A reference table was seen next to control panel EC-04. A computer (instmment) stand was seen between EC-108 and EC-126. The control room gallery wall (adjacent to EC-13) and an internal wall*(adjacent to

  • . EC-1 lA) should be checked to ensure the top of each wall is strapped or secured in some manner to the slab above. Most of these issues. with the exception of the gallery wall integrity, were identified by the Seismic Review Team (SRT); ho\\vever. the peer reviewers
  • cited the aluminum diffusers in the suspended control room ceiling which they considered a personnel hazard and. thus. an outlier issue. The SRT had seen the diffusers, but had not chosen to declare this as an outlier issue.

EC-14 was not tied (bolted) to.EC-06. which was.noted by the SRT.

The rod hung ducting behind EC-04; -06 and -126 was adjudged not to pose a credible -

interaction hazard. but the peer reviewers suggested it be explicitly mentioned in the SEWS for the control room.

Component Cooling Water Room No major issues were noted in this area. A lube oil reservoir bulb on one component cooling water pump was found to be slightly loose and was tightened on the spol. This is a generic problem throughout the industry and should be checked on <1ll pumps to make sure they MC threaded down all of the wa~*.

SA If you have questions or comments. please contact the undersigned.

Very truly yours,

\\\\(~ 1.~

~-Stevenson Peer Review Engineer li:/-f.~

Robert P. Kennedy Peer Review Engineer

/

ENCLOSURE 3 CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY PALISADES PLANT DOCKET 50-255 DOCKET 72-7 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEETS (SEWS) FOR EQUIPMENT EB-1, EB-26 AND P-55C.

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-0SVS-EB01 PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT I

GIP Rev 2, Corrected 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS)

Sheet 1 of 1 ID : EB-01 (Rev. 0)

I Class : 1. Motor Control Centers Description : 480 VOLT MOTOR CONTROL CENTER Building: AB I Floor El.: 607.00.

Room, Row/Col : 224.

I Base El..: 610.00

1. OUTLIER ISSUE DEFINITION - Mechanical and Electrical Equipment
a.

Identify all the screening guid~lines which are not met. {Check more than one if several guidelines could not be satisfied.)

Capacity vs. Demand x

Caveats Anchorage Seismic Interaction Other

b.

Describe all the reasons for the outlier {i.e., if all the listed outlier issues were resolved, then the signatories*

would consider this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy).*

I Conservative design floor response spectra exceeds 1.5 x bounding spectrum.

2. PROPOSED METHOD OF OUTLIER RESOLUTION (Optional)
a.

Defined proposed method(s) for resolving outlier.

I Using SSI RG 1.60 FRS as resolution of capacity vs. demand.

b.

Provide informatio11 needed to implement proposed method{s) for resolving outlier {e.g., estimate of fundamental frequen*cy).

  • 3. COMMENTS
4. CERTIFICATION:.

The information on this OSVS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate, and resolution of the outlier issues listed above will satisfy the requirements for this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy:

. "Approved by: /4t-..:..--

Date:

.?/M'hS---

~7 Owner's Review:

-;1¢s-

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-EB01 PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2/14/92 Status: No Sheet 1 of 10

. ID : EB-01 Rev. 0)

Class : 1. Motor Control Centers Description : 480 VOLT MOTOR CONTROL CENTER Building : AB Floor El. : 607.00 Room, Row/Col : 224 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. :

SEISMIC CAPACITY VS DEMAND

1.

Floor elevation where equipment receives seismic input 610.00

2.

Floor elevation of seismic input below about 40' from grade (grade= 590.00)

N/A

3.

Equipment has fundamental frequency above about 8 Hz (est. frequency= 5.00)

N/A

4.

Capacity based on:

I 1.50

  • Bounding Spectrum
5.

Demand based on:

I 1.00

  • Conservative Design Floor Response Spectra 3.000 G-LOG-

~..

0.100 I

I I

I I

I I

I I I

I 1.00 LOG Hz 40.00

__ Capacity..... Demand File Record Capacity F:\\GIP\\GIP\\spectra.des LabellBounding Spectrum Demand 1 F:\\GIP\\PROJ003C\\spectra.des BUILDINGIAUXILIARYIELEVATIONl61 O'ILOCATIONIALLIDIRECTIO NIHORIZONTAL Demand 2 F:\\GIP\\PROJ003C\\spectra.des BUILDINGIAUXILIARYIELEVATIONl610'1LOCATIONIALLIDIRECTIO NI HORIZONTAL Does capacity exceed demand?

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-EB01 PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2/14/92 Status: No Sheet 2of10

. ID: EB,..01 (Rev. 0)

Class: 1. Motor Control Centers Description : 480 VOLT MOTOR CONTROL CENTER Building : AB Floor El. : 607.00 Room, Row/Col : 224 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. :

CAVEATS - BOUNDING SPECTRUM MCC/BS Caveat 1 - Earthquake Experience Data Base.

Yes MCC/BS Caveat 2 - Rating of 600 V or Less.

Yes MCC/BS Caveat 3 -Adjacent Cabinets Bolted Together.

Yes MCC/BS Caveat 4 - Attached Weight of 100 Pounds or Less.

Yes MCC/BS Caveat 5 - Externally Attached Items Rigidly Anchored.

Yes MCC/BS Caveat 6 - General Configuration Similar to NEMA Standards.

Yes MCC/BS Caveat 7 - Cutouts Not Large.

Yes MCC/BS Caveat 8 - Doors/auckets Secured.

  • Yes MCC/BS Caveat 9 - Natural Frequency Relative to 8 Hz Limit Considered.

Yes MCC/BS Caveat 1 O - Adequate Anchorage.

Yes MCC/BS Caveat 11 - Potential Chatter of Essential Relays Evaluated.

Yes MCC/BS Caveat 12 - No Other Concerns Yes Is the intent of all the caveats met for Bounding Spectrum?

ANCHORAGE

1. The sizes and locations of anchors have been determined.

Yes

2. Appropriate equipment characteristics have been determined (mass, CG, natural freq.,

Yes damping, center of rotation).

3. The type of anchorage is covered by the GIP.

Yes

4. The adequacy of the anchorage installation has been evaluated (weld quality and length, Yes nuts and washers, expansion anchor tightness, etc.)
5. Factors affecting anchorage capacity or margin of safety have been considered: embedment Yes*

length, anchor spacing, free-edge distance, concrete strength/condition, and concrete cracking.

6. For bolted anchorages, any gaps under the base are less than 1/4.

Yes

7. Factors affecting essential relays have been considered: gaps under the base, capacity Yes reduction for expansion anchors.
8. The base has adequate stiffness and the effect of prying action on anchors has been Yes considered.
9. The strength of the equipment base and the load path to the CG is adequate.

Yes

10. The adequacy of embedded steel, grout pads or large concrete pads have been evaluated.
  • Yes
11. The anchorage capacity exceeds the demand.

Yes Are anchorage requirements met?

  • ~*-

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-EB01 PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2114/92 Status: No Sheet 3of10 ID: EB-01 (Rev. 0)

Class: 1. Motor Control Centers Description : 480 VOLT MOTOR CONTROL CENTER Building : AB Floor El. : 607.00 Room, Row/Col : 224 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. :

INTERACTION EFFECTS

1. Soft t~rgets are free from impact by nearby equipment or structures.

Yes

2. If the equipment contains sensitive relays, it is free from all impact by nearby equipment or Yes structures.
3. Attached lines have adequate flexibility.

Yes

4. Overhead equipment or distribution systems are not likely to collapse.

Yes

5. No other adverse concerns were found.

Yes Is equipment free of interaction effects?

IS EQUIPMENT SEISMICALLY ADEQUATE?

COMMENTS SRT: Djordjevic/Anagnostis Date: 7/8/93 REF 1: CPCo. Drwg. #C-103 Sh. 2 Rev. 1.

Rl;F 2: URS/JOHN A. BLUME & ASSOC., Drwg. # 7 Rev. 1.

Photos: 6-16,17,18 Cabinet contains essential relays.

Ancho'rage: 19 cubicles (20x20x90), each cubicle had at least one 1" Hilti Kwik:-Bolt 12" long front and back. In the* anchor analysis, one of the 19 cubicles is studi~d. Estimated 800# cabinet weight using table C.1-1 of the GIP. Edge distance: 6" for the 5/8" bolt and N/A for the 1" bolt because the embedment of the 1" bolt is assumed to be 4.5" (4" below floor line and 1/2" accounted for the embedment.,.5" in the raised concrete pad.

Check of anchorage of embedded steel: does not need to be checked because the embedded steel does not.

resist uplift, uplift is resisted by the expansion anchors.

Original installation Cutler Hammerr MCC, bolted to based channels with 4 3/8" bolts per bay.

3/20/~

~,

1fr/1J,...

I Owner's Review:

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-EB01 PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2/14/92 Status: No Sheet4of10 ---------1 ID : EB-01 ( Rev. 0 )

Class : 1. Motor Control Centers Description : 480 VOLT MOTOR CONTROL CENTER Building : AB Floor El. : 607.00 Room, Row/Col : 224 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. :

Attachment:

Pictures

Attachment:

ANCHOR Report

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-EB01 PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2/14/92 Status: No Sheet 5of10 ID : EB-01 ( Rev. O )

Class : 1. Motor Control Centers Description : 480 VOLT MOTOR CONTROL CENTER Building : AB Floor El.: 607.00 Room, Row/Col : 224 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. :

PICTURES Figure 1: EB-01 Figure 2: EB-01 Figure 3: EB-01

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-EB01 PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2/14/92

  • Status: No Sheet 6 of 10 ID : EB-01 (Rev. 0)

Class : 1. Motor Control Centers Description : 480 VOLT MOTOR CONTROL CENTER Building : AB Floor El. : 607.00 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. :

ANCHOR Report Earthquake :

Response Spectrum : lnstructure Conservative Frequency : User - 5.00 Percent Damping : User - 5.00 Spectral Values :

Direction Acceleration (g's)

North - South 1.64 East-West 1.64 Vertical 0.20 Angle (N-S Direction makes with the X Axis): 0.00 Combination Criteria : SRSS Weights :

Number of Weights : 1 No Weight x

800.00 10.000 Forces:

Number of External Forces : 0 Moments:

Number of External Moments : O Allowables :

Anchor :

Number of Anchor types : 2 No.

Dia Manufact 1

1 Hilti 2

5/8 Hilti Concrete :

Ultimate Stress : 3000.00 psi.

Reduction Factor : 0.85 Product Kwik-Bolt (N)

Kwik-Bolt (M) y 10.000 Ultimate Tension 6950.00 3170.00 z

45.000 Ultimate Shear 9530.00 3790.00 Room, Row/Col : 224 Tension Shear Inter Inter Saf Coe ff Coe ff Fact 1.00 0.30 1.00 1.00 0.30 1.00

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-EB01 PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2/14/92 Status: No Sheet 7of10 ID : EB-01 (Rev. O)

Class : 1. Motor Control Centers Description : 480 VOLT MOTOR CONTROL CENTER Building : AB Floor EL : 607.00 Room, Row/Col: 224 Manufacturer, M_o_d_e-'l,_E_tc_._: ________________ _

Weld:

Allowable S*r~ss : 30600 psi.

Surfaces:

Number of Surfaces : 1 Surface Orientation Direction Comp No Nx 1

0.000 Direction Comp Ny 0.000

~x Direction Comp Nz 1.000 Anchor Pattern for Surface # 1 Legend for Anchor Patterns Anchor Bolts: 1-1 Concrete Lines: 1-1 Concrete Points: 1-1 Weld Lines :

1-1 Geometry:

Anchor :

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-EBO 1 PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2/14/92 Status: No Sheet 8of10 ID: EB-01 (Rev. 0)

Class: 1. Motor Control Centers Description : 480 VOLT MOTOR CONTROL CENTER Building: AB Floor El.: 607.00 Room, Row/Col: 224 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. :

Number of Anchors : 3 An ch x

No.

Id Coo rd 1

2 14.000 2

1 4.000 3

1 16.000 Concrete Lines :

  1. of elements per line : 4 Number of Concrete Lines : 2 Start Start y

z Surf Coo rd Coo rd Id 5.000 0.000 1

3.000 0.000 1

17.000 0.000 1

Start End End End No X-Coord Y-Coord Z-Coord X-Coord Y-Coord Z-Coord 1

0.000 3.000 0.000 20.000 3.000 2

0.000 17.000 0.000 20.000 17.000

. Concrete Points :

Number of Concrete Points: O Weld Lines*

  1. of elements per line : 5
  • Number of Weld Lines :.O Determination of Reduction Factors :

Reduction Factor Input for Anchor# 1 Adequately Installed: Yes*

Embedment Length: ( 2.75 in. Min Reqd. to achieve full capacity):= 6.00 in.

Gap at Threaded Anchor : 0.00 in.

Edge Distance - Edge 1 : 6.00 in.

Crack Size : 0.000 in. - Cracks Affect <= 50% Bolts Essential Relays in Cabinet: Yes Adequate Equipment Ba~e Strength and Structural Load Path: Yes Embedment Steel and Pads Adequately Installed: Yes Reduction Factor Input for.Anchor# 2 Adequately Installed: Yes Embedment Length : ( 4.50 in. Min Reqd. to achieve full capacity) := 4.50 in.

Gap at Threaded Anchor: 0.00 in.

Crack Size : 0.000 in. - Cracks Affect<= 50% Bolts 0.000 0.000.

Sf Line Id Width 1

  • 2.000 1

2.000 Essential Relays in Cabinet : Yes Adequate Equipment Base Strength and Structural Load Path: Yes Embedment Steel and Pads Adequately Installed: Yes

~.

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-EB01 PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2/14/92 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Status: No Sheet 9of10 ID : EB-01 ( Rev. 0 )

I Class : 1. Motor Control Centers Description : 480 VOLT MOT0._13CONTROL CENTER Building : AB I Floor El. : 607.00 Room, Row/Col : 224

-=-.--

Manufacturer, Model, Etc. : ----..

Reduction Factor Input for Anchor# 3 Adequately Installed: Yes Embedment Length : ( 4.50 in. Min Reqd. to achieve full capadty) := 4.50 in.

Gap at Threaded Anchor: 0.00 in.

Crack Size: 0.000 in. - Cracks Affect<= 50% Bolts Essential Relays in Cabinet: Yes Adequate Equipment Base Strength and Structural Load Path: Yes Embedment Steel and Pads Adequately Installed : Yes*

Reduction Factors Data Current: Yes Anc Pall/

Pallr/

No Id Vall Vallr RT RN RL RG RS RE 1

2 1711.80 N/A 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 2539.98 N/A 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 2

1 3909.38 N/A 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 x

6790.13 N/A 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 x

3 1

3909.38.

N/A 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 x*

6790.13 N/A 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 x

Legend*.

N/A

= Not Applicable Pall

  • =Allowable Pull without Reduced Inspection Vall

= Allowable Shear without Reduced Inspection Pallr

= Allowable Pull with Reduced Inspection Vallr

= Allowable Shear with Reduced Inspection

=Outlier x*

= Reduction Factbr Not Used RT

= Reduction Factor for Type of Anchorage RN

= Reduction Factor for Installation Adequacy RL

= Reduction Factor for Embedment RG

= Reduction Factor for Gap at Anchors RS

= Reduction Factor for Spacing RE

= Reduction Factor for Edge Distance RF

=Reduction Factor for Concrete Strength RC

= Reduction Factor for Concrete Cracks RR

=Reduction Factor for Essential Relays RP

=*Reduction Eactor for Base Stiffness and Prying Action RB

=Reduction Factor for Ba3e Strength and Load Path RM

= Reduction Factor for Embed. Steel and Pads Analysis Results :

Analysis Performed : Yes RF 0.75 0.95 0.75 0.95 0.75 0.95 RC RR RP RB 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 1.00*

1.00 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 RM 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00*

  • ~*..

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-EB01 PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

GIP ~ev '2, Corrected, 2114/92 Status: No Sheet 10of1 D ID : EB-01 ( Rev. 0 )

Class : 1. Motor Control Centers

-,c_*-------~

Description : 480 VOLT MOTOR CONTROL CENTER Building : AB _ _

Floor El. : 607.00 Room, Row/Col : 224 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. :

Type of Analysis : Regular Spectral Accelerations (G's)

No N-S E-W Vertical Safety Factor 1

1.640 0.656 0.080 1.-187 2

-1.640

-0.656

-0.080 1.440 3

-1.640 0.656 0.080 1.417 4

1.640

-0.656

-0.080 1.206 5

1.640

-0.656 0.080 1.187 6

-1.640 0.656

-0.080 1.440 7

1.640 0.656

-0.080 1.206 8

-1.640,

-0.656 0.080 1.417 9

0.656 1.640 0.080 1.359 10

-0.656

-1 ~640

-0.080 1.088 11 0.656

-1.640 0.080 1.072 12

-0.656

, 1.640

.-0.080 1.380 13

-0.656 1.640

.0.080 1.359 14 0.656

-1.640

-0.080 1.088 15 0.656 1.640,

-0.080 1.380 16

-0.656

, -1.640, 0.080 1.072

, 17 0.656 0.656 0.200 2.846 18

-0.656

-0.656

-0.200 2.834 19 0.656 0.656

-0.200 3.151 20

-0.656

-0.656 0.200 2.577 21

-0.656 0.656 0.200 3.269 22 0.656

-0.6~6

-0.200 2.834 23 0.656

-0.656 0.200 2.577 24

-0.656 0.656

-0.200 3.595 Minimum Safety Factor:

1.072 The *Anchorage Capacity *is 1.072 times greater than.the _Dem~nd

.... ~ *. !!"'tl*!G*.. -*

u**** 1tJ*11 i,,.*,, '"":JF

.,u_...

f.. 1.

.**,..d1 Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-EB26 PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2/14/92 Status: Yes Shedt 1 of 11 ID: EB-26 (Rev. O)

Class: 1. Motor Control Centers Description : 480 VOLT MOTOR CONTROL CENTER Building: AB Floor El.: 607.00 Room, Row/Col : 725 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. :

SEISMIC CAPACITY VS DEMAND

1.

Floor elevation where equipment receives seismic input 610.00

2.

Floor elevation of seismic input below about 40' from grade (grade = 590.00)

NIA

3.

Equipment has fundamental frequency above about 8 Hz (est. frequency= 5.00)

NIA

4.

Capacity based on:

I 1.00 *Test Response Spectra

5.

Den:iand based on:

I 1.00

  • Conservative Design Floor Response Spectra File Record Capacity Demand 1 F:\\GIP\\PROJ003C\\spectra.des BUILDING[AUXILIARYIELEVATIONl61 O'ILOCATION[ALLIDIRECTIO NIHORIZONTAL Demand 2 F:\\GIP\\PROJ003C\\spectra.des BUILDINGIAUXILIARYIELEVATIONl61 O'ILOCATION[ALLIDIRECTIO NIHORIZONTAL Does capacity exceed demand?

ANCHORAGE

1. The sizes and locations of anchors have been determined.

Yes

2. Appropriate equipment characteristics have been determined (mass, CG, natural freq.,

Yes damping, center of rotation).

3. The type of anchorage is covered by the GIP.

Yes

4. The adequacy of the anchorage installation has been evaluated (weld quality and length, Yes nuts. and washers, expansion anchor tightness, etc.)
5. Factors affecting anchorage capacity or margin of safety have been considered: embedment Yes length, anchor spacing, free-edge distance, concrete strength/condition, and concrete cracking.
6. For bolted anchorages, any gaps under the base are less than 1/4.

Yes

7. Factors affecting essential relays have been considered: gaps under the base, capacity Yes

. reduction for expansion anchors.

8. The base has adequate stiffness and the effect of prying action on anchors has been Yes considered.
9. The strength of the equipment base and the load path to the CG is adequate.

Yes

10. The adequacy of embedded steel, grout pads or large concrete pads have been evaluated; Yes
11. The anchorage capacity exceeds the demand.

Yes Are anchorage requirements met?

"'"""'*0'£.¥"'"

1i;;;::-.* :cg-Q*

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-EB26 PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2114/92 Status: Yes Sheet 2of11 ID: EB-26 (Rev. O)

Class: 1. Motor Control Centers Description : 480 VOLT MOTOR CONTROL CENTER Building: AB Floor El.: 607.00 Room, Row/Col: 725 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. :

INTERACTION EFFECTS

1. Soft targets are free from impact by nearby equipment or structures.
2. If the equipment contains sensitive relays, it is free from all impact by nearby equipment or structures.
3. Attached lines have adequate flexibility.
4. Overhead equipment or distribution systems are not likely to collapse.
5. No other adverse concerns were found.

Is equipment free of interaction effects?

IS EQUIPMENT SEISMICALLY ADEQUATE?

COMMENTS SRT: Djordjevic/Anagnostis Date: 7(8/93 REF 1: CPCo., Drwg. # C-46qQ, Rev. 14, 3/10/84.

REF 2: CPCo. Seismic Qualifiqition Test Report,.#E-110-14, Rev. 1 RE.~ 3: CPco*: Seismic Qualification Test Report,.#E-110-20, Rev.,1 Photo: 6~36 Cabin~tcontains essential relays.

Recent installation Gould/ITE MCC, bolted.to base channels with 4 5/16° bolts per bay.

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Anchorage: Similar to EB-25. 4 attached cubicles each 20" x 20" x 90" tall. Anchored with 1 O" of weld along the front and 10" of weld along the back of each to embedded steel tubes. Assumed 800# cabinet weights using table C.1-1 of the GIP. Anchorage analysis is check of embedded steel.

Weld check:

(0.707)(40 inches of weld)(1/4" weld)(30,600#/in"2) = 216 Kips>> 3200# (800# x 4 cabinets). OK.

Capacity v Demand: TEST

SUMMARY

(REFs 2 & 3)

G<:>uld,_n~eismic Certifica!ion for Class 1 E MCCs", ~C-491, Rev. 1 (REFs 2 & ~)

This report documents the seismic qualification of the MCCs per the requirements of IEEE 344-1975. The testing consisted of biaxial resonant sweeps (0.2g input with a sweep rate of one octave per minute) followed by five OBE and one SSE, where the QBE/SSE tests consisted of sine beats at the fundamental frequencies determined in the resonant sweeps. A set of tests was run Front - to - Back I Vertical, and another set Side-to-SideNertical.

The resonant sweeps showed a fundamental frequency of about 6 Hz in both horizontal directions and about 15 -

20 Hz in the vertical direction. The QBE/SSE were conducted at about the same level, and the horizontal and

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-EB26 PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT*

SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEEr(SEWS)

GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2/14/92 Status: Yes Sheet 3of11 ID : EB-26 ( Rev. O )

Class : 1. Motor Control Centers Description : 480 VOLT MOTOR CONTROL CENTER Building: AB Floor El.: 607.00 Room, Row/Col: 725 -------1 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. :

vertical inputs were about the same: the 3% damped TRS have a ZPA of about 1.5g and a peak at about 6 Hz of about 6g, and a second peak at about 20 Hz of about 4g.

CONCLUSION The MCCs are located at AB 607. The 2% damped AB 610 Horizontal FRS (no 3% data and no vertical spectra) has a ZPA*of 0.3g and a peak of 2.94g spread between 5 Hz and 6.4 Hz. The SRT concludes that the tests show that sesimic capacity exceeds the demand.

Evaluated by:

owner's Review: *-----,..-----""").:h-=-=-~=

...--.1_C=*'"""*..... e

.... /)..... 2/""'.... ii

..... ~y..__* _ Date:

Attachment:

Pictures

Attachment:

ANCHOR Report

  • spa/7s--

'/i_;f /7<

I

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-EB26 PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2/14/92 Status: Yes Sheet 4of11 ID : EB-26 ( Rev. 0)

Class : 1. Motor Control Centers Description : 480 VOLT MOTOR CONTROL CENTER Building : AB Floor El. : 607.00 Room, Row/Col : 725 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. :

PICTURES EB-26

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-EB26 PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2/14/92 Status: Yes Sheet 5of11 ID : EB-26 (Rev. 0)

Class: 1. Motor Control Centers Description : 480 VOLT MOTOR CONTROL CENTER Building: AB Floor El. : 607.00 Room, Row/Col: 725 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. :

ANCHOR Report Earthquake :

Response Spectrum: lnstructure Conservative Frequency : User - 5.00 Percent Damping : User - 5.00 Spectral Values :

Direction Acceleration (g's)

North - South 1.64 East-West 1.64 Vertical 0.20 Angle (N-S Direction makes with the X Axis): 0.00 Combination Criteria : SRSS Weights:

Number of Weights : 4 No Weight x

y 1

800.00 13.000 10.000 2

800.00 13.000 30.000 3

800.00 13.000 50.000 4

800.00 13.000 70.000 Forces:

Number of External Forces : 0 Moments:

Number of External Moments : 0 Allowables :

Anchor:

Number of Anchor types : 1 Ultimate No.

Dia Manufact Product Tension 1

1 Hilti Kwik-Bolt 6950.0C Concrete :

Ultimate Stress : 3000.00 psi.

Reduction Factor : 0.85 (N) z 45.000 45.000 45.000 45.000 Tension Shear Ultimate Inter Inter Shear Coe ff Coe ff 9530.00 1.00 0.30 Saf Fact 1.00

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-EB26 PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2/14/92 Status: Yes Sheet 6of11 ID : EB-26 ( Rev. O )

Class : 1. Motor Control Centers Description : 480 VOLT MOTOR CONTROL CENTER Building : AB Floor El. : 607.00 Room, Row/Col : 725 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. :

Weld :

Allowable Stress : 30600 psi.

Surfaces:

Number of Surfaces : 1 Surface Orientation Direction Comp No Nx 1

0.000 Geometry:

Direction Comp Ny 0.000 Direction Comp Nz 1.000 Anchor Pattern for Surface # 1 Legend for Anchor Patterns Anchor Bolts :

Concrete Lines: 1-1 Concrete Points: 1-1 Weld Lines :

1-1

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS~EB26 PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT.

SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2/14/92 Stat*Js: Yes Sheet 7of11

_!P~_E.B_-:.26 _ _(ReY.._Q)________ __ _________

Class: 1. MqtorControlCenters

~,..-..-...~~'-=--~~~~~~~-=---~~-,:'-:==,..-----------------------1-------

Description : 480 VOLT MOTOR CONTROL CENTER Building: AB Floor El.: 607.00 Roor:n...... _R_o_w_IC_o_l_:_7_2_5 _____

-1 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. :

Anchor:

Number of Anchors : 10 An ch x

No.

Id Coard 1

1 3.000 2

1 3.000 3

1 3.000 4

1

-3.000 5

1 3.000 6

1 23.000 7

1 23.000 8

1 23.000 9

1 23.000 10 1

23.000 Concrete Lines :

  1. of elements per line : 5 Number of Concrete Lines : 2 Start Start y

z Surf Coard Coo rd Id 3.000 0.000 1

21.500 0.000 1

40.000 0.000 1

58.500 -

0.000 1

77.000 0.000 1

3.000 0.000 1

21.500 0.000 1

40.000 0.000 1

58.500 0.000 1

77.000 0.000 1

Start End End End No X-Coord Y-Coord Z-Coord

  • X-Coord Y-Coord Z-Coord 1

3.000 0.000 2

23.000 0.000 Concrete Points :

Number of Concrete Points : O -

Weld Lines:

  1. of elements per line*: 2 Number of Weld Lines : O 0.000 0.000 Determination of Reduction Factors :

Reduction Factor Input for Anchor# 1 Adequately Installed : Yes 3.000 80.000 23.000 80.000 Embedmenf Length-: ( 4.50 in. Min Reqd. to achieve full capacity) := 6.00 in.

Gap at Threader! Anchor: 0.00 in.

Crack Size : 0.000 in. - Cracks Affect<= 50% Bolts Essential Relays in Cabinet: Yes Adequate Equipment Base Strength and Structural Load Path: Yes Embedment Steel and Pads Adequately Installed : Yes Reduction Factor Input for Anchor# 2 0.000 0.000 Sf Line Id Width 1

6.000 1 -

6.000

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-EB26 PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2/14/92 Status: Yes Sheet 8of11 JD : EB-26 ( Rev. O )

Class : 1. Motor Control Centers Description : 480 VOLT MOTOR CONTROL CENTER

"="~,,...--------r--=----=-.,...,,......,...._---------t Building : AB Floor El. : 607.00 Room, Row/Col : 725 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. :

,__ _________ _.;_ ___________ ----~-------------------'

Adequately Installed: Yes Embedment Length: ( 4.50 in. Min Reqd. to achieve full capacity):= 6.00 in.

Gap at Threaded Anchor : 0.00 in.

Crack Size: 0.000 in. - Cracks Affect<= 50% Bolts Essential Relays in Cabinet: Yes Adequate Equipment Base Strength and Structural Load Path: Yes Embedment Steel and Pads Adequately Installed: Yes Reduction Factor Input for Anchor# 3 Adequately Installed: Yes Embedment Length : ( 4.50 in. Min Reqd. to achieve full capacity) := 6.00 in.

Gap at Threaded Anchor : 0.00 in.

Crack Size: 0.000 in. - Cracks Affect<= 50% Bolts Essential Relays in Cabinet: Yes Adequate Equipment Base Str~ngth and StrucbJral. Load Path : Yes Embedment Steel and Pa~s Adequately Installed: Yes Reduction Factor Input for Anchor #4 Adequately Installed: Yes Embedment Length : ( 4.50 in. Min Reqd. to achieve full capacity) := 6.00 in.

Gap at Threaded Anchor : 0.00 in.

Crack Size : 0.000 in. - Cracks Affect<= 50% Bolts Essential Relays in Cabinet: Yes Adequate Equipment Base Strength and Structural Load Path: Yes Embedment Steel and Pads Adequately Installed : Yes Reduction Factor Input for Anchor# 5 Adequately Installed : Yes Embedment Length: ( 4.50 in. Min Reqd. to achieve full capacity):= 6.00 in.

Gap at Threaded Anchor: 0.00 in.

Crack Size: 0.000 in, - Cracks Affect<= 50% Bolts Essential Relays in Cabinet: Yes Adequate Equipment Base Strength and Struclural Load Path: Yes Embedment Steel and Pads Adequately lnstaUed: Yes

. Reduction Factor Input for Anchor# 6 Adequately Installed: Yes Embedment Length : ( 4.50 in. Min Reqd. to achieve full capacity) := 6.00 in.

Gap at Threaded Anchor : 0.00 in.

Crack Size: 0.000 in. - Cracks Affect<= 50% Bolts Essential Relays in Cabinet: Yes Adequate Equipment Base Strength and Structural Load Path: Yes.

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-EB26 PALISADES NUCLEAR Pi.ANT SCREENING EVALUATION WORI< SHEET (SEWS)

GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2/14/92 Status: Yes Sheet 9of11 ID : EB-26 ( Rev. O )

Class : 1. Motor Control Centers

==

Description:==

480 VOLT MOTOR CONTROL CENTER ___________ *-----*-- - --* - ---.-- ----* - ---- *--* -- -. ------

Building: AB

=~""',=1£~<?()~.!=J*: 607.00 I Room, Row/Col '.,I~5-.c.*.~*-"

Manufacturer, Model, Etc. :

="-* *-"*"*-'** -------------------*-********------'

Embedment Steel and Pads Adequately li1stalled: Yes Reduction Factor Input for Anchor# 7 Adequately Installed*: Yes Embedment Length : ( 4.50 in. Min Reqd. to achieve full capacity) :=.6.00 in.

Gap at Threaded Anchor: 0.00 in.

Crack Size : 0.000 in. - Cracks Affect<= 50% Bolts Essential Relays in Cabinet: Yes Adequate Equipment Base Strength and Structural Load Path: Yes

  • Embedment Steel and Pads Adequately Installed: Yes.

Reduction Factor Input for Anchor# 8 Adequately Installed: Yes Embedment Length : ( 4.. 50 in. Min Retjd. to achieve full capacity) := 6.00 in.

Gap at Threaded Anchor : 0.00 in.

Crack Size: 0.000 in. - Cracks Affect<= 50% Bolts Essential Relays in* Cabinet : Yes.

Adequate Equipment Base Strength and Structural *Load Path : Yes

  • Embedment Steel and Pads Adequately Installed: Yes Reduction Factor Input for Anchor# 9
    • Adequately lnstal.led: Yes Embedment Length : ( 4.50 in. Min Reqd. to achieve full capacity) := 6.00 in.

Gap at Threaded Anchor: 0.00 in.

Crack Size : 0.000 in. - Cracks Affect<= 50% Bolts Essential Relays in Cabinet: Yes Adequate Equipment Base Strength and StructUral Load Path : Yes Embedment Steel and Pads Adequately Installed: Yes Reduction Fact~r Input for Anchor# 10 Adequately Installed: Yes Embedment Length : ( 4.50 in. Min Reqd. to achieve full capacity) := 6.00 in.

Gap at Threaded Anchor: 0.00 in.

Crack Size : 0.000 in. - *Cracks Affect<= 50% Bolts

. -Essential Relays in-Cabinet :_Yes Adequate Equipment Base Strength and Structural Load Path: Yes Embedment Steel and Pads Adequatt:iy Installed: Yes Reduction Factors Data Current: Yes Anc Pall/

Pallr/

No Id Vall Vallr 1

3909.38 N/A 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 x

0.75 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-EB26 PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET{SEWS)

GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2/14/92 Status: Yes Sheet 1 O of 1 *i JD :.EB-26(Rev *. O )_-:_. _.

I Class: 1. Motor Control Centers

-*-----------i Description : 480Vol.. T MOTOR CONTROL CENTER Building : AB I Floor El. : 607.00 I R<;>E>m, Row/Col : 725 Manufact~er::M~oj~l.;._7-_E_fo_. _: ----------------------------------'

6790.13 NIA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 x

0.95 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 2

1 3909.38 NIA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 x

0.75 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 6790.13 NIA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 x

0.95 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 3

1 3909.38 NIA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 x

0.75 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 6790.13 NIA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 x

0.95 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 4

1 3909.38 NIA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 x

0.75 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 6790.13 NIA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 x

0.95 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 5

1 3909.38 NIA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 x

0.75 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 6790.13 NIA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 x

0.95 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 6

1 3909.38 NIA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 x

'0.75 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 6790.13 NIA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 x

0.95 1.00 0.75

  • 1.00 1.00 1.00 7

1 3909.38 NIA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 x

0.75 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 6790.13 NIA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 x

0.95 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 8

1 3909.38 NIA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 x

0.75

.1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 6790.13 NIA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 x

0.95 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 9

1 3909.38 NIA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 x

0.75 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 6790.13 NIA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 x

0.95 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 10 1

3909.38 NIA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 x

0.75.

1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 6790.13 NIA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 x

0.95 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 Legend*.

NIA

= Not Applicable Pall

=Allowable Pull without Reduced Inspection Vall

= Allowable Shear without Reduced Inspection Pallr

.=Allowable Pull with Reduced Inspection**

Vallr

=Allowable Shear with Reduced Inspection

=Outlier x

= Reduction Factor Not Used RT

= Reduction Factor for Type of Anchorage RN

= Reduction Factor for Installation Adequacy RL

= Reduction Factor for Embedment RG

=Reduction Factor for Gap at Anchors RS

= Reduction Factor for Spacing RE

= Reduction Factor for Edge Distance RF

=Reduction Factor for Concrete Strength RC

= Reduction Factor for Concrete Cracks RR

=*Reduction Factor for Essential Relays*

RP

= Reduction Factor for Base Stiffness and Prying Action RB

=Reduction Factor for Base Strength and Load Path RM

= Reduction Factor for Embed. Steel and Pads Analysis Results :

Analysis Performed: Yes 1----+----S--!.-pe_c~tr~a_l_A_cc_e_le_r_a_tio_n_s~(~G-'s~)-.,.-.,.---+""::'.'"""-:---,-"-=---i No N-S E-W Vertical Safety Factor rype of Analysis : Regular

11;.nr...,,f*-

  • ~, *.u.

i(;.;ull::u,,.;;:i,:.mU;,,

Evaluation No~: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-EB26 PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2/14/92 Status: Yes Sheet 11 of 11 ID : EB-26 ( Rev. o )

Class: 1. Motor Control Centers

==

Description:==

480'.rocnvlOTORCONTRQ['CENTER' - ~~-- - - -- -- - ---------- -

Building: AB Floor El.: 607.00-Room, Row/Col: 725 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. :

,_= _____

I 1

1.640 0.656 0.080 1.772 2

-1.640

-0.656

-0.080 1.811 1.772 3

-1.640 0.656

  • 0.080 4

1.640

-0.656

-0.080 1.811 5

1.640

-0.656 0.080 1.772 6

-1.640 0.656

-0.080 1.811 7

.1.640 0.656

. -0.080 1.811 8

-1.640

-0.656 0.080 1.772 9

0.656 1.640 0.080 4.359 10

-0.656

-1.640

-0.080 4.602 11 0.656

-1.640

. 0.080 4.359 12

-0.656 1.640

-0.080 4.602 13

-0.656 1.640 0.080 4.359 14 0.65_6

-1.640

-0.080 4.602 15 0.656 1.640

-0.080 4.602

.16

-0.656

-1 ~640 0.080 4.359 17 0.656 0.656..

0.200 4.193 18

--0.656

-0.656

- -0.200 4.803 19 0.656 0.656

. -0.200 4.803 20

-0.656

. -0.656 0.200*

4.193 21

-0.656 0.656 0.200 4.193

22.

0.656

-0.656

-0.200 4.803 23 0.656

-0.656 0.200 4.193 24

-0.656 0.656

-0.200 4.803 Minimum Safety Factor:

1.772 The Anchorage Capacity is

1. 772 times greater than the Oe.mand

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-P55C PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2/14/92 Status: Yes Sheet 1of13 ID: P-55C (Rev. O)

Class: 5. Horizontal Pumps

'-='"~.....,....-,..-....l.-.,,,._;___,:;+---=-=-,...,,,..,=-~----'-----------..:..;.;!:,..:,__ ___________ --1_ - -- - -----

Description : CHARGING PUMP C Building : AB Floor El.: 590.00 Room, Row/Col : 1048 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. :

SEISMIC CAPACITY VS DEMAND

1.

Floor elevation where equipment receives seismic input 590.00

2.

Floor elevation of seismic input below about 40' from grade (grade= 590.00)

Yes

3.

Equipment has fundamental frequency above about 8 Hz (est. frequency= 33.00)

Yes

4.

Capacity based on:

I 1.00

  • Bounding Spectrum
5.

Demand based on:

I 1.00

  • Design Basis Ground Response Spectrum 3.000 G._

LOG'"""

0.100 I

I I

I I

I I

I I I

I 1.00 LOG Hz 40.00

__ Capaeity..... Demand File Record Capacity F:\\GIP\\GIP\\spectra.des LabellBounding Spectrum Demand 1 F:\\GIP\\PROJ003C\\spectra.des BUILDINGIGROUNDIELEVATIONl590'1LOCATIONIALLIDIRECTIONI HORIZONTAL Demand 2 F:\\GIP\\PROJ003C\\spectra.des BUILDINGIGROUNDIELEVATIONl590'1LOCATIONIALLIDIRECTIONI HORIZONTAL Does capacity exceed demand?

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-P55C PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2/14/92 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Status: Yes Sheet 2of13 ID : f'-55C ( Rev. 0 ). _

I Class : 5. Horizontal Pumps Description : CHARGING PUMP C Building : AB I Floor El. : 590.00 Room, Row/Col : 104B Manufacturer, Model, Etc. :

CA VEA TS - BOUNDING SPECTRUM HP/BS Caveat 1 - Earthquake Experience Equipment Class.

Yes HP/BS Caveat 2 - Driver and Pump on Rigid Skid.

Yes HP/BS Caveat 3 - Thrust Bearings in Both Axial Directions.

Yes HP/BS Caveat 4 - Check of Long Unsupported Piping.

Yes HP/BS Caveat 5 - Base Vibration Isolation System Checked.

N/A HP/BS Caveat 6 - Sufficient Slack and Flexibility of Attached Lines.

Yes HP/BS Caveat 7 - Adequate Anchorage.

Yes HP/BS Caveat 8 - Potential Chatter of Essential Relays Evaluated.

N/A HP/BS Caveat 9 - No Other Concerns.

Yes Is the. intent of all the caveats met for Bo!-Jnding Spectrum?.

ANCHORAGE

1. The sizes and locations of anchors have been determined.

Yes

2. Appropriate equipment characteristics have been determined (mass, CG, natural freq.,

Yes damping, center of rotation}.

3. The type of anchorage is covered by the GIP.

Yes

4. The adequacy of the anchorage installation has been evaluated (weld quality and length, Yes nuts and washers, expansion anchor tightness, etc.}
5. Factors affecting anchorage capacity or margin of safety have been considered: embedment Yes length, anchor spacing, free-edge distance, concrete strength/condition, and concrete cracking.
6. For *bolted anchorages, ahy gaps under the base are less than 1/4.

Yes

7. Factors affecting essential relays have been considered: gaps under the base, capacity N/A reduction for expansion anchors.
8. The base has adequate stiffness and the effect of prying action on anchors has been Yes considered.
9. The strength of the equipment base and the load path to the CG is adequate.

Yes

10. The adequacy of embedded steel, grout pads or large concrete pads have been evaluated.

Yes 11.. The anchorage capacity exceeds the demand.

Yes Are anchorage requirements met?

I.-*

~..

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-P55C PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2114/92 Status: Yes Sheet 3of13 ID: P-55C (Rev. 0)

Class: 5. Horizontal Pumps i--=---=----------'"""-----=-..... - -,.-----=-----.-..:--'=--=-=--=--~---------"----------=.------------=---=--=--=-=---=1---- -- --. ---

Description : CHARGING PUMP C Building : AB Floor El.: 590.00 Room, Row/Col : 104B Manufacturer, Model, Etc. :

INTERACTION EFFECTS

1. Soft targets are free from impact by nearby equipment or structures.

Yes

2. If the equipment contains sensitive relays, it is free from au impact by nearby equipment or N/A structures.
3. Attached lines have adequate flexibility.

Yes

4. Overhead equipment or distribution systems are not likely to collapse.

Yes

5. No other adverse concerns were found.

Yes Is equipment free of interaction effects?

IS EQUIPMENT SEISMICALLY ADEqUATE?

COMMENTS SRT: Djordjevic/Anagnostis Date: 7/6/9~

  • _REF 1: CPCo Drwg. # M1-HA SH. 133, Rev. 3.

REF 2: Bechtel Cal., "Palisades Class. I Equip., Equip. Fdn's - Cinch_ Anchors", Job #5939" 4/15/69.

Photo: 2-39 * -

' CPCo. concrete detail drawings do not indicate any bolt schedule..It means that bolts cannot be cast..:in-place.

Therefore, bolt type is either grouted-in-place (if embedment > _ 3") or Cinch Anchor (if embedment < 3" as used in Palisades - REF 2). Since ultrasonic testing (see document) indicates. embedment = 4", bolts are grouted-in-place bolts.

Anchorage: Anchored with 10-1" grouted-in-place anchors. Otherwise OK based on SRT inspection and judgement. 4" Bolt embedment is used in anchorage evaluation for all bolts. See document for ultrasonic testing of anchor bolts.

In ANCHOR Report; Weight No. 1 is Pump and weight No. 2 is all other parts (REF 1 ). The cg's are estimated from the drawing.

Contains the following as Rule-of-the-Box: T-105C, P-55C SUCTION STABLIZER; T-106C, P-55C DISCHARGE ACCUMULA TIOR.

Evaluated by:

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-P55C PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2/14/92 Status: Yes Sheet4of13 ID : P-55C ( Rev. 0 )

Class : 5. Horizontal Pumps Description--:-cHARGING-PUMP c------ --- -- ------ ------

Building: AB Floor EL~ 590.00 Room, Row/Col: 104B Manufacturer, Model, Etc. :

---~~~~

........ v.......... C_..._,l~;~qJ3v~t _ '--- Date:

Attachment:

Pictures

. U Owner's Review:

Attachment:

P-55C: Ultrasonic Testing of Anchor Bolts

Attachment:

ANCHOR Report

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-P55C PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2/14/92 Status: Yes Sheet 5of1 ?

ID: P-55C (Rev. 0)

Class : 5. Horizontal Pumps Description : CHARGING PUMP C Building : AB Floor El. : 590.00 Room, Row/Col : 104B Manufacturer, Model, Etc. :

PICTURES P-55C

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-P55C PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT SC~EENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2/14/92 Status: Yes Sheet 6of13 ID : P-55C (Rev. 0)

Class : 5. Horizontal Pumps Description : CHARGING PUMP C Floor El. : 590.00 Building : AB Manufacturer,_M_o_d_e_I_, E=t-c-. -: -----'------------

Room, Row/Col : 104B P-55C: Ultrasonic Testing of Anchor Bolts Ultrasonic testing of Anchor Bolts for the SQUG Program e

-(])

I I I I Equip ID P-.s.sc Number of Anchor bolts_~/

...... O......_ __

A.Boll t.oc.cioa 2

l 4

S 6

7 8

9 10 11 12 C. Tocal Bo11 Lcnllh 7. S _+/-__ 'l.S "*' ~

_.!.....:!__ _.!__ 9._,. ~ __

D. Boll dist.

H

~

-- lloor M '*' s.s 3.S ~.5 s.S 3.5.!:.:[ s.S J.5. -

E.

cmbcddment lcagth(c.C-c).+/-: -

S

$.I

~. '1 Data taken by. AA ( f?g,I{,

Date 1,P/ct4 Ultrasonic testing performed by /)4 /<.< Ca tAe,rlM n Date /IU /qt Ultrasonic tester serial number 000 J s;s=S

-J. 011.e, fo ;>oor rM.rf,u.t; co.... f#c.t Muri;"J-fllA.I

.AfCttSIJY1!1'1'ttr1.fs Co11. IJ..,.

  • f J,~ t~ l:.tt. Y\\ *

,,11"£.f, 1/1

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-P55C PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2/14/92 Status: Yes Sheet 7of13 ID : P-55C ( Rev. 0 )

Class : 5. Horizontal Pumps Description : CHARGING PUMP C Building : AB Floor El. : 590.00 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. :

ANCHOR Report Earthquake :

Response Spectrum : SSE Frequency : GIP - Rigid Percent Damping : GIP - 5.00 Spectral Values :

Direction Acceleration (g's)

North - South 0.40 East-West 0.40 Vertical 0.26 Angle (N-S Direction makes with the X Axis) : 0.00 Combination Criteria : SRSS Weights:

Number of Weights : 2 No Weight x

y 1

4600.00 30.000 68.000 2

3100.00 20.000 50.000 Forces:

Number of External Forces: 0 Moments:

Number of External Moments : 0 Allowables :

Anchor :

Number of Anchor types : 1 Ultimate No.

Dia Manufact Product Tension 1

1 Other Grouted In 2670.00 Place Concrete:

Ultimate Stress : 3000.00 psi.

Reduction Factor : 0.85 Weld :

z 31.250 22.000 Ultimate Shear 13350.00 Room, Row/Col : 104B Tension Shear Inter Inter Saf Coe ff Coe ff Fact 1.00 0.30 1.00

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-P55C PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2/14/92 Status: Yes ID: P-55C (Rev. 0)

Description : CHARGING PUMP C Building : AB Manufacturer, Model, Etc. :

Allowable Stress : 30600 psi.

Surfaces:

Number of Surfaces : 1 Surface Orientation Direction Comp No Nx 1

0.000 Geometry :

Anchor :

Number of Anchors : 10 Direction Comp Ny 0.000 Sheet 8of13 Class : 5. Horizontal Pumps.

Floor El. : 590.00 Direction Comp Nz 1.000 Anchor Pattern for Surface # 1 Legend for Anchor Patterns Anchor Bolts :

Concrete Lines: 1-1 Concrete Points: 1-1 Weld Lines:

1-1 Room, Row/Col : 104B ------t

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-P55C PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2114/92 Status: Yes Sheet 9of13 ID : P-55C (Rev. 0)

Class : 5. Horizontal Pumps Description : CHARGING PlJMP C Building: AB Floor El. : 590.00 Room, Row/Col : 1048 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. :

An ch x

y z

Surf No.

Id Coo rd Coo rd Coo rd Id 1

1 1.500 1.500 0.000 1

2 1

26.500 1.500 0.000 1

3

.1 1.500 31.500 0.000 1

4 1

26.500 31.500 0.000 1

5 1

1.500 57.000 0.000 1

,6 1

1.500 81.000.

0.000 1

7 1

31.000 52.250 0.000 1

8*

1 31.000 81.000 0.000 1

9 1

60.500

. 52.250 0.000 1

10 1

60.500 81.500 0.000 1 '

ConQ[et§ Lines ;

. #of elements per lin~.: 5 Number of Concrete Lines : 2 Start Start Start End End End No.

X-Coord *

. Y-Coord z~coord X-Coord Y-Coord Z-Coord 1

14.000 0.000 2

0.000 66.875 Concrete Points.;

Number of Concrete Points: O

. Weld Lines :

  1. of elements per line : 5 Number of Weld Lines : O 0.000 0.000 Determination of Reduction Factors :

Reduction Factor Input for Anchor# 1 Adequately Installed : Yes 14.000 50.750 62.000 66.875 Embedment Length : (10.00 in. Min Reqd. to achieve full capacity):= 4.00 in.

Gap at Threaded Anchor : 0.00 in.

. Crack-Size : o~OOO*in.

Essential Relays in Cabinet : No Adequate Equipment Base Strength and Structural Load Path: Yes Embedment Steel and Pads Adequately Installed : Yes Reduction Factor Input for Anchor# 2 Adequately Installed: Yes 0.000 0.000.

Sf

. Line Id Width 1

28.000 32.250

  • J

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10 IP"".((""-*

i
. 1*1*--
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Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-P55C PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHtET (SEWS)

GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2114/92 Status: Yes Sheet 10of13

!,D __ : _P...,..-5_5_C_(,,,_R_e_v_._O_.:_) ________

..__Cl.'!lss : ~[ ~Horizontal Pumps Description : CHARGING PUMP C Building : AB Floor.f:L" :* 5-90.-=o-=:0---.....--.,..........R-o_o_m_,...,.R_o_w_/C_o_I_: -10_4_B ___

._ **~~-

1------------------'---

Manufacturer, Model, Etc. :

'------------"-------~~o-.*:-*-*.. *. =*------------------,..--'

Embedment Length: (10.00 in: Min Reqd. to achieve full capacity):= 4.00 in.

Gap at Threaded Anchor: 0.00 in.

Crack Size : 0.000 in.

Essential Relays in Cabinet : No Adequate Equipment Base Strength and Structural Load Path: Yes

  • Embedment Steel and Pads Adequately Installed : Yes Reduction Factor Input for Anchor# 3 Adequately Installed : Yes Embedment Length: (10.00 in. Min Reqd. to achieve full capacity):= 4.00 in.

Gap at Threaded Anchor: 0.00 in.

Crack Size : 0.000 in.

Essential Relays in Cabinet : No Adequate Equipment Base Strength and Structural Load Path: Yes Embedment Steel and Pads Adequately Installed : Yes Reduction Factor Input for Anchor# 4 Adequ*ately Installed: Yes Embedment Length: (10.00 in. Min Reqd. to achieve full capacity):= 4.00 in.

Gap at Threadeq Anchor: 0.00 in.

Crack Size : 0.000 in.

Essential Relays in Cabinet : No Adequate Equipment Base Strength and Structural Load Path: Yes Embedment Steel and Pads Adequately Installed: Yes Reduction Factor Input for Anchor# 5 Adequately*lnstalled: Yes Embedment Length: (10.00*in. Min Reqd. to achieve full capacity):= 4.bo in.

Gap at Threaded Anchor: 0.00 in.

Crack Size: 0.000 in.

Essential Relays in Cabinet : No Adequate Equipment Base Strength and Structural Load Path: Yes Embedment Steel and Pads Adequately Installed: Yes Reduction Factor Input for Anchor# 6 Adequately Installed : Yes Embedment Length: (10.00 in. Min Reqd. to achit::ve full capacity):;:: 4.00 in.

Gap at Threaded Anchor : 0.00 in.

Crack Size : 0.000 in.

Essential Relays in Cabinet : No Adequate Equipment Base Strength and Structural Load Path: Yes Embedment Steel and Pads Adequately Installed: Yes

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-P55C PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2/14/92 Status: Yes Sheet 11 of 13

~---.,,,---~------------"~----*-=---.....------.,...,.......,....--....,....,,,---'-----___..;..... *-***-*-cr----t ID: P-55C (Rev. O)

Class: 5. Horizontal Pumps

,,~-.

.....:...... _____ ~~------------'------"----~=.

.. -/:.:... *-----t Description : CHARGING PUMP C Building: AB

=-~:=-*=*~*-*=--**I Floor El.: 590.00 Manufacturer, Model, Etc~-:

--~---

  • Reduction Factor Input for Anchor# 7 Adequately Installed: Yes Embedment Length : (10.00 in. Min R'*~qd. to achieve full capacity} := 4.00 in.

Gap at Threaded Anchor : 0.00 in.

Crack Size : 0.000 in.

Essentia_I Relays in Cabinet : No Adequate Equipment Base Strength and Structural Load Path: Yes

  • Embedment Steel and Pads Adequately Installed: Yes Reduction Factor Input for Anchor#_ 8
  • Adeql,!ately installed: Yes Embedment Length*: (10.00 in. Min Reqd. to achieve full capacity}:= 4.00 in.

Gap at Threaded Anchor: 0.00 in..

Crack Size: 0.000 in.

Essential Relays in Cabinet : No *

  • Adequate _Equipment Base Strength and Structural Load Path :Yes
  • Embedment Steel and Pads Adeql,lately Installed*: Yes R~du~tio~ Factor Input for Anchor# *9
    • .~i.

Adequat~ly Installed: Yes Embedment L~ngth : (10.00 in.. Min Reqd. to achieve_ full capacity} := 4.00 in.

  • Gap at Threaded Anchor: 0.00 in.

Crack Size : 0.000 in.

Essential Relays in. Cabinet : No Adequate Equipment Base Strength and Structural Load Path: Yes Embedment Steel and Pads Adequately Installed: Yes Reduction Fae.tor Input for Anchor# 1 O Adequately Installed: Yes Embedment Length: (10.00 in. Min Reqd. to achieve full capacity}:= 4.00 in.

Gap at Threaded Anchor : 0.00 in.

Crack Size : 0.000 in.

Essential Relays in Cabinet : No Adequate Equipment Base Strength and Structtiral Load Path: Yes

.Embedment Steel and Pads AdequatelyJnstalled : Yes..

Reduction Factors Data Current. Yes Anc Pall/

Pallr/

No Id Vall Vallr RT RN RL RG RS RE 1

1.

449.44 NIA 1.00.1.00 0.18 1.00 1.00 x

2247.22 NIA 1.00 1.00 0.18 1.00 1.00 x

2 1

449.44 NIA 1.00 1.00 0.18 1.00 1.00 x

2247.22 NIA 1.00 1.00 0.18 1.00 1.00 x

RF 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 RC RR RP RB RM 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00. 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00

'lJJ.. /Ii.)J. '1** 11-"'"*

'=-=--*.1~.=--

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-$EWS-P55C PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT GIP-;~ev 2, Corrected, 2/14/92 ING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

SCREEN ID: P-55C"(Rev.

==

Description:==

CHA Building :*A1r-Ma~~fr.jur_>.-_"fu1_0 Sta~l.ls: Yes Sheet 12of13

0)

I Class: 5. Horizontal Pum~s,0

~GING PUMP C I Floor El. : 590.00

J= Ro~~n:11-~9w/Col : 104B

.del, Etc.:

... ---:-~*-:..:.......:,.;-:..

1--3___.l-"**r.. *r.... 449*~44 N/A 1.00 1.00 0.18 1.00 1.00 x

o.93 -no 1.00 1.oo 1.oo 1.00 I_. 2247.22 N/A 1.00 1.00 0.18 1.00 1.00 X

0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1--4-1---f

  • 449.44 NIA 1.00 1.00 0.18 1.00 1.00 x

o.93 * --1--.=oo=-+....,.1.-=-oo,,_*.+-..,.1"""'.o""'"o........,1-=.o~o..........,1,....,.o=o-i 2247.22 N/A 1.00 1.00 0.18 1.00 1.00 X

0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5

1 449.44 N/A 1.00 1.00 0.18 1.00 1.00

  • X 0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00

~247.22 N/A 1.00 1.00 0.18 1.00 1.00 X

0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 6

1 449.44 N/A 1.00 1.00

  • 0.18 1.00 1.00 X

0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2247.22 N/A 1.00 1.00 0.18 1.00 1.00 X

0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 7

1 449.44 N/A 1.00 1.00 0.18 1.00 1.00 X

0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2247.22 N/A 1.00 1.00 0.18 1.00 1.00 X

0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 8

1

  • 449.44*

N/A 1.00 1.00 0.18 1.00 1.00 X

0.93 1.00 1.00

'1.00 1.00 1.00 2247.22 NIA 1.00 1.00 0.18 1.00 1.00 X

0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 9

1 449.44 NIA 1.00 1.00 0.18 1.00 1.00 X

0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2247.22.

N/A 1.00 1.00 0.18 1.00 1.00 X

0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 10 1

. 449.44 N/A 1.00 1.00 0.18 1.00 1.00 X

0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00

.____._~~-_.__2_2_41_.2~2__.__N_l_A_~1_.o_o_._1_.o_o_,_o_._18_..__1._oo_.__1_.oo_.__x___.__o_.9_3.........,1_.o_o_._1_.o_o__.__1._oo___.__1_.o_o_._1_.o~o,.....

Legend" I

N/A *

-::::-~-..: = Not Applicable Pall

= Allowable Pull without Reduced Inspection

-~;;:.,

Vall

= Allowable Shear without Reduced Inspection e

Pal Ir

= Allowable Pull with Reduced Inspection Vallr

=Allowable Shear with Reduced Inspection

=Outlier x

= Reduction Factor Not Used RT

= Reduction Fact()r for Type of Anchorage RN

= Reduction Factor for Installation Adequacy

-~-

RL

= Reduction Factor for Embedment RG

= Reduction Factor for Gap at Anchors RS*

= Reduction Factor for Spacing RE

=Reduction Factor for Edge Distance RF

= Reduction Factor for Concrete S~rength RC

=Reduction Factor for Concrete Cracks RR

= Reduction Factor for Essential Relays RP

= Reduction Factor for Base Stiffness and Prying Action RB

=.Reduction Factor for Base Strength and Load Path RM

=Reduction Factor for Embed, Steel and Pads Analysis Results :

Analysis,J>erformeq: Yes Type of Analysis : Regular Spectral Accelerations (G's)

No N-S E-W Vertical Safety Factor 1

0.402 0.161 0.102 3.318 2

-0.402

-0.161

-0.102 3.082 3

-0.402 0.161 0.102 2.398

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-P55C PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2/14/92 Status: Yes Sheet 13of13 ID : P-55C (Rev_. p ) _

Class : 5. Horizontal Pumps Description : CHARGING PUMP C Building: AB Floor El.: 590.00 Room, Row/Col : 104B IV!anufacturer, Model, Etc. :

4 0.402

-0.161

-0.102

'***~'~'=--c-. 3:212 5

0.402

-0.161 0.102 2.281 6

-0.402 0.161

-0.102 3.349 7

0.402 0.161

-0.102 4.581 8

-0.402

-0.161 0.102 2.201 9

0.161 0.402 0.102 1.725 10

  • -0.161

-0.402

-0:102 5.770 11 0.161

-0.402 0.102 2.618 12

-0.161 0.402

-0.102 1.931 13

-0.161 0.402 0.102 1.725 14 0.161

-0.402

.:0.102 3.975 15 0.161 0.402

-0.102 1.931 16.

-0.161

-0.402 0.102 3.806 17 0.161 0.161 0.255 3.368 18

-0.161

-0.161

-0.255 12.027 19 0.161 0.161

-0.255 6.941 20

-0.161

-Q.161 0.255 3.037 21

-0.161 0.161 0.255 3.153 22 0.161

-0.161

-0.255 11.433 23 0.161

-0.161 0.255 2.72.3 24

-0.161 0.161

-0.255 6.943

  • .Minimum Safety Factor:

1.725 The Anchorage Capacity is

1. 725 times greater than the Demand

ENCLOSURE 4 CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY PALISADES PLANT DOCKET 50-255 DOCKET 72-7 LIMITED ANJ:\\L YTICAL REVIEW LA ROOS

Consumers Power Company - Palisades Nuclear Plant A-46 Cable Tray and Conduit Raceway Review

  • Lim.ited Analytical Review (LAR) Data Sheet.

Room No.: ___

.....:.n..:.:../=a _____ _

Selection No.:

LARGOS

---='--~...::;_:;;. __

Plant Location:

see attached Description and Sketch:

see attached Reference Calculation:

see attached Result:

Ou.tlier Analytically Resolved.

Additional Notes:

Certification: (Signatures of at least two Seismic Capability Engineers are required; one.

of whom is a licensed professional engineer.)

W. Djordjevic (S&A)

.*Name Steve Anagnostis (S&A)

Name Signature 4(z,s jq(

Date

.1/x/~r Date

JOB No. 9 2., C: Z 7 SQ SHEET

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ENCLOSURE 5 CONSUMERSP.QWER COMPANY PALISADES PLANT DOCKET 50-255 DOCKET 72-7 SAMPLE CALCULATIONS FOR TANKS AND HEAT EXCHANGERS

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-T73 PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2/14/92 Status: Yes Sheet 1of8

  • 10: T-73 (Rev. 0)

Class: 21 - Tanks and Heat Exctianger~

Description : QUENCH TANK Building : RB Floor El. : 625.00 Room, Row/Col : 335 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. :

BASIS: Horizontal TANK analysis

1. The buckling capacity of the shell of a large, flat-bottom, vertical tank is equal to or greater N/A than the demand.
2. The capacity of the anchor bolts and their embedments is equal to or greater than the Yes demand.
3. The capacity of connections between the anchor bolts and the tank shell is equal to or Yes greater than the demand.
4. Attached piping has adequate flexibility to accommodate the motion of a large, flat-bottom, N/A vertical tank.
5. A ring-type foundation is not used to support a large, flat-bottom, vertical tank.

NIA IS EQUIPMENT SEISMICALLY ADEQUATE?

COMMENTS SRRETF:

1 DjocrdPjCevic/Anagncostis 6

DRate: 7 6

/9/93 o Drwg #

-14, ev..

REF 2: CPCo Drwg # M1-L-C Sheet 364, Rev. 8..

Photo: 7-8&9 Horizontal tank on 2 saddles. Each saddle ah~hored with 8 1.25" cast-in-place J-bolts (REF 1 ).

Estimated weight= 1.3 * [Weights of 15' Sch. 40 2" pipe + 55' Sch. 40 6" pipe + 6.5' Sch. 40 1 O" pipe + Tank body

(=Pl x 9.5 x 0.06 x 18 x 490 + 2 x Pl x 4.75112 x 0.0625 x 490)] +Water(= 62.4 x Pl x 4.0625112 x 18) = 85 kips.

Weight density = 85 I (Pl x 4. 75 11 2 x 18) = 66.6 lbs/ft113.

Saddle weak.axis moment of interia = 5 x (1 x 9 11 3 / 12) + 89 x 1 11 3 / 12 = 311. in114.

Saddle shear area in weak axis direction = 5 x 1 x 9 = 45 in112.

Saddle shear cross-sectional area in weak axis direction and weak axis moment of interia are based on the fxied end support only. The four corner anchor bolts are ignored in the tank anchorage analysis because of their locations. Base plate welding size= 3/8* x 2 / 6 = 1-/8. See-document for evaluation of saddle stresses in weak axis bending.

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-T73 PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2/14/92 Status: Yes Sheet 2 of 8 lD : T-73 (Rev. 0)

~ _ Cjass: 21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers

==

Description:==

QUENCH TANK Building : RB Floor El. : 625.00 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. :

Evaluated by:

Owner's Review:

Attachment:

Pictures

Attachment:

T-73: Evaluation of saddle stresses in weak axis bending

Attachment:

TANK Analysis Results Room, Row/Col : 335 Date:

Date:

'""h.....,,. 1"'"'

t l'.~

u:;:: 11::::: lidl ib/i PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS}

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-T73 GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2/14/92 Status: Ye;;

Sheet 3 of 8 ID : T-73 (Rev. 0)

Class : 21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers

==

Description:==

QUENCH TANK Building : RB Floor El. : 625.00 Room, Row/Col : 335 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. :

PICTURES Figure 1: T-73

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-T73 PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2/14/92 Status: Yes Sheet4 of 8 ID : T-73 (Rev. 0)

Class: 21 -: Tanks and Heat Exchangers Description-:-QUENeH 'fANK--

Building : RB Floor El. : 625.00 Room, Row/Col : 335 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. :

T-73: Evaluation of saddle stresses in weak axis bending

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PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-T73 GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2/14/92 Status: Yes Sheet 5 of 8 ID : T-73 (Rev. 0)

Class: 21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers

  • Description*: QUENCH 'TANK -- * -

Building : RB Floor El. : 625.00 1---~---"--~~~~~~~~~--'-~

Manufacturer, Model, Etc. :

Room, Row/Col : 335 TANK Analysis Results Step 1 - Input Data a) Assumptions

1. Tank is cylindrical, horizontally oriented and supported on saddles.

Yes

2. Tank and saddles are made of carbon steel.

Yes

3. Saddles are uniformly spaced.

Yes

4. Saddles overhang is less than spacing*/ 2.

Yes

5. Base plates have slotted anchor bolt holes for thermal growth except for the base plate under Yes the fixed saddle.
6. Imposed nozzle loads are not significant.

Yes

7. The tank foundation is adequate.

Yes

8. Anchor bolts are cast in place or expansion type.

Yes b) Materials Weight of Tank+ Fluid 85.0 kips Weight Density of Tank+ Fluid 66.6 lbS/ftA3 Saddle Elastic Modulus 30000.0 ksi Saddle Shear Modulus 11538.0 ksi Base Plate Yield Strength 36.0 ksi Anchor Type 1-1/8 in 90 deg. J-Bolts c) Dimensions Tank Diameter, D 9.5 ft Tank length, L 18.0ft Tank Thickness, t 0.6875 in Height of Tank + Fluid C.G., Hcg 5.75 ft Number of Saddles 2

Saddle Spacing, S 10.67 ft Saddle Height, h 12.0 in Saddle Shear cross-sectional area 45.0 inA2 Saddle Weak Axis Moment of lnteria 311.0 inA4 Number of Bolt Locations I Saddle 2

Number of Bolts I Bolting Location 2

Extreme Bolt Spacing, D' 4.17 ft Anchor Bolt Eccentricity, e 7.0 in Weld Thickness 0.125 in Base Plate Thickness 0.625 in

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-T73 PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2114/92 Status: Ye~.

Sheet6 of 8 ID : T-73 (Rev. 0)

Class: 21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers 8escription-: QUENGH -T-AN15-- -

Building : RB


,...1 """F,....lo-or-E=1-.. -. 6,...,2"'""5....,_0--0-----...... l--R_o_o_m_,.,.,.Rowj~o17_-:fa5 Manufacturer, Model, 0E_!.c:_: ------------------

--~----1 d) Anchor Bolts Type= 90 Deg J-Bolt Diameter= 1-1/8 in Manufacturer =

Product Name =

Pullout Shear Nominal Capacity 33.8 kips 16.9 kips I Concrete Compression Strength, fc' = 3000.0 psi Reduction Parameters Capacity Reduction Factor Label Check Condition Pullout Shear.

1. Type of Anchorage Yes 1.0

- 1.0

2. lnstall~Jion Adequacy Yes Installation is adequate.

1.0 *'

1.0

3. Embedment Length Yes Embedment Length = 18.5 0.39 1.0
  • in
4. Gap at Threaded Anchors Yes Gap size= 0.0 in 1.0 1.0'
5. Spacing between Anchorages Yes 1.0

.1.-0

6. Edge Distance No
7. Concret~ Strength and Condition Yes 0.93 0.93
8. Concrete Crack Location and Size Yes Crack Size= 0.0 in 1.0 1.0

\\.>:. *'

9. Essential Relays in.Cabinets Yes Essential relays are not 1.0 1.0 present*:
10. Base Stiffness and Prying Action Yes 1.0.

1.0

11. Equipment Base Strength and Yes Base strength and loi=id path 1.0

- -1.0 Structural Load Path are O.K:

12. Embedment Steel arid Pads Yes Installation is O.K.

1.0 1.0 Does the tank satisfy.all the assumptions and is within the applicable ra*nge of parameters?*

"Yes Step 2 - The allowable J:>olt loads Allowable Tension Load, Pu' 12.239 kips Allowable Shear Load, Vu' 15.646 kips Step 3 - Determine base plate bending strength reduction factor I RB 0.383-Step 4 - Determine base plate weld strength reduction factor IRW 3.0939

Evaluation "40.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-T73.

PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT GIP Rev 2, Corrected; 2/14/92

'REENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Status: Yes Sheet 7 of 8 (Rev: 0)

I Class: 21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers n: QUENCH TANK ID: T-73 Descripti~

Building:-

Manutacf RB I Floor El. : 625.00 Room, Row/Col : 335 urer, Model, Etc. :

Step 5 - Determine the anchorage tension and shear allowable loads Allowable Anchorage Tension Load, Pu 4.688 kips Allowable Anchorage Shear Load, Vu 15.646 kips Step 6 - Calculate the ratios and values alpha (PuNu) 0.3 Wb 10.63 kips/bolt Vu/Wb 1.47 Hcg ID' "1.379 Hcg IS.

0.539 F1 2.236 F2

~

3.035 Step 7 - Determine the acceleration capacity of the tank anchorage lambda_1 0.659 G lambda_u 0.408 G Anchor Acceleration capacity, la!'Tlbda 0.408 G Step 8 - Determine the maximum saddle spacing for transverse and vertical ri~id frequency response

[Maximum Saddle Spacing, Sc 24.63 ft Step 9..:.. Compute the resonant frequency of the tank in the longitlJdinal direction Saddle Stiffness, Ks 11785.73 kips/iri Resonant Frequency of Tank in Longitudinal Direction 36.82 Hz Step 1 O - Determine the seismic demand acceleration I ZPA 0.32G*

Tank is rigid in all three directions.

Tank anchorage is adequate because anchorage acceleration capacity is greater than ZPA St~p 11 - Ct!eck the s~ddle st~sses The program does not check the saddle stresses Check the saddle stresses by an independent calculation

Evaluation No.: EA-POC0007899-SEWS-T73 PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT GIP Rev 2, Corrected, 2/14/92 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Status: Yes Sheet 8 of 8 ID: T-73 (Rev. 0)

I Class: 21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers

  • nesctiption : QUENCHTANK- -

Building: RB

-1 Floor El.: 625.00 Room, Row/Col : 335 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. :

Summary IS EQUIPMENT SEISMICALLY APEQUATE?

The tank anchorage is adequate.