ML18041A080
| ML18041A080 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 04/17/1980 |
| From: | Lempges T NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP. |
| To: | Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| IEB-79-01, IEB-79-1, NUDOCS 8005120208 | |
| Download: ML18041A080 (26) | |
Text
7 NlAGAR U MOHAWK
'52 RO g,o8'IAGARA MOHAWKPOWER CORPORATION/300 ERIE BOULEVARDWEST, SYRACUSE. N.Y. 13202/TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511 April 17, 1980 Mr. Boyce H. Grier Director United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 Re: Docket No. 50-220 I.E. Bulletin 79-01B
Dear Mr. Grier:
Our letters of March 5 and March 28, 1980, transmitted partial responses to I.E.Bulletin 79-018.
That Bulletin addresses environmental qualification of-electrical equipment.
The attached information responds to the remaining requests contained in the Bulletin.
Discussion of previously outstanding items is also included.
Very truly yours, NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION I
r~
Qt~7 ~ ~ ~ ~r
~1<
Thomas E.
Lempges Vice President - Nuclear Generation DKG:jk Attachment
STATE OF NEW YORK
)
COUNTY OF ONONDAGA
)
ss:
THOMAS E.
LEMPGES, being duly sworn, says:
I am Vice President, Nuclear Generation, of Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation.
I have read the foregoing letter and the facts contained in the letter and attachment are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.
THOMAS E.
LEMPGES Sworn to before me on this
<a~day of April, 1980 NOTARY PUBLIC CYNTHIA A. PETTA t:otcrv tonne tti tho stoto ot ciew Yoik Qostittod in Onondooo t.o. No. 4682225 My Contntission Exoitos Motcht 30, 19+5.
RESPONSE
TO INSPECTION ANO ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN 79-018 APRIL 17, 1980
Provide a "master list" of all Engineered Safety Feature Systems (Plant Protection Systems) required to function under postulated accident conditions.
Accident.conditions are defined as the LOCA/HELB inside containment and HELB outside containment.
For each system within (including
- cables, EPAs, terminal blocks, etc.) the master list identify each Class IE electrical equipment item that is required to function under accident conditions.
Pages 1
and 2 of Attachment 2 are standard formats to be used for the "master list" with typical information included.
Electrical equipment
- items, which are components of systems listed in Appendix A of Attachment 4, which are assumed to operate in the FSAR safety analysis and are relied on to mitigate design basis events are considered in the scope of this Bulletin, regardless whether or not they are classified as part of the engineered safety features when the plant was originally licensed
,to operate.
The necessity for further upgrading of non-safety related plant systems will be dependent on the outcome of the licensees and the NRC reviews subsequent to TMI/2.
~Res onse The following additions to our March 28, 1980 submittal have been identified:
A)
The 115/4.16KV reserve transformer and Reactor Protection System (RPS)
Buses Il and 12 should be added t'o the list of electrical equipment common -to all systems.
Attached is a revised table (Table
- 1) of electrical equipment common to all systems which includes these items.
B)
Additional instrumentation systems'lectrical components, in areas exposed to harsh environmental conditions, are listed in Table 2. It should be noted that many components common to the Reactor Protection System are contained in the component list for reactor vessel instrumentation transmitted by Niagara Mohawk's March 5, 1980 response.
question 2
For each Class IE electrical equipment item identified in Item 1, provide written evidence of its environmental qualification to support the capability of the item to function under postulated accident conditions.
For those Class IE electrical equipment items not having adequate qualification data available, identify your plans for determining qualifications of these items and your schedule for completing this action.
Provide this in the format of.
~Res onse Our March 5, 1980 response provided system component evaluation work sheets for components inside the primary containment required to mitigate a
loss of coolant accident (LOCA).
The worksheets for electrical penetration assemblies and General Electric Vulkene cable should indicate that no thermal aging had been simulated.
Attached are revised worksheets for these two components.
In our March 28, 1
response.to this question, it s stated that ev'aluation worksheets for components outside the primary containment would not be submitted unless it'was determined that such components are subject to harsh environments during a
LOCA or high energy line break (HELB).
An evaluation of possible harsh environments outside the primary containment has been completed.
This evaluation indicates that certain general areas may be subject to harsh environmental conditions of temperature and relative humidity.
The specific results of this evaluation are included in response to guestion 3.
Niagara Mohawk is presently identifying equipment in the harsh environment areas outside the primary containment and will submit component qualification evaluation worksheets for such equipment by March 31, 1981.
(}uestion 3 For equipment identified in Items 1
and 2, provide service condition profiles (i.e., temperature,
- pressure, etc.
as a function of time).
This data should be provided for design basis accident conditions and qualification tests performed.
This data may. be provided in profile or tabular form.
Response
Service conditions due to a LOCA inside the Nine Mile Point Unit 1 primary containment, were provided in the March 5, 1980 Niagara Mohawk submittal.
Evaluation of harsh environmental conditions due to HELB outside of the primary containment indicates that generally the react'or building and turbine building may see temperatures of 150F for extended periods of time, building design pressure
( less than 1 psig) and relative humidity of 100K on all elevations.
Local areas may see direct'team or water impingement and higher temperatures.
Oetailed radiation service conditions outside of the Nine Mile Point Unit 1 primary containment following a LOCA are being evaluated.
Preliminarily, it has been determined that the containment spray piping outside of the primary containment is the main shine source.
Integrated radiation doses in areas where radiation sensitive-equipment may be located will be included in evaluation worksheets to be provided by March 31, 1981.
guestion 4
Evaluate the qualification of your Class IE electr ical equipment against the guidelines provided in Attachment 4., "Interim Staff Position on Environmental gualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment",
provides supplemental information to be used with these guidelines.
For the equipment identified as having "Outstanding Items" by Attachment 3, provide a detailed "Equipment gualification Plan."
Include in this plan specific actions which wi 11 be taken to determine equipment qualification and a schedule for completing the actions.
Response
The March 5, 1980 Niagara Mohawk response to I.E. Bulletin 79-01B contained qualification evaluation worksheets for electrical components within the primary containment required to mitigate a LOCA.
Outstanding items on these worksheets are being further investigated as described below.
A)
D.
G. O'rien electrical penetration assemblies and General Electric Vulkene cable:
Niagara Mohawk will test these components under LOCA service conditions including water spray and simulated thermal aging.
Testing, to be performed by the Franklin Institute Research Laboratory will begin by November, 1980 and is expected to be completed by February, 1981.
B)
Plans to address outstanding items for qualification of Limitorque valve operators, automatic depressurization system solenoids, and General Electric EB-5 terminal boards are to be reported by March 31, 1981.
Gener'al Electric has been retained to evaluate this equipment and -this date is the earliest we expect results to be available.
The March 28, 1980 Niagara Mohawk response to I.E. Bulletin 79-01B contained qualification evaluation worksheets for electrical components inside the primary containment which are not required for LOCA mitigation but may be useful to the operator (referenced in LOCA procedure).
Recirculation pump isolation valve motor operators are being addressed as indicated in Item 8 above for Limitorque valve operators.,
Instrumentation components within the primary containment will not be evaluated further.
Caution will be provided in operator procedures r egarding the questionable qualification of operator aid type equi'pment by December 31, 1980.
Plans to address potential electrical equipment qualification deficiencies for equipment outside the primary containment will be reported by March 31, 1981.
General Electric has been retained to perform the evaluation of this equipment and we have been informed that this is the best schedule we can expect due to similar work they are performing for other licensees.
(}uestion 5
Identify the maximum expected flood level inside the pr imary containment resulting from postulated'ccidents.
Specify this flood level by elevation such as 620 ft. elevation.
Provide this information in the format of.
~Res ense Maximum expected flood level elevation inside the pr imary containment resulting from postulated accidents has been previously identified in the March 5 and March 28, 1980 Niagara Mohawk submittals.
It has been determined that the maximum expected flood level will be within the suppression chamber.
SYSTEM TABLE 1 ELECTRICAL EQUIPME COMMON TO ALL SYSTEMS Plant Identification Number*
COMPONENTS Generic Name Location Inside Primary Outside Primary Containment Containment FLEXIBLE WATERTITE ELECTRICAL COND.
FLEX.
COND. FITTINGS J.B.
IXXXXX-A THRU ZZZ COPE - TRAYMASTER CABLE TRAY COPE - CAGE TRAY FITTINGS 115/4. 16 KV RESERVE TRANSFORMER RPS BUS 11 5 12 SEALTITE CONDUIT VARIOUS SIZES SEALTITE FITTINGS VARIOUS SIZES JUNCTION BOXES VARIOUS SIZES CABLE TRAYS VARIOUS SIZES CABLE TRAY FITTINGS VARIUS SIZES PREFERRED POWER FOR AUX. ELEC.
EQUIP.
120 V AC POWER
SySTEM ADDITIONAL INSTRUMENTON TABLE 2 P1ant Identification Number*
COMPONENTS Generic Name Location Inside Primary Outside Primary Containment Containment 36-03A 36-038 36-03C 36-03D 36-04A 36-048 36-04C 36-04D 36-05A 36-058 36-05C 36-05D 36-06A 36-068 36-06C 36-06D 36-07A 36-078 36-07C 36-07D 36-08A 36-088 36-08C 36-OSD LEVEL TRANS.
LEVEL TRANS.
LEVEL TRANS.
LEVEL TRANS.
LEVEL TRANS.
LEVEL TRANS.
LEVEL TRANS.
LEVEL TRANS.
LEVEL TRANS.
LEVEL TRANS.
LEVEL TRANS.
LEVEL TRANS.
h PRESS.
TRANS.
4 PRESS.
TRANS.
~ PRESS.
TRANS.
~ PRESS.
TRNAS.
PRESS.
TRANS.
PRESS.
TRANS.
PRESS.
TRANS.
PRESS.
TRANS.
PRESS.
TRANS.
PRESS.
TRANS.
PRESS.
TRANS.
PRESS.
TRANS.
SySTEM ADOITIONAL -INSTRUME TION TABLE 2 Plant Identification Number*
COMPONENTS Generic Name Location Inside Primary Outside Primary Containment Containment NR 108 A
NR 108 B
NR 108 E
NR 108 C
NR 108 0
NR 108 F 01-26A 01-26B 01-26C 01-260 01-26E 01-26F 01-26G Ol-26H 201.2-476A 201.2-476B 201. 2-476C 201.2-476D 1810A 1B10B 1810C 1B10D 1810E 1B10F PRESS.
SWITCH PRESS.
SWITCH PRESS.
SWITCH PRESS.
'SWITCH PRESS.
SWITCH PRESS.
SWITCH PRESS.
TRANS.
L PRESS.
TRANS.
a PRESS.
TRANS.
6 PRESS.
TRANS.
6 PRESS.
TRANS.
6 PRESS.
TRANS.
5 PRESS..
TRANS.
a PRESS.
TRANS.
PRESS TRANS.
PRESS.
TRANS.
PRESS.
TRANS.
PRESS.
TRANS.
TEMP.
SWITCH TEMP.
SWITCH TEMP.
SWITCH TEMP.
SWITCH TEMP.
SWITCH TEMP.
SWITCH
1
.SYSTEM ADDITIONAL INSTRUMEIel'ION TABLE 2 Plant Identification Number*
COMPONENTS Generic Name Location Inside Primary Outside Primary Containment Containment 1810G 1810H 1810 J 1810K 1810L 1810M 1810N 1810P 1810Q 1810R RN05A RN058 RN05C RN05D RV45A RV458 RV45C RV45D RN07A RN078 RN 04 RN 04 RN 04 TEMP.
SWITCH TEMP.
SWITCH TEMP.
SWITCH TEMP.
SWITCH TEMP.
SWITCH TEMP.
SWITCH TEMP.
SWITCH TEMP.
SWITCH TEMP.
SWITCH TEMP.
SWITCH RADIATION ELEMENT RADIATION ELEMENT RADIATION ELEMENT RADIATION ELEMENT
~ PRESS.
SWITCH
~ PRESS.
SWITCH
~ PRESS.
SWITCH b, PRESS.
SWITCH RADIATION ELEMENT RADIATION ELEMENT RADIATION ELEMENT RADIATION ELEMENT RADIATION ELEMENT
.SYSTEM ADDITIONAL INSTRUME ION TABLE 2 Plant Identification Number*
COMPONENTS Generic Name Location Inside Primary Outside Primary Containment Containment RN 04 1B06-13 1806-14 1B06-23'806-24 201.2-476A-D (4) 36-03A-D (4) 36-03A-D (4) 36-04A-D (4) 36-08A-D (4) 36-08A-D (4) 36-05A-D (4) 36-06A-D (4) 01-26A-D (4) 01-26A-H (8) 36-07A-D (4) 36-07A-D (4) 01-01 MSIV 01-02 MSIV 01-03 MSIV 01-04 MSIV IJ12 IJ90 RADIATION ELEMENT TEMP.
ELEMENT TEMP.
ELEMENT TEMP.
ELEMENT TEMP.
ELEMENT TRIP UNIT (MASTER)
TRIP UNIT (MASTER)
TRIP UNIT (SLAVE)
TRIP UNIT (MASTER)
TRIP UNIT (MASTER)
TRIP UNIT (SLAVE)
TRIP UNIT (MASTER)
TRIP UNIT (MASTER)
TRIP UNIT (MASTER)
TRIP UNIT (MASTER)
TRIP UNIT (MASTER)
TRIP UNIT (SLAVE)
POSITION SWITCH POSITION SWITCH POSITION SWITCH POSITION SWITCH FLOW TRANS.
FLOW SWITCH
4 Facility:
Nine Mile Point Unit l Docket:
50-220 SySTEM COMPONENT EVALUATION WORK SHEET ENVIRONMENT DOCUMENTATION REF.*
Equipment Description Parameter pecification ualification Specification Qualification Qualification Method Outstanding Items system:
Containment Plant ID No.Isolation H/A Operating Time 60 Secs.*".
28 hrs 5
2.3 Simultaneous None Component:
El eCtri Cal Penetration Assemblies Manufacturer:
D.
G. O'rien 19 pin 816 Model No.:
5 pin 816 4 pin 88 28 pin 816 Function:
Electr ical Penetrations Accuracy:
Spec:
H/A Demon: N/A Service:
Containment Isol ati on Temperature
~ ( F)
Pressure (psia)
Relative Humidity Spray Radiation SEE ACCIDENT AND TEST PROFILES PROVIDED looa l00%
NA 1.15 M rads 26 M rads
'4 2.3 2.3 23 Simultaneous Simultaneous Simultaneous HA Simulation Hone None Hone Note I
None Location: Containment El'59', 237'ging NA NA NA'-" "
Note -
Containment Flood Level:
within torus Yes Above Flood Level:
No Submergence H/A H/A H/A N/A N/A
<<Documentation
References:
- 1. FSM, Appendix E, Figures E-31 and E-33 2.
FIRL Test Report F-C4879, dated December 1977 3.
FIRL Report F-C4879-1, dated April 1978
- 4. Letter dated March 7, 1979, D.P. Disc (HMPC) to T. Ippolito (NRC)
- 5. FSM Ch.VI, Table VI-3
- For accident profile below notes:
- 1. Evaluation to be performed to determine if qualification testing is. required
Facility:
Docket:
Nine Mile Point Unit 1 50"220 SYSTEM COMPONENT EVALUATION WORK SHEET 1
ei f
~
I 1
Equipment Description I
'Parameter ENVIRONMENT pecification ualification DOCUMENTATION REF.*
Specification Qualification Qualification Method Outstanding
,Items System:
COntainmqnt Isolatson Plant ID No.:
N/A Operating j ~
Time I
'60 Secs **
28 hrs 3
~
Simultaneous Note 1
Hone component:
Electrical'able
'anufacturer:-
General Electric Temperature
( F)
Pressure (psia)
SEE ACCIDENT AND TEST PROFILES PROVIDED 2.3 2.3 Simultaneous Note 1
Simultaneous Note 1
None Hone Ho No.:
Function:
POWer g, COntrO Accuracy:
Spec:
H/A Demon: H/A Service:
COntainment Isolation Relative Humidity Spray Radiation 100%
NA 1.15 N rads 100%
26 H rads 2.3 NA Simul taneous Note. 1 Simulation Hone Note 2
None Loca tion:
COn ta i nmen t Aging NA NA'HA, Note 2
Containment Flood Level:
within torus yes Above Flood Level:
No e
Submergence N/A H/A H/A H/A N/A
- Documentation
References:
- l. FSAR, Appendix E, Figures E-31 and E-33 2 ~
FIRL Test Report F-C4879, dated December 1977 3.
FIRL Test Report F-C4879-1, dated April 1978
".. Letter dated triarch 7,
- 1979, D.P. Disc (NHPC) to T. Ippoli to (HRC) 5.
FSAR Ch. VI, Table VI-3 Notes:
- l. qualified as part of the Electrical Penetration Assembly Tests
- 2. Evaluation of ser vice conditions a9in9 and spray is being performed.
- For accident profile below
0