ML17331A898

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Initial SALP 11 Repts 50-315/93-01 & 50-316/93-01 on Jan 1992 - Apr 1993.Superior Level of Performance in Areas of Security & Emergency Preparedness
ML17331A898
Person / Time
Site: Cook  American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 04/30/1993
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML17331A897 List:
References
50-315-93-01, 50-315-93-1, 50-316-93-01, 50-316-93-1, NUDOCS 9307130104
Download: ML17331A898 (15)


See also: IR 05000315/1993001

Text

INITIAL SALP REPORT

SALP

11

U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT

OF LICENSEE

PERFORMANCE

II

~

Inspection

Report

No.

50-315/93001;

50-316/93001-

Indiana Michigan Power

Company

Donald

C.

Cook Nuclear Plant

January

1,

1992,

through April 30,

1993

9307130104

930702.

PDR

ADOCK 05000315

Q

PDR

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

o

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~ ~, ~

o

1

II.

SUMMARY OF

RESULTS

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

. .

.

.

.

2

0verview

2

III.

PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

A.

Plant Operations

B.

Radiological Controls

C.

D.

E.

G.

Maintenance/Surveillance

Emergency

Preparedness

Security

Engineering/Technical

Support

Safety Assessment

and guality Verification

2

2

4

5

6

7

8

9

IV.

SUPPORTING

DATA AND SUMMARIES...................

1'1

A.

B.

Major Licensee Activities

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

11

Major Inspecti on Activities.................

12

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Systematic

Assessment

of Licensee

Performance

(SALP) program is

an

integrated

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

(NRC) staff effort to collect

available observations

and data

on

a periodic basis

and to evaluate

licensee

performance

on the basis of this information.

The program is supplemental

to

normal regulatory processes

used to ensure

compliance with NRC rules

and

regulations.

It is intended to be sufficiently diagnostic to provide

a

rational

basis for allocating

NRC resources

and to provide meaningful

feedback

to the licensee's

management

regarding the NRC's assessment

of the facility's

performance

in each functional area.

This report is the NRC's assessment

of the licensee's

safety performance

at

D.

C.

Cook Nuclear Plant for the period January

1,

1992,

through April 30,

1993.

An

NRC SALP Board,

comprised of the'taff members listed below,

met on June

9,

1993, to review the observations

and data

on performance

and to assess

licensee

performance

in accordance

with the guidance

in

NRC Manual

Chapter

0516,

"Systematic

Assessment

of Licensee

Performance."

Board Chairman

C.

E. Norelius, Director, Division of Radiation Safety

and Safeguards

(DRSS)

Board

Members

T. 0. Hartin, Acting Director, Division of Reactor Safety

(DRS)

W.

H. Dean, Acting Project Director, Project Directorate

(PD) III-I, Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation

(NRR)

W.

D. Shafer,

Chief,

Branch 2, Division of Reactor Projects

(DRP)

B. A. Wetzel, Project

Manager,

PD III-I, NRR

J.

A. Isom, Senior Resident

Inspector,

D.

C.

Cook

Other Attendees

at the

SALP Board Meetin

C.

E. Brown, Reactor

Engineer,

DRP

B. L. Burgess,

Chief, Operations

Section,

DRS

J.

R. Creed,

Chief, Safeguards

Section,

DRSS

J.

L. Hansen,

Licensing Examiner,

DRS

B. L. Jorgensen,

Acting Chief, Reactor Support

Programs

Branch,

DRSS

J.

R. Kniceley, Physical

Security Inspector,

DRSS

J.

W. HcCormick-Barger,

Chief,

Emergency

Preparedness

and Non-Power Reactor

Section,

DRSS

R. A. Paul,

Senior Radiation Specialist,

DRSS

W.

D.

Pegg,

Reactor Inspector,

DRS

H.

C. Shumacher,

Chief, Radiological Controls Section

1,

DRSS

E.

R. Schweibinz,

Acting Chief, Section

2A,

DRP

H. J.

Simons,

Radiation Specialist,

DRSS

II.

SUMMARY OF

RESULTS

Overview

Overall performance

at the

D.

C.

Cook plant during the appraisal

period

was

characterized

by improvement

across

a broad spectrum of appraisal

areas.

The

Maintenance/Surveillance

area

improved from a Category

2 rating to

a Category

1 rating, while the Security

and

Emergency

Preparedness

areas

retained

Category

1 ratings.

This is indicative of a superior level of performance.

Each of the remaining four areas

was assigned

a Category

2 rating with an

improving trend.

This rating is indicative of a clearly discernable

trend in

performance

which, if continued,

could result in an improved rating in the

next

SALP assessment

period.

In some areas,

such

as Maintenance/Surveillance

and Engineering/Technical

Support,

the improvements resulted

from long-term programmatic efforts

and

were

a continuation of progress

observed

during the previous appraisal

period.

Both these

areas

had

been

assigned

Category

3 ratings for SALP Cycle 9, which

ended

on August 31,

1990.

In other areas,

such

as Safety Assessment/guality

Verification, improvements

were more recently observed.

Both plant

and corporate efforts appeared

to be involved in the positive

results

achieved

across

the several

appraisal

areas,

which is notable.

The performance

ratings during the previous

assessment

period

and this

assessment

period according to functional

areas

are given below:

Functional

Area

Plant Operations

Radiological Controls

Maintenance/Surveillance

Emergency

Preparedness

Security

Engineering/Technical

Support

Safety Assessment/guality

Verification

Rating Last

Period

Rating This

Pet iod

Trend

Improving

Improving

Improving

Improving

III.

PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

A.

Plant

0 erations

I.

~Anal sis

Plant operations

were characterized

by safe,

conservative

operations

and

by

improved operator

performance

in most areas.

Management's

effectiveness

in ensuring quality was excellent, with few

exceptions.

Plant management

closely monitored issues that could impose

either operational

or safety challenges for the operators.

Initiatives were

taken to minimize the number of lit control

room annunciators

and equipment

2

controllers not in automatic.

Also, evolutions that could cause

balance-of-

plant transients

were reviewed'losely to minimize these

challenges.

Management

continued to display

a strong,

conservative

and safety-conscious

approach to both operational

and shutdown plant decisions.

Operator responses

to the reactor trips and other operational transients

were

excellent.

For example,

when

an auxiliary equipment operator

(AEO) caused

automatic pressurizer

level control to be lost, control

room operators

promptly and correctly diagnosed

the problem through noting the change

in the

volume control tank level.

Also, operator

response

to the Unit I main

feedwater transient,

caused

by

a pressure

controller failure,

and their

response

to

a loss of condensate

event were very good.

Likewise, there

was

an

improvement in operator

performance

during reactor startups

and shutdowns.

Performance

during startups

showed

some weakness

in the previous

assessment

period.

There were

no operational

events during the numerous

Unit =2 reactor

and turbine startups

and generator tests,

and operator errors adversely

affecting the plant were very rare.

Shift performance

during routine operations

was good.

Shift turnover, log-

keeping practices,

and control

room professionalism

remained

strong throughout

the assessment

period.

Operator attentiveness

to parameters

in the control

room remained

good;

however,

operators

were not always attentive to details of

plant conditions outside the control

room. Operators

were typically excellent

in reacting to events,

but did not always analyze routine plant conditions to

prevent

problems

from developing.

For example,

the lack-of a questioning

attitude

and inadequate

review of the emergency diesel

generator

(EDG) lube

oil tank level readings

caused

a condition in which

a steady loss of oil from

the tank was, left uncorrected for a period of about

5 months.

This eventually

led to one

EDG being inoperable for a period greater

than allowed by the

technical

specifications

(TS).

A Severity Level III violation was issued for

this.

The identification and resolution of technical

issues

from a safety standpoint

remained strong.

The licensee

continued to perform full-core off loading

during outages

to minimize shutdown risk.

Critiques

and lessons

learned

from

both industry events

and events that occurred at the plant were routinely made

available to the operations shift through

memoranda

and newsletters.

Additionally, general

plant appearance

and cleanliness

continued to improve

during this assessment

period.

Compensatory fire protection measures,

which

had experienced

problems during the previous

assessment,

appeared

to be better

controlled during the current period.

Plant staffing was

ample with experienced

operating staff.

Most operations

department

management staff were either currently or formerly licensed.

Overtime of licensed

operators

was adequately

controlled.

The training and

qualification programs for personnel

were effective

and contributed to the

good operating

performance of both units.

Unlike the last assessment

period,

problems experienced

in conducting transient evolutions

and in implementing

EOPs were not evident.

Also, there

was

an improvement in the performance of

the operators

during initial and requalification examinations.

They had

a

pass rate of 85 percent (II out of 13 individuals)

on the initial

'xaminations,

and

a pass rate of 97 percent

(31 out of 32 individuals)

on the

requalification examinations.

2.

Performance

Ratin

Performance

is rated Category

2 with an improving trend in this functional

area.

Performance

was rated Category

2 in the previous

assessment

period.

3.

Recommendations

None.

B.

Radiolo ical Controls

1.

~Anal sis

Performance

in this functional-area

was characterized

by effective management

with good support from an experienced staff which resulted

in good overall

radiological controls.

Hanagement

effectiveness

was 'good.

Good support for source

term reduction -was

indicated

by chemical

decontamination

of the resistance

temperature

detector

l.ines, early boration,

and hydrogen peroxide addition.

Hanagement

backing for

as-low-as-reasonably-achievable

(ALARA) efforts was evident in the use of a

reactor

head shield,

remote monitoring, robotic tools,

and electronic

dosimeters.

Hanagement

also supported

the commitment to good water qual,ity,

National Registry of Radiation Protection Technicians certification of

radiation protection technicians,

upgrading the liquid effluent monitoring

system,

and station

programs for self identification and correction of

problems.

Hanagement

was less

aggressive

in resolving problems with startup

flash tank system

use that resulted

in low-level ground contamination

outside

the plant.

The identification and resolution of technical

issues

was good.

Cumulative

dose in 1992 (about

490 person-rem)

was low,

and was consistent

with the

original station

goal despite

a longer than expected

outage

(400 days)'.

Significant radiological work included plugging

and resleeving of more than

1800 steam generator

tubes

as well as considerable first time and emergent

work.

During the appraisal

period, there

was

a reduction in contaminated

areas

and

a corresponding

reduction in protective clothing use.

Other

improvements

noted were the oversight of exits from radiologically controlled

areas

and assessing

the cause of personnel

contamination

events.

Cold

chemistry measurement

comparisons

with the

NRC remained

good

(28 agreements

in

31 comparisons),

and the station maintained

a satisfactory

crosscheck

program

with vendors.

Radioactivity in liquid and gaseous

effluents remained well

below regulatory limits, efforts to reduce solid radwaste

continued,

and the

radiological environmental

monitoring program was effectively implemented.

Performance

weaknesses

were noted in a violation of a transportation

regulation,

and in a violation for unauthorized transfer of a small

amount of

radioactive material.

Prompt corrective actions

were implemented

and were

effective.

Overall, staffing, training,

and experience

level in the radiological controls

area

were good.

2.

Performance

Ratin

Performance

is rated category

2 with an improving trend in this area.

Performance

was rated Category

2 during the previous

assessment

period.

3.

Recommendations

None.

C.

Maintenance

Surveillance

l.

A~nal sis

Performance

in this functional

area

was characterized

by an improvement in the

quality of maintenance

work and evidence of strong root-cause

investigations.

Management's

effectiveness

in the maintenance

area

continued to improve -and

was excellent.

Emphasis

on improving the material condition of both the

auxiliary and the turbine buildings continued

as evidenced

by the reduction in

the number 'of steam,

water,

and oil leaks in the plant.

The material

condition of the plant was good.

Plant management

closely followed

maintenance

on equipment

problems that could possibly affect safety or

operation of the plant until they were satisfactorily addressed.

Corrective

actions

were typically well founded

on aggressive

and thorough failure

analyses

and root cause

investigations.

The surveillance

program

and procedures

were good; although,

there were

a few

missed nonroutine surveillances.

There

was only one reactor trip caused

or

associated

with equipment failures,

an improvement from the previous

assessment

period.

Improvements

in the maintenance

program continued.

For example,

an integrated

scheduling

group was formed late in the assessment

period to schedule all

maintenance activities.

As

a consequence,

after

some

problems in this area,

improvements

in planning

and scheduling

were noted.

Also, the maintenance

procedure

upgrade

work was completed

and procedure

use

was excellent.

Some

positive effects of program changes

became

increasingly evident in the latter

portion of the assessment

period.

The backlog of non-outage

corrective job

orders

was

somewhat

high but showed

slow but steady

improvement over the

assessement

period.

Identification and resolution of technical

issues,

with a view to safety,

was

excellent.

The quality of root-cause

analyses

improved from the last period

and is considered

excellent.

Timely, effective,

and thorough actions

were

taken in response

to the findings.

Examples

included resolution of water

entrainment

in the vital electrical

switchgear

room ventilation system,

which

caused

several trips of the spent fuel pit pump,

and adjustment to the reactor

trip breaker

undervoltage trip attachment.

Engineering

resources

were

effectively utilized.

The quality of the maintenance

performed

by the crafts

was excellent.

There

were

a few examples of,rework early in the assessment

period typically

involving either difficult or infrequently performed outage

maintenance

activities,

Haintenance activities

such

as work on

an emergency

boration

valve, repairs to

a reactor trip breaker,

and another safety-related

breaker

were excell'ent.

Problems relating to procedural

adherence,

-identified during

,the previous

assessment

period,

were not observed

during this assessment

period.

Ha'intenance

department staffing was

ample

and overtime usage

was controlled.

Except for the rework activities mentioned

above, training effectively

supported

a well qualified and experienced staff.

2.

Performance

Ratin

Performance

is rated Category

1 in this functional area.

Performance

was

rated Category

2 in the previous

assessment

period.

3.

Recommendations

None.

D.

Emer enc

Pre

aredness

l.

~Anal sis

Performance

was characterized

by strong

management

support for the well

maintained

emergency

preparedness

(EP)

program

and acceptable

exercise

performance.

Hanagement

effectiveness

in ensuring quality was good.

The emergency

plan

and

emergency

response facilities (ERFs)

were maintained

in an excellent state of

readiness.

In addition,

improvements,

such

as the addition of an automated

telephone call system to activate the emergency

response

organization

(ERO),

were

made to the

ERFs

and the

EP program.

However, during the

1992 exercise,

five weakness

were identified.

The approach to identifying and resolving technical

issues,

with a view to

safety,

remained

excellent..

The exercise

weaknesses

involved accident

classification,

proper activation of the

Emergency Operations Facility,

command

and control of the onsite

emergency

response

efforts, timely dispatch

of repair

teams,

and the ability to perform post-accident

sampling

and

analysis.

These

were not programmatic in nature,

and aggressive

corrective

actions

were taken to address

the root causes

of the weaknesses.

For example,.

weekly post-accident

sampling drills and walkthroughs

were initiated and this

capability was promptly redemonstrated.

In addition, identified weaknesses

in

EP implementing procedures

were promptly corrected.

Periodic emergency

plan revisions

continued to be well done

and enhanced

the plan.

The

EP

response

to operational

events

was excellent

as demonstrated

by the proper

classification of four unusual

events.

Notifications of these

events

were

detailed

and timely.

The

EP staffing and qualifications were excellent.

A full-time Assistant

EP

Coordinator

was assigned

to the program

and all the non-managerial

EP training

was placed

under

one trainer for better uniformity.

The

ERO staffing levels

remained excellent with at least three persons

qualified for each

key

position.

The

ERO training program

was reviewed in depth in view of the exercise

weaknesses;

the program

was judged excellent

and further upgrades

were

made to

the program.

The program was comprehensive

and included

a detailed

qualification program that required demonstration

of knowledge to be -fully

qualified as

a member of the

ERO.

2.

Performance

Ratin

Performance

is rated Category

1 in this area.

Performance

was rated Category

1 during the previous

assessment

period.

3.

Recommendations

None.

E.

~Securi t

l.

~Anal sis

Performance

was characterized

by excellent

management

attention

and support.

Management

effectiveness

in ensuring quality was excellent

as evidenced

by the

continued reduction in the personnel

error and equipment

events identified in

the safeguards

event log.

The security self-assessment

and quality assurance

(gA) audits

and surveillances

were excellent in monitoring and evaluating

program effectiveness.

The Plant Hanager's

support of the security program

fostered

a high level of awareness

towards security

by the plant staff and

security force personnel.

An example of management

support

was the upgraded

computerized

badge fabrication system.

Site management

liaison with local-

law-enforcement

agencies

(LLEAs) was excellent.

The licensee

shared their

training facilities and provided their training video

on non-lethal

force to

LLEAs.

The

LLEAs were also allowed to use the licensee's

trained

dog in area

drug enforcement activities.

The approach

to identifying and resolving technical

issues

from a safety

standpoint

was excellent

as

shown

by the development of effective compensatory

measures

to ensure that security concerns

were adequately

addressed

during the

construction of a new fire protection

pumping station inside the protected

area.

Additionally, the development

and implementation of a monthly

preventive maintenance

program

and the support of plant management

resulted

in

a low number of door-related security events,

Evaluation of loggable events

was excellent.

These

events

were properly

identified, analyzed,

and documented.

There were

no events that were required

to be reported within

1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of discovery.

Staffing continued to be excellent.

Several

key management

position vacancies

were filled in

a timely manner with experienced

individuals.

Fitness-for-duty

functions were centralized

in the Security Department resulting in improved

communications

and consistency

in implementation of 10, CFR 26 requirements.

The effectiveness

of the training and qualification program was excellent.

Security personnel

were knowledgeable

and proficient in performing their

assigned

duties.

Tactical

response

capability improved through the conduct of

limited force-on-force drills in the plant

and range instruction in the

tactical

combat course.

2.

Performance

Ratin

Performance

is rated Category

1 in this area.

Performance

was rated Category

1 during the 'previous

assessment

period.

3.

'Recommendations-

None.

F.

-En ineerin

Technical

Su

ort

l.

~Anal sis

Engineering

and technical

support effectiveness

in performing routine

and

reactive engineering activities

was good.

Improvements

in this area

were

noted

and weaknesses

identified in the last assessment

period were effectively

addressed.

Hanagement

effectiveness

in ensuring quality continued to improve

and

was

good.

There

was evidence of management

emphasis

and oversight in the design

change

program,

motor operated

valve program,

and inservice inspection

program.

Attention to previous

issues

involving communication

and

coordination

between

corporate

and onsite engineering

resulted

in better data

evaluation,

thorough root-cause

analysis,

and more effective corrective

actions.

This improved management

attention to detail contributed to,fewer

operational

events

and

no violations in this area.

Examples

in which

management

ensured

proper problem resolution included

improvements

in acoustic

valve monitor reliability and modification to the air supply for the post-

accident

hydrogen monitoring system valves.

- Nanagement effectively

communicated

performance

expectations

to the technical staff as indicated

by

continuing system engineering

performance

improvements.

On the other hand,

management

did not effectively address

problems with battery

room temperature

control.

Technical

issue identification and resolution

were generally good.

Technical

evaluations

and corrective actions

were technically sound, timely,

and

displayed

an understanding

of safety implications.

Engineering

resources

were

effectively utilized in safely recovering

an incorrectly grappled

spent fuel

bundle.

Engineering

reviews of equipment

maintenance

and performance history

resulted

in timely modifications,

appropriate repairs,

or replacement.

Corrective actions for problems

were often broadened

to encompass

generic

as

well as specific issues.

This was evidenced

by the addition of many valves to

the inservice testing

( IST) program following investigation of a single

failure,. and

by

a system-wide

upgrade of supports

and restraints

on branch

lines off the residual

heat

removal

system.

A rigorous safety review program

was instituted during this appraisal

period to ensure

engineering

safety

evaluations

were appropriately detailed

and were technically based.

This also

was

an improvement from the last assessment

period.

On the other hand,

the identification and resolution of some problems

was not

timely or conservative.

Examples

included recurring diesel

performance

problems after design-related

modifications intended to achieve corrective

action were completed

and problems with accelerated

wear

on auxiliary

feedwater

pump bearings.

In addition,

ac short-circuit calculations

were less

conservative

than accepted

industry standards.

Engineering

and technical

support staffing was excellent.

Onsite

and

corporate

engineering

positions

were filled with experienced

individuals with

specific expertise.

Engineering

issues

were effectively resolved with minimal

outside support.

Where consultants

were used,

as in the nondestructive

examination

program,

personnel

were qualified and knowledgeable,

and proper

oversight

was given.

The training organization maintained

a good staffing

level.

Staff training and qualification were excellent.

The training program for the

systems

and project engineers

was considered

to be

a strength.

System

engineers

had completed required

comprehensive

instruction involving classroom

lectures,

self-study,

on-the-job training,

and examinations.

The site

engineering staff had

a thorough

knowledge of plant systems

and system

interfaces.

The operator training and requalification program also

was

good

and

had improved from the last

assessment

period.

This was reflected in the

proposal

to more realistically staff the simulator control

room during the

last requalification cycle

and the higher pass rate

on NRC-administered

examinations.

2.

Performance

Ratin

Performance

is rated Category

2 with an improving trend in this area.

Performance

was rated Category

2 in the previous

assessment

period.

3.

Recommendations

None.

G.

Safet

Assessment

and

ualit

Verification

l.

Analysis

Management

was effective in ensuring

issues

which affected quality were

identified and resolved in a timely manner.

Improvements

were noted in

conduct of root-cause

analyses

and communications

between

corporate

and the

site.

Management's

effectiveness

in ensuring quality was good.

A low threshold for

reporting quality assurance

(gA) issues

continued,

while adequate

planning

and

prioritization aided in resolving quality-related

issues

in a timely manner.

A more aggressive

and thorough

approach

toward conducting root-cause

analyses

was noted.

Hanagement

supported

self-improvement initiatives that resulted

in

improved material condition of the auxiliary and 'turbine buildings,

installation of a system to minimize the effect of zebra

mussel

infestation,

useful monthly performance

indicators,

and

an internal audit program focusing

on areas

to be evaluated

during upcoming major team inspections.

An example

of an effective self-assessment

activity was the safety

system functional

inspection

(SSFI)

conducted

on the containment

spray system.

SSFIs

are

conducted

annually, contributing to

a good self-assessment

of engineering

activities.

In the latter part of this reporting period,

a graded corrective

action program that assigns

resources

for investigating

and analyzing problems

on the basis of the safety impact was implemented.

The onsite

gA audit program was adequately

managed with an appropriate

mix of

performance-

and programmatic-based

audits

and surveillances.

The audits

were

of good quality and were positive contributors to Security,

Emergency

Preparedness,

and Radiation Protection activities.

Audit findings were

adequately

dispositioned with few exceptions.

One exception

involved failure

to ensure

the

IST coordinator

was informed whenever

pump maintenance

was

expanded

beyond its original work scope,

so

pump

IST reference

values

could

be

reverified.

'he

approach to identifying and resolving technical

issues

reflected

a

conservative

philosophy with regard to considering

equipment operable.

An

example of this was the conservative operability assessment

for a main steam

isolation valve that was found to be outside its surveillance

period during

a

plant startup.

There

was noted

improvement in the p'rocess

to determine-if

an

unreviewed safety question existed.

10 CFR 50.59 reviews were typically well-

documented

with good technical rationale.

On the other hand,

there were

some instances

when corrective actions did not

prevent

subsequent

equipment

problems.

Examples of these

were mentioned in

earlier sect'ions of this report.

Further,

a few operational

events

were not

effectively resolved.

These

included the problems with the

EDG slow start

modification and boron chemical

control of the refueling water storage

tank.

However,

subsequent

evaluation of these

issues

demonstrated

an aggressive

and

thorough

approach

to achieve

a complete resolution.

Technical

information and justification for proposed

TS changes

were good.

The extensive effort to provide logically oriented

and thorough documentation

to support the

NRC's review of the proposed analog-to-digital

conversion of

the reactor protection

system

was particularly noteworthy.

Although some

effort was

needed

to clarify original submittals,

such

as the response

to

Generic Letter 87-02

on seismic qualifications,

and

a request

to remove the

alarm feature of the subcooling

margin meters,

the information provided for

both design reviews

and

amendments

was sufficient to perform

a technical

review and safety 'evaluation.

The Nuclear Safety Design

Review Committee (offsite review committee)

and the

Plant Nuclear Safety

Review Committee (onsite review committee)

were well

staffed

and met frequently.

Both groups contributed to a stronger self-

assessment

capability and demonstrated

a conservative

approach

in resolving

issues.

Audits conducted

under the cognizance of the offsite review committee

were thorough

and were successful

in raising substantive

issues.

10

Hanageme'nt

focused attention

on improving communications

between

the corporate

office and the site.

Efforts in this area

were successful,

as corporate

management

participated

in daily status

discussions

with the plant staff and

conducted

monthly interface meetings

in the corporate office that included

site managers.

Communications with the

NRC staff were also

emphasized

and

were improved, resulting in enhanced

interactions with the

NRC technical staff

and improved license

amendment

applications.

The staffing and experience

level of the onsite

gA organization

and the

training and qualifications of the

gA auditors

were good.

The level of

expertise

among the corporate

gA staff was excellent.

2.

Performance

Ratin

Performance

is rated Category

2 with an improving trend in this area.

Performance

was rated Category

2 during the previous

assessment

period.

3.

Recommendations

None.

IV.

SUPPORTING

DATA AND SUMMARIES

A.

Ma'or Licensee Activities

UNIT 1:

On June

22,

1992, the unit was shut

down for a refueling outage.

While

shutting

down,

an engineered

safety feature actuation

occurred

when both

source

range detectors failed as they were being energized.

On July 5,

1992, refueling operations

were halted

when the refueling machine

grapple

assembly did not properly engage

the top of a fuel assembly

and.could

not be freed.

On July 18,

1992,

an Unusual

Event was declared

when essential

service water

was shut off for about half an hour to both emergency

diesel

generators

because

of a rupture in a nonessential

service water expansion jo'int.

On September

9,

1992, the licensee

completed extensive

plugging

and resleeving

operations

on the steam generators.

On October 28,

1992, the unit was paralleled to the grid. -'About 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />

later,

the reactor tripped from a turbine trip caused

by

a main turbine thrust

bearing trip.

On October

28,

1992,

the unit was returned to service

and reached

100-percent

power on November

15,

1992,

where it remained

through April 30,

1993, with no

significant operational

problems.

11

Unit 2

On January

22,

1992, unit shutdown

commenced

because

of high boron

concentration

in the refueling water storage

tank

(RWST).

A temporary waiver

of compliance

was granted for 6 days

and the unit did. not shut

down.

On

January '24,

1992,

the boron concentration

in the

RWST was returned within

specifications.

On January

24,

1992,

power was reduced to 34 percent to repair

a through-wall

leak in the high-pressure

turbine exhaust piping.

On January

27,

1992, the

unit was returned to 100-percent

power.

On February

1,

1992,

power was reduced to 70 percent

because

of a different

through-wall leak in the high-pressure

turbine exhaust

piping that could not

be repaired

at power.

On February

22,

1992,

the unit shut

down for a refueling outage.

On June

19,

1992,

excessive

turbine vibration was observed

during turbine roll

up.

.The licensee

commenced efforts to balance

the turbine-generator.

On July 2,

1992, during investigation of the turbine vibration problems,

the

reactor tripped from a turbine trip because

of a loss of condenser

vacuum.

On September

2,

1992, the unit was paralleled to the grid.

On September

8,

1992, the unit was shut

down from 87 percent

power because

of

high generator vibration.

The generator rotor was shipped to the vendor for

repairs.

On November 30,

1992,

the unit commenced

power operation for turbine-generator

balancing efforts.

After modifications to the bearing

and the hydrogen seals,

the unit was paralleled to the grid on December

12,

1992.

Unit 2 reached

100 percent

power operation

on December

26,

1992,

where it

remained

through April 30,

1993, with no significant operational

problems.

B.

Ha'or Ins ection Activities

1.

Ins ection Data:

The inspection reports discussed

in the

SALP are listed below:

Docket Nos:

50-315 (Unit 1)

and 50-316 (Unit 2) Inspection

Reports

(same

number applies to both units):

92002 through 92006;

92008 through 92012;

92013 (Unit

1 only); 92014 through 92023;

93002 through 93011.

2.

S ecial

Ins ection

Summar

a.

From February

3 through March 6,

1992, the

NRC conducted

an electrical

distribution system functional inspection

(IR No. 92003/003).

12

From April 6 through

10,

1992, the

NRC conducted

a review of the

licensee's

peer inspection

process

(IR No. 92008/008).

From August

31 through October 9,

1992, the

NRC conducted

an engineering

and technical

support

program inspection

( IR No. 92015/015).

From December

3 through

18,

1992, the

NRC inspected

the failure of the

Unit 2 "AB" emergency diesel

generator

from a trip on low lube oil

pressure

and Unit 2 operation in Mode

2 with expired

steam generator

stop valve surveillances

( IR No. 92022/022).

From February

23 through

March 8,

1993, the

NRC conducted

a review of

inservice testing of pumps

and valves

and of the effectiveness

of the

program regarding the performance of check valves

(IR No. 93008/008).

From March 22 through April 1,

1993,

the

NRC conducted

a review of the

implementation of the motor-operated

valve program established

in

response

to Generic Letter 89-10 (IR No. 93006/006).

13