ML18005A690

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Insp Rept 50-400/88-33 on 880829-0930.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification, Monthly Maint Observation,Radiological Protection Program, Physical Security Program,Lers & Design Changes
ML18005A690
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/28/1988
From: Bradford W, Fredrickson P, Shannon M
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML18005A688 List:
References
50-400-88-33, NUDOCS 8811090273
Download: ML18005A690 (17)


See also: IR 05000400/1988033

Text

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Report No.:

UNITED STATES,

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.

ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323

50-400/88-33

Licensee:

Carolina

Power

and Light Company

P. 0.

Box 1551

Raleigh,

NC 27602

Docket No.:

50-400

License No.:

NPF-63

Facility Name:

Harris

1

Inspection

Conducted:

August 29 - September

20,

1988

Inspectors:

W. H. Bradford

M.

.

han

Approved By:

P.

E. Fredrickson,

Chief, Section

1A

Division of Reactor Projects

D te

S gned

0

Da

e Sig ed

ro

N

Da

e Sig ed

SUMMARY

Scope:

Results:

This

routine safety

inspection

involved the

areas

of operational

safety

verification,

monthly

surveillance

observation,

monthly

maintenance

observation,

radiological

protection

program;

physical

security program,

licensee

events reports,

design

changes

and modifi-

cation,

and refueling activities.

In the

areas

inspected,

one violation was identified:

Failure to

follow approved fire protection procedures

- paragraph

2.

8=:21090273

8=1031

PDC

EiR

I-'IDOCK 050004C>O

Q

REPORT

DETAILS

Persons

Contacted

Licensee

Employees

R. A. Watson,

Vice President,

Harris Nuclear Project

  • C. S. Hinnant, Plant General

Manager

C.

R. Gibson, Director,

Programs

and Procedures

  • D. L. Tibbitts, Director, Regulatory Compliance

C.

S.

Bohanan,

Director, Special

Program

R.

B.

Van Metre, Manager,

Technical

Support

  • T. C. Morton, Manager,

Maintenance

  • J.

M. Collins, Manager,

Operations

  • J. R. Sipp, Manager,

Environmental

and Radiation'Monitoring

D. A. Braund, Supervisor,

Security

T.

F. Lentz,

Systems

Engineering

W. R. Wilson, Reactor/Performance

Engineering

  • L. J.

Woods, Testing

and Maintenance

Support

W. H. Batts, Supervisor,

Mechanical

Maintenance

J.

H. Smith, Supervisor,

Operations

Support

C.

S. Olexik, Supervisor,

Shift'Operations

G. L. Forehand,

Director,

QA/QC

E.

E. Willett, Manager,

Outages

and Modifications

Other

licensee

employees

contacted

included

technicians,

operators,

mechanics,

securitv

force

members,

engineering

personnel

and office

personnel.

  • Attended exit intervie>>

No:e:

Acronyms

and abbreviations

used in the report are listed in para-

graph

11.

Operational

Safety Veri ication (71707)

The inspectors

observed

control

room operations,

reviewed applicable

logs

and

conducted

discussions

with control

room operators

during the report

period.

Also, the operability of selected

emergency

systems

was verified,

tagout

records

were

reviewed

and

proper return to service

of affected

components

was verified.

Tours of the plant were

conducted

tc observe

plant equipment conditions,

including fluid leaks

and excessive

vibrations

and general

housekeeping

efforts.

The inspectors verified compliance with

selected

LCO and results of selected

surveillance tests.

The verifica-

tinns

were

accomplished

by direct observation

of monitoring instrumenta-

tion, valve positions,

switch positions,

accessible

pipe snubbers,

and

review cf completed

logs, records,

and chemistry results.

The licensee's

compliance with LCO action statements

was reviewed

as events

occurred.

The inspectors

routinely attended

meetings with certain

licensee

manage-

ment and observed

various shift turnovers.

These

meetings

and discussions

provided

a daily status

of plant operations,

maintenance,

and testing

activities in progress,

as well

as

discussions

of significant problems.

The inspectors

reviewed

the shift foreman's

log, control

room operator's

log,

clearance

center

tag

out logs,

system

status

logs, chemistry

and

health physics logs,

and control status

boards.

The inspectors

noted that

the operators

appeared

to be alert

and aware of changing plant conditions.

During

a routine plant inspection,

the inspector

noted that

a designated

fire barrier

was

breached

and

was

not identified in the

licensee's

breached fire protection penetration

program.

This discrepancy

led to

a

review of the fire protection

program for fire watches

and fire barrier

penetration control.

Procedure

FPP-013,

"Fire Protection

Minimum Requirements

and Mitigating

Actions", requires

the licensee

to establish

hourly fire watch patrols in

areas

where

equipment

is required to be operable

when fire barriers

are

degraded.

Surveillance

and security

access

records

from September

2 to

September

10,

1988,

were

reviewed.

The inspector

found that

on eight

occasions

the interval

between fire patrols

exceeded

the acceptable

time

of one hour and fifteen minutes.

The following list contains

examples

of

this discrepancy

and is not intended to be all inclusive:

Date

Time

Time Between Patrols

September

2,

1988

September

2,

1988

September

2,

1988

2:00 a.m.

6:00 a.m.

3:00 p.m.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />,

32 minutes

2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />,

52 minutes

1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />,

52 minutes

Also,

on September

9,

1988, it was found that two electrical

conduit runs

were

open in several

places,

thus degrading

two separate

fire barriers;

one -

3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> barrier

and

one -

1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> barrier.

The fire protection

group

was not aware of the breaches

in the fire walls.

The conduit numbers

were

B 18755X

and

B

18755XX

and

breached

the

"B" emergency

diesel

generator

building

3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire wall and the

"B" electrical

room

1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> fire wall.

Procedure

OMM-003, "Equipment Inoperable

Record", requires

the licensee

to

complete

an equipment

inoperable

record

and to immediately deliver it to

the shift foreman

when

a fire protection

component

becomes

inoperable.

Fire protection

components (i.e.,

the

two fire barriers)

were inoperable

in the

"B" diesel

generator

building and

an equipment

inoperable

record

was not completed

as required.

The identified penetrations

have

since

been

placed

in the fire protection

surveillance

program.

No other

degraded

penetrations

were

found during

the course

of the inspection.

It was

noted

by the inspector that fire

watch patrols

had

been established

in the diesel

generator building due to

other degraded

penetrations.

The failure to perform hourly fire watch patrols

and

the failure to

identify and control

breaches

in fire barriers

are collectively considered

to

be

a failure to follow the fire protection

program procedures

and is

identified as Violation

400/88-33-01.'rocedure

FPP-005,

"Duties of

a

Fire Watch",

establishes

the

basic

responsibilities

of

a fire watch

which

includes

documenting

hourly

inspections

and states

the inspection

should consist

not only of looking

for fires, but looking for undue fire hazards.

A total of approximately

150 ins'pections

were

reviewed

and twenty

one inspections

were

found to

have

taken

less

than thirty seconds.

One inspection

was

found to take

nine

seconds

as

documented

by the security

computer.

The fire watch

patrols

were not adequate

because

of the duration of the inspections

and

the licensee

was in effect relying solely on the fire detection

system;

therefore,

not

meeting

the

intent of the

compensatory

surveillance

requirements

of the fire protection

program.

The licensee

had also

made

this determination,

and

implemented

measures

to improve the fire watch

program.

An electronic

key system

was installed

and requires

the fire

watch to walk through the designated

area.

Also, patrol

maps

have

been

developed

and it is the responsibility of the fire watch to inspect

the

area

per the patrol

map.

At this time, the concern with inadequate fire

inspections

appears

to be resolved.

As discussed

above,

the licensee

is dependent

upon compensatory

measures

in order to meet

the fire protection

program

requirements.

The fire

patrol

program

has

become

manpower

intensive

due

to fire protection

equipment

being inoperative,

degraded

or requiring engineering

evaluation.

The inherent

problem with excessive

fire watches

was discussed

with the

licensee

and the licensee

stated

that corrective actions

were being taken

to resolve this concern.

The concern with using

a number of compensatory

measures

in order to meet

the fire protection

program is identified as

Inspector

Followup Item 400/88-33-02.

One violation and

no deviations

were identified.

Nonthly Surveil lance Observation

(61726,

71709)

The inspectors

witnessed

the licensee

conducting maintenance

surveillance

test activities

on safety-related

systems

and

components

to verify that

the licensee

performed the activities in accordance

with licensee

require-

ments.

These

observations

included witnessing

selected

portions of each

surveillance,

review 'of

the

surveillance

procedure

to

ensure

that

administrative

controls

were

in force,

determining

that

approval

was

obtained prior to conducting the surveillance test,

and verifying that the

individuals conducting

the test

were qualified in accordance

with plant

approved

procedures.

Other observations

included ascertaining

that test

instrumentation

used

was

calibrated,

data

collected

was within the

specified requirements

of Technical Specifications,

any identified discre-

pancies

were properly noted,

and the

systems

were correctly returned

to

service.

Portions

of the following test activities

were

observed

or

reviewed

by the inspectors:

MST-I0488

MST-I0484

MST-I0482

Diesel

Generator

1B-SB Lube Oil Pressure

Instrument

Calibration,

Rev.

2.

Diesel

Generator

1B-SB Lube Oil Instrument Calibration.

Diesel

Generator

1B-SB Lube Oil Sump Tank Low Level

Calibration.

OST-1006

OST-1013

OST-1819

Boron Flow Path Verification.

1A-SA Emergency

Diesel Generator Operability Test.

Fuel Handling Building Crane Interlocks

and Operability

Test.

No violations or deviations

were identified.

Monthly Maintenance

Observation

(62703)

Station

maintenance

activities of safety-related

systems

and

components

were observed/reviewed

to ascertain

that they were conducted

in-accordance

with approved

procedures,

regulatory guides,

industry codes

and standards,

and

were in conformance with Technical Specifications.

Items considered

during

the

review included:

verification that limiting conditions for

operations

were met while components

or systems

were

removed

from service;

approvals

were obtained prior to initiating the work; approved

procedures

were used;

completed

work was

inspected

as applicable;

functional testing

and/or

calibrations

were

performed

prior to returning

components

or

systems

to service; quality control

records

were maintained; activities

were

accomplished

by qualified

personnel;

parts

and

materials

were

properly certified;

and radiological

and fire prevention

controls

were

implemented.

Work requests

were also reviewed to determine

the status

of

outstanding

jobs to assure

that priority was assigned

to safety-related

equipment maintenance

which may affect system

performance.

On August 29,

1988,

the inspector witnessed

bench troubleshooting of the

annunciator

inverter that

had previously failed

on August 12,

1988.

No

problems

had

been identified with the

power source,

annunciator

loads

or

internal

to

the

inverter

except

the

output transistors.

Overload

conditions

and loss of input power tests

were performed

and the inverter

functioned properly.

One output transistor

was shorted

and the companion

transistor

experienced

an

identical

failure to

the

August 12,

1988

failure.

Root

cause

has

been

determined

to

be

a

.random transistor

failure.

Portions of the following activities were observed

or reviewed:

FHP-20

PM-E005

BZZ-33

Fuel Handling Bridge Crane Repair.

6.9

KY 1200/2000

Amperage Air Circuit Breaker Preventative

Maintenance,

Revision 4.

Work Request for 1B Bus Outage.

No violations or deviations

were identified.

Radiological Protection

Program

(71709)

Selected activities of the licensee's

Radiological Protection

Program were

reviewed

by the inspectors

to verify conformance with plant procedures

and

NRC regulatory requirement.

The areas

reviewed included:

organization

and

management

of the plant's

health

physics staff;

"ALARA" implementa-

tion; Radiation

Work Permits

(RWPs) for compliance to plant procedures;

personnel

exposure

records;

observation of work and personnel

in radiation

areas

to verify compliance to radiation protection procedures;

and control

of radioactive materials.

No violations or deviations

were identified.

Physical

Security Program

(71881)

Licensee's

compliance

to the

approved

security plan'as

reviewed

by the

inspectors.

The inspectors

verified by observation

and interviews with

security force

members

that measures

taken to assure

the physical protec-

tion of the facility met current requirements.

Areas

inspected

included:

organization

of the security

force;

establishment

and

maintenance

of

gates,

doors,

and isolation zones;

access

control;

and badging procedures.

No violations or deviations

were identified.

Licensee

Event Reports

(92700)

The following Lice'nsee

Event

Reports

(LER) were

reviewed for potential

generic

problems

to determine

trends,

to determine

whether

information

included

in the

report

meets

the

NRC reporting

requirements

and

to

consider

whether

the corrective action

discussed

in the report

appears

appropriate.

The licensee

action

was

reviewed to verify that the event

has

been

reviewed

and

evaluated

by the

licensee

as

required

by the

Technical

Specifications;

that

corrective

action

was

taken

by

the

licensee;

and that safety limits, limiting safety setting

and

LCOs were

not

exceeded.

The

inspector

examined

the incident report,

logs

and

records,

and

interviewed

selected

personnel.

The following reports

are

considered

closed:

LER 86-01

LER 86-09

LER 87-05

LER 87-06

LER 87-08

LER 87-09

LER 87-11

LER 87-12

LER 87-13

Turbine Building Stack Monitor.RM-ITY-3536-1 Inoperable.

Inadequate

Safety Injection Signal

Due to Procedure

Inadequacy.

Reactor Trip/Condensate

Pump Trip Caused

by "Low Discharge

Pressure."

1B-SB Chiller Start Failure.

Reactor Trip - Loss of Main Feedwater.

Containment

Leak Detection Radiation Monitor Inoperable.

6.9

KV Onsite Distribution.

Reactor Trip During Turbine Rotor Instrumentation Testing.

Reactor Trip - Loss of Feedwater.

LER 87-14

LER 87-17

LER 87-18

LER 87-22

LER 87-23

LER 87-24

Containment Integrity; Containment Isolation Valve Open for

Longer Than Allowed by Technical Specification.

Reactor Trip.

Reactor Trip - Loss of Feedwater.

Technical Specification Violation - Missed

Flow Rate

Estimates.

Isolated Miniflow Path for 1C-SAB Charging/Safety

Injection A.

Reactor Trip - Loss of Heater Drain

Pump "B".

No violations or deviations

were identified.

8.

Design,

Design Changes,

and Modification (37700)

a 0

Permanent Modifications

The

inspectors

reviewed

selected

design

changes

and modifications

which were determined

by the licensee

to not require

NRC approval to

ascertain

that the design

changes

and modifications are in conform-

ance

with the

requirements

of the

TS

and

10 CFR 50.59.

Items

reviewed

included verification that:

design

changes

were

reviewed

and

approved

in accordance

with

10 CFR 50.59;

design

changes

were

controlled

by approved

procedures;

operability tests

were conducted;

LCO requirements

were

met while components

or systems

were

removed

from service to accomplish

the design

changes;

as-built drawings

were

changed

or controlled to reflect the design

changes;

and, preventive

maintenance,

surveillance

test

and

operating

procedures

had

been

revised

or were

scheduled

to

be revised

to reflect design

changes.

The following design

changes

and modifications

were

reviewed

or

observed

to verify that

the work was

being conducted

in accordance

with appropriate

construction

documents,

inspected

by gC inspectors,

tested

in accordance

with appropriate

test

procedures,

and appro-

priate fire prevention

and housekeeping

controls

were implemented.

PCR-2109

PCR-2992

PCR-3029

PCR-3185

PCR-3297

PCR-3509

PCR-3521

(RCS) Reactor Coolant System

Leakage.

Boron Injection Tank Bypass

Line Plugging.

"C" Charging

Pump Recirculation Valve.

(RVLIS) Reactor

Vessel

Level Indication System

Isolation Valve Installation.

Soft Seat

Replacement

(Anchor-Darling).

Auxiliary Feedwater

Drip Leg Line Reroute.

Auxiliary Feedwater

Check Valve 1AF-68 Hinge Pin Seal

Weld.

No violations or deviations

were identified.

The inspectors will continue

to review other design

changes

and modifications.

9..Refueling Activities (60710)

The

inspectors

observed

refueling activities

and

reviewed

certain

documentation

and procedures

to verify that the activities were controlled

and

conducted

in accordance

with Technical

Specifications

and

approved

procedures.

This

inspection

included,

but is

not limited to,

the

following:

Approved procedures

were

used for fuel accountability.

Core monitoring was performed throughout the fuel movement.

Mater levels

and boron concentration

were maintained.

Containment integrity was maintained.

Communication

between

refueling stations

and

the control

room were

maintained.

A qualified senior reactor

operator

supervised

the refueling opera-

.ion

and

the refueling

personnel

were qualified to perform the

refueling functions.

No violations or deviations

were identified.

10.

Exit Interview

The

inspection

scope

and

findings

were

summarized

during

management

interviews

throughout

the report period

and

on September

22,

1988, with

the plant

manager

and

selected

members

of his staff.

The inspection

findings were discussed

in detail.

The licensee

acknowledged

the inspec-

tion findings listed

below

and

did not identify as

proprietary

any

material

reviewed

by the inspection during this inspection.

Item Number

400/88-33-01

400/88-33-02

Descri tion/Reference

Para

ra

h

VIOLATION - Failure to Follow the Fire

Protection

Program

Procedures

(paragraph

2).

IFI - Concern With Using

a Number of Compensatory

Measures

in Order to iieet the Fire Protection

Program

(paragraph

2)..

11.

List of Acroynyms and Abbreviations

AFM

ALARA-

FHP

FPP

LCO

Auxiliary Feedwater

As Low As Reasonably

Achievable

Fuel Handling Procedure

. Fire Protection

Program

Limiting Condition for Operation

LER

MST

OMM

OST

PCR

PN

RN

RWP

TS

Licensee

Event Report

Maintenance

Surveillance Test

Operations

Management

Manual

Operations

Surveillance Test

'Plant

Change

Request

Preventative

Maintenance

Radiation Monitor

Radiation

Work Permit

Technical Specification

4