ML18009A330
| ML18009A330 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 01/10/1990 |
| From: | Becker R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9001120305 | |
| Download: ML18009A330 (52) | |
Text
'C.
DISTRIBUTION FOR MEETING
SUMMARY
DATED:
Facility: Harris
~II ~k~'..Frill~
NRC PDR Local PDR T. Murley J. Sniezek J.
Partlow S.
Varga E.
Adensam P. Anderson R.
Becker OGC E. Jordan D. Verrel li D. Notley S.
Saba 0.
Chopra F. Burrows ACRS (10)
B. Borchardt 12-G-18 12-G-18 12-G-18 14-E-4 14-B-20 14-B-20 14-8-20 15-B-18 MNBB-3302 RII 8-D-1 8-D-20 8-D-20 8-D-20 P-315 17-G-21
- Copies sent persons on facility service list
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 January 10, 1990 Docket No.
50-400 LICENSEE:
Carolina Power
& Light Company FACILITY:
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit I
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF THE DECEMBER 20, I989 MEETING REGARDING OCTOBER 9, 1989 GENERATOR-TRANSFORMER FIRE AND PLANT TRIP A meeting was held with Carolina Power
& Light Company (CP&L) on December 20, 1989, in Rockville, Maryland.
The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the October 9, 1989, electrical fault and resulting fires at the main generator and main transformer at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit I (Harris).
CP&L discussed their investigation of the event and their root cause determination.
The following people were in attendance:
CP&L NRC R. Richey C. Hinnan't W. Russell D. Tibb itts J.
Eads E.
Aden sam D. Verrelli R. Becker D. Notley S.
Saba 0.
Chopra F.
Burrows After comprehensive root cause evaluation, CP&L now believes that the electrical fault was initiated by residual debris from inlet damper failures on the isolated bus cooling system that occurred on February 27,
- 1988, and in the summer of 1989.
The louvers of the damper were aluminum and aluminum debris was recovered from the cooling duct.
Two pieces of debris shown at the meeting resembled a louver that had been mechanically mangled (probably from passing through the fan, downstream of the dampers) and one that appeared scored and
- melted, as if being involved in electrical arcing.
Strike marks from arcing were found upstream of the "8" main transformer in the duct surrounding the "A" isolated phase bus.
CP&L speculates that the arcing in the "A" phase duct resulted in ionization of the cooling air and the ionized cooling air and debris were swept into the "B" transformer bushing box which resulted in flashover to ground in the bushing box, involving both low-voltage bushings.
The fault caused the cracking of both low-voltage bushings, which leaked oil and ignited causing the transformer fire.
The resulting ground faults elevated the voltage of the generator neutral.
A sma 11 current transformer installed on one of the leads of the neutral to ground transformer, which is used as a radio frequency monitor to indicate incipient faults in the main generator, failed when the voltage of the main generator was increased by the ducting and main transformer ground faults.
The neutral lead from the generator and the current transformer were normally
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January 10, 1990 at ground potential.
When the voltage of the generator neutral was elevated, the insulating tape between the lead and current transformer was inadequate arid' the neutral lead faulted to ground through the current transformer.
Arcing in the area under the main generator burned holes in the main generator moisture sensing lines on the generator hydrogen system which allowed hydrogen to escape and ignite.
The ensuing hydrogen fire ignited a small oil fire in the main generator area.
The cursory root cause was believed to be the failure of insulators supporting the isolated phase bus from the duct.
However, after a more comprehensive investigation, CPSL now believes that the magnetic forces resulting from the massive ground faults caused the insulator failures and that failure of the,,
insulators was not the root cause.
Visual aids presented by CP8L at the meeting are enclosed.
Orignal Signed by:
Richard A. Becker, Project flanager Project Directorate II-I Division of Reactor Projects I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation cc:
See next page DISTR IBUTION OFC: PDI NAME:P DATE:I/4/90
- PDI -1 m
I/
/90
HARRIS
SUMMARY
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January 10, 1990 at ground potential.
When the voltage of the generator neutral was elevated, the insulating tape between the lead and current transformer was inadequate and the neutral lead faulted to ground through the current transformer.
Arcing in the area under the main generator burned holes in the main generator mcisture sensing lines on the generator hydrogen system which allowed hydrogen to escape and ignite.
The ensuing hydrogen fire ignited a small oil fire in the main generator area.
The cursory root cause was believed to be the failure of insulators supporting the isolated phase bus from the duct.
However, after a more comprehensive investigation, CP8L now believes that the magnetic forces resulting from the massive ground faults caused the insulator failures and that failure of the insulators was not the root cause.
Visual aids presented by CPKL at the meeting are enclosed.
Orignal Signed by:
Richard A. Becker, Project Hanager Project Directorate II-1 Division of Reactor Projects I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation cc:
See next page D I STR IBUTION OFC:PDI 1: DII-1 NAYiE:P n:R DATE:1/'90 1/'7/90
- PDII-1 m
1/
/90 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY Document Name:
HARRIS SUtHNRY
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Mr. L. M. Eury Carolina Power
& Light Company Shearon Harris CC:
Mr.
R.
E. Jones, General Counsel Carolina Power
& Light Company P.
0.
Box 1551
- Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Resident Inspector/Harris NPS c/o U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Route I, Box 315B New Hill, North Carolina 27562 Mr.
R.
B. Richey, Manager Harris Nuclear Project Harris Nuclear Plant P.
0.
Box 165 New Hill, North Carolina 27562 Mr.
H. A. Cole Special deputy Attorney General State of North Carolina P.
0.
Box 629
- Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Regional Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Mariet ta Street Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Mr.
C.
S. Hinnant Plant General Manager Harris Nuclear Plant P.
0.
Box 165 New Hill, Not th Carolina 27562 Mr. Dayne H. Brown, Chief Radiation Protection Section Di'vision of Facility Services N.
C. Department of Human Resources 701 Barbour Drive
- Raleigh, North Carolina 27603-2008
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Enclosure
~ t Carolina Povrer 8 light Company HARRIS PLANT ELECTRICAL FAULT/ FIRE / PLANT TRIP OCTOBER 9. 1989
resen a ion u ine o Introduction / Overview o Event Description e
Damage Assessment R.B. Richey Scotty Hinnant Scotty Hinnant o Accident Investigation Organization Scotty Hinnant o Root Cause Investigation o Conclusion Kent Russell R.B. Richey
ven escri ion e
Plant Arrangement o Turbine Generator and lsophase Bus Duct Arrangement e
Sequence of Events o Personnel 8 Equipment Performance
PIIYSICALLAYOUTOF SIINPP GENERATOR OUTPUT GENERATOR EL. 314 TOUAl s OOOO OOOO OOOO NEUTRAL 8US 8US DUCT OOOO OOOO OOOO NEUTRAL GROUNDING TRANSFORMER EL.
286'ROUND LEVEL EL 261'UPPORTS (TYPICAL)
OOOO OOOO OOOO l1AIN TRANSFORMERS
ISOLATED PHASE BUS DUCT HEAVY ALUMINUM ENCLOSURE HIGH CREEPAGE INSULATOR BUS CONDUCTOR CROSS - SECTION
23:05 23:05 23:09 23 12 23:15 23:20 23:35 23:36 23:41 uence of Events Monday, October 9, 1989 Generator / Main Power transformer differentia relay tripped.
Generator output breaker and exciter breakers opened.
AO reported two flashes near "B"main power transformer and under main generator to MCR.
Plant Fire Brigade activated.
Fire Tech tripped transformer deluge valve to spray down transformer.
AO informed Control Room of hydrogen fire on 286'urbine Bldg. and fires at transformer and generator enclosure.
AO isolated hydrogen supply valve.
Control Room called 911 to request off-site fire department assistance.
Alertdeclared due to release of flammable gas in Protected Area..
First fire department arrived.
Second fire department arrived.
uence of Events Tuesday, October 10, 1989 00:00 00:22 00'40 Fire at 286'urbine Bldg. still burning but under control.
NRC Resident Inspector arrived on site.
Visual flames extinguished at all locations.
01:02 Technical Support Center fullymanned and activated.
01:03 Carbon dioxide purge of generator (started earlier) reached 2 psig.
04:45 Allfires were verified out.
02:43 Alertwas terminated and TSG deactivated after fires were verified out, CO 2purge was In progress, and Fire Watches were set.
Personnel and Equipment Performance Plant protective circuitry worked as designed.
Transfer from UAT's to SUT's functioned as designed.
Off-site power not lost.
Forced RCS circulation not lost.
Fire Brigade performance was outstanding.
Local fire department response was outstanding.
Security access for offsite emergency response personnel did not delay response.
Damage Assessment lwain Transformer:
Lowvoltage and high voltage bushings Isophase bus duct connection box Radio Frequency Monitor:
Current transformer Monitor Enclosure Neutral Bus:
Neutral Bus and enclosure Neutral grounding transformer enclosure Isophase Bus Duct:
A-Phase connector melted to enclosure 5 insulators broken in "A" 4 insulators broken in "B" Generator:
Neutral bushings Current transformers Neutral lead box Fire Damage:
Piping and misc. cable/conduit damage localized to area near neutral grounding transformer
cci eh nvesi aion Organization Investigative Approach
- Short Term Team
- INPO Incident Investigation Team
- Long Term Continuing Investigation Team
INVESTIGATIVE APPRO ACH OCTOBER 9, 1989 INCIDENT I Rtw CP8cL SHORT TERM INVESTIGATION TEAM (10 MANTEAM)
COORDINATED INPO INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM (4 INPO+ 2 CPScL)
CONTINUING PROVIDE INPUT AND ASSISTANCE AS REQUIRED LONG TERM CONTINUING INVESTIGATION TEAM (2 CPEcL, 1 INPO)
CPRL SHORT TERM INVESTIGATION TEAM
~ PURPOSE:
TO REVIEW PLANT DATA, STAFF OBSERVATION, AND EQUIPMENT DAMAGE TO DETERMINE ROOT CAUSE AND DAMAGE ASSESSMENT 0 METHODS:
MULTI-DISCIPLINETEAM OF CPRL AND CONSULTANTS WAS ASSEMBLED.
TECHNICAL SUPPORT PROJECT ENGINEER WAS APPOINTED TEAM LEADER FROM THE TSC IMMEDIATELYFOLLOWING EVENT.
FAA "TYPE" REVIEW OF DATA AND DEBRIS WAS UTILIZED TO DEVEI.OP THE FAILURE SCENARIO.
~ ORGANIZATION:
ROOT CAUSE/
DAMAGE ASSESSM'T C. S. HINNANT KEY:
SITE PERSONNEL CPRL OFFSITE TURBINE GENERATOR M. H. LONG INCIDENT INVESTIG./
DAMAGE ASSESSM'T R. ZULA INCIDENT REPORT DRAFT A. GONZAIEZ
.COIGULTANT TRANSFORMER/
BUS DUCT J.
MORRIS NEUTRAL GROUND/
PROTECTIVE RELY K. HEFFNER TURBINE GENERATOR R. RABOLD DELTA-UNIBUS SUBSTATION MAINT.
ELEC.
CREW T. HALKER WESTINGHOUSE NSIAM NEUT, GRND. DES.
A. COCKEILL (NED)
PROT. RELAYING L SmART (TRANS)
INPO INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM
~ PURPOSE:
TO PROYIDE AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE INCIDENT, TO DETERMINE ROOT CAUSE, AND TO SHARE LESSONS LEARNED WITH THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY
~ METHODS:
REVIEW PLANT DATA EXAMINE DEBRIS FIO'IN CHART FACTS AND CAUSAL FACTORS ORGANIZATION:
INPO TEAM LEADER CP8(L CORPORATE NUCLEAR SAFETY ENGINEER CP8cL ON-SITE NUCLEAR SAFETY ENGINEER INPO,'NPO I
,'INPO IIIVESTIGATOII: 'ISVESTIGATOITI 'IIIVESTIGATOGI KEY SITE PERSONNEL CP8cL OFF-SITE INPO
l' LONG TERM CONTINUING INVESTIGATION TEAM
~ PURPOSE:
TO CONTINUE TO CHALLENGE THE INCIDENT SCENARIO TO ENSURE THAT THE ROOT CAUSE HAS SEEN IDENTIFIED AND APPROPRIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN.
~ METHODS:
PERFORM ADDITIONAL LABORATORY TESTING AND DESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATIONS REVIEW FAILURES AT OTHER PLANTS CONTACT VENDORS AND CONSULTANTS FOLLOW-UP ON "LOOSE THREADS" FROM SHORT-TERM INVESTIGATION TEAM CPRL CORPORATE NUCLEAR SAFETY CP8cL ON-SITE NUCLEAR SAFETY NPO INVESTIGATOR (PART-TIuE3 ICDNSULTANTS AND)
ERE CENTER LAR I
(AS REQUIRED)
SITE KEY:
oo ause nves i a ion I Cause and effect relationships I Detailed initiating sequence Root Causes
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e uence o ven s
- 1. Electrical faults in "Delta" section of isophase bus (A-Phase).
- 2. Double phase-to-ground fault at 8-Phase main transformer.
S. Electrical fault in generator neutral grounding transformer cubical.
- 4. Phase-to-ground fault in "MAIN"section of isophase bus (A-Phase).
- 5. Hydrogen fire under main generator.
- 6. Oil fire in main generator housing.
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- 1. Electrical Faults in "Delta" Section of Isophase Bus o loose debris in bus duct from prior bus duct cooling unit damper failures.
e None identified.
e Hundreds of arc strike marks left on bus duct conductor and enclosure.
e Airmolecules ionized in bus duct, reducing dielectric strength of bus duct cooling air.
e A-Phase-t~round flashover in B-Phase main power transformer.
Fault propogated to B-Phase bushing resulting in double phase-t~round fault.
PHYSICALLAYOUTOF SHNPP GENERATOR OUTPUT GENERATOR EL. 3I4'O UAT's OOOO OOOO OOOO NEUTRAL BUS BUS DUCT OOOO OOOO OOOO tiEUTRAL GROUNDING TRANSFORtIER EL.
266'ROUND LEVEL EL 26 I'UPPORTS OYPICAL)
OOOO OOOO OOOO I1AIN TRANSFORMERS
- 2. Double Phase-to-Ground Fault at B-Phase Main Power Transformer o Reduced dielectric strength from arcing in A-Phase of "Delta" bus.
9 Carryover by cooling air of ionized gases or debris from fault in A-Phase of Main Bus.
o Dirtylow voltage bushings on main power transformer.
9 Faulty connection on transition plates at low voltage bushing.
Eff e Oil from cracked bushings ignited and burned for approximately one hour.
6 Differential portective relays operated, resulting in operation of generator lockout relay and isolation of electrical fault from main generator and transmission grid.
e Generator, turbine, and reactor trips.
e Main generator neutral voltage elevated.
- 3. Electrical Fault in Generator Neutral Grounding Transformer Cubicle Nl Pr I
e Damaged insulation on neutral conductor where radio frequency monitor current transformer was mounted.
Note: Insulation was not challenged until neutral voltage elevated by phase-t~round fault at main power transformer.
o Faulty connection of neutral conductor to primary of neutral grounding
,transformer.
e Destruction of neutral grounding transformer cubicle from force of electrical fault.
e loss of neutral grounding resistor from generator circuit so that phase-to~round currents were no longer limited to a small value.
e Damage to generator water detector hydrogen line and ignition of escaping hydrogen.
e Damage to surrounding electrical components from fault currents.
e Main generator neutral voltage elevated.
NEUTRAL GROUNDING TRANSFORMER ENCLOSURE CABLE SUPPORT AS REQUIRED FUSE AND.MOLDER NEUTRAL BUS SURGE CAPACITOR CURRENT TRANS FOYER NEUTRAL GROUNDING TRANSFORMER ENCLOSURE I
l
- 4. Phase-to-Ground Fault in "Main"Section of Isophase Bus {A-Phase) o Magnetic forces from fault at main power transformer broke insulators in A-Phase and 8-Phase.
A-Phase conductor came into contact with bus duct enclosure creating phase-t~round fault.
o Insulator failure prior to any other electrical faults.
NOTE: Ifinsulators failed first, this would be the initiator of all other occurrences.
o Conductor and enclosure melted at point of contact.
o Molten aluminum was blown down bus duct and deposited on insulators.
NEUTRAL GROUNDING TRANSFOR1ER i,
GENERATOR LEADS ~ DISCONNECT LINKS V) rn Cl Q
CD CP C:
C7 6)
AIR FLOW BUS PHASE FAN 1A FAN 18 5
i5 Q1 1st FAULTAT TRANSFOAt1ER BUSING Q2 2nd FAULT IN NEUTRAL BUS ENCLOSURE Q5 3rd FAULT IN BUS DUCT AREA WITH DAt1AGE GROUND l1AIN LEADS COOLING UNIT
0
ISOLATED P H ASE BUS DUCT TURBINE BUILDING UAT GA tlAIN TRANSFONER A
UAT GB HAIN TRANSF(REER PLAIN GENERATOR 0
0 Qo Oo Qo GB t1AIN TRANSFORMER TYPICAL INSULATORS INSULATORS OH BOTT(N OF BUS O
INSULATORS ON TOP OF BUS FAILEO ISULATORS
- 5. Hydrogen Fire Under Main Generator o Arcing from electrical fault in neutral grounding transformer enclosure burned holes in hydrogen line allowing hydrogen to escape and ignite.
I I
6 Hoies in the hydrogen line developed prior to the event from abrasion.
Arcing from electrical fault ignited the leaking hydrogen.
9 Rre propagated up to main generator housing and burned oil from broken seal oil lines.
4
- 6. Oil Fire in Main Generator Housing e Propation of hydrogen fire under main generator.
hrP i
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None considered.
9 Small oilfire in main generator housing.
e No major damage to generator.
Double Phase-t+4round Fault at "B" MPT Fault from Damper Debris Fault at Neutral Grounding Tl888folIller Enclosure Phasa4~round Fault ln Main $0 Bus
~~~ R~ ~OII Fire in Main Gen. Housing
C
ROOT CAUSES I.
PREVIOUS DAMPER FAILURES A.
CHRONOLOGY:
- INITIAI DAMPERS FAILED ON FEBRUARY 27, 1988.
NEW DAMPERS INSTALLED IN MARCH 1988.
- NEW DAMPERS DISCOVERED DAMAGED IN JULY 1989.
DAMAGED DAMPER FRAME REMOVED DURING SUBSEQUENT LOAD REDUCTION ON JULY 30, 1989 B.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS IDENTIFIED PRIOR TO THE EVENT:
- INSPECT ACCESSIBLE PORTIONS OF BUS DUCT IN '89 OUTAGE.
II.
INADEQUATE DESIGN FOR RADIO FREQUENCY MONITOR
- ONLY PRECURSOR WAS WESTINGHOUSE SERVICE BULLETINTO CHECK INSULATION DUE TO POTENTIAL SHOCK HAZARD ON RADIO FREQUENCY MONITOR COAX.
CONCLUSION
- CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
- ACTIONS TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE
- SHARING LESSONS LEARNED
- CPRL CONCLUSIONS
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
- REPLACED CABLE AND CONDUIT DAMAGED IN THE EVENT.
- REPLACED DAMAGED EQUIPMENT AND BUS DUCT SECTIONS.
- CUT AND ROTATED BUS DUCT SECTIONS WHERE FAULT OCCURRED TO PLACE INSULATORS ON BOTTOM.
- INSPECTED ALL INSULATORS.
Hl-POT TESTED MAIN GENERATOR WINDING.
- REPLACED DAMAGED TRANSFORMER BUSHINGS.
ACTIONS TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE
- CLEANED ENTIRE ISOPHASE BUS DUCT TO REMOVE DAMPER DEBRIS AND DEBRIS FROM THE FIRE.
- COMMITIED TO ESTABLISH PM INSPECTIONS OF INSULATORS AND NEUTRAL GROUNDING TRANSFORMER.
- REDESIGNED BUS DUCT COOLING UNIT DAMPERS AND INSTALLED A DEBRIS SCREEN.
REDESIGNED RADIO FREQUENCY MONITOR CURRENT TRANSFORMER.
- CONDUCTED A DESIGN REVIEW OF ISOPHASE BUS DUCT AND VERIFIED THAT THE DESIGN WAS ADEQUATE.
SHARING LESSONS LEARNED WITH INDUSTRY ON OCTOBER 24 INPO ISSUED SEN-65 TITLED "FULL POWER PLANT TRIP AND DAMAGED MAJOR ELECTRICAL BUSES FROM INSULATOR FAILURES."
LER 89%17 WAS ISSUED TO NRC.
INFORMATION HAS BEEN PROVIDED TO NUMEROUS UTILITIES WHO HAVE CONTACTED THE PLANT.
DUKE POWER AND FP&L PERSONNEL HAVE VISITED THE SITE.
- A
SUMMARY
BRIEF WAS PROVIDED ON SOUTHEASTERN NUCLEAR PLANT MANAGERS'OICE MAILSYSTEM.
SHARING LESSONS LEARNED WITHIN CP8cL
- A
SUMMARY
DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT WAS PROVIDED TO HBR AND BSEP PLANT MANAGERS.
- AN INCIDENT REPORT WAS PROVIDED TO CP&L NUCLEAR AND FOSSIL MANAGERS.
CP&L FOSSIL AND NUCLEAR PLANT MANAGERS WERE PROVIDED A PRESENTATION ON THE INCIDENT.
- A CP&L TASK FORCE WAS ESTABLISHED TO REVIEW BUS DUCT DESIGNS AT THE COMPANY'S PLANTS.
CP8rL CONCLUSIONS
- ELECTRICAL FAULT WAS INITIATINGEVENT.
HYDROGEN FIRE RESULTED FROM FAULT CURRENTS.
PLANT PROTECTIVE CIRCUITRY WORKED AS DESIGNED.
- PLANT STAFF AND FIRE BRIGADE HANDLED EVENT WELL
- CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ARE THOROUGH.
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DISTRIBUTION OOCI(ET NO.
September 21, 1989 DOCKET-FILE '>
HARRIS FILE PAnderson Rules and Procedures Branch MElttORANDUMFOR:
Division of Rules and Records Office of Administration and Resources Management FROM:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation OPPORTUNIVY FOR HEARING - SHEARON HARRIS One signed original of the Federal Register Notice Identified below Is enclosed for your transmittal to the Office of the Federal Register for publication. Additional conformed copies (
) of the Notice are enclosed for yoUr use.
cense Notice of Receipt of Application for Construction Permit(s) and Operating License(s).
Notice of Receipt of Partial Application for Construction Permit(s) and Facility License(s): Time for Submission of Views on Antitrust Matters.
Notice of ConsIderation of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License.
Notice of Receipt of Application for Facility License(s); Notice of Availabilityof Applicant's Environmental Report; and Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Facility Ucense(s) and Notice of Opportunity for Hearing.
Notice of Availabilityof NRC Draft/Final Environmental Statement.
Notice of Limited Work Authorization.
Notice of Availabilityof Safety Evaluation Report.
Notice of Issuance of Construction Permit(s).
NotIce of issuance of Facility Operating License(s) or Amendment(s).
t)Lj o",.
Exemption.
0 Notice of Granting Exemption.
Environmental Assessment.
Notice of Preparation of Environmental Assessment.
l oth<<Notice Of o s de
'o of I s ance of Amendment to a
Pro osed No S dr nD Hearing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
As stated co"<<ct: pat Ander son Phone:
..PDII-j.
PAnderson OFFICE SURNAME 9/... $8g..
NRC FORM 3IS I'IOISOI NRCM 0240 OFFICIAL,RECORD COPY
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